Flight - Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training?
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We disagree. Fighters roll at up to 720 degrees per second. Even roll reversal does not cause the a/c to lurch. If you make roll inputs in large airliners and change the rate of roll or worse reverse direction you shake the entire a/c. I call it 'the widebody lurch'.
Pull back - trees get smaller? Sure. Push forward trees get bigger? Sure. Yes they're similar but at the same time there's significant differences. And the procedures to recover are the same. But given a choice I'd take an upset in a fighter anyday over an airliner. Why? What's the last defense in a fighter with altitude below them? Let go. Actually a regular biannual training event years ago. It's not a good idea an airliner.
Pull back - trees get smaller? Sure. Push forward trees get bigger? Sure. Yes they're similar but at the same time there's significant differences. And the procedures to recover are the same. But given a choice I'd take an upset in a fighter anyday over an airliner. Why? What's the last defense in a fighter with altitude below them? Let go. Actually a regular biannual training event years ago. It's not a good idea an airliner.
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Pull back - trees get smaller? Sure. Push forward trees get bigger? Sure.
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Upset
The fact you did'nt experience any unrecoverable upset doesn't mean you'll be able to cope with it when it happens. I was a fighter in another life. I thought it would never happen to me until it did. If the surprise effect can be so huge for an experienced fighter, flying half of the time upside down and at high G's, tell me what today's airline pilots (with very limited training in that area) will do...? Besides, you din't read all the words of my post. I wrote:You can't blame the youngsters.
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In 1950 when being trained on the Link D2 it was possible to have the whole operation either with or without " Rough Air". ( Whether this could have different settings - has been forgotten.) We started with "Calm Air" and learned to fly on instruments and stalling and how to recover from a spin. Then "Rough Air" was used for most or all of my training. As a new pilot I felt that it was unlikely that I would spend the rest of my instrument flying time just under calm conditions. ( I was right !)
Thanks to the random nature of the "Rough Air" one learned to maintain ones flight path with greater accuracy. ( "Calm Air" was easier - but not as useful as a lesson.) Later, hand flying alternate hours with the Captain, when it was " my hour" to hand fly a York, sometimes we flew into an unseen/ unsuspected Cb. The randomness of the Link meant that surprise or shock of sudden turbulence even when accompanied by lightening strikes, St. Elmos Fire and squeals of static were just additional effects.
(165 Kts. IAS or about 180 kts. TAS and just below 10,000ft. I assume that a higher TAS would have meant that we would hit each cell harder.)
( Radar was not fitted for a further ten years, for me. Then it had become a "No Go Item". And I could radar map read - at night, too!)
LT
Thanks to the random nature of the "Rough Air" one learned to maintain ones flight path with greater accuracy. ( "Calm Air" was easier - but not as useful as a lesson.) Later, hand flying alternate hours with the Captain, when it was " my hour" to hand fly a York, sometimes we flew into an unseen/ unsuspected Cb. The randomness of the Link meant that surprise or shock of sudden turbulence even when accompanied by lightening strikes, St. Elmos Fire and squeals of static were just additional effects.
(165 Kts. IAS or about 180 kts. TAS and just below 10,000ft. I assume that a higher TAS would have meant that we would hit each cell harder.)
( Radar was not fitted for a further ten years, for me. Then it had become a "No Go Item". And I could radar map read - at night, too!)
LT
Plastic PPRuNer
"Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training"
From the comments it seems that there are almost insuperable barriers to this.
It would probably be easier/cheaper to make the automation better.
From the comments it seems that there are almost insuperable barriers to this.
It would probably be easier/cheaper to make the automation better.
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"Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training"
From the comments it seems that there are almost insuperable barriers to this.
It would probably be easier/cheaper to make the automation better.
From the comments it seems that there are almost insuperable barriers to this.
It would probably be easier/cheaper to make the automation better.
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So the future is to lower the standards of airmen so incompetent pilots will not be unemployed using automation as a fix?
Now rerun the Hudson USAIR double engine failure in your minds and visualize the deep hole in the ground. That is what automation and lowering standards will do to our aviation future. Do we want the public to know this is where we are headed for if regulations are made to allow this to happen?
