Sea Vixen Fuel Management
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: London
Posts: 1,256
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The loss rate from the Scimitar was worse than a Vixen. Around fifty per cent of aircraft built. It was a simpler aircraft to fly than a Vixen. Maybe having somone in the coal hole helped.
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: England
Posts: 924
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There was a really good article about Fuel Management of the FAW1 Sea Vixen in the FAAs "Cockpit" magazine many years ago by I think the now late Graham Wilcock as I recall (from the FAA museum I think, not sure), that is worth a read. In fact it really struck me at the time reading it - they launched from around Malta at Xmas time on the back end of a Far East deploy- nearly ran out of fuel recovering to 04 Yeovilton (at the end that is think - he was trying to recover to 27 and went into the circuit left hand then onto 04-Winter and weekend and marginal weather). Tanks practically dry as they rolled out.....worth a read if you can find it.
Last edited by Hangarshuffle; 30th Dec 2016 at 21:00. Reason: Names not confirmed STBC.
The Vixen was still made for pitch-up. (Bah bah doop bah bah doop).
It also needed, and eventually got, a step change in the FAA's approach to what is called today a CAMO. Any one remember "We have a Problem"
M
It also needed, and eventually got, a step change in the FAA's approach to what is called today a CAMO. Any one remember "We have a Problem"
M
The Sea Vixen accident record was not good, but was by no means exceptional for that period. The following figures have been copied from the "Meteor Research" Thread. They include only accidents for the Meteor aircraft.
1. 150 total losses in 1952
2. 68 lost after running out of fuel
3. 23 lost doing official low level aeros displays
4. 890 lost in total
5. 436 fatal accidents between 1944 and 1986.
2. 68 lost after running out of fuel
3. 23 lost doing official low level aeros displays
4. 890 lost in total
5. 436 fatal accidents between 1944 and 1986.
Towards the end of its service life, the original Sea Vixen drawings were kept in a small store room at the end of the main drawing office at Brough. Some of the original drawings were by then, pretty tatty, but some had been traced and were beautifully drawn in ink on linen. There was one particular drawing of the engine driven accessory gearbox that was absolutely fantastic, every nut, bolt, washer, split pin and spline fully detailed.
I resolved that just before the drawings were going to be disposed of, I would borrow that particular one and have it framed on my living room wall. Alas I missed my chance, the next time I visited the store room they had all gone, presumably to a museum somewhere. Perhaps they are now kept by the de Havilland museum in London Colney?
I resolved that just before the drawings were going to be disposed of, I would borrow that particular one and have it framed on my living room wall. Alas I missed my chance, the next time I visited the store room they had all gone, presumably to a museum somewhere. Perhaps they are now kept by the de Havilland museum in London Colney?
Originally Posted by JENKINS
Old chum completed time in Fleet Air Arm as Sea Vixen 'looker,' and promptly changed colour to become WIWOL
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
LTCTerry, IIRC it was any fuel not in the fuselage at risk. Tanks certainly but also wings if the fuel burn exceeded the wing transfer rate.
A Looker............
My father was a driver and I am still in touch with a couple of his Lookers (absolute top men, both of them without a doubt).
I went flying with a mate of mine many years ago who at the time was in the AAR World. To cut a long story short, I learned then that whatever you do is another day at the office.
Having said that, on finals to Ark Royal at 0300 in the South China Sea during a storm from hell..........
I went flying with a mate of mine many years ago who at the time was in the AAR World. To cut a long story short, I learned then that whatever you do is another day at the office.
Having said that, on finals to Ark Royal at 0300 in the South China Sea during a storm from hell..........
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Often in Jersey, but mainly in the past.
Age: 79
Posts: 7,808
Received 135 Likes
on
63 Posts
Any discussion of the Sea Vixen reminds me of a mate from BRNC who found himself approaching terrain at low level. His O didn't apparently hear the 'Eject" call.
It was sobering at SBAC a few years after I had gone light blue to encounter some old BRNC mates in the FAA enclosure, and discover how many had not made the reunion. They were hard days, whatever uniform you wore.
