Cypriot airliner crash - the accident and investigation

[flyboy2]

Cypriot airliner crash to be re-enacted
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=3&art_id=qw1134730980943B216&newslett=1&em=49386a6a20051217ah

December 16 2005 at 02:03PM

By Michele Kambas

Nicosia - Greek investigators will re-enact the flight of a doomed Cypriot airliner on December 19 in an effort to discover why the plane crashed north of Athens in August killing all 121 people on board.

The Boeing 737-300 operated by Helios Airways rammed into a hillside on August 14, the worst accident on record for either Greece or Cyprus and the worst in Europe this year.

Investigators are trying to work out what happened on board the plane - travelling from Larnaca in Cyprus to Prague - to render its two pilots unconscious, leaving a flight attendant with an emergency oxygen kit grappling with the controls
Costas Orphanos, head of the Cypriot crash investigation committee, said authorities had formed a picture of what had happened, but needed the re-enactment to verify the findings.

"What happened was unheard of, the way it happened was unheard of," Orphanos said when asked what made the disaster different from other air crashes.

He declined to be more specific pending release of the committee's findings at the end of February.

"It will be something which should concern the aviation industry as a whole, and it is our obligation to ensure that nothing like this happens again," he said.

"I haven't seen anything like this before, and I've been in the aviation industry for 40 years."

Seventeen people, pilots and engineers, will take part in Monday's flight using an Olympic Airways Boeing 737-300. Orphanos gave no further details.

The Helios jet crashed into the Greek mountains after flying on autopilot for over two-and-a-half hours. It is thought that the passengers, the majority of them Cypriots, were unconscious.

Two Greek fighter jets scrambled to intercept what was then regarded as a "renegade aircraft" and saw the co-pilot slumped in the cockpit and a steward wrestling with the controls. The pilot was nowhere to be seen.

Helios, a subsidiary of Britain's Libra Holidays Group, has defended its maintenance record but disclosed the aircraft had previously had decompression problems.

Air decompression reduces oxygen supplies and can lead to rapid loss of consciousness.

Relatives of the dead said they were still struggling to come to terms with their loss, a heavy blow to a small Mediterranean island with less than one million people.

"Some say time heals all wounds. In our case the anxiety and waiting to find out what happened just opens wounds further," said relatives' representative Nicholas Yiasoumis.

Relatives will not be present at the re-enactment.

[The Good Samaritan]

Seventeen people, pilots and engineers, will take part in Monday's flight using an Olympic Airways Boeing 737-300. .
:confused: Does Olympic have a compatible -300 like the one crashed????

[Oshkosh George]

According to this list,they have one,SX-BLC.

http://www.airfleets.net/flottecie/Olympic%20Airlines-active-b737.htm

Any volunteers for pax on this re-enactment?:cool:

[Jet2]

Flight took place today as reported by the BBC

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4542226.stm

Greek investigators have taken part in a re-enactment aimed at determining what caused a Cypriot airliner to crash near Athens in August.

All 121 people on board died when the Helios Airways Boeing 737-300 lost cabin pressure and hit a hillside.

Greek investigation chief Akrivos Tsolakis said the re-enactment was unprecedented for Greece.

A Greek F-16 fighter jet also flew alongside the plane on Monday, as happened on the fatal day.

"We hope certain basic questions will be answered," said one of the investigators, Serapheim Kamoutsis.

Monday's reconstruction flight left Larnaca airport at 1107 - two hours after the original flight on 14 August - due to the position of the sun, the AFP news agency reported.

An Olympic Airways Boeing 737-300 was used, taking the same flight path as the Helios jet.

As a mark of respect, the re-enactment was given the symbolic flight number 121, in memory of the crash victims.

Coroners said those on board the Helios jet were alive - though possibly unconscious - when it crashed.

A pressure valve left in manual mode is thought to have contributed to the crash by failing to adjust the in-flight cabin pressure.

All but 11 of the victims were Cypriot.

The crash orphaned 47 Cypriots, 26 of them children.

A flight attendant is believed to have tried to take control of the airliner during its final moments.

The pilots of two Greek F-16s who shadowed the airliner just before the crash said they saw the co-pilot slumped over the controls and the captain was missing from the cockpit.

Flight 522 had been heading for Athens en route to Prague when it lost contact with air traffic controllers, sparking a security alert before it crashed.

[SaturnV]

From Reuters
Aviation experts said after re-enacting the doomed Boeing 737-300 flight from Larnaca in Cyprus to Prague, that the steward -- who had some flight training and used an emergency oxygen kit -- actually flew the plane for 10-12 minutes.

"We have indications that (he) controlled the plane. He took a portable oxygen device and opened the cockpit door using a code," Seraphim Kamoutsis, head of the Greek investigations team, told a news conference after the simulation.

[airside]

Yep,
photos of re-enact flight avaialble here :

www.11aviation.com

or here :

http://tinyurl.com/dusac

Not easy to see something like tha very often
Elliott

[PAXboy]

This may seem like a rude question but is honestly asked: What is gained by flying a machine round this route - as opposed to running it in the SIM?

From an outsider's point of view, if they can reconstruct the flight path, then they have already learnt what the machine was doing 'on the outside' but that can make zero change to what they know about the events on the inside of the machine.

This flight looks more like a publicity event for the investigator and a tribute flight as an expression of sympathy for the friends and relatives.

[Kyprianos Biris]

link to the other thread with a video of the low pass

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=185849&perpage=20&pagenumber=86

[PAXboy]

This confirms that the event to be a 'memorial' flight for the bereaved families and should, really, have been advertised as such. The new data learned from this must be very small.

[DingerX]

While here and there some are getting sanctimonious about this "reenactment", unfortunately it serves a specific scientific purpose. The investigating board's job is to create a hypothesis concerning what happened, and then as accurately as possible test that hypothesis. That can mean recreating the conditions if possible.

Of course, there's no ruling out that some officials may want to milk this event for as much political gain as possible, and do their business with a certain pomposity and flair.

[big fraidy cat]

If you check on the old Cypriot thread [see Tech Log], you will see my post referring to the press conference, which was held after the re-enactment flight. I think that it proves that the re-enactment was worthwhile. I don’t want to post it here again, as it just takes up too much space.

Also on that thread, in my response to a query from The Hawk who asked ‘what new input’, it might be worth repeating those details here as well.

The new input is that they tested some of their hypotheses in real time, and found that they were implausible, and apparently this was not earlier ascertained in the simulator.

Most particularly among them is the fact that the cabin attendant, Andreas Prodromou, entered the cockpit using the door code (and not an axe!). Further, that he entered the cockpit way prior to any engine flameout; that he took manual control of the plane, and that they still don’t know how he disengaged the autopilot.

They also discovered that setting the pressurization switch to manual in reality really had little or no effect on the cabin pressure. In the final analysis at this point, there was no sudden death at 14000 feet.

[Techman]

Paxboy,

A simulator is nothing more than a box full of wires. Fidelity is not guaranteed.

[PAXboy]

Techman: Thanks for that. I usually preface my remarks to indiucate that I am not crew and that my PPRuNe name shows that too.

[Flight Detent]

big cat,

I'm curious to know the specifics of your statement -
Setting the pressurization switch to manual has little or no effect on cabin pressure.

Since in reality it makes a very large difference to the cabin pressure, I'm wondering just what was the position of the outflow valve at the point the switch was set to manual?
I'm totally avoiding the question of that big indicator light above the switch that shows MANUAL, when it's set.

On landing, the outflow valve autos to fully open slowly, so it's always fully open unless the switch is set to manual and the valve intentionally toggled towards closed.

I can't understand how, if the valve is fully open (and who knows if it was) it doesn't make any difference to the cabin pressure - of course it will!

Cheers, FD :bored:

[big fraidy cat]

Flight Detent

Here's a copy of today's article in The Athens News. I think that it addresses your question. Information on the postion of outflow valve has not yet been released.


Helios puzzle 'recreated'

Questions about the strangest crash in aviation history multiply as Greek investigators re-enact the doomed flight which killed 121 people

By Dimitris Yannopoulos

AN UNPRECEDENTED "re-enactment" of the doomed Helios Airways flight that crashed 50km outside Athens on August 14 "has cast some light on the dark spots in the four-month probe", the Greek investigators said after the flying drill on the evening of December 19.
But 'experiments' carried out during the mock flight also raised more questions that needed further analysis, veteran captain Akrivos Tsolakis, chairman of the Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) told reporters. "Some of our assumptions and flight recorder data were confirmed, but others need revision and further scrutiny," Tsolakis said.
All 121 people on board were killed when the Boeing 737-300 slammed into a hillside.
The plane apparently had lost cabin pressure after takeoff, incapacitating the pilots, and eventually crashed into a Grammatiko hillside as it ran out of fuel after flying pilotless for nearly three hours. Investigators carried out the re-enactment of Helios Flight 522 from Larnaca, Cyprus, to Athens to analyse the causes of Greece's worst air disaster and probably the weirdest accident in aviation history.

Flight attendant's heroism

The most striking new finding of the flight's recreation was that the flight attendant, Andreas Prodromou, was in control of the Cypriot Helios Airways plane in its final path, 15-20 minutes before it crashed. A trained pilot who was working as a steward with Helios until he could find a co-pilot's job, Prodromou - donning a cabin crew oxygen mask - tried to save the doomed flight and wrestled with the controls after entering the cockpit by punching in the door code while the plane was still doing its holding rounds at 34,000 feet over the island of Kea.
Tsolakis had earlier hypothesised that Prodromou entered the cockpit after the plane's left engine burned out. AAIASB executive director Serafeim Kamoutsis said they now believe that the 25-year-old Prodromou entered the cockpit before the engine failure while the plane was still in a holding pattern and the pilots were unconscious or partially conscious. "He tried to fly the plane manually as best as he could when the autopilot disengaged," Kamoutsis said, adding that it was too early to say how the auto-pilot was disabled.

Why not climb down

Tsolakis said he believed the Cypriot airliner suffered a "partial, and not total loss of pressure" at an early stage in the flight. At its highest "cruising" altitude of 34,000 feet, the plane's cabin altitude – the pressure inside the fuselage - had reached 26,000 feet when, under normal pressurisation, it should remain at 8,000 feet throughout the flight. "This (loss of pressure) occurred during the ascent, in the first five minutes after takeoff from Larnaca..." Tsolakis said. The flight attendant, with other members of the cabin crew, remained conscious, however, because they used the plane's portable supply of oxygen, he added.
Asked by the Athens News why they didn't stop the climb below 10,000 feet when the pressurisation problem was obvious but not yet fatal for the crew or passengers, Tsolakis admitted that this remains a mystery. "We are still investigating why the pilots continued their ascent and did not respond properly," Tsolakis said.
Kamoutsis admitted that at a cabin-altitude ascent rate of 2,500 feet per minute most passengers' eardrums would feel like bursting within seconds from takeoff. Normal ascent rate of a fully pressurised cabin is 300-400 feet per minute - anything above that rate can be painful. "We know that this makes the theory of the confusion of the decompression alarm signals with configuration problems difficult to swallow," Kamoutsis told the Athens News, referring to the initial speculation that, at 12,000 feet, the pilots mistook the decompression alarm signal for a takeoff warning that only sounds on the ground. "But we have no other rational explanation for their failure to climb down before they passed out," he said.
Investigators suspected that a mode selector switch for controlling the plane's two pressure valves had been placed on the wrong setting, but, following the re-enactment flight, Tsolakis cautioned that this fact alone was not enough to explain the accident. "The switch is not the main issue," he said, acknowledging that the position of the switch on "manual" instead of "auto" could not by itself produce such loss of pressure. "We have to look into the factors behind the position of the switch to determine why it was found in that position and what happened to the pressure valve after takeoff."

[BOAC]

Back into the fray after a while:

If that journalist's article is a true representation of what Mr Tsolakis is saying/thinking then he and his team are some way off track! To allay my concerns I am hoping it is a translation problem as there are some significant questions arising from the article.

One of the big questions for me is why it took so long for the c/crew to enter the flight deck, and reading the newspaper reports, this seems to have been ignored so far?

[big fraidy cat]

BOAC

I was baffled too, since most of the international press carried the same news from the Tsolakis briefing about Prodromou entering the cockpit earlier with the code. So I contacted the editor of the Athens News; he advised that, due to space restrictions, the article, which went to press late Thursday, had to be limited to 750 words. He very kindly sent me the original draft, which included the comments on the Prodromou and cabin crew issue, as noted below. For the sake of brevity, I will just excerpt the Q & A.

According to the reporter’s original draft, which includes some marginal notes, the question you raise about the timing of the cabin crew’s entrance was asked more than once. The answer was: “This is still under investigation. We don’t know yet whether they could or did get into the cockpit earlier.”

Again, according to the draft, several reporters asked how the flight attendant and at least one other of the cabin crew had survived for 2.5 hours at an unpressurized cabin altitude of 26,000 feet. The answer was: “They used auxiliary O2 bottles.” Q: How long do these last? A: “Twenty-five minutes – they were using them interchangeably.”

Continuing, the next questions were: Why were traces of the co-pilot’s DNA (saliva) found on two different cockpit oxygen masks? Was there a lack of oxygen, or did the co-pilot need more until he could lower the plane? Did the captain leave his seat to find spare bottles in the passenger cabin? A: “This is still under investigation.”

Q: What about the medical report stating that both pilots had severe coronary blockage? The co-pilot’s wife strongly disputes this. A: “We haven’t studied the evidence of that in the coroner’s report. It is not yet confirmed.”

BOAC, there is much more in this text of the press conference; these are just a few of the topics covered. All in all, the re-enactment of the flight raised more questions than were answered.

Finally, I would like to wish you and all of our fellow pruneys a very Merry Christmas and all the best for the New Year to come!!

[SASless]

Cabin/cockpit altitiude does not change in the Sim....as it does in the actual aircraft.

If some of the volunteers were masked and some unmasked then the effects of the loss of pressure...and such could be measured...compared to theories...etc.

I can see some benefit to a re-enactment as it relates to the investigation. However it would appear the long list of questions that would remain far outweigh what benefit the reenactment would answer. It almost sounds like a few pages out of a Richard Wambaugh novel where the detectives tried to reenact their theory that would turn a murder into a suicide and thus solve the case quickly. Wambaugh described a situation where the cops fired a Colt .45 over a thousand times to get a single spent shell casing to land on top of a wardrobe in order to prove their convenient theory.

Is this what is going on here....pick an answer and find the evidence to support it?

[Helios Ray]

SASless,

Pick an answer and find the evidence to support it?

Hmmm... I don't think so. Problem is they've picked the most implausible answer and can't find credible evidence to support it.

This is the real mystery of the Helios investigation IMHO.

What's the problem with saying the decompression happened at 34,000 feet and, for some reason (eg lack of O2, radio malfunction, APU failure etc), they didn't have time to react before the onset of hypoxia.

Makes more sense than having to say it all happened at 12,000ft but "the crew didn't realise it because they thought it was the T/O Config horn" and... 15 minutes later, they were still talking with Helios LAME, at 29,000ft.

Any thought on this puzzle, anybody?

[Deserter]

Helios Ray,

You are obviously no veteran of the 100-page Cypriot thread, but the point you're making is both original and serious.
Nevertheless, I don't see why you seem to imply that the available data are no less implausible than the 'answers' given to explain them.

You obviously take into account the new evidence which the investigation has unveiled relatively recently - when the previous thread had abruptly fallen silent :mad:

The new facts (confirmed during the re-enactment briefing) are

(1) Cabin Alt Horn sounded at 12,000ft, about 4 minutes from takeoff (09:11) - NOT at 15,000ft as previously assumed.

(2) At 29,000ft, about 15 minutes from takeoff (09:20), the crew was still in communication with the ground - ATC and Helios maintenance chief.

(3) The cabin altitude at the end of the plane's 2.28-hour flight at cruise alt FL340, was around 26,000 feet.

The above new data are broadly consistent with the timeline put forward by Captain Tsolakis in his first full interview with Flight International on Aug.24:

http://www.flightinternational.com/Articles/2005/08/24/Navigation/195/201065/Helios+737+crashed+with+no+fuel++.html

In this interview the Greek Chief Investigator also reveals something extraordinary about the plane's airworthiness:
Tsolakis says he is worried at what he is finding in the engineering records of the aircraft, which had required air conditioning system rectification five times in less than two months, leading Helios engineers to question the aircraft's fitness to fly.[/qote] The importance of that observation will become apparent later.

This is then followed by the central tenet of the sudden death scenario:
[quote]It was only 4min 50s into the flight before the crew reported to ATC an air conditioning malfunction, Tsolakis reveals, but they kept climbing. Passing through 14,000ft, the cabin altitude warning alert activated and it was not cancelled.

Four months later, we know that the sequence of these early events was the reverse of what Tsolakis had implied: The cabin altitude sounded at 12,000ft, ie BEFORE the crew notified ATC of their airconditioning problem. And then, the cabin altitude horn WAS cancelled as they manually restored the OFV to the closed (or at least partially closed) position.

Here is what Tsolakis tells TA NEA daily in a full-page interview two months after his FI interview, on October 29:

When the plane took off from Larnaca airport, "the environmental control system packs and bleed switches were configured correctly. But the pressure mode selector switch was in MANUAL and pressurization of the aircraft was not automatically controlled, resulting in an increasing cabin altitude as the airplane climbed," Tsolakis tells the mass-circulation daily.
And then, here comes his salvo: "It appears that the captain and the first officer knew that [PMSS set in MANUAL]. As the plane was climbing at a rate of 4,000 feet per minute, the cabin altitude warning horn sounded in the flight deck and was cancelled by the crew, who believed that they had regained control of the pressurisation inside the aircraft, by manipulating the outflow valve manually. They then continued to climb."

In other words: No mixup of horns, no PMSS 'unwittingly' set in Manual, full open pressure valve shut manually by the crew, pressurization restored (temporarily), plane continues to climb while dealing with secondary problems (E&E bay cooling) with Helios engineers. This is all stated succinctly in another respectable aviation website:

http://www.b737.org.uk/accident_reports.htm


The aircraft departed Larnaca at [09.07 Greek time] for Athens. The crew reported to Cypriot ATC that they had a problem with the air conditioning system and wanted to remain at 16,000ft. At [09:22] the crew said that they had solved the problem and requested a climb to 34,000ft. Radio contact was lost with the aircraft at approximately [09:37], as it was entering Greek airspace, 30 minutes after its departure, although it did sqwark 7700.

Did they really hold their climb at 16,000 feet, when they started talking with Helios Maitrol? Was the 'problem' solved at 30,000 feet, when they requested a climb to 34,000 feet? Probably not.

Given Tsolakis' aforementioned evaluation of the plane's lackluster pressurization record and airworthiness, it is easy to understand how the �problem� re-emerged in full force after they decided to revert back to AUTO. From a (manually) closed position, the OFV gradually or swiftly opened again by one-third, and remained in the same position until it was found at the crash site, with the FDR registering cabin alt 26,000 feet at FL340.

It had happened before at the same cruise altitude (16 December 2004). It happened again on August 14. But this time - even though they were prepared for it - they couldn�t bring the plane down.

They just couldn't climb down an inch from 34,000 feet - not even glide down! For how long did they try to do so? How did Prodromou finally manage it by disengaging the autopilot?
Nobody will ever know for sure. But Tsolakis is right when he speaks to London's Guardian newspaper on December 15, shortly before his controversial re-enactment of the fateful flight:

It was a tragedy waiting to happen," said Mr Tsolakis. Ultimately, he said, every area of the aviation industry, from the manufacturers of the plane, to the airline, the mechanics, civil aviation ground staff, and pilots were to blame for the crash.

[BOAC]

Oh dear! Another 'register and 1 post' user and we are getting the issue more and more clouded.

I have to say that that post by 'Deserter' tells me nothing and raises so many more questions that I must ignore it.

All I wish to say is that we owe it to the dead and bereaved from that flight to find out what happened and try to ensure it cannot happen again, although I do not, sadly, have great hopes in that direction.

[Helios Ray]

Deserter,

Admittedly, your scenario makes sense. Certainly, the valve can¢t go from full-open at 12,000 feet to ¾-shut at 34,000 feet, without some form of …manual intervention in between (assuming a cabin altitude of 26,000 feet at cruise height is the correct figure). That should dispel at least some of BOAC¢s clouds.

Nonetheless, the argument sounds more like that of a Helios Investigation deserter (excuse the pun) from Seattle, than of Tsolakis himself. Although the words - coming from disparate interviews over the past 4 months - may be his, he certainly didn¢t sound so unequivocal at the press conference room after the re-enactment, if BFC has quoted him correctly.

Personally, I don¢t see why "the manufacturer" or the two lost pilots should bear the same blame for the disaster as "the airline". And that, IMHO, goes a long way towards explaining the Greek investigators¢ (and third parties¢) residual ambivalence.

They know they can¢t get the company off the hook, so they throw their net out wide enough to catch as much fish as they can, and let the lawyers separate the small fry from the sharks.

The pilots should have refused to get on that plane, that¢s for sure. Even if this meant an early end to their professional careers and their 'easy' replacement by another condemned duo, including someone as desperate to fly as Prodromou. Who can accuse pilots for bowing to their employer if they like their job?

As for Boeing, their refusal to legitimize Helios¢ shoddy maintenance and repairs culture became evident when they categorically denied having ever issued a clean bill of health for this or any other of the airline¢s fleet. But even this was too little to late for stopping the disaster from "waiting to happen".
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_id=2002442821&zsection_id=2002119995&slug=boeinggreece17&date=20050817

[big fraidy cat]

Since we now have a second thread started, I will post the latest news from the Cyprus Mail here, rather than on the old thread. This certainly brings the discussion to a new level:


Police probe into Helios crash into its final stages
By Constantine Markides

RESPONSIBILITIES for the August 14 Helios crash in Greece that killed all 121 passengers on board will soon be meted out, as the investigation into the crash nears its final stages.

Cypriot investigators have already gathered many witnesses, both from Helios personnel as well as from other sources in relation to the aircraft and the technical troubles it exhibited. Evidence so far suggests that a number of people knew that the plane had problems but kept silent for fear that they might endanger their careers.
Police spokesman Demetris Demetriou told the Cyprus Mail yesterday that although the police investigation was under way, it would not be completed and no responsibilities would be doled out until chief accident investigator and head of the Greek team Akrivos Tsolakis completes and releases the investigation findings.

Greek police have requested of the Cypriot authorities to give them copies of all evidence relating to the accident.

There are cases, however, when particularly sensitive material, such as the tape from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), may be withheld from police due to privacy issues.
For example, after a June 1995 plane crash in New Zealand, police asked for the actual CVR tape, not the transcript, but investigators refused to hand it over. The case ended up in court.

Article 229 of the Cyprus Civil Aviation Act protects such information from disclosure except in certain rare circumstances.

At the beginning of the New Year, Cypriot police investigators are expected to travel to Greece to exchange opinions and then travel to Germany and Britain for additional testimonies from the widow of the German pilot and from the two mechanics who flew back to the UK shortly after the crash.

A seminar was held last Wednesday at Intercollege on Aviation Safety and Accident Investigation to clarify that it is not the role of aviation accident investigations to identify responsibility or assign blame for those who caused the accident but rather to root out the system failures and prevent future occurrences. It is the role of the police, not the accident investigators, to seek out and assign blame.

During the seminar, Tsolakis said that the Helios crash “so far does not seem to have one cause” but rather was caused by a “chain of events which could not be broken”.

Helios first applied for a licence to fly to and from Cyprus in December 1998, but the application was rejected because the documentation was not all in place, according to Communications Minister Haris Thrasou. Helios again applied in March 1999 with a different business plan and two months later the Communications Ministry granted the air carrier the permit.




Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

I am not sure which thread to post this to. Perhaps they will be merged soon.

In any event, here is the latest news from the Cyprus Mail concerning some upcoming litigation.


Libra to sue over Helios losses
By Jean Christou

LIBRA Holidays Group (LHG), is considering legal action to recoup a £5 million loss the group sustained as a result of the Helios Airways crash last August in which 121 people were killed.

Helios is owned by LHG, one of the biggest UK-based tour operators, which bought the airline late last year. LHG is also listed on the Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE).

In an announcement to the CSE yesterday, Libra said it was in touch with its London-based lawyers about the possibility of suing ‘third parties’ over the crash of the Helios Boeing 737-300.

The accident, which happened in Greece, cost Libra at least £5 million plus another £18 million the group wrote off in goodwill as a result of the crash.

In its announcement to the CSE, the group reported massive losses of £23.69 million for the financial year up to the end of October compared to a profit of £2.58 million in the same period in 2004.

Libra said turnover was up because of the acquisition of Helios, but following the crash it decided to proceed with a major write-off of goodwill in the books. But in relation to the £5 million Helios loss, it said it was contemplating suing third parties.

The company did not specify who the third parties were and is unlikely to do so until the final investigation into the crash is complete and has been published.

“When an accident happens, it is very seldom that there is only one cause for it,” said a source close to the investigation. “A number of factors are usually involved but not a lot of players. Any confirmation that is needed will come from the investigation.”

The investigation into the crash is due to be completed early next year. So far it appears the accident was caused by a number of different factors. This was confirmed by chief Greek investigator Akrivos Tsolakis during his recent visit to Cyprus.

The predominant theory is that cabin decompression led to hypoxia – or low oxygen in the blood – causing the crew to pass out.

Greek investigators have discovered there have been many other cases of a Boeing 737 climbing without pressurisation set, but the crews recognised the alerts and averted hypoxia and resultant disaster.

Tsolakis said he had received reports from numerous other national aviation authorities advising him of events similar to the Helios one, but with “non-fatal outcomes”.

It is believed that before the doomed flight, maintenance crew who had conducted a pressurisation check left the control in manual instead of automatic, so the aircraft did not pressurise as it gained altitude. But the crew failed to notice the setting in their pre-take-off checks, and the post-take-off checks require no further confirmation of the pressurisation control selection.

In the Helios case, when the audible cabin altitude alert sounded, the crew thought it was an erroneous configuration warning because the sound is identical. According to Tsolakis, the pilots’ “subsequent mindset and actions were determined by this preconception until hypoxia overcame them as the aircraft continued to climb.”

In September at Tsolakis` request, Boeing circulated a ‘reminder’ to flight crews about the difference between warning alarms for incorrect take-off configurations and cabin altitude.

Boeing acted to reduce the likelihood of flight crews misinterpreting a cabin altitude warning as the automatic aural warning for an incorrect take-off configuration and the aural alert triggered when cabin altitude rises above 10,000ft make the same sound.

However Boeing said the reminder "doesn't mean [this] is necessarily the cause [of the Helios accident", although it was widely seen within the industry as a tacit acknowledgement that cabin pressurisation and the CA warning were part of the investigation.”


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005


My very best wishes to all of you for a safe, healthy, and happy New Year.

Sharon, the Big Fraidy Cat

[corsair]

I always found that this incident to an Aer Lingus 737 had some striking parallels. What was particularly interesting was that Captain failed to go onto oxygen and seemed to effected by hypoxia.

http://www.aaiu.ie/AAIUviewitem.asp?id=3504&lang=ENG&loc=1280

[BOAC]

Sorree! - I've lost track of the various threads on this but do we have a target date for either an proper interim or full accident investigation report?

[big fraidy cat]

Hi BOAC, and Happy New Year!

Posted below is an article from the Cyprus Mail, published on the Internet on 1 January. Most of the article is a rehash, but they mention a new type of FDR which is supposed to supply most of the answers to most, but not all, of our questions. If anyone is familiar with this new type, would you care to elaborate and tell me what kind of information we might expect?


Holding the key to the doomed Helios flight
By Elias Hazou
THE flight data animation for the doomed Helios Airways jetliner that crashed into a ravine outside Athens last August, killing all 121 onboard, is in the hands of the Greek air-accident investigating team.

Aviation experts say the sophisticated flight data recorder should answer at least some of the questions that have perplexed investigators.

Because so much about the crash doesn't add up, the digital flight data recorder, or DFDR, takes on greater importance as investigators piece together evidence. They’ll add this information to clues from the wreckage pattern, autopsies, radar tapes, witness reports and photographs taken by fighter pilots who trailed the doomed Boeing 737-300.

The recorder that Boeing installed in the tail of the plane in 1998 records 128 kinds of data, according to the company. That's more than has been extracted from most black boxes in past accidents.

In effect, the data gleaned from the DFDR can reconstruct the doomed flight, chief Greek investigator Akrivos Tsolakis told the Sunday Mail.

Popularly known as the ‘black box’, the plane's flight data recorder has been analysed by the French Accident Investigation Bureau, which has compiled an hour-long CD. It should clear up questions about whether the cabin lost pressure and, if it did, how quickly it was lost and how high the plane was flying when that happened.

The recorder should also tell investigators when the plane on autopilot; when it was controlled by humans and when it was out of control.

