Midair near Gympie, Qld
Sort of…
The ATSB has been requested to download and recover flight data from the GPS. To facilitate this assistance, the ATSB has initiated an external investigation under the provisions of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.Any enquiries relating to the accident investigation should be directed to RAAus at: www.raa.asn.au
Well, whadya know.. the ATSB have decided to step in after all!! 
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...rt/ae-2022-005
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...rt/ae-2022-005
Last edited by Squawk7700; 23rd Dec 2022 at 05:05.
Any thoughts on how the GPS data, if accessible, will help? It will probably confirm that the aircraft tracked so as to end up at the same location, laterally and vertically, at the same time. I suppose the tracks and altitudes of the aircraft could be of some further assistance?
Good point, GIII.
What worries most is that ATSB seems to believe that a collision between 2 ‘light’ aircraft (to use a neutral term) in G has no potential implications for its priority of systemic improvements to transport safety.
Ask any crew of an RPT aircraft operating in and out of an aerodrome in G what they consider to be their single biggest risk. Answer: The ‘light’ aircraft in the vicinity.
In a previous life I used to say that one of the ways in which we kept aircraft operating in and out of YSSY safe was to monitor, and secure compliance with the competence standards of, the student pilots operating in and out of YSBK. The same logic applies to every other RPT airport with adjacent ‘light’ aircraft aerodromes.
The safety of RPT aircraft depends, fundamentally, on the competence of the pilots of the ‘light’ aircraft with whom the RPT aircraft are sharing airspace. Are those pilots:
- monitoring the correct frequency (assuming the aircraft’s radio is serviceable)?
- making accurate and timely broadcasts of location, altitude, track and ETA on the correct frequency?
- keeping a proper lookout (assuming they have their glasses on)?
Almost every time I go flying, I see and hear evidence that the answer is often ‘no’. If I had a dime for the number of times I’ve heard a CTAF call on Area, I’d own a PC12. A while ago, I had a radio failure and had to join an active circuit without being able to make any broadcasts. I then managed to stuff up the first approach, so did a go-around and landed after a second circuit. This is with another aircraft in the same circuit with me. After that aircraft landed I walked over to explain to the pilot why he hadn’t heard from me. He said he’d never seen me! I’ve helped a pilot operate a fuel bowser because he couldn’t read the keypad…
And to anticipate one potential argument: RPT aircraft might be much bigger than your average ‘light’ aircraft and, therefore, easier to see in theory, but my first hand experience and observations are that the RPT aircraft are generally moving about 3 times faster than the average ‘light’ aircraft and can be hard to spot as a matter of practicality.
If ATSB’s view is that the competence standards of ‘light’ aircraft pilots create risks only to themselves and other ‘light’ aircraft pilots, I reckon the ATSB is wrong. Those pilots share airspace with RPT aircraft, or are supposed to confine themselves to airspace outside airspace in which RPT aircraft are operating. Any systemic incompetence in the ‘light’ aircraft pilot population creates risks to RPT. Either or both of the aircraft involved in the recent tragedy near Gympie could just as easily have been flying in the vicinity of Mildura, or Ballina or…
I stress that I’m not saying that either or both of the pilots of the aircraft involved in the tragedy were incompetent or that their training and ‘checking’ environment is systemically flawed. But something went wrong. I don’t know what or why. But nor does ATSB and ATSB is clearly not inclined to try to find out.
And TIBA and TRAs? Meh.
If the public on board RPT aircraft understood what's going on...
Ask any crew of an RPT aircraft operating in and out of an aerodrome in G what they consider to be their single biggest risk. Answer: The ‘light’ aircraft in the vicinity.
In a previous life I used to say that one of the ways in which we kept aircraft operating in and out of YSSY safe was to monitor, and secure compliance with the competence standards of, the student pilots operating in and out of YSBK. The same logic applies to every other RPT airport with adjacent ‘light’ aircraft aerodromes.
The safety of RPT aircraft depends, fundamentally, on the competence of the pilots of the ‘light’ aircraft with whom the RPT aircraft are sharing airspace. Are those pilots:
- monitoring the correct frequency (assuming the aircraft’s radio is serviceable)?
- making accurate and timely broadcasts of location, altitude, track and ETA on the correct frequency?
- keeping a proper lookout (assuming they have their glasses on)?