It was sobering at SBAC a few years after I had gone light blue to encounter some old BRNC mates in the FAA enclosure, and discover how many had not made the reunion. They were hard days, whatever uniform you wore.
I recall in the early days of 360 the odd part at a FAA mates house, and the conversation always turned to accidents various, usually fatal. The RN wives seemed to take it in their stride, but RAF wives tended to go a bit pale.
Having lost 6 close friends out of total of 22 during his first carrier tour, my old friend said that he would buy himself out if he had to do another. He did do a second tour and they lost no-one so something must have improved.
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Australia OZ
Age: 75
Posts: 2,577
Likes: 0
Received 52 Likes
on
45 Posts
'pulse1' said:
I can only guess that from research about 'how others deck landed' that the re-introduction of LSOs to help ameliorate the loss of Sea Vixens and crews perhaps was a factor. Of course there are many other factors as outlined/hinted at in this thread.
"Having lost 6 close friends out of total of 22 during his first carrier tour, my old friend said that he would buy himself out if he had to do another. He did do a second tour and they lost no-one so something must have improved."
“...This large aircraft [Sea Vixen] was operated from small aircraft carriers by day and night. It was difficult to deck land because being an aerodynamically clean aircraft it had low profile drag. The consequence of this was that the throttles were retarded to about one third of their travel in order to command the low thrust required for a constant speed approach critical for deck landing. The engines were therefore operating in the lower rpm response time margins when fully configured on approach to land. Speed control was difficult and speed accuracy was essential to the safe conduct of a deck landing....”
http://www.seavixen.org/sea-vixen-accidents-public-page
http://www.seavixen.org/sea-vixen-accidents-public-page
FLY NAVY - The view from the cockpit 1945-2000 - Lieutenant Commander Bob McQueen, Commanding Officer, 899 Squadron, Sea Vixens, HMS Eagle, 1966. RNAS Yeovilton, 1968
-
“In the course of my 700-odd fixed-wing carrier landings in the comparatively safe environment of the angled deck, several refinements were introduced to improve the art of deck-landing and make it safer.
One was the 'Donkey's Tail', a vertical string of lights dropped down over the ship's stern to extend the very short line of lights indicating the deck centreline. For the pilot on approach at night its effect was magical, for the slightest deviation from the true centreline immediately showed up as a kink in the donkey's tail, allowing much more precise line-up control than before; and as a Sea Vixen landing at 130 knots on one of the smaller carriers like Centaur or Hermes could not be more than two feet off-centre without the risk of hitting something, this was important.
Even more momentous was the introduction of the LSO or Landing Safety Officer, previously the 'batsman', who had been pronounced redundant with the introduction of the mirror landing sight. Initial problems with the big fast jets forced a re-think on this and the LSO reappeared in the form of a senior pilot, of such experience that even I as a Squadron C.O. could not question his judgement, monitoring all landings from the deck-edge with the power to 'wave off' any dubious approaches. And because his assessment of each landing was posted up in stark colour on a board in that most public of places, the Squadron briefing-room - red for dangerous; yellow, passable; green, good; and green star, teacher's pet - deck-landing became competitive. The LSO, stalking the crewrooms with his clipboard preaching the one true faith, standardization, was at first resented by some of us more senior and experienced pilots, but there was no escaping the very public verdict of 'The Board', or the fact that deck-landing safety improved tremendously, to the extent that most pilots including myself were soon catching the target No.3 wire on the centreline every time. Dare one say - a little tame?
However, other things could happen to spoil a pretty row of 'greens'. [OK landings as shown on a 'greenie board']”
-
“In the course of my 700-odd fixed-wing carrier landings in the comparatively safe environment of the angled deck, several refinements were introduced to improve the art of deck-landing and make it safer.
One was the 'Donkey's Tail', a vertical string of lights dropped down over the ship's stern to extend the very short line of lights indicating the deck centreline. For the pilot on approach at night its effect was magical, for the slightest deviation from the true centreline immediately showed up as a kink in the donkey's tail, allowing much more precise line-up control than before; and as a Sea Vixen landing at 130 knots on one of the smaller carriers like Centaur or Hermes could not be more than two feet off-centre without the risk of hitting something, this was important.
