Incident: Delta B763 blew tyre on takeoff
i don't know the route taken, but if the captain proceeded knowing that there were alternate airports with sufficient runways and services to deal with whatever might come up, and basically using the fuel to produce distance while reducing the weight in case a landing was needed, there is nothing unsafe about that.
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Some more info about this "incident"...
I got this info from a thread on airliners.net started by the movie maker, KDTWflyer.
Combine this with the info from Avherald:
I think it's safe to assume that the crew hadn't noticed anything wrong with the TO roll, raised the gear normally, were informed later that tyre debris was found on the runway that might have come from their A/C and therefore declared an emergency before ldg just in case.
Originally Posted by KDTWflyer, the maker of the movie.
- "The gear retraction sequence appeared to me to be within a normal timeframe following Vr." (A picture of this flight on climb out)
- 'There was a DTW ops vehicle that went down the runway about 20mins after DL 257 left"
- "One thing I would like to point out is how hard N195DN appeared to land on the right side before this departure..." (Picture of the previous landing)[
Delta Airlines said the crew was aware of tyre debris being found on the runway following their departure, Delta technicians however were unable to positively identify from photos whether the debris belonged to a Delta aircraft or not. The crew therefore declared emergency on approach to Sao Paulo as a precaution.
Last edited by sabenaboy; 5th Jun 2011 at 06:52. Reason: added origin of the quote
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Always fun reading these threads with the ex-air force types who have limited understanding of the commercial aspect of things ie the airline is actually here to make money. VS the ex GA types who have worked for a bunch of operators who went broke and therefore try to balance commercial and safety.
Bringing up the VC10 is interesting but as a percentage of tyre failures on the T/O roll what are the chances of that happening. The LH 340 centre gear tyre failure and associated hyd failure also makes good reading but statistically IMHO chances of secondary failure are slim.
Bringing up the VC10 is interesting but as a percentage of tyre failures on the T/O roll what are the chances of that happening. The LH 340 centre gear tyre failure and associated hyd failure also makes good reading but statistically IMHO chances of secondary failure are slim.
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I remember a training seminar at an airline I worked as a mechanic,that covered the importance of completing all work to specs,and the proper sign offs required.
The accident was a Nationair DC8 that had wheel failure on the taxi out and subsequent inflight fire and crash,The tire pressures had been "pencil whipped" by a manager,and the results were human lives lost.
Nationair Canada History on the Web
Deltoid 767=Wrong decision
The accident was a Nationair DC8 that had wheel failure on the taxi out and subsequent inflight fire and crash,The tire pressures had been "pencil whipped" by a manager,and the results were human lives lost.
Nationair Canada History on the Web
Deltoid 767=Wrong decision
Last edited by Golden Rivit; 5th Jun 2011 at 06:11.
Too many variables I think to continue after a failure with that much potential damage.
Unless performance demands it I would not raise the gear.
Climb to a reasonable altitude, run the appropriate checklists, dump down to a lighter weight , then land as soon as possible having prepared for a possible evacuation.
Unless performance demands it I would not raise the gear.
Climb to a reasonable altitude, run the appropriate checklists, dump down to a lighter weight , then land as soon as possible having prepared for a possible evacuation.
...therefore try to balance commercial and safety...
The decision to leave the gear out is predicated on knowing that a decision to leave the gear out or not is required.
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"Leave the gear down"? Why? How do you know a tyre has burst? Yes - there are TPIs on the Flt Deck but they are really for maint purposes and about the most unreliable eqpt fitted (most of our Airbus ones currently disabled).
NB "leaving the gear down" on a MTOW jet = invalid performance in case of engine failure (if you have to leave the gear down e.g. brake unit U/S your MTOW is limited based on climb perf).
Proceed to dest? Well, it's pretty clear the manual says fine if no further indication.
In short 2 decisions to make:
1 short term, and I would be most concerned if there was a decision to leave the gear down, outside the SOPs, that compromised takeoff perf.