Almost every time I go flying, I see and hear evidence that the answer is often ‘no’. If I had a dime for the number of times I’ve heard a CTAF call on Area, I’d own a PC12. A while ago, I had a radio failure and had to join an active circuit without being able to make any broadcasts. I then managed to stuff up the first approach, so did a go-around and landed after a second circuit. This is with another aircraft in the same circuit with me. After that aircraft landed I walked over to explain to the pilot why he hadn’t heard from me. He said he’d never seen me! I’ve helped a pilot operate a fuel bowser because he couldn’t read the keypad…
And to anticipate one potential argument: RPT aircraft might be much bigger than your average ‘light’ aircraft and, therefore, easier to see in theory, but my first hand experience and observations are that the RPT aircraft are generally moving about 3 times faster than the average ‘light’ aircraft and can be hard to spot as a matter of practicality.
If ATSB’s view is that the competence standards of ‘light’ aircraft pilots create risks only to themselves and other ‘light’ aircraft pilots, I reckon the ATSB is wrong. Those pilots share airspace with RPT aircraft, or are supposed to confine themselves to airspace outside airspace in which RPT aircraft are operating. Any systemic incompetence in the ‘light’ aircraft pilot population creates risks to RPT. Either or both of the aircraft involved in the recent tragedy near Gympie could just as easily have been flying in the vicinity of Mildura, or Ballina or…
I stress that I’m not saying that either or both of the pilots of the aircraft involved in the tragedy were incompetent or that their training and ‘checking’ environment is systemically flawed. But something went wrong. I don’t know what or why. But nor does ATSB and ATSB is clearly not inclined to try to find out.
And TIBA and TRAs? Meh.
If the public on board RPT aircraft understood what's going on...
Last edited by Clinton McKenzie; 23rd Dec 2022 at 21:48.
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And yet another tragedy arising from a collision between two aircraft in G. The pilots in command of the aircraft involved were the subject of the same rules of the air and see and avoid obligations as those to which the pilots in command of the aircraft involved in the collision near Gympie were subject.
The rules of the air and see and avoid obligations do not distinguish between aircraft on the basis of whether there happen to be pax on board or not. A moment’s reflection reveals why: The aircraft don’t ‘know’ whether there are pax on board or not, the pilot of one aircraft wouldn’t necessarily know whether there happen to be pax on board another aircraft and, most importantly - a collision is precisely that: A collision to be avoided, no matter who or what is involved.
Either these collisions are “rare” “operational” events from which nothing new can be learnt, or they aren’t.
Indeed, Mr ATSB. And precisely the same durr-obvious statement would be made in the wake of a collision between an RPT aircraft and a ‘light’ aircraft in the vicinity of an aerodrome in G. (Perhaps some investigation into who said what and who heard what on what frequency/ies could highlight a contributing factor, too...)
If ATSB is really concerned about “systemic improvements to transport safety”, ATSB should be investigating all mid-air collisions. ATSB can’t know if there’s a systemic problem which can be improved to the benefit of transport safety if the only mid-air collisions it’s going to investigate are those which coincidentally involve fare paying passengers.
The rules of the air and see and avoid obligations do not distinguish between aircraft on the basis of whether there happen to be pax on board or not. A moment’s reflection reveals why: The aircraft don’t ‘know’ whether there are pax on board or not, the pilot of one aircraft wouldn’t necessarily know whether there happen to be pax on board another aircraft and, most importantly - a collision is precisely that: A collision to be avoided, no matter who or what is involved.
Either these collisions are “rare” “operational” events from which nothing new can be learnt, or they aren’t.
But exactly why this occurred, the range of visibility from both the pilots, what was happening inside the cabins the time – they’re the things that will help us piece together potentially what may have been a contributing factor here. But it’s still very early stage in the investigation to start speculating.
Indeed, Mr ATSB. And precisely the same durr-obvious statement would be made in the wake of a collision between an RPT aircraft and a ‘light’ aircraft in the vicinity of an aerodrome in G. (Perhaps some investigation into who said what and who heard what on what frequency/ies could highlight a contributing factor, too...)
If ATSB is really concerned about “systemic improvements to transport safety”, ATSB should be investigating all mid-air collisions. ATSB can’t know if there’s a systemic problem which can be improved to the benefit of transport safety if the only mid-air collisions it’s going to investigate are those which coincidentally involve fare paying passengers.
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