Now rerun the Hudson USAIR double engine failure in your minds and visualize the deep hole in the ground. That is what automation and lowering standards will do to our aviation future. Do we want the public to know this is where we are headed for if regulations are made to allow this to happen?
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Problem is, unless you empoy only pilots like Sully with lots of real stick and rudder time in all sorts of circumstances (and where would you find them these days?) who could pull off a 'Hudson', the alternative is automatic aeroplanes with much better and more clever automatics.
A few hours of 'hands on' in a transport jet sim every few weeks won't do it. You need 'background'.
A few hours of 'hands on' in a transport jet sim every few weeks won't do it. You need 'background'.
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SSD, interesting point. 'Background' as you suggest will absolutely help and is not an option in the commercial environment. Some would argue that three to five days of well structured upset recovery training in the classroom and in aerobatic aeroplanes as a starting point and maybe a day or two of recurrency training every year (six months? two years?) may not guarantee a save on the scale of Sully's ditching but will absolutely put the pilot in a far better position to ensure that his or her IAs are the very best ones possible.
There has been an interesting parallel debate on one of the LinkedIn groups (Aviation Professionals) where the REAL costs of a hull loss are touched upon, not just from a financial and legal liability perspective but from the actual reputational hit; one commented that you would have to take into account the cost of the accident AND the safety overspend factor, and suggested that for a western European airline, the cost of AF447 would, in ALARP terms, come in well above $1000 million dollars. It is difficult to see how this level of training cost could be exceeded even with the discounted cash flow analysis. And yes, I fully acknowledge that some will view that perspective as sitting at an extreme end of the spectrum. But is it, really?
For me this thread has been fascinating, not just to see the various views (mostly pro-upset training, although a huge variation in what people believe to be suitable or appropriate), but also in the mostly polarised opinions with little apparent swing room. I have already stated my own pro-upset training bias, both from background (RAF, GA safety and aeros FI) and from business, as my company now delivers this kind of training for pilots of larger aeroplanes. Fortunately for us, and probably for some passengers who could well end up better off as a result of this kind of training, a number of Heads of Flight Ops feel that getting this training definitely IS worthwhile.
I met with the fleet manager of a small Business Jet operation today where he expressed huge concern that many of his pilots had rarely been beyond 45 degrees of bank and he had a genuine concern that he was not confident that if a genuine upset was encountered that it would be handled in a way that most likely delivered a safe outcome. The ICATEE suggestion that only new pilots should receive Upset training in real aerobatic aircraft (notwithstanding 4greens support for this mission I've seen nothing that will make any suggested change in training requirements mandatory) is absolutely - in my already declared to be biased view - a great step in the right direction. Real progress is good, but many will still feel that it is nothing like enough.
There has been an interesting parallel debate on one of the LinkedIn groups (Aviation Professionals) where the REAL costs of a hull loss are touched upon, not just from a financial and legal liability perspective but from the actual reputational hit; one commented that you would have to take into account the cost of the accident AND the safety overspend factor, and suggested that for a western European airline, the cost of AF447 would, in ALARP terms, come in well above $1000 million dollars. It is difficult to see how this level of training cost could be exceeded even with the discounted cash flow analysis. And yes, I fully acknowledge that some will view that perspective as sitting at an extreme end of the spectrum. But is it, really?
For me this thread has been fascinating, not just to see the various views (mostly pro-upset training, although a huge variation in what people believe to be suitable or appropriate), but also in the mostly polarised opinions with little apparent swing room. I have already stated my own pro-upset training bias, both from background (RAF, GA safety and aeros FI) and from business, as my company now delivers this kind of training for pilots of larger aeroplanes. Fortunately for us, and probably for some passengers who could well end up better off as a result of this kind of training, a number of Heads of Flight Ops feel that getting this training definitely IS worthwhile.
I met with the fleet manager of a small Business Jet operation today where he expressed huge concern that many of his pilots had rarely been beyond 45 degrees of bank and he had a genuine concern that he was not confident that if a genuine upset was encountered that it would be handled in a way that most likely delivered a safe outcome. The ICATEE suggestion that only new pilots should receive Upset training in real aerobatic aircraft (notwithstanding 4greens support for this mission I've seen nothing that will make any suggested change in training requirements mandatory) is absolutely - in my already declared to be biased view - a great step in the right direction. Real progress is good, but many will still feel that it is nothing like enough.