1 long term - proceed? It would take an hour+ to decide "what" went wrong (as they say, info they later got was vague anyway), dump fuel to as light as possible etc. Might as well continue en route with suitable divs. Later becomes apparent no further issues, continue seems fine.
To me, the most likely reason to return was the company considering damage needing to be repaired, and facilities at dest. This is a commercial decision, and in the days of modern comms, would be "requested" from outside the Flt Deck. Up to the Flt Crew whether they then followed that, and how (and to an extent same for a decison to continue).
Each of those advocting a return is doing so outside the SOPs. This is perfectly OK, but might need to be justified
NB "leaving the gear down" on a MTOW jet = invalid performance in case of engine failure (if you have to leave the gear down e.g. brake unit U/S your MTOW is limited based on climb perf).
Proceed to dest? Well, it's pretty clear the manual says fine if no further indication.
In short 2 decisions to make:
1 short term, and I would be most concerned if there was a decision to leave the gear down, outside the SOPs, that compromised takeoff perf.
1 long term - proceed? It would take an hour+ to decide "what" went wrong (as they say, info they later got was vague anyway), dump fuel to as light as possible etc. Might as well continue en route with suitable divs. Later becomes apparent no further issues, continue seems fine.
To me, the most likely reason to return was the company considering damage needing to be repaired, and facilities at dest. This is a commercial decision, and in the days of modern comms, would be "requested" from outside the Flt Deck. Up to the Flt Crew whether they then followed that, and how (and to an extent same for a decison to continue).
Each of those advocting a return is doing so outside the SOPs. This is perfectly OK, but might need to be justified
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From the Boeing FCTM:
"Tire Failure during or after Takeoff
If the crew suspects a tire failure during takeoff, the Air Traffic Service facility serving the departing airport should be advised of the potential for tire pieces remaining on the runway. The crew should consider continuing to the destination unless there is an indication that other damage has occurred (non-normal engine indications, engine vibrations, hydraulic system failures or leaks, etc.).
Continuing to the destination will allow the airplane weight to be reduced normally, and provide the crew an opportunity to plan and coordinate their arrival and landing when the workload is low. Considerations in selecting a landing airport include, but are not limited to: sufficient runway length and acceptable surface conditions to account for the possible loss of braking effectiveness, sufficient runway width to account for possible directional control difficulties, altitude and temperature conditions that could result in high groundspeeds on touchdown and adverse taxi conditions, runway selection options regarding "taxi-in" distance after landing, availability of operator maintenance personnel to meet the airplane after landing to inspect the wheels, tires, and brakes before continued taxi, availability of support facilities should the airplane need repair."
There is no QRH drill to run for this scenario and the Boeing advice is good. Virgin had a similar incident last year and also elected to continue with the flight. G-VROC
"Tire Failure during or after Takeoff
If the crew suspects a tire failure during takeoff, the Air Traffic Service facility serving the departing airport should be advised of the potential for tire pieces remaining on the runway. The crew should consider continuing to the destination unless there is an indication that other damage has occurred (non-normal engine indications, engine vibrations, hydraulic system failures or leaks, etc.).
Continuing to the destination will allow the airplane weight to be reduced normally, and provide the crew an opportunity to plan and coordinate their arrival and landing when the workload is low. Considerations in selecting a landing airport include, but are not limited to: sufficient runway length and acceptable surface conditions to account for the possible loss of braking effectiveness, sufficient runway width to account for possible directional control difficulties, altitude and temperature conditions that could result in high groundspeeds on touchdown and adverse taxi conditions, runway selection options regarding "taxi-in" distance after landing, availability of operator maintenance personnel to meet the airplane after landing to inspect the wheels, tires, and brakes before continued taxi, availability of support facilities should the airplane need repair."
There is no QRH drill to run for this scenario and the Boeing advice is good. Virgin had a similar incident last year and also elected to continue with the flight. G-VROC
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I hope that I never fly as a passenger with any such airline which is prepared to compromise safety on so-called 'commercial' grounds.
