NTSB update on Asiana 214
There had been some cars with digital speed display, but they never succeeded enough to become standard.
Tachometers on cars still come with dials and pointers, that' s why?
Tachometers on cars still come with dials and pointers, that' s why?
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Originally Posted by FGD135
What studies, olasek? Can you give some pointers or links to at least one, please. There is just no way that a speed tape, which requires reading digits from a 1" x 1" patch of panel, can be better than the big dial with pointer - which requires only a glance for assessment of angular position, with no reading and processing of digits required.
As the saying goes: "Keep they airspeed up, less the ground cometh from below and smite thee" Something passed on to many a student learning to fly.
A diligent crew should be able to monitor their speed and notice a deterioration. A diligent crew with a backup crew sitting behind them doubly so. A diligent crew with instructors sitting behind them should be flying gods.
Seeing as airliners are not dropping out of the sky on a daily basis due to the pilots not being able to understand what the speed tape is telling them, I think it's pretty but a moot point.
The Asiana 214 crew screwed up.
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Bring back the big round dial of yesteryear
Pilots have been stalling their planes out of the sky a lot longer than the electronic PFD has been around.
There had been some cars with digital speed display, but they never succeeded enough to become standard.
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Without reviewing the past half-million comments, I wonder if we are not back to the old AOA indication argument? USN pilots, always flying approaches on the ragged edge, seem to be advocates of AOA. While I've never personally used it, and recognize it's not a foolproof cureall, there is obvious merit here.
Tachometers on cars still come with dials and pointers, that' s why?
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They are staring at 4 reds on the PAPI and not going around. Do you really think changing from speed tape to a dial is going to make them go around?
The lack of go around is the big problem here. Yes, they messed up the automatics but if they'd pressed TOGA when it first started going pear shaped I suspect that we'd be looking at an incident report about the automatics rather than a fatal accident report.
The lack of go around is the big problem here. Yes, they messed up the automatics but if they'd pressed TOGA when it first started going pear shaped I suspect that we'd be looking at an incident report about the automatics rather than a fatal accident report.
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Was there a period, ever, in the days of the big round dial where there were 4 stall-crashes in the space of 5 years (to scheduled passenger flights)?
Last edited by porterhouse; 30th Jul 2014 at 18:41.
notfred
They are staring at 4 reds on the PAPI and not going around. Do you really think changing from speed tape to a dial is going to make them go around?
The lack of go around is the big problem here. Yes, they messed up the automatics but if they'd pressed TOGA when it first started going pear shaped I suspect that we'd be looking at an incident report about the automatics rather than a fatal accident report.
They are staring at 4 reds on the PAPI and not going around. Do you really think changing from speed tape to a dial is going to make them go around?
The lack of go around is the big problem here. Yes, they messed up the automatics but if they'd pressed TOGA when it first started going pear shaped I suspect that we'd be looking at an incident report about the automatics rather than a fatal accident report.
They saw 4 reds, because they had been dropping quite low on speed, thus being unable to arrest the descent.
Being not quite familiar with the switchology, but would have pressing TOGA reactivated Autothrottle?
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Being not quite familiar with the switchology, but would have pressing TOGA reactivated Autothrottle?
This is a good source:
Take Off / Go Around (TOGA) - Explained - Journal - Flaps 2 Approach
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Good point, they would have needed to manually add power. Even if they were confused like me 
and pressed TOGA then the lack of response would surely trigger them to pushing the levers forward.
Yes, I agree that they got low on the approach because the speed dropped with the AT off, but they still had plenty of time to fix it. Nobody called for a go around until the aircraft was about to hit.
and pressed TOGA then the lack of response would surely trigger them to pushing the levers forward.Yes, I agree that they got low on the approach because the speed dropped with the AT off, but they still had plenty of time to fix it. Nobody called for a go around until the aircraft was about to hit.
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Bring back the big round dial
Such question makes no sense from the statistical point of view.
We have had 4 accidents since 2009 where these factors were the key ingredient in the crash.
I have been a long time student of air safety but cannot think of even ONE accident like this from the era prior to the airspeed tape.
The closest related accident that I can find was to the China Airlines A300 that stalled during a go-round at Nagoya in 1994, but in this case the pilots were highly aware of the airspeed (the CVR revealed a comment about the aircraft being likely to stall). A fight had broken out between the PF and the autopilot - all because the FO had bumped the TOGA button on late finals.
There was an almost identical accident 4 years later at Taipei. Same airline, same type. During the go around there was a struggle between the pilots and autopilot, with a stall resulting.
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I have been a long time student of air safety
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FGD135,
Here is one:
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports...4-12-01-US.pdf
Ok then, just name one or two where the aircraft stalled, following a period of airspeed decay of which the pilots were apparently unaware.
