KingAir down

[forget]

NTSB LAUNCHES GO TEAM TO INVESTIGATE
CRASH OF TWIN-ENGINED AIRCRAFT IN MINNESOTA

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The National Transportation Safety Board today dispatched
a Go Team to investigate the crash of a twin-engined aircraft in Minnesota.

At 10:20 a.m. Central Daylight Time today, a Beech A100 (N41BE) -
known as a King Air - crashed several miles from the Eveleth, Minnesota
airport while on approach. There were 8 persons aboard. It has been
reported that United States Senator Paul Wellstone and members of his family
were among the passengers.

[Look_Up]

Further info from the BBC news website (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2362671.stm).

[I. M. Esperto]

He was an ardent liberal politically, opposed Bush's plans for war on Iraq, and was openly critical of Israel's treatment of Palestinians.

He made a few enemies, but this crash looks innocent to me.

My condolences to the remainder of his family.

[bluskis]

Poor weather, light snow, not impossible but makes for difficulties if under pressure and anything else goes wrong.

I shouldn't really comment but the CNBC gave out the report just as I logged on.

[spagiola]

This is the second Democratic senatorial candidate to be killed in a small aircraft crash just before an election (previous was Carnahan (spelling?) just before the 2000 election). For those who deal with such statistics, this would certainly seem an oddity.

[whatshouldiuse]

Goto...

story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&ncid=578&e=1&cid=578&u=/nm/20021025/ts_nm/crash_wellstone_dc


The other guy to suffer a similar fate was the a Senator in Missouri whose wife took over his position.

andy

[boredcounter]

I remember a B200 driver looking at a 100 in the hangar. We never operated them, and cursing the whole damn concept.
Can someone put my mind at rest, as I can never remember. Was it a 200 body on 90 wings and engines, as my fuddled memory recalls. Or the othe way around, 90 body on 200 wings and donkeys. I put it in very crude terms, so plse forgive me.
Any loss is a sad loss.

Bored

[Canadiankid]

A sad situation indeed. The press from here across the pond is covering this heavily. The Senator was a well liked member of the Democratic party.....

Having flown the aircraft involved in the accident (BE A100) I can give a very good guess as to what happened. It seems to me with the conditions being poor weather and icing involed there was a good set up for a classic"Tail" stall situation. The stab on the BE 10 is low (unlike its BE20 cousin). The King Airs perfom well in moderate levels of ice but great care must be taken when getting into the approach phase. Flap selections (especially below the approach setting) must be made with great dilligence. Boots must be working well. Any disruption of airflow (AOA changes etc) over the tail in icing conditions can lead to disaster very quickly. The proper procedure for recovery of a tail stall is check back and reduce power. Something we are not taught in flight school. If this was the case the crew would have only seconds to react successfully. Only my theory of course.


Boredcounter: The BE10 is a BE20 fuselage with a BE99 wing. Low wing, low tail, PT6-28 engines. A great airplane as I have fond memories of it. I liked the BE20 better but the 10 is a great A/C in its own respect.


Sorry to hear it happened.

[DeskDriver]

The METARs at the time show a degredation of conditions throughout the day and notably between 1434z and 1454z. The Auto at KEVM is updated every 20 minutes. IMC conditions, and altimeter settings dropping (though in a fairly linear fashion).

The Be10, from what little I've read, was fairly new. -1998 from MSNBC's account-. What kind of terrain is around KEVM? From 1515Z to 1534Z the ceiling drops from sct 0004 to ovc 0004. Though I've not heard any decent times of the accident occurance. The temp and dew point are overly friendly. So there is a lot of met going on.

If there was an over-reliance on the radar altemetry, it has a lot of the ingredients for a CFIT.

[av8boy]

aviationpolicy.org http://www.aviationpolicy.org has posted a fair amount of info on this crash More will become available as it, well, becomes available...

[thermostat]

Another sad loss.
We don't know the cause of this crash yet but on examining the VOR approach chart one has to wander why these charts are constructed with such low altitudes and resuling shallow flight path angles.
If the angle had been 3 degrees all the way from the 10nm "Walls" WP, the aircraft altitude at that point would be 4600 ft and not 3300 ft. The FAF (5nm) alt would be 3000 ft not 2900 ft.
Could this have made a difference ?? Maybe.
With a ground speed of 100 Kts, the rate of descent from "Walls" (4600 ft) to the 50 ft threshold crossing height would be 530 fpm, quite comfortable.