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Sully won't save the next one because automation can't. Read his book. It is great. I hope most of us could have done what he did. We don't get to practice ditching so expect we could do what the manual says. He had to do it with no training. He did everything right.
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Pilot training
pakeha-boy. You hit it on the head. Well said. Too much emphasis on flight testing rather than on training. I don't see how aerobatic training would have helped the crew of AF447. You don't take a passenger jet which is at 35000 ft (close to coffin corner) and put it through an area of bad weather. I've said many times before, if they had flown around the bad weather, they would be alive today. Also, if they had released the sidestick (taken their hands off the thing) the aircraft may have recovered on it's own. This was a stupid accident that should never have happened in my opinion. The attitude that we should know how to recover from an upset is only one side of the story. I prefer the side that says, let's fly the 'plane so as NOT to have an upset.
My experience in sim "training" on the Airbus was not good. It was a "get you" attitude rather than "let's see how we can make this a better pilot". One should leave the sim exercise feeling good, that you have practised/mastered a particular problem, accomplished something. That is not happening.
T
My experience in sim "training" on the Airbus was not good. It was a "get you" attitude rather than "let's see how we can make this a better pilot". One should leave the sim exercise feeling good, that you have practised/mastered a particular problem, accomplished something. That is not happening.
T
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[quoteWe don't get to practice ditching][/quote]
Why not -assuming of course you are talking about practice ditching in the simulator
In fact it should be part of type rating training as every aircraft is different. The Boeing 737 FCTM and QRH give very good advice on the ditching procedure. But it takes good instrument flying skills especially if carried out in IMC/night. That is because any excess variation from the recommended airspeed and rate of descent will effect the body attitude. There is an optimum body attitude at impact and attitudes lower than that even momentarily could cause the aircraft to dive under at impact. Pilots proficient at raw data manual flying will quickly get the hang of the careful instrument scanning and thrust handling required to maintain a steady state rate of descent and nose attitude in the last few hundred feet. Remember there may not be accurate QNH available.
On the other hand simulator experience has revealed that pilots wedded to automatics and out of current manual instrument flying practice, usually "crash" several times into the water rather than maintain correct flying attitude, airspeed and optimum rate of descent. It is a worthwhile exercise in the simulator which doesn't take too much time.
If it is obvious this writer is somewhat biased in his thoughts on practicing ditching in the simulator, it is because in another life he spent a few thousand hours flying wartime designed four engine maritime reconnaissance aircraft over the oceans, night and day at low level.
We carried flame-floats, which when activated in contact with the water, would burn brightly for several minutes. On long range maritime reconnaissance flights, crews would take up pre-planned ditching positions in the aircraft while we practiced laying our own flare-path with flame-floats in the water and made approaches with go-arounds conducted at 200 feet. Squadron pilots were thus well versed in ditching techiques in terms of airspeed, rate of descent and nose attitude.
I must say I didn't envy the crew members sitting in their ditching stations as they couldn't see outside. No doubt each prayed fervently the pilots knew what they were doing because no one wanted to get wet feet 500 miles out to sea.
Why not -assuming of course you are talking about practice ditching in the simulator
In fact it should be part of type rating training as every aircraft is different. The Boeing 737 FCTM and QRH give very good advice on the ditching procedure. But it takes good instrument flying skills especially if carried out in IMC/night. That is because any excess variation from the recommended airspeed and rate of descent will effect the body attitude. There is an optimum body attitude at impact and attitudes lower than that even momentarily could cause the aircraft to dive under at impact. Pilots proficient at raw data manual flying will quickly get the hang of the careful instrument scanning and thrust handling required to maintain a steady state rate of descent and nose attitude in the last few hundred feet. Remember there may not be accurate QNH available.
On the other hand simulator experience has revealed that pilots wedded to automatics and out of current manual instrument flying practice, usually "crash" several times into the water rather than maintain correct flying attitude, airspeed and optimum rate of descent. It is a worthwhile exercise in the simulator which doesn't take too much time.
If it is obvious this writer is somewhat biased in his thoughts on practicing ditching in the simulator, it is because in another life he spent a few thousand hours flying wartime designed four engine maritime reconnaissance aircraft over the oceans, night and day at low level.
