Resistence to Change and Reform -- Anywhere.
Thread Starter
Leadie, I disagree entirely with the premise that the winding back of NAS was entirely industrial. I genuinely believe it was safety driven.
You are quite entitled to your beliefs and fond memories, the difference is, I know exactly what happened, blow by blow, I would love to be able to spell it out, but I can't afford the possible legal costs of a defo. action. Sadly, truth is not an absolute defense, despite reforms of recent years.
Somewhere in my files, I/AOPA have the wash-up of all the monitoring that was done over the 12 months "trial" that informed the decision that the NAS 2b system would continue as permanent, and the NAS would move to the next phase. In the first few months, results and "incident" reports were investigated almost in "real time", there was 100% "sampling" for the whole 12 months, the industry/AsA/CASA team were most thorough.
The decision was made, and then virtually unilaterally reversed at the last moment ---- and it had nought to do with "safety".
Tootle pip!!
Leadsled, clearly I wasn't in as exalted position as yourself during that time, but I can tell you from a coal face participant that our concern was entirely about safety and our ongoing ability to stay alive and NOT industrial.
Who manipulated what to achieve what end was not visible to the mere mortals but it achieved what we had hoped it would achieve, which was to put a stop to a change that we felt was reckless and stupid in the extreme.
I have popped out of cloud in a dash 8 to have the windscreen literally filled with an unannounced Pitts special flown by a now deceased "legend" of aviation who was doing a bit of VFR don't ask and don't tell aviating and it frightened the crap out of me with the rapidity with which it occurred and the impact (both literally and figuratively) that it would have had if we were no more than 5-10 seconds earlier or maybe 2-3 knots faster, because you would have had 36 pax plus 3 crew plus the legend in a Pitts spread across the landscape.
Not saying that NAS did or didn't have anything to do with that but it occurred at the same time and demonstrated to me how quickly things can evolve, particularly in weather that isn't 8/8 blue.
All done and dusted these days of course and we are just arguing like Statler and Waldorf from the muppets, but please don't dismiss any contrary view as simply being a reflection of a presupposed industrial agenda and not founded in a good faith belief that the proposed system was fundamentally flawed, regardless of its pedigree.
Who manipulated what to achieve what end was not visible to the mere mortals but it achieved what we had hoped it would achieve, which was to put a stop to a change that we felt was reckless and stupid in the extreme.
I have popped out of cloud in a dash 8 to have the windscreen literally filled with an unannounced Pitts special flown by a now deceased "legend" of aviation who was doing a bit of VFR don't ask and don't tell aviating and it frightened the crap out of me with the rapidity with which it occurred and the impact (both literally and figuratively) that it would have had if we were no more than 5-10 seconds earlier or maybe 2-3 knots faster, because you would have had 36 pax plus 3 crew plus the legend in a Pitts spread across the landscape.
Not saying that NAS did or didn't have anything to do with that but it occurred at the same time and demonstrated to me how quickly things can evolve, particularly in weather that isn't 8/8 blue.
All done and dusted these days of course and we are just arguing like Statler and Waldorf from the muppets, but please don't dismiss any contrary view as simply being a reflection of a presupposed industrial agenda and not founded in a good faith belief that the proposed system was fundamentally flawed, regardless of its pedigree.
Snake. How about a few more details. What altitude did this incident take place and at what location.?
Are you suggesting that with the pre 1990 system such incidents did not place?
A few more details please. Also what year was this?
Are you suggesting that with the pre 1990 system such incidents did not place?
A few more details please. Also what year was this?
Join Date: Jul 2010
Location: sydney
Posts: 1,469
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Are you suggesting that with the pre 1990 system such incidents did not place?"
Of course they did Dick.
I recall a Bathurst race day, the regulator used to install a temporary Tower at Bathurst with its own frequency. One of those crappy weather days. One operator elected to go to orange and Bus to Bathurst rather than face the delays. Shot the approach at orange completely unaware that another aircraft had diverted from Bathurst and was doing the same approach at the same time, except he was still on Bathurst tower frequency. In those days we had flight service, they were unaware of the aircraft from Bathurst as well.
Of course they did Dick.
