Military AircrewA forum for the professionals who fly the non-civilian hardware, and the backroom boys and girls without whom nothing would leave the ground. Army, Navy and Airforces of the World, all equally welcome here.
RE your post #5271
There should have been radar data available from Lowther Hill which had both secondary and primary radar relayed back to ScotMil which could have been of great value in analysisng this crash – I have run a propagation model for an a/c at 500ft crossing from NI coast up to the Mull and got direct line of sight coverage right up to the Mull – further, I have given an example (years back) on this thread of contact with Lowther Hill radar for an Islander (air ambulance) that crashed into the sea a lot further away (to the west of Mac aerodrome) and arguably one would have thought that a broadside Chinook would have had just as big if not bigger radar cross section than an Islander – further again, I have referred to an article written by a reputable journalist soon after the crash; he was adamant that his source was in a position to know at ScotMil and that he said that he had seen recordings of the flight wherein it appeared that the a/c had been going straight in to the Mull; however, when I first brought up the question of radar on this thread it was in the context of what had been the squawk code as I thought it would have cleared up the question of the unusual squawk code found set – initially, I was ridiculed as it was said that Aldergrove had no secondary radar at the time and places like Tiree (?) were too far but no mention was made of Lowther Hill – when I did the research and brought up the article by the jounalist someone on this thread threw in the red herring that Prestwick Aerodrome would not have had the coverage, again without mentioning Lowther Hill; when I did the further research on the coverage of Lowther Hill the existence of recordings was flatly denied by people who said that they had either been there at the time or had looked at all relevent recordings and had seen nothing of ZD576.
Little wonder I do not accept many rebuttals at face value.
By the way, with reference to the Boeing analysis – I rather thought that Mitchell did point out assumptions and tried to estimate error windows – at any rate a useful framework to add one's own calculations to. The fundamentally important position where the waypoint was changed, as I recall from memory just now, was derived principally from the range and bearing to waypoint B that the SuperTANS had stored at the point of changing waypoint; so, the accuracy of the position of waypoint change is as accurate as the SuperTANS was at that point – after a sea crossing, the (Doppler/GPS nav computer) SuperTANS could be expected to have significant error but we do have a fixed point not that long after the position of waypoint change and that point was the impact position – retrospectively, it was deduced that the SuperTANS had been reasonably accurate in the latter stages of the flight – sadly, a retrospective that the pilots would not have had and so would have not viewed the SuperTANS as precise if it contradicted a local reference when closely approaching the Mull.
Regarding the rest of the reconstruction of the whole track, Mitchel's time/distance caculations had it (quite reasonably, I think) that the a/c could not have done much else other than to have made a bee line from Aldergrove to the position of waypoint change at the high cruising speed – makes it a lot easier? Aldergrove VOR 027 radial (at the time) would (extrapolated, of course, with the SuperTANS) have taken you exactly to the LZ that I have referred to – so to get there with the SuperTANS ('cause you wouldn't have had the VOR that far at their height) you would need a terminating waypoint there and if you read off your chart to nice roundy figures you get the coords that were waypoint A. It is reasonable to assume that their cruise speed (in terms of air speed) would have remained constant from the ATC fix to the position of waypoint change and so you can work backwards for that long leg using your best estimates for wind and see if it all fits together – as Mitchell did.
<<The mehods used by the AM,s to obtain their verdict would fit in perfectly in Iran or North Korea, but has no place in this country.>> Would that this were true. WMD & Dr David Kelly just for starters. Perhaps you need a reality adjustment?
1,2,3,4, Let them wait outside the door...5,6,7,8, Does them good to stand and wait! Come! Ah, JP, sorry to keep you waiting but all our operators have been extremely busy, hope you liked the Mozart, catchy isn't it? Now where were we, ah yes, the prologue..
Chugalug.... put up or shut up. JP
Glad to see you've taken my call for a bit more edge into account, JP. Good first effort, particularly like the repetition of "up", but we know another word that JP could have used with "up" to describe this affair, don't we boys and girls? That's right! So your post 5278:
..... " Not only bent on covering up the culpability of the CoC in foisting a known unairworthy aircraft type into service, the RAF then stitches up two JO's to cover their tracks with fabricated "modelling" of non-evidence."
So it was a conspiracy. Why do you not go public? I'm sure that many 'major' newspapers would be only too pleased to get their hands on a scandal of that scale; failing that, then 'Private Eye 'would probably do so. Of course, you would have to give your real name, and to be sure of your facts.
Now there is a challenge for you. Are you up to it? Otherwise, please spare us these allegations.
I'm particularly interested in your use of the word "conspiracy" JP, your word not mine! I point out that the BoI ignored known airworthiness problems of the Chinook Mk2 (or more correctly included a one line reference, and then ignored them). Similarly it asked one question of their only witness to en-route weather, got the "wrong" answer (ie that he could see both the Chinook that was bathed in sunlight, and the Mull coastline). Even so the BoI failed to come up with the "robust" finding required of it which was then imposed by the RO's, without mention of the two discrepancies above, indeed they substituted their "knowledge" of the weather which was at variance to that of the BoI, suggesting that witnesses on the Mull where it was indisputably IMC provided proof of conditions away from the Mull. The "robust" finding was of course to find that both pilots were Grossly Negligent, a satisfactory outcome for both the MOD (the Airworthiness Authority responsible for the Airworthiness of the aircraft, and the RAF (the Operator, which had pushed it into Squadron Service). What I find interesting is that you see my construction above as tantamount to being a conspiracy, yet Walter's (sorry Walter, merely for illustrative purposes) version that a clandestine landing had been authorised and possibly an associated and hence presumably successful Mass Murder perpetrated is not so labelled, even by your chums (you know, the "many folk" that you have mentioned before?). One getting too close to reality perhaps? Oh, that's another thing, when you get rattled you accuse me and others of hiding behind our identities. Are you saying that you really are "John Purdey"? Thing is I can't find anyone of that name in my RAF List, though it is the 1982 edition!
