RAF Rivet Joint
Tourist, once again you demonstrate you don't know the difference between airworthiness and fitness for purpose, or airworthiness and serviceability. Your reply has nothing whatsoever to do with previous posts.
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Soldiers walk on untested terrain, sailors go out in storms and frankly sh1t happens.
Perhaps non-IED proof vehicles being used in IED strewn parts of the world and ships made from highly flammable materials aren't the the greatest examples of military procurement.
Tourist, once again you demonstrate you don't know the difference between airworthiness and fitness for purpose, or airworthiness and serviceability.
THS
Your examples are a little extreme and somewhat naive. It deosn't really matter what you do with military equipment, someone is going to find a way of defeating you. You might just as well have chosen the example of the 62 ton Challenger - significant armour didn't save that either. I also know quite a few army personnel who thought that Snatch was the best vehicle for patrolling many of the narrow streets in towns and villages in Iraq.
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I think its more indicative that the MACP cannot cover each and every Type that the MAA through the six-stage process.
The design is pretty specialist and whilst we are short of the capability, I dare say some level of risk acceptance (fully endorsed by our Lords and masters it seems with legal repercussions) is necessary, otherwise nothing will get done.
The point is, there IS accountability and risk acceptance, which is the big difference in my view between pre and post haddon cave.
The design is pretty specialist and whilst we are short of the capability, I dare say some level of risk acceptance (fully endorsed by our Lords and masters it seems with legal repercussions) is necessary, otherwise nothing will get done.
The point is, there IS accountability and risk acceptance, which is the big difference in my view between pre and post haddon cave.
I flew an aircraft for many years that apparently wasn't "airworthy". Did I worry about it? No, as far as we were concerned it wasn't unairworthy; it may have been unserviceable quite a lot of the time but we were all quire happy to fly it.
With respect, you and Tourist need to accept that one first attains, then maintains, airworthiness. And Fitness for Purpose, for all practical purposes, becomes a consideration only after the former. That is, much of what goes on is, and should be, invisible to you (front line). The whole thread is about what has happened before the release. It is being discussed here because the failures have been made public. Had the regulations been followed, this thread wouldn't exist. This "attaining airworthiness" is the phase Rivet Joint is in, and it has failed miserably because it has been known for years the problems exist, but (seemingly) something has only been done after the MAA (rightly) dug their heels in and refused to countenance the RJ project team's refusal to correct their mistakes and heed the audit. I'm being polite here because, as Chug says, the new MAA DG has been handed a poisoned chalice. He should be banging tables asking why the audit was ignored. The huge problems MoD are admitting is in many ways a smokescreen, hiding even bigger ones. That is, the consistent, flat refsual of many staffs to meet legal obligations, while being protected by VSOs and Ministers.
You were right to assume your aircraft was airworthy, because it had been released and you had to assume higher ups had done their jobs properly. The MAA exists because it is now ACKNOWLEDGED these higher ups didn't do their jobs. It was KNOWN they did not do their jobs over 20 years ago.
What I'd like to know is why no action was taken at the time (3 years ago in the case of RJ), especially given the history (e.g. Nimrod MRA4) of certain key staffs. When people have let you down to the tune of £4Bn+, why on earth keep them in the same job and allow them to retain delegation? I sincerely hope that is what is keeping MAA DG busy, not the simple task of getting an RTS.
I think THS makes a valid point. Much of this is about proper setting of Requirements and management of Configuration Milestones. Both are widely regarded as a waste of money by those he mentions with the laissez faire attitude. For example, again, by the same individuals responsible for Nimrod.
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You notice that we won that conflict, yes?
The fact you are discussing an aircraft after it has been released to service proves his point.
Thank you for pointing out that serviceability and airworthy are different, I'll say this once more - I KNOW! You and others need to accept that your views are different to ours. Some of us are prepared to accept that there is a risk in flying, that the evidence from another nation with 1000s of hours on type is sufficient. That your desire for 100% airworthiness, laudable though that is, would mean that NOTHING would EVER fly. You will never create a safety case that will cover every eventuality, it's just not possible.
It's pointless debating this any further with those not prepared to see a different viewpoint so I will leave this and all other airworthiness debates to a select few. I just hope the guys and girls on the RJ are enjoying flying the RAF version of the aircraft they have been flying on with the USAF for a few years. I'm off.