Even more momentous was the introduction of the LSO or Landing Safety Officer, previously the 'batsman', who had been pronounced redundant with the introduction of the mirror landing sight. Initial problems with the big fast jets forced a re-think on this and the LSO reappeared in the form of a senior pilot, of such experience that even I as a Squadron C.O. could not question his judgement, monitoring all landings from the deck-edge with the power to 'wave off' any dubious approaches. And because his assessment of each landing was posted up in stark colour on a board in that most public of places, the Squadron briefing-room - red for dangerous; yellow, passable; green, good; and green star, teacher's pet - deck-landing became competitive. The LSO, stalking the crewrooms with his clipboard preaching the one true faith, standardization, was at first resented by some of us more senior and experienced pilots, but there was no escaping the very public verdict of 'The Board', or the fact that deck-landing safety improved tremendously, to the extent that most pilots including myself were soon catching the target No.3 wire on the centreline every time. Dare one say - a little tame?
However, other things could happen to spoil a pretty row of 'greens'. [OK landings as shown on a 'greenie board']”
[SEA VIXEN] Lt. Cdr. (P) John E. Kelly. RN.“...6/1/1961 he witnessed Accident ID 4. From his Interview:
http://www.seavixen.org/aircrew-test...ies-john-kelly
"The C.O. Dave Stanley and myself as No2, followed by a second pair Lt. Cdr. Jeff Varley and Lt Dudgeon set off for night touch and go DLP. On completion of my 4 night DLP's and Hook On, I went to Flyco to witness the second pair. On the final (4th) night approach Lt Dudgeon was authorised for "Hook Down". There was no LSO in those days. The approached seemed a little unsettled and Lt Dudgeon self waved off. His port wing tip struck an engine box parked in Fly 4. A six foot section of his port wing separated and the aircraft continued inverted down the flight deck and crashed into the sea. His previous approaches had been perfect. Lt Dugeon was a highly skilled and experienced night deck lander from the Sea Venom days. Jeff Varley who had just landed on and was walking back to the Island also witnessed this sad occassion....”
http://www.seavixen.org/aircrew-test...ies-john-kelly
"The C.O. Dave Stanley and myself as No2, followed by a second pair Lt. Cdr. Jeff Varley and Lt Dudgeon set off for night touch and go DLP. On completion of my 4 night DLP's and Hook On, I went to Flyco to witness the second pair. On the final (4th) night approach Lt Dudgeon was authorised for "Hook Down". There was no LSO in those days. The approached seemed a little unsettled and Lt Dudgeon self waved off. His port wing tip struck an engine box parked in Fly 4. A six foot section of his port wing separated and the aircraft continued inverted down the flight deck and crashed into the sea. His previous approaches had been perfect. Lt Dugeon was a highly skilled and experienced night deck lander from the Sea Venom days. Jeff Varley who had just landed on and was walking back to the Island also witnessed this sad occassion....”
Personal Testimony of Sea Vixen Operations by: Lt. (P) Jonathon Whaley. RN. 1965/1973
http://www.seavixen.org/aircrew-test...onathan-whaley
“Am I qualified to write a "Pilots Perspective" on the Sea Vixen? Well as probably the only pilot left that still flies a jet fighter www.heritageaviation.com and who flew Sea Vixens operationally for two tours, one as Air Warfare Instructor (AWI), I stake my claim.
I'm allowing myself (or I hope the Ed. will) a paragraph of "Soap Box" One of the primary requirements for acceptance in to the Royal Navy and in particular as Naval Aircrew, is to have a sense of humour. The source of "If you can't take a joke, you shouldn't have joined" the Senior Service. If your sense of humour was slightly warped, then a) you were a survivor by nature and b) destined for great things.