The plane lost radio contact with the ground roughly 30 minutes after takeoff from Larnaca. Fighter pilots who intercepted it reported that the pilot was not in the cabin, the co-pilot was slumped over the controls and oxygen masks were dangling from the ceiling. That led to the initial conclusion that the cabin had suddenly lost pressure at a high altitude, which would have quickly incapacitated everyone aboard if they didn't have another source of oxygen.

But then Greek officials revealed that the fighter pilots saw someone at the controls and that passengers were alive when the plane crashed.

That person has since been identified as 25-year-old steward Andreas Prodromou, believed to have tried to save the plane before it crashed at Grammatikos, near Marathon.

According to reports, the flight data animation contains some chilling sounds, such as the “Mayday, Mayday” uttered by Prodromou during his frantic efforts. He is also heard opening the cockpit door.

There are some questions the data recorder won't answer, though. It won't tell investigators whether the radio was working, or who was at the controls. It won't say who was in the cockpit, where the pilot went or why.

That's why the cockpit voice recorder, or CVR, is an invaluable tool, recording Prodromou’s pleas for help as well as minute details such as the pilots’ seat movements and chatter, even the pushing of buttons.

The CVR has also revealed the vain attempts by other airborne planes to contact Helios ZU522 while it was circling above the Greek island of Kos, as well as the approach of the two Greek fighter jets.

The investigation into the crash is due to be completed early next year. So far it appears the accident was caused by a number of different factors.

The predominant theory is that cabin decompression led to hypoxia – or low oxygen in the blood – causing the crew to pass out.

It is believed that before the doomed flight, maintenance crew who had conducted a pressurisation check left the control in manual instead of automatic, so the aircraft did not pressurise as it gained altitude. But the crew failed to notice the setting in their pre-take-off checks, and the post-take-off checks require no further confirmation of the pressurisation control selection.

In the Helios case, when the audible cabin altitude alert sounded, the crew thought it was an erroneous configuration warning because the sound is identical. According to Tsolakis, the pilots’ “subsequent mindset and actions were determined by this preconception until hypoxia overcame them as the aircraft continued to climb.”

Tsolakis reiterated to the Sunday Mail that the findings of the investigation should be ready by February or March, at which time they would be handed over to a Greek prosecutor. A news conference will then be held to brief the public – most of all the anxious relatives of victims – on what caused the horrific accident.

“What I can say is that the investigations are on track, but I urge everyone to have a little more patience. We’re almost there,” he said.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[MrFire]

Popularly known as the ‘black box’, the plane's flight data recorder has been analysed by the French Accident Investigation Bureau, which has compiled an hour-long CD.
Sacre bleu!

[big fraidy cat]

The Helios crash investigator, Capt. Tsolakis, is back on Cyprus again, according to the Cyprus Mail online:


Tsolakis attends to final gaps in Helios investigation
By Constantine Markides

THE investigation into the August 14 Helios crash in Greece that killed all 121 passengers is in its final stages, as chief investigator Akrivos Tsolakis has returned to Cyprus for some final clarifications before the preliminary draft of the findings, expected next month.

Tsolakis said that the purpose of the visit to Cyprus was to fill certain gaps found over the course of the investigation, although he noted that none of the gaps were serious.
“The investigation is proceeding in good time,” Tsolakis said. “Our visits for some time now are due to the fact that we need to cover certain gaps that have emerged from our investigation and from the evaluation of evidence we have accumulated.”

According to reports, Tsolakis is presently clarifying forensic reports, mechanical and maintenance details of the aircraft, and information regarding civil aviation procedures.
The investigative team also called upon several witnesses, including state pathologist Sophocles Sophocleous, who was present as an observer on behalf of the Cyprus government during the forensic analyses that took place in Athens after the crash.

The Cypriot investigative team and Tsolakis are also expected to visit the Helios aircraft maintenance site in Larnaca during the visit.

Tsolakis met yesterday with Communications Minister Haris Thrasou, who later said that the collaboration with Tsolakis would continue even after the publication of the investigation findings because Cyprus “has the need of such experts”.

Tsolakis said that the preliminary draft of the findings would be submitted around the end of February and hoped that by early March at the latest the document “would be transmitted to all high officials who are involved according to ICAO (International Civil Aviation Authority) law”.

Although he said that he was content with the recent steps taken in Cyprus in air safety, Tsolakis also noted that there were “certain measures that should have been implemented for many years now”.

With characteristic oratorical flourish, Tsolakis expressed his gratitude and praise to Cyprus and to the Cypriot authorities and investigative team he has been working with:
“Every time I leave the island I leave with feelings of deep contentment as a professional, as an aviator, as a Greek, and as a Cypriot, which I boast that I can consider myself to be.”


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

From the Cyprus Mail's Internet edition on Sunday, 15 January, Helios Airways is about to announce a change, requesting name change to ALPHA-JET:

Helios to announce ‘good news’ in coming days
By John Leonidou

THINGS are set to change at beleaguered Helios Airways, according to an official of the airline, with reports suggesting the airline could undergo a facelift and operate under a different name.

Phileleftheros reported yesterday that six executives of the airline had last week gone to the civil aviation office and requested that the airline be converted to another company under the name Alpha-Jet.

Helios has also been linked with a merger with Eurocypria, the profitable charter arm of Cyprus Airways, which the government is in the process of buying from the debt-ridden national carrier.

Helios Airways spokesman Nicos Anastassiades yesterday refrained from confirming if any meeting had taken place, but did say that there were some “positive” developments currently taking place at the airline.

“I cannot make an official comment on this matter yet, but we will be holding a news conference this coming week and all will be enlightened. The only thing I can say is that good things are happening.”

Helios have been struggling since one of its planes crashed in Greece last August, killing all 121 passengers and crew on board.

According to sources quoted by Phileleftheros, the airline was informed that such a process could take time and that there could be no change until the report of crash investigator Akrivos Tsolakis was completed. Civil Aviation officials are also believed to have turned to Communications Minister Haris Thrasou for legal advice on the matter.

On August 14 last year, a Helios Airways flight bound for Prague via Athens crashed into a mountainside in Grammatikos, Greece. A drop in cabin pressure and human error are believed to have been the major contributors in the accident, which saw the Boeing 737-300 flying unpiloted for over two hours before finally running out of fuel and crashing just 25km outside Athens.

In December 2004, the airline had approached Cyprus Airways with a proposal of $17 million to lease three planes from the national carrier’s now-defunct Athens-based subsidiary, Hellas Jet, but the offer was rejected.

Last year’s crash has caused serious problems for Helios, which is believed to be losing around £1 million a month.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[ATC Watcher]

Good old tactic : do not change the people or the method, change the name instead...
Egyptian and Turk carriers were expert is that....

[big fraidy cat]

From today's Cyprus Mail Internet edition:

Helios relatives call for President’s help
By John Leonidou

RELATIVES of victims of the Helios crash yesterday appealed for help from President Tassos Papadopoulos, with some of them still facing problems in the aftermath of the tragedy.

Yesterday, a committee representing the relatives met with the President in a one-hour meeting and discussed various issues, the most urgent being the financial difficulties facing some relatives who lost their loved ones in last August’s air crash.

The head of the committee, Nicolas Yiasoumis, told reporters after the meeting that their basic request was for aid from the government for victims’ families who have inherited property and tax issues left behind by the victims.

Papadopoulos assured the relatives that the government would do all that it could to ensure that relatives were given as much help as possible in such matters.

They also discussed the investigative report on the crash and how the Cyprus government would act once the report has been finalised by the Greek investigating team, headed by Akrivos Tsolakis.

Yiasoumis tolf the Cyprus Mail that the committee would take legal action if their rights were compromised in any way.

Helios has recently been linked with a merger with Eurocypria, the profitable charter arm of Cyprus Airways, which the government is in the process of buying from the debt-ridden national carrier. But President Papadopoulos yesterday told the relatives that no meeting had taken place to discuss the issue.

“We have informed the President that we have been watching the recent developments surrounding Helios very carefully,” said Yiasoumis. “In the event that our rights as relatives are put in jeopardy by some kind of shift in the company, then we will appeal to the European Court of Human Rights”.

On Saturday, Phileleftheros reported that six executives of the airline had last week gone to the Civil Aviation Department and requested that the airline be converted to another company under the name Alpha-Jet. Although, Helios spokesperson Nicos Anastassiades wouldn’t confirm such a meeting had taken place, he did say that the airline would be holding a news conference this week to announce “something good”.

On August 14 last year, an Helios Airways Boeing 737-300 flight flying from Larnaca to Prague via Athens crashed into a mountainside in Grammatikos, just 25 kilometres outside the Greek capital. All 121 passengers and crew were killed in the crash, believed to have been caused by a combination of falling cabin pressure and human error.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

I'm not familiar with the term 'postholder maintenance.' Perhaps someone could explain please?

Also, if the flight deck oxygen system is found empty, can you still test to see if it last contained oxygen or nitrogen?

[big fraidy cat]

I have seen mentioned that Mr. Irwin was designated as Chief Engineer for Helios (presumably replacing Kyriacos Pylavakis). Did he report directly to the Director? Or was Irwin the Director of Maintenance? Or, since Mr. Pantazis, the General Manager, holds an engineering degree, was he also acting as Director of Mainentance?

Another question or two for those in the know: There is a very strong possibility that the aircraft departed Larnaca with bleeds off and APU running (given the fairly full weight load and the high temperature of the day). If that were the case, in what mode would the pressurization switch be set at takeoff (auto/standby or manual)? When the bleeds and packs were turned on and the APU off (somewhere between 10,000 and 16,000 feet), would the pressurization switch also need to be reset? If the APU was not functioning properly, could this result in the often talked about equipment cooling problem?

[BOAC]

Another question or two for those in the know: There is a very strong possibility that the aircraft departed Larnaca with bleeds off and APU running (given the fairly full weight load and the high temperature of the day). If that were the case, in what mode would the pressurization switch be set at takeoff (auto/standby or manual)?

***Auto normally

When the bleeds and packs were turned on and the APU off (somewhere between 10,000 and 16,000 feet), would the pressurization switch also need to be reset?


***No. Still 'auto'. NB This is 'normally' done in the after take-off checks, at around 2-3000'. Packs are NOT normally turned off, only engine bleeds.

If the APU was not functioning properly, could this result in the often talked about equipment cooling problem?

*** Don't see why unless the reconfiguration was either forgotten or done far later.

[big fraidy cat]

BOAC, does that mean that if Auto failed, then the crew would have to use the Manual setting?

[BOAC]

'Standby' or 'Alternate' (depends on the equipment) would be the normal first choice. There should be no need for manual unless the automatics failed. I have lost the detail of this - do we know which system was on this aircraft? DCPS or CPCS?

[CaptainSandL]

The aircraft was l/n 2982 which makes it about 1998 vintage, so almost certainly Digital (DCPCS).

[BOAC]

Thanks, Cpt'n. In which case it is 'Auto'/'Alternate'/Manual. I believe auto and alternate are indentical in perfomance. Where are we going, BFC?

[big fraidy cat]

We know certain facts that have been officially reconfirmed after the re-enactment. The cabin altitude warning horn sounded at 12,000 feet, four minutes from takeoff. A few seconds later (09.11.50), the captain reported an air-conditioning problem and requested clearance from ATC to hold at 16,000 feet, which happens to be the maximum for APU bleed supply.

However, 10,000 feet is the limit if APU supplied both bleeds and electric. If they had missed that, a resulting APU bus failure could cause a host of electrical problems to other electrical systems, including packs, E&E Bay cooling fans, and/or outflow valve control in auto.

Why pick 16,000 to level off, if not to check that pressurization is back to normal after bleed reconfiguration has been completed? If the cabin pressure hadn’t been restored to 8,000 feet and was still climbing to 14,000 with the pressurization switch in Auto or Alternate, wouldn’t they switch it to Manual so as to manually close the outflow valve? This may be why the investigators are now saying, after the re-enactment, that the final position of the switch in Manual was not as significant as previously thought. They have even suggested that the crew had intentionally sought to control the valve in Manual.

Other facts we know are that the captain called his Larnaca maintenance and reported an electrical problem with air conditioning, cabin lights and equipment cooling fans. The conversation lasted through 28,900 feet. Seconds later, at 29,000 feet, the captain reported back to ATC saying that the problem had been solved and requested clearance to climb to 34,000.

Assuming a bleeds-off takeoff, it seems that leaves us with one or all of three possibilities for an early cause of the pressurization failure at 34,000 feet:

(1) A failure of one or both APU busses, which could cause a short in any neighboring electrical circuits, all the way to the E&E Bay fans and/or the pressurization system.

(2) A single or double pack failure (if one pack fails, loss of pressurization is possible; if both packs fail, the cabin pressure will certainly climb).

(3) Failure of the outflow valve to close completely (it was found one-third open).

[CaptainSandL]

Just for info, an EQUIP COOLING fan OFF light does not necessarily indicate that the fan has stopped, ie an electrical problem. It merely indicates that there is no airflow downstream of the fan.

I have done dozens of (controlled) depressurisations in the 737 and on many of them the EQUIP COOLING - EXHAUST fan OFF light illuminates during this test. This is because of the reduced airflow in the depressurised condition. The flow (& OFF light) is always restored when the aircraft is re-pressurised.

The EQUIP COOLING fan OFF light does not necessarily indicate an electrical fault, but if other faults were observed a crew could be forgiven for making that assumption.

[BOAC]

"However, 10,000 feet is the limit if APU supplied both bleeds and electric."

Do we have ANYTHING to suggest both or one engine generators were u/s before take-off? Why else would the APU be supplying 'electrics'? Was it dispatched with one gen?

"if not to check that pressurization is back to normal after bleed reconfiguration"

It should have been obvious if it had been done 'correctly' as the cabin altitude would probably start descending as both packs gave normal flow. No need to level off. To level off (at 16000ft or whatever) would be essential if the altitude horn had sounded, and should have been done when it did sound, followed by a descent.

"Wouldn’t they switch it to Manual"

That would be the normal drill having tried 'ALTN'

"The conversation lasted through 28,900 feet"

There is a huge gap here between what happened at 16000 ft and 28900ft. How long at 16? When were the various problems ("air conditioning, cabin lights and equipment cooling fans") reported to Maintrol?

"A failure of one or both APU busses"

It SHOULD be impossible to power both busses with the APU in a 300 in the air UNLESS the air/ground sensor is stuck in 'Ground' mode

"if one pack fails, loss of pressurization is possible"

No, it SHOULD be possible to climb to 33000ft and maintain normal cabin pressure.

"Failure of the outflow valve to close completely"

With battery power it should still work. Surely any significant electrical failure would be evident on the FDR? Which "cabin lights" were a problem? The whole topic of this 'reconstruction' is too vague for me. WHAT did they 'reconstruct' - and why?

A no-engine bleed take-off, no reconfiguration plus APU failure?

What parameters were used to 'reconstruct' the abnormal cabin pressure at 12000ft?

What were the defects it carried at dispatch regarding electrics and pressurisation?

[Geoff Smith]

Just a shot in the dark, others more knowledgeable will know. I offer it from the depths of my memory.
On the B747 Classic (just a Boeing) if you forced the APU electrics on in flight by closing the APU electrical field switches and selecting the APU electrics ON you would place the airplane in GROUND MODE (in flight). i.e pressurisation system would drive outflow valves open, take off configuration would sound with thrust levers forward etc. Therefore there was a procedural limitation to forbid this.
For info this characteristic was provided for engineering use on the ground during checks with the airplane on jacks.

[scarebus03]

Hello all,

firstly why would both APU busses be in operation at 34000ft? If we know the aircraft had previous enviromental system problems how would we not know at this stage whether the A/C was dispatched acc. the MEL for pack,bleed or electrical problems? If there was a problem the A/C would have been altitude restricted below FL340 as required by the MEL if the APU was involved.
It has been a few years since I worked on the 'classics' but I remember (I could be wrong) the e&e fault light would also illuminate in flight if cabin diff. press. went below a certain level, 2 or 3 psi I think. But this would only be indicative of a bigger problem.
I wonder will the investigating team ever really know what happened,:confused:


Brgds

SB03

[big fraidy cat]

Although the exact connection to the APU electric supply is beyond my knowledge, I know that a group of Greek and Cypriot pilots and engineers also believe that a bleeds-off takeoff was done, with a ground-air sensor malfunction leading to the pressurization failure at a much later stage than the official explanation would admit. (By the way, I have an engineering discussion paper on this, which is circulating at the Athens airport … I’ll find it, type it up neatly, and post it later.)

Previously on Prune, both Kaptin M and Rockhound had suggested that the ground air sensor might have mistakenly been left in air mode after the pressurization tests the morning of the flight. If I misinterpreted your meaning, please correct me, Kaptin M and Rockhound. Also, please tell me if this would be picked up on the FDR.

If the sensor was left in air mode:

(1) How would that affect the T/O configuration and the pressurization settings during climbout?

(2) How would that affect the operation of the APU during a bleeds-off takeoff?

(3) When the captain spoke to Irwin and discussed the air conditioning problem, what CB was pulled at 29,000 feet? On the CB panel behind the captain’s seat, the T/O Aural Warning and T/O Configuration CBs are next to one another. Will this also be picked up on the FDR?

(4) For pulling CBs in flight, I excerpted the following from Chris Brady’s technical site. Emphasis added is my own: From the QRH CI.2.3 March 29, 2004 "Flight crew reset of a tripped circuit breaker is flight is not recommended. Unless specifically directed to do so in a non-normal checklist. However, a tripped circuit breaker may be reset once, after a short cooling period (approximately 2 minutes), if in the judgement of the Captain, the situation resulting from the circuit breaker trip has a significant adverse effect on safety. A ground reset of a tripped circuit breaker by the flight crew should only be accomplished after maintenance has determined it is safe to reset the circuit breaker. Flight crew cycling (pulling and resetting) of circuit breakers to clear non-normal conditions is not recommended."

[BOAC]

First and foremost if left in 'Air Mode' the APU would not power both busses before start-up so that should have alerted the crew. There would be several other OBVIOUS clues. It happened to me on landing a 737 a few years ago and it was immediately obvious all was not well!

[GotTheTshirt]

Not familiar with B737 but can you select "ground mode " in the air?

Most aircraft do this through the gear sensors.

[big fraidy cat]

Poljot, you've asked this question 3 times now. Why do you think his DNA was on two masks?

The bleeds-off takeoff was normal procedure for Helios’ crews and was the case in the five previous incidents where air conditioning problems were reported in less than two months, since July 2005. The Chief Investigator has already released the plane’s recent history on that (Flight International 24 Aug.). I am not suggesting that this is a direct causal link to the crash, but it’s part of it.

If I understand the technical argument of the Greek and Cypriot skeptics correctly, an apparently insidious and increasingly recurrent electrical problem in the wiring and electronic interfaces of the ground-air sensor system, occurring in the first minutes of the climb, could have damaged the electronic card which triggers or cuts the T/O Warning Horn from the Aural Warning Generator (located above the captain’s left knee).

This would have the effect of retaining the T/O Warning Signal to the Aural Warning Module instead of canceling it when the aircraft is in the air. This would explain both an early sounding of the Cabin Altitude Horn without an actual pressurization failure, as well as the readiness of the crew to pull the CB of the T/O Aural Warning circuit. This would have rendered the pressurization warning system inoperative with a later decompression at 34,000 feet.

[BOAC]

Interesting. That last para, if relevant, would mean that the signal to close the outflow valve and pressurise the a/c would not be there either, with a DCPCS system. Not being a techie I do not know whether a failure after t/off of the a/g 'air' signal would actually open the valve or leave it closed. Any techs know?

This 'failure' would, I presume, be instantly identifiable on the FDR, since several other circuit functions would change also. So, unless the crew were actually monitoring the cabin altitude, it could all have gone un-noticed. Do we know at which point the 'horn' was audible on the R/T?

[BOAC]

poljot - it is indeed an important question, and will, I hope, be addressed in the course of the investigation. What is more important right now is finding out WHY the cabin pressure was abnormal. In that answer may lie the answer to your question. There are several other questions as well that may become clearer as the investigation progresses.

With your enormous flying experience I'm sure you can see why this is the necessary course of action? May I suggest that if you have not already done so, you read the original thread from start to end as well as this one. The original thread is here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=185849&highlight=Cyprus).

Do you have a theory as to why control was lost? I believe all sensible inputs can help. Do you have experience of hypoxia?

[Woodman]

For general heads up - our marketing department has been approached by a film company wanting to make a TV programme about this incident and they were looking to rent a 737 for a day. Not something to be associated with so our aircraft were 'busy'.

[big fraidy cat]

From today's Cyprus Mail online:

Tsolakis returns

THE PRELIMINARY draft of the investigation report into the Helios crash will be ready next month, Akrivos Tsolakis, the chief investigator into the accident said yesterday.

Tsolakis was speaking on arrival at Larnaca airport to begin a 24-hour visit where he will conduct another round of interviews related to the August 14 crash in Greece in which 121 passengers and crew died when the plane slammed into a mountainside north of Athens.
“We are at the end of the investigation and the preliminary conclusions will be ready in March,” said Tsolakis.

“There are a number of urgent points left to clarify,” added Tsolakis who had a meeting later in the afternoon with Transport Minister Haris Thrasou. The investigation into the crash so far points to human error.

[big fraidy cat]

BOAC, as promised, here’s an excerpt from one of the engineering discussion papers that I have. I’ve had it translated from Greek, and I’ve removed any direct references to the Cypriot maintenance team.

I know that some of the technicians involved in the engineering discussion are readers of PPRune, though not necessarily posters. It would be extremely valuable to our discussions if they, or others who have raised similar issues directly with Capt. Tsolakis and his team, would post to this thread, rather than simply read it.

Also worth noting is that the last news article that I posted states that the Preliminary draft report will be released before the end of March, but what was not said is whether it will be released to the general public at that time. I have a sinking feeling that, unless some pressure is brought to bear by those outside the investigation (particularly by the press), we will continue to be kept in the dark. And, if the cause of the crash is directly related to some technical occurrence, such as that outlined below, then withholding the report would serve no one.

AIR-GROUND SENSING

1. This is a very important system because it affects many other components of the aircraft, from the brake system to the engine power system, the APU electrical supply, as well as the pressurization controls. Ground-air sensing derives from two sensors, one on the right landing gear and another on the nose landing system. Electrical signals from the two sensors are distributed through 10 electronic cards from where they lead to various electrical and electronic aircraft modules.

2. It is possible to have an air-ground sensing problem as a secondary effect from related electrical wiring or electronic cards, rather than from the sensors themselves. A problem in the sensors leads to several malfunctions, which are immediately noticeable, so it’s more likely that there was a chronic and insidious secondary malfunction in the ground-air system, which may occur intermittently during flight and is difficult to trace by the engineers when the aircraft is on the ground [text removed].

3. Let’s assume that the electronic card, which prompts or cuts the T/O Warning Horn from the Aural Warning Generator (located above the captain’s left knee), had a malfunction, which retained the T/O Warning Signal to the Aural Warning Module instead of canceling it when the aircraft is in the air. One possible reaction of the flight crew, who has experienced the problem before, would be to pull the T/O Aural Warning CB. But, because this fuse is located right next to the CB of the ground-air sensor system, they could pull the latter by mistake. This could then cause serious problems to the pressurization system. I have seen this happening many times and the reverse is also likely: instead of the ground-air CB, they pull the T/O Aural Warning CB. This move would silence most of the flight deck’s aural warning systems, especially the cabin altitude horn, which sounds when cabin altitude passes 10,000 feet.

4. The situation becomes even more complicated given that the crew carried out a bleeds-off takeoff, which is often done in hot weather, with full loads and transit trips with no enroute refueling, as was the case with Helios Flight 522 to Prague via Athens. This was also the case in the five previous incidents of electrical malfunction in the aircon packs, which the same plane had experienced before its final flight. In this case, the APU compressor normally supplies bleed air for the initial cabin pressurization to allow the engines to develop full thrust in the early stages of climbout to a maximum of 17,000 feet. But the APU electrical generator is one of the systems directly affected by electrical malfunctions in the ground-air sensor system. So you can have a situation where APU electrics are also left ON together with APU bleeds without the crew knowing about it. More likely, however, is that the plane was left in AIR MODE on the ground after the pressurization test carried out three hours before the last flight. Combined with a secondary electrical fault in the ground-air sensor, this would affect the pressurization AUTO controls, outflow valves and take-off configuration warning systems in all sorts of unpredictable ways.

[BOAC]

BFC - many thanks and I echo your 'hopes' for comments.

More likely, however, is that the plane was left in AIR MODE on the ground after the pressurization test carried out three hours before the last flight - on a quick read through your post only, this would have been instantly noticeable to the pilots as they would not have been able to select the APU electrics onto both generator buses before start, as that function is 'ground mode only' on the Classic 737. This would have caused several problems with systems etc during the pre-flight preparation and taxy.

I'm still not aware from any reports as to when the horn began sounding? Do you know?

To add that anyone wishing to contribute 'off-line' is welcome to PM me and I will de-identify and post if I consider it suitable material.

[big fraidy cat]

The following article by today's Cyprus Mail online edition goes into some detail about the plane's history of inspections; this information follows the political aspects of the investigation.

Can some tech people comment as to whether this plane's maintenance history is standard for the industry, or indicative of an underlying technical problem that no one could find?


‘A deafening silence’
By Alexia Saoulli

Helios victims’ families still waiting for independent investigation six months on
DISY DEPUTY George Georgiou yesterday criticised the government for failing to appoint an independent investigation committee into the fatal Helios Airways crash last August.

Speaking to reporters at a press conference, Georgiou questioned why President Tassos Papadopoulos remained silent on an issue the relatives of all 121 passengers killed on board wanted answers to.

“President Tassos Papadopoulos promised the formation of an Independent Investigation Committee following the initiative of the Democratic Rally (DISY) for the issue to go to the House,” he said.

“Everyone accepted DISY’s suggestion and the House unanimously officially put the suggestion to Tassos Papadopulos. The president accepted the suggestion. What happened from then until today? Six months following the accident and five months after the president’s acceptance of the committee’s appointment there’s been a deafening silence.”

Georgiou also pointed out the Greek Air Accident Investigating Committee had nearly concluded its investigation into the crash and yet its Cyprus counterpart had not made any noises.

When journalists pointed out the Air Accident Investigation Committee in Cyprus had no jurisdiction over an accident which occurred in Greece, Georgiou said he was well aware of that, but that the government should be upfront that the local committee’s role was null and void.
The DISY deputy questioned how the government system worked and if its aim was for “time to go by so responsibilities and those responsible are forgotten”.

Speaking for his party he said the House had been shown no respect as its call for an independent investigation committee had been ignored and said the House Communication and Works Committee had been refused a discussion on the tragedy with regard to the Civil Aviation Department nor had been given access to the findings of two European experts on the crash.
He said: “It is clear some people in the government and coalition parties are trying to bide their time so as to reduce public reaction and to smooth over the damage.”

‘Plane was given all-clear on August 5’

COMMUNICATION Minister Haris Thrasou confirmed the fatal Helios Airways Boeing 737-300 which crashed in August last year had undergone continuous inspections from the first day of its registration.

Thrasou’s written confirmation was given to journalists by DISY deputy George Georgiou yesterday, during a press conference to highlight the government’s failure to implement an independent body to investigate the crash.

During the press conference journalists heard the House Communication and Works Committee, of which Georgiou is a member, has repeatedly been refused a discussion concerning the tragedy with regards to the Civil Aviation Department.

Nevertheless Georgiou gave journalists a letter Thrasou had addressed to the House regarding what mechanical inspections the aircraft had undergone.

Before the plane’s registration two Civil Aviation Department inspectors travelled to a German maintenance company in Munich where the aircraft’s annual mechanical inspection (maintenance) was conducted, he said.
In the inspectors’ presence it was determined that any repairs and changes that had been made to the plane on prior occasions had been in accordance with European Union regulations. Also all necessary systems, specified by European regulations, were installed on the aircraft and it underwent a thorough visual inspection, he said. A test flight was then carried out during which the aircraft’s systems underwent technical inspection.

Following the plane’s registration, Helios Airways appointed the aircraft’s maintenance to ATC Lasham, a British Boeing aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul company. The company maintained the aircraft according to approved maintenance programmes, the Minister said.
In November 2004 three Civil Aviation Department inspectors attended a scheduled maintenance inspection of the ill-fated plane.

On December 7, 2004 a mechanical inspection of the plane was conducted by the maintenance company’s specialised mechanics in the presence of a Civil Aviation Department inspector in Larnaca.

In March last year a Civil Aviation Department inspector travelled on board the aircraft and carried out an in-flight inspection. On June 8 and 9 inspectors from the Civil Aviation Department inspected the private airline company’s technical department and, among others things, the specific aircraft’s log book, said Thrasou. A month later Civil Aviation Department officials met with the UK company to discuss Helios Airways’ aircraft maintenance matters.