In my "limited" airline flying (15 years with 2 UK majors, 8 as Capt), I reckon most flights have had a level of "compromise" (e.g. MEL items including TCAS / Reversers / Brakes / Generators U/S). If the weather is anything other than CAVOK, then there is a compromise. I have operated into discretion - and whatever anybody says, that is invariably a commerical judgement v safety.
The regulator, airline and crew each have their inputs and judgements into the "Safety System". I have refused to accept aircraft that are "legal" as far as the Operator and Regulator are concerned, because I judged the circumstances / my judgement warranted it. Many will, in other circumstances, accept a flight / aircraft that is bordering on strictly "legal" under the rules, but the circumstances they judge safe. One would need to be fairly naive to consider that "commercial" considerations are not part of those judgements
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Colleagues,
I challenge you to have a "pop" on take off, especially near to Vr, get airborne, get the "positive climb" call and NOT call for the gear up. It's ingrained by SOP and is very difficult to override.
Try leaving the gear out on take off from Johannesburg/Addis/Entebbe or any other high altitude airport and you could be asking for a lot of trouble. In the absence of positive signs of damage to the airframe/other systems, get the gear up. If there are signs of control damage, chances are you don't want to be juggling with that and performance issues with the gear down either. However, that's subjective.
Fly the aircraft, get away from the ground and safe, then work it out. Assess and manage.
So if the gear's going to hang up: A - How do you know?
B - Why be half way when you could be at destination at the lower wieght?
If you are worried about it, you've got longer to think about problems and solutions, look at checklists etc.
If there are no other factors, landing at destination is as safe and commercially sensible.
I challenge you to have a "pop" on take off, especially near to Vr, get airborne, get the "positive climb" call and NOT call for the gear up. It's ingrained by SOP and is very difficult to override.
Try leaving the gear out on take off from Johannesburg/Addis/Entebbe or any other high altitude airport and you could be asking for a lot of trouble. In the absence of positive signs of damage to the airframe/other systems, get the gear up. If there are signs of control damage, chances are you don't want to be juggling with that and performance issues with the gear down either. However, that's subjective.
Fly the aircraft, get away from the ground and safe, then work it out. Assess and manage.
Sure you waste some gas and delay your passengers but you don't take the chance that the gear would hang up in the well when you tried to put it down.
B - Why be half way when you could be at destination at the lower wieght?
If you are worried about it, you've got longer to think about problems and solutions, look at checklists etc.
If there are no other factors, landing at destination is as safe and commercially sensible.
Last edited by helen-damnation; 6th Jun 2011 at 08:04.
That Boeing FCTM extract is so typical of the way that airmanship and captaincy have been replaced by beancounters' SOPs.
In the same way that Airbus had to legislate for idiots who didn't understand that FMS fuel predictions assume a specific configuration - and refused to accept that the fuel quantity indicators were correct, not the FMS predictions, when an A310 was being flown with the gear down.....until it ran out of fuel on an emergency approach into Vienna. So now there's an Idiot Clause in the FCOM to remind dimwits of this.
Mind you, back in the late 1970s a colleague had a main gear red in one of Desperate Dan's fine old Comet 4s. They reselected down and three greens were obtained, so flew on with the gear down, telling the passengers that the delayed arrival was due to 'strong headwinds' (they'd carried round trip fuel). After the turnround and a quick thump on as many microswitches as possible, they flew back with the same snag and again reselected the gear down. Being prudent, they'd taken off with 'just in case it happens again' fuel. On landing, once again they blamed the delay on strong headwinds.... "Funny that", said one of the passengers, "my friends told me that they'd had strong headwinds on the way out. Amazing that the wind should have changed quite so much today!"...
But that was in the days before CRM, TEM, MELs and TCIC appeared on the scene, of course.
In the same way that Airbus had to legislate for idiots who didn't understand that FMS fuel predictions assume a specific configuration - and refused to accept that the fuel quantity indicators were correct, not the FMS predictions, when an A310 was being flown with the gear down.....until it ran out of fuel on an emergency approach into Vienna. So now there's an Idiot Clause in the FCOM to remind dimwits of this.
