Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
I was dismayed by this decision, and on 21 October started to write a letter to my MP, who is also the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, over this issue. I am not going to copy the entire letter here, but initial points included:
-I was shocked, this does not appear to have been thought through
-The RN has been unfairly hit
-The review says we will not need carriers for a decade, and writes them off as a Cold War legacy, yet says we need Challenger and Tornado (despite the prediction of nothing happening), which were also designed during the Cold War
-RN morale has (reportedly) nose dived, even the First Sea Lord's message acknowledged the risks involved and the problems in regenerating carrier aviation in a decade's time
-The SDSR has been rushed
-What were serving personnel, future recruits, families, allies, and adversaries to make of it?
-Why did Dr Fox look so angry during the PM's announcement?
After a few comments about CVF, I then went on to talk about the Harrier, and its utility in recent operations, the support contracts signed for it, and the fact that it can do air defence to an extent, particularly if supported by Sea King ASaCs or similar, pointed out that the US Marines use theirs in Afghanistan, suggested the retention of a small number, and queried what would happen to the aircraft.
Then I compared HMS Ships Illustrious and Ocean, pointing out that the latter is in need of an extensive refit and was built on the cheap, as opposed to the faster and more robust Illustrious. I also pointed out that retaining illustrious would mean Harriers could been embarked, even if they are American, Italian, or Spanish ones.
I then outlined my concerns, including that future cuts are more likely to kill future naval aviation. I noted that post Sea Harrier having embarked Harriers has been rare whilst the force has been committed to Afghanistan, but we could have had we really needed to. However, if we scrape through a decade with no disasters, the Treasury will insist we do not need then.
Then the skills issue. I noted that lots of personnel are involved in flying operations, and we can't send then all on exchange. Not only are pilots involved but also aircraft handlers, maintainers and armourers, the Navigating Officer, the OOW and his/her team, the Commander (Air) and his team, Marine Engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre, the operators and maintainers of various sensors, communications systems, and landing aids, Air Traffic Control, the Command team, and finally senior Officers. Without fixed wing flying at sea, how will their skills be maintained?
I then repeated that these things need practising at sea and cannot be easily simulated. I noted that (according to a baby WAFU I sort of know) it is taught that it would taken ten years to get to our current level of expertise from scratch. I recalled seeing a period of flying aboard Illustrious in late 2007, when I was surprised by how many parts of ship were involved. I also noted reading a magazine in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) identified the danger of naval aviators becoming unfamiliar with HM Ships.
I then went on to point out that the major events of the pasty twenty years were mostly unpredicted, so surely the future will be too. I also pointed the contribution our carriers and aircraft made during the first Gulf War, Bosnia, stand-offs with Saddam Huessein, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the war on terror, the invasion of Iraq, and the Lebanon NEO in 2006.I made a passing mention of the persisting threat to Falklands, noting that Argentine Super Etendards still conduct flying training from US and Brazilian carriers and Argentina has amphibious ships on its shopping list, and the increased belligerence in both words and deeds such as incursions into Falklands waters. I noted that a task group with the Harrier GR9 (supported by Sea King ASaCS etc) would still be able to engage aircraft beyond the range of shipborne missiles, and noted the reece and attack (against maritime or ground targets) capabilities. I noted that it will take a few years before all six Type 45 destroyers are in service with Sea Viper, and that experience from 1982 shows that even the best equipped ships can experience computer failure or manoeuvring and blocking firing arcs.
I also noted that the reduction in frigate numbers will make it likely that the APT(S) role will be gapped from time to time, as it was when HMS Northumberland was retasked for counter piracy stuff in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008. [Funnily enough, HMS York, in her way the Falklands, was diverted last week because of the Libyan situation.] I also noted that SSN numbers will fall below seven later this decade - so having one down South will be less likely. I also pointed out the Falklands patrol vessel Clyde will need refitting in 2012, but we might not be able to relieve her with a River class OPV due to the security requirements of the Olympics. I suggested that retaining Illustrious and a small number of Harriers would increase our options should something happen, and would help deter any Argentine hotheads.
I then mentioned possible Yemeni [this was before the recent terror plots] and Somali scenarios, as well as other events in Africa or the Middle East. Lastly I noted that carriers and amphibious vessels are suitable for use as flagships, which may be important as the four Type 22 frigates getting axed have been used in this role.
I then said that I did not think anyone with professional experience of naval aviation would think you could pick up the baton after ten years of having no carrier operations, and pointedly asked if any naval aviation professionals had been consulted. I also noted that I had heard suggestions that a possible defence review outcome might be Reservists taking over capabilities not currently needed. I then suggested that retaining Illustrious would allow the embarkation of Harriers (even if not our own) and allow skills to be retain, and that retaining a small number of Harriers would enhance this and allow us to react to unforeseen crises. I then repeated that I consider that a ten year gap of having no fixed wing carrier operations is incompatible with the desire to operate carriers in the future.
After posting this letter on 25 October, I continued to pay attention to related news in the media. I also waited for any reply. By February, no replied had come, so I chased it up with an a-mail to my MP's researcher, and took the opportunity to make a few more points. These included the fact that the £700 million support contracts signed for the Harrier included cancellation clauses, that the Captain of Ark Royal alluded to a four year gap until Queen Elizabeth enters service, that the December announcement of details of surface fleet cuts included retaining Illustrious until 2014, therefore most of this decade we should be able to embark Harriers. I also noted that Ocean is getting a very extensive £100 million refit - and wondered what work might be involved, then I noted the story in the Telegraph about Reservists and Harriers:
Navy Chiefs' plan to save jump jets
A last-ditch attempt has been made by the Royal Navy to save Harriers from the axe, with a proposal to allow reservist pilots to fly them.
As the last flight of the jump jets takes place at RAF Cottesmore today a plan, said to be backed by the First Sea Lord, has been put forward to preserve a rump of 20 Harriers.