Then on August 5, nine days before the crash, the Boeing 737-700 underwent a ground inspection by inspectors and officials of the Civil Aviation Department (flight operations). “Any problems that arose during the inspection were dealt with and the flight was deemed flight worthy,” he said.

In his letter the Communication Minister assures routine checks were carried out on the plane by licensed mechanics authorised by ATC Lasham. These inspections were carried out two or three times daily from the day of its registration till its crash.

He said: “The results of the mechanical inspections are recorded in the aircraft’s log book, which is in the possession of the Greek Air Accident Investigating Committee. It should be noted the Civil Aviation Department has no access to these records.”

Meanwhile according to European regulations on continuous air worthiness, an aircraft’s owner is responsible for its constant airworthiness and entrusts its mechanical inspections to an approved maintenance organisation.

According to the same regulation, the competent authority (the civil aviation department) inspects the maintenance programme and carries out inspections to determine the aircraft’s continuous air worthiness, said Thrasou.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[Danny]

Doesn't sound like anything out of the ordinary. Civil Aviation Department inspectors from whatever country have a duty to regularly check up on the airlines. The timescale indicated in the report don't appear to be anything out of the ordinary, particularly for a small airline in a small country.

It appears to be more of a report of a politician grandstanding and looking for soundbites. The facts about the operational inspections do not appear to be unusual in frequency or results. Often, after an operational inspection there will be some things highlighted that will need to be reviewed at the next inspection but these are not usually things that affect safety.

At this stage, they may as well await the results of the investigation which will have taken into account all the previous history from previous inspections. It may eventually surface that there was a particular recurring problem that was reviewed during the operations inspection but it is likely that on its own it didn't pose a particular safety issue. Unfortunately, opening statements such as COMMUNICATION Minister Haris Thrasou confirmed the fatal Helios Airways Boeing 737-300 which crashed in August last year had undergone continuous inspections from the first day of its registration.are ambiguous enough to imply that the fact that 'continuous' inspections were carried out somehow implies there was a problem when in fact it is perfectly normal that aircraft are inspected on a regular basis as part of normal operations. An aircraft is inspected in one way or another after and before every flight. Does that imply that there is a problem?

Again, without specifying exactly what type of inspections or by whom they were carried out the statement is nothing more than waffle and hyperbole by the Minister. Fairly typical of politicians wouldn't you say? :rolleyes:

[big fraidy cat]

I think that what called my attention to the frequency of the daily inspections was the use of the words two or three times per day. Two times made sense to me, but three times seemed excessive. My attention was also drawn to this statement since it has already been reported (yet not confirmed) that the plane had been fitted with a 128-parameter FDR, more than required by law for a plane manufactured in 1997.

[GearDown&Locked]

My attention was also drawn to this statement since it has already been reported (yet not confirmed) that the plane had been fitted with a 128-parameter FDR, more than required by law for a plane manufactured in 1997.
Two questions:
-If true, was it installed to trace an eventual chronic problem with the a/c?
-and by whom? Boeing? or maintenance own decision?

GD&L

[Plane View]

As an independent consultant who is in regular contact with the official investication on behalf of some of the victims’ families, I can only comment on issues I have discussed with Captain Tsolakis, the chief investigator, the NTSB and Boeing, as matters of public record.

Regarding the aircraft’s inspection history as presented in parliament by Communication Minister Thrasou, it is important to differentiate between regular or routine checks (which may be carried out two or three times daily, depending on the number of scheduled flights per day) and special inspections undertaken following a report logged by the crew of possible technical problems during a previous flight.

Mr Thrasou’s confirmation that the plane was undergoing continuous inspections - since its registration with Helios Airways in April 2004 - is hardly reassuring as a clean bill of health about its airworthiness.

On December 7, 2004 a mechanical inspection of the plane was conducted by the maintenance company’s specialised mechanics in the presence of a Civil Aviation Department inspector in Larnaca.
Note that the above inspection took place barely nine days before the aircraft suffered a serious incident of Decompression at 34,000 feet on December 16, 2004.

The subsequent investigation by the Cypriot Accident Investigation Board, headed by Costas Orphanos, failed to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding the causes of that pressurisation failure. Orphanos’ Investigation Report, issued one month later, made no mention of any FDR data being retrieved and assessed during that investigation or after the plane was flown to ATCLasham, UK, for further checks and equipment overhaul.
The same cursory reference to later unscheduled inspections raises more questions about the unspecified recurrent problems the Helios crews have had with this particular aircraft in the weeks prior to its final flight:
In March last year a Civil Aviation Department inspector travelled on board the aircraft and carried out an in-flight inspection. On June 8 and 9 inspectors from the Civil Aviation Department inspected the private airline company’s technical department and, among others things, the specific aircraft’s log book, said Thrasou. A month later [July] Civil Aviation Department officials met with the UK company to discuss Helios Airways’ aircraft maintenance matters. Then on August 5, nine days before the crash, the Boeing 737-700 underwent a ground inspection by inspectors and officials of the Civil Aviation Department (flight operations). “Any problems that arose during the inspection were dealt with and the flight was deemed flight worthy,” he said.
These intensified inspections were obviously related to at least five incidents of (reported) electrical malfunctions in the plane’s air-conditioning system, within two months prior to the crash, which Mr Tsolakis had confirmed in his first interview with Flight International on August 22, 2005.

The five incidents include the problems reported in the penultimate flight which necessitated a “full pressurisation test” on the ground three hours before the fateful flight on August 14. Mr Thrasou failed to mention this last inspection as another proof of the aircraft’s flight-worthiness, something which Mr Tsolakis himself has disputed on several occasions.
With hindsight, I don’t see how someone can say that this inspection record doesn't sound like anything out of the ordinary.

[Melchior]

There might have been numerous inspections done on the aircraft and it may have had a lot of technical incidents but I don't believe that this accident happened due to technical failures.

The following is from a previous post which in my opinion is very close to the truth about what happened in the accident:

There was no electrical problem, no radio failure, no toxic gases, no hijacking nor any other kind of actual problem. The aircraft behaved perfectly. What happened is that the outflow valve was left on Manual by the engineers that carried out the pressurization check during the previous night. The valve’s wrong position was missed by the flight crew during the overhead scan and during the checklists. It’s not unthinkable, it happened before and it will happen in the future.

The Equipment cooling light came on and did not go out when 'Alternate' was selected, simply because the intake pressure was low since there was no cabin pressurisation. (The EE light is triggered by a low pressure sensor in the equipment cooling duct.) The QRH says: 'IF THE LIGHT DOES NOT GO OUT WHEN ALTERNATE IS SELECTED, NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED'.

The flight crew were dealing with this 'problem' when the cabin altitude warning (intermittent horn) came on. They then probably considered that this was a false take-off configuration warning (the two warnings are exactly the same) caused by the equipment cooling problem. The captain probably stood up to look at the circuit breakers, probably to try and reset the EE cooling sensor circuit breakers. While they were trying to figure it all out the aircraft was climbing and they were suffering progressive hypoxia due to the high cabin altitude, which impairs reasoning.

At 14000 ft cabin altitude, the cabin masks dropped. Cabin crew are told not to contact the flight deck immediately in such cases, due to high workload of the pilots. The warning for the oxygen masks in the FD is a light in front of the pilots saying ‘overhead’, same as for the EE cooling light! The oxygen masks light though on the overhead panel is much further aft on the panel than the EE cooling light though. Thus this warning was probably totally dismissed by the crew as a repetition of the EE cooling warning.

Therefore the flight crew were totally unaware that there was a pressurization problem while the cabin crew and passengers were on oxygen masks from 14000 ft onwards. Once the flight crew were unconscious there was no way to enter the Flight deck since the door was locked, unless the crew knew the code. Only the senior CC member would know the code, unless the code was changed and the crew was not informed. Maybe the senior was unconscious or panicked or forgot the code. Who knows. We may never find out. When both engines flamed out and electrical power was lost, the door unlocked and the cabin crew that survived on the portable oxygen cylinders entered the cockpit.

So to sum it up, this accident was caused by a series of human errors alone. The aircraft behaved as if it was brand new.

[big fraidy cat]

Here are two articles posted on the Cyprus Mail Internet edition today. Both discuss the litigation already commenced, with a suit filed in the U.S. courts on 27 January.

More law experts to meet Helios relatives
By John Leonidou

RELATIVES OF the Helios crash victims will be meeting with officials from two of the world’s leading aviation law firms next Wednesday in what looks to be another class action launched against the major companies involved in the crash.

A class action suit is already heading for civil courts in the US. The US-based legal team was in Cyprus yesterday informing clients about recent developments surrounding the case.

Aviation law specialist Stephan Eriksson of Advokatfirman Stephan Eriksson in Stockholm yesterday told the Cyprus Mail that he would be coming to Cyprus on Monday to speak with the relatives, along with a team of experts made up by a historic joint-venture of two of the world’s leading aviation law firms.

“I am currently working with two of the biggest aviation litigation firms in the world, Miami-based Podhurst Orseck and New York-based Kreindler & Kreindler. These two rival firms have decided to team up for the first time and send a team to Cyprus to meet with the Helios victims’ relatives”, said Eriksson.

He added, “They will be arriving on the island next Monday along with officials of a leading crash reconstruction firm and a Boeing 737 specialist. We will hold a presentation for the relatives next Wednesday, where we will try and give them some technical information that they need before talking some law with them. As far as we know, there is need for information from the relatives and we intend to give them that information.”

Although not confirmed by Eriksson, reports suggest that the teaming up of the two leading firms could only mean one thing – a massive criminal law suit is to be filed against Boeing.

Kreindler & Kreindler, for example, only undertake large law suits and in the past have represented the largest group of families of passengers killed in the July 1996 TWA Flight 800 disaster off Long Island, New York. They went on to file the first suit in October 1996 against the airline and manufacturer.

They were also the leading law firm in the Pan Am Lockerbie disaster. Their seven-year effort resulted in the largest total recovery for a single disaster in the history of aviation. The firm still continues to pursue claims on behalf of the families against the Libyan government.

They were also involved in the Avianca disaster of 1991 and the Korean Airlines disaster of 1983.
A reliable legal source told the Cyprus Mail that it was hardly surprising that other American firms would be interested in joining the race, especially companies that see a chance to take legal action against such a major firm like Boeing.

“It has now got to the stage where it has become a cut-throat business. We now see local law firms, international law firms and local firms working with international law firms and they are all trying to get in on this event.”

Meanwhile the head of Helios Victims’ Relatives Committee Nicolas Yiasoumis confirmed to the Cyprus Mail that “they are aware of their arrival and they will be meeting them.”

Yiasoumis added that the relatives were allowed to join any law firm that they wanted. He was not sure about the legal status of the same parties participating in two separate cases.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005


US lawyers return for Helios lawsuit update
By Alexia Saoulli

TRIAL LAWYERS from two American law firms representing the families of Helios Airways victims in last summer’s tragic crash, yesterday confirmed they had instigated litigation proceedings against Boeing.

Owen, Patterson & Owen, Girardi & Keese and Servicios Legales de Mesoamerica are three firms who have filed civil action claims against Boeing, Helios Airways Inc, Libra Holidays Group Public Ltd and Olympic Airlines as well as any other parties believed to be responsible for last summer’s tragic air accident involving a Boeing 737, which left 115 passengers and six crew dead.

Speaking to reporters at a press conference, Greg Owen of Owen, Patterson & Owen said its purpose was to communicate to all interested parties the recent developments in the case and to provide written documentation pertaining to the civil action which had been filed in a US court last month.

Specifically on January 27 a wrongful death and survival action was filed in a Los Angeles Superior Court. Owen said the parties had 30 days to respond but that Boeing had already filed its general appearance with the court and denied all charges. Both sides have asked for jury trials, he said. Whether the case goes to trial or not, the lawyers’ 50 clients could be awarded millions of pounds worth of damages if the court rules in their favour.

Owen said: “We made three promises to the victims’ families. One, that that we would file a lawsuit in the US to bring the defendants to justice. Two, that we would force Boeing to take steps to fix their aircraft, whether it takes one or 10 years to do… they have openly stated they know there is a problem with their warning system and are recalling planes. And three, we would seek adequate compensation for the victims’ families.”

The lawyer said they had already kept two out of three promises and that all that remained was the issue of compensation, pointing out that among other things it was their aim to secure enough money to ensure the education and welfare of orphaned children was taken care of.

Owen said the court would only hear evidence relevant to the case, “what caused the accident on this particular day”.

Vincent Carter, a principal in Girardi & Keese added: “Through this action we will have access to documents and witnesses… new venues of thought and possibilities of how the accident happened may arise and we will follow those avenues.”

They were answering questions regarding whether or not the Civil Aviation Authority would be held responsible for the August 14 crash. Grief stricken relatives looking for answers have blamed lax Civil Aviation Authority inspections for contributing to the crash that occurred just 40 kilometres from Athens.

But “right now in this current investigation we don’t see it (the Civil Aviation Authorities responsibility)”, said Owen.

According to Carter it was not uncommon for lawsuits to be resolved in a year, however, this case was likely to take longer as it involved over one hundred deaths.

“Litigation like this should take about two years,” he said.

Owen said the firms would be available for contact around the clock until all claims were resolved. A local number has been set up for this purpose, which he said is “open 24-hours to help with the litigation”.
“Anyone can call at any time. Current clients, lawyers, the media and we’ll get back to you immediately,” he said.

The number is 99250122

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

Here's a further update on the lawsuits being filed in the States. I am not clear on why Olympic Airlines is named as a defendant, nor am I sure that the list of those named is complete.

Boeing faces US lawsuit over Helios crash
By Leo Leonidou

A TEAM of lawyers representing 11 victims of last August’s Helios Airways plane disaster have announced that the families have filed a lawsuit against Boeing in the United States.

In a press release issued yesterday, American law firm Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein declared: “In co-operation with the Cyprus law firm Phoebus, Christos Clerides, N. Pirilides & Associates, of Nicosia and Limassol, the families of victims of the crash of Helios Flight 522 filed a lawsuit on Tuesday against The Boeing Company in the United States District Court in Chicago, Illinois.”

One hundred and fifteen passengers and six crew died on August 14, 2005,
when the Boeing 737-200 apparently flew without cabin pressure and then
crashed north of Athens.

“The investigation of the crash has reportedly found that the pressurisation system on the plane was not properly configured by the pilots at the time the aircraft took off from Larnaca,” the lawyers’ statement said.

However, Robert L. Lieff, founding partner of the American law firm, explained that “while there appears to have been negligence on the part of the Helios pilots, Boeing was also negligent and shares responsibility for the passengers’ deaths.”

Christos Clerides, whose firm will spearhead efforts to prosecute claims against Helios itself, is working in partnership with Lieff Cabraser in representing the families in pursuing Boeing and any other US manufacturers who may have contributed to the accident.

He told the Cyprus Mail that, “we are all confident and the timeframe, as we understand it, is that we’ll have further developments within the next two months. I am very pleased to take this step forward in achieving justice for my
clients and we intend to make sure that no responsible party escapes accountability for this horrible tragedy.”

Hans-Peter Graf, a former airline commander and investigator in charge at
the Swiss Aircraft Accidents Investigation Bureau who specialise in flight
operation and human factors, has been retained by Lieff Cabraser to work on
the case. Graf explained that, “the checklists that Boeing composed and
recommended for the 737 aircraft made it easy for crews to take off and fly
with the pressurisation system set incorrectly. The alerts and warnings
given to the crew were inexcusably vague and late. The design and
implementation of a superior system would have cost a minimal amount. Thus,
I am firmly convinced that Boeing and its partners played a substantial role
in this crash, and they could have prevented it with a proper design of the
crew alerting system.”

The complaint alleges that a series of design defects in the Boeing 737-200
led to the pilots’ failure to understand the nature of the problems they
were facing. Foremost among these was that the pressurisation warning horn
on the Boeing 737-200 emits the same sound used to alert pilots about
improper takeoff and landing configurations. The pilots’ confusion was
compounded by the fact that the very danger being warned of – low cabin air
pressure – impairs cognitive functions.

“If you are warning about a dangerous condition that impairs a pilot’s ability to think, it is common sense that you make that warning as clear as possible, and Boeing did not do that,” commented Lieff.

The complaint alleges that in 2003, Boeing communicated to 737 operators that “flight crews may not recognise the horn as an alert of excessive cabin
altitude.” Yet, Lieff said that, “Boeing took no corrective action in response to this potential safety hazard other than ask 737 operators to revise their manuals. Boeing could have eliminated the confusion from multiple uses of the same horn by using a vocal warning or a unique horn, through an inexpensive modification to the 737 pressurisation warning system.”

The action is the latest in a series of lawsuits in the pipeline following the tragedy. Two of the biggest aviation litigation firms, Podhurst and Orseck and New York-based Kreindler & Kreindler have teamed up together while Owen, Patterson & Owen, Girardi & Keese and Servicios Legales de Mesoamerica have filed civil action claims against Boeing, Helios, Libra Holidays and Olympic Airlines.

When asked why so many international law firms have become involved, Clerides said: “Unfortunately, the level of damages awarded by Cypriot courts doesn’t match up to the levels awarded by US courts. The relatives are seeking not only monetary compensation but also want to get to the root cause of the accident. They believe that Boeing, as the aircraft’s manufacturer, must take some of the responsibility.”



Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[BOAC]

For BFC:THE PRELIMINARY draft of the investigation report into the Helios crash will be ready next month- any further news?

[Plane View]

Don't bet on it, BOAC.

I spoke with Tsolakis last week, after Cypriot lawyers had told me they weren't expecting any kind of investigation report (factual, preliminary or final) before August.

Tsolakis denied it would take him that long but stated that there was indeed a further postponement of his report until the end of June "give or take a few days - NOT weeks".

He complained about the lack of staff for the compilation of his 600-page draft and about problems with the coroner's report that had to be sorted out.

Personally, I think he's stuck with gaps or inconsistencies in the DFDR data (notably, glaring evidence of an initial bleeds-off-takeoff configuration and no sign of cabin O2-masks Master Caution light anytime after the Cab Alt Horn sounded at FL120 - certainly not at FL160, when crew contacted Helios Maintrol about aircon electrics and E-bay cooling, for another 7 mins up to FL290 - when they contacted ATC for the last time).

Nevertheless, the chief investigator bragged about Boeing's block revisions of B737 flight crew procedures regarding the pressurisation mode selector in AUTO (preflight NC) and the cabin altitude horn (new cabin altitude or configuration NNC added to QRH sections 0 and 15).

These checklist revisions issued on February 17, were in response to Tsolakis' recommendations in early September. And he's still got "two more safety recommendations for further SOP amendments which Boeing has not yet heeded," he said, adding that there are "more recommendations for the manufacturer to come in his final report".

Needless to say, the lawyers of the bereaved Cypriot families are having a field day over all this, confident that their case against Boeing is rock-solid.

[big fraidy cat]

Plane View: Thanks for the information about the report. I also heard that it had been postponed until the end of June. I would assume that a 600-page draft must include the 500 or so pages that the coroner submitted, plus many pages for the FDR readout, so I don’t understand his complaint about lack of staff. I would think that his report, without these addenda, would only run to 20 pages or so. Someone, please correct me if I’m wrong.

Also, I don’t think that the case against Boeing is all that “rock-solid.” With 5000 planes in production over 30 years, this seems to be the first one that didn’t do what it was supposed to do. I have sifted through American and European incident reports going all the way back to 1978, where pressurization problems caused the pilots to lower altitude or land, but these incidents didn’t cause the plane to crash. In fact, most of the incidents referred to failure of a particular part, such as outflow valve, cabin pressure controller, or open door or faulty seal. The other failures during climb or cruise were due to pilots’ failure to reconfigure after a bleeds-off takeoff.

I have also carefully looked through the checklists, past and present, and the instructions seem pretty clear and straightforward and always have. In fact, even though the recently revised checklist specifically states that the pressurization mode selector should be set to “Auto,” if pilots elect to do a bleeds-off takeoff, they will still have to reconfigure the bleeds, and that is what has been overlooked, even though it has been on the non-normal checklist from the beginning, with a revision in 2002 as per the following incident report of the Canadian Transport Safety Board http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2000/a00p0101/a00p0101.asp

I still think that an unrelated, recurring electrical problem is at fault here, and that the pressurization failure was secondary, albeit fatal. As Poljot suggested earlier, was there also a problem with the pilots’ oxygen supply? If the bottles weren’t erroneously filled with nitrogen, then perhaps they were empty. I hope that at least one of the 600 pages of the investigation report will cover this.

[big fraidy cat]

Here's the latest article online from the Cyprus Mail:

An eerie echo of the Helios crash
By John Leonidou

AIRLINE manufacturers Boeing were fully aware long before last Summer’s Helios Airways crash that warning signals over cabin pressurisation problems could be confusing to the crew, according to emails from the company seen by the Sunday Mail.

Helios Airways flight ZU 522 crashed into a mountainside just north of Athens on August 14, 2005, killing all 121 passengers on board. Though the official accident report is still pending, there are strong indications the pilots were confused over warning signals indicating a gradual loss of pressure in the cockpit. Not realising there was a problem, they eventually passed out, leaving the plane to fly on auto-pilot until it finally crashed three hours later.

“Had there been a proper warning system that would have alerted the crew directly to the problem then it is my belief that the whole tragedy would have been avoided,” a Boeing pilot told the Sunday Mail this week.

Two and a half years earlier, a Norwegian airliner experienced almost identical problems to the Helios Airways plane. On November 29, 2002 a Braathen Airline Boeing 737-700 was forced to descend and make an emergency landing just after takeoff after pressurisation problems similar to those in the Helios case. The Braathen pilots, however, realised the problem and brought the plane down safely, and the company immediately reported the problem to Boeing.

In their report to Boeing customer service headquarters in Seattle, Braathens said the pressurisation problem “was not the ‘normal’ ‘rushing air’ associated with a rapid decompression, because the leakage was not of a rapid type”.

Preliminary investigations into the Helios crash show a slow decompression leak resulted in the pilots passing out.

In the Braathens incident, just as in the Helios tragedy, the problem was compounded by confusion over warning signals: “The warning horn [for high cabin altitude] is the same that is used for the takeoff warning, both with intermittent aural warnings. This led the flight-crew to not identify cabin altitude problems at once.”

Replying on December 9, 2002, Boeing said it had received “an increased number of reports of flight crews not configuring the pressurisation panel correctly”. But it also admitted it had received “similar comments from a number of airlines” regarding the confusing warning signals, adding, they would be proposing an optional system to fix the problem in about two or three years.

“The high cabin altitude warning horn itself has not changed since the 737 first delivered in 1967,” Boeing said. “However, in response to your comments and similar comments from a number of airlines, we are considering development of a limited crew messaging system for the 737NG.”

According to David Learmount of Flight International, as well as two Boeing pilots, this system has yet to be introduced, although Boeing did send out a circulate a “reminder” to flight crews about the difference between warning alarms for incorrect takeoff configurations and cabin altitudes – after the Helios Airways tragedy of August 14, 2005.
Several teams of foreign lawyers have offered to represent victims of the accident in suing Boeing in the US courts.

A BOEING 737 pilot, who wished to remain anonymous, yesterday told the Cyprus Mail that the problems experienced by the Norwegian airliner were “not identical, but very similar” to those on Helios. He insisted the tragedy could have been avoided had Boeing installed proper alarms to warn the crew of pressurisation problems in the cabin.

“From what we know so far about what went wrong with Helios, it appears that the pack and bleed switches were in fact on, but that the pressurisation switch was on manual. This is not identical to what happened in the other flight, but very similar, and had there been a proper warning system that would have alerted the crew directly to the problem, I believe the whole tragedy would have been avoided.”

The pilot said he wasn’t surprised that Boeing had not changed the alarm system after receiving the letter from the Norwegian airliner.

“To change this alarm system is not as simple as some may think. It is not just a matter of changing a few buttons, but changing the whole philosophy of the airplane, which would basically mean retraining all Boeing crew around the world – and that as you can imagine will not be easy.”


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[Dream Buster]

I must admit I haven't read the whole of this thread but,

It seems to me that we pilots are not very good at identifying, facing up to and dealing with the obvious dangers of hypoxia for all the well known and accepted reasons.

Surely there should be a case for providing both pilots with an automatic drop down O2 system, similar to the system that the pax have.

Yes it would be expensive and difficult to retrofit and a million other excuses BUT it should hopefully provide the crew with auto O2 when they most need it.

We just then need someway of automatically clamping the mask onto his or her face......solutions, please. Not blame.

:eek:

[RatherBeFlying]

Also, I don’t think that the case against Boeing is all that “rock-solid.” With 5000 planes in production over 30 years, this seems to be the first one that didn’t do what it was supposed to do. I have sifted through American and European incident reports going all the way back to 1978, where pressurization problems caused the pilots to lower altitude or land, but these incidents didn’t cause the plane to crash. In fact, most of the incidents referred to failure of a particular part, such as outflow valve, cabin pressure controller, or open door or faulty seal. The other failures during climb or cruise were due to pilots’ failure to reconfigure after a bleeds-off takeoff.

I have also carefully looked through the checklists, past and present, and the instructions seem pretty clear and straightforward and always have. In fact, even though the recently revised checklist specifically states that the pressurization mode selector should be set to “Auto,” if pilots elect to do a bleeds-off takeoff, they will still have to reconfigure the bleeds, and that is what has been overlooked, even though it has been on the non-normal checklist from the beginningThe one big change is the armoured door. The cabin crew can no longer get O2 to an unconscious flight crew without the door code. Boeing's lawyers will be pointing out that other operators' SOPs have the door code checked before takeoff.

[big fraidy cat]

A-Jet plan to replace Helios
By Jean Christou

HELIOS AIRWAYS is to cease flying but not trading, while its parent company Libra Holidays Group (LHG) intends to replace it with a new charter airline named A-Jet.

Still reeling after tragic crash that killed 121 passengers and crew north of Athens last August, Helios has been unable to fully recover and has caused multi-million in losses to LHG, which is listed on the Cyprus Stock Exchange.

The Helios crash cost Libra at least £5 million plus another £18 million the group wrote off in goodwill as a result of the accident, which resulted in group losses up until the end of October 2005 of £23.69 million compared to a profit of £2.58 million in the same period in 2004.

In relation to the £5 million Helios loss, LHG said it was contemplating suing third parties
But the company, one of the biggest UK-based tour operators said yesterday it is ready to create a new charter airline, which will use the aircraft and resources of Helios.

Libra chief executive Andreas Drakos told the Cyprus Mail yesterday it had applied for a licence for the creation of a new airline A-Jet.

“It’s not exactly ready yet,” he said but added that the company intended to make an announcement within days.

“We have been going through the normal processes of obtaining a licence for some time now,” Drakos said denying reports in Phileleftheros yesterday that they were bypassing normal procedures.

Drakos said Helios would remain on the books as a trading company but cease flying.

“Helios will remain as a company, a subsidiary of Libra to support the investigating committee and to pursue claims against third parties but cease carrying out operations,” Drakos said.

He said A-Jet would be mainly carrying out charter flights, unlike Helios, which also operated scheduled flights.

“Our business as a group is to bring people (tourists) in from the UK and Europe. This will be a new company,” he said.

An announcement from the Civil Aviation Department yesterday said that in January this year an application had been submitted by representatives of Helios to transfer the assets of the company to a company A-Jet.

“This application was rejected by the Department of Civil Aviation, because it was not compatible with the relevant European regulations,” said the announcement.

It said that last month the Department then received an application from the company A-Jet for a licence, along with the relevant documents.

“The technical aspects of the application is being examined by the Department of Civil Aviation, while for the legal aspects are the subject of a letter to the Attorney-general’s Office for his opinion” said the announcement.

It added that just because a process had begun for a licence did not imply the outcome would be successful or within a specified time period.

“This depends whether all of the technical and other conditions have been satisfied and also relevant EU regulations,” the Civil Aviation Department said, adding that it was handling the case with responsibility and having in mind the public interest and sensitivity.

Results of the Helios crash investigation are not due out at least until the end of April.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

Here's a bit of a follow-up to the rebranding of Helios from today's Cyprus Mail Internet edition:

Libra: Ajet plan will not affect our finances
By Jean Christou

LIBRA Holidays Group (LHG) yesterday sought to assure shareholders that the creation of a new airline Ajet and the reassigning of Helios Airways aircraft to the new charter company would have not affect the group’s financial situation.

“In any case, this issue involves in-house restructuring of two wholly owned subsidiaries of the Group and has no financial consequences to the Group whatsoever,” an LHG announcement to the Cyprus Stock Exchange said yesterday.

LHG said that due to the serious problems that Helios Airways encountered just after the tragic air accident in August 2005, in which 121 people lost their lives, “Helios considered to pass its operations to Ajet Airways Ltd ('ajet') which was registered on January 20, 2006 and is owned 100 per cent by Libra Holidays Group Public Ltd,” the company said.