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To be fair the people banging on have at least a partial point
Why do we have a system that is going to allow the RJ's to enter service when it's clear they aren't following the current rule book?
the answer is, of course, that the current rules were put in place as a response to another situation. No-one thought it through properly (this IS the MoD gentlemen) and now we are caught in a dilemma of our own making
Rather than confess they'll do it on the sly and it may (I hope not) come and bite them in the bum in the future
I think we've said all that needs to be said on this TBH - no-one is going to have any effect and no-one on hear will shift their position
Why do we have a system that is going to allow the RJ's to enter service when it's clear they aren't following the current rule book?
the answer is, of course, that the current rules were put in place as a response to another situation. No-one thought it through properly (this IS the MoD gentlemen) and now we are caught in a dilemma of our own making
Rather than confess they'll do it on the sly and it may (I hope not) come and bite them in the bum in the future
I think we've said all that needs to be said on this TBH - no-one is going to have any effect and no-one on hear will shift their position
Military Risk
Just a different point of view, the a/c takes off from xxxx and ploughs into the centre o, Insert city/ town. (No I don't want this to happen)
Who is responsible and will they stand up and stick their chest out and admit ANY failures? Or will they hide?
Who is responsible and will they stand up and stick their chest out and admit ANY failures? Or will they hide?
HH:-
The 'system' that you refer to is Hammond who has the power to override the MAA, which says that it is grateful that he has done so. So that's all right then, isn't it? Isn't it?
Well, many if not all the current rules were put in place by the MAA which really had little choice as the last lot were shredded by Pol Pot, sorry RAF VSO's. However, I guess you mean the rules under which airworthiness used to be provided when... well, when airworthiness used to be provided.
So you have a choice, establish an independent MAA and MAAIB who will then have the unenviable and prolonged task of regaining that past system, or continue with the present farce whereby the MAA is seen to be a toothless tiger under the malevolent control of the MOD. If that is the case its demise cannot be far off in yet another exciting new round of freshly painted signage.
The downside is of course continuing avoidable airworthiness related accidents and entirely needless deaths, but you're up for that aren't you, Tourist and Roland?
Why do we have a system that is going to allow the RJ's to enter service when it's clear they aren't following the current rule book?
the current rules were put in place as a response to another situation.
So you have a choice, establish an independent MAA and MAAIB who will then have the unenviable and prolonged task of regaining that past system, or continue with the present farce whereby the MAA is seen to be a toothless tiger under the malevolent control of the MOD. If that is the case its demise cannot be far off in yet another exciting new round of freshly painted signage.
The downside is of course continuing avoidable airworthiness related accidents and entirely needless deaths, but you're up for that aren't you, Tourist and Roland?
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Chugalug
Yes, I am up for avoidable deaths in the interests of military capability if the only way to stop them is to neuter our forces.
A bit like the way we accept avoidable road deaths in their thousands in the interests of having a country that keeps operating.
We could reduce road deaths by mandating a 5 Mph speed limit throughout the country and cars surrounded in 20ft of foam, but nobody wants it despite it being an easy to implement fix. I wonder why?
Yes, I am up for avoidable deaths in the interests of military capability if the only way to stop them is to neuter our forces.
A bit like the way we accept avoidable road deaths in their thousands in the interests of having a country that keeps operating.
We could reduce road deaths by mandating a 5 Mph speed limit throughout the country and cars surrounded in 20ft of foam, but nobody wants it despite it being an easy to implement fix. I wonder why?
Tourist, there is absolutely no question that your position on this will be fulfilled. RJ simply joins all the other fleets that are known to be unairworthy, suspected of being unairworthy, or at least cannot be assumed to be airworthy. That is the reality of present day UK Military Aviation.
So we are not in conflict over that. My point is that for the future of UK Military Aviation we should agree upon taking the necessary steps of changing all that and slowly (and like all things that have been broken in an instance, it will be a long and slow process of repair) begin to reattain the process of airworthiness provision that no longer exists.
RJ proves, if nothing else, the irrelevance that is the present MAA. It has known that since inception RJ could never be issued with an RTS iaw the regulations. That merely resulted in the farce at Waddington until the SoS did what everyone expected him to do, and now one has been issued. Result! Well hardly, because as the DG MAA reminds us, it still doesn't accord with the regs and almost certainly never will.
Either we get to grips with this scandal and start the process of reverse by making the MAA and the MAAIB independent of the MOD and of each other, or we scrap them and leave the whole rotten mess in the maws of the MOD which created it anyway.
The MAA and MAAIB are worse than useless because they create an aura of respectability to a process driven by ignorance, incompetence, and gross negligence. If they hang around as is they will simply be kept busy overseeing a steadily increased airworthiness related accident rate that they were supposed to prevent. An expensive and pointless exercise in sheer waste.
So we are not in conflict over that. My point is that for the future of UK Military Aviation we should agree upon taking the necessary steps of changing all that and slowly (and like all things that have been broken in an instance, it will be a long and slow process of repair) begin to reattain the process of airworthiness provision that no longer exists.