When are the chart drawing people going to wake up ?? How many more CFIT accidents do they want ?? There are far too many shallow approaches in existance out there. Time to do something about it !!!

Thermostat.

[wes_wall]

CNN has reported, in part:


quote: Radar data showed that the plane was traveling just 85 knots (98 mph) at the time of the crash. Hilldrup would not speculate on whether the plane might have stalled at that speed, but he said investigators would be looking at the possibility. unquote

Seems to me to be fairly slow. Can anybody advise approach speeds for this airplane? Flaps and gear down, what is stall speed?

Thanks.

[I. M. Esperto]

Radar shows Ground Speed. Wind has not been reported.

[wes_wall]

Esperto

Obviously you have not read much about the incident. Allow me to enlighten you. I am assuming you can read WX.

2002/10/25 15:14
KEVM 251514Z AUTO 00000KT 3SM -SN SCT004 OVC007 01/00 A3006 RMK
AO2

Now, do you know anything about speeds for this airplane?

[reynoldsno1]

When are the chart drawing people going to wake up ?? How many more CFIT accidents do they want ?? There are far too many shallow approaches in existance out there. Time to do something about it !!!

I am directly involved with the production of approach charts/plates at the originator level (i.e. not Jeppesen/Aerad etc.). We always include a table of advisory altitudes based on a TCH of 50ft and a 5% descent gradient throughout the approach.
However, there are operators who prefer to get down to their minimums as early as possible, and creep in on the wrong side of the drag curve.

The "solution" could be to remove reference to all minimum altitudes at the IF and FAF, replace them with the advisory altitudes and just publish the final OCA/OCH. This would encourage stabilised approaches, but I'm sure some operators would still grumble....

[I. M. Esperto]

TWA ops required a stabilized approach @500', including a rate of descent of 500'/min OR LESS. If 500'/min is exceeded, abandon the approach.

5 degrees is a bit too steep for comfort IMO. I prefer a flatter approach, 3 or 4 degrees.

[reynoldsno1]

5% descent gradient = 2.9 degrees
not 5 degrees!!

[Ignition Override]

Hello out there: I can't figure out how a non-precision approach (which requires a bit of planning with often very little time to do it), incorporates a shallow flight path, except when level, either up to the FAF, or way down below at the MDA. One technique I try to use is to request a switch to tower freq whwn several miles from the FAF-this can easily reduce the critical workload at the FAF (landing checklist, timing, reseting the altitude warning knob, using tail de-ice while the flying pilot tries to figure how much power [N1 @ 55%?] and wondering, did he say reported "fair braking action" on the short runway?), while starting a steep descent through clouds or fog towards the MDA, which may be only about 400 feet above the rocks in the dark 'firmament'.

My airlines's profile for any non-prec. aproach in a certain fleet is to be fully configured about three miles before the Final Approach Fix (FAF). It then says to descend our jets at 1200-1500 feet per minute until at 1,000 AGL, then our descent rate must no more 1,000 fpm until a bit above the MDA. Where is the shallow angle? If done wrong, you could easily get killed, or you might end going missed approach, because many missed approach points (MAPs)leave you way too high for a normal (600-800 fpm) descent to the touchdown zone (TDZ) . The FAA re-charted (their OWN) VOR 15 approach into Hartford, CN, after an MD-83 crew ran into trees on a hill, below the MDA. The FAA discovered that their approach design was not so good. The MD-83 crew also had the wrong altimeter setting, and due to the very strong winds, the tower controllers had evacuated the control tower at the tim, unable to give them an update. I don't want to blame that crew (I was never good enough to feel self-righteous regarding others' mistakes), and don't understand all of the circumstances involved. The jet's crew and passengers were very lucky to have survived.

When I trained on the 757 using the VS mode, the company required many more non-prec versus ILS approaches in the sim, because of the numerous hazards when using VS...

I'm always wondering how many Pprune contributors have no cross-country IFR experience, despite the appearance of such.

[reynoldsno1]

because many missed approach points (MAPs)leave you way too high for a normal (600-800 fpm) descent to the touchdown zone (TDZ)

Ummm, isn't the reason you are at the MAP because you have already decided you are NOT going to land?