It said that under the presumption that all necessary approvals and consents were issued by the relevant authorities, the lease agreements of the aircraft operated by Helios would be reassigned to Ajet, which will operate basically as charter flight airline.

”Due to the presumption as aforesaid, there has been no announcement yet since the Libra Holidays Group waited to first obtain the said licences and just then to proceed with the related announcement,” LHG said.

The Helios crash cost Libra at least £5 million plus another £18 million the group wrote off in goodwill as a result of the accident, which resulted in group losses up until the end of October 2005 of £23.69 million compared to a profit of £2.58 million in the same period in 2004.

In relation to the £5 million Helios loss, LHG, one of the biggest UK-based tour operators said it was contemplating suing third parties.

Helios will remain as a company and a subsidiary of Libra to pursue the claims and also to support the investigating committee into the crash.

The Civil Aviation Department said on Monday it had received the application for a licence from Ajet and that both the technical and legal aspects were being examined.

Results of the Helios crash investigation are not due out at least until the end of April.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005


Keep in mind that the investigation report is due at the end of June, not April. Helios and Libra have been sued in the U.S. courts, but I don't know if they have filed an Answer yet, of if they intend to.

[big fraidy cat]

Here are some interesting new developments reported by the Cyprus Mail this morning.


Cyprus ‘blamed’ for Helios crash
By By Elias Hazou

Leaked report cites Civil Aviation failings, Helios maintenance and human error



A US FEDERAL Aviation report commissioned by the government reportedly points the finger at Cyprus’ Civil Aviation authorities with regard to the Helios Airways disaster last August that claimed the lives of all 121 people onboard.


News of the report, described as “top secret,” was broken yesterday by Greek daily To Vima. According to the paper’s sources, the FAA found fault with the Cypriot Civil Aviation Agency for inadequate checks on the airline prior to the crash.


The very existence of the FAA’s probe came as a surprise; but in the wake of the revelation yesterday, commentators said it tied in with the government’s pledge last year to seek the help of American experts.


The main investigation, under Greece’s chief air investigator Akrivos Tsolakis, is nearing completion and should be made public by summer, the latest information suggests.

The FAA report is said to be particularly damning of both Cypriot Civil Aviation authorities and Helios Airways. According to To Vima, it draws attention to the airline’s “problematic maintenance team” and mentions the now-famous issue of the decompression switch.

It is believed that before the doomed flight, maintenance crew who had conducted a pressurisation check left the control in manual instead of automatic, so the aircraft did not pressurise as it gained altitude. But the crew failed to notice the setting in their pre-take-off checks, and the post-take-off checks require no further confirmation of the pressurisation control selection.

In the case of Helios flight ZU-522, this was further compounded by the fact that the pressurisation warning alarm on the Boeing 737-200 emits the same sound used to alert pilots of improper takeoff and landing configurations. It is now thought the pilots’ confusion was worsened still by the fact that the very danger being warned of – low cabin air pressure – would have already impaired cognitive functions.

Citing its sources, the Greek paper said co-pilot Pambos Charalambous was the first to lose consciousness in the cockpit, presumably due to the onset of hypoxia, or low oxygen in the blood.

In short, the above scenario—assuming it’s true—would confirm experts’ initial assessment that the accident was a combination of human error and technological failure.


In its Airline safety review 2005 published this January, Flight International said:

“The Helios 737-300 that crashed in Greece was one of the intermediate generation of jets, with a part digital, part electro-mechanical flightdeck.

“This configuration, however, seems unlikely to be relevant to the accident cause. Early reports from the investigator suggest the accident sequence began when the flightcrew failed to set the pressurisation controls correctly during pre-start checks, and this omission was compounded by their failure to recognise warnings that the cabin was not pressurising as the aircraft climbed.

“Chief investigator Akrivos Tsolakis looks likely to comment, however, on the fact that many other incidents of failure to pressurise have occurred in 737s, but in those cases crews recognised the warnings in time.”

But the FAA’s findings went a step further, apparently exonerating Helios’ former chief engineer—a British national. Alan Irwin had been employed by the airline on a short-term contract, but shortly after the crash, reports emerged that he was at loggerheads with the company over the cause of the disaster.


Irwin is thought to be the last person to have spoken to the flight crew.

To Vima said yesterday that chief investigator Tsolakis had incorporated all or most of the FAA’s conclusions in his own probe.

The leaked FAA report takes matters in a new direction, somewhat deflecting attention away from Boeing, which is being sued in the United States by relatives of the victims.

The families and friends of the deceased hold the aircraft manufacturer at least partly liable, arguing that disaster could have been avoided had Boeing taken steps to eradicate the confusion over the decompression warning.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

Well, Cyprus Mail has certainly been busy today. Here is another interview with the management of the new airline, A-jet or ajet, or whatever, which will now be 80% charter operation. In one day, we've gone from total charter to 80%. Life is certainly interesting.


‘New airline is not Helios in disguise’
By Leo Leonidou

LIBRA HOLIDAYS GROUP (LHG), one of the biggest UK-based tour operators said yesterday that its new charter airline, ajet, was not Helios in disguise but “a completely different business model.”

Speaking to the Cyprus Mail yesterday, Managing Director of the new airline, Bryan Field said “the important thing is that it’s not just a name change”.

Helios Airways will remain as a subsidiary of LHG but without any operations while awaiting the results of the Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) probe into last August’s crash north of Athens which killed 121 passengers and crew. The results of the investigation are not due out at least until the end of April.

“As part of LHG’s strategy to strengthen its position in the market as the number one specialist to Cyprus, LHG are pleased to announce the launch of ajet airways,” a press release stated.

Andreas Drakou, Chief Executive of LHG, said ajet will “strengthen our position in the air charter market primarily in the UK and Europe.

“More than 80 per cent of our business will be on a chartered basis leaving only some routes on a partly scheduled basis due to high demand from our UK customer base.”

“We expect that this effort will continue contributing positively to the overall Cyprus tourist industry with some 250,000 return passengers in our first year increasing to around 500,000 by 2008.”

Field, who has over 30 years experience with British Airways and was a former director of BA’s CitiExpress, explained that the decision was taken to create a different type of airline in the spring of 2005.

“When LHG bought Helios, they bought a scheduled airline, but what they really need is a charter airline which is better suited to their leisure operations.

“After last August’s accident, plans were put on hold but we decided in December that UK tour operators had stuck with us and this encouraged us. There was a future, provided we could build a good, strong company.”

Seats will be sold on a no-frills basis, online through ajet.com. It will be a ticketless system, which makes travel easier and cheaper for the customer.

“The start-up cost is relatively low,” Field said. “A big overhaul has taken place and we have kept costs as low as possible. We want to learn to walk before we can run and want a year of consolidation. Our aim is to get ajet up and running and profitable in the first 12 months and will then look to start expanding when the leased plane comes back, which will give us a 50 per cent capacity increase.”

Ajet currently have two Boeing 737-800s and will take delivery of a third in May, at which point one of the existing two will be leased out for one year to a UK carrier.

The airline is to start operating on March 25. Field said the company is confident that it will receive an air operator’s certificate and operating license and will demonstrate that it is a competent operator.

He added that the Helios investigation outcome shouldn’t be pre-judged.

“All carriers worldwide will learn from this. Helios wasn’t the first company to have an accident and won’t be the last.”


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

Not sure if we can look forward to daily reports on the Helios rebranding saga, but it will be quite interesting to follow. Here is today's article on the Cyprus Mail Internet edition:

Government says no green light for new airline
By John Leonidou

COMMUNICATIONS Minister Haris Thrasou yesterday denied claims that Helios Airways would soon be operating under the name of ajet.

Libra Holdings Group (LHG) which is one of the biggest UK-based tour operators and which owns Helios, had announced on March 13 that it was ready to create a new charter airline, which will use the aircraft and resources of Helios.

Last August, an Helios Airways flight bound for Athens crashed into mountainside just north of the Greek capital killing all 121 passengers and crew members on board.

Still reeling after tragic crash, Helios has been unable to fully recover and has caused multi-million in losses to LHG, which is listed on the Cyprus Stock Exchange.

Libra chief executive Andreas Drakos had previously told the Cyprus Mail that ajet would be mainly carrying out charter flights, unlike Helios, which also operated scheduled flights.

Thrasou yesterday described the announcement of Libra as “somewhat vague” adding that an operator’s licence had yet to be given to ajet.

“For any airline company to operate it is imperative that they have a certified operator’s licence, something which ajet has yet to obtain. Therefore there announcement is somewhat vague. They say that they are in the final stages of collecting the necessary licenses and that the whole procedure is set to finish very soon. They have said that until that time they will operate on temporary licences – but what temporary licences and how have A-Jet deduced that they are allowed to operate on temporary licences?

Speaking about media reports that an airplane would arrive on the island on Sunday under the livery of aet, Thrasou said that every airline is allowed to change the livery on its aircrafts if they want to.

“However, they cannot change their name to ajet”, said the Minister “and that is because Helios had sent a request to the Civil Aviation in January 2006 requesting that their fleet and company change to the name ajet but it was declined.

“Some time later, a new company arrived on the scene requesting the issue of an operator’s licence and operator’s certificate. That procedure began but there are still some loose legal terms that have to be looked into before anything can be issued. In fact we have requested the help of the Attorney-General to aid us on a few of the matters.”

He added that the whole matter is still in the shadow of the tragedy of Helios flight ZU 522 and that it wasn’t possible to simply write off a company that is currently being investigated because of air crash.

The Director of the Civil Aviation Department Leonidas Leonidou supported Thrasou’s comments, adding that a plane under the name ajet had requested to take off from Cyprus recently but was refused permission from the Civil Aviation.

“They are allowed to plan flights but it was one thing to plan flights and another thing to actually execute flights. In this case, the plane did not have the necessary credentials and was not allowed to leave.”

Meanwhile, in a press conference yesterday, DISY deputy Giorgos Georgiou said that Helios was attempting to weave itself out of the investigation by converting their company to A-Jet. He added that the government was also taking unprecedented measures to make sure that nothing was being done to stop Helios from being written off.

Giorgiou also noted that the government’s “guilty silence” was a clear indication that the requests for ajet, which would be operating with the Helios fleet, would be approved in the near future.

The Managing Director of the new airline, Bryan Field told the Cyprus Mail on Wednesday that its new charter airline was not Helios in disguise but “a completely different business model.”

He added that Helios Airways would remain a subsidiary of LHG but without any operations while awaiting the results of the Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) probe into last August’s air crash.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

Here's a second article today from the Cyprus Mail.


US denies Helios report

THE US Embassy in Cyprus has categorically denied recent media reports in Greece that the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) has issued a secret report that partially blames the Cypriot Civil Aviation Department for last August’s Helios air crash.

An announcement issued last night said, “This is false. There is no US-government report on the Helios crash. The government of Greece has final responsibility for investigating the crash and publishing the accident assessment.”

According to Greek daily To Vima, the FAA report was said to have been particularly damning of both Cypriot Civil Aviation authorities and Helios Airways whilst it also pointed to the airline’s “problematic maintenance team”.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Communications also issued an announcement yesterday denying that they handed information on the Helios crash to any US governing bodies.

[Rananim]

The attempt by Helios to rebrand at such a sensitive time is surprising and miscalculated.Assuming no major surprises in the final report,the crash aircraft was by all accounts fully serviceable.In the immediate aftermath,there was a lot of media frenzy about shoddy maintenance and disgruntled and cold passengers.I think this has been proven a red herring.The crew seemingly crashed a perfectly serviceable aircraft.By all accounts,the engineer left the pressurization mode switch in MAN because the checklist instructed him to do so.He can NOT be held accountable.The investigation has uncovered sporadic and unsatisfactory vigilance of airline operations by the Cypriot CAA but can this failing be directly connected to the probable cause?Its a major failing for sure,but unrelated to probable cause.
A lawsuit has been filed against Boeing and it will be interesting to see if they can make it stick.I have serious doubts.Boeing's reminder to pilots that an intermittent horn whilst airborne can only mean excessive cabin altitude is not an admission of design ambiguity,but rather a reminder of the obvious.The checklist design issue is not quite so transparent;omission of specific challenge and response items relating to the configuration of the pressurization panel is problematic,but must be balanced by the fact that there was one checklist item that encompassed the configuration of the airconditioning and pressurization panel as a whole.Boeing's decision to now include the setting of the pressurization mode selection as a specific and separate checklist item might possibly be construed/mis-construed as proof of a voltaface.And the same might be said of the changes made to the AFTER TAKEOFF checklist.However,a manufacturer must be able to refine and finetune system and checklist design without having that revision used against them in a court of law.
The 737 was designed and certified in the 1960's;Boeing's later models are EICAS-equipped and warn the pilot of cabin altitude in excess of 10000 feet by displaying an EICAS message "CABIN ALTITUDE" accompanied by a intermittent siren.Cancelling the master warning/caution cancels the siren.Additionally,at 11000 feet,the cabin altitude controllers are bypassed and the outflow valve is closed automatically.It is a superior and safer design but does this make the 737 design unsafe?

[d246]

So we have a perfectly servicable aircraft airborne with the outflow valve open. Happens all the time. Warning horn sounds to alert the crew. Two options for this horn, 1 take off config, well they were airborne, 2 pressurisation! You might think that this would be worth checking, but no 'they were confused'! Sounds like total incompetence to me. Of course Boeing and the airline will have to face months of litigation. Another crew c..k up.

[Dream Buster]

d246

You are quite correct, dead right.

The unthinkable has happened.

If, by design, 'just in case' this scenario were to happen, an automatic drop down O2 mask were to appear in front of a pilot and he then reasoned that he had better put it on, just in case, then the pilot would suddenly not only have saved his own life, but the aeroplane and all of the passengers.

Would not this 'yet to to be tried' new system of auto drop down O2 for pilots too be worth considering or do we need yet more proof that pilots are quite capable of making extremely basic mistakes in a well known 'gotchya' enviornment of lack of O2?

Has drop down O2 for pliots ever been considered or maybe it is used on some aeroplanes?

And if not? Why not?

Sorry to keep banging on about it, but......

:confused:

[BOAC]

Have you read the whole thread....................? Might be worth it.

[Magplug]

Drop down oxygen masks for pilots.....?

How about an active warning you can't ignore...
http://images.art.com/images/products/small/10069000/10069549.jpg

But seriously, I have made exactly that same mistake on a 737.... Got airborne from a Scandinavian station after a nightstop where the 3rd party engineers had closed the outflow valve in manual to keep the weather out. As I was NHP setting up the flight deck from the LHS I missed the green [MANUAL] light on the pressurisation panel as it is not at all conspicuous and even less so when viewed at an acute angle. The FO also missed it when he came in from the cold. Only a pressurisation [AUTO-FAIL] triggers anything on recall, merely being selected to [MANUAL] triggers nothing.

We got airborne and thankfully noticed due to sensitive ears. Company SOP's would have also called for a check at 10,000'.

The 737 Master Caution system is truly appalling. There are warning lights & captions scattered all over the flight deck instead of being gathered in one place and the Master Warning only illuminates to inform the subject area of the warning. From there you have to go-find what triggered it. Some warnings that lie (allegedly) within the pilot's primary visual field have no attention getter at all - Fire Detector [FAULT] light for instance.

In the sad case of Helios with a preoccupation in dealing with an Equipment-Cooling issue, an [OVERHEAD] warning caused by a the critical [PASS OXY-ON] is in precisely the same zone as the warning of [EQUIP-COOLING OFF] and so can be overlooked with relative ease.
And as for the bloody horn! Most often heard in descent as the throttles close with the gear up, one's first reaction is to cancel it. Shame that one audio warning is designed to convey three different messages.

There is so much we have learnt and now understand about human cognitive processes and abilities. It is appalling that the 737-3/4/5 have not been subject to the simple modifications that would help out a pair of below-average pilots who might be having a bad day.

Good luck to the families going after Boeing.

[Dream Buster]

BOAC - I've just scanned through the present thread and I also followed the other 51 pages at the time of the accident and I can't see anything which relates to a possible new way of dealing with hypoxia.

Would not a drop down O2 system be of use to the pilots as well as the passengers? Some time in the future.............

Nice simple question, what do you think?

Many is the time I've been flying and had to force myself to understand what the pressurisation presentation is showing me; especially when it's abnormal and one is climbing at 1500' a minute and really haven't got too long to work it out before one's brain fades away...............

Whereas an O2 mask dangling in front of me might be a good clue to do something about it.

Only trying to help and think out of the box.

:ouch:

[Igor37]

"And as for the bloody horn! Most often heard in descent as the throttles close with the gear up, one's first reaction is to cancel it. Shame that one audio warning is designed to convey three different messages."

No, the warning you hear during descent with throttles idle and the flaps extented is a continuous horn as opposed to the pressurisation one being intermitent (same as take off config warning) and are not cancelled by the same switch .

I.

[Magplug]

Igor you are missing the point entirely. Are you a pilot? have you any experience of the 737?

[big fraidy cat]

The Greek press has been very vocal recently, due in large part to leaks from unknown sources "close to the investigation." The preliminary report was originally scheduled for April; the investigation team insists that it will be presented in June. Further, the current "leaks" are pointing fingers at everyone, though not necessarily providing any real news in any one quarter.

I am posting the current article from today's Kathimerini online edition. I will also try and translate part of the article from To Vima (a Greek daily), at least the part that refers to the Irwin report and the questionable airworthiness of the plane.

Helios Flight 522 was destined to crash
Investigation committee finds mistakes and omissions committed on the ground and in the air, with blame for almost all involved

By Aristea Bougatsou - Kathimerini

The crash of a Boeing aircraft near Athens last August that killed all 121 passengers and crew will go down in aviation history as a case study of what can go wrong, according to an interim report to be released by the Investigation Commission for Accidents and Flight Security (EDAAP) in early April.

Apparently neither of the two malfunctions that appeared simultaneously during the flight could have caused the aircraft to crash if there had not also been dozens of other omissions related to flight security.

Sources have revealed to Kathimerini that the report will attribute a long series of mistakes on the part of all those in Cyprus involved in flight security. The report will attribute blame to both state and airline authorities for the unprecedented lack of any evaluation of the flight security system by the Cypriot Civil Aviation Authority. As for Helios Airways, the findings point to criminal negligence on the ground and in the air, both on the part of company officials and ground staff involved in the particular flight.

Mistakes on the ground

The Helios aircraft crashed because of errors made on the ground which were then not dealt with in the air. During takeoff, just a few minutes after 9 a.m., instruments almost simultaneously gave two warnings regarding air pressure and cooling systems. Clarifications were sought from technicians on the ground.

The warnings (both an alarm and a light) came when the aircraft rose above 10,000 feet. Technicians on the ground in Larnaca had left the cabin air pressure switch in the manual position, instead of switching it over to auto, as they were supposed to do.

The aircraft cabin was already losing pressure and, as it turned out, the flight crew had not carried out the appropriate checks before takeoff in accordance with the pre-takeoff checklist. The pressure switch had not been checked and so remained in the manual position; the warning alarm caused confusion since the same alarm also sounds for a quite different malfunction —the position of the flaps and the wheels while on the ground.

As the aircraft rose to its cruising altitude of 34,000 feet and the problem remained unsolved, the gradual decompression began to affect passengers and crew; the latter, however, did not realize what was wrong. The air pressure level in the cabin was shown to be the same as it had been at 8,500 feet, when the second malfunction (overheating) in the communication cooling system (found under the pilot’s seat) occurred.

The German pilot got up to deal with the second malfunction. He may have attempted to reset the system or activate a backup system.

Meanwhile, the airplane had become a gas chamber. Passengers and crew would at first have fallen into an altered state and then lost consciousness, while the pilot collapsed in the cockpit. From then on the plane was on automatic pilot.

All the passengers would have suffered irreversible brain damage due to lack of oxygen, according to the coroners’ report. Even if the heroic cabin steward Andreas Prodromou, who sent out a Mayday message, had been able to land the plane as he apparently was trying to do, the rest of those on board still breathing would have been in a vegetative state. Prodromou stayed conscious by using portable oxygen bottles, perhaps because he had been able to put an oxygen mask on when the plane fell to 14,000 feet.

The problems had begun on the ground. During the groundchecks carried out just a few hours before the flight took off, Helios’s ground engineers had switched the air pressure valve to manual in order to create artificial compression conditions, but then forgot to switch it back to auto.

Then the flight crew on board neglected to check it, either by scanning or by reading out and naming the items on the pre-flight checklist. Nor did they switch it back during the flight, since they probably attributed the warning indication to a breakdown in the warning system or some other cause.

The crash showed a failure of the checking systems. The Flight Authority, a branch of the Cypriot Transport Ministry, was compromised and the airline found accountable but protected by a network of entangled interests and silence.

The Cypriot Civil Aviation Authority did not carry out the required checks and had not adopted the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) instructions, nor did it take into serious consideration the written recommendations submitted by its two British advisers.

Although blatant omissions had been noted, and the Cypriot Civil Aviation Authority should have been under the supervision of the European Aviation Safety Agency and the Joint Aviation Authority, both these bodies failed to act.

The airline itself was characterized by a complete absence of air safety culture. Its chief concern was low-cost staff (with a six-month turnover) and hiring pilots on the cheap who were out of work and without many prospects.

Boeing weaknesses

The accident has revealed the weaknesses in the functioning of the Boeing 737-300, of which about 4,000 are in use around the world.

The investigating committee has already made four recommendations to the manufacturer. According the ICAO, security recommendations must be issued before the accident report and sent to the manufacturer, if the head of the investigation believes they are urgent.

According to sources, the head of the committee, Akrivos Tsolakis, sent the four recommendations to Boeing via the US Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee. All four concern the cabin air pressure system; hundreds of incidents involving this system have been reported around the world.

Two of the recommendations have already been adopted and Boeing has informed all airlines flying B737-300s.

One of these recommendations concerns the fact that the same warning sign appears for both the cabin pressure and the flaps — two different functions. The manufacturer is required to separate the two warning systems. The second recommendation adopted concerns an omission in the technical manual used by technicians on the ground with regard to setting the pressure switch to manual. The manual instructs technicians to switch back to the “original position” and not to “auto,” which would be clearer.

The EDAAP report will be sent to the Air Accident Investigation Committee in Cyprus, since Helios was based there, and to the US National Transportation Safety Board, since Boeing is based in the US. According to the law, EDAAP must make note of their comments within 60 days so as to reach its final conclusions. After the report is completed, the due process of law may proceed in Athens and Nicosia and the investigation will enter another phase, this time in the civil courts.

[Magplug]

Nice post Fraidy Cat. It speaks volumes about the attitude the Greeks, (and Italians also), have about accident investigation.

There are at least 4 paragraphs in the report above that make reference to lack of supervision or oversight at a regulatory level, although in reality there seems very little reason - as yet - to lay any blame there. One gets the distinct impression that without a pair of pilots to throw into jail they are determined to look around the living to see who can take the slightest blame. Saving political face is far more important than removing the plain truth from the shadows.

- Missing a mis-configured pressurisation controller pre-flight.
- Missing an abnormal pressurisation regime early in flight.
- Mistaking a cabin altitude warning for a false-trigger of one of the other systems using an almost identical aural alert.
- Preoccupation with a minor malfunction whist another of greater gravity worsens.

Whilst this string of omissions is very unusual they are individually recognisable and attributable. All of these are quantifiable human failings that have happened before and will happen again. Pilots will continue to make mistakes because quite simply they are human. Unfortunately, with some corporate arrogance, Boeing refuse to acknowledge that smart design can trap & mitigate predictable human errors.

Simple changes to the alerting system in this aircraft would have prevented each single one of the above omissions.

And finally...... There are plenty of places around Western Europe where you could set up a cheap charter airline tomorrow. The British Libra Holidays Group is now aware of exactly the financial penalty of attempting to reduce their charter costs - but they have survived.

Had the victims of HCY522 been British holidaymakers I suspect Libra Holidays would now no longer be in existence.

[CAT3A]

quote:


"Had the victims of HCY522 been British holidaymakers I suspect Libra Holidays would now no longer be in existence."

Not really true if you look at the history of aviation here in U.K (or in Europe)

and I wouldnt want to comment further on this statement.

[Casper]

The report will attribute blame to both state and airline authorities for the unprecedented lack of any evaluation of the flight security system by the Cypriot Civil Aviation Authority. As for Helios Airways, the findings point to criminal negligence on the ground and in the air, both on the part of company officials and ground staff involved in the particular flight.
------------------------------------------------------------------

I agree with you, Magplug.

ICAO Annex 13 Chapter 3.1 "It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability."

Finding the cause(s) - yes. Apportion blame - NO!

[ATC Watcher]

The journalist writing on the Greek newspaper said that : " The report will attribute blame" . I doubt the actual report will do this.( but one never knows )

If indeed he saw a draft of the report he possibly interpreted some sentences under "causes " as " attributing blame " . Not the first time this happen.

[CAT3A]

Its interesting to know how the Greek newspaper/journalist got a draft of the report

Shouldnt the report be confidential??????

Food For Though!!!!!

[big fraidy cat]

The Cyprus Mail online edition has published an article basically repeating the previous article by Kathimerini. However, they have added a bit more information with regard to the format of the report, which they still insist will be presented in April.


‘Doomed from the outset’ By Elias Hazou

Greek paper says leaked report points to grave errors that led to crash

OVERSIGHTS ON the ground, slackness on the part of the crew during the flight, inadequate controls by the Civil Aviation Authority and faulty flightdeck consoles by Boeing – led to what has been dubbed the worst peacetime disaster in Cyprus’ recent history.

The above are the conclusions gleaned from a leaked draft of the accident report, published by Greek daily Kathimerini on Sunday. Citing its sources, the paper commented ominously that flight ZU-522, the August 14 crash of Helios Airways that claimed the lives of 121 people, was “doomed from the outset.”

According to Kathimerini, chief air investigator Akrivos Tsolakis and his team of experts have found that the confusion over the decompression warning alarm “could under no circumstances have been the cause on its own…there were dozens of other omissions in air safety that contributed to the crash.”

Now seven months in the making, Tsolakis’ voluminous probe should be ready sometime in April. It comprises 200 pages, divided into four chapters: the facts of the case; analysis of the facts; the findings/causes of the accident; and a list of safety recommendations. This is followed by thousands of pages of appendices with all the documents used in the investigation.

Kathimerini said the probe would apportion responsibility on all those involved with aviation in Cyprus, and would be particularly damning on civil aviation, for an “unparalleled absence of assessing air flight safety,” and on the airline for “criminal negligence”.

The inquiry contains some chilling details on the sequence of events. Problems began with mistakes on the ground that were subsequently not dealt with in the air. Shortly after takeoff at 9am on the fateful day, two warnings – one for the decompression system, the other for the cooling system – were sounded almost simultaneously.

The warning horn sounded after the aircraft reached an altitude of 10,000 feet. The cabin decompression switch had been left on manual by ground crew during pre-flight checks, while it should have been set to automatic.

Still, this lapse could have been detected in time by the pilots had they properly scanned their gauges and carried out a checklist of components before takeoff. The aviators apparently did not do that.

When the decompression alarm went off, the crew – who had assumed that the decompression switch was on auto – mistakenly took this for a glitch in the positioning of the flaps, because the sounds emitted in both cases are identical. As the aircraft climbed to 34,000 feet, both the pilots and passengers gradually suffered the effects of hypoxia, or low oxygen in the blood: giddiness, loss of consciousness and finally deep slumber.

Captain Hans-Juergen Merten, who had left his seat to check the cooling system, is believed to have fainted inside the cabin.

According to the paper, all the people on board suffered irreversible brain damage from the lack of oxygen, and even if anyone had actually survived the horrific crash they would have been left in a vegetative state.

That includes flight attendant Andreas Prodromou who managed to retain consciousness using a portable oxygen mask at 14,000 feet and vainly tried to fly the plane before it slammed into a ravine at Grammatikos, outside Athens.

Moving on, the probe hauls the Cypriot Civil Aviation Authority over the coals, reportedly suggesting that its system of controls was “full of holes”. Kathimerini’s sources say the agency did not carry out the necessary checks on planes and often ignored instructions from ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation). Moreover, it blew off recommendations periodically made by its two British consultants.

However, partial responsibility also lies with EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) and JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) for failing to place the local civil aviation authorities under surveillance and thus acting preventatively.

As far as Helios Airways is concerned, the probe reportedly notes the marked “lack of a safety culture” in the company. The airline’s employees were hired on six-month contracts, giving them no career prospects and thus no incentives. The same corporate policy extended to the pilots, as the airline tended to hire the “cheapest they could find”,
Aircraft manufacturers Boeing also had its share of blame. In his probe, Tsolakis notes the confusion generated over the decompression warning signal and that Boeing should have taken steps to rectify this.