Navy chiefs have warned of an "unbridgeable skills gap" for pilots needed to fly the Joint Strike Fighter off the new aircraft carriers that will come into service in 2020 if carrier training is stopped. Without the ability to fly off carriers for the next 10 years, Navy pilots will lose the skill of landing on rolling decks in bad weather and deck crews will not get the practice they needed to safely launch and recover aircraft.
The decision to scrap the Harrier in favour of the RAF's Tornados in the strategic defence review infuriated the Navy.
But hopes of saving the Harrier, of which there are 65 serviceable aircraft in total, will be raised at a meeting of the defence board in January.
A proposal will be made to allow Royal Navy Reserve pilots to continue flying the planes at weekends from Yeovilton, Somerset.
Senior naval officers say the RAF is rushing to retire the Harriers to make the defence review decision a "fait accompli" before alternatives are put in place."
Then I said I though that the idea had merit, since RNR personnel include all Fleet Air Arm trades, who can be mobilised for operations or exercises as well as shorter periods. I suggested money could be saved by having less aircraft doing less flying, needing less spares and support, and less personnel - many of whom would not need paying 365 days a year. I noted that the cancellation clauses will mean the support cost will not be zero in any circumstances, and also that the base closures would be unaffected, I also mentioned the possible MOD use of Wittering where the simulator is, and the role of Reservists as simulator instructors.
This week, I received a reply, dated 28 February. It acknowledged my letter(s) and explained the Government position. It was dated 28 February, but may have had parts of the reply drafted prior to my chasing up e-mail. After thanking me for the letter and e-mail, he went on to explain the Government's position. Instead of copying and pasting the entire letter, I shall attempt to summarise it: Direct quotes are in bold italics.
In the light of the need for financial cuts, defence spending had to be cut. It came down to a decision between Harrier and Tornado due to the greater savings achieved by withdrawing a type entirely. As Tornado is in Afghanistan, it was preferred, although Harrier is capable and flexible and has served the nation well.
The decade long capability gap was accepted as Afghanistan is the priority. Since the number of operational Harriers was cut to 32 in 2009 (Torpy strikes again?) it would be unable to sustain Afghan deployments and carrier operations with decent capacity for unexpected events. However, in the long term we need to regenerate carrier capability as we cannot take for granted the continued availability of host nation support that would allow us to deploy air power where we might need to. After mentioning the decision to have one carrier in extended readiness and the decision to opt for the F35C instead of F35B, the paragraph ends in: We are now investigating the optimum means of delivering this outcome.
I argued very persuasively about the problems of maintaining and regenerating the demanding skills and experience needed to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea. These were put forward and discussed at length during the SDSR process (before or after the announcement, I wonder)? Further work is being undertaken on mitigating this risk, through, amongst other things*, a programme of international exchanges, and significant investment of time and effort in regenerating its capacity when the new carriers and Joint Strike Fighter enter service.
Then he mentioned Illustrious and Ocean. Naturally Ocean is preferred for the LPH role, with an equipment storage area and the ability to operate landing craft. She is due a refit in "about two years time", so Illustrious is being retained until 2014 so that one is always available at readiness for operations. Nothing to do with RN senior bods the need to continue to be able to embark jets, then?
The Falklands issue got mentioned, apparently the assessment is capability gap will not risk their security, and the Government is committed to their protection, by maintaining a capable sea, ground, and air presence to deter and defend.
It concludes that this is a point of departure, not the end of the line, with a path to 2020 and beyond with reviews every five years. 2010-2015 is about rebalancing our strategic direction, and 2015-2020 will be about regenerating the carrier capability which is the overall strategy.
* Could other things include embarking US/Italian/Spanish Harriers, or perhaps some Indian Sea Harriers - a response to the aid we give them? How about still trying to periodically embark and operate UK owned Harriers?
I guess the issue of unexpected events and strategic changes is too controversial to think or talk about?
-I was shocked, this does not appear to have been thought through
-The RN has been unfairly hit
-The review says we will not need carriers for a decade, and writes them off as a Cold War legacy, yet says we need Challenger and Tornado (despite the prediction of nothing happening), which were also designed during the Cold War
-RN morale has (reportedly) nose dived, even the First Sea Lord's message acknowledged the risks involved and the problems in regenerating carrier aviation in a decade's time
-The SDSR has been rushed
-What were serving personnel, future recruits, families, allies, and adversaries to make of it?
-Why did Dr Fox look so angry during the PM's announcement?
After a few comments about CVF, I then went on to talk about the Harrier, and its utility in recent operations, the support contracts signed for it, and the fact that it can do air defence to an extent, particularly if supported by Sea King ASaCs or similar, pointed out that the US Marines use theirs in Afghanistan, suggested the retention of a small number, and queried what would happen to the aircraft.
Then I compared HMS Ships Illustrious and Ocean, pointing out that the latter is in need of an extensive refit and was built on the cheap, as opposed to the faster and more robust Illustrious. I also pointed out that retaining illustrious would mean Harriers could been embarked, even if they are American, Italian, or Spanish ones.
I then outlined my concerns, including that future cuts are more likely to kill future naval aviation. I noted that post Sea Harrier having embarked Harriers has been rare whilst the force has been committed to Afghanistan, but we could have had we really needed to. However, if we scrape through a decade with no disasters, the Treasury will insist we do not need then.
Then the skills issue. I noted that lots of personnel are involved in flying operations, and we can't send then all on exchange. Not only are pilots involved but also aircraft handlers, maintainers and armourers, the Navigating Officer, the OOW and his/her team, the Commander (Air) and his team, Marine Engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre, the operators and maintainers of various sensors, communications systems, and landing aids, Air Traffic Control, the Command team, and finally senior Officers. Without fixed wing flying at sea, how will their skills be maintained?
I then repeated that these things need practising at sea and cannot be easily simulated. I noted that (according to a baby WAFU I sort of know) it is taught that it would taken ten years to get to our current level of expertise from scratch. I recalled seeing a period of flying aboard Illustrious in late 2007, when I was surprised by how many parts of ship were involved. I also noted reading a magazine in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) identified the danger of naval aviators becoming unfamiliar with HM Ships.
