Is the RAF "anti-cannon" ?
Thanks for your comments Engines! You may be aware that the high filling ratio shell was most widely used in the German MK108 30mm single barrel cannon against Allied bombers. Worth saying that the MG213 revolver cannon was under development at the end of WW11 and it was this weapon which held such potential that it was developed into the ADEN, DEFA etc..
Cheers
OAP
Cheers
OAP
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OAP:
Thanks for coming back.
I actually worked with a guy who was part of the Enfield team who converted the MG213 into the Aden, and got to see the original drawings for the Aden. Most of them were simply MG213 drawings with the metric dimensions converted to imperial. The Aden 30's mounting design, which led to quite a bit of weight, was originally designed for the Hunter belly pack. The Aden 30 shell was slightly changed version of the German design, and its antiquated Torpex filling was causing severe problems by the 90s. Essentially, the Aden 30 had been severely neglected for some years.
The shame was that the UK never seriously tried to design another aircraft cannon after the Aden 30. The Aden 25 was a modified version, but very limited in scope. Much more could have been done (at not a lot of cost) to get a lot of weight out of the gun and its feed systems.
The 213, and its design team, spawned a whole generation of derivatives in many other countries, including the DEFA 30 (France), M39 (US) and Oerlikon (Sweden) revolvers.
The main problem immediately after WW2 and into the 50s was that early jet fighters struggled to be able to carry out an effective 'pursuit' gun attack on a large, fast, jet bomber. One attempt at a solution was a very large gun with a long range, and I understand that the Javelin was originally designed to carry a retractable ten shot 4.5 inch recoilless weapon. Gawd.
Eventually, it was realised that a 'collision course' attack was required, and that led in turn to unguided multiple FFAR rocket systems, intended to fill the sky with enough HE to get enough hits on the oncoming target. These rocket packs appeared on most 1950s fighter in various guises. The Hughes development of 'control theory' that I mentioned a few posts ago was done to provide intercepting fighters with an automatic guidance system that would put them where the FFAR systems could be used - an early form of IFFC. Once guided missile emerged as practical proposition, the techniques being developed by Hughes were moved on to supporting the F-102 and other programs that were using automated missile interception systems.
Hope this lot's not boring anyone yet,
Best Regards
Engines
Thanks for coming back.
I actually worked with a guy who was part of the Enfield team who converted the MG213 into the Aden, and got to see the original drawings for the Aden. Most of them were simply MG213 drawings with the metric dimensions converted to imperial. The Aden 30's mounting design, which led to quite a bit of weight, was originally designed for the Hunter belly pack. The Aden 30 shell was slightly changed version of the German design, and its antiquated Torpex filling was causing severe problems by the 90s. Essentially, the Aden 30 had been severely neglected for some years.
The shame was that the UK never seriously tried to design another aircraft cannon after the Aden 30. The Aden 25 was a modified version, but very limited in scope. Much more could have been done (at not a lot of cost) to get a lot of weight out of the gun and its feed systems.
The 213, and its design team, spawned a whole generation of derivatives in many other countries, including the DEFA 30 (France), M39 (US) and Oerlikon (Sweden) revolvers.
The main problem immediately after WW2 and into the 50s was that early jet fighters struggled to be able to carry out an effective 'pursuit' gun attack on a large, fast, jet bomber. One attempt at a solution was a very large gun with a long range, and I understand that the Javelin was originally designed to carry a retractable ten shot 4.5 inch recoilless weapon. Gawd.
Eventually, it was realised that a 'collision course' attack was required, and that led in turn to unguided multiple FFAR rocket systems, intended to fill the sky with enough HE to get enough hits on the oncoming target. These rocket packs appeared on most 1950s fighter in various guises. The Hughes development of 'control theory' that I mentioned a few posts ago was done to provide intercepting fighters with an automatic guidance system that would put them where the FFAR systems could be used - an early form of IFFC. Once guided missile emerged as practical proposition, the techniques being developed by Hughes were moved on to supporting the F-102 and other programs that were using automated missile interception systems.