I recall a Bathurst race day, the regulator used to install a temporary Tower at Bathurst with its own frequency. One of those crappy weather days. One operator elected to go to orange and Bus to Bathurst rather than face the delays. Shot the approach at orange completely unaware that another aircraft had diverted from Bathurst and was doing the same approach at the same time, except he was still on Bathurst tower frequency. In those days we had flight service, they were unaware of the aircraft from Bathurst as well.
Are you suggesting that with the pre 1990 system such incidents did not place?
VFR weren't entitled to a TFC info service outside an AFIZ, but the Pitts would probably been given by FS a "For info, ABC a Dash 8 inbound ..".
These days because VFR particularly NOSAR have been scared off - indeed actively discouraged by certain parties - from talking to ATC or broadcasting on area frequencies, the self-announcement may not happen.
Hi Dick,
Actually I don't think that this particular incident was NAS related other than I would expect to see more of those types of things happening in a NAS unalerted see and avoid environment.
Can't remember the dates but it would have been somewhere between 92-94.
Altitude would have been 5-6000 and we were probably 15 or so miles from a reasonable sized regional airport. As I say it is a few years ago now and the only vivid thing is a very big yellow Pitts flashing right to left right before our very eyes (which because a Pitts ISNT a very big aeroplane meant he was very close). We had made all the appropriate calls on the appropriate frequencies and nada heard from our now dead intrepid aviator.
At the end of the day Dick, Leadsled and whomever else cares, my view is that any heads up on things that can hurt you is a good thing. Alerted see and avoid is better than unalerted see and avoid.
I fly for a living and don't have any issues with VFR traffic getting in the way of my radio calls, I am often a hundred miles (maybe more) east of Perth and hear traffic broken hill, Dubbo, etc etc etc, whether I get in the way of theirs because I can't hear them and inadvertently over transmit them I don't know, but I have VHF 2 tuned to 121.5 as well so would hope to hear something on that frequency if someone close enough was in strife.
All I would ask is that in your grail like quest for airspace change you don't dismiss the legitimate views of aviation professionals (note that word), some of whom have many many years of management experience at high levels in big aviation enterprises, as mere industrial manipulation and not real safety concerns.
And Leadsled, thanks for suggesting that I need more Valium, but how about playing the issue not the man.
Actually I don't think that this particular incident was NAS related other than I would expect to see more of those types of things happening in a NAS unalerted see and avoid environment.
Can't remember the dates but it would have been somewhere between 92-94.
Altitude would have been 5-6000 and we were probably 15 or so miles from a reasonable sized regional airport. As I say it is a few years ago now and the only vivid thing is a very big yellow Pitts flashing right to left right before our very eyes (which because a Pitts ISNT a very big aeroplane meant he was very close). We had made all the appropriate calls on the appropriate frequencies and nada heard from our now dead intrepid aviator.
At the end of the day Dick, Leadsled and whomever else cares, my view is that any heads up on things that can hurt you is a good thing. Alerted see and avoid is better than unalerted see and avoid.
I fly for a living and don't have any issues with VFR traffic getting in the way of my radio calls, I am often a hundred miles (maybe more) east of Perth and hear traffic broken hill, Dubbo, etc etc etc, whether I get in the way of theirs because I can't hear them and inadvertently over transmit them I don't know, but I have VHF 2 tuned to 121.5 as well so would hope to hear something on that frequency if someone close enough was in strife.
All I would ask is that in your grail like quest for airspace change you don't dismiss the legitimate views of aviation professionals (note that word), some of whom have many many years of management experience at high levels in big aviation enterprises, as mere industrial manipulation and not real safety concerns.
And Leadsled, thanks for suggesting that I need more Valium, but how about playing the issue not the man.
Thread Starter
Snakecharma,
The core issue of my last several posts is straight forward fact.
The review and evaluation of the NAS 2b "trial" was extensive and thorough, both because it should have been, and because it was so controversial, with most (but not all) of the controversy generated by the AFAP.
AIPA was notably and sensibly very restrained on the matter, with no concerns about E, and Qantas management, the DFO of the day, was supportive.
On the east coast, in early days of the trial, there were independent observers on selected flight decks.
Every "incident" filed was considered, one of the first considerations was: Is this something caused by the new procedures, or would it have happened anyway, under the old system.
For example, on the first morning, a light aircraft downwind at Port Macquarie, making "normal" radio calls was rejected as an "air miss" because it had nothing to do with the NAS 2b, and had a perfect right to be there. Likewise, an "air miss" that was opposite direction traffic at the correct level VFR was nothing to do with NAS 2b.