I then went on to point out that the major events of the pasty twenty years were mostly unpredicted, so surely the future will be too. I also pointed the contribution our carriers and aircraft made during the first Gulf War, Bosnia, stand-offs with Saddam Huessein, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the war on terror, the invasion of Iraq, and the Lebanon NEO in 2006.I made a passing mention of the persisting threat to Falklands, noting that Argentine Super Etendards still conduct flying training from US and Brazilian carriers and Argentina has amphibious ships on its shopping list, and the increased belligerence in both words and deeds such as incursions into Falklands waters. I noted that a task group with the Harrier GR9 (supported by Sea King ASaCS etc) would still be able to engage aircraft beyond the range of shipborne missiles, and noted the reece and attack (against maritime or ground targets) capabilities. I noted that it will take a few years before all six Type 45 destroyers are in service with Sea Viper, and that experience from 1982 shows that even the best equipped ships can experience computer failure or manoeuvring and blocking firing arcs.
I also noted that the reduction in frigate numbers will make it likely that the APT(S) role will be gapped from time to time, as it was when HMS Northumberland was retasked for counter piracy stuff in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008. [Funnily enough, HMS York, in her way the Falklands, was diverted last week because of the Libyan situation.] I also noted that SSN numbers will fall below seven later this decade - so having one down South will be less likely. I also pointed out the Falklands patrol vessel Clyde will need refitting in 2012, but we might not be able to relieve her with a River class OPV due to the security requirements of the Olympics. I suggested that retaining Illustrious and a small number of Harriers would increase our options should something happen, and would help deter any Argentine hotheads.
I then mentioned possible Yemeni [this was before the recent terror plots] and Somali scenarios, as well as other events in Africa or the Middle East. Lastly I noted that carriers and amphibious vessels are suitable for use as flagships, which may be important as the four Type 22 frigates getting axed have been used in this role.
I then said that I did not think anyone with professional experience of naval aviation would think you could pick up the baton after ten years of having no carrier operations, and pointedly asked if any naval aviation professionals had been consulted. I also noted that I had heard suggestions that a possible defence review outcome might be Reservists taking over capabilities not currently needed. I then suggested that retaining Illustrious would allow the embarkation of Harriers (even if not our own) and allow skills to be retain, and that retaining a small number of Harriers would enhance this and allow us to react to unforeseen crises. I then repeated that I consider that a ten year gap of having no fixed wing carrier operations is incompatible with the desire to operate carriers in the future.
After posting this letter on 25 October, I continued to pay attention to related news in the media. I also waited for any reply. By February, no replied had come, so I chased it up with an a-mail to my MP's researcher, and took the opportunity to make a few more points. These included the fact that the £700 million support contracts signed for the Harrier included cancellation clauses, that the Captain of Ark Royal alluded to a four year gap until Queen Elizabeth enters service, that the December announcement of details of surface fleet cuts included retaining Illustrious until 2014, therefore most of this decade we should be able to embark Harriers. I also noted that Ocean is getting a very extensive £100 million refit - and wondered what work might be involved, then I noted the story in the Telegraph about Reservists and Harriers:
Navy Chiefs' plan to save jump jets
A last-ditch attempt has been made by the Royal Navy to save Harriers from the axe, with a proposal to allow reservist pilots to fly them.
As the last flight of the jump jets takes place at RAF Cottesmore today a plan, said to be backed by the First Sea Lord, has been put forward to preserve a rump of 20 Harriers.
Navy chiefs have warned of an "unbridgeable skills gap" for pilots needed to fly the Joint Strike Fighter off the new aircraft carriers that will come into service in 2020 if carrier training is stopped. Without the ability to fly off carriers for the next 10 years, Navy pilots will lose the skill of landing on rolling decks in bad weather and deck crews will not get the practice they needed to safely launch and recover aircraft.
The decision to scrap the Harrier in favour of the RAF's Tornados in the strategic defence review infuriated the Navy.
But hopes of saving the Harrier, of which there are 65 serviceable aircraft in total, will be raised at a meeting of the defence board in January.
A proposal will be made to allow Royal Navy Reserve pilots to continue flying the planes at weekends from Yeovilton, Somerset.
Senior naval officers say the RAF is rushing to retire the Harriers to make the defence review decision a "fait accompli" before alternatives are put in place."
Then I said I though that the idea had merit, since RNR personnel include all Fleet Air Arm trades, who can be mobilised for operations or exercises as well as shorter periods. I suggested money could be saved by having less aircraft doing less flying, needing less spares and support, and less personnel - many of whom would not need paying 365 days a year. I noted that the cancellation clauses will mean the support cost will not be zero in any circumstances, and also that the base closures would be unaffected, I also mentioned the possible MOD use of Wittering where the simulator is, and the role of Reservists as simulator instructors.
This week, I received a reply, dated 28 February. It acknowledged my letter(s) and explained the Government position. It was dated 28 February, but may have had parts of the reply drafted prior to my chasing up e-mail. After thanking me for the letter and e-mail, he went on to explain the Government's position. Instead of copying and pasting the entire letter, I shall attempt to summarise it: Direct quotes are in bold italics.
In the light of the need for financial cuts, defence spending had to be cut. It came down to a decision between Harrier and Tornado due to the greater savings achieved by withdrawing a type entirely. As Tornado is in Afghanistan, it was preferred, although Harrier is capable and flexible and has served the nation well.
The decade long capability gap was accepted as Afghanistan is the priority. Since the number of operational Harriers was cut to 32 in 2009 (Torpy strikes again?) it would be unable to sustain Afghan deployments and carrier operations with decent capacity for unexpected events. However, in the long term we need to regenerate carrier capability as we cannot take for granted the continued availability of host nation support that would allow us to deploy air power where we might need to. After mentioning the decision to have one carrier in extended readiness and the decision to opt for the F35C instead of F35B, the paragraph ends in: We are now investigating the optimum means of delivering this outcome.