Hope this lot's not boring anyone yet,
Best Regards
Engines
Cheers Engines. I wonder if anyone could prove that the ADEN (Mauser) was the only UK air to air weapon with any pk at all in the jet age, until the Sidewinder and Sparrow were aquired? I believe Firestreak and Red-Top had "limitations"? 
OAP
OAP
Arming an aircraft or any other military hardware has nothing whatsoever to do with "fundamental human rights". It's purely about building and operating an instrument of war.
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My experience with air-to-air gunnery is that it is more difficult than the movies would have you believe and that bullet dispersion can actually help with Ph. Even trying to hit a non-maneuvering towed target is not that easy. I, along with several of my squadron mates, have fired at both towed “darts” and towed “banner” targets that our Ph was not very good. Gun training sorties didn’t happen very often and this contributed to our lack of proficiency. I would be curious how often fighter pilots get gun air-to-air training sorties these days. In some live fire meets, where the pilots send more training time preparing, there was still a desire to “spread out” the bullet to the point that some pilots actually yawed the aircraft while firing.
Now trying to keep the gun sight on a fast jet that is maneuvering for a long enough period of time to get hits is VERY difficult. So from my perspective I would want a fast bullet, but I would put my priority on a gun that has a high rate of fire for air-to-air gunnery.
Now trying to keep the gun sight on a fast jet that is maneuvering for a long enough period of time to get hits is VERY difficult. So from my perspective I would want a fast bullet, but I would put my priority on a gun that has a high rate of fire for air-to-air gunnery.
Onceapilot, it’s not easy to compare weapons, or different aircraft with the same gun; time, threat, role …
Firestreak / Redtop were more likely to achieve a kill than the early AIM7 / Sidewinders on the F4; but then things moved on.
The Lightning missiles also had greater kill probability than the ADEN against most targets, but in a close-range turning encounter then the gun offered more opportunity, but due to the longer distance harmonised firing range in the Lightning when compared with a Hunter (speed, Aero D, etc) it resulted in a lower pk.
Pilots were trained for smoothness and expertise in gunnery range and tracking accuracy, but in the ‘heat of war’ my advice was to take any shot, at least you might frightening the opposition into doing something silly; and with a better opportunity, all of the theory goes out of the window.
Firestreak / Redtop were more likely to achieve a kill than the early AIM7 / Sidewinders on the F4; but then things moved on.
The Lightning missiles also had greater kill probability than the ADEN against most targets, but in a close-range turning encounter then the gun offered more opportunity, but due to the longer distance harmonised firing range in the Lightning when compared with a Hunter (speed, Aero D, etc) it resulted in a lower pk.
Pilots were trained for smoothness and expertise in gunnery range and tracking accuracy, but in the ‘heat of war’ my advice was to take any shot, at least you might frightening the opposition into doing something silly; and with a better opportunity, all of the theory goes out of the window.
Typhoon93,
I could not disagree more. Re your post #50. As you will have realised by now, not all aircraft have integral guns. Regarding your comments, the fit we fly with is dictated by the requirements of the mission, not the wishes of the aircrew. Incidentally, you may find that the aircrew, understanding the mission, would chose the prescribed load - often the load they chose in the planning phase.
You appear to have a slightly rose-tinted idea about being an operational pilot. It comes with risks and we don't stand in the ops room fretting about how the aircraft configuration matches any imagined expectations of our human rights.
Are you sure this is the profession you wish to pursue?
I could not disagree more. Re your post #50. As you will have realised by now, not all aircraft have integral guns. Regarding your comments, the fit we fly with is dictated by the requirements of the mission, not the wishes of the aircrew. Incidentally, you may find that the aircrew, understanding the mission, would chose the prescribed load - often the load they chose in the planning phase.
You appear to have a slightly rose-tinted idea about being an operational pilot. It comes with risks and we don't stand in the ops room fretting about how the aircraft configuration matches any imagined expectations of our human rights.