[Belgique]

http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/occurs/occurs_detail.cfm?ID=412

[Eboy]

Wellstone pilot had felony record . . .

http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/3402854.html

[Ignition Override]

Reynoldsno1: Possibly, but if a crew hasn't flown a certain non-prec approach before, they don't know what the runway will look like if they do see enough approach/runway lights to begin a decent, and as briefed, we don't normally go missed-approach until at the MAP, because an early turn could put a plane into, or near an obstacle or hill.

Another hazard is that with parallel runways, many non-prec. approaches are designed to bring you right by the wrong runway (which may have its approach lights much brighter than the lights for your planned runway!, i.e. OMA, MSP etc. Check the LDA 12R at STL: very tricky, it aims you straight at the wrong runway-in IMC, the DME must be used to begin a turn to the right) and a non-prec could have a final approach course up to about 30 degrees different than the runway heading, or it was the case years ago, not just on an NDB.

These days we almost always need to remind ATC to turn the approach/runways lights above the dimmest setting, and for visibility less than a mile, sometimes near minumums! It baffles us as to why we must often remind them, no matter what previous aircraft request, and this at major hub airports too.

[LRdriver]

Regarding that felony issue..

It is one thing to hang the pilot out to dry now that he can't defend himself...but what exactly did he do wrong, he was asked if he had any convictions within the last 5 years, he truthfully answered no, all of a sudden it becomes an issue regarding fitness to fly.. WTF?? sounds like an easy way out to sue his estate and family.. If he answered his questions truthfully on his application then is the onus not on the company to make their own decisions?
If he already has done his time then, as far as I'm concerend, hes paid the price to society, (unless its a drink/drug conviction of course, THEN we can talk about fitness to fly..)
Whatever the reason for the accident (thats the NTSBs' problem..) it ain't related to the pilots mail fraud 10 Bl**dy YEARS AGO..

[catch 22]

The copilot was Michael Guess. He had recently started working for the company and only had 580 hours. He used to work for PAIFA and was well thought of.

[Check 6]

Conry's medical certificate application would have to be examined to see if he reported his felony convictions.

Also U.S. 14 CFR 61.153(c), and ICAO, require that holders of an ATPL be of "good moral character."

May all rest in peace.

[boredcounter]

Thanks for the tech clarification.
As the thread progresses in the way it has, (Press report wise), I wish I hadn't asked. Kinda seems pointless you clearing that up for me.

Thanks anyway




All of ya fly safe.

Bored

[I. M. Esperto]

Update on funeral services:
http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/3402875.html
Pilots remembered as men who loved life, loved to fly
Larry Werner
Star Tribune

Published Nov. 1, 2002 PILO01

In two somber Catholic services Thursday, the pilots who died in the crash that also took the lives of Sen. Paul Wellstone and five others were remembered as men who began chasing careers as aviators when they were boys.

The mass for Michael Guess, the 30-year-old copilot, was held at the Cathedral of St. Paul on Thursday morning. A memorial service for Richard Conry, 55, the captain, was Thursday night at Our Lady of Lourdes in Minneapolis.

Within the cavernous marble of the cathedral, after a stirring rendition of the African-American spiritual "Swing Low, Sweet Chariot," Coleman Rader recalled a visit many years ago from a black 12-year-old boy named Michael Guess.

Rader, who belongs to the Organization of Black Airline Pilots, said the young Guess wanted to know "what it took to be a career aviator."

The answers he gave him then, Rader said, became a poem he wrote for Guess' funeral, titled, "One in a Million." It detailed the many physical, academic and professional challenges of getting from the dream of flying to the professional reality.

The poem began, "I think I've known a million men who say they love the sky" and finished with, "Only the best go on to fly." In between were detailed the many hurdles that very few are able to cross.

"Michael knew what he wanted," Rader said. "Michael knew what he had to do, and Michael stayed the course."

Guess was also eulogized by Archbishop Harry Flynn of the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, who baptized Guess less than two years ago when Guess converted to Catholicism, and by the Rev. John Estrem, pastor of the Cathedral parish. Speaking to Guess' family and Jan Nelson, his fiancée, Estrem said Guess "was filled with joy" at his baptism.