What is more, the company’s manual for the Boeing 737-300 was vague. Instead of explicitly instructing ground technicians to reset the decompression switch to auto, the manual simply said that the switch should be set “to the previous position,” i.e. from manual to auto.

The manual setting is used in pre-flight checks to simulate decompression situations, but needs to revert to automatic for takeoff.

According to procedure, when completed the probe will be communicated to the US’s National Transportation Safety Board and to Helios, who then need to respond to the observations within 60 days. Once their answers are in, the report will be published, opening the way for any legal proceedings by the victims’ relatives, who for months now have been agonisingly waiting for the truth to come out.

In a related development, ICAO is considering enforcing stricter controls on the civil aviation authorities of countries that are deemed to be problematic. One proposal is to appoint a “guardian” who would monitor the authorities and ensure they comply with all safety standards.

At the ICAO summit in Montreal, Canada, the heads of civil aviation authorities around the world are being asked to authorise the publication of the results of checks on the organisation’s website.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2005

[big fraidy cat]

Lest I forget, here are two snippets from the Greek press, which were republished in the Cyprus Mail today. Once again, all of these "sources" claim that the investigation report is imminent.

ALITHIA: “Unbearable responsibilities”. According to an Athens newspaper, the Flight Safety and Accident Investigations Committee’s intermediary report on the August 2005 airplane tragedy, which will most likely be completed and published within the next few days, puts all blame and responsibility on the Helios Company and on the Civil Aviation Department and makes some serious accusations against them.

PHILELEFTHEROS: “It all started on the ground”. An embarrassment of mistakes and mishaps by the Helios Company and the Civil Aviation Department are listed and described by Akrivos Tsolakis’ Investigative Committee’s report on the airplane tragedy last August. According to the information that arrived from Athens, Tsolakis’ report will point to State and Corporate responsibilities for the first ever absence of correct evaluation of the flight safety system.

[Magplug]

unconscious, oxygen-starved and frozen-stiff in an unpressurised environment at cruise altitude of 34,000ft?I would take issue with the assumptions here. A depressurised cabin is not necessarily cold unless the air-supplies are inoperative and/or there is a big hole where a window used to be. We know that following a packs-off take off the air supplies were restored so warm conditioned air would have been supplied throughout as the system attempted to bring the cabin to the demanded temperature.

With the outflow valve left in [MANUAL] for the entire flight the pressurisation would have progressed abnormally leading eventually to a hypoxic environment as they climbed. As the engineers had carried out static pressurisation tests on the ground pre-flight, The probability is that the valve was left in a near-closed position.

If you take off in an aircraft that is totally failing to pressurise then it is pretty evident - your are obiged to clear your ears frequently as the cabin ROC is 2500fpm as opposed to about 500fpm. In short - it is a cue difficult to miss... so how come...? The probability that the outflow valve was static in a near-closed position would allow some pressurisation but the situation might not be recognised as so abnormal as to give rise to concern.

In this configuration the resulting cabin altitude when at FL340 will be a matter of pot luck. If the cabin ends up (say) in the high 20,000's you will have an adequate amount of oxygen to sustain life but insufficient to sustain consciousness in the majority of subjects.

The cabin oxygen PSU's drop at 14000'. The chemical oxygen generators in the are designed to function for a minimum of 12 minutes. They don't stop after 12 minutes but the level of oxygen produced tails off until the production ceases altogether much later. If you pass unconscious with the mask still on your face you will be getting SOME oxygen for some time thereafter. As for the 8yo child surviving after the crash - we already know that children have survived for extraordinary periods in water under ice so perhaps children are better equipped to survive hypoxia that adults?

[BOAC]

May I ask the professionals who are losing interest here to continue the 'Blacklist' discussion on this thread http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=218193 and leave this thread for the topic of the Helios investigation?

On a personal note, since my local newsagent does not unfortunately stock Cypriot newspapers, I am grateful for the insight BFC provides into the on-going situation and would ask him/her to continue - subject of course to 'the nod' from the boss.:)

[PPRuNe Towers]

Well written reports on the accident and investigation yes.

Livery and business changes no.

Rob

[fyrefli]

If you take off in an aircraft that is failing to pressurise then it is pretty evident - your ears are uncomfortable as the cabin ROC is 2500fpm as opposed to about 500fpm. In short - it is a cue difficult to miss... so how come? The fact that they missed this cue supports the probability that the outflow valve was in a near-closed (although still abnormal) position, so the cabin although climbing abnormally, was not so abnormal so as to give rise to concern.
Paraglider (or hang glider) pilots flying in "big stuff" - Alps, Himalaya, Owens Valley etc. - regularly experience climbs of many thousands of feet (although obviously not usually into fully hypoxic altitudes) at ROC well in excess of 500fpm - 1600/1700fpm would not be at all unusual on a good day. In my own 12 years I've never experienced any unusual reactions in my ears due this - and I actually occasionally take an inhaler course due "tubes" problems.
I'd therefore concur with the above observation about the potentially absent cue, whilst not being in a professional position to comment on the resulting theory.
Cheers,
Rich.

[big fraidy cat]

For those interested, I have posted a Cyprus Mail article from today's edition on the Airlines and Airports thread regarding the rebranding of Helios. The article covers both the investigation status of the Helios crash and the licensing of ajet.

[big fraidy cat]

From today's Cyprus Mail online edition:

We’re still working on air safety

COMMUNICATIONS Minister Haris Thrasou yesterday stated that efforts to improve and upgrade the Civil Aviation are continuing following a meeting with Greek Air Crash Investigator Akrivos Tsolakis.

Speaking after a meeting with Tsolakis, who is leading the investigation into what caused Helios Airways flight ZU 522 to crash in Greece in August 2005, Thrasou told reporters that his meetings with Tsolakis are not only about being briefed on the ongoing investigation into the crash.

“We also discussing various practical issues which include upgrading the civil aviation and looking at ways in which to further improve air safety”, said Thrasou. “We are determined to see these developments continue.”

Speaking about the ongoing investigation into the crash which caused the death of 121 passengers and crew members, most of which were Cypriot, Tsolakis said that the investigative report was in its final stages and that it would be circulated in both Greek and English.

The preliminary report is estimated to be ready by April and the final, official report by June.

The report is also said to comprise of 200 pages and is to be divided into four chapters: the facts of the case; analysis of the facts; the findings/causes of the accident; and a list of safety recommendations. This is followed by thousands of pages of appendices with all the documents used in the investigation.

According to Greek newspaper Kathimerini, the probe would apportion responsibility on all those involved with aviation in Cyprus, and would be particularly damning on civil aviation, for an “unparalleled absence of assessing air flight safety,” and on the airline for “criminal negligence”.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

From the Cyprus Mail online edition of 9 April:

Why were organs destroyed in Helios probe?
By Elias Hazou

IN A MORBID twist to investigations into last August’s air disaster, Greek authorities are now puzzling over why and how organs belonging to the late co-pilot Pambos Charalambous – possibly vital clues to determining the cause of the accident – have vanished.

The heart condition of the doomed plane’s aviators became a subject of much controversy last September, when post-mortem findings showed severe infractions in the coronary arteries of both Charalambous and chief pilot Hans Juergen-Merten. That immediately rose questions as to whether the two men were fit to fly.

At the time, the findings – released by Greece’s chief coroner Philippos Koutsaftis – were angrily dismissed by Charalambous’ family back in Cyprus. Charalambous’ wife Sofia insisted her late husband was in good health and even engaged in hunting. She attributed the reports to a malicious effort by some quarters to exonerate the airline and shift attention to the pilots instead.
And Charalambous’ personal physician, a neuro-pathologist, had produced electrocardiograms (EKGs) indicating no health problems. However, other physicians commented that EKGs do not provide a clear picture of a person’s health, as they cannot detect constrictions in arteries.
And experts suggested the pilots may have passed out a lot quicker in the event of lack of oxygen, as happened on flight ZU 522.

To dispel the rumours, Charalambous asked through their lawyer for a second analysis of the heart. But according to Philelefheros, in late February Koutsaftis replied that this was not possible because the organ had in the meantime been “destroyed” by the examining scientist.

In a letter addressed to the lawyer, Koutsaftis informed the family that procedures dictated the destruction of organs within three months of their examination.

This apparently came as a shock to Charalambous’ relatives, who claim they had previously received assurances that the organs would be preserved until the end of the legal investigation or for a period of at least three years.

Moreover, looking at the dates, the family say the heart was destroyyed even before Koutsaftis had completed and submitted the report, and wonder why that is so.

Meanwhile in Athens senior public prosecutor Panayiotis Poulios is looking into the allegations. Poulios, regarded in legal circles as a “tough cookie”, is the supervisor of the police investigation into the causes of the August 14 crash.

He is also known for his involvement in the case of the 14 British and Dutch plane-spotters in Greece in 2001. A Greek court found the group guilty of illegally gathering state secrets.
Chief accident investigator Akrivos Tsolakis yesterday declined any comment on the press reports, saying he could only speak about his area of expertise, which did not include medical issues.

But he did confirm that Greek authorities were investigating the matter.

Tsolakis was speaking to the Mail shortly before departing from Cyprus. Though he could not say for certain whether or when he would be returning to the island, he guessed that would “probably not be necessary”.

He said the probe on the air crash was on track and should be wrapped up by early summer.
“We are proceeding very rapidly, and will have completed the investigation in little under a year – a record amount of time, considering that similar inquiries elsewhere usually take up to two years.”
The predominant theory on the plane crash is that a sequence of mishaps and oversights lead to gradual loss of cabin pressure, which caused hypoxemia, or reduced oxygen in the blood, rendering the crew unconscious.

Much has been said of the decompression switch, which was left on manual by ground crew during pre-flight checks, while it should have been set to automatic. The wrong configuration was not noticed by the pilots, partly because they were confused by an alarm that went off for another component that emitted the same sound as the warning for decompression.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

After a long period of silence, and while all are waiting for the investigation report on the crash, here is a bit of news from the Cyprus Mail online edition of today. I suppose that the expression "better late than never" would apply in this case.

Cyprus announces investigator for Helios inquiry
By Jacqueline Theodoulou

THE CABINET yesterday approved the appointment of an independent, one-member Investigative Committee to determine the exact reasons behind last August’s Helios Airways crash, which claimed the lives of all 121 passengers aboard.

Talking after the meeting, Government Spokesman George Lillikas named Panayiotis Kallis, previous Member of the Supreme Court, as the chief investigator.

“Kallis will be assisted by two expert appraisers from Greece, Elias Nicolaides and Georgios Bonnis, as well as other necessary staff,” said Lillikas.

“The President of the Republic, with public statements, had taken on the commitment that the government would do everything and wouldn't omit anything in the complete and in-depth objective, independent and incontestable investigation into the reasons behind the accident, the ascertainment of responsibilities and their attribution to those who they belong to, independent of title, office, political or other situation, advantages or connection of anyone who may be responsible.”

The investigation, explained Lillikas, would not only cover the specific flight, but also the procedures in general, the practicalities and safety levels that are adjusted, both presently and in the recent past.

“The investigation concerns the conditions under which licensing was given to the companies, aircrafts and crews, as well as the conduct of pre-flight checks in general and especially the ones made for this specific flight and this aircraft”.

The committee’s mandate is very broad, said the Government Spokesman, “to ensure in practice the total and in-depth investigation into the reasons of the accident, without bars and restrictions.”

He added that the decision for the appointment of the Investigating Committee was taken in view of the forthcoming issuing of the findings of the Greek Committee for the Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents, “so that there is no delay in the detection and attribution of responsibilities”.

A designated area has been found and rented for the Committee to carry out its duties.
The committee’s mandate will soon be given to the public, Lillikas concluded.

“They are written in such a way, that they cover all areas and all of those who are possibly to blame.”

President of the Committee for the relatives of the Helios victims Nicolas Yiasoumis said yesterday, for there to be substance to the newly appointed committee, the results of Tsolakis’ investigation need to be made formally known.

“The conclusion of Mr Tsolakis’ investigation must be given to the relevant authorities, within the next few days, so that the investigative committee is not an investigative committee appointed just on paper, but a committee with a substantial role to play during the procedures for finding those who are to blame and bringing them to justice.”


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[atakacs]

one-member Investigative Committee

Love that one :)

[big fraidy cat]

Here we go .... this from the Cyprus Mail today. I could not possibly post this today, without adding a personal comment. After reading this article, I could not help but feel like Alice who fell down that incredible hole!!

DISY slams timing of Helios probe
By Jacqueline Theodoulou

THE GOVERNMENT has a clear indication of the main reasons behind last August’s Helios crash in Grammatiko, and that is why it has appointed the Investigative Committee, the Government Spokesman said yesterday.

George Lillikas was responding to opposition DISY’s claims that the government planned the appointment of the committee to coincide with the crucial pre-election period.

This was deemed the appropriate time to appoint the committee, he said, because Akrivos Tsolakis – head of the Greek Committee for the Investigation into Air Accidents and Incidents – had recently stated that his report would be ready on May 15.

Tsolakis’ investigation will cover all the facts surrounding the crash in detail. The independent committee, appointed by President of the Republic Tassos Papadopoulos on Wednesday, will have the task of decoding Tsolakis’ report and apportioning blame.

DISY repeated its concerns yesterday over the timing of the independent committee’s appointment. The party’s Communications Commissioner, George Georgiou, spoke of political expediencies and accused President Papadopoulos of inconsistency in words and actions.

“I would like to express our sadness for the way the DISY leadership, in its nihilistic and populist approach due to the elections, doesn't hesitate to play with the emotions of the victims’ relatives in a serious and humanely sensitive matter,” said Lillikas.

“We are also expressing our sadness, because some, instead of supporting the investigative committee in the difficult task it has ahead of it, with various statements and insinuations, have started to doubt it. Either by doubting the composition of the committee, or its effectiveness.”

But Georgiou expressed the certainty that the report had not been submitted, and that it wouldn’t be submitted until after the elections.

“When the President of the Republic himself, for so many months, didn’t move ahead and appoint the independent committee – because he was publicly telling us that this would happen as soon as the President of the Republic had the conclusions of the report in his hands – then this means one of two things: either the President move forward with the appointment yesterday, due to the immense pressure from the public because of his nine-month-long delay in appointing the committee. Or secondly, he [Papadopoulos] has the Tsolakis report in his possession and what the public wants is the publication of this report”.

Meanwhile, Communications Minister Haris Thrasou yesterday announced that the Independent Committee would be based at the Nicosia Conference Centre.

According to the Minister, various actions had been taken in the past few weeks to find a base for the Committee, so that it could immediately start operating after its appointment and not create impressions that there were purposeful delays in the attribution of responsibilities.
He also rejected the opposition’s claims that the appointment of the committee had political connections.

“The appointment (of the committee) has happened a few days before the submission of Tsolakis’ conclusion and if this has coincided with the elections, I believe that it has no relevance and this dimension should not be given to the matter”, said Thrasou.

“We are awaiting the conclusion of the investigation by the Greek Committee for the Investigation into Air Accidents and Incidents from Tsolakis and we decided, and so did the president personally, that this was the appropriate moment to appoint a committee. In this way it is prepared and ready.”

When he was in Cyprus last month, Tsolakis had said that the conclusion would be ready by mid-May or by the end of May at the latest, Thrasou continued.

“I don't know whether the result will be issued before or after the elections and I don't believe Tsolakis would connect the matter of the result with the elections.

Mr Tsolakis mentioned that once the results are ready, it will be given to the relevant authorities.”

President of the Cypriot Committee for the Investigation into Air Accidents, Costas Orfanos, said that the committee would be informed on Tsolakis’ results through the government. He specified that it would also be passed on to the committees of Cyprus and the US, who will make it available to the respective companies that are involved.

He also said that after the results were announced, there would be a period of 60 days where comments and observations would be made, and then the Greek committee would decide whether to approve them or reject them.

“I believe that in these next few days we will know when the results will be given to the Cypriot and American committees” said Orfanos.

President of the Victims’ Relatives Committee, Nicolas Yiasoumis, said he believed it was a matter of days before Tsolakis submitted his report.

He stressed the importance of their being no political manipulation in the matter.

“Within the next few days, the result must be submitted to the parties involved, so that that these rumours of political interferences, which have developed in the past few days, with the rumoured pressures put on Tsolakis by political influences, not to issue the report before the elections, can end,” Yiasoumis commented.

“And now there are impressions being expressed that the committee was appointed clearly for political reasons. This is something the relatives disagree with.”

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

This article really relates to the continuing saga of the rebranding of Helios, the thread for which I cannot find !!

Therefore, it is being posted here and is an update on the name change fracas as reported by the Cyprus Mail today:

Relatives’ fury at ajet licence
By Elias Hazou

AJET, the successor airline to disaster-stricken Helios Airways, yesterday got the thumbs-up to start flights, even as relatives of the air crash victims vowed to take action against the government within the EU.

Back in March ajet had applied to Civil Aviation for a licence and has since been using the assets and flight code of Helios. The company had also applied for an Air Operator’s Licence to operate as a charter airline.

Helios says it had long contemplated changing its business model and denied this was a ploy to evade justice. And it cited corporate law, according to which ultimately, any liability claims are guaranteed by Helios’ insurers.

In the meantime, Helios’ planes have been flying under the ajet livery but with the Helios ZU flight codes; even more confusingly, Helios as a business entity has been stricken from the records of the Registrar of Companies.

But the families and friends of the people who perished aboard flight ZU522 last August are outraged that the airline should change its name and image – let alone operate – while the jury is still out on whether the company was responsible for the disaster.

Their lawyer has also argued that, according to ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) regulations, an airline with a crash record must undergo all technical and security inspections from scratch, and that clearly this was not done in the case of Helios.

With feelings of bitterness still running high, Civil Aviation yesterday announced that it had okayed the issuing of an air operator’s licence to ajet.

The department’s head Leonidas Leonidou told state radio that the department would be making a “favourable recommendation” to the Transport Ministry for the licence.

Their decision was based on the legal opinion of the Attorney-general, he added.

According to Leonidou, it was perfectly normal for an airline to fly with certificates under a different name.

“The company is in a transitional phase, it is in the process of acquiring its own licences. Therefore, as far as we have been told, there is no legal hindrance as to issuing an air operator’s licence for ajet.”

However, the new company also needs a commercial licence before starting up its charter operations.

Leonidou said he expected an independent committee to award ajet the commercial licence “very soon.”

The news was met with strong reaction from Nicolas Yiasoumi, head of the committee representing the bereaved relatives.

Yiasoumi reiterated the accusation that Civil Aviation had demonstrated “excessive zeal” in expediting the processing of ajet’s application for a licence.

“Even the Transport Minister has admitted as much,” he said.

“Either Civil Aviation does not know what it’s doing, or they don’t want to admit they don’t know.”

The relatives had sent Transport Minister Harris Thrasou a letter demanding that any actions enabling Helios to fly – under any name or guise – be stopped in its tracks. Unless they received a response by yesterday, they had threatened to report the government to EU organs.

The latent charge is that the Cyprus government is not adhering to international aviation rules.
“We are sticking to this deadline,” affirmed Yiasoumi.

“Today we shall be meeting with our lawyers and proceed with filing the report.”

The inquiry into the causes of the disaster, due out in early summer, is likely to find fault with all the involved agencies, including Civil Aviation and Helios.

While not naming names, the probe will implicitly point the finger at people or procedures through an exhaustive account of activities and omissions, both on the ground as well as in the air on the fateful day.

The report is to be scrutinised by an independent, government-appointed commission that will then decide whether criminal proceedings are necessary.

Press reports yesterday said the probe was more or less ready, but first needed to be translated into Greek, as it has been written in English, the official language of the aviation industry.

Anticipation of the report’s release has heightened anxiety among relatives and rekindled painful memories of their loss, especially following a memorial service this weekend marking nine months since the disaster.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[Frangible]

Ajet by any other name would smell as sweet (?)

Before the disaster, after

Windscale Sellafield
Long Kesh The Maze
ValuJet Air Tran
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha Windsor
Battenburg Mountbatten

[BOAC]

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=217744

[ThinkRate]

My brief from today's Greek press and radio:

Tsolakis officially handed over The Report to the Cypriot Authorities today.

According to the same news sources (AP), the Report was also forwarded to the NTSB and the "equivalent French Investigative Committee" and is also to be sent to Boeing and Helios

They all have 60 days to comment, according to international procedure and requirements.

Tsolakis said the the Report contains a full analysis of the causes that lead to the crash as well as recommendations to flight safety.

Tsolakis also commented that while the report is confidential at present, it will be made public on July 18 (well before the [quote] "morally time-limiting date of August 14" [unquote] which is the date of the tragic accident).

Tsolakis politely refused to comment further on the content of the report.

TR
----------------------------
ThinkRate! ThinkRate! Don't Think!

[big fraidy cat]

Here are some details on the investigation report that was just submitted. This is from the Cyprus Mail online edition of 19 May.

Helios crash report handed to the government
By John Leonidou

‘We are not reporting on who is to blame, but what caused the crash’
CHIEF air accident investigator Akrivos Tsolakis yesterday officially handed over his draft report on the crash of Helios Airways flight ZU 522 to the Cyprus government.
The 200-page report, which the Greek investigator wants to make public on the one-year anniversary of the crash – August 14 – was given to the head of the Cypriot crash investigation committee Costas Orphanos in the presence of President Tassos Papadopoulos at the Presidential Palace yesterday in Nicosia.

The report outlines the series of events that led to the crash of the Boeing 737 in Grammatikos in Greece last August, killing all 121 passengers and crew members, most of them Cypriot families going on holiday. It also examines many elements in relation to air safety.

It will be returned to Tsolakis in 60 days with comments from the Cypriot crash investigation committee.

Tsolakis said comments that were accepted would then be incorporated into the report, which would then be made public under the name ‘Final Report’ by the latest on August 14, the most fitting time to release the report, he said.

“I reiterate once more that we are not reporting on who is to blame but rather what caused the crash. That was our mission – to assemble the causes of what caused the crash,” Tsolakis said.

He told reporters that the completion of the report in Athens had lifted a huge weight from his shoulders, adding that the last nine months had been a very daunting and sad experience for him.

“I believe that in the end the victims will have some questions answered, at least when it comes to the causes of the crash.”

Orphanos said yesterday the recent name change of Helios Airways to A-Jet would have no bearing on the investigation.

“Two copies of the report are to be made and one of the copies will be handed to the company involved in the crash, which to the committee is the company with the name Helios. The other copy will be kept and reviewed by the committee,” he said.
Orphanos said that as far as the crash was concerned, the company Helios did exist and that matters concerning anything else did not concern the air accident investigation.
But while Tsolakis said his report would not pin blame, the Head of the Helios Relatives Committee, Nicolas Yiasoumis, wanted those responsible to be brought to justice.
“This report has been handed in at a time when the President of the Republic has launched an investigative committee headed by Mr [Panayiotis] Kallis to determine the exact reasons behind the crash.
“We expect work to begin now that the report has been handed in so as to determine what caused the crash and who needs to be brought to justice.”

Government Spokesman George Lillikas yesterday said the government was “pleased” with Tsolakis’ efficient and timely completion of the report
“Mr. Tsolakis and his committee have worked very hard and at great speed so that they could complete their task at the soonest possible time. I would like reiterate the President’s commitment for a full investigation into the matter and for action to be taken against those responsible, without any exception.”

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[flyboy2]

Not my opinion-merely a report found on www.airwise.com
May 19, 2006
Human error led to a Cypriot airliner crashing near Athens last August, killing all 121 people aboard, according to an official report leaked to the Greek media on Friday.

The report indicates technicians in Cyprus, checking the decompression system following problems on an earlier flight, forgot to switch on its automatic activation.

Once airborne, pilots forgot to check whether the system was switched on automatic or manual, according to the draft report by the Greek accidents investigation committee.

As a consequence, the higher the plane flew the less oxygen was in the cabin, causing everyone aboard, except for a steward, to become unconscious.

The report said even if the steward, using portable oxygen bottles, had managed to land the plane all the passengers would have been dead because of a lack of oxygen.

There was no comment from Cypriot authorities on the report.

The committee was investigating why the Helios Airways Boeing 737-300 had crashed on a flight from Cyprus to Prague.

The committee delivered the dossier to Cypriot authorities on Thursday. The Cypriots have 60 days to include their own findings before a final report is published.

Long suspected to have suffered a loss of cabin pressure, the plane was on autopilot for more than two hours. A steward with a trainee pilot's license was grappling at its controls.

Trailed by two Greek fighters which scrambled when the plane lost radio contact, it crashed into a mountain north of Athens after running out of fuel.

Leaked to several newspapers, the report blames the Cyprus civil aviation authority for not following international safety checks and criticizes the airline for a lack of attention to air safety.

Ajet, the successor company to Helios, said it would comment on the draft report within a specified 60 day deadline.

"Our commitment to cooperate fully with the accident investigators stems from our sincere desire to establish the true causes of this tragic accident," it said in a statement.

"We are required to keep the contents of the draft report confidential, hence we shall not be commenting on any issues that may be reported, until the publication of the final report."

(Reuters)
http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1148076455.html

[172driver]

interesting article about hypoxia awareness training here:

http://www.flyingmag.com/article.asp?section_id=12&article_id=641

[big fraidy cat]

Cypriot investigator to have two assistants, so sayeth the Cyprus Mail online edition today.

Cypriot air crash investigator sworn in
By John Leonidou

FORMER Supreme Court Judge Panayiotis Kallis was yesterday officially sworn in as the head of the government-appointed Cypriot Air Crash Committee.

On May 10, the Cabinet approved the appointment of an independent Investigative Committee to determine the causes of last August’s Helios Airways crash, which claimed the lives of all 121 passengers on board.

Kallis is expected to begin work on the investigations in six days’ time.

Kallis said yesterday he would do everything possible to make sure his investigation was finalised quickly, without putting a time limit on how long he expected his investigation to take.

That would depend on how long it would take to conduct the necessary questioning and statements that would need to be taken, he told reporters. The former judge will soon draw up a list of the people that he will be calling on to testify and give statements on record.

He also made it known that he would soon be issuing an announcement calling on anyone who may have any knowledge surrounding the incident to contact his committee.
The final reports of the Cypriot Air Crash Committee are to be submitted to the Cabinet and then to Attorney-general Petros Clerides – the only official allowed to bring possible criminal charges against individuals pinpointed in the report, Kallis explained.

Kallis, who will be assisted by Greek expert appraisers Elias Nicolaides and Georgios Bonnis, did not rule out the possibility of calling up politicians to make statements.

Communications Minister Haris Thrasou said yesterday the committee had been given all the necessary green lights to allow it them to make a complete and thorough investigation.

Asked by reporters if Kallis’ report might not clash with that submitted last week to the government by Greek Air Crash Committee head Akrivos Tsolakis, the Minister said he would respect the outcome of both reports.

“The report will look into the series of events during the flight but will also look into whether other necessary measures and precautions were followed around the time of the disaster,” said Thrasou.

COMMUNICATIONS Minister Haris Thrasou said yesterday that Civil Aviation would soon be deciding on whether to allow Helios Airways’ request to change its name to ajet.

The decision has angered relatives of the Helios victims, who are accusing the airline of trying to escape any possible charges that may be brought against the airline. They have been involved in a public row with Thrasou, who they say is not doing anything to stop the airline from attempting to change its name.

“I reiterate once more that the Civil Aviation has not given any aviation licences to Helios Airways to allow the airline to fly under the name of ajet”.

He added that he shared the same view as President Tassos Papadopoulos and Attorney-general Petros Clerides, who have both stated that the name change would not exonerate the airline of any possible blame.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

According to yesterday's Cyprus Mail online edition, the Discovery Channel's documentary on the Helios crash is due to be broadcast in August.

Tsolakis dismisses documentary re-enactment
By John Leonidou

THE HEAD of the Greek air accident committee, Akrivos Tsolakis, yesterday told the Cyprus Mail he was skeptical as to whether Discovery Channel’s documentary on the Helios crash, to be aired this August, would be based on the actual facts of what happened on August 14 last year.

Discovery Channel have researched and filmed the documentary on the crash, ahead of publication of Tsolakis’ final report. The documentary features interviews and a re-enactment of the crash with actors.

Last August, Cypriot airliner Helios Airways flight ZU 522 crashed outside Athens, killing all 121 passengers and crew on board.

Tsolakis said yesterday there was nothing that could be done about the documentary.
“Life goes on and we cannot stop progress and the endeavours of those channels to re-enact such things. It wouldn’t be the first time, and they have re-enacted most of the major accidents that have happened in the past.

“They should, however, have done the re-enactment after the final report had been published and not before. They should be presenting the whole event in the most proper way without resorting to the imagination.”

The Greek investigator said it was unlikely for the producers of the documentary to have a clear image of what happened.

“I don’t know if they have the information and data which is necessary for such an endeavour because this data is still under juridical protection. There is no permission given by the prosecutor to release the data which is still in our hands – and I can assure you that they are still in our hands and are guarded properly.”

