We should be asking what sort of regulatory oversight is in place thats first denies an issue, then stalls on the inspection process for the rest of the fleet and then finally admits to an issue that engineers had been stating was there from day one.
The time scale is unacceptable and so don't be surprised if conspiracy theorists start suggesting cover ups or inventing links between Airbus the european manufacturer and Easa the european regulator.
I personally see one issue here and only one. I can no longer distinguish between regulator and operator. To me they are one and the same. Thats dangerous in my view.
The regulatory issue is called Continued Airworthiness and has its own part under the codes.
It presumes that some degradation may occur over the life of the fleet and that the type holder/operator must provide an analysis and a program to address the issue in a manner that minimizes (not eliminate) the risk over the time period that it is in operation.
If the risk is high (compared to all other risks) than the time period that it is allowed to exist will be short. The implication of this that a fleet is always under a degree of risk for all other problems (known and unknown) and that no single known problem du jour, should significantly contribute
My read of the current discussion on this problem is that it will not significantly contribute to overall risk in the near time-frame, but must be addressed before accumulating even more risk (wear out mode).
The type holder, has apparently proposed a corrective action and the regulator accepted this with the understanding that as new data is found the corrective action program will be updated.
It's a validated process and I really don't see how we on the outside can pick it apart without new data