Are you sure this is the profession you wish to pursue?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
I recall a brief by CFE on engaging bombers with gun armed day fighters. As the Badger and Bear had radar controlled guns their plan was to attack from behind and below and climb under the target ahead of the gun defensive arc.
They also showed gun tracking against a manoeuvring Valiant at low level. The pipper stayed steady on the back of the cockpit.
4x30, great weapon with a good on by DAY.
They also showed gun tracking against a manoeuvring Valiant at low level. The pipper stayed steady on the back of the cockpit.
4x30, great weapon with a good on by DAY.
Tiffy 93,
I trust you've seen the Armstrong and Miller sketch with the two R.A.F. Officers, the content of their delivery is intented as an ironic satirical send up of a particular culture and generation.
I think!?!?!?
FB
I trust you've seen the Armstrong and Miller sketch with the two R.A.F. Officers, the content of their delivery is intented as an ironic satirical send up of a particular culture and generation.
I think!?!?!?
FB
Last edited by Finningley Boy; 25th Oct 2014 at 06:32.
PN,
Indeed,
I'm just a tad concerned that Tiff 93, with the greatest respect, may have taken the content for a warts an' all wartime drama series?!?
FB
Indeed,
I'm just a tad concerned that Tiff 93, with the greatest respect, may have taken the content for a warts an' all wartime drama series?!?
FB
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If I may be so bold, we have approximately two generations of legacy thinking being explained here by some very well informed people.
In modern BFM, which 'legacy mindset 2' thought would never happen due to all missile load outs it is a completely valid tactic to remain within the enemy Rmin and possible if you have the g, alpha and power available. Both players will also be ensuring that, in a defensive situation they present the hardest 'Range/Angle/Closure' problem possible - which will probably differ significantly to WW2 era bombers or those of the V force, as experienced by those of 'legacy mindset 1'.
This leads you to what will one day be known as 'legacy mindset 3'. You aren't realistically in contemporary BFM going to track the opponent, but you need to have the gun site up at all times for anytime you can't shoot due to Rmin or acquisition problems. If you have a radar that gives you a decent aiming solution so much the better. Close scissors at base, slashing opportunities are all great times to use a gun, and don't forget - every 180 by zip is a guns opportunity, as is every time he flashes through the HUD, it's just that we aren't allowed them in peacetime!
Last point, it was very interesting how the RAF entered WW2 without a clear understanding of the damage mechanisms for A-A gunnery which led to small calibre armament. Don't forget though, in 'soon to be legacy mindset 3' the aircraft have a lot less space, are made of materials that aren't necessarily easy to repair and have a lot of vulnerabilities past pilot, controls, engine. Look at the damage a pebble can achieve in a gas turbine, a single shell could be all it takes.
Just trivia but with the M61A1 you could choose your rate of fire.
In modern BFM, which 'legacy mindset 2' thought would never happen due to all missile load outs it is a completely valid tactic to remain within the enemy Rmin and possible if you have the g, alpha and power available. Both players will also be ensuring that, in a defensive situation they present the hardest 'Range/Angle/Closure' problem possible - which will probably differ significantly to WW2 era bombers or those of the V force, as experienced by those of 'legacy mindset 1'.
This leads you to what will one day be known as 'legacy mindset 3'. You aren't realistically in contemporary BFM going to track the opponent, but you need to have the gun site up at all times for anytime you can't shoot due to Rmin or acquisition problems. If you have a radar that gives you a decent aiming solution so much the better. Close scissors at base, slashing opportunities are all great times to use a gun, and don't forget - every 180 by zip is a guns opportunity, as is every time he flashes through the HUD, it's just that we aren't allowed them in peacetime!