The Fleet Air Arm, at the time I joined in 1965, were losing about 1½ aircrew a year per squadron. That's three killed out of 28 Pilots and Observers. You gotta have a sense of humour just to want to join! Circa 1971 "SOPs" were tightened up and "job's worth" criteria added to restrict the antics of aircrew such that losses were dramatically reduced. In 1969 when we lost a couple of Vixens flying in to the sea at night, the papers never mentioned it. To day, such rare accidents are front page news. I'm not saying today's restrictions in flight ops are wrong in any way, just that I was lucky enough to fly (and survive) in the last few years....”
http://www.seavixen.org/aircrew-test...onathan-whaley
“Am I qualified to write a "Pilots Perspective" on the Sea Vixen? Well as probably the only pilot left that still flies a jet fighter www.heritageaviation.com and who flew Sea Vixens operationally for two tours, one as Air Warfare Instructor (AWI), I stake my claim.
I'm allowing myself (or I hope the Ed. will) a paragraph of "Soap Box" One of the primary requirements for acceptance in to the Royal Navy and in particular as Naval Aircrew, is to have a sense of humour. The source of "If you can't take a joke, you shouldn't have joined" the Senior Service. If your sense of humour was slightly warped, then a) you were a survivor by nature and b) destined for great things.
The Fleet Air Arm, at the time I joined in 1965, were losing about 1½ aircrew a year per squadron. That's three killed out of 28 Pilots and Observers. You gotta have a sense of humour just to want to join! Circa 1971 "SOPs" were tightened up and "job's worth" criteria added to restrict the antics of aircrew such that losses were dramatically reduced. In 1969 when we lost a couple of Vixens flying in to the sea at night, the papers never mentioned it. To day, such rare accidents are front page news. I'm not saying today's restrictions in flight ops are wrong in any way, just that I was lucky enough to fly (and survive) in the last few years....”
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 2nd Jan 2017 at 18:59. Reason: add quotes
ORAC, fascinating reading the Sea Vixen Pilot's Notes you provided the link to earlier.
Slightly off thread but is raises the question who was L. T. Dunnett ? His signature is on the first paper page of the notes in the ring binder.
I did a quick 'google' and he also released other Manuals: Seamanship and Mathematics etc.
I recall that JSP 318 as late as the mid 1980s had his signature too.
What was L T Dunnett's position in MOD PE ? Is he (or she) still alive and has a tale to tell about the responsibility of releasing all these important documents ?
Slightly off thread but is raises the question who was L. T. Dunnett ? His signature is on the first paper page of the notes in the ring binder.
I did a quick 'google' and he also released other Manuals: Seamanship and Mathematics etc.
I recall that JSP 318 as late as the mid 1980s had his signature too.
What was L T Dunnett's position in MOD PE ? Is he (or she) still alive and has a tale to tell about the responsibility of releasing all these important documents ?
Join Date: Sep 2012
Location: North of Watford, South of Watford Gap
Age: 68
Posts: 251
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
1 Post
I suspect that Dunnett was a senior civil servant who may not have been closely involved with the editing etc. of such manuals. In the inter-war years Air Publications carried the name of (I think) the Secretary of State for Air who would have issued instructions that APs were to be published, but probably didn't see even the final proofs.
Sir (Ludovic) James Dunnett was Permanent Under-Secretary at the MOD from 1966 to 1974 http://www.gulabin.com/britishcivils...20Servants.pdf
Sir (Ludovic) James Dunnett was Permanent Under-Secretary at the MOD from 1966 to 1974 http://www.gulabin.com/britishcivils...20Servants.pdf
Last edited by Innominate; 2nd Jan 2017 at 22:23. Reason: Updated
I thought that manual fuel management went out with Lindbergh, does the Vixen really require the pilot to manually select tanks, anyone know ?
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/airc...-november-2013
Has a summary.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...015_G-SPAO.pdf
Full report.
From memory:- Helicopter with fuel on board and with no evidence of fuel supply system faults (pumps or valves or pipes) fatally crashed due to the engines not being supplied with fuel.
Switchology issue?
Possible issues with some of the 4 fuel level sensors?
Jim.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: UK
Posts: 799
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Perhaps I could offer a couple of thoughts.