I argued very persuasively about the problems of maintaining and regenerating the demanding skills and experience needed to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea. These were put forward and discussed at length during the SDSR process (before or after the announcement, I wonder)? Further work is being undertaken on mitigating this risk, through, amongst other things*, a programme of international exchanges, and significant investment of time and effort in regenerating its capacity when the new carriers and Joint Strike Fighter enter service.
Then he mentioned Illustrious and Ocean. Naturally Ocean is preferred for the LPH role, with an equipment storage area and the ability to operate landing craft. She is due a refit in "about two years time", so Illustrious is being retained until 2014 so that one is always available at readiness for operations. Nothing to do with RN senior bods the need to continue to be able to embark jets, then?
The Falklands issue got mentioned, apparently the assessment is capability gap will not risk their security, and the Government is committed to their protection, by maintaining a capable sea, ground, and air presence to deter and defend.
It concludes that this is a point of departure, not the end of the line, with a path to 2020 and beyond with reviews every five years. 2010-2015 is about rebalancing our strategic direction, and 2015-2020 will be about regenerating the carrier capability which is the overall strategy.
* Could other things include embarking US/Italian/Spanish Harriers, or perhaps some Indian Sea Harriers - a response to the aid we give them? How about still trying to periodically embark and operate UK owned Harriers?
I guess the issue of unexpected events and strategic changes is too controversial to think or talk about?
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Methinks the FAA does protest too much
WEBF, perhaps you could remind us who got rid of the FA2 and why? Because, it seems strange that the RN, having been given a share of RAF cockpits on the formation of JFH, has little right to complain about RAF cuts. If the govt thought they could do without a Carrier, why should the RAF maintain a Carrier capable aircraft?
I like you regret these cuts, but making this argument on the basis that the RAF was behind it is a little disingenuous - ask the 170 trainees who have just lost their jobs and the RAF aircrew from the Nimrod, F3, GR4 and Harrier squadrons who have all had to endure closures ahead of time. To date the FAA have lost nothing like this amount.
The real issue here is the terrible reductions within the RN surface fleet, not the survival of an in increasingly small FAA.
I happen to believe that if the RAF had been filling every fast jet cockpit it would have still gone for cutting Harrier - so your argument is really about the FAA and not the Harrier, and the Govt took care of the carrier element (not the RAF).
I like you regret these cuts, but making this argument on the basis that the RAF was behind it is a little disingenuous - ask the 170 trainees who have just lost their jobs and the RAF aircrew from the Nimrod, F3, GR4 and Harrier squadrons who have all had to endure closures ahead of time. To date the FAA have lost nothing like this amount.
The real issue here is the terrible reductions within the RN surface fleet, not the survival of an in increasingly small FAA.
I happen to believe that if the RAF had been filling every fast jet cockpit it would have still gone for cutting Harrier - so your argument is really about the FAA and not the Harrier, and the Govt took care of the carrier element (not the RAF).
Sorry WEBF, but I have to side with Captain Pugwash. Far too much has been said about the Harrier's all round panacea capability. It is after all a Battlefield Support Fighter and nothing more. I don't care what upgrades to the GR7 into the GR9 have been made or how it coped in Afghanistan, the remaining Harrier Force would have been much harder pressed to maintain operations in Afghanistan and still provide a Carrier full to go and participate in whatever venture or scheme Cameron had in mind for Libya.
But as Pugwash says, this was an R.A.F. asset. It is they who were ordered to lose one of the three remaining Fast Jet combat types. Even after the loss of two GR4 Squadrons they're still left with 5 squadrons to the single unit of Harriers they would be left with, if they ditched the Tornado instead. This might have been great for the prestige of Naval Aviation and popular as a result of the public appeal surrounding the Harrier, but it would have been a much greater disaster, than it is, for the R.A.F's already over diminished frontline. As for alluding to ditching the Typhoon for the sake of retaining jump jets, you've got to be joking.
I simply don't buy the argument that the Tornado is useless, just because it can't hover and operate from a Carrier deck. I've not heard any complaints yet about its operation in theatre. I'm sure there were no complaints about the Harrier either, but while I'd sign up anytime to retain the whole lot, if one has to go, then let it be the smallest cut of all, not the biggest.
FB
But as Pugwash says, this was an R.A.F. asset. It is they who were ordered to lose one of the three remaining Fast Jet combat types. Even after the loss of two GR4 Squadrons they're still left with 5 squadrons to the single unit of Harriers they would be left with, if they ditched the Tornado instead. This might have been great for the prestige of Naval Aviation and popular as a result of the public appeal surrounding the Harrier, but it would have been a much greater disaster, than it is, for the R.A.F's already over diminished frontline. As for alluding to ditching the Typhoon for the sake of retaining jump jets, you've got to be joking.
I simply don't buy the argument that the Tornado is useless, just because it can't hover and operate from a Carrier deck. I've not heard any complaints yet about its operation in theatre. I'm sure there were no complaints about the Harrier either, but while I'd sign up anytime to retain the whole lot, if one has to go, then let it be the smallest cut of all, not the biggest.
FB
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WEBF, could I just say, as a bystander to all of this, would you stop wasting people's time over this and more importantly your own time. Put your effort in to your family/job/hobby. Writing letters is not going to bring back the Harrier and it is simply wasting people's time, who are extremely busy, having to respond to them; you simply won't get the answer that you're looking for.
Let it go, the Harrier is not coming back. For your own sake, stop wasting so much of your time on this topic. Life has more exciting things to offer!
Let it go, the Harrier is not coming back. For your own sake, stop wasting so much of your time on this topic. Life has more exciting things to offer!