He added: “If they release a story which has no data and no facts then it will be just a story.”

‘No conflicts between crash committees’

Tsolakis insisted also that there could be no possible conflict between his investigating committee and the investigating committee in Cyprus, headed by Costas Orphanos.
He added that both committees would be acting on the Greek crash report and that conflicts could simply not arise.

“Any comment on the report is welcome within the 60 days required for the report to be reviewed; if something is acceptable and we believe that it has to be included on our final report then it will be done,” said Tsolakis.

“Items that we don’t accept will just be submitted along with the final report. So everything is under the light of the sun and nothing is secret. There is the absolute right of the Cypriot board and the American board to express their views and their views will be highly respected. There is no conflict involved. We are simply trying to produce the best possible final report having heard the opinions of all the parties involved.”

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

The Cypriot independent investigation now stalled, according to Cyprus Mail online edition:

Helios crash investigation stops before it even starts
By John Leonidou

AN INDEPENDENT investigation aimed at finding those responsible for the Helios crash came to a grinding halt yesterday under unexpected circumstances.

The probe was set to start yesterday morning but in a startling turn of events, the head of the committee Panayiotis Kallis decided to postpone the investigation after the lawyers of ajet, the company formerly known as Helios Airways, objected to the appointment of two Greek experts who were assigned to assist Kallis in his investigation.

Kallis’ decision has prompted an angry response from the Relatives of the Helios Crash Victims Committee.

On August 14 last year, Cypriot airliner Helios Airways crashed into a mountainside just north of Athens killing all 121 passengers and crew members on board. Most of the victims were Cypriot families going on holiday.

Reports suggest that the crash was caused by a combination of pilot errors, decompression problems and a problematic alarm system.

On May 10 this year, the cabinet had appointed Kallis, a former Supreme Court judge, to head a committee aimed at bringing those responsible for the crash to justice. The cabinet had also appointed George Bonnis and Elias Nicolaides to aid Kallis in the investigations because of their vast experience in aviation matters.

All three officials were officially sworn in on May 24.

The procedures set to take place are believed to be similar to procedures followed in civil courts.
But Helios’ lawyers argue that the two experts may bias the investigations because they were part of Akrivos Tsolakis’ investigating team appointed by the Greek government to find out what caused the crash of Helios Airways flight ZU 522.

Nicolaides is a former co-pilot while Bonnis is a former mechanic. They both used to work for Greek airline Olympic Airways.

The defence team of Helios, made up of lawyers from the office of Chrysis-Demetriades, sent a written letter to Kallis informing him of their objections.

Kallis decided to delay investigations until the matter is cleared up, saying that it was now up to the cabinet to decide upon the matter. He added that he was hopeful that the matter would be cleared by shortly.

But that did little to appease the victims’ relatives who yesterday walked out of Kallis’ office disappointed and frustrated with his decision to delay the investigation.

“We have been waiting a long time for this procedure to get under way so those responsible could be taken to court but it appears that the company has objected to something right at the last minute instead of objecting to it earlier,” said the Head of the Victims Relatives Committee Nicolas Yiasoumis.

“That has obviously concerned and frustrated us because we feel that this move has been made for other intentions.”

Meanwhile, the statements have already been submitted to the committee by Police Chief Charalambous Koulentis, the Head of Aircraft Licensing at Cyprus' Civil Aviation Deputy Charalambos Hadjigeorgiou and the Senior Officer of Registrar of Companies at the Commerce Ministry Spyros Kokkinos.

Yiasoumis’ committee had accused the airline of trying to escape any possible charges that may be brought against the airline by the changing the company profile from Helios Airways to a-jet.

They had also been involved in a public row with Communications Minister Harris Thrassou, who they say wrongfully allowed the airline to change its name whilst still under investigation.

Thrassou had defended the civil aviation department’s decision adding that the airline would not be exonerated from any possible blame because of a company name change.

The relatives have since filed an official complaint and are set to take the civil aviation to the European Courts.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

After a two-week delay, the local Cypriot investigation of the Helios crash is now underway. I would expect that there will be frequent articles appearing in the Cyprus Mail, similar to the following from today's online edition.

Inquiry hears of ‘poor staffing and communications problems’ in Civil Aviation
By Alexia Saoulli

THE COMMITTEE of inquiry for last year’s tragic Helios plane crash yesterday heard the Civil Aviation department was insufficiently staffed, lacked organisation and had difficulty meeting its obligations.

The assessment was made by department head Leonidas Leonidou who was called to testify as part of the local probe into the airline disaster which killed 121 passengers and crew members last August.

Reports suggest that the crash was caused by a combination of pilot errors, decompression problems and a problematic alarm system.

In his testimony, Leonidou, who was appointed head of department just under two months after the crash, told the committee the fact that the department came under the Communication Ministry often hindered procedures. He said it was his estimation that perhaps the department would operate more efficiently if it were an independent authority.

During yesterday’s proceedings former Supreme Court judge Panayiotis Kallis, who heads the committee, read out extracts of letters and reports from foreign aviation organisations that pointed out the severe shortcomings of the department regarding the correct supervision of the airline with respect to problems that could have put flight safety at possible risk.

Specifically Leonidou heard extracts from five letters and reports from foreign organisations, including the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the UK Civil Aviation Organisation, which found severe problems with the way the local aviation department supervised Helios.

According to CyBC, a letter from the UK Civil Aviation Organisation dated July 2004 drew attention to what problems the airline needed to address to improve flight safety. According to the report the UK body had downgraded the report from a Level 1 safety issue, to a Level 2 issue, so as to give Helios time in which to comply with the report’s observations. The airline was given a month to comply.

Due to the date of Leonidou’s appointment to the position of department head he was unable to answer a lot of the committee’s questions.

The inquiry proceedings will continue today.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[Hirsutesme]

Why is it ALWAYS "pilot errors" listed first!

[big fraidy cat]

Today's Cyprus Mail online edition posts its own article on the suspension of the Cypriot inquiry until August, plus they post several excerpts from the Greek Press.

Local Helios probe adjourned until August
By Jacqueline Theodoulou

LOCAL investigations into last August’s Helios Airways crash stalled again yesterday after yet another problem appeared during depositions to the Cypriot investigative team.

The procedures have now been adjourned until August 28, as the Helios lawyers said they couldn’t proceed with questioning witnesses until they had seen and studied the accident report carried out by the Greek Air Accident Investigating Committee headed by Akrivos Tsolakis.

The President of the Cypriot investigation, Panayiotis Kallis, felt the company’s request was justified and ordered the postponement.
Helios lawyer Demetris Araouzos had said he wasn't in a position to observe and participate in the proceedings because he didn't have the document on which the committee was basing its investigation.

He added that he couldn’t ask the questions he wanted to ask without knowing the contents of the report.
It was unheard of for there to be an investigation without the documents being available to all parties involved, Araouzos said.

Kallis then adjourned for five minutes, before coming back to announce that the testimonies would resume in August when the complete report would be available to all the parties involved. He did specify, however, that the report was binding and that the Helios lawyers’ questions would not alter it in any way. Kallis’ decision was final.
Relatives of the crash victims said they were disappointed at the development.
Spokesman for the Relatives of the Helios Crash Victims Committee, Nicolas Yiasoumis, accused the company of finding excuses to delay proceedings.
“The fact that the investigative committee’s proceedings have been postponed saddens us immensely, because just where things had started taking their correct course, another obstacle was created,” he said.

“From the beginning we feared the company would continuously invoke pretexts to delay the procedures,” Yiasoumis added.
The relatives’ spokesman said the matter would be discussed by the committee later in the day at an extraordinary meeting, in the presence of their legal advisors.
The investigative committee should have anticipated this problem, Yiasoumis concluded.

In his testimony earlier yesterday, the president of the Cypriot Investigative Committee into Air Accidents and Incidents, Costas Orfanos, estimated that Tsolakis’ final report would be published before August 14 – the anniversary of last year’s crash which killed all 121 passengers and crew members on board.

Orfanos submitted four documents concerning inspections of Helios planes by British experts working for the Civil Aviation Department during 2004-2005, before the tragedy.
Orfanos was questioned by the Helios lawyer, but didn’t give answers concerning Tsolakis’ report.
“I haven’t answered any questions that concern the preliminary report, which we have in our possession,” Orfanos told reporters after the session. “We are discussing and studying it and we are hoping that within the next four or five days we will be able to submit our final opinions to the Greek committee so the preliminary report can become final and be published.”

President of the Cyprus Civil Aviation Department, Leonidas Leonidou, yesterday repeated his claims that at the time of the crash there had been serious shortcomings at the Department.

He stressed, however, that the department had since been modernised to a degree that it would no longer need guidance from foreign experts. At the same time, he assured the Committee that the department had total control over airlines on matters of safety.
“What needs to be said is that at the moment, independent of the shortcomings it had in the past, the Department is on the road of restructuring and is completely and sufficiently controlling the three companies that are operating in Cyprus,” Leonidou said.

“All checks that need to be carried out, according to European standards, are taking place,” he added.

At the moment, there are just two properly qualified inspectors at the department and they are in the process of training three more, said Leonidou.
“I believe that the department’s form needs to change. We must follow the international prototypes so the department can progress further,” he concluded.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

----------------------------------------------------------

PHILELEFTHEROS: “Civil Aviation caught with its pants down”. The daily led with the ongoing inquiry into last August’s air crash that cost the lives of 121 people. This week the investigating commission got hold of some “shocking evidence”, the paper says, pointing to “problems of the first degree” with disaster-struck Helios Airways. Based on documents submitted to the committee by current Civil Aviation head Leonidas Leonidou, it can be inferred that the government department played down Helios’ problems so as not to be forced to revoke the airline’s licence.

ALITHIA: “Criminal negligence by Civil Aviation”. Another take on the inquiry, with the paper being especially critical of Civil Aviation for “cushioning” Helios, an airline the paper says was ‘rife with problems’. This emerged after the current director of Civil Aviation testified before the committee of inquiry. Elsewhere, the paper notes that opposition DISY has decided not to return to the National Council unless drastic changes are made to that body.

HARAVGHI: “Warnings fall on deaf ears”. The communist party mouthpiece also concentrated on the inquiry into the Helios air crash. The paper said that the Civil Aviation department ignored repeated warnings from international aviation and air safety organisations about Helios’ practices. To many, these revelations confirm speculation that the department may be one of the guilty parties for last year’s disaster.

[ATC Watcher]

I saw an a-jet 737 recently, Are they really the same airframes as Helios but painted differently ? operated by the same people, maintenance, ops and crews included ? I find this hard to beleive .

[Cuillin]

The airline had always planned to change it's livery ever since the takeover by the current owners several months prior to the crash. Cypriot newspapers are being very irresponsable in their reporting of this fact. It helps sell newspapers though.

Anybody in the aviation industry with a level, unbiased head on themselves (and a few of the recent posters don't qualify) can identify with this incident and will learn from the proper findings.

It is arguable as to the contribution that the locked flight deck door made to this unfortunate accident. Many established airlines are putting a lot more thought into the effect the presence of this locked door is having on flight safety.

There are other relevent discussion points that I am sure will come out when the report is released in it's entirety.

I am only trying to bring some balance to the discussion and no, I am not a Helios/Ajet employee.

[ATC Watcher]

Appreciate your reply Cuillin . In a comm course some years ago I learned that the impressions one has of a fact is more important than the fact itself.

Most airlines continue to operate after a crash, but generally they drastically change things inside as result. When one hastily change livery and name ( even if this was planned before ) after a crash, it gives the bitter impression that one does not want to change things other than the name and color .
We have seen this before in the Land of the Pyramids.
But maybe I am wrong in this case.

On the cockpit door , if the report of the Greek F16 pilot published in Greece is correct ( one never know) then this was not a factor. But let's wait for the final report .

[big fraidy cat]

My guess is that today's article in the Cyprus Mail online edition might be the last that we'll see until either the release of the investigation report to the public, or the reconvening of the Cypriot investigation on 18 August, whichever is first. Personally, I don't understand the reason for the suspension of the local investigation. The Greek investigation report was purportedly delivered to all interested parties. If that's true, then the Helios lawyers should certainly have a copy.


Families repeat frustration over Helios probe delay
By Jacqueline Theodoulou

HELIOS AIRWAYS, in cooperation with the civil aviation department, is purposefully using legal avenues to delay the investigation into last August’s crash and cloud over the exact events, the victims’ relatives said yesterday.

The opinion was voiced following Wednesday’s decision by the Cypriot one-member investigative committee, headed by Panayiotis Kallis, to postpone proceedings yet again.
The reason was the airline’s lawyers’ proclamation that they couldn’t proceed with questioning witnesses without possessing the final report, conducted by the Greek Investigative Team into Air Accidents, headed by Akrivos Tsolakis.

Communications and Works Minister Harris Thrassou also commented on the decision yesterday, stressing the need for catharsis following the crash, which occurred just outside Athens and killed all 121 passengers and crew members on board.

“A drama has occurred in Cyprus and now there is an urgent need for catharsis,” said the minister. “All the parties involved must help, so that this catharsis can take place as soon as possible,” he added.

Thrassou went on to condemn those who were creating obstacles in the investigation’s proceedings. “All they are achieving is that they are distressing the victims’ relatives, the Civil Aviation and the public opinion in general”.

He promised that the Ministry would do anything it could to help in the investigation and said he hoped the same cooperativeness would be shown by the rest of the parties involved.

“Everyone’s efforts should be centred on the swift elucidation of the matter. The responsibilities should be appointed where they exist and more importantly, there is a need for introspection so we can achieve a state-worthy mechanism that will no longer expose Cyprus abroad,” said Thrassou.

“The matter of restructuring is under great evolution”, he added.

Spokesman for the Relatives of the Helios Crash Victims Committee, Nicolas Yiasoumis, repeated yesterday that the relatives were deeply concerned with the way things are going.
He spoke of deterioration within the proceedings and said there was a mutual covering up of issues by the Civil Aviation Department and Helios.

“Just when you think that things are moving in the right direction, some start making an account of their mistakes and omissions,” said Yiasoumis yesterday.

“Suddenly a barrier has been put up through legal means, which is marring the proceedings at a critical point in the investigation.”

Yiasoumis questioned how the airline could be making comments on the affair – seeing that it received the preliminary report on May 18 – and yet its lawyers couldn’t use it to question witnesses.

“We are observing these attempts to cloud the waters, to cloud the scene, and this concerns us,” said the spokesman for the relatives. “From the moment that the [Cypriot one-member investigative] committee was appointed on the instruction of the President of the Republic, all these possibilities and obstacles should have been predicted and resolved.”

The sense of justice felt by the public when the investigative committee was appointed, has now been destroyed said Yiasoumis.

“In the one week that the committee has been operating, we have seen two postponements, via legalistic approaches and obstacles. And we wouldn’t be at all surprised if even more legal problems push proceedings further back.”
Concluding, Yiasoumis accused the parties involved of trying to convince the public that everything was running smoothly in the investigation’s proceedings.

“We are trying to convey a positive fa?ade on the outside when on the inside there is serious decay.”

Loizos Papacharalambous, the lawyer representing the victims and relatives, said there was no margin for objections.

He mentioned that Helios was in possession of the preliminary report and said as far as he was concerned there was no substantial reason for an issue to be created as at this stage in the proceedings, as the company’s lawyers only needed to submit specifying questions.
”It is a decision that was made by the committee,” said Papacharalambous of Kallis’ decision to postpone the investigation.

“I would not like to comment on whether it was right or wrong, it is respected.

“On the other hand, I believe that the specific document the Helios lawyers were referring to (when they said they could not proceed with questioning), was in their possession, as it was part of the [preliminary] Tsolakis report.”

Therefore, it was very unlikely for there to be any substantial reason why the Helios lawyers couldn’t ask questions of a specifying nature, said Papacharalambous.

“Though at this stage in the procedure, I believe that cross-examining questions are not allowed,” he added.

“I think it is a matter of tactics and that the Helios lawyers wanted to set a frame within which they want to move.”

But he stressed that there was no room for objections. “All we can do is hope proceedings begin immediately on August 18, so that we can see an end to this matter.”

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

Here is another chapter in this ongoing battle, with resumption of local investigation now due for 28 August.

Helios team questions investigating Judge
By Jacqueline Theodoulou

HELIOS Airways is examining the possibility of requesting the withdrawal of Judge Panayiotis Kallis from the Cypriot investigative committee into last August’s plane crash near Athens, which claimed the lives of all 121 passengers and crew on board.
A member of the airline’s legal team, Christos Neocleous, said yesterday the company had asked to be presented with the practicalities of the investigation proceedings so far.

The company believes Kallis unlawfully quoted parts of the preliminary report, drawn up by Greek Air Accident Investigator Akrivos Tsolakis. The Helios lawyer claimed that due to the report’s confidential nature Kallis should not have discussed it during the testimonial proceedings.

Neocleous added that the company’s aim was not to put a halt to the proceedings, but to ensure the correct application of justice.

On Wednesday, Kallis adjourned the investigation until August 28, after the airline’s lawyers said they couldn’t proceed with questioning witnesses without seeing the contents of the Tsolakis report.

“Kallis clearly justified his decision to adjourn his committee’s activities until August 28”, said Neocleous. “It was because Mr Tsolakis’ preliminary report had been deemed confidential and it was not possible to continue with this procedure without handing out copies to the lawyers.”

But the lawyer said yesterday the adjournment didn’t detract from the fact that Kallis had used the report in the proceedings.

“We are not satisfied [with Kallis’ decision to postpone proceedings]. When the Cabinet decided to appoint the committee, we said we would co-operate and began proving this co-operation with the committee, participating in the procedure”, he said.
“Then, a second problem arose. It was Kallis who used the confidential report, while it was Helios who admitted that the report couldn’t be used and publicised further and asked for the procedure to be interrupted.”

He added that just because the company had received a copy of the preliminary report, it didn’t mean that all the company’s lawyers and members had been informed on its contents.

“Specific members of the company are in the process of studying the report, based on the instructions and regulations that were set by Mr Tsolakis,” said Neocleous.
“We don't want to obstruct any proceedings the state has decided to follow. We are studying all possibilities that will ensure that justice is done under any procedure.”
Neocleous admitted there was a possibility that the company would be turning to the Supreme Court and asking for Kallis’ withdrawal.

“I wouldn't say that Kallis is prejudiced against the company, but from the moment that he is taking part in a procedure, in which, as he admitted, he wrongly used certain things, there are certain legal actions that need to be investigated,” the lawyer said.
“We decided to request the practical details of the committee’s procedure so far, and from the contents the company and its advisors will decide how to act further,” he concluded.
The President of the Cypriot Air Accident Investigation, Costas Orfanos, said yesterday Tsolakis’ report would remain confidential until it was officially released by the Greek Air Accident Investigator.

He said the Cypriot authorities had received two copies of the report and had given one of them to Helios Airways so it could be informed and submit its comments.
“It is our obligation to supply the company with a copy, which we have done, and we are awaiting the company’s comments, which we will then pass on to the Greek committee,” said Orfanos.

“We received two copies: one we kept and studied as the committee, and the other we sent to Helios with a letter specifying that the document’s contents were confidential.”
On behalf of the crash victims’ relatives, Nicolas Yiasoumis, repeated their distaste at the actions by the Helios legal team and branded the company’s latest actions as “sly” and “underhand”.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[fyrefli]

On the cockpit door , if the report of the Greek F16 pilot published in Greece is correct ( one never know) then this was not a factor. But let's wait for the final report .

I don't want to go over old ground covered extensively in the original thread so suffice to say here that there's at least one very good explanation there as to why your assertion doesn't hold. (Hint: what unlocked it?)

Unfortunately, whilst it will probably set certain matters to rest, I'm not sure the final report in this instance is going to be one of the more definitive works to find a place in the aviation safety archives.

Cheers,

Rich.

[ATC Watcher]

Thanks Rich, I know what you are refering to, but only an exact timing will prove this theory . In one (Press , I agree ) report in Athens it was said that the interception lasted over 30 minutes. It would be interesting to find out at what time eactly the F16 pilot saw movement in the cockpit and at what time the first engine stopped.
But perhaps more interesting is the quote from a press conference from one of the investigator last December who said :

"We have indications that (the steward ) controlled the plane. He took a portable oxygen device and opened the cockpit door using a code," Seraphim Kamoutsis, head of the Greek investigations team, told a news conference after the simulation. (Reuters )

So I am open, until I see the timing of the accident in the final report.

[fyrefli]

So I am open, until I see the timing of the accident in the final report.

Re-reading my previous, I could have worded it slightly better.

Reading your response has actually set my brain off on the whole conundrum again. The entire story reads like a cross between a thriller and a whodunnit, when unfortunately it's more of a tragedy than a large number of other incidents and accidents given that description.

Cheers,

Rich.

[Casper]

Under what section of ICAO Annex 13 is the official investigation required to forward a copy of any part of the investigation to the operator or the operator's attorneys before the final report is released??

[ATC Watcher]

Quite agree with you Rich, also the coronary report that all the bodies retrieved were alive at the moment of impact also add to the mystery.

Casper , ICAO set minimum recommendations, it does not prohibit anything, Every Member State can do what he wants basically ( even go against any ICAO recommendation as long as it files a difference with it )

[big fraidy cat]

Here's an interesting article in today's Cyprus Mail online edition regarding the alleged shortcomings in the Cypriot Aviation organization.

Civil Aviation was warned of safety gaps in 2003
By Constantine Markides

IN A MEMO directed to Civil Aviation on December 10, 2003, the Cyprus Regional Manager for the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority P.A. Varley warned that unless six gaps in aviation safety were addressed, there would be an “increased risk of a serious accident” involving a Cypriot plane.

On August 14 of last year, a Helios airliner smashed into a mountainside just north of Athens, killing all 121 passengers and crew on board. Most of the victims were Cypriot families going on holiday.

According to Politis, which published the document yesterday, one of the trouble areas that Varley urged be addressed – that private Cypriot carriers do not receive frequent and thorough inspections – seems to have played a role in the Helios crash.

“We strongly recommend that this document is brought to the attention of the Ministry and incorporated into the future aviation policy of the Ministry and Department of Civil Aviation,” Varley wrote in the memo to the then Civil Aviation Authority Director Stelios Vasilliou.

The Communications and Works Minister at the time was Kikis Kazamias. The Director of Civil Aviation and the relevant Aviation Safety Official were both out of the country yesterday and so Civil Aviation could not comment on their response to the memo and on whether or not it had been forwarded to Kazamias.

Varley followed up the letter with more memos about the gaps in aviation safety and the undue laxity regarding proper inspections, especially regarding small private planes.

The six weaknesses that Varley identified were:

1. The large number of aircraft registered in Cyprus but operating out of other countries due to the ease with which licences are given, thereby making Cyprus a “flag of opportunity” for overseas and private carriers. As Civil Aviation has little control over the operations and inspections of these aircraft, Varley recommended that Cyprus either assign staff specifically to inspect these craft or make licensing conditions more stringent. Currently there are 150 aircraft registered in Cyprus, many of which are based offshore.

2. The high frequency of aircraft striking birds at the Larnaca and Paphos airports during takeoff and landing, costing companies tens of thousands of pounds every year in damages and increasing the likelihood of serious accidents.

3. Insufficient maintenance of single-engine and dual-engine aircraft, many of which do not meet even the minimum ICAO and JAA standards.

4. The dispensing of Air Operator Certificates (AOCs) to companies with insufficient funds and technical experience.

5. Insufficient examination standards for those testing for private pilot licences.

6. Illegal transportation of the public for compensation by pilots licensed to fly private crafts but not licensed to transport the public.

In light of the Helios crash, the concluding lines of Varley’s memo sound a darkly prophetic note:

“Failure to act on these issues will not only impact on the international credibility of Cyprus in the aviation field, it will also lead to an increased risk of a serious accident involving a Cyprus registered aircraft.”

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[John47]

http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-08-11T094342Z_01_L11

ATHENS (Reuters) - Greek investigators said on Friday they found three skeletons at the site of last year's Cypriot passenger plane crash east of Athens and that they could be the remains of three people missing from the flight.

The Boeing 737-300 operated by Helios Airways rammed into a hillside on August 14 last year, the worst accident on record for either Greece or Cyprus, killing all 121 passengers and crew on board. The majority of the passengers were Cypriots.

But only 118 bodies had been recovered after weeks of on-site searches. The human remains were found during a debris collection operation this week.

"I am here at the site of the crash and we are hopeful that these three skeletons are of the missing three," Captain Akrivos Tsolakis, who leads the investigation into the cause of the crash, told Reuters.

"They will be sent to the laboratory for DNA testing."

Investigators are due to release their final report next month on what exactly caused the plane to crash.

[atakacs]

"I am here at the site of the crash and we are hopeful that these three skeletons are of the missing three," Captain Akrivos Tsolakis, who leads the investigation into the cause of the crash, told Reuters.

I muss say that there is no shortage of wierd incidents in this investigation...

[EyeWideShut]

That’s the most interesting development in this bizarre tragedy for months!
I’ve actually got the Greek Coroner Koutsaftis on record (tape) insisting that every bit and fragment of human remains had been accounted for in his 500-page Forensic Report submitted late last year. He said then that the only explanation for the three missing passenger bodies was that they “evaporated” in the brushfires after the crash.
On the other hand, there was quite a lot of debris left to rot at the crash site, unguarded for almost a year. These ‘unwanted’ items of fuselage included the back section of the APU which I’ve got photographed last December, lying there almost intact, a few meters away from the Helios landmark tail, while Chief Investigator Tsolakis was flying over it in a Reenactment of the Helios Flight.
Please note, that a complete and thorough examination of all the fragments of the APU would be essential if the investigation was prepared to give serious consideration to a BLEEDS-OFF TAKEOFF scenario. But they refused to do so despite protests by experts who insisted that this was a crucial parameter in the mechanical causes of the crash.
Now that the Tsolakis Final Report is due to come out (next month, after repeated delays), they’ve decided to finally collect key pieces of evidence which the official probe had erstwhile blatantly ignored, to clear the ground for the Monday (August 14) memorial service. And in this macabre mop-up operation, they ‘discover’ three skeletons in their open-air closet!

[big fraidy cat]

Here's an article from today's Kathimerini online edition, which details a bit more about where/how these skeletal remains were found.

Actually, what I find particularly strange about this is that not all of the aircraft was recovered after the crash. Why was the wing, allegedly covering these remains, not removed from the crash site? Doesn't sound like a very thorough investigation.

More Helios crash bodies found
Investigators said yesterday they found at least one of three missing bodies from Greece’s worst airplane crash, three days before the first anniversary of the accident.

Greek chief accident investigator Akrivos Tsolakis said three sets of human remains were located on Wednesday near the site where a Cypriot Helios Airways airliner crashed on August 14, 2005, killing all 121 people on board.

Rescuers had recovered 118 bodies from the site, near the village of Grammatiko, some 40 kilometers northeast of Athens. “We have hopes that at least one or two of these skeletons belong to the three missing persons,” Tsolakis told The Associated Press.

He said the remains were found lodged under a wing section of the wreckage, in a gorge outside the 4-hectare main crash site. “Some of them were very badly burned,” Tsolakis said.

Chief state coroner Fillippos Koutsaftis said police would ask relatives of the three missing victims - all Cypriot nationals - to provide DNA samples to cross-check with the remains, “but the results will take a very long time, as the remains have deteriorated,” Koutsaftis said.

Tsolakis said the process could take up to two months. The chief investigator said he expected to submit his final report on the causes of the crash in early September.

“It’s a very delicate affair... we’re working very intensely on this case,” he said.

In May, Tsolakis handed Cypriot authorities a draft report on the causes of the accident, but did not make the findings public.

The Boeing 737-300, which was en route from Larnaca in Cyprus to Athens, flew on autopilot for over two hours after reaching cruising altitude. Two Greek fighter jets tailed it until it crashed.

After a re-enactment in December of the Helios flight from Larnaca to Athens, investigators said the plane apparently had lost cabin pressure, incapacitating the pilots, and eventually ran out of fuel before crashing.

A flight attendant wrestled with the controls for at least 10 minutes before the Cypriot airliner crashed, investigators said. (AP)

[big fraidy cat]

Here's the latest from the Cyprus Mail today:

Island looks back a year after Helios crash
By Elias Hazou

BELLS WILL toll mournfully across the island today, as people flock to churches in remembrance of those who perished on a Helios airliner a year ago tomorrow in the worst peacetime disaster in Cyprus’ recent history.
The tragedy that shocked an entire nation also happened on a Sunday, when Cypriots awoke to the news that 121 travellers lost their lives when their plane crashed into a ravine near Marathon.

Tomorrow the victims’ relatives will make a final pilgrimage to the site of the carnage at Grammatikos, where they will attend a memorial service.
A year on after the horrific accident, the tears may have subsided but the quest for the truth remains as strong as ever.