In the first few weeks, most of the "incidents" attributed to NAS 2b would have been funny, if it hadn't been a serious example of the unbalanced attitude of many of the reporters.
During this time, the AFAP pushed very hard the concept that "a perception of a safety problem" should be addresses as if it was a "real" safety problem, that even if many of the reported "incidents" were not "real", they should be treated as "real". Apparently, the idea of a crew worrying about a non-existent problem was just as much a threat to air safety as a real threat.
Can you really mitigate a perception?? Would an episode of MythBusters done the trick.
In other words, NAS should be canned, on the basis of a perception of a problem, even when it was comprehensively demonstrated to not be a problem. The idea of evidence based evaluation was rejected, out of hand, by self-confessed professionals. Both the NAS implementation team and review team were highly experienced and qualified.
At times, some of the meetings I attended descended to low farce.
It was not just me, QF staff pilots and AIPA pilots, as well as others present, involved in the continuous evaluation of the trial, would shake their heads in wonder at the intellectual level of the objections of some of those opposed, regardless of the facts staring them in the face.
To quote one prominent AFAP identity of the day: "I don't care how safe the FAA system is, compared to Australia, or how safe NAS 2b is, we are not going to have Dickspace in Australia".
I have already explained that I would love to be able to say what really happened, in the end, but have explained why I cannot. Just that it was "industrial" and not safety, and only involved Ansett, not Qantas or any of its subsidiaries (despite a couple of individuals in QLink absolutely opposed), or the other smaller airlines of the day, such as Flight West.
The final report of the NAS 2b trial contained NOTHING that suggested that the NAS should be "wound back".
Tootle pip!!
PS: In some ways a bit like the matter of owner drivers and road safety. Despite the lack of any statistical causal relation between owner drivers and truck accident rates in Australia, the TWU position is that owner driver are the problem, not TWU member drivers. A self- serving "perception", if there ever was one.
The core issue of my last several posts is straight forward fact.
The review and evaluation of the NAS 2b "trial" was extensive and thorough, both because it should have been, and because it was so controversial, with most (but not all) of the controversy generated by the AFAP.
AIPA was notably and sensibly very restrained on the matter, with no concerns about E, and Qantas management, the DFO of the day, was supportive.
On the east coast, in early days of the trial, there were independent observers on selected flight decks.
Every "incident" filed was considered, one of the first considerations was: Is this something caused by the new procedures, or would it have happened anyway, under the old system.
For example, on the first morning, a light aircraft downwind at Port Macquarie, making "normal" radio calls was rejected as an "air miss" because it had nothing to do with the NAS 2b, and had a perfect right to be there. Likewise, an "air miss" that was opposite direction traffic at the correct level VFR was nothing to do with NAS 2b.
In the first few weeks, most of the "incidents" attributed to NAS 2b would have been funny, if it hadn't been a serious example of the unbalanced attitude of many of the reporters.
During this time, the AFAP pushed very hard the concept that "a perception of a safety problem" should be addresses as if it was a "real" safety problem, that even if many of the reported "incidents" were not "real", they should be treated as "real". Apparently, the idea of a crew worrying about a non-existent problem was just as much a threat to air safety as a real threat.
Can you really mitigate a perception?? Would an episode of MythBusters done the trick.
In other words, NAS should be canned, on the basis of a perception of a problem, even when it was comprehensively demonstrated to not be a problem. The idea of evidence based evaluation was rejected, out of hand, by self-confessed professionals. Both the NAS implementation team and review team were highly experienced and qualified.
At times, some of the meetings I attended descended to low farce.
It was not just me, QF staff pilots and AIPA pilots, as well as others present, involved in the continuous evaluation of the trial, would shake their heads in wonder at the intellectual level of the objections of some of those opposed, regardless of the facts staring them in the face.
To quote one prominent AFAP identity of the day: "I don't care how safe the FAA system is, compared to Australia, or how safe NAS 2b is, we are not going to have Dickspace in Australia".
I have already explained that I would love to be able to say what really happened, in the end, but have explained why I cannot. Just that it was "industrial" and not safety, and only involved Ansett, not Qantas or any of its subsidiaries (despite a couple of individuals in QLink absolutely opposed), or the other smaller airlines of the day, such as Flight West.