We carried flame-floats, which when activated in contact with the water, would burn brightly for several minutes. On long range maritime reconnaissance flights, crews would take up pre-planned ditching positions in the aircraft while we practiced laying our own flare-path with flame-floats in the water and made approaches with go-arounds conducted at 200 feet. Squadron pilots were thus well versed in ditching techiques in terms of airspeed, rate of descent and nose attitude.
I must say I didn't envy the crew members sitting in their ditching stations as they couldn't see outside. No doubt each prayed fervently the pilots knew what they were doing because no one wanted to get wet feet 500 miles out to sea.
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Who could replicate what Sully did? He realized he couldn't reach TEB. LGA was a stretch and an immediate decision had to be made. The river was the largest open space available. He choose it.
If anything he ran out of airspeed too soon. They impacted at 750' FPM with no flare(AOA limited).
The Airbus FBW would not allow him to stall the a/c prior to water impact. The threat of stalling a non-FBW a/c prior to impact exists. Old saying - 'it's alwyas better to fly to the scene of the crash then to crash at the scene of the crash'.
Who could replicate what Sully did? He says the answer is many.
He's a great spokesman for the profession.
If anything he ran out of airspeed too soon. They impacted at 750' FPM with no flare(AOA limited).
The Airbus FBW would not allow him to stall the a/c prior to water impact. The threat of stalling a non-FBW a/c prior to impact exists. Old saying - 'it's alwyas better to fly to the scene of the crash then to crash at the scene of the crash'.
Who could replicate what Sully did? He says the answer is many.
He's a great spokesman for the profession.
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Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) Part One
I have not had the pleasure of reading PPRUNE for a time, but am quite pleased to view this thread. I have been working on Upset and LOC-I issues for the past four years, and prior to that, on simulator fidelity issues. I am currently a line Captain flying 737's, and served about ten years as a Check-Airman. I am happy to see a few posts identifying ICATEE (International Committee for Aviation Training in the Extended Envelope), as I have been working on this committee since the summer of 2009 (a sad irony was that the first day of our first meeting was the day we lost AF 447).
I have greatly benefitted from the previous posts, as it confirms many of the assumptions we have arrived at in ICATEE. By the way, there are many other excellent working groups globally working on Upset and Stall issues (two FAA ARC's, EASA, ICAO, AIAA, SAE, etc.), and there is tremendous consensus between the groups, giving us confidence that we can identify a solution to eliminating or at least reducing LOC-I in the future.
If I may, I would like to summarize the important lessons we have learned from our activities in ICATEE. Our mission is to eliminate/reduce LOC-I through enhanced UPRT. Our method was to conduct a thorough review of the accident/incident literature, and then to seek training solutions. As much as possible, we focused on identifying the existing global training infrastructure that could contribute to enhanced UPRT. Our approach is a long-term approach; we will not be able to "fix" the current deficit in UPRT knowledge and skills of existing airline pilots overnight, but we can begin moving the needle towards more robust knowledge and skill development. And we can certainly better equip future airline pilots entering the inventory. Much of what we need to repair is in eliminating negative training, emphasizing academics, using simulators appropriately, and then providing some realistic exposure to the real g-environment and psychological/physiological benefits of training upsets/stall in real aircraft.
Examples of negative training; the practical test standards (FAA) that emphasized "minimum loss of altitude" for approach to stall and stall training (now removed with new AC from FAA, but still wrongly emphasized at some airlines and operators. Regardless, we have suffered from years of this negative training that will have to be "trained-out" by proper emphasis on immediately reducing AOA).
In-appropriate use of simulators. A FFS is very accurate in the normal flight envelope, as the aero model is based on actual flight test data. FFS lack this model beyond the normal envelope. ICATEE has worked with OEM's, NASA, etc. to derive "non-normal envelope data" to produce a more accurate and capable upset model. Flight test data does require an OEM to produce approach to stall and limited stall data, but it is derived from a very benign entry, wings-level, 1-g with 1 knot per second or so deceleration up to the stall. However, most "real-world" in-advertant stalls are dynamic. We need the capability to provide an "enhanced" aero-model in the FFS, and we are close to producing that.