Military aircraft fuel systems are complex and are getting more so. In my view, this is probably linked to the need for LO airframes, where more fuel has to be packed inside the mould line inside of dangling off the outside in a drop tank or two. As a result, fuel has to be spread around a number of tanks scattered around the airframe. On top of that, the aircraft C of G has to be maintained to close limits (this has always an issue for single rotor helicopters) and even required to help with cooling the aircraft. Add in AAR capability plus redundancy features and you have some seriously complex plumbing.
Harrier had some fairly challenging fuel system architecture to maintain fore and aft C of G, as well as some definitely 1960s type indication and control systems. Plus the UK's insistence on playing around with the way the indication systems worked. That led to the loss of at least two T12s due to pumps being selected off and not switched back on.
The RN had some issues with fuel management on Sea King Mk5, caused (as I remember it) by a substantial aft shift in C of G. Again, some fairly critical pumps had to be switched on and off at various times.
My view only, but any fuel system that needs to be actively managed by a single pilot is an aircraft loss waiting to happen. With two (or more) aircrew, the risk is reduced, but certainly not avoided. Similarly with fuel jettison systems that can be switched on and not always switched off. This is not always a recognised risk. It needs to be.
When the UK fitted RTM322s to Apache, I attended a CDR where we were told that the (really quite good) automatic fuel management system on the aircraft would have to be 'overridden' and 'actively managed' to cope with the much heavier engines aft of the C of G, as it would cost too much to change to software handling the management system. This was agreed to there and then by the then PM. Not a few of us in the audience disagreed. I'd be interested to know whether this caused any issues in service.
The F-35 has a complex fuel system, doing lots of stuff around the airframe. The head of the team designing it was Brit, very experienced and able to use all the lessons learned on Typhoon. He was very well regarded at Fort Worth, but he had to handle literally hundreds of charges to the system. His view was that the fuel system is frequently called upon to help solve problems all over the airframe. That can lead to complex results.
Best wishes as ever to all those poring over fuel system diagrams,
Engines
Military aircraft fuel systems are complex and are getting more so. In my view, this is probably linked to the need for LO airframes, where more fuel has to be packed inside the mould line inside of dangling off the outside in a drop tank or two. As a result, fuel has to be spread around a number of tanks scattered around the airframe. On top of that, the aircraft C of G has to be maintained to close limits (this has always an issue for single rotor helicopters) and even required to help with cooling the aircraft. Add in AAR capability plus redundancy features and you have some seriously complex plumbing.
Harrier had some fairly challenging fuel system architecture to maintain fore and aft C of G, as well as some definitely 1960s type indication and control systems. Plus the UK's insistence on playing around with the way the indication systems worked. That led to the loss of at least two T12s due to pumps being selected off and not switched back on.
The RN had some issues with fuel management on Sea King Mk5, caused (as I remember it) by a substantial aft shift in C of G. Again, some fairly critical pumps had to be switched on and off at various times.
My view only, but any fuel system that needs to be actively managed by a single pilot is an aircraft loss waiting to happen. With two (or more) aircrew, the risk is reduced, but certainly not avoided. Similarly with fuel jettison systems that can be switched on and not always switched off. This is not always a recognised risk. It needs to be.
When the UK fitted RTM322s to Apache, I attended a CDR where we were told that the (really quite good) automatic fuel management system on the aircraft would have to be 'overridden' and 'actively managed' to cope with the much heavier engines aft of the C of G, as it would cost too much to change to software handling the management system. This was agreed to there and then by the then PM. Not a few of us in the audience disagreed. I'd be interested to know whether this caused any issues in service.
The F-35 has a complex fuel system, doing lots of stuff around the airframe. The head of the team designing it was Brit, very experienced and able to use all the lessons learned on Typhoon. He was very well regarded at Fort Worth, but he had to handle literally hundreds of charges to the system. His view was that the fuel system is frequently called upon to help solve problems all over the airframe. That can lead to complex results.
Best wishes as ever to all those poring over fuel system diagrams,
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 4th Jan 2017 at 08:53.