To this day, two of the afflicted families have been unable to find peace of mind. Three people on board the ill-fated Boeing are still unaccounted for. They are Michalis and Kalliope Constandinou, a married couple from Pera Chorio, and Andriani Chrysanthou of Mosfiloti.
That may now change, though, as investigators have unearthed the remains of three people at Grammatikos. The bones had been buried deep in the ground as a result of the ferocity of the impact.

Other items recovered at the crash site, such as wedding rings engraved with the owners’ names, are expected to confirm these are the three missing persons. Moreover, according to press reports, the three were seated on rows 13 and 14 on the plane, just behind the right wing. The wing was torn off like paper on impact, ending up in a crevice many metres from the main body of the wreckage.

Akrivos Tsolakis, chief of the Greek accident investigating team, yesterday explained that the delay in finding these remains was due to the inaccessibility of the terrain.
But he pledged these latest findings would not push back the completion and publication of his report into the causes of the crash, to be released by early September.
Tsolakis’ findings should put paid to the mystery that has baffled experts and observers alike for the past year.

So many questions persist. If there was someone in the cockpit trying to veer the plane away from Athens, why didn’t they use the radio to try and make contact? One of the cabin crew, Andreas Prodromou, was a qualified pilot so the theory goes that he tried to save the flight.
But if the plane had suffered a decompression soon out of Larnaca how did anyone survive to make an attempt to save the plane in the last half an hour? Does the oxygen supply to those wearing masks last more than two hours?

Also, why were there no reports of people having put on their lifejackets? Moreover, why were the pilot and co-pilot not wearing their oxygen masks if the plane suffered decompression?
But answering all these questions may offer only partial relief for the friends and families of the deceased, who desperately seek justice. There is a widespread suspicion among them that the airline was cutting corners when it came to safety, and they want the guilty to be held accountable.

The publication of the probe will therefore end one chapter of the saga, but will open another: the court proceedings.

And Helios Airways’ bid to change its name to ajet has not gone down well with the victims’ relatives, who believe the company is slyly trying to shirk responsibility. The airline has also not gained any popularity points by raising various objections to the functioning of a committee of inquiry tasked with establishing any liability for the accident.
But Politis yesterday reported an even more distasteful aspect of the affair: the airline’s treatment of the cabin crew of Helios flight ZU522. The paper interviewed Androulla Charalambous, the mother of Haris Charalambous, one of the flight attendants on board.
Haris was engaged to Andreas Prodromou, the man believed to have heroically tried to land the doomed plane.
Among the allegations made by Charalambous’ mother was that the airline never sent her a letter of condolence for her loss.

Worse, she claimed, her daughter’s last paycheque was calculated for only half the month – i.e. up until August 14, the day of the crash. In other words, the mother said, the company did not have the decency to even pay the last salary in full.

She said she contacted someone at Helios, who explained that the payslips are computerised and that this was not intentional.

“But someone must have entered the figures into the computer,” said the distressed mother.
“It’s not about the money. Let them keep it. It’s about common decency. Where’s their humanity?”
According to the mother, the company never once contacted her and she was forced to chase Helios officials around to regulate these matters.

But there was more: Haris and fianc? Andreas Prodromou had been planning to take a trip to the Greek island of Santorini later that summer. They had booked a flight with Helios. Haris’ plane ticket, writes Politis, cost £166. It was never refunded.

The mother also wondered whether this shameful penny-pinching by the company reflected a broader “cheap mentality” that may have led to substandard operation.
The only sign of dignity came from the hotel the couple had booked in Santorini. As soon as the managers there realised that the couple had died on the plane, they refunded the deposit paid for accommodation.

August 14, 2005
9am: Helios Airlines Flight ZU522, a Boeing 737, with 115 passengers and six crew members on board takes off from Larnaca International Airport in Cyprus, heading for Athens, Greece, and then Prague, Czech Republic.
9.37am: The plane enters Greek airspace and is identified by Greece's Civil Aviation Authority.

10.07am: Control tower at Athens International Airport is unable to establish communication with the plane.
10.20am: Air traffic controllers notify their counterparts at Larnaca who say the plane reported a problem with its air conditioning system before entering Greek airspace.
10.25am: Greece's Civil Aviation Authority notifies Defence Ministry's national search and rescue centre.

10.30am: The Greek Defence Ministry issues a Renegade alert, a standard aviation procedure when a plane fails to respond to the control tower.
10.55am: Two F-16 fighter jets scramble to locate airliner.
11.20am: Fighter jets make visual contact with the Cypriot jet over Aegean island of Kea, but are unable to communicate with pilots.

11.25am: Fighter jets approach the plane and report that the co-pilot of the Cypriot plane appears unconscious in the cockpit, while the other pilot was absent. Oxygen masks also seem to have been activated in the plane.
12.05pm: Airliner crashes near coastal town of Grammatiko, about 40 kilometres north of Athens.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

Here's the latest from the Cyprus Mail online edition for today:

Grammatikos bones mystery brings despair
By Elias Hazou

WITH ONLY weeks to go the long-awaited release of the Helios probe, controversy erupted in Cyprus over recent finds at the crash site, the skeletal remains initially thought to belong to the three victims still unaccounted for.

The three missing persons are Michalis and Kalliope Constandinou, a married couple from Pera Chorio, and Andriani Chrysanthou of Mosfiloti.

Bones unearthed at a crevice in Grammatikos, where the Boeing 737 crashed a year ago, had fed hope that the finds would help the affected families finally have peace of mind.
Other items reportedly recovered at the same location, such as wedding rings engraved with the owners’ names, had reinforced the belief these were the three missing persons.
But for a brief moment yesterday the discovery turned into something of a cruel joke, when Greece’s chief coroner Philippos Koutsaftis said the bones unearthed most likely belonged to animals.

Meanwhile Akrivos Tsolakis, chief of the Greek accident investigating team, stuck to his guns: he did not rule out the possibility the remains might be human, but said further lab tests would arrive at the truth.

The whole debate left an air of uncertainty over the bones, and to the victims’ relatives this was the last straw, as one after the other they vented their frustration at the authorities.
“We are utterly confused by these conflicting statements. We don’t know who to believe anymore,” said Costas Chrysanthou, son of missing Andriani Chrysanthou.
He said he had received no official briefing on the matter, and that he was forced to make enquiries with the Cypriot embassy in Athens.

“They were very helpful. They made some calls and are keeping me up to date. Were it not for them, I would be totally in the dark.”
But Nicolas Yiasoumis, who heads a committee representing the aggrieved families of the victims, was far more outspoken.

“We shouldn’t have to chase people around, trying to dig up the tiniest bit of information. Officials have all our phone numbers, they could easily contact us. They have no problem doing that whenever they want to be on camera.”
The relatives have been unhappy with how the whole investigation has turned out, especially with the fact that an inquiry into liability for the disaster has been put on ice.
“We want statements that have substance. But for a year now, we have been hearing anything but,” said Yiasoumis.
“And we shall not tolerate our plight being used for political purposes by some quarters,” he added.

His remark was taken to refer to allegations by Cypriot state coroner Panicos Stavrianos, who said yesterday that Cypriot scientists had been warned not to get involved in the investigations.

According to Stavrianos, who is also a deputy in the AKEL party, at one point some of the victims’ relatives had asked that Cypriot coroners conduct an autopsy on the bodies.
But these same scientists later received “threats to stay away” claimed Stavrianos, but did not elaborate.

He also piled criticism on the crash probe, saying it was conducted in a “superficial manner.” He cited previous reports in the media that certain evidence had been misplaced or destroyed.

“A single wrong find could derail the whole investigation. The area should have been sealed off,” noted Stavrianos.
The final report on the causes of the crash was due out in early September. The latest findings could push that date back yet again, although industry experts agree that the bulk of the investigation was completed in record time.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

Comments from one of the Cyprus Mail journalists on the course of this investigation [from today's Cyprus Mail online edition].


The Helios probe and rampant populism
By Loucas Charalambous

THE AIR disaster of August 14, 2005 runs the risk of becoming a second missing persons’ saga. It does bear all the hallmarks:

A ruthless exploitation of people’s pain by the cannibals of the media

The continuing mocking of the victims’ relatives, with populist promises of catharsis and vindication

An incredible lack of gravity in handling the matter from all those involved

A year on, everyone is still waiting for the notorious probe into the crash to come out. Starring in this spectacle is Akrivos Tsolakis, head of the Greek investigating committee. As we have written before, Tsolakis has turned the issue into a one-man show. It would barely be an exaggeration to say that he spent more time dealing with the media than with the actual case. A telling sign of the casual way in which the investigation has been conducted is the fact that the remains of three of the passengers remained at the crash site for an entire year, only to be discovered days ago!

Another element pointing to a lack of seriousness: for a whole year, Tsolakis himself was threatening fire and brimstone with his “legendary” probe, around which he cultivated a hollow myth. He succeeded in convincing many that his report would just about solve all the problems created by the accident. He stopped short of vowing to bring back the dead. “No stone shall be left unturned. I shall get down to the marrow of the bone,” he declared audaciously, impressing the naïve. Having thus created this phony climate for so long, just this week he recanted, obviously having realised that the moment of truth has arrived and that he will now be called to explain his bold words. Setting aside his clumsy bravado, Tsolakis about-faced, admitting that his report would only concern the causes of the crash!

The cause of the accident was known from the very first moment. It shouldn’t have taken a whole year for Tsolakis to tell us what happened. The facts were such that the reason for the disaster could have been reliably revealed in the space of a few days. Just a week after the incident, on August 21, 2005, this column precisely presented the cause of the accident, as this will be laid out in Tsolakis’ report: the pilots committed an unforgivable error. From the second they walked into the cockpit up to the moment the plane reached 12,000 feet, they should have checked the decompression selector at least four times. This is explicitly stated in the checklist manual they held in their hands. Incredible as it may sound, the pilots never once checked the decompression selector. They left the switch on the wrong setting, which led to cabin depressurisation. But even when this happened they hadn’t realised what was going on, as they slipped into unconsciousness and were unable to fly the plane to a lower altitude and save the day. So what occurred thereafter on the plane was just the natural course of events, entirely irrelevant to the non-experts. This was the unique cause of the tragedy. Everything else is science fiction. Whether there were other problems with the airline, other planes, or with Civil Aviation, is an entirely different story that has nothing to do with the crash.

This, then, is the simple truth that Tsolakis has been unable to tell us a year after the accident. Instead, Tsolakis has chosen to endow the case with a mythical aura, blowing it out of proportion. As a result – and with the help of the populists from politics and journalism – the unfortunate relatives and the public at large are now expecting impossible “catharses” and false “vindications” that exist only in the minds of those who created them.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[bubbers44]

It does not seem that a bleeds off takeoff would be required for that short of a flight unless the departure runway was very short. The pressurization panel being left in manual and not auto probably caused the whole problem. Has anyone ever heard the conversation they had with maintenance during their flight or the CVR? I have had the takeoff warning horn go off in flight because of dual pressurization problems and initially thought it was a faulty takeoff warning until I looked up and the cabin was above 10,000 ft in a B737. Overnight maintenance would have to use manual mode to pressurize on the ground and then manually partially open it to finish the leak check. When both engines ran out of fuel the cockpit door was no longer electrically locked and someone was able to enter the cockpit if he didn't remember the code to open the door. He must have used the oxygen bottles to stay conscious since the passenger masks only last around 20 minutes each.

[atakacs]

Just a week after the incident, on August 21, 2005, this column precisely presented the cause of the accident

One week into one of the most mysterious crash in recent history the Cyprus Mail has the whole story… If there is definitely much to be said about the investigation lead by M. Tsolakis such comments are just plain pathetic.

Sorry… shouldn’t feed the trolls :uhoh:

[bubbers44]

Don't expect too much. We had TWA 800 and AA587 over on our side come out with some politically correct conclusions. They make the possible cause what they want.

[big fraidy cat]

Here's the current status of the litigation against Boeing in the States [from today's Cyprus Mail online edition]:

Heliios relatives suing Boeing for plane crash
By Elias Hazou

IN THEIR drive for vindication, the relatives of the victims who perished aboard the Helios airliner are going ahead and suing manufacturers Boeing, one year after the worst aviation disaster in Cyprus’ history.

They are holding Boeing responsible for a string of build omissions, which they say contributed to the crash.

At least two of the alleged oversights involve the now-famous decompression warning signal.

The relatives say that, in the event of a problem, the alarm should have been configured to go off even before the plane reached an altitude of 10,000 feet. After that point, they say, it would be too late for pilots to react as they would come under the effects of hypoxia, or low oxygen in the blood.

Normal cabin pressurisation for a Boeing 737-300 is set at around 8,500 feet.

There is also the issue of the sound emitted for decompression being the same as that for the warning of a glitch in the positioning of the flaps.

Another omission concerns access to the cockpit. The relatives and their lawyers say Boeing should have made arrangements allowing other crew members to open the reinforced cockpit door from the outside, in case of an emergency, for example if something happened to the pilots.

The lawsuit has been filed in Illinois, the headquarters of Boeing.

Prodromos Prodromou, uncle of flight attendant Andreas Prodromou, yesterday told the Mail the first hearing in the case would take place tomorrow at a US federal court in Chicago.

He said Boeing would be filing a non-convenience forum motion, i.e. they would try to prevent the case from being heard in the United States, arguing that it should take place either in Greece or Cyprus. Compensation awarded in the US is typically much higher than in Cyprus.

A decision on whether the civil suit should take place in the United States should be out “by the end of the year”, Prodromou said.

“We have not determined the compensation amounts. This will come at a later stage.

“Bear in mind that 43 infants have been orphaned. Who will take care of them, their education?” mused Prodromou.

Meanwhile the liable airline, Helios, has been proposing out-of-court settlements. The company’s insurers have made an offer to the families of the seven Greek nationals who died in the crash.

Figures quoted in the media range from 500,000 to 1,000,000 euros, collectively.

The Cypriot relatives are not discussing such offers at the present time.

At any rate, the lawsuits do not rule out possible criminal proceedings against Helios and/or Boeing. This will largely depend on the findings of the Greek accident-investigating team, due out next month.

The probe will then be handed to a committee of inquiry here in Cyprus that will decide whether and who is liable for the accident.

Under the law, any criminal case must be brought up in Greece, in whose territory the accident occurred.

From the facts that have emerged in the year since the accident, it seems possible to build a tentative picture of what happened on the doomed flight: shortly after takeoff at 9am on the fateful day, two warnings – one for the decompression system, the other for the cooling system – were sounded almost simultaneously.

The warning horn sounded after the aircraft reached an altitude of 10,000 feet. The cabin decompression switch had been left on manual by ground crew during pre-flight checks, while it should have been set to automatic.

Still, the lapse could have been detected in time by the pilots had they properly scanned their gauges and carried out a checklist of components before takeoff. The aviators apparently did not do that, and the question remains why.

When the decompression alarm went off, the crew – who had assumed that the decompression switch was on auto – mistakenly took this for a glitch in the positioning of the flaps, because the sounds emitted in both cases are identical. As the aircraft climbed to 34,000 feet, both the pilots and passengers gradually suffered the effects of hypoxia: giddiness, loss of consciousness and finally deep slumber.

Chief air investigator Akrivos Tsolakis has also pointed out that the company’s manual for the Boeing 737-300 was vague. Instead of explicitly instructing ground technicians to reset the decompression switch to auto, the manual simply said that the switch should be set “to the previous position,” i.e. from manual to auto.

However, a Boeing pilot told the Mail that, while this was true, the manual explicitly states that when the compression alarm goes off in flight, this means a pressurisation problem; and when it sounds while the plane is on the ground, it indicates a takeoff configuration fault.

“There can be no misinterpretation as far as that’s concerned,” the source said.

He also thought that calls for Boeing to make the decompression alarm sound before 10,000 feet were “a bit far-fetched”.

“I don’t think it would make much of a difference. Normal cabin pressure is set at 8,500 to 8,800 feet, depending on the plane. With Boeing, in the case of loss of pressure, the alarm is configured to go off after the 10,000 feet mark. This is intended to give some leeway above the 8,500 mark, and is considered in the industry to be well within limits as far as safety goes.”

In other words, the source explained, the chances of a pilot passing out or losing his mental faculties between 8,500 to 10,000 feet were infinitesimal to non-existent.

The only serious defect the source could think of with the Boeing 737 was the absence of a visual indicator for loss of cabin pressure.

“There’s no red button flashing when that happens. You just hear a loud horn. But, again, pilots are trained to recognise this sound – they can’t miss it.

“If anything, it’s a design flaw. I wouldn’t go so far as to call it a manufacturing error.”

But assuming the pilots somehow missed the decompression alarm, did they not notice the effects of hypoxia?

“Maybe, maybe not. What I can tell you is that no commercial airliner pilot receives training for low-oxygen conditions. They undergo simulated tests, yes, where they learn what to do in such an eventuality

“But they’re not placed in a real-life decompression chamber, like the ones you see in the movies.”

As far as the cockpit door safety measures were concerned, the source said that at least the senior flight attendant knows which code to enter on the keypad.

However, depending on airline policy, it was also possible for junior attendants to know the code. The source speculated that perhaps this was the case with steward Andreas Prodromou, who is believed to have tried to fly the plane when it was too late.

“I guess we’ll never know for sure. This is one of the grey areas,” he said.


Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[bubbers44]

I hope Boeing doesn't have to pay for this disaster. Yes, the take off warning and the cabin above 10,000 ft are the same warning but pilots are all trained to know this. I have heard the same warning for both conditions and it wasn't that hard to figure out. I know all the lawyers only care about the money and Boeing has big pockets but give them a break. The pilots should have been able to know the difference. Why didn't the FA's know the code for the door? That could have solved the situation by itself. Boeing can't babysit every crew on all of their aircraft.

The 10,000 ft warning is fine. I have gone over 15,000 ft and felt no problems. You do not pass out until at least 25,000 ft, if then. I hope these lawyers lose the case as they should and don't try to feed off of Boeing. I guess I just hate greedy lawyers. Sorry.

[FlyEGNT]

Please forgive my ignorance and I do apologise if this has been mentioned previously in other posts; but are there any plans or have there ever been plans to install CCTV into the cabin and flightdeck of commercial airliners?
If video footage could be recorded to the blackboxes, surely this would be a huge help in investigations such as this one.

[jondc9]

CCTV cameras have been proposed for many,many years...indeed in the US, cameras were mounted on DC10's for American Airlines allowing passengers to see takeoff from pilots view...taken off after o'hare crash tragedy late 70's...they didn't record though.

pilot unions seem to be oposed, though I am in favor of it.(with certain restrictions on who views it)

AS to the Boeing law suit, I hope boeing loses. HOW hard is it now a days to put a mechanical voice that says: OXYGEN MASKS NOW instead of the stupid dual use horns? I know bubber44 is right, pilots are trained to know the difference...but they are trained below 10,000 feet without any chance of hypoxia...and while you might not have had a problem, others might feel hypoxic earlier and lower. this might have been part of the equation.

And to all pilots, climbing out of 10,000 feet check the cabin altimeter as force of habit and avoid this kind of problem.

jon

[big fraidy cat]

After a two-month delay, the Cyprus investigation of the crash has now commenced. Below are two articles reported in today's Cyprus Mail online edition regarding a letter submitted by the airline and testimony by one of the technicians, among others.


Helios claims evidence it followed all procedures
By Constantine Markides

IN A LETTER sent to the Helios crash investigators, the legal team representing ajet – the company formerly known as Helios airways – has claimed that new evidence has surfaced demonstrating Helios Airline followed all safety requirements before the crash.

The intervention comes at the tail end of a year long investigation and less than two weeks before investigative committee head Akrivos Tsolakis is set to release the final report on the causes behind last year’s August 14 crash in Grammatiko, Greece, that killed all 121 passengers and crew on board.

Christos Neocleous, a lawyer for the airline, claimed the document proves that Helios did in fact address all of the problems and deficiencies with the airplane that had been noted by two British experts before the crash.

Politis yesterday reported that in light of this document the airline has requested that the investigation start again from the beginning, but Neocleous refuted that claim on state radio yesterday.

“We are not seeking to start the investigation anew,” Neocleous said, adding that they instead “wanted to be 100 per cent sure that Mr. Tsolakis has seen this document” and included it in the final report.

Neocleous said that it was possible Tsolakis was already aware of the document but that he could not know for certain as the contents of Tsolakis’ final report have yet to be released.

Neocleous claims that the new evidence arose from the testimonies of key witnesses and emphasised that its incorporation was essential “for the legality of the procedure”.
“We are not trying to win points in a political game, nor impress public opinion,” Neocleous said. “We are merely trying to make sure responsibilities are doled out where they belong.

“If the company bears responsibilities then it will pay for them,” he said, but then added that if certain crucial pieces of evidence are ignored, thereby “tricking certain people that still suffer from the effects of this accident, then we will not take part in this game.”

Testimonies of key witnesses later in the day yesterday seemed to contradict the airline’s claim that it had not violated aviation safety regulations.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Last technician to contact Helios was ‘not right man for job’
By John Leonidou

AN HELIOS Airways technician, who was the last person to have contact with the pilot of the doomed Helios Airway plane that crashed last year, yesterday told an investigative committee that he could not help the pilot because “the proper official to handle the situation had been on night-shift duty”.

The revelation came to light yesterday when technician Marios Frangiskos was called to make a witness statement in front of the investigative committee, headed by former Supreme Court Judge Panagiotis Kallis, tasked by the Cabinet to bring to justice any individuals found responsible for the crash of Helios Airways flight ZU 522.

On August 14 last year, the plane, destined for Athens and Prague, crashed into a mountainside in Grammatikos in Greece, killing all 121 passengers and crew on board.

Although the official cause of the crash has yet to be released, it is believed that a combination of decompression problems and pilot error caused the Boeing 737 to fly unpiloted for almost three hours before running out of fuel and crashing just north of Athens.

Yesterday, the committee heard statements from various witnesses, with some complaining of hectic work hours at the airline and others of problems with the plane on previous flights.

Addressing the committee yesterday, Frangiskos, the last person to have contact with the pilots before they passed out, said that just four minutes after takeoff, the German pilot, Hans Jurgen Mertin, had contacted him and told him, “Take-Off Configuration Warning”, before telling him that he awaited further instructions on what to do.

Frangiskos said he didn’t know what to do, because the appropriate official was not present and had been on night duty.

He added that he had tried to call the appropriate official on his mobile phone, but there was no answer. He called the plane back six minutes later, but there was no answer from the cockpit.

The committee also heard that Frangiskos couldn’t understand the German pilot and had requested the co-pilot so they could speak to each other in Greek.

Also called to give her testimony was stewardess Fanoula Savvidou who told the committee that the aircraft had experienced some problems during a flight to London just one day before the crash.

She had told committee members that ice had accumulated on the cabin door, adding that passengers had been complaining that they were cold, forcing the pilot to switch on the heating, adding that a funny noise could be heard during take off and landing.

Savvidou added she had often heard of complaints about the specific aircraft.
The committee then heard from the wife of the co-pilot, Sofia Charalambous, who claimed her husband Pambos Charalambous had his warnings of the aircraft problems waved away by airline officials.

She claimed to have been present when her husband had once reported some of the problems to Helios official George Kikkides. The official had allegedly told her husband that the airline would soon be replacing the problematic plane.

The co-pilot’s wife also noted how her husband had told her he was having communications problems with German pilot Hans Jurgen Mertin.

She also stated that the Mertin was a “bad character” who was confrontational, accusing the German pilot of “drinking too much”.

She then launched a scathing attack on former Helios director Demetris Pantazis, who she said was only interested in the profits, not the safety of the flights.

But a lawyer representing the airline dismissed her claims, arguing that the wife was bitter because the airline had not given her husband a promotion.

Another airline official, Chrystalla Asprou, told the committee that staff were under immense strain from their superiors and were being forced to work extensive hours without being paid overtime.

Asprou told the committee: “Mr Pantazis was very demanding and put pressure on employees to work extra hours without being given overtime. We would go to work at 9am and not know what time we would be finishing work.”

The investigations got under way yesterday for the first time in two months, after lawyers of the airline had objected to the investigations because they did not have a copy of the confidential report filed by Greek Air Accident Investigator Akrivos Tsolakis.

But the committee decided to restart its enquiry on statements that were not based on the Tsolakis report.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[LNAV VNAV]

'Also called to give her testimony was stewardess Fanoula Savvidou who told the committee that the aircraft had experienced some problems during a flight to London just one day before the crash.
She had told committee members that ice had accumulated on the cabin door, adding that passengers had been complaining that they were cold, forcing the pilot to switch on the heating, adding that a funny noise could be heard during take off and landing.'
Is this considered to be a problem nowdays?? !
If this committee is expecting to learn something by asking cabin crew if they were cold on a flight then God help us here in Cyprus.

[big fraidy cat]

The Cypriot investigation continues with testimony from the former Civial Aviation official [from Cyprus Mail online edition of today]:

Former civil aviation official claims gross negligence
By Elias Hazou

A FORMER official with Civil Aviation yesterday fingered the department for apathy and lack of professional ethos, saying these played a big part in last year’s crash of a Cypriot airliner.

Charalambos Hadjigeorgiou, ex-director of the Civil Aviation’s licensing department-turned whistleblower, was testifying to a committee of inquiry in Nicosia tasked with finding liability for the disaster that cost the lives of 121 people.

In its second day of proceedings, the committee, headed by former Supreme Court judge Panayiotis Kallis, heard claims that negligence was the order of the day in the corridors of Civil Aviation, the department whose job it is to ensure air safety.

Not one to pull any punches, Hadjigeorgiou named persons in key positions who carried out their duties negligently and in a slipshod manner.

The department was characterised by an absence of discipline, he claimed.

And even though the many problems – such as insufficient manpower – were known to the people in charge and often brought up at meetings, nothing was done to remedy the situation.
For example, a proposal to hire more staff fell by the wayside.

But more alarmingly, Hadjigeorgiou accused, no in-flight checks were ever carried out aboard the ill-fated Boeing 737, despite repeated incidents of falling temperatures inside the cabin.

On Monday, a stewardess told the committee that the aircraft had experienced some problems during a flight to London just one day before the crash. She said ice had accumulated on the cabin door, adding that passengers had been complaining that they were cold, forcing the pilot to switch on the heating, adding that a funny noise could be heard during take off and landing.

It has also transpired that on the fateful day, the last man to have had contact with the pilot of the plane was an unqualified stand-in, as the proper official had been on night-shift duty.

Hadjigeorgiou also alleged that Civil Aviation was biased in favour of Helios Airways at the expense of other airlines.

For instance, he said, charter firm Eurocypria had on one occasion asked for permission to hire two American aviators, but their request was denied. By contrast, Helios had no problem hiring five pilots, even though they did not have EU licences, Hadjigeorgiou maintained.

Worse, Hadjigeorgiou said, Civil Aviation was deliberately misleading EU air safety authorities by painting a rosy picture of the department, when that was anything but.

In one case, he had personally asked permission to set up a helicopter school based at Paphos airport, and his request was immediately granted. At the time – around August 2003 – Hadjigeorgiou was not even employed at Civil Aviation. Yet this did not stop officials there from passing him off as the head of the ‘new unit’, giving a false and exaggerated impression of his position.

This was done to con foreign air safety authorities into thinking that Cyprus’ Civil Aviation was a robust organisation, he claimed.

Hadjigeorgiou’s indictments were promptly seized upon by the victims’ relatives, who said their worst fears were coming true.
Nicolas Yiasoumis, who heads a committee representing the aggrieved relatives, yesterday described Hadjigeorgiou’s statements as “a most official… confirmation of the problems we suspected [with Civil Aviation].

“It’s sad because the department was burying its head in the sand. To this day, they are plagued by the same problems,” Yiasoumis said.

Civil Aviation is just one of the organisations the relatives are blaming for the disaster. Manufacturers Boeing are also being sued in the United States for a string of alleged construction flaws on the 737-300.

“Those in responsible positions need to feel the weight of the chairs they’re sitting on…they must realise this is not just another desk job,” added Yiasoumis.

The report on the causes of the crash is due out sometime next month. It is believed that a combination of decompression problems and pilot errors caused the plane to fly unpiloted for almost three hours before running out of fuel and crashing just north of Athens.

One mystery that continues to baffle is why the pilots continued their ascent beyond 10,000 feet, evidently ignoring a possible decompression warning that sounded just minutes into the flight.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

Continuation of testimony of the former Cyprus Aviation official [from today's Cyprus Mail online edition]:

Civil Aviation in the dock in Helios probe
By Elias Hazou

FRESH allegations were brought up yesterday against Civil Aviation before the committee of inquiry that is looking into responsibility for last August’s Helios air disaster.

Former CA official Charalambos Hadjigeorgiou picked up right where he left off on Tuesday, painting a picture of a corrupt department interested only in keeping up appearances.