For now however, FFS should only be used in accordance with their accuracy; for now that should be in approach to stall training, and not full aerodynamic stall training. If pilots and instructors attempt to perform "real stall training" in simulators now, it will likely not be accurate. For example, most (if not all) swept-wing jet transport FFS will replicate a full aerodynamic stall very much like an approach to stall; the jet (FFS) will be controllable around the pitch and roll axis. This "benign" behavior will give the wrong training impression to pilots on the criticality of full aerodynamic stall; a much different condition that an "approach to stall". In the future, we will need to adopt the improved type-specific aero-models and begin providing more "accurate" aerodynamic stall training to airline pilots (precisely because of the large difference in performance of an aircraft in aerodynamic stall vs. approach to stall).
End Part One
I have greatly benefitted from the previous posts, as it confirms many of the assumptions we have arrived at in ICATEE. By the way, there are many other excellent working groups globally working on Upset and Stall issues (two FAA ARC's, EASA, ICAO, AIAA, SAE, etc.), and there is tremendous consensus between the groups, giving us confidence that we can identify a solution to eliminating or at least reducing LOC-I in the future.
If I may, I would like to summarize the important lessons we have learned from our activities in ICATEE. Our mission is to eliminate/reduce LOC-I through enhanced UPRT. Our method was to conduct a thorough review of the accident/incident literature, and then to seek training solutions. As much as possible, we focused on identifying the existing global training infrastructure that could contribute to enhanced UPRT. Our approach is a long-term approach; we will not be able to "fix" the current deficit in UPRT knowledge and skills of existing airline pilots overnight, but we can begin moving the needle towards more robust knowledge and skill development. And we can certainly better equip future airline pilots entering the inventory. Much of what we need to repair is in eliminating negative training, emphasizing academics, using simulators appropriately, and then providing some realistic exposure to the real g-environment and psychological/physiological benefits of training upsets/stall in real aircraft.
Examples of negative training; the practical test standards (FAA) that emphasized "minimum loss of altitude" for approach to stall and stall training (now removed with new AC from FAA, but still wrongly emphasized at some airlines and operators. Regardless, we have suffered from years of this negative training that will have to be "trained-out" by proper emphasis on immediately reducing AOA).
In-appropriate use of simulators. A FFS is very accurate in the normal flight envelope, as the aero model is based on actual flight test data. FFS lack this model beyond the normal envelope. ICATEE has worked with OEM's, NASA, etc. to derive "non-normal envelope data" to produce a more accurate and capable upset model. Flight test data does require an OEM to produce approach to stall and limited stall data, but it is derived from a very benign entry, wings-level, 1-g with 1 knot per second or so deceleration up to the stall. However, most "real-world" in-advertant stalls are dynamic. We need the capability to provide an "enhanced" aero-model in the FFS, and we are close to producing that.
For now however, FFS should only be used in accordance with their accuracy; for now that should be in approach to stall training, and not full aerodynamic stall training. If pilots and instructors attempt to perform "real stall training" in simulators now, it will likely not be accurate. For example, most (if not all) swept-wing jet transport FFS will replicate a full aerodynamic stall very much like an approach to stall; the jet (FFS) will be controllable around the pitch and roll axis. This "benign" behavior will give the wrong training impression to pilots on the criticality of full aerodynamic stall; a much different condition that an "approach to stall". In the future, we will need to adopt the improved type-specific aero-models and begin providing more "accurate" aerodynamic stall training to airline pilots (precisely because of the large difference in performance of an aircraft in aerodynamic stall vs. approach to stall).
End Part One
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UPRT and ICATEE Part Two
Almost ALL of the folks I have had the pleasure of working with in airline training management are fine people with great integrity. For the most part, they provide excellent training, and there is no question on their "desire" to provide the best training. Other examples of negative training in UPRT are due to a lack of knowledge on the training capabilities of the training infrastructure.
The American Airlines Advanced Manuevers Program is a great example of this. It was never their intent than to provide other than world-class quality training. Indeed, we will never know if one of the benefits of this training was in one or several aircraft accident "saves". So I am not here to impugn the developers of this training program. However, we have learned from AA 587, and how limitations in academic understanding, and the practical demonstration of maneuvers in a simulator can have negative consequences.