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports...4-12-01-US.pdf
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Turbine D, I was well aware of that one but did not mention it because it was nothing at all like the 4 recent. For starters, that was not a scheduled passenger service. Secondly, and most importantly, the pilots were well aware of the airspeed (they had the big round dial). Their problem was that the airspeed reading was incorrect, due icing, and they misinterpreted this.
I will go over it yet again. Since 2009, there have been 4 fatal accidents to scheduled passenger aircraft. The stall, and the apparent unawareness of the airspeed decay were the key ingredients.
Can you point to any similar accidents that occurred prior to the era of the speed tape? I have not been able to identify any. There was the BEA Trident stall crash at Staines, but that does not qualify (there was no period of airspeed decay - the PNF rectracted the "droop" leading edges at too low an airspeed, causing an instant stall).
olasek, I have identified that there has been 4 stall-related accidents in the last 5 years, when for the entire period of commercial aviation prior to the airspeed tape, there was nowhere near this rate. You call that "absolutely nothing"?
In an earlier post I asked you for pointers or links to just one of those studies you claimed NASA had done on how good the tape was. You have not come up with anything. I do not believe any proper studies have been done on the human factors of the speed tape.
I will go over it yet again. Since 2009, there have been 4 fatal accidents to scheduled passenger aircraft. The stall, and the apparent unawareness of the airspeed decay were the key ingredients.
Can you point to any similar accidents that occurred prior to the era of the speed tape? I have not been able to identify any. There was the BEA Trident stall crash at Staines, but that does not qualify (there was no period of airspeed decay - the PNF rectracted the "droop" leading edges at too low an airspeed, causing an instant stall).
... because so far you got absolutely nothing.
In an earlier post I asked you for pointers or links to just one of those studies you claimed NASA had done on how good the tape was. You have not come up with anything. I do not believe any proper studies have been done on the human factors of the speed tape.
Why look at anything hi tech here, how long did digital watches last. Not long because the brain can determine all kinds of things from the hands on a watch -like, I am late I am early I can catch that train after the merest glance.
As a regular passenger and aviation enthusiast I would hope that Boeing and Ab choose the optimum form of display of key parameters for pilot interpretation rather than what fits on the screen -that's not to say that it would have made any difference in this incident since instruments were pretty much superfluous anyway but people might well have a point about bad weather/night especially as many pilots on here have commented they couldn't read the panel easily in bad turbulence and a general position on a dial is easier to determine than numbers surely
Anyway just a view from a customer perspective , important in all businesses except aviation where only price matters, and that's dig at both sides of the equation industry and consumer
As a regular passenger and aviation enthusiast I would hope that Boeing and Ab choose the optimum form of display of key parameters for pilot interpretation rather than what fits on the screen -that's not to say that it would have made any difference in this incident since instruments were pretty much superfluous anyway but people might well have a point about bad weather/night especially as many pilots on here have commented they couldn't read the panel easily in bad turbulence and a general position on a dial is easier to determine than numbers surely
Anyway just a view from a customer perspective , important in all businesses except aviation where only price matters, and that's dig at both sides of the equation industry and consumer
Oh come on! This accident has almost nothing to do with the subject of this thread. In a nutshell, it was the result of not turning on the pitot heat, flying into icing conditions, and subsequently failing to control the aircraft. Although you're technically correct to claim that they were unaware of decreasing airspeed, it's because the instruments were telling them (incorrectly) that they were flying too fast. It has nothing to do with not paying attention or cultural problems. The airspeed was lying to them and everyone in the cockpit was focusing on the speed even though one might argue they didn't react in the best possible way. Most of us would say, "I hope I would have reacted differently by recognizing the real problem more quickly and flying attitude and power setting while ignoring the false airspeed problem". But most of us would also say, "If I'm telling the truth, I could imagine myself doing the same thing these guys did if I happened to run out of luck on that particular day".
The subject of this thread is quite different. In SFO the pilot flying apparently failed to notice (or ignored) decreasing airspeed and the collection of pilots backing him up failed to do anything about it, perhaps because they were not paying attention or (more likely in my opinion) their culture got in the way of good airmanship. Most of us would say, "I can't imagine letting the airspeed get so low on final, but if I did make this kind of huge mistake, I can't imagine my fellow pilots wouldn't be calling for POWER long before I got into real trouble". We would also say, "Even if I were catching a ride in the cockpit and not part of this company, I would speak up and start yelling POWER to save my own skin, and if I were a check pilot for this company, I absolutely know that I would".
Apples and oranges, as they say
The subject of this thread is quite different. In SFO the pilot flying apparently failed to notice (or ignored) decreasing airspeed and the collection of pilots backing him up failed to do anything about it, perhaps because they were not paying attention or (more likely in my opinion) their culture got in the way of good airmanship. Most of us would say, "I can't imagine letting the airspeed get so low on final, but if I did make this kind of huge mistake, I can't imagine my fellow pilots wouldn't be calling for POWER long before I got into real trouble". We would also say, "Even if I were catching a ride in the cockpit and not part of this company, I would speak up and start yelling POWER to save my own skin, and if I were a check pilot for this company, I absolutely know that I would".