Mind you, back in the late 1970s a colleague had a main gear red in one of Desperate Dan's fine old Comet 4s. They reselected down and three greens were obtained, so flew on with the gear down, telling the passengers that the delayed arrival was due to 'strong headwinds' (they'd carried round trip fuel). After the turnround and a quick thump on as many microswitches as possible, they flew back with the same snag and again reselected the gear down. Being prudent, they'd taken off with 'just in case it happens again' fuel. On landing, once again they blamed the delay on strong headwinds.... "Funny that", said one of the passengers, "my friends told me that they'd had strong headwinds on the way out. Amazing that the wind should have changed quite so much today!"...
But that was in the days before CRM, TEM, MELs and TCIC appeared on the scene, of course.
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BEagle/kiwibrit i was closely involved with the VC10 incident it was from Leuchars 1988 or 89, as the shift leader on the visiting aircraft section(for BEagle George Smiths section) I advised the flight crew not to take the aircraft due tyre damage they declined my advise after the incident they then tried to 'stitch' up several of us at the subsequent board of enquiry
shame on all of them from the Captain downwards.
shame on all of them from the Captain downwards.
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That Caravelle incident is a comlete "Red Herring.
The Caravelle performed a high-speed rejected take off, then taxied for a second attempt. The brakes were too hot before the second take off run, and the wheels "let go" well after retraction.
Remember, it takes 20 minutes after final brake release for the brakes to reach maximum temperature.
The Caravelle performed a high-speed rejected take off, then taxied for a second attempt. The brakes were too hot before the second take off run, and the wheels "let go" well after retraction.
Remember, it takes 20 minutes after final brake release for the brakes to reach maximum temperature.
matkat - 8 Nov 88 as I've now discovered.
Good old Big George Smith - a real Leuchars character! If one of his lads had advised me or my crew of such a problem, I'd certainly have believed him without the slightest hesitation.
Sorry to hear that the crew behaved in such a deplorable way at the subsequent BoI - did the truth ever come out?
Neptunus, the cause of the hot Caravelle brakes was certainly different, I agree. But had a draggy brake unit caused the Delta tyre failure, then an adjacent tyre might have been on the point of failure and could have cooked up and burst 20 min into the flight as you rightly state.
Good old Big George Smith - a real Leuchars character! If one of his lads had advised me or my crew of such a problem, I'd certainly have believed him without the slightest hesitation.
Sorry to hear that the crew behaved in such a deplorable way at the subsequent BoI - did the truth ever come out?
Neptunus, the cause of the hot Caravelle brakes was certainly different, I agree. But had a draggy brake unit caused the Delta tyre failure, then an adjacent tyre might have been on the point of failure and could have cooked up and burst 20 min into the flight as you rightly state.
Last edited by BEagle; 5th Jun 2011 at 13:45.
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My opinion ...
If they had not known they blew a tyre, and were only subsequently informed by ATC of tyre remains i.e after the gear had been raised normally ... then it would be better to continue to destination as any potential problem would only emerge on "gear down" selection ..
If they were aware immediately that they had blown a tyre then maybe the best option would be to return to departure airport (leaving the gear down), as a ragged tyre carcass, particularly if rotating ( i.e. brake problems, hydraulic lines) could cause significant damage to an already very tight wheel well ...
If they had not known they blew a tyre, and were only subsequently informed by ATC of tyre remains i.e after the gear had been raised normally ... then it would be better to continue to destination as any potential problem would only emerge on "gear down" selection ..
If they were aware immediately that they had blown a tyre then maybe the best option would be to return to departure airport (leaving the gear down), as a ragged tyre carcass, particularly if rotating ( i.e. brake problems, hydraulic lines) could cause significant damage to an already very tight wheel well ...
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That Caravelle incident is a complete "Red Herring. The Caravelle performed a high-speed rejected take off, then taxied for a second attempt.
I'll see if I can find it.
No sooner said than done -
http://www.pprune.org/aviation-histo...ch-1963-a.html