In-appropriate use of rudder was a finding in this accident. A simulators ability to accurately portray "yaw or side-load heave" as produced by aggressive rudder input is very limited. If the simulator WAS accurate in this motion cueing capability, the sim response to that aggressive input would have been so violent and direct (like the actual aircraft) that you would never have to explain to the pilots why that input was in-appropriate. However, if we combine the lack of realistic g-cueing capabilities in a FFS (particularly those departing the normal flight envelope), and compound this problem with a lack of realistic feedback tools to the pilots and instructors; then we exacerbate the problem. In current FFS, the lack of useful feedback tools can actually REWARD in-appropriate flight control inputs. Using rudder as a roll strategy is VERY effective, however it can produce very negative consequences such as aircraft structural limits being exceeded. ICATEE has identified the necessity of providing enhanced feedback capability to instructors and pilots as a primary need (flight control inputs, flight displays, VN diagram, alpha/beta plots, etc.). The good news is that this is not a formidable technical or cost issue.
This brings up the next challenge; better instructor UPRT training and standardization. In ten years of working as a Check-Airman, I was never given any explicit training in how to teach and evaluate Upsets and Stalls, and certainly in how to use simulators appropriately (and I would consider the bulk of my instructor training and standardization efforts provided by my company as excellent! This seems to be an issue predominately with Upset/Stall training).
Unfortunately, in reviewing our surveys to airlines and operators, this appears to be the norm in the global industry. Many of you may have performed "free-play" with the simulator, expecting that it's accuracy was excellent in all attitudes and maneuvers. Because of this wrongly held notion, too many instructors will provide their own "upset techniques" and a lack of airline training management appreciation on FFS limitations, and the need to ensure UPRT standardization becomes problematic.
One other quick example. Several posters here have identified pre-set maneuvers in simulators in providing upset scenarios. At my airline, we selected one of these maneuvers for our recurrent training cycle in the B-737NG. This was to be a high altitude, heavy weight upset, designed as a TCAS wake encounter that pitched the aircraft up to 20 degrees, and then began an aggressive roll through 130 degrees. So far so good. This was selected from a preset feature on the simulator instructor panel, and the maneuver began!
As the pilot flying, I identified the pitch and roll, cross-checked flight deck instruments, and then initiated a recovery by turning off the A/P and A/T. I provided measure nose down elevator, and as roll began, provided measured aileron input (measured in that flight control inputs were not abrupt, but initiated in respect to the lack of aero-damping at altitude). Imaging my surprise as I reached FULL aileron input that the roll had not reversed, nor even slowed the rolling rate! The jet continued to roll just as quickly past 130 degrees with full aileron input! The next thing I remembered was the instructor yelling at me to feed in rudder!
ICATEE work has made me aware that more damage is incurred during high altitude upsets by pilots inputting improper or overly aggressive flight control inputs. So this selected maneuver needed to be investigated. What we found is a simple and prevalent condition in most level D simulators in use. It is what we can call the "wash-out" effect. When an upset maneuver was pre-selected, the simulator went into an "aerodynamic freeze" whereby no flight control inputs provided by pilots would be honored or recognized by the simulator, until the preselect parameters were achieved (could be 2-6 seconds or so). The net effect of this training exercise was to "teach" our airline pilots that in the event of an high altitude upset, that they would need to take aggressive flight controls inputs. Worse training than if we had done nothing at all!
End of Part Two
The American Airlines Advanced Manuevers Program is a great example of this. It was never their intent than to provide other than world-class quality training. Indeed, we will never know if one of the benefits of this training was in one or several aircraft accident "saves". So I am not here to impugn the developers of this training program. However, we have learned from AA 587, and how limitations in academic understanding, and the practical demonstration of maneuvers in a simulator can have negative consequences.
In-appropriate use of rudder was a finding in this accident. A simulators ability to accurately portray "yaw or side-load heave" as produced by aggressive rudder input is very limited. If the simulator WAS accurate in this motion cueing capability, the sim response to that aggressive input would have been so violent and direct (like the actual aircraft) that you would never have to explain to the pilots why that input was in-appropriate. However, if we combine the lack of realistic g-cueing capabilities in a FFS (particularly those departing the normal flight envelope), and compound this problem with a lack of realistic feedback tools to the pilots and instructors; then we exacerbate the problem. In current FFS, the lack of useful feedback tools can actually REWARD in-appropriate flight control inputs. Using rudder as a roll strategy is VERY effective, however it can produce very negative consequences such as aircraft structural limits being exceeded. ICATEE has identified the necessity of providing enhanced feedback capability to instructors and pilots as a primary need (flight control inputs, flight displays, VN diagram, alpha/beta plots, etc.). The good news is that this is not a formidable technical or cost issue.
