Monitoring the standby ADI at critical phases of flight

[megan]

"Humans do a pretty good job", yes but the whatever enables the good performance can also result in 'pretty good mistakes'

Too true. In the course of observing 60 flights 899 deviations were observed, 194 in checklist use, 391 in monitoring, and 314 in primary procedures. Helios would fit right in there as a pretty good mistake as you put it.

https://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/p...010-216396.pdf

[TOGA Tap]

There are other failures resulting in loss of attitude information such as failure of the pilot flying primary display unit and maybe some vierd electrical failures.

If that happens on take-off near V1 speed on a limited runway it might be wise to continue takeoff. Most probably that situation will not be covered by your departure briefing as reason tor the mandatory reject like engine failure, fire etc.
Aircraft is perfectly flyable and it can safely lift off.
Then the only available source if attitude information for the pilot flying would be the ADI. Just rotate into PREVIOSLY KNOWN SAFE attitude, monitor airspeed and when you feel safe and nicely climbing away transfer controls to the other pilot.

This is not just airmanship - this is a training issue.

In my humble oppinion it should be the SOP to mention this safe pitch attitude in takeoff and in go-around briefings.

This would greatly reduce the startling effect in the minds of both pilots so hopefully one of them will start monitoring the pitch angle early in the event.
alf5071h made some exellent points in his post on negative effects of startle. We are just humans.

Aplogize for the long post.

[RAT 5]

In my humble oppinion it should be the SOP to mention this safe pitch attitude in takeoff and in go-around briefings.

Over the years I witnessed takeoff briefings getting longer and longer and more blah blah; yet there is no delay code for them???!? In the Ops Part A there is a statement that "briefing should be brief as memory & concentration have their limits. Briefings should be able to be recalled easily." Then they expand the takeoff briefing to include even more SOP items. What is the point of having rigid SOP's if they need to be repeated every takeoff. Flaps, SID's & emergency routings differ, yes: but RTO's, fires, depressurisation procedures etc. are all SOP's. If you don't know those and need reminding everyday then you shouldn't be there.

[PEI_3721]

M, thanks, an interesting report by NASA.

I will trade you this one.
http://homes.lmc.gatech.edu/~fischer...14_Orasanu.pdf
The relevance to this thread is that pilots view situations according to experience and the role they have in the flight deck (discussion p31).
Captains focus on the the severity of the problem - flight task. Monitoring pilots prioritise judging if and when a response - call out, is required.

If this is a general conclusion then the argument for cross monitoring and FO intervention is weak because there is little shared awareness of a developing problem.
Thus in the CRJ accident, the Capt continues with the task of flying - but based on an erroneous attitude display; the monitoring pilot calls 'pitch attitude' but may not understand the nature of the problem. The result is that neither pilot has an overall grasp of the situation, and with a reluctance to change the original understanding and action, become committed, each in their respective task.

[Judd]

Over the years I witnessed takeoff briefings getting longer and longer and more blah blah;

While not specific to a take off briefing the following article in www.skybrary.aero concerned a Boeing 737 in fog flying an ILS to Cat 1 DH where, among other SOP calls, the automated call-out of "1000 feet" was supposed to be acknowledged by the PF as "stable" or "Not stable - going around." Another automated call-out of "Minimums" occurred at DH where the PF was supposed to say "Continuing" if visual at that point or "going around" if not visual.

In the event, the PF descended to 100 ft above the runway where he became visual and disconnected the autopilot before landing.

The investigation not only criticised the PF (a 23,000 hour captain) for failure to make the required company call-out procedures during the ILS but also criticised the co-pilot for not taking action when the captain omitted to make the company SOP calls. The aircraft was stable on the approach. It did not state specifically what physical action the co-pilot was supposed to take.

The investigation heard the captain was known for his silent cockpit attitude and replying by grunts instead of articulating SOP call-outs.

The company was criticised for not taking preventive measures to call in the captain on numerous previous occasions when his failure to stick to SOP call-outs was well known among fellow pilots.

How things have changed over the years where once a silent cockpit was considered not only safe but desirable with the only call-outs being for an emergency. Monitoring took place but not necessarily articulated.

Perhaps because of a well founded fear of litigation, but disguised as essential flight safety measures (everything is recorded via the CVR), manufacturers and companies for years have steadily increased SOP call-outs to the degree where on an instrument approach and even visual approaches, it is common to have almost continuous verbalising of instrument and mode information from start of the approach to touch down.

If the tendency of some passengers to back seat driving is annoying to most car drivers, then the increasing plethora of crew SOP calls required by a company can be equally distracting to the pilot concentrating on flying; even if most of the time the automatics are engaged. Some pilots may welcome SOP calls coming thick and fast as it gives them a sense of comfort that all is well. But have we gone too far and are these calls becoming distracting and thus counter-productive?

[RAT 5]

Interesting questions, Judd. Back in the day, even in a company wth quite rigid, but not intrusive SOP's, I flew with various old dogs whose takeoff brief was the flap, the thrust, SID, the emergency routing and "the rest will be SOP's". The same with an ILS or visual approach. The approach brief was "SOP's + salient items for that particular day."
Too much Blah Blah, that is just repeating of SOP's causes boredom and switching off. It's like the wife telling me how to fill the dishwasher. The second thing with too many callouts is that under stress the first thing that shuts down is your ears; thus yapping too much has the opposite effect of 'trying to be helpful'. You gave up listening long ago.