Apples and oranges, as they say
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FDG 135,,,United in Chicago Midway 737....more than one in commercial jets with nobody minding the store...two (or 3) sets of eyes and all looking outside....
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_553
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_553
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.when for the entire period of commercial aviation prior to the airspeed tape, there was nowhere near this rate.
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I have a vague recollection of a (now retired) Boeing manager telling about his unpleasant experiences investigating 727 crashes shortly after the 727 EIS where the crew failed to properly manage airspeed during approach. He had told me that the 727 had a reputation as a 'hot rod' and the crew would let airspeed drop too low before applying power and would get behind the power curve. So I did a quick web search and found the following 727 accidents that occurred during approach where poor airspeed management may have been a contributing factor:
16 August 1965; United Airlines 727; Flight 389; near Lake Forest, IL: The aircraft had a controlled flight into the waters of Lake Michigan while on approach to Chicago. There was no indication of any unusual problem prior to impact.
11 November 1965; United Airlines 727; Flight 227; Salt Lake City, UT: The aircraft crashed about 340 feet (103 meters) short of the runway after an excessively steep final approach.
4 February 1966; All Nippon Airways 727; Flight 60; near Tokyo, Japan: During a night approach, the aircraft crashed into the waters of Tokyo Bay about 6.5 miles (10.4 km) from Haneda airport.
16 February 1968; Civil Air Transport 727; Flight 010; near Linkuo, Taiwan: The aircraft impacted trees and a house short of the runway during a night approach in poor weather.
5 January 1969; Ariana Afghan Airlines 727-100; Flight 701; near Gatwick Airport, England: The aircraft hit trees and a house about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) short of the runway during approach.
4 June 1969; Mexicana 727; Flight 704; near Monterey, Mexico: The aircraft hit high ground during descent. The crash happened in daylight under poor weather conditions.
21 September 1969; Mexicana 727; Mexico City, Mexico: The aircraft undershot the runway and landed about 0.9 miles (1.5 km) short of the runway.
Now, I haven't gone into the detailed accident reports (I have a life, after all). But all fit the basic premise of running out of altitude and airspeed at the same time. Seven approach crashes in the first five years after EIS. Compare that to those glass cockpit speed-tape deathtraps - 767 certified 1982, went 12 years after EIS before the first accident, no approach/stall accidents to date. 777 certified 1995, 13 years after EIS before the first accident (due to engine power loss during approach), one other approach/stall accident to date (Asiana). Or to put it a little differently, 727 lost more aircraft to approach/stall accidents in it's first five years than the 777 has lost to all causes in the nineteen years since EIS.
Yep, we need to get rid of those glass cockpit speedtape deathtraps and return to round dials
16 August 1965; United Airlines 727; Flight 389; near Lake Forest, IL: The aircraft had a controlled flight into the waters of Lake Michigan while on approach to Chicago. There was no indication of any unusual problem prior to impact.
11 November 1965; United Airlines 727; Flight 227; Salt Lake City, UT: The aircraft crashed about 340 feet (103 meters) short of the runway after an excessively steep final approach.
4 February 1966; All Nippon Airways 727; Flight 60; near Tokyo, Japan: During a night approach, the aircraft crashed into the waters of Tokyo Bay about 6.5 miles (10.4 km) from Haneda airport.
16 February 1968; Civil Air Transport 727; Flight 010; near Linkuo, Taiwan: The aircraft impacted trees and a house short of the runway during a night approach in poor weather.
5 January 1969; Ariana Afghan Airlines 727-100; Flight 701; near Gatwick Airport, England: The aircraft hit trees and a house about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) short of the runway during approach.
4 June 1969; Mexicana 727; Flight 704; near Monterey, Mexico: The aircraft hit high ground during descent. The crash happened in daylight under poor weather conditions.
21 September 1969; Mexicana 727; Mexico City, Mexico: The aircraft undershot the runway and landed about 0.9 miles (1.5 km) short of the runway.
Now, I haven't gone into the detailed accident reports (I have a life, after all). But all fit the basic premise of running out of altitude and airspeed at the same time. Seven approach crashes in the first five years after EIS. Compare that to those glass cockpit speed-tape deathtraps - 767 certified 1982, went 12 years after EIS before the first accident, no approach/stall accidents to date. 777 certified 1995, 13 years after EIS before the first accident (due to engine power loss during approach), one other approach/stall accident to date (Asiana). Or to put it a little differently, 727 lost more aircraft to approach/stall accidents in it's first five years than the 777 has lost to all causes in the nineteen years since EIS.
Yep, we need to get rid of those glass cockpit speedtape deathtraps and return to round dials