The final report of the NAS 2b trial contained NOTHING that suggested that the NAS should be "wound back".
Tootle pip!!
PS: In some ways a bit like the matter of owner drivers and road safety. Despite the lack of any statistical causal relation between owner drivers and truck accident rates in Australia, the TWU position is that owner driver are the problem, not TWU member drivers. A self- serving "perception", if there ever was one.
Last edited by LeadSled; 22nd Apr 2016 at 04:33.
Snakecharmer. Under NAS 2 b there was a clear recommendation to monitor the CTAF if flying in the approach and departure airspace of an airport. In that case the Pitts would have heard your CTAF calls.
Recently I was at 9500' about 25 miles from Mildura. I monitored the Mildura CTAF and heard a departing aircraft. I was also monitoring he area frequency but for some reason did not hear a call on that frequency.
Recently I was at 9500' about 25 miles from Mildura. I monitored the Mildura CTAF and heard a departing aircraft. I was also monitoring he area frequency but for some reason did not hear a call on that frequency.
Was the departing aircraft VFR or IFR?
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: in the classroom of life
Age: 55
Posts: 6,864
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
I am flying from a class G aerodrome, very busy and going to VFR it with others to a unmarked station strip…….what do I do?
I will come back IFR…..what will I do?
Change fatigue……… :-/
I will come back IFR…..what will I do?
Change fatigue……… :-/
SURVEILLANCE REPORT
Michael,
Got a copy of that report from a mutual contact. Guess I cannot redistribute but it should be let loose.
I can see why someone on the RRAT committee wants to talk to you on the record. Good luck if that occurs. Is it a senator? Z?
That risk model has application wider than airspace. How did you get to that model? Why not expunge that and let it be used - surely that would not offed your standards.
Dick will like a lot of what you said but will nor like some of the the other parts. Has he asked for a copy?
PM sent.
GNE
Got a copy of that report from a mutual contact. Guess I cannot redistribute but it should be let loose.
I can see why someone on the RRAT committee wants to talk to you on the record. Good luck if that occurs. Is it a senator? Z?
That risk model has application wider than airspace. How did you get to that model? Why not expunge that and let it be used - surely that would not offed your standards.
Dick will like a lot of what you said but will nor like some of the the other parts. Has he asked for a copy?
PM sent.
GNE
I am flying from a class G aerodrome, very busy and going to VFR it with others to a unmarked station strip…….what do I do?
I will come back IFR…..what will I do?
Change fatigue……… :-/
I will come back IFR…..what will I do?
Change fatigue……… :-/
Lead. It was an IFR airline aircraft that was departing
GNE. If it copies from other leading aviation countries the most efficient and lowest cost ways of operating airspace I will be a strong supporter.
I am a bit suspicious that it has been kept secret. Why?
GNE. If it copies from other leading aviation countries the most efficient and lowest cost ways of operating airspace I will be a strong supporter.
I am a bit suspicious that it has been kept secret. Why?
FAA's budget covers a huuuuge number of FSDOs & ATC facilities required by the ginormously larger amount of aviation here in the US - that Oz doesn't have or need. The FAA's budget is approximately 16x bigger than AirNoServices, covering a population about 14 x bigger, over an area about 30% bigger, but includes equivalent functions to CASA as well.
Join Date: Oct 2002
Location: act
Posts: 181
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From memory part of the justification to roll back NAS 2B – specifically E over D - was an Air Services (AsA) Airspace modelling report based upon Albury and the D/E airspace design under the 2B changes. The report used the AsA software program, which calculated the various collision pairs, level of safety etc. This was based on various inputs including aircraft numbers, flight category, mistakes rates of pilots, controllers etc. I’m sure someone reading this knows more about the actual system than I, please feel free to expand on this description. The report demonstrated that the risk level in E over D was marginally higher that the accepted ALARP level.
The problem was AsA intentionally manipulated the inputs to achieve the required outcome, specifically the VFR pilot mistake levels were artificially inflated to make them appear to pose a greater risk than they actually were. Several industry groups wrote to AsA formally complaining about this assumed incompetence of VFR pilots. And the controller/IFR pilot mistake levels were artificially lowered so that IFR/IFR conflicts would never enter the equation, and that controllers were able to administer the large area of airspace at Albury. I'm an IFR pilot with 20+years of experience,. The rate of mistakes AsA allowed for IFR pilots almost made me fall off my chair when I saw how incredibly brilliant AsA considered me to be!!