Last point, it was very interesting how the RAF entered WW2 without a clear understanding of the damage mechanisms for A-A gunnery which led to small calibre armament. Don't forget though, in 'soon to be legacy mindset 3' the aircraft have a lot less space, are made of materials that aren't necessarily easy to repair and have a lot of vulnerabilities past pilot, controls, engine. Look at the damage a pebble can achieve in a gas turbine, a single shell could be all it takes.
Just trivia but with the M61A1 you could choose your rate of fire.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
orca, that crucial word is legacy.
I think those of my generation and earlier were not advocating missiles over guns but explaining why that had happened. Remember L2 decision makers formed their assumptions decades ago before GW 1. The Typhoon of today should have been service 15 years ago.
I think those of my generation and earlier were not advocating missiles over guns but explaining why that had happened. Remember L2 decision makers formed their assumptions decades ago before GW 1. The Typhoon of today should have been service 15 years ago.
Thanks Safetepee, my comment was perhaps a little harsh bearing in mind the UK missiles age. Yes, guns tracking is hard but, as many veterans say, you need to get close!
orca, Mauser 27mm in Tornado GR1, selectable one or both guns and, selectable 1000 or 1700 rpm instantaneous rate of fire.
OAP
orca, Mauser 27mm in Tornado GR1, selectable one or both guns and, selectable 1000 or 1700 rpm instantaneous rate of fire.
OAP
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Today's Torygraph has a snippet about Typhoon and Brimstone:
"The unexpected campaign against Islamic militants" sort of says it all.
Decisions made decades earlier are no more than a blind guess. Maybe, like a true MRCA, like Nimrod, all bells and whistles should be designed in but not necessarily procured or fitted.
That Typoon was procured with a gun bay and guns were cheaper than ballast was fortuitous.
Back to guns, during Confrontation, it could have fallen to the Javelins, Sea Biden's and Sabres to warn off intruding Indonesia aircraft. Using a missile would have been problematical and not achieve the political aim.
"The unexpected campaign against Islamic militants" sort of says it all.
Decisions made decades earlier are no more than a blind guess. Maybe, like a true MRCA, like Nimrod, all bells and whistles should be designed in but not necessarily procured or fitted.
That Typoon was procured with a gun bay and guns were cheaper than ballast was fortuitous.
Back to guns, during Confrontation, it could have fallen to the Javelins, Sea Biden's and Sabres to warn off intruding Indonesia aircraft. Using a missile would have been problematical and not achieve the political aim.
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I think PN makes a very good and important point about the decisions that have to be made in the MoD, and which attract a lot of criticism in this and other forums.
He's absolutely right that the staffs have to make decisions a long time before the systems that arise from those decisions enter service. They have no better crystal balls than anyone else, but have always been forced to justify their decisions using a range of assumptions about how the systems will be used, the expected costs, and how efficient they will be. A good many of those assumptions will not be correct, but the reasons for that can vary.
In some cases, the 'errors' the staffs make are simply due to unforeseen changes in circumstances - again, it's easy (with hindsight) to say that the changes should have been foreseen, harder to get it right.
However, in some cases the assumptions made by the staffs are wrong because they simply don't know enough about the systems that they are developing requirements for. This is an area that I've worked with for a long time, and I have to say that requirements development is far and away the weakest area of the air staffs (all three services) that i've worked with.
Too often, requirements are driven by personal operational experience, or worse, the last sexy gadget they saw at an air show. Sorry if that sounds flip, but it's just too common. It's been especially true for UORs.
Turning to the subject of this thread, I don't think that the RAF have been 'anti-cannon' - but I do think that successive air staffs have been unable to develop a proper set of requirements for cannon (or gun) systems, mainly due to an almost total lack of the required R&D and analysis within industry or MoD to determine how requirements should be set and how far they should try to reach. Take a basic one - what is the required lethality of projectiles? Has anyone used the standard STANAG target set?
The best one I was involved with was the Lynx cabin mounted .50 calibre gun, which was precisely defined in terms of 'we want a gun that does this (classified) to this target (classified) at this range (classified)'. Surprisingly, it was an SF requirement.