Without mincing his words, Hadjigeorgiou cited one compelling anecdote after another to show the CA was cutting corners when it came to air safety – and in the process fooling the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).

As a member of the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities), Cyprus is obliged to maintain common safety regulatory standards and procedures. But the reality was very different, Hadjigeorgiou claimed.

But even more alarmingly, the CA was affording Helios Airways – the airline in the spotlight –preferential treatment.

In one instance, Helios asked to lease a plane from Egypt. Even though no airworthiness tests were carried out on the aircraft, the CA granted Helios a licence to fly it, he claimed.

According to Hadjigeorgiou, a team of CA officials had travelled to Egypt to inspect the plane, but for some reason never got to actually see it. Nevertheless, on their return to Cyprus they approved the licence.

Hadjigeorgiou said this was just one example of being blindsided by his colleagues: he himself did not make the trip, nor was he kept informed on the case.

“I heard it from the news,” he said.

But more drama unfolded before the cameras at the committee hearing yesterday, when its chairman Panayiotis Kallis unveiled official correspondence regarding the “Egyptian incident”.
Kallis presented a letter by the Transport Ministry’s permanent secretary Makis Constantinides, who was asking for clarifications about the trip.

The response from the former deputy director of Civil Aviation was that the department had received verbal instructions from Transport Minister Harris Thrassou to accommodate Helios.
The revelation caused uproar in the room, with the victims’ relatives wasting no time in calling for the minister’s resignation.

But their demands were swiftly brushed aside later in the day, when Government Spokesman Christodoulos Pashardis cautioned against a trial by media.

Seen as a stool pigeon by his ex-colleagues, Hadjigeorgiou said the CA pulled out all the stops to convince EASA that it was up to scratch. One allegedly dodgy practice was for the department to replenish manpower for its SRU (Safety Regulation Unit) from the broader civil service, especially whenever an inspection was imminent.

That was done, Hadjigeorgiou contended, to keep European air safety authorities off the CA’s back.

At that point, Kallis asked him what was behind these attempts to trick EASA.

“Personal interests were at stake,” Hadjigeorgiou replied, hinting at politics and clash of personalities within the department.

Speaking to reporters after the hearing adjourned for the day, the victims’ relatives were livid with the allegations of gross negligence.

“It seems Mr Thrasou was trying to expedite the lease [of the Egyptian plane] and save money. I don’t understand why Mr Thrasou is so keen to help Helios,” said Nicolas Yiasoumis, who heads a committee representing the relatives.

“As far as the plane that crashed is concerned, it was a flying coffin that killed 121 souls,” he added.

To the families and friends of those who perished aboard the Boeing 737, the Transport Ministry is, by association, also responsible for the tragedy.

Yesterday’s deliberations before the committee of inquiry served to fuel speculation that Helios and Civil Aviation were in cahoots, in the sense the two jointly tried to sweep under the rug glaring safety omissions.

In this climate of recriminations and raging passions, every bit of information that comes out has tended to be hyped up and blown out of proportion, and this even before the release of the final report into what caused the crash.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

At least we now know what happened to the co-pilot's diary; this from today's Cyprus Mail online:

Late pilot’s son accuses Helios
By Elias Hazou

THERE was more tension yesterday at Nicosia’s International Conference Centre, the venue of the hearings into last August’s air disaster.

The highlight of the day was the testimony of Ioannis Charalambous, son of Pambos Charalambous, co-pilot aboard the downed plane.

Charalambous submitted to the committee of inquiry his father’s diary, in which the deceased pilot voiced grave concerns about the airline.

At one point, he had jotted down: “If all the things I know were to come out, the airline would surely close.”

Charalambous told the committee how his father would often share these misgivings and complaints with his colleagues.

He said his father was so frustrated he began seeking employment elsewhere, for example with a Hong Kong-based airline.

In his notes, Pambos Charalambous had referred in detail to an inbound flight from Tel Aviv (August 2004), when a series of technical glitches occurred aboard the plane.

Tempers flared in the room as the victims’ relatives heard what seemed to be recurring problems with Helios’ planes that were never addressed.

The lawyer for Helios Airways, Demetris Araouzos, suggested that the late pilot’s worries were exaggerated – that Charalambous tended to hype things up out of sour grapes.

Araouzos mentioned, for example, how Charalambous had once been turned down for a job with Helios before actually being hired.

He next questioned the witness’ credibility, wondering why Charalambous flew with Helios just two weeks after the accident.

“Was this trip some kind of reward for the very company you are now accusing?” Araouzos challenged.

“I had just lost my father. I wasn’t in a position to hold anyone responsible. I went [with Helios] for sentimental reasons,” offered Charalambous.

Earlier, Sofia Savvidou, an administrative officer at the Transport Ministry, told the committee of steps taken since the accident to upgrade Civil Aviation, such as the hiring of five extra airplane inspectors.

The last witness of the day was Georgios Michaelides, head of Helios’ Flying Personnel Department. He said that 15 aircrew had resigned from the company since last August’s disaster, but did not have details on these people when asked by the committee.

Michaelides will resume his testimony today.

Last week the committee heard from a former Civil Aviation official and Helios staff. The hearings got under way even as the probe into the causes of the crash has yet to be released.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[ZAGORFLY]

As I wrote one year ago this incident has been an insult to the aviation industry research to the safety.

We all know the danger and the benefits of the high altitude flying and oxygen is there to supply the people during those 20-25 minutes more than enough time necessary to descend 30,000 feet.

Dual oxygen system is fitted on our aircraft to secure the crew segregation with a separate Oxygen supply (if you test properly, as you should, the mask before departure to be sure that the system in operative)

How come that an FMS/Autopilot system that is able to perform an auto land is unable to detect abnormal cabin ALT over and extended logical time? How come we do not have CAB ALT able to deploy PASS OXY at 14,000 automatically that is unable to set a different alarm if the clime continues? That is what I call and insult to this technology design.

How simple to design a software that will “re-clear” the autopilot to descend to safe ALT or to prevent a further climb. This is what I hope to read in the tech magazine or aviation publication. All those unnecessary deaths will be better remembered as contribute of the Aeronautical science.

I am truly amazed and surprised to read that after Golfer Payne and the Cyprus disaster still airplane can’t recover from a dual crew incapacitation.

[big fraidy cat]

Testimony from the Cypriot investigation continues, with the following recap of yesterday's proceedings (from Cyprus Mail online):

‘These people are going to kill us’
By Elias Hazou

A HOST of flight attendants paraded yesterday before the Helios committee of inquiry, some telling harrowing stories of their experiences with the airline, others saying that all was well.

Former stewardess Louiza Polemitou testified that she and her colleagues had a sense of dread whenever their flight came up.

“We flew with out heart in our mouth,” she told the committee.

The crew was particularly concerned about the plane named Olympia, which crashed last August in Grammatikos, outside Athens, killing all 121 onboard.

According to Polemitou, there were frequent instances of ice accumulating on the rear door hatch. And often, the temperature on the plane was not regulated – it was either too cold or too hot.

Once, on an inbound flight from Warsaw, the late co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, who died in the subsequent disaster, got out of his seat and headed to the back of the plane to check.

“After looking at the ice on the hatch, he turned to me and said ominously, ‘These people are going to kill us’,” Polemitou testified.

The aviator was understood to be referring to the company.

Polemitou then recounted what her fianc? Zacharias Herodotou – also a flight attendant at the time – told her about another flight on August 13, 2005, just a day before the tragedy.

It was a Larnaca to Heathrow journey and while on the ground Herodotou noticed a strong smell on board. He asked a mechanic to check it out, and the mechanic found nothing at fault, giving the green light for takeoff.

The mechanic surmised that the smell came from burnt food. But Herodotou had a sneaking suspicion that it was burnt cables.

Polemitou went on to complain of the staff’s treatment by Helios. On the same day the accident happened, she was travelling aboard another plane headed to Scotland. The airline had failed to notify her family about her status, resulting in her relatives frantically trying to reach her on the phone.

“When they finally got through to me, they were beside themselves with worry. They told me what had just happened. I was shocked. I sat down and wept on the plane,” she said.

“I’m ashamed and embarrassed for having worked in this company.”

In response to a question from the committee, Polemitou said that all flight attendants knew the pin-code giving access to the cockpit. This was company policy.

There is a great deal of speculation why flight attendant Andreas Prodromou, the man believed to have tried to fly the doomed plane towards the end, took so long to enter the cockpit.

The hearings continued with the testimony of senior flight attendant Ermis Christodoulou, still employed with Helios. He said that on three flights he had felt nauseous, but other than that nothing out of the ordinary.

Christodoulou had a more subdued take on the situation, saying that the problems occurring on Helios flights were common to all airlines in the world.

But he also said he often heard a whistling sound coming from the plane’s hatch.

Marios Hardjiotis, lawyer for the victims’ relatives, asked Christodoulou whether, in his view, the whistling had anything to do with the crash.

“It’s likely,” offered Christodoulou.

For her part, flight attendant Sofia Raptopoulou said she never experienced problems during flights. She resigned from the company for “psychological reasons”.

Committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis, a former Supreme Court judge, then read out a document stating that 56 flight attendants testified to police about air conditioning problems on the plane, while 35 made no mention of that or any other major problems.

Giorgos Michaelides, head of the Flying Personnel Department at Helios, testified that senior flight attendant Alexia Gerolemou was unpopular with her colleagues, who accused her of “inappropriate behaviour”.

But he added Gerolemou was probably the only flight attendant who bothered to submit memos about flight safety.

For example, she once filed a report about an engineer who was drunk while on duty. In another case, she spoke of certain flight attendants who did not have the necessary knowledge of flight safety issues.

In response to a question from the committee chairman, Michaelides denied that Gerolemou was something of a black sheep in the company because she spoke her mind.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

Helios pilot testifies during the Cypriot inquiry [Cyprus Mail online edition of 7 September]:

‘Pilots wasted time contacting ground’
By Elias Hazou

THE TWO men flying the Olympia shoulder a great deal of the blame for last August’s crash that killed 121 people, a pilot told the Helios committee of inquiry yesterday.

Captain Robert Lascelles, still employed with ajet – the successor airline to Helios – said the pilots of flight ZU522 wasted valuable time in troubleshooting and contacting ground engineers while their plane rapidly lost pressure.

“The first action they should have taken was put on their oxygen masks. It’s also important that you try to control the depressurisation. You need to shut the airflow valve, then switch the decompression system to manual. That way a pilot can control the airflow. Also, you must lower the plane and drop the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin.”

According to Lascelles, the time of useful consciousness (TUC) at 35,000 feet is 12 to 15 seconds. Pilots therefore need to act quickly and bring the aircraft down to 10,000 feet as soon as possible.

TUC is the amount of time an individual is able to perform flying duties efficiently in an environment of inadequate oxygen supply.

In Lascelles’ opinion, instead of contacting the ground, captain Hans-Jurgen Mertin should have automatically gone through the above procedures.

“It’s unusual that they did what they did. Perhaps it was because they were at a high altitide and were feeling the effects of hypoxia,” he said.

“All pilots are trained for a disastrous event at high altitude. If they had done what I just mentioned, the outcome would have been different.”

Lascelles said that in the aviation industry all Boeing 737s are widely known or rumoured to have decompression problems. At the same time though, pilots are specially trained to cope with such hitches.

He cited a personal experience, during an inbound flight fromWarsaw. Lascelles faced a depressurisation problem, but went through the standard steps and landed safely.

Asked by committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis whether he had called engineers for assistance, the aviator replied in the negative.

“The first thing that happens during decompression at a high altitude is that you have intense pain in the ears, frost and moisture on the plane. Simultaneously, the ‘horn’ will sound.”

Lascelles dismissed speculation that an engineer had left the decompression switch on manual before takeoff.

If that were the case, he said, the passengers would have felt unbearable pain in the ears as soon as the engines throttled.

This scenario was therefore an impossibility.

Lascelles informed the committee that there are three types of decompression: explosive, fast and slow. Explosive decompression is the most dangerous, and pilots must react to it “in a split second”.

He was next quizzed about the late captain Mertin, of whom much has been reported in the media.

Lascelles said he had known Mertin while working together with another airline. Mertin was fired at some point for not complying with company protocol.

Apparently the German did not mend his wayward ways after joining Helios.

“They called him in to talk about certain problems and compliance with procedures, but they gave him a last chance. I believe he tried. They told him, ‘one more mistake and you’re out’,” said Lascelles.

He never flew with Mertin at Helios, since both were captains. However, other co-pilots – including Pambos Charalambous – were concerned with doubling up with him.

The next witness of the day was Alexia Gerolemou, formerly a senior flight attendant with Helios Airways.

Gerolemou insisted that recurrent problems in technical checks, staff training and organization were not addressed.

She said that the airline would often leave it to the last minute to fix technical glitches on planes.
The committee also heard yesterday from Christos Neocleous, a lawyer for Libra Holidays Group, owners of the airline.

Neocleous, who played an integral part in the company’s controversial name-change to ajet, rebutted suggestions the airline was cutting costs that affected safety.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[BOAC]

“The first thing that happens during decompression at a high altitude is that you have intense pain in the ears, frost and moisture on the plane. Simultaneously, the ‘horn’ will sound.”

Lascelles dismissed speculation that an engineer had left the decompression switch on manual before takeoff.

If that were the case, he said, the passengers would have felt unbearable pain in the ears as soon as the engines throttled.
- I hope for Captain L's sake that all that is a translation error:confused:

[LNAV VNAV]

I don't think this guy Lascelles knows what he's talking about. If you start the engines, taxi and take off with the Pr mode selector to manual and the outflow valve to, say, half open, how would that cause pain to the passengers??

The outflow valve is normally fully open and closes gradually to almost fully closed position during take off roll.

[Boeingmann]

- I hope for Captain L's sake that all that is a translation error:confused:


I sincerely hope so, if not he should be taken off line flying.

[Midland63]

Relieved about the above reactions! I'm just a piece of SLF following this accident with amateur interest but when I read the bit about how throttling up the engines with the outflow valve would cause the passengers (and presumably the crew as well) unbearable pain I thought "Eh? I obviously know less about this than I thought I did!"

Rgds, Neil

[Strepsils]

and closes gradually to almost fully closed position during take off roll.

Does this happen on the 737 with manual mode selected?

I would expect some discomfort climbing at 3000ft/min unpressurised.

[LNAV VNAV]

Does this happen on the 737 with manual mode selected?

I would expect some discomfort climbing at 3000ft/min unpressurised.


It happens with Pr control mode set to Auto which is the normal setting. If its on manual the outflow valve stays where it was when manual was selected (unless of course it's moved manualy).

[slipperysid]

Think about it LNAV! The Greek investgators have stated that the outflow valve was left in manual, 14.6 degrees open. What will happen after engine start and the packs are put to the Auto postion? I'll tell you what will happen...Greek report out the window and big egg on face!

[BOAC]

The 'awaited' non-normal Checklist revision for Warning Horn activation has been issued by Boeing.

[big fraidy cat]

Continuation of pilot's testimony, plus a few extra bits from the Cyprus Mail online of 8 September:

‘Don’t blame the plane or the co-pilot’
By Constantine Markides

HELIOS airline captain Robert Lascelles yesterday said he believed the blame for the August 14, 2005 Helios crash that killed all 121 passengers and crew on board lay primarily not with the co-pilot, whom he characterised as a “professional”, nor with the actual craft, which he claimed faced no unusual problems, but rather with the captain.

Lascelles, still employed with ajet – the successor airline to Helios – yesterday continued to answer questions posed by the investigative committee and lawyers of the victims’ families.

On Wednesday, captain Robert Lascelles had said that while the plane was rapidly depressurising, the pilots had wasted valuable time troubleshooting and contacting ground engineers.

“The first action they should have taken was put on their oxygen masks,” he said. “It’s also important that you try to control the depressurisation. You need to shut the airflow valve, then switch the decompression system to manual. That way a pilot can control the airflow. Also, you must lower the plane and drop the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin.”

But according to state radio, Lascelles yesterday limited his criticism to Hans-Jurgen Mertin, the German captain of flight ZU522. Lascelles said Mertin was known for his tendency to take unilateral action and may have treated co-pilot Pambos Charlamabous as a steward, ignoring any of his suggestions to deal with the situation differently.

Lascelles had worked together with Mertin at another airline. Mertin was fired at some point for not complying with company protocol but apparently did not mend his wayward ways after joining Helios.

“They called him in to talk about certain problems and compliance with procedures, but they gave him a last chance,” Lascelles said. “I believe he tried. They told him, ‘one more mistake and you’re out’.”

Lascelles never flew with Mertin at Helios, as both were captains. However, other co-pilots, including Charalambous, were concerned with doubling up with him.

Lascelles had only flattering words for Charalambous, calling him a “professional” and “very experienced”.

The British pilot did testify that the airline company pressured personnel to work long hours and imposed financial penalties on staff who called in sick and did not show up to work – although he noted that such penalties were shelved under the new ajet terms of employment.

But he also stated that the upkeep of the craft was “extremely good” and rejected claims that the changes in temperature on the Boeing in question or the fact that there was ice found on the craft door demonstrated its flight unworthiness.
Lascelles said that heating systems in older Boeing 737s are not very good or easily controlled – although he said this was not true of the new line of Boeings – and that technical deficiencies are to be expected on older aircraft.

Former Helios air stewardess Despina Amajouranou, who also testified yesterday, flew 11 times on the Boeing in question. She quit her job because, in her words, she did not want to risk her life to fill someone else’s pocket.

Amajouranou claimed that on August 9, 2005, five days before the fateful crash, the temperature of the Boeing 737’s cabin was very cold and, feeling dizzy, she had to cover herself with a blanket.

She also said that she smelled petrol during another flight and expressed the view that craft problems were not addressed due to their economic cost.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[The AvgasDinosaur]

I watched the reconstruction on TV and have read carefully this thread. Unless I have missed something blindingly obvious. The Greek AF F-16 pilots made clear reference to the passengers wearing o2 masks in flight and rescuers mentioned many of the deceased were still wearing them on the ground. Why do not flight crew masks drop down in the same manner, thus providing an unmistakable visual clue that there is a problem.
Be lucky
David

[BOAC]

TAD - this was the second thread on this accident. The first one was closed and is at http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=185849

You need, unfortunately, to read all of that to answer your question.:eek: - and to get the whole picture.

[Rananim]

Lascelles informed the committee that there are three types of decompression: explosive, fast and slow. Explosive decompression is the most dangerous, and pilots must react to it “in a split second”.



Explosive decomp is the least dangerous as it is not insidious;however,it does require prompt corrrective action,he's right about that.

Lascelles said Mertin was known for his tendency to take unilateral action and may have treated co-pilot Pambos Charlamabous as a steward, ignoring any of his suggestions to deal with the situation differently.


I cant see the First Officer letting the Captain continue the climb if he was aware of the real problem.That would be suicide.Its a good theory but do you know of a pilot who once reprimanded sits there with his hands folded and lets the other guy kill everybody?No,I think its more likely that the co-pilot was trapped in the same mindset as the Captain.

[LNAV VNAV]

Rananim, I totally agree with you. I don't think the copilot ever realized what was happening. In fact I am sure of it. Who would know that the aircraft is not pressurizing and not press the ALT HOLD button??!

I even believe that the copilot just flew the aircraft and took over the ATC without being much involved with what the captain was doing, i.e., talking to the Engineer and trying to pull the Take off config warning cb.

[Dream Buster]

BOAC

I made reference to automatic drop down masks for pilots somewhere in the previous thread, many months ago.

Perhaps you could remind us all of the exact reason as to why they are not used in the critical area of the cockpit?

Many thanks.

:ugh:

[MNBluestater]

Is this considered to be a problem nowdays?? !
If this committee is expecting to learn something by asking cabin crew if they were cold on a flight then God help us here in Cyprus.

I flew B737's in the cabin, occasionally ice would build up on the floor slightly, near the exit doors. However, a whole door covered with ice would be a clue here...

[BOAC]

DB - a question for Boeing, the FAA and CAA? I have very limited commercial jet a/c experience (737) but I am not aware of any such fit? How about the much-loved DC-10?

[LNAV VNAV]

I flew B737's in the cabin, occasionally ice would build up on the floor slightly, near the exit doors. However, a whole door covered with ice would be a clue here...


I don't think so. Even if it was completely covered with ice which I very much doubt, it could just mean that the lagging in the door was not adequate.

[slipperysid]

Just a few points to think about while debating:
1) The Cyprus Mail is well known for it's inaccurate reporting.
2) The quotes attributed are not even close to what was actually said in the inquiry and are therefore not worth debating on this professional forum.
3) The build up of ice was very small and was simply due to the condensation freezing and was nothing but normal.
4) I'm sure all operators of the 733 will testify to the poor temp control of the cabin.
5) Constant interviewing of 21 year old, disgruntled, ex cabin crew is not worth reporting on..unless you are the Cyprus Mail.

Points worth debating:
1) There are grave CRM issues that have come to light that are worth discussing.
2) The report states that the crew started the engines with the outflow valve in manual and it was set and left at 14.6 degrees open. I find this difficult to believe for the following reasons:
a) It would have been noticed on the walkaround
b) It would have been picked up on the checklist
c) The crews attention would have been immediately drawn to the pressurisation panel when the packs were set to Auto after engine start.

I know it is tempting to comment on the Cyprus Mail articles but please try and realise that 90% of it is inaccurate journalistic sensationalism.

[BOAC]

Sid - or anyone - I am not familiar with the full travel of the O V. What does '14.6' represent please?

[slipperysid]

Hi BOAC,

I'm not an engineer but I believe it equates to around 10mm open. I have received verbal reports from an engineer that was present during the test conducted in LTN two days ago that the ROC indicator on the pressurisation panel registered 3,500fpm up when the packs were placed in auto. A Sky news crew filmed the test and it is being presented to the Commission today. As I understand it there was also a noticable pressure fluctuation when the door was closed and when the APU bleed was switched off ( the latter causing a depressurisation). Hard to believe a crew would not have looked at the pressurisation panel after having had their ears tweaked that hard!

[BOAC]

10mm open! To the eye, closed. As you say, that should have alerted the walk-round. It is one of the signs we look for that the aircraft may have been left pressurised in which case it is NOT a good idea to open a door from the outside, especially if the APU has been left running!

Standard overnight security, though, to close it if a/c 'unsecured'.

[LNAV VNAV]

2) The report states that the crew started the engines with the outflow valve in manual and it was set and left at 14.6 degrees open. I find this difficult to believe for the following reasons:
a) It would have been noticed on the walkaround
b) It would have been picked up on the checklist
c) The crews attention would have been immediately drawn to the pressurisation panel when the packs were set to Auto after engine start.

a) It SHOULD have been noticed on the walkaround
b) It SHOULD have been picked up on the checklist
c) The crew's attention SHOULD have been immediately drawn to the pressurisation panel when the packs were set to Auto after engine start.

There have been numerous occasions where switches were not in their normal position but crew failed to spot them. I personally know about 10-12 incidents like this, three of which happened in Cyprus. Also, remember the Aeroperu (I think) accident? That one took off with all the static ports covered with tape. It was night but shouldn't that have been spotted during walk around with a flashlight? There was another accident, don't remember the airline, where the crew didn't set the flap for take off. The config warning was u/s and the aircraft crashed after rotation. So these things happen.

I think the main lesson here is, read the checklist, CHECK THE ITEM, and then say 'check'.

[slipperysid]

Point taken LNAV but for my money a much more plausible scenerio would be that outflow valve was signalled full open on the initial climb out.

[bubbers44]

I have been a pilot doing a ground pressurization check in manual mode. When max diff. is reached the last manual setting on the pressurization system to end the test is whatever it takes to bring the cabin down at a comfortable rate. If the control was forgotten in manual I don't think that setting would blown your ears off on take off like someone suggested. I have had the outflow valve stick closed on take off on the 737 and shut off all the packs to give me time to sort out the problem after making a turn to avoid a thunderstorm.

[Jay Doubleyou]

Rananim,
The answer to your final question is yes, Junior pilots have been known to sit tight where an overbearing, skipper kills them all. Trident accident near Staines, London, about 1976? Two junior FOs didn't challenge the Captain when he stalled the A/C on climb out, then he died of a heart-attack leaving them no time to recover. Details from memory, I haven't read the accident report for many years, so if I'm being too simplistic, I apologise to anyone who knows better.

[TheSailor]

hello,

For Doubleyou.......
http://www.pprune.org/forums/archive/index.php/t-143.html http://smilies.sofrayt.com/%5E/j0/leseratte.gif

Regards. http://photobucket.com/albums/v509/Bebermaur/th_bye.gif

[BOAC]

Once again the thread is drifting off topic and into speculation.

Somewhere, someone SHOULD have the data from the aircraft which will tell WHEN the cabin altitude warning sounded and what height the aircraft was at when this happened. Without this info, speculation on outflow valves, A/G sensor boards and petrified F/Os etc are really meaningless.

Can anyone provide ths data?

I repeat - there are too many 'strange' facets to this accident to make it straightforward. We STILL do not know what caused this accident - over a year on..

[slipperysid]

10,814ft. Still doesn't really help. It depends on whether the outflow valve was left in manual before engine start or was the ouflow valve in Auto and then signalled open ( as has happened before ) in the intial climb?

[TheSailor]

Hello,

We STILL do not know what caused this accident

After read all the related press articles and reports of first earings and the behaviour of the officials and all the ppl's involved ... I'm not sure if we will know one day the real causes....:uhoh:

Regards. http://photobucket.com/albums/v509/Bebermaur/th_bye.gif

[BOAC]

10,814ft. Still doesn't really help. - well, it does, actually - ??if?? we can take that as factual a/c altitude at the time of the warning it does lay a significant number of 'theories' to rest but raises a lot more queries, unfortunately. I have to say that I am more interested in the 'other issues' than why the a/c actually depressurised. Training and drills SHOULD cope with that. The crew reactions and the unexplained physiological events for pax and crew over time are still confusing.

[slipperysid]

Sorry BOAC. I stand corrected 12,400ft. Haven't got the exact no but it's close.

[big fraidy cat]

Two articles in today's Cyprus Mail, with one indicating that the investigation report will be available by the end of this month:

Helios relatives lash out against minister
By Constantine Markides

RELATIVES of the August 14, 2005 Helios plane crash victims yesterday mobbed the Communication Minister’s vehicle outside Parliament, striking the doors and windows with angry calls for his resignation.

The relatives blocked the car at the entrance of the parking lot at Parliament, where Communications Minister Harris Thrassou was to attend a House Communications Committee meeting.

With photos of the plane victims in hand, the relatives attacked the car and, with accusations that he was involved in a cover-up, cried out in chorus for his resignation.
“Murderers, every one of you,” one relative screamed. “We are sad that we are represented by such murderers! The fish stinks from its head!”

Thrassou later said he had been receiving threatening phone calls and has warned that “if anything happens” there would be severe consequences.

But the Minister also said that he wanted to “express his sadness” at the incident that took place with the relatives outside Parliament.

“I understand their bitterness and their sentiments, but these sentiments unfortunately are incited by some who give false information – that supposedly the Minister said that they would be satisfied if they were given some money, that supposedly the Minister has economic relations with the company that is a shareholder in Helios, and much more,” Thrassou said.

“I want to make it clear and declare officially that I never made such statements and neither I nor any of my relatives, at least the immediate ones, have even one stock in the company Libra, which has relations with Helios.”

Thrassou requested that everyone “show responsibility, have patience, and let the procedure run its course,” adding that the report by investigation committee head Akrivos Tsolakis would soon be published.

“If the government does not keep to its promises, then everyone has the right to put forth his critique.”

House Communications Committee head Zacharias Koulias said that the relatives’ pain was “understandable” but said that the problem “would not be solved with such actions”.

Government Spokesman Christodoulos Pashiardis also noted that while the feelings of the relatives was understandable, such violent reactions on their behalf were “incomprehensible and unjustifiable”.

“Such actions neither assist nor speed up the process of locating and assigning blame for those responsible for the tragic crash,” Pashiardis said, adding that Thrasou has the “sensitivity and dignity to dole out responsibilities”.

The spokesman for the Relatives of the Helios Crash Victims Committee, Nicolas Yiasoumis, challenged the Education Minister to name those whom Thrassou alleged were inciting the relatives out of personal interest.

“The only thing inciting us is the desire for justice and for proper punishment so that we don’t have to mourn more dead,” Yiasoumis said.

“It is not the relatives who crashed the plane; it is not the relatives who employ people with deficiencies; it is not the relatives who work in flawed procedures and attitudes that are condemned by the EU but are not addressed.”

The Tsolakis report on the crash investigation is expected to be released to the public at the end of the month.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

-------------------------------------------------------

Ajet hits back at safety slur
By Elias Hazou

THE successor airline to Helios, ajet yesterday hit back at reports that it ran the risk of being placed on the EU’s list of banned air carriers.

Last week Politis leaked