Cap'n Pugwash/FB
I have actually never said either Tornado or Typhoon was useless. Others have, but not me. Nor have I ever suggested binning either. Nor have I ever blamed the big bad Crabs for these cuts. Who got rid of the mighty Sea Harrier FA2? Err, that would have been the last Government/HM Treasury. Surely after the 1998 SDR all jets belonged to what was then Strike Command - 3 Group (which was quickly disbanded)?
I don't pretend to understand the interservice politics that may be a factor here.
Perhaps you might like to read the Ministerial corrspondence (post 307) that I discussed in my post last night?
Wrathmonk
Was that when the RAF got slagged off for poor strafing by Harrier? The irony being, of course, that GR7/9 never had a cannon...
FL
Not a total waste of time, as it encourages the Ministers to talk to the SO1/SO2 level subject matter experts. As for being busy - well, they will be even more busy if our defence policy is on the wrong side of the Geopolitical changes in the Middle East and North Africa.*
Life has exciting things to offer - where?
IO
Some of the pre SDSR speculation talked of losing ten or more frigates and destroyers and having SSN numbers reduced - maybe to just four. That would have been even worse.
*Talking of which: 'Random. Fallacious. Arrogant.': The Government's confused defence strategy
The defence review has weakened key air and sea capabilities, with the scrapping of the Harrier jets and HMS Ark Royal one of the most controversial decisions. Senior military figures are so concerned that they have produced a briefing now being circulated within the Cabinet which contradicts Mr Cameron's optimism that Britain could play any meaningful role if a no-fly zone was needed over Libya. It warns: "The resources required in terms of land-based fighter aircraft and supporting units for the enforcement of such a zone are significantly greater than those available within the British military inventory." It adds that if the Harriers and Ark Royal had been kept in service, "Britain would now be in an incommensurably better position to assist in the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya."
Also....
But even General Sir Richard Dannatt, a Conservative adviser and former chief of defence staff, backed the call for a rethink: "There are moments in history when any government might wish to re-evaluate its security and defence policies and priorities – recent events in North Africa and the Middle East constitute one such moment. Even though the Government's SDSR is only months old, its conclusions should now be tested against the world as it looks today – last year seems a long time ago."
I have actually never said either Tornado or Typhoon was useless. Others have, but not me. Nor have I ever suggested binning either. Nor have I ever blamed the big bad Crabs for these cuts. Who got rid of the mighty Sea Harrier FA2? Err, that would have been the last Government/HM Treasury. Surely after the 1998 SDR all jets belonged to what was then Strike Command - 3 Group (which was quickly disbanded)?
I don't pretend to understand the interservice politics that may be a factor here.
Perhaps you might like to read the Ministerial corrspondence (post 307) that I discussed in my post last night?
Wrathmonk
Was that when the RAF got slagged off for poor strafing by Harrier? The irony being, of course, that GR7/9 never had a cannon...
FL
Not a total waste of time, as it encourages the Ministers to talk to the SO1/SO2 level subject matter experts. As for being busy - well, they will be even more busy if our defence policy is on the wrong side of the Geopolitical changes in the Middle East and North Africa.*
Life has exciting things to offer - where?
IO
Some of the pre SDSR speculation talked of losing ten or more frigates and destroyers and having SSN numbers reduced - maybe to just four. That would have been even worse.
*Talking of which: 'Random. Fallacious. Arrogant.': The Government's confused defence strategy
The defence review has weakened key air and sea capabilities, with the scrapping of the Harrier jets and HMS Ark Royal one of the most controversial decisions. Senior military figures are so concerned that they have produced a briefing now being circulated within the Cabinet which contradicts Mr Cameron's optimism that Britain could play any meaningful role if a no-fly zone was needed over Libya. It warns: "The resources required in terms of land-based fighter aircraft and supporting units for the enforcement of such a zone are significantly greater than those available within the British military inventory." It adds that if the Harriers and Ark Royal had been kept in service, "Britain would now be in an incommensurably better position to assist in the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya."
Also....
But even General Sir Richard Dannatt, a Conservative adviser and former chief of defence staff, backed the call for a rethink: "There are moments in history when any government might wish to re-evaluate its security and defence policies and priorities – recent events in North Africa and the Middle East constitute one such moment. Even though the Government's SDSR is only months old, its conclusions should now be tested against the world as it looks today – last year seems a long time ago."
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Letter to the Independent on Sunday 6 Mar 11
Letter in full below.....quite a signature list from all 3 services, all sides of both Houses and senior military academics....
Dear David Cameron,
We accept the need for savings to be made in the defence budget, against a background of the wider economic situation and the history of overspends at the Ministry of Defence.
However, the Strategic Defence and Security Review seems to have been driven by financial rather than military considerations. Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have highlighted the unpredictability of global security – there was no mention of North Africa in the SDSR at all.
The security landscape has radically changed and some of the assumptions on which the review was based should be reconsidered.
The irony of HMS Cumberland, which faces being decommissioned, playing a key role in evacuations from Benghazi is not lost on those who take an interest in the future of the Royal Navy. The announcement of redundancies in the RAF on the same day as speculation about enforcing a no-fly zone was also regrettable.
Britain's ability to play a role in the event of military action in Libya has been called into question in recent days. In light of the new potential threats posed by unrest in North Africa, we urge David Cameron, the Prime Minister, and Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, to reopen the SDSR and ensure the forces are properly structured and adequately funded to meet the nation's requirements.