At the level of the LZ, the "IMC" would typically have only been 10 metres or so off the slope and intermittent at that .......I do not believe that a responsible crew would have gone in there without believing that they had accurate range - I believe that they thought they had but were misled wilfully or by error on the part of the personnel on the ground.
Walter, the responsibility for starting, let alone continuing, such an approach is the Captain's alone. I'm not privy to heli ops, let alone SF heli ops so stand by to be corrected on this, but the fixed wing variant is that you cannot make an approach to a runway that is not visual unless that approach is in accordance with IFR, ie to an approved and licensed approach and landing aid, and even then the IRVR must be at or above your minima. Hangars visual, tower visual, surrounding landscape visual, but if the runway isn't and IRVR's are below your minima, no approach (or go around if a change since you commenced approach). That is surely where the planned "murder" theory falls down; captain realises LZ not visual so does not even start an approach, endex! Wacky radios, handheld or otherwise, may be a useful aid to locating a visual LZ, but that is all they are, not the sole means of getting to one through mist or cloud no matter how shallow that might be. I'm sorry, I just don't go for your scenario.
I note the lack of reasoned response, so may I remind you of the reason that led to my joining this discussion some three years ago. It was the allegation that:
1. This Mk of Chinook was put into service when it was not fit for such service. 2. The RAF hierachy (that is to say CAS, CinC, AOC, and their staffs) knew full well that it was not fit to enter service but nevertheless insisted that it be flown. 3. When the Chinook crashed into the Mull, the heirachy decided to blame two innocent pilots in order to conceal their own failings. 4. This view was supported by the Air, Flight Safety, Engineer and Legal Saffs at Group, Command, AFB and MOD levels 5. Since then, no whistle-blower at any level has dared to put his head above the parapet to expose this conspiracy.
Will you be good enough to confirm that this is your opinion?
A simple question, not 'on the one hand and on the other' but a simple YES OR NO
JP. Answer to question1: Yes. Answer to other questions; I don't know who knew what or what actions individuals took or didn't take. I am convinced that the reason this aircraft crashed has yet to be determined because the Accident Investigation conducted by the RAF at the time was woeful. That is why there should be a new, objective and fair investigation into every aspect of this tragedy. The main effect to my mind of the BoI/RO's efforts to date has been to obscure the lack of Airworthiness Regulation enforcement by the MOD. We know that since this crash there have been at least two other such tragedies (though I suspect even more) involving lack of airworthiness, accounting for a further 24 needless deaths. It is just possible if the airworthiness shortcomings of the MOD had been exposed by this BoI, those later deaths might have been avoided. I'm sure that this answer is unacceptable to you, like all my others. Too bad.
Dalek. My answer in 'no'. But nor is it necessary to know in great detail exactly what happened as the aircraft flew towards the Mull (for example, what did the two pilots say to each other? does it matter? What we do know is that they continued towards and then into the granite in weather that made such a venture highly negligent at the very least. They should not have been where they were in those conditions in the first place (see numerous earlier posts). Now please answer my question. JP
JP, if you dealt honestly and sincerely with the main issues, ie was the RAF's finding justified, was the accident properly investigated, was the aircraft airworthy, instead of your tiresome habit of setting homework for people and rejecting their responses you would get more out of me and everyone else. Of course my reply is unacceptable, it was always going to be no matter how I replied to you. It is for others to judge both you and I in that exchange. Of course those involved in rushing an unairworthy aircraft type into service have reputations at risk if that aircraft subsequently suffers the worst unexplained peacetime RAF accident. So those reputations are secured, no matter how temporarily, when the fault is arbitrarily laid on the two pilots without any real proof, let alone beyond any doubt whatsoever as required by the RAF itself. By being found Grossly Negligent, I'd class those JO's reputations as trashed, wouldn't you? So how have I changed my mind? Of course my allegations are serious. 29 deaths are very serious and to date have not been properly explained. Time that someone somewhere did so.
1. This Mk of Chinook was put into service when it was not fit for such service.
This extract from OC RWTS, Boscombe Down letter on the Channel 4 website, seems to indicate that this is the case:
5. While RWTS appreciate the effect that any delay in the programme will have on current theatres of operation and the associated political pressures this imposed, we consider that Boscombe Down is failing in its primary role of providing the Front Line with equipment which can not only efficiently carry out the role but do it safely.
I have transcribed this from the (admittedly blurred) letter on the C4 website, however JP I would be interested to know:
(1) If you agree that I have transcribed the paragraph accurately.
(2) This letter indicates that OC RWTS thought that the Mk2 Chinook was unsafe.
The line about 'political pressure' could also be interpreted as a 'Yes' to your point 2:
2. The RAF hierachy (that is to say CAS, CinC, AOC, and their staffs) knew full well that it was not fit to enter service but nevertheless insisted that it be flown.