RJ proves, if nothing else, the irrelevance that is the present MAA. It has known that since inception RJ could never be issued with an RTS iaw the regulations. That merely resulted in the farce at Waddington until the SoS did what everyone expected him to do, and now one has been issued. Result! Well hardly, because as the DG MAA reminds us, it still doesn't accord with the regs and almost certainly never will.
Either we get to grips with this scandal and start the process of reverse by making the MAA and the MAAIB independent of the MOD and of each other, or we scrap them and leave the whole rotten mess in the maws of the MOD which created it anyway.
The MAA and MAAIB are worse than useless because they create an aura of respectability to a process driven by ignorance, incompetence, and gross negligence. If they hang around as is they will simply be kept busy overseeing a steadily increased airworthiness related accident rate that they were supposed to prevent. An expensive and pointless exercise in sheer waste.
I'm going to reluctantly dip a toe in here....
I suspect the issue here is not one of eliminating all risk, but rather one of understanding the likely risks and their likely occurrence relative to how the aircraft is operated.
No-one is saying the aircraft is inherently unsafe - the millions of flying hours in USAF service suggests otherwise. However, that is NOT the same as understanding the risk. Nor are they suggesting that the three UK frames are somehow inferior - they're not AMARC regenerations, but rather direct KC135R conversions.
The issue for RJ appears to be that either Design disclosure for the original frame design is incomplete or inaccessible, or that the staff in MAA are either not competent or have not been sufficiently resourced to do the design assessment in time to meet the programme RTS. It's all coloured by the aftermath of H-C and people's experience / perception of the way the system appears to have been broken.
Tourist is entirely right in the idea that you cannot remove all risk from flying (especially military flying). However by the same token, a competent organisation ought to be able to understand the risks it is taking and certainly not attempt to suppress / subvert that process.
The first part of that last sentence requires a well-staffed competent engineering organisation and the last part indicates that at least some of the engineering oversight function (potentially the MAAIB) ought to be independent from the operator.
I suspect the issue here is not one of eliminating all risk, but rather one of understanding the likely risks and their likely occurrence relative to how the aircraft is operated.
No-one is saying the aircraft is inherently unsafe - the millions of flying hours in USAF service suggests otherwise. However, that is NOT the same as understanding the risk. Nor are they suggesting that the three UK frames are somehow inferior - they're not AMARC regenerations, but rather direct KC135R conversions.
The issue for RJ appears to be that either Design disclosure for the original frame design is incomplete or inaccessible, or that the staff in MAA are either not competent or have not been sufficiently resourced to do the design assessment in time to meet the programme RTS. It's all coloured by the aftermath of H-C and people's experience / perception of the way the system appears to have been broken.
Tourist is entirely right in the idea that you cannot remove all risk from flying (especially military flying). However by the same token, a competent organisation ought to be able to understand the risks it is taking and certainly not attempt to suppress / subvert that process.
The first part of that last sentence requires a well-staffed competent engineering organisation and the last part indicates that at least some of the engineering oversight function (potentially the MAAIB) ought to be independent from the operator.
Agreed Nab, but Regulation is also an oversight function, leading to enforcement when required. If that simple process had continued unhindered in the late 80's, instead of have being utterly subverted, then this and other airworthiness threads here might never have been needed.
Who did the subversion? The operator, aka the MOD, aka certain known VSO's. Their actions have been reported to Parliamentary Committees, MPs, Ministers, SOS's, Judicial Reviews, the media, and the police (both civil and military). The result is that they remain unmolested and unchallenged. Is the moral to draw from this that nothing can be done? Not in my book, on the contrary it suggests that plenty must be done, in order to avoid any further subversion.
Just as the MAAIB must be independent so must the MAA, and both must be manned by professionals that place their jobs above their careers. That means civilian DGs heading up both, and service personnel who are seconded so that their CoC is through those DGs and not the Services.
The MAAIB is an equally important check in such a system, but only kicks in when the system has already failed. Rather than seek merely to avoid further failures, far better to avoid them in the first place, especially when the failure infects a whole fleet, or many fleets. That is why both the MAA and MAAIB should be independent of each other as well as of the MOD.
You are right though, the key is in trained and experienced engineers in both organisations. The very people who were got rid of by RAF VSO's.
The point of all this is to maintain operational capability and not have it frittered away by avoidable accidents and compromised fleets, both of which exist now.
Who did the subversion? The operator, aka the MOD, aka certain known VSO's. Their actions have been reported to Parliamentary Committees, MPs, Ministers, SOS's, Judicial Reviews, the media, and the police (both civil and military). The result is that they remain unmolested and unchallenged. Is the moral to draw from this that nothing can be done? Not in my book, on the contrary it suggests that plenty must be done, in order to avoid any further subversion.