The worst example I came across was for the attack helicopter, which merely specified that the gun system should 'be capable of engaging a target'. That was the entire (verbatim) SRD entry for a large, costly and complex system, which has become the most frequently used weapon system on the Apache. In a similar vein, Typhoon's requirements set specified a Mauser 27mm cannon with existing shells, again with no serious requirements for effect or lethality.
Yes, it was procured with a gun system, not just a bay. The gun system was taken out as a savings measure in the late 90s, at about the time the Aden 25 for the GR7 was cancelled. At that time, the Air Staffs were definitely assuming that no cannon would be required in the future. The ensuing saga of the Typhoon gun might be funny if the taxpayer hadn't had to pay so much to play 'Mauser hokey-cokey'.
So, that would be my plea - get the staffs informed and resourced to develop and write meaningful requirements for gun systems.
Best regards to those who do their best,
Engines
He's absolutely right that the staffs have to make decisions a long time before the systems that arise from those decisions enter service. They have no better crystal balls than anyone else, but have always been forced to justify their decisions using a range of assumptions about how the systems will be used, the expected costs, and how efficient they will be. A good many of those assumptions will not be correct, but the reasons for that can vary.
In some cases, the 'errors' the staffs make are simply due to unforeseen changes in circumstances - again, it's easy (with hindsight) to say that the changes should have been foreseen, harder to get it right.
However, in some cases the assumptions made by the staffs are wrong because they simply don't know enough about the systems that they are developing requirements for. This is an area that I've worked with for a long time, and I have to say that requirements development is far and away the weakest area of the air staffs (all three services) that i've worked with.
Too often, requirements are driven by personal operational experience, or worse, the last sexy gadget they saw at an air show. Sorry if that sounds flip, but it's just too common. It's been especially true for UORs.
Turning to the subject of this thread, I don't think that the RAF have been 'anti-cannon' - but I do think that successive air staffs have been unable to develop a proper set of requirements for cannon (or gun) systems, mainly due to an almost total lack of the required R&D and analysis within industry or MoD to determine how requirements should be set and how far they should try to reach. Take a basic one - what is the required lethality of projectiles? Has anyone used the standard STANAG target set?
The best one I was involved with was the Lynx cabin mounted .50 calibre gun, which was precisely defined in terms of 'we want a gun that does this (classified) to this target (classified) at this range (classified)'. Surprisingly, it was an SF requirement.
The worst example I came across was for the attack helicopter, which merely specified that the gun system should 'be capable of engaging a target'. That was the entire (verbatim) SRD entry for a large, costly and complex system, which has become the most frequently used weapon system on the Apache. In a similar vein, Typhoon's requirements set specified a Mauser 27mm cannon with existing shells, again with no serious requirements for effect or lethality.
Yes, it was procured with a gun system, not just a bay. The gun system was taken out as a savings measure in the late 90s, at about the time the Aden 25 for the GR7 was cancelled. At that time, the Air Staffs were definitely assuming that no cannon would be required in the future. The ensuing saga of the Typhoon gun might be funny if the taxpayer hadn't had to pay so much to play 'Mauser hokey-cokey'.
So, that would be my plea - get the staffs informed and resourced to develop and write meaningful requirements for gun systems.
Best regards to those who do their best,
Engines
Engines,
Until we a) post good people into RM jobs for 3-5 years b) train them properly c) reward them properly then we will continue to deal with the 'bright ideas club' with the 18-24 month 2x OJAR cycle.
There is no crystal ball, but the cannon is a classic example of being selective with history and over-optimistic about the future.
"Say what you need, not what you want - state a requirement, don't point at a solution..."
Until we a) post good people into RM jobs for 3-5 years b) train them properly c) reward them properly then we will continue to deal with the 'bright ideas club' with the 18-24 month 2x OJAR cycle.
There is no crystal ball, but the cannon is a classic example of being selective with history and over-optimistic about the future.
"Say what you need, not what you want - state a requirement, don't point at a solution..."