"As you know, Michael was a man of few words," Estrem said. "But he was also a very deep man, a man of deep love and a very strong presence. He loved flying. He loved his family. He loved Jan. He loved his newfound faith."

The communion song was "On Eagle's Wings," which seemed to take on special significance at the funeral of a man who realized his lifelong dream to fly -- and died doing it.

Guess grew up in St. Paul after moving from Benton Harbor, Mich. He graduated from Cretin-Derham Hall High School and the University of North Dakota and joined Executive Aviation of Eden Prairie in 2001.

A smaller group of mourners gathered in the more-intimate surroundings of a French parish in northeast Minneapolis to hear Conry's French-Canadian wife, Johanne, talk about meeting her husband when he was in Quebec for an auto race. She served as a tour guide and translator for him and his friends. She later moved to Minnesota and, at his urging, learned to fly.

"His first love is flying," she said. "He died with his boots on. He was soft. He was sensitive. Sometimes he was a pain in the neck. But he was my life, and I was his life."

His wife recalled his joy when he was hired by Executive Aviation in April of 2001.

"He came home and said, 'Jo, I can't believe it. They'll hire me,' " she said. " 'I'm an old man, and they'll hire me.' "

[Squawk7777]

Weather Worried Wellstone's Pilot, Documents Show

Updated 3:54 PM ET February 21, 2003


By Tim Dobbyn

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The pilot of a plane that crashed killing Minnesota Sen. Paul Wellstone and all seven others aboard in October was concerned about icy weather and nearly canceled the trip, documents released on Friday showed.

Wellstone himself may have been worried. The plane's pilot, Richard Conry, had another pilot who had just flown a similar route talk to Wellstone just before departure.

"The King Air pilot told the senator that 'the weather was at minimums, but the pilots could handle it,"' wrote investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board.

The board on Friday released facts gathered on the crash but offered no conclusions. The probable cause of the crash will be considered at a later date.

Wellstone, a Democrat, was in the midst of a tight re-election campaign when he, his wife, his daughter, three campaign staffers and two crew were killed in the Oct. 25 crash on approach to Eveleth, Minnesota, from St. Paul.

The impact and post-crash fire in a wooded area two miles short of the runway destroyed the twin-engined Beechcraft King Air A100.

There has been speculation that Wellstone's plane may have had ice on its wings, which would require a higher speed to avoid losing lift and falling from the sky.

Early on the morning of the flight, Conry had called the air weather service for conditions along the St. Paul to Eveleth route.

On hearing the cloud ceiling was between 300 and 600 feet with light snow and mixed icing, Conry told the weather specialist: "OK, ah, you know what, I don't think I'm going to take this flight."

But an hour later he checked again and the cloud ceiling had lifted to 900 feet. "OK, that's what I need, at least it's above my minimums," Conry said.

Aviation Charter Inc. supplied records showing Conry had flown into Eveleth four times before, most recently on Sept. 19 and 20. Co-pilot Michael Guess had never flown to Eveleth.

Engine experts assembled by the safety board said the engines were operating normally at impact. Damage observed to the propellers suggested operation at low power.

The plane contained no flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder but the last radar contact showed an altitude of 2,300 feet and a ground speed of 160 knots or 184 mph.

Wellstone's plane was heading west, straight for the runway at the start of its approach, but began a slight turn to the south before crashing. Tests of a navigation beacon at Eveleth showed an error during a flight test the day after the accident but an Oct. 28 comprehensive ground check was normal.

Crash site evidence suggested no in-flight breakup. The plane descended through the trees at a 25 degree downward path with wings approximately level.

[Check 6]

Business and Commercial Aviation Article (http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/search/autosuggest.jsp?docid=115805&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aviationnow.com%2Favnow%2Fnews%2Fchanne l_bca_story.jsp%3Fview%3Dstory%26id%3Dnews%2Fcc2043.xml)

[forget]

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: November 18, 2003
SB-03-37

************************************************************

NTSB Cites Flight Crew Failures in Crash of Airplane
Carrying Senator Wellstone, 7 Others

************************************************************

Washington, DC - The National Transportation Safety Board
today determined that the probable cause of the crash late
last year of a Raytheon (Beechcraft) King Air 100 airplane,
carrying Senator Paul Wellstone and seven others, was the
"flight crew's failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which
led to an aerodynamic stall from which they did not
recover."