This brings up the next challenge; better instructor UPRT training and standardization. In ten years of working as a Check-Airman, I was never given any explicit training in how to teach and evaluate Upsets and Stalls, and certainly in how to use simulators appropriately (and I would consider the bulk of my instructor training and standardization efforts provided by my company as excellent! This seems to be an issue predominately with Upset/Stall training).
Unfortunately, in reviewing our surveys to airlines and operators, this appears to be the norm in the global industry. Many of you may have performed "free-play" with the simulator, expecting that it's accuracy was excellent in all attitudes and maneuvers. Because of this wrongly held notion, too many instructors will provide their own "upset techniques" and a lack of airline training management appreciation on FFS limitations, and the need to ensure UPRT standardization becomes problematic.
One other quick example. Several posters here have identified pre-set maneuvers in simulators in providing upset scenarios. At my airline, we selected one of these maneuvers for our recurrent training cycle in the B-737NG. This was to be a high altitude, heavy weight upset, designed as a TCAS wake encounter that pitched the aircraft up to 20 degrees, and then began an aggressive roll through 130 degrees. So far so good. This was selected from a preset feature on the simulator instructor panel, and the maneuver began!
As the pilot flying, I identified the pitch and roll, cross-checked flight deck instruments, and then initiated a recovery by turning off the A/P and A/T. I provided measure nose down elevator, and as roll began, provided measured aileron input (measured in that flight control inputs were not abrupt, but initiated in respect to the lack of aero-damping at altitude). Imaging my surprise as I reached FULL aileron input that the roll had not reversed, nor even slowed the rolling rate! The jet continued to roll just as quickly past 130 degrees with full aileron input! The next thing I remembered was the instructor yelling at me to feed in rudder!
ICATEE work has made me aware that more damage is incurred during high altitude upsets by pilots inputting improper or overly aggressive flight control inputs. So this selected maneuver needed to be investigated. What we found is a simple and prevalent condition in most level D simulators in use. It is what we can call the "wash-out" effect. When an upset maneuver was pre-selected, the simulator went into an "aerodynamic freeze" whereby no flight control inputs provided by pilots would be honored or recognized by the simulator, until the preselect parameters were achieved (could be 2-6 seconds or so). The net effect of this training exercise was to "teach" our airline pilots that in the event of an high altitude upset, that they would need to take aggressive flight controls inputs. Worse training than if we had done nothing at all!
End of Part Two
Join Date: Jan 2009
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bburks, thank you for your excellent summary... having read part one and part two, I hope for more.
You make the point that training on simulators may elicit over-reaction and agressive imput that make a situation worse. This being due to the limitations inherent in the simulator.
When teaching stall recovery in a glider, it is often sufficient to simply let go of the controls! and the trimmed glider will recover and respond normally to control imputs. When the student does an overexcited recovery from a spin, the bunt that results gives an interesting view of the landscape, and if the straps are not tightly done up, the negative g can be quite entertaining as well. Although this is dealing with stalls and recovery from unusual attitudes in its simplest form, the feedback is authentic....and instant. I once had the privilege of stalling a "BA111" at Cranebank, long ago, and it never felt quite real.
You make the point that training on simulators may elicit over-reaction and agressive imput that make a situation worse. This being due to the limitations inherent in the simulator.
When teaching stall recovery in a glider, it is often sufficient to simply let go of the controls! and the trimmed glider will recover and respond normally to control imputs. When the student does an overexcited recovery from a spin, the bunt that results gives an interesting view of the landscape, and if the straps are not tightly done up, the negative g can be quite entertaining as well. Although this is dealing with stalls and recovery from unusual attitudes in its simplest form, the feedback is authentic....and instant. I once had the privilege of stalling a "BA111" at Cranebank, long ago, and it never felt quite real.