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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 11:09   #1 (permalink)
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AAIB investigation to Hawker Hunter T7 G-BXFI 22 August 2015

This is a new thread to discus the AAIB report, released on Friday 3rd March 2017.

There are other threads on PPRuNe discussing the crash, the aftermath and display authority issues.

This thread is to discuss the actions and recommendations of the AAIB in relation to this incident.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:03   #2 (permalink)
 
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https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/airc...22-august-2015
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:11   #3 (permalink)
 
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Pilot errors led to Shoreham air crash, says AAIB - BBC News
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:25   #4 (permalink)
 
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Recommend reading the entire report before taking the media's word for it; they don't have a particularly good record when it comes to aviation reporting. At over 400 pages, I suspect they have just read the summary so far.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:30   #5 (permalink)


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Too low, too slow. Didn't roll out of the manouvre when he might have done.

Knew this about two hours after the event didn't we?
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:36   #6 (permalink)
 
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Not had time to read all of it it yet, but one key point made "was that the pilot was not trained in or had not practiced the escape manoeuvre".

Am I missing something here, because the escape manoeuvre is simply to roll upright at the top, or very shortly after the top, and fly away when it is obvious there is insufficient height and/or speed to complete the loop.

We learned the "roll off the top" aero very early in our RAF training.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:41   #7 (permalink)
 
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Quote:
Recommend reading the entire report before taking the media's word for it; they don't have a particularly good record when it comes to aviation reporting. At over 400 pages, I suspect they have just read the summary so far.
TBH, there is absolutely no need for the vast majority of interested aviators (and ex aviators) to read "the entire report".

Anyone who cannot deduct the general flight safety lessons from the summary and conclusions of this accident report should not hold a pilots licence, as they don't have the necessary mindset/effective intelligence to be in command in the air, in anything other than perhaps a hot air balloon (no offence meant to balloonists).

The detailed report is for the benefit of those involved in the operation, planning and authorization of this type of flying activity and that is a pretty niche field.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:48   #8 (permalink)
 
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Didn't roll out of the manouvre when he might have done.

Am I missing something here, because the escape manoeuvre is simply to roll upright at the top or very shortly after the top and fly away.

We learned the roll off the top aero very early in our RAF training.


Missing ... The recognition of the need to change the plan - awareness, altitude margins, pre planned alternatives.
The human element ... vs pilot error.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:56   #9 (permalink)
 
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It might be worth noting that Sussex Police have an active investigation into the circumstances of this accident.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 12:58   #10 (permalink)
 
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"The entry height of the manoeuvre was consistent with the 200ft minimum height on the pilot's DA for a Jet Provost; the apex height and speeds on the accident manoeuvre were consistent with those flown in the Jet Provost the previous weekend"

Point 22 Page 197.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:03   #11 (permalink)
 
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Safety gates are fundemantal to low level aerobatics and were taught when I was instructing even if at medium level. Sadly, they seem to have been ignored in this case.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:08   #12 (permalink)
 
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Unfortunately, the expected report. Also, unfortunately this accident has degraded all flying displays in the UK for the foreseeable future. Very sad for all aviation enthusiasts but even sadder for the victims families. May you get at least some consolation that the truth is now out. I say no more.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:12   #13 (permalink)
 
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I rather suspect AH will have been taught about gates and all other things being equal I'm sure would have been well aware of them.

Having had a quick scan of the whole report can I ask ddoes anyone with any Hunter background (I don't) have any opinions about the comments in the report about the "left" side altimeter ..e.g; ease of reading, tendency to possibly lag at high rates and "stickiness"..page 49/50 of the report refers to that particular altimeter's behaviour on a previous display that may be of interest; also in the appendices: page 417 makes interesting reading.

Last edited by wiggy; 3rd Mar 2017 at 13:35.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:24   #14 (permalink)
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by The Old Fat One
Quote:
Recommend reading the entire report before taking the media's word for it; they don't have a particularly good record when it comes to aviation reporting. At over 400 pages, I suspect they have just read the summary so far.
TBH, there is absolutely no need for the vast majority of interested aviators (and ex aviators) to read "the entire report".