Just as the MAAIB must be independent so must the MAA, and both must be manned by professionals that place their jobs above their careers. That means civilian DGs heading up both, and service personnel who are seconded so that their CoC is through those DGs and not the Services.
The MAAIB is an equally important check in such a system, but only kicks in when the system has already failed. Rather than seek merely to avoid further failures, far better to avoid them in the first place, especially when the failure infects a whole fleet, or many fleets. That is why both the MAA and MAAIB should be independent of each other as well as of the MOD.
You are right though, the key is in trained and experienced engineers in both organisations. The very people who were got rid of by RAF VSO's.
The point of all this is to maintain operational capability and not have it frittered away by avoidable accidents and compromised fleets, both of which exist now.
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Gentleones, is it possible that the MAA has some very competent engineers and operators that have been following the extant rules diligently? Those rules that are possibly designed for the ideal situation of new aircraft procurement? And that, encountering a situation not of their making, are finding a pragmatic solution that, as they are so experianced and competent, they understand the risks all to well and can come to a sound judgement?? Or, as Tuc has already said he would use his engineering judgment to use outdated CA instructions over current regs, are the only competent people long out of service of the MOD and those left are so inferior? Not capable of reasoned, risk based, decisions based on the full available evidence which those inhabiting the hallowed grounds of pprune are not privy to! If this is the case, then it matters not one iota if the "devils pack" of the MAA & MilAAIB are totally independent of MOD, as cloning is not yet feasible for humans, the only competent ones can not be reproduced at a working age but with all that hard earned experiance in place, so there would be no SQEP available to man the desks.
Nice piece DBP.
"...engineering judgment to use outdated CA instructions over current regs..."
All aircraft, from the Wright's Flyer to today's F-35, have been built to "a specification".
Even today all aircraft are mainly held to their original specification (as that's the designed they were built to meet) and operators and authorities are supposed to have access to that spec when accepting new and second-hand aircraft - to compare it against its designed origins and current modified status.
Used aircraft are 'normally' assessed against their original spec or changed design spec. In former days New regulations were not normally used to assess an old aircraft and are not 'normally' retrospectively applied except for new modifications. The aircraft should meet its original or (certified) modified specifications.
Some aircraft have been modified to conduct new roles (Sentry, Sentinel, Shadow, Voyager etc.) and have developed new profiles and parameters in which they operate. (I'm not sure about Sentry here, but that not my point)
NORMALLY, development of changes such as those would be through defined and legal practices in design and production followed by thorough testing and retesting to confirm, define or rectify performance limitations.
"What if", years ago, some military/contractor establishments did not conduct said practices and just bolted/soldered some stuff together - that happened to work - and just left it at that? ...And then happened to sell some of that stuff years later?
How could anyone justify "using engineering judgement" without any supporting documentation or evidence?
(I am not saying that anyone has done this - it's just "What if?")
"...engineering judgment to use outdated CA instructions over current regs..."
All aircraft, from the Wright's Flyer to today's F-35, have been built to "a specification".
Even today all aircraft are mainly held to their original specification (as that's the designed they were built to meet) and operators and authorities are supposed to have access to that spec when accepting new and second-hand aircraft - to compare it against its designed origins and current modified status.
Used aircraft are 'normally' assessed against their original spec or changed design spec. In former days New regulations were not normally used to assess an old aircraft and are not 'normally' retrospectively applied except for new modifications. The aircraft should meet its original or (certified) modified specifications.
Some aircraft have been modified to conduct new roles (Sentry, Sentinel, Shadow, Voyager etc.) and have developed new profiles and parameters in which they operate. (I'm not sure about Sentry here, but that not my point)
NORMALLY, development of changes such as those would be through defined and legal practices in design and production followed by thorough testing and retesting to confirm, define or rectify performance limitations.
"What if", years ago, some military/contractor establishments did not conduct said practices and just bolted/soldered some stuff together - that happened to work - and just left it at that? ...And then happened to sell some of that stuff years later?
How could anyone justify "using engineering judgement" without any supporting documentation or evidence?
(I am not saying that anyone has done this - it's just "What if?")
Today's aircraft are not built to a Specification they are built to a contract. OK they start with a specification, but after all the PTs "we can't afford that" and the manufacturers "we don't want (can't) build that" and "our suppliers can only gives this" you end up with a contract for an aircraft that doesn't do what the customer wanted and doesn't meet 00-970 let alone Mil Specs. This is because it was built as a 'Civil Certified' design as that is seen as a quicker / cheaper route by the PT and the manufacturer who hasn't designed and built a military aircraft because they understand FAR 25 better than any Def Stan or Mil Specs.