TCX NCL and thoughts on 'tiredness'
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TCX NCL and thoughts on 'tiredness'
I see on R&N 'excuses' being offered as mitigating for the events due to a 'long duty day'. I can only wonder if crews of today have possibly lost the ability to manage 'these' days? I recall the CAA position in my aviation time - that I was expected to be not only fit for the rostered duty at report but also expected to be fit enough to exercise maximum discretion if required. And yes, I have been 'knackered' at times.
There are many ways to alleviate the inevitable 'tiredness', but yes, folks, it is understood that you WILL be tired at the end of a long duty day, but it is expected you will 'manage' your tiredness. Some of the ways are:
to take a 'nap' when possible - even 20 minutes can be fantastic
to brief it so PM is aware
to 'slow things down' at the end (take an extra 10 track miles, configure early etc etc) and make full use of the automatics where possible. I am not sure how they went slicing through the LOC but that would not have helped, and it is then possible that PM was left floundering as PF may have done the 'one-armed paper hangar' act to re-establish, and would not be well-placed to assist with a screwed-up G/A.
What say the massed bands?
There are many ways to alleviate the inevitable 'tiredness', but yes, folks, it is understood that you WILL be tired at the end of a long duty day, but it is expected you will 'manage' your tiredness. Some of the ways are:
to take a 'nap' when possible - even 20 minutes can be fantastic
to brief it so PM is aware
to 'slow things down' at the end (take an extra 10 track miles, configure early etc etc) and make full use of the automatics where possible. I am not sure how they went slicing through the LOC but that would not have helped, and it is then possible that PM was left floundering as PF may have done the 'one-armed paper hangar' act to re-establish, and would not be well-placed to assist with a screwed-up G/A.
What say the massed bands?
Agree - also comes under Threat and Error Management.
On more than a few occasions on the brief I have commented at the end of a gruelling detail that a Threat was my (our) feeling "bushed" therefore we will manage this by (as you say) being proactive in this respect - keep it simple and if ATC start turning you in high ask for more track milesvetc
On more than a few occasions on the brief I have commented at the end of a gruelling detail that a Threat was my (our) feeling "bushed" therefore we will manage this by (as you say) being proactive in this respect - keep it simple and if ATC start turning you in high ask for more track milesvetc
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I once spent a whole midnight eastbound NATS sector optimistically drinking 'strong coffee' to find it had been de-caff......................
I once had a LOC overshoot due to setting the incorrect course during the brief, the PM didn't spot it because he became distracted while I briefed.
Long sector and low arousal levels reduced the amount of "active listening" and the course I'd set looked very similar at first glance.
We asked for a 360 to re establish and the controller gave us a left turn onto a downwind heading, but when I pushed the HDG button, the FD commanded a turn to the right.
PM immediately requested a right turn rather than a left turn just as I was going onto raw data because we couldn't get the FD to command a turn to the left. Fortunately ATC were in a helpful mood and we landed without further trauma.
The modern emphasis on SOPs and standard calls doesn't leave much flexibility to think and act when the automatics don't do what you are expecting.
In this case, due to taking the FD out of VOR/LOC and going straight to HDG, the FD simply commanded the shortest turn, no amount of button pushing could persuade it to change its mind.
Long sector and low arousal levels reduced the amount of "active listening" and the course I'd set looked very similar at first glance.
We asked for a 360 to re establish and the controller gave us a left turn onto a downwind heading, but when I pushed the HDG button, the FD commanded a turn to the right.
PM immediately requested a right turn rather than a left turn just as I was going onto raw data because we couldn't get the FD to command a turn to the left. Fortunately ATC were in a helpful mood and we landed without further trauma.
The modern emphasis on SOPs and standard calls doesn't leave much flexibility to think and act when the automatics don't do what you are expecting.
In this case, due to taking the FD out of VOR/LOC and going straight to HDG, the FD simply commanded the shortest turn, no amount of button pushing could persuade it to change its mind.
Last edited by hec7or; 19th Oct 2014 at 14:05.