Signed:
General Sir Michael Rose;
Admiral Lord West, former First Sea Lord and Labour minister;
Rear Admiral Scott Lidbetter, chairman of the Fleet Air Arm Officers' Association;
Commodore Steve Jermy, former strategy director, British embassy, Kabul;
Colonel Clive Fairweather, former SAS Commander;
Commander Nigel 'Sharkey' MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC;
Sir Michael Graydon, former Air Chief Marshal;
Major General Julian Thompson;
Sir Paddy Hine, former Air Chief Marshal;
Baroness Brenda Dean, chairman, House of Lords defence group;
Lord George Foulkes;
Colonel Peter Walton;
Sir Nicholas Bonsor, UKNDA vice-president, former Foreign Office minister; Rear-Admiral Jeremy Larken;
Col David Benest;
Capt Michael Clapp RN;
Cdr Graham Edmonds RN;
Lt-Cdr Richard Little RN, UKNDA life member;
Randolph Churchill, UKNDA vice-president, former naval officer;
Andrew Roberts, journalist, historian and author, UKNDA vice-president; Peter Caddick-Adams, military historian;
Bruce Dalton, retired Army officer;
Azeem Ibrahim, UKNDA vice-president, businessman;
Kees van Haperen, UKNDA chief executive;
Andy Smith, journalist and military historian, UKNDA board member; Stuart Notholt, journalist and author, UKNDA board member;
Michael Codner, director of military sciences, RUSI;
Bob Ainsworth, former Labour defence secretary;
Jim Murphy, shadow defence secretary;
Gisela Stuart, Labour MP;
Mike Hancock, LibDem MP;
Sandra Osborne, Labour MP;
Admiral Sir Jeremy Black GBE KCB DSO, former Commander in Chief naval home command;
Dr Anthony J Cumming, author of 'The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain' and winner of the Julian Corbett prize for research in modern naval history, 2006;
Professor Greg Kennedy, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London;
Sir Benjamin Bathurst GCB, former admiral of the fleet;
Dr Duncan Redford, Centre for Maritime Historical Studies, University of Exeter;
David Hobbs, former commander Royal Navy;
Captain Alan Hensher RN;
Admiral Sir John Forster 'Sandy' Woodward;
Lieutenant General Sir Hew Pike, KCB, DSO, MBE;
Baroness Ann Taylor of Bolton, minister for defence procurement 2007;
Baroness Helen Liddell of Coatdyke, SoS Scotland 2001-03;
Dr GH Bennett, naval historian, University of Plymouth;
Julie McCarthy, chief executive, Army Families Federation;
Sir Peter Squire, former chief of air staff;
Major General Patrick Cordingley, commander of the Desert Rats during the first Gulf War;
Professor Eric Grove, professor of naval history at Salford University;
Lord Williams of Elvel, member of Lords EU sub-committee on defence and foreign affairs;
Sir Patrick Duffy, former navy minister."
Dear David Cameron,
We accept the need for savings to be made in the defence budget, against a background of the wider economic situation and the history of overspends at the Ministry of Defence.
However, the Strategic Defence and Security Review seems to have been driven by financial rather than military considerations. Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have highlighted the unpredictability of global security – there was no mention of North Africa in the SDSR at all.
The security landscape has radically changed and some of the assumptions on which the review was based should be reconsidered.
The irony of HMS Cumberland, which faces being decommissioned, playing a key role in evacuations from Benghazi is not lost on those who take an interest in the future of the Royal Navy. The announcement of redundancies in the RAF on the same day as speculation about enforcing a no-fly zone was also regrettable.
Britain's ability to play a role in the event of military action in Libya has been called into question in recent days. In light of the new potential threats posed by unrest in North Africa, we urge David Cameron, the Prime Minister, and Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, to reopen the SDSR and ensure the forces are properly structured and adequately funded to meet the nation's requirements.
Signed:
General Sir Michael Rose;
Admiral Lord West, former First Sea Lord and Labour minister;
Rear Admiral Scott Lidbetter, chairman of the Fleet Air Arm Officers' Association;
Commodore Steve Jermy, former strategy director, British embassy, Kabul;
Colonel Clive Fairweather, former SAS Commander;
Commander Nigel 'Sharkey' MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC;
Sir Michael Graydon, former Air Chief Marshal;
Major General Julian Thompson;
Sir Paddy Hine, former Air Chief Marshal;
Baroness Brenda Dean, chairman, House of Lords defence group;
Lord George Foulkes;
Colonel Peter Walton;
Sir Nicholas Bonsor, UKNDA vice-president, former Foreign Office minister; Rear-Admiral Jeremy Larken;
Col David Benest;
Capt Michael Clapp RN;
Cdr Graham Edmonds RN;
Lt-Cdr Richard Little RN, UKNDA life member;
Randolph Churchill, UKNDA vice-president, former naval officer;
Andrew Roberts, journalist, historian and author, UKNDA vice-president; Peter Caddick-Adams, military historian;
Bruce Dalton, retired Army officer;
Azeem Ibrahim, UKNDA vice-president, businessman;
Kees van Haperen, UKNDA chief executive;
Andy Smith, journalist and military historian, UKNDA board member; Stuart Notholt, journalist and author, UKNDA board member;
Michael Codner, director of military sciences, RUSI;
Bob Ainsworth, former Labour defence secretary;
Jim Murphy, shadow defence secretary;
Gisela Stuart, Labour MP;
Mike Hancock, LibDem MP;
Sandra Osborne, Labour MP;
Admiral Sir Jeremy Black GBE KCB DSO, former Commander in Chief naval home command;
Dr Anthony J Cumming, author of 'The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain' and winner of the Julian Corbett prize for research in modern naval history, 2006;
Professor Greg Kennedy, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London;
Sir Benjamin Bathurst GCB, former admiral of the fleet;
Dr Duncan Redford, Centre for Maritime Historical Studies, University of Exeter;
David Hobbs, former commander Royal Navy;
Captain Alan Hensher RN;
Admiral Sir John Forster 'Sandy' Woodward;
Lieutenant General Sir Hew Pike, KCB, DSO, MBE;
Baroness Ann Taylor of Bolton, minister for defence procurement 2007;
Baroness Helen Liddell of Coatdyke, SoS Scotland 2001-03;
Dr GH Bennett, naval historian, University of Plymouth;
Julie McCarthy, chief executive, Army Families Federation;
Sir Peter Squire, former chief of air staff;
Major General Patrick Cordingley, commander of the Desert Rats during the first Gulf War;
Professor Eric Grove, professor of naval history at Salford University;
Lord Williams of Elvel, member of Lords EU sub-committee on defence and foreign affairs;
Sir Patrick Duffy, former navy minister."