Problem was the VFR rate couldn’t be inflated too high because then the risk in the Class D airspace would also become intolerable.. So it had to relate only to VFR aircraft overflying Albury and remaining in Class E. But the problem was there wasn’t enough VFR only flights overflying Albury and remaining in Class E. The number of aircraft initially used was based on factual data, historical figures ie facts.
No problem here, AsA decided off their own back that VFR overflight of a Class D was a new procedure that must be taught, therefore the numbers of aircraft in that airspace must surely increase. Note that this training requirement was never identified by the NAS team, or CASA, it was never published in any syllabus of training for any licence. AsA decided to increase the numbers off their own back, until – guess what – the ALARP level was exceeded. Oh dear, we will have to reverse the airspace.
Oh by the way, during all of this 2B rollback, did you know that AsA was awarded a contract by the FAA to run several class D towers in the USA? Utilising the same airspace model they claimed was unsafe in Australia? And no, class D towers in the US don’t have radar, their tower controllers aren’t required to be radar rated, they administer the airspace within about 5NM of the aerodrome. And yes, they are a damn sight busier than Australian Class D, with 121/135 and 91 operations.
So in all reality the rollback was never based on safety, it was purely industrial.
The problem was AsA intentionally manipulated the inputs to achieve the required outcome, specifically the VFR pilot mistake levels were artificially inflated to make them appear to pose a greater risk than they actually were. Several industry groups wrote to AsA formally complaining about this assumed incompetence of VFR pilots. And the controller/IFR pilot mistake levels were artificially lowered so that IFR/IFR conflicts would never enter the equation, and that controllers were able to administer the large area of airspace at Albury. I'm an IFR pilot with 20+years of experience,. The rate of mistakes AsA allowed for IFR pilots almost made me fall off my chair when I saw how incredibly brilliant AsA considered me to be!!
Problem was the VFR rate couldn’t be inflated too high because then the risk in the Class D airspace would also become intolerable.. So it had to relate only to VFR aircraft overflying Albury and remaining in Class E. But the problem was there wasn’t enough VFR only flights overflying Albury and remaining in Class E. The number of aircraft initially used was based on factual data, historical figures ie facts.
No problem here, AsA decided off their own back that VFR overflight of a Class D was a new procedure that must be taught, therefore the numbers of aircraft in that airspace must surely increase. Note that this training requirement was never identified by the NAS team, or CASA, it was never published in any syllabus of training for any licence. AsA decided to increase the numbers off their own back, until – guess what – the ALARP level was exceeded. Oh dear, we will have to reverse the airspace.
Oh by the way, during all of this 2B rollback, did you know that AsA was awarded a contract by the FAA to run several class D towers in the USA? Utilising the same airspace model they claimed was unsafe in Australia? And no, class D towers in the US don’t have radar, their tower controllers aren’t required to be radar rated, they administer the airspace within about 5NM of the aerodrome. And yes, they are a damn sight busier than Australian Class D, with 121/135 and 91 operations.
So in all reality the rollback was never based on safety, it was purely industrial.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Melbourne
Age: 72
Posts: 774
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The US contract was for remote Pacific Island towers, not the mainland. Three in Hawaii, one in Guam and one in Saipan. Not busy airports as claimed. In March this year, Guam was averaging 196 movements per day (FAA figures). US airspace and US contracted controllers. It was a bit like privatising Coffs Harbour and keeping the staff.
Join Date: Oct 2002
Location: act
Posts: 181
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bloggs, to the contrary. Hawaii is hardly a remote island. Lots of VFR scenic flights around there. But my point is that why would AsA claim the airspace model is unsafe, and then go and operate towers in that very model? Surely their risk assessment would have highlighted that additional services would have been required, like C over D? Which is what we have here.
During the rollback I also recall AsA claiming that they could provide the C airspace that would replace the E airsapce at no extra cost. I wonder if they made that offer to the FAA?
During the rollback I also recall AsA claiming that they could provide the C airspace that would replace the E airsapce at no extra cost. I wonder if they made that offer to the FAA?