Anyone who cannot deduct the general flight safety lessons from the summary and conclusions of this accident report should not hold a pilots licence, as they don't have the necessary mindset/effective intelligence to be in command in the air, in anything other than perhaps a hot air balloon (no offence meant to balloonists).

The detailed report is for the benefit of those involved in the operation, planning and authorization of this type of flying activity and that is a pretty niche field.
If you feel you don't need to base your assumptions on the entire report, or just can't be bothered to read it, then you are missing a LOT of facts. The report explains the limitations of the evidence available and the contradictory evidence from various sources. Altitude and airspeed data and engine performance are just two of these, which are important factors.

The established facts, the tolerances of acquired data and the limitations of the evidence available are far from being a niche field. There is a lot of evidence in the body of the report that do not entirely match the summary - and I'm only half way through reading it so far.

Just to offer an example: "Disassembly of the Mk 30B and further testing identifed an open circuit across the rotor windings of the synchro-transmitter. It also confirmed that the power failure flag had come off its pivots, probably as a result of the accident impact.
Disassembly of the synchro-transmitter, and examination under a digital stacking microscope, identifed that one of the input wires to the rotor winding was broken, which could account for the open circuit. This damage was probably not accident related, but there was no way to determine how long this condition had existed."

And: "Cockpit video evidence indicated that the g-meter was not working during the accident flight". There's lots of information like that in the body of the report. But your expert examination of a summary would clearly dismiss that as relevant.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:40   #15 (permalink)
 
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A reminder to all posters that the British press will undoubtly monitor social media (yes, also this PPRuNe forum!) for quotes and the like.


Be careful what you post!


Especially now this is "hot news"...
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:41   #16 (permalink)
 
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The Mk30/Mk29 combination of altimeters is used in both the Tucano and Canberra, albeit with one in each cockpit. As the report states, the Mk30 is a very accurate servo altimeter, but without 115vac it will freeze. The Mk29 when used in Reset will effectively mimic the Mk30, but will still allow a different pressure setting to be used if needed.

If the Mk29 is left in Standby then it ignores the electrical input from the Mk30 and becomes a normal (none-servo) altimeter. It does have a vibrator to help eliminate stiction. In the Canberra the Mk29 was the main altimeter for the pilot (the nav had the Mk30) and was often used in standby mode. Although not quite as 'smooth' as the Mk29 it was perfectly useable for aeros. Spent many aeros sequences in the back of a Tucano watching the Mk29 in either mode and it was perfectly good in either!

Even if its wasn't covered in Hunter 'ground school', I'm just amazed that AH didn't wonder what the R/S knob on the LH Mk29 altimeter did in the Hunter. I simply can't comprehend any pilot (therefore naturally inquisitive) not wanting to know.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:47   #17 (permalink)
 
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Thanks HP.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:48   #18 (permalink)
 
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Having read the report, a couple of points that stand out:
The vapour plume from the fuselage, seen on video after the Derry turn, is not identified or commented on.
The considerable thrust reduction caused by the engine only achieving ~7500rpm in the pull-up compared with the 8100rpm for full thrust is not quantified.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:54   #19 (permalink)
 
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Onceapilot

Having scanned the report again tucked away there do seem to appear to be a few "open items", mainly in the appendices, mainly in Human Factors: e.g.
Quote:
It was not known at the time of writing this report what caused the loss of thrust (such as pilot action, technical fault, etc) and so no HF analysis has been undertaken of it. However, in the course of the analysis of the in-cockpit video it was considered whether the pilot was aware of the loss of thrust and, if so, when. Such analysis assumes that the loss of thrust was not initiated by the pilot intentionally. If subsequent work by AAIB identifies that the pilot intentionally reduced thrust during the climb, then the analysis presented in paragraphs 17 and 18 is invalid.
elsewhere:

Quote:
At present it is not known if the altimeter was serviceable and displaying the correct altitude during the loop. Technical analysis is on-going by AAIB which may provide further information on this point.
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Old 3rd Mar 2017, 13:57   #20 (permalink)
 
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Quote:
There is a lot of evidence in the body of the report that do not entirely match the summary - and I'm only half way through reading it so far.
Yet one assumes that the people writing the summary and those that have reviewed the report over the months of the consultation period are fully familiar with that detail and therefore the summary and its recommendations are entirely based upon the detail and accepted details - or you don't agree?
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