B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don

[Capn Bloggs]

I bet Boeing will modify the trim logic so that the trim can only be run for a maximum of a few seconds at a time.

"Stabiliser Motion, Stabiliser Motion".

[Centaurus]

I bet Boeing will modify the trim logic so that the trim can only be run for a maximum of a few seconds at a time.

I would be most surprised if Boeing introduce a mod like that. In the end it boils down to individual pilot flying skills. Like everyday car drivers, there are very safe pilots and others so awful that you wonder how they have got away with it over the years without an accident. They may pass regular simulator checks and get the boxes ticked for years.

But then one night for them when by sheer chance and coincidence, the wrong combination of circumstances all come together - and it might happen only once in their career - then the end is nigh for them. It has always been such.

[Jwscud]

Boeing don't introduce mods like that as it would hint at liability.

Hence why the takeoff config and cabin altitude horns are still identical a decade after the Helios accident...

[RAT 5]

So now they will install a flashing light in front of both pilots that alerts you to the trim switch being pressed: just like they did (steady lights) with the takeoff config & cabin alt. An added warning with no liability/admission issues.

Note: there is already a light for autopilot trim issues.

[737er]

Boeing don't introduce mods like that as it would hint at liability.

Hence why the takeoff config and cabin altitude horns are still identical a decade after the Helios accident...

Jwscud,

Well except for the tiny detail that Boeing added both a Cabin Altitude Warning light and a Takeoff Configuration Warning light in the 737 after the Helios accident.

http://www.b737.org.uk/images/cabinaltitudelights.jpg

[Aluminium shuffler]

TOGA arms at 2500RA, so if you press TOGA, whichever parts of the AFDS are on will engage in that mode, regardless of MCP altitude. The MCP altitude will, if above the alt at which TOGA was pressed, be the commanded level-off alt, but if below the alt at which TOGA engaged, you will have an unrestricted climb away from the MCP window. This can be over-ridden by engaging LVL CHG, V/S, manual intervention or by winding the MCP alt up to an altitude higher than the passing alt.

[Jwscud]

737er - I'm aware of those lights.

That they were added was not an admission of liability in the same way altering the cabin alt warning horn would have been.

[Old King Coal]

Aluminium shuffler: Almost correct.

Nb. I’ve only shown the text for the 'F/D Go-Around', as flydubai are not approved to use ‘A/P Go-Around’, i.e. they are not approved to utilise a dual-autopilot based approach mode, and so its likely that they were either flying the approach utilising just a single autopilot (which will have disengaged the moment a TOGA button was pressed) or else they were flying manually and, in either case, the following then applies.

F/D Go–Around

If both A/Ps are not engaged, a manual F/D only go–around is available under the following conditions:

• inflight below 2000 feet RA
• inflight above 2000 feet RA with flaps not up or G/S captured
• not in takeoff mode.

With the first push of either TO/GA switch:

• A/T (if armed) engages in GA and advances thrust toward the reduced go–around N1 to produce 1000 to 2000 fpm rate of climb. The A/T Engaged Mode annunciation on the FMA indicates GA
• autopilot (if engaged) disengages
• pitch mode engages in TO/GA and the Pitch Engaged Mode annunciation on the FMA indicates TO/GA
• F/D pitch commands 15 degrees nose up until reaching programmed rate of climb. F/D pitch then commands target airspeed for each flap setting based on maximum takeoff weight calculations
• F/D roll commands approach ground track at time of engagement. The Roll Engaged Mode annunciation on the FMA is blank
• the IAS/Mach display blanks
• the command airspeed cursor automatically moves to a target airspeed for the existing flap position based on maximum takeoff weight calculations.

With the second push of either TO/GA switch (if A/T engaged and after A/T reaches reduced go–around thrust):

• the A/T advances to the full go–around N1 limit

TO/GA mode termination from F/D go–around:

• below 400 feet RA, both F/D switches must be turned off.
• above 400 feet RA, select a different pitch or roll mode.

• if the roll mode is changed first:

- F/D roll engages in the selected mode
- F/D pitch mode remains in TO/GA.

• if the pitch mode is changed first:

- F/D pitch engages in the selected mode.
- F/D roll mode automatically changes to HDG SEL

• the A/T GA mode (if engaged) is terminated when:

- another pitch mode is selected
- ALT ACQ annunciates engaged.

Note: Engaging an A/P in CMD automatically engages the A/P and F/Ds in LVL CHG for pitch and HDG SEL for roll.