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Sir Hardly....
Just to paraphrase the letter then:
Give us back the carriers, naval fixed wing better than everyone elses, navy navy navy, 5 harriers (OS version, no radar, sub sonic no link, old heaters only) could enforce a Nfz over country the size of France by them selves, crabs are bastards, navy navy navy, you did this to us, we played no part in any decision making process, navy navy navy.
Signed Navy various.
Let it go, your bed was made in no small part by yourselves.
Just to paraphrase the letter then:
Give us back the carriers, naval fixed wing better than everyone elses, navy navy navy, 5 harriers (OS version, no radar, sub sonic no link, old heaters only) could enforce a Nfz over country the size of France by them selves, crabs are bastards, navy navy navy, you did this to us, we played no part in any decision making process, navy navy navy.
Signed Navy various.
Let it go, your bed was made in no small part by yourselves.
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"Signed Navy various"
Sir Peter Squire, former chief of air staff
Sir Michael Graydon, former Air Chief Marshal
Sir Paddy Hine, former Air Chief Marshal
Have the above been "turned" by the Navy
Sir Peter Squire, former chief of air staff
Sir Michael Graydon, former Air Chief Marshal
Sir Paddy Hine, former Air Chief Marshal
Have the above been "turned" by the Navy
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Sir Hardly....
Just to paraphrase the letter then:
Give us back the carriers, naval fixed wing better than everyone elses, navy navy navy, 5 harriers (OS version, no radar, sub sonic no link, old heaters only) could enforce a Nfz over country the size of France by them selves, crabs are bastards, navy navy navy, you did this to us, we played no part in any decision making process, navy navy navy.
Just to paraphrase the letter then:
Give us back the carriers, naval fixed wing better than everyone elses, navy navy navy, 5 harriers (OS version, no radar, sub sonic no link, old heaters only) could enforce a Nfz over country the size of France by them selves, crabs are bastards, navy navy navy, you did this to us, we played no part in any decision making process, navy navy navy.
Admiral Sir John "Sandy" Woodward, commander of Britain's taskforce in the Falklands War, accused the former chief of the defence staff Lord Stirrup of privately lobbying Mr Cameron to axe the Harrier. Lord Stirrup rejected the "completely false" allegations yesterday, claiming that "the whole issue of which aircraft to reduce was debated extensively".
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Fair one fellas, but it does seem that a lot of the ranting about the loss of harrier and carrier aviation for the uk (a decision that I massively disagree with by the way) follows the lines of my above paraphrased letter, and that the navy have look closer to home rather than slag off everyone else off to try and get their stuff back.....
That is all.
That is all.
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Read the letter more carefully
The letter refers to HMS Cumberland and trainee pilot redundancies – this was how the RAF signatures were secured.
On the basis of recent events, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the alleged fortune telling of the SDSR may have been a little off. However, this letter does not make any better suggestions on what the future might hold or what we might need to meet it.
NEOs are part of normal contingency planning and I cannot think of one that would normally require a NFZ or serious combat power to affect it. That said, this one has got a bit messy, but that is through our own delays and incompetence rather than a lack of military capability.
Notably absent is any reference to Carriers or Harriers in the letter, only some of the journalists make an implied link (presumably fed their lines by the usual suspects).
This debate should now be moved to the “Libya NFZ” thread, rather than “axing Harriers is bonkers”. A proper NFZ would have to be implemented by ac properly equipped to respond to a threat. One with eyes, legs and a long pole, not a blind jumping bean with a happy stick!
Last time these RN grandees made a claim for bringing back the carrier it was for the Falklands (they clearly didn’t see this coming either), maybe we should check to see just who these Libyan rebels are, could be the FAA in disguise
On the basis of recent events, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the alleged fortune telling of the SDSR may have been a little off. However, this letter does not make any better suggestions on what the future might hold or what we might need to meet it.
NEOs are part of normal contingency planning and I cannot think of one that would normally require a NFZ or serious combat power to affect it. That said, this one has got a bit messy, but that is through our own delays and incompetence rather than a lack of military capability.
Notably absent is any reference to Carriers or Harriers in the letter, only some of the journalists make an implied link (presumably fed their lines by the usual suspects).
This debate should now be moved to the “Libya NFZ” thread, rather than “axing Harriers is bonkers”. A proper NFZ would have to be implemented by ac properly equipped to respond to a threat. One with eyes, legs and a long pole, not a blind jumping bean with a happy stick!
Last time these RN grandees made a claim for bringing back the carrier it was for the Falklands (they clearly didn’t see this coming either), maybe we should check to see just who these Libyan rebels are, could be the FAA in disguise
WEBF...whilst you may not have directly slagged other ac types, you have posted enough links/quotes that do for members here to reasonably assume that you support the views of that which you quote. If you don't support them, you ought to make that clear.
It is very disingenuous of those ex-(emphasis on the ex)-military officers to try and "save the carrier" by linking it to anything and everything. How would AR and its handful of GR9s have enforced a NFZ? Sure, AD is needed as well as an ability to monitor and strike if necessary, but to claim we should have them back to do that job, at the huge cost it would take, is a fairly slack argument.
In an ideal world, we'd have 3 or 4 carriers with several dozen swing-role fighters embarked. But we don't have that kind of money, and claiming that a tiny through-deck cruiser with a handful of limited GA ac aboard would be good enough is simply stupid. As for blaming the RAF when the Navy decision to cut the FA2 signed the death warrant of carrier aviation for the forseeable future, and claiming that by cutting Tornado, enough could have been saved to leave the UK with a small boat and 3 sqns of GR9s as our only strike ac capability is a laughable defence policy.
Please......stop it.
It is very disingenuous of those ex-(emphasis on the ex)-military officers to try and "save the carrier" by linking it to anything and everything. How would AR and its handful of GR9s have enforced a NFZ? Sure, AD is needed as well as an ability to monitor and strike if necessary, but to claim we should have them back to do that job, at the huge cost it would take, is a fairly slack argument.