The airplane, operated by Aviation Charter, Inc., was on a
flight from St. Paul to Eveleth, MN, when it crashed, on
October 25, 2002, on approach to the Eveleth-Virginia
Municipal Airport. The airplane was destroyed and there
were no survivors.

"This tragic accident that took the lives of a respected
U.S. Senator, members of his family, staff, and the flight
crew, shocked us all," said NTSB Chairman Ellen G. Engleman.
"It sadly and starkly points out the need for more
aggressive action to improve safety in the on-demand charter
industry."

Reviewing the results of the extensive investigation into
this accident, NTSB Members concluded that the flight crew
failed to maintain an appropriate course and speed for the
approach to Eveleth and did not properly configure the
airplane at the start of approach procedures.

"During the later stages of the approach," the Board said,
the flight crew "failed to monitor the airplane's airspeed
and allowed it to decrease to a dangerously low level (as
low as about 50 knots below the company's recommended
approach speed) and to remain below the recommended approach
speed for about 50 seconds." The airplane then entered a
stall from which it did not recover.

The Board judged that while cloud cover might have prevented
the flight crew from seeing the airport, icing did not
affect the airplane's performance during the descent.
Cockpit instrument readings on course alignment and airspeed
should have prompted the flight crew to execute a go-around.

The Board did not find indications of any preexisting
medical or other physical condition that might have
adversely affected the crew's performance during the
accident flight. Crew fatigue also does not appear to have
been a factor in the accident. A review of flight crew
records and interviews with co-workers, the Board said,
indicated that both pilots had "previously demonstrated
serious performance deficiencies consistent with below-
average flight proficiency." There was no clear evidence as
to which crewmember was the flying pilot at the time of the
accident.

The Board determined that the accident airplane was properly
certificated, equipped and maintained in accordance with
Federal regulations. The recovered components showed no
evidence of preexisting powerplant, system or structural
failures.

The Board also concluded that the out-of-tolerance condition
and slight bends in the Eveleth-Virginia airport VOR signal
were not a factor in this accident.

With respect to the operator, the Board found that Aviation
Charter, Inc., was not making crewmembers sufficiently aware
of its Standard Operating Procedures, and also cited the
company's failure to provide adequate stall recovery
guidance. Further, the company was not training its pilots
in crew resource management in accordance with its FAA-
approved training program. Consequently, the Board
recommended that the FAA make such training mandatory for
Part 135 on-demand charter companies that conduct dual-pilot
operations.

The Board, noting that FAA surveillance of Aviation Charter,
Inc., was not sufficient to detect the discrepancies that
existed at the company, recommended that the agency conduct
en route inspections and observe training and proficiency
checks at all Part 135 on-demand charter operations, as is
done at Part 121 and Part 135 commuter operations, to ensure
the adequacy, quality and standardization of pilot training
and flight operations.

Additionally, the Board recommended that the FAA convene a
panel of experts to determine the feasibility of a
requirement for the installation of low-airspeed alert
systems in airplanes engaged in commercial operations under
Parts 121 and 135, and act accordingly on the panel's
findings.

A synopsis of the accident investigation report, including
the findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations,
can be found on the Publications page of the Board's web
site, http://www.ntsb.gov. The complete report will be
available in about six weeks.
##

[Chris Higgins]

That little operator will be sued from here to Kingdom Come. Hope they've got good liability!

[willbav8r]

Several months back it was the full $25 million being sought, with some sort of apportion per person. It may have been USA Today which reported it, so I dunno if true or not.

I believe it was stated as being the full limit of insurance - as you would expect in such circumstances.

Just imagine if the operator had $100m in limit.

Very messy..........

[TheShadow]

Looking for some cogent commentary upon this alternative (systems related) Wellstone crash theory:

LINK (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&postid=1074291#post1074291)

Dedicated to the proposition that:

Alternative theories are designed for those who just don't necessarily accept mud-slinging and pilot error bottom-lines at face value - but try to look beyond pilot error (as a good old reliable "probable" cause) for any hidden killers that aren't necessarily going to hit the crash investigators between the eyes.

--------------------------------------
I am Death. I am your Shadow