Nb. The above system description was cut / paste straight out of the Boeing B737-800 / FCOM / Volume 2 / Section 4 - Automatic Flight / Go Around, and which it seems that some of you could well do with reading!

[Almostfamous]

After the fact changes as an admission of liability

At least as far as courts in the United States are concerned, a subsequent remedial measure is inadmissible to prove liability. Otherwise, nobody would fix anything if it opened the door to successful suit.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Coal, my response was in response to the question at the top of the same (last) page, and contained the information pertinent to the question. What you have quoted is correct but irrelevant and omits the information specifically sought, ie. the bit about MCP altitude settings. I was trying to give a simple answer to a simple question, and my answer is entirely correct regardless of whether the MAP is flown manually or by autopilot, as it is relevant to the engagement logic of ALT AQUIRE, which is the same for FD as for A/P.

[16024]

What Shuffler said.
Coal's post is correct but he is answering a different question.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Thank you, 16024.

For what it's worth, I'm pretty sure all aircraft with AFDS are designed to behave this way to ensure an immediate MAP even if the pilots forgot to wind the MCP ALT up (eg for a non-precision app, where the ALT was set to app minima). As serious as a level bust is, and as badly as they can be managed, it is preferable to TOGA not engaging because you forgot to set the MCP ALT higher.

[striker26]

Flydubai pilot to be laid to rest - Cyprus Mail Cyprus Mail

Sad...may they all RIP


I hope the official report outlines specifically who/what was at fault. There will be many causes leading up to this crash, not just one!

[pax britanica]

Looking at OKCs post with the extract from the Boeing Manual , I am tempted very naively with a lot of tongue in cheek to say that far from helping the pilot a long list of 'If this do that ' alternative options, some of which could have dire consequences if misunderstood seem to be less rather than more help to a pilot going around than pull back a bit, push thrust leavers a good way forward and adjust both till you see say ten degrees nose up and positive climb.

Not belittling anyone as I have the greatest respect for all FD crew and to be in a situation like this, tired, in dead of night and poor weather must be horrible. However reading this thread and others , Asiana T7 , Turkish 738 it seems that the number of mods and options and conditional actions on the automatics seem to be making these situations worse rather than better

[Chronus]

pax britanica on this thread every conceivable speculation has been debated and discussed to complete exhaustion. Any suggestion that automatics may be exacerbating the incidence of aviation accidents is not supported by those cited. There is very little communality in the majority of air accidents, each and every one involves a unique and lengthy chain of complex events. That is the sole communality to all air accidents. Never one that can be reduced to a single factor.
The outstanding feature in this instance is the large pitch down moment applied to a large aircraft at low level, at high energy and inertia. That seems to be the sum total of the facts known so far.

[Kulverstukas]

We get another "leak" today. Some "source" inside investigation body suggested that Cpt. deliberately moved HS to dive position and "he was completely aware about a/c position and his intentions and speak in calm and self confident voice".

interfax

No new information on IAC page yet since May.

[unworry]

Kulverstukas, due to my poor translation of the article, would you clarify: is the inference that these action were due to fatigue and loss of situational awareness by the captain or is it implying he deliberately flew her into the ground.

[pax britanica]

Chronus

I am not suggesting automatic flight control features are a cause of more accidents what iwas trying to say is that it seems that recently most of the accidents that have happened ( and I fully accept that autoflight systems have probably prevented very many more) may be due to nuances/subtlties, call them what you will where some element of autoflight behaviour previously unknown or an ambiguity has been a causal factor in those incidents that have taken place.
Posts on this forum regulary highlight differences in undertanding with what the aircraft will do when button x is pushed pulled or turned in different circumstances. SoI am not criticising the concept or its applciation but it does seem to me that perhaps training lags a little behind reality in developing procedures to ensure that what is supposed to happen really does and how crews can develop motor memory skills and actions that ensure that things like pressing TOGA buttons means the engines spool up and not that they spool up except when condition x is present and in that case they immediately spool down again.

And I would repeat that i am not criticising anyone here especially flight crews who I have the utmost respect for working under pressurised and mentally and physically tiring conditions

[Kulverstukas]

unworry,

is the inference that these action were due to fatigue and loss of situational awareness by the captain or is it implying he deliberately flew her into the ground.

in the article it implies the second, with reference to fatigue problems and Cpt decision to leave FD as sidenote.

UPD: IAC dismissed this. "IAC is not the source of this information, investigation is carried on".

[Super VC-10]

Interim report published.

http://mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/ecd...FDN%20(en).pdf