In an ideal world, we'd have 3 or 4 carriers with several dozen swing-role fighters embarked. But we don't have that kind of money, and claiming that a tiny through-deck cruiser with a handful of limited GA ac aboard would be good enough is simply stupid. As for blaming the RAF when the Navy decision to cut the FA2 signed the death warrant of carrier aviation for the forseeable future, and claiming that by cutting Tornado, enough could have been saved to leave the UK with a small boat and 3 sqns of GR9s as our only strike ac capability is a laughable defence policy.
Please......stop it.
1. No, never favoured getting rid of Tornado, and cetainly not Typhoon. Never having written any articles I am not accountable for the more loony bits they may contain.
2. WRT to carriers, any capability is better than none. Why incidentally would we be trying to enforce a No Fly Zones by ourselves? However, a carrier would be a worthy contribution to coalition operations. Apart from the jets, and Sea King ASaCS, there would also provide Merlin for ASW and maritime search/patrol, and command/control facilities.
3. As MinAF has said, MOD isn't sure how to maintain the skill set needed for fixed wing flying operations at sea. Why not something like.......err......... embarking Harriers?
4. The world has changed a lot since October.
2. WRT to carriers, any capability is better than none. Why incidentally would we be trying to enforce a No Fly Zones by ourselves? However, a carrier would be a worthy contribution to coalition operations. Apart from the jets, and Sea King ASaCS, there would also provide Merlin for ASW and maritime search/patrol, and command/control facilities.
3. As MinAF has said, MOD isn't sure how to maintain the skill set needed for fixed wing flying operations at sea. Why not something like.......err......... embarking Harriers?
4. The world has changed a lot since October.
WEBF - perhaps the Navy should have thought of all this when they consigned the carriers to the operational waste bin when they pulled the FA2.
"Any capability is better than none"? At what expense? What are we prepared to lose to maintain 12 short-range limited-weather bombers? The Navy (and the ex-Navy gaggle who cannot let it go) would appear to be happy with completely losing any long range deep strike capability in order to maintain their floating runway/gin palace. Is it any wonder they have no credibility?
"Any capability is better than none"? At what expense? What are we prepared to lose to maintain 12 short-range limited-weather bombers? The Navy (and the ex-Navy gaggle who cannot let it go) would appear to be happy with completely losing any long range deep strike capability in order to maintain their floating runway/gin palace. Is it any wonder they have no credibility?
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JAJ,
Sorry, but I can't let some of this stuff go unchallenged. I worked with the RAF for over 9 years, work with them now and unreservedly consider them the most professional air force in the world. Bar none. But your reply..?
The RN did not can FA2 - the MoD did, at the suggestion of the RAF. God help us, some RN types even agreed, but it was an RAF decision - after all, they owned the aircraft by that time. The money was needed to fund the over cost and under funded GR7 to 9 conversion programme. Sort of ironic that the money saved then went to waste when the rest of the Harriers were canned...
The decision to can the Harriers is done and dusted. I lament it, but there it is. However, to put the choice in your way is intellectually dishonest. Retaining the Harrier force would give us a lot more than 12 aircraft, as you well know. It's like saying that keeping Tornadoes gives us 8 aircraft in theatre. Similarly, calling a Harrier 'short range, limited weather', while indirectly saying that Tornado is a 'long range' aircraft is laughable. Tornado is a very, very good strike aircraft, but long range? No. And in any case, I was under the impression that Typhoon has an excellent strike capability, according to recent RAF press releases.
Calling the people who signed up to the letter a 'gaggle' is another cheap shot. Looking at the list, there are more than a few that are not ex-Navy. Paddy Hine and Peter Squire for example. Both distinguished and respected people.
However, the thing I really dislike is your snide reference to a 'floating runway/gin palace'. A carrier is a floating air station, plus command centre, plus lots of other capabilities. More than a runway. It's a fighting unit, goes to war, in harm's way if required. Very many of my former service colleagues (RAF and RN) have done that very thing. I'm sure that you'd be upset if someone referred to Bastion as a 'beer tent'.
Come on, let's raise the tone here a bit. If you can't, happy to take it outside, via PM.
Yours ever,
Engines
Sorry, but I can't let some of this stuff go unchallenged. I worked with the RAF for over 9 years, work with them now and unreservedly consider them the most professional air force in the world. Bar none. But your reply..?
The RN did not can FA2 - the MoD did, at the suggestion of the RAF. God help us, some RN types even agreed, but it was an RAF decision - after all, they owned the aircraft by that time. The money was needed to fund the over cost and under funded GR7 to 9 conversion programme. Sort of ironic that the money saved then went to waste when the rest of the Harriers were canned...
The decision to can the Harriers is done and dusted. I lament it, but there it is. However, to put the choice in your way is intellectually dishonest. Retaining the Harrier force would give us a lot more than 12 aircraft, as you well know. It's like saying that keeping Tornadoes gives us 8 aircraft in theatre. Similarly, calling a Harrier 'short range, limited weather', while indirectly saying that Tornado is a 'long range' aircraft is laughable. Tornado is a very, very good strike aircraft, but long range? No. And in any case, I was under the impression that Typhoon has an excellent strike capability, according to recent RAF press releases.
Calling the people who signed up to the letter a 'gaggle' is another cheap shot. Looking at the list, there are more than a few that are not ex-Navy. Paddy Hine and Peter Squire for example. Both distinguished and respected people.
However, the thing I really dislike is your snide reference to a 'floating runway/gin palace'. A carrier is a floating air station, plus command centre, plus lots of other capabilities. More than a runway. It's a fighting unit, goes to war, in harm's way if required. Very many of my former service colleagues (RAF and RN) have done that very thing. I'm sure that you'd be upset if someone referred to Bastion as a 'beer tent'.
Come on, let's raise the tone here a bit. If you can't, happy to take it outside, via PM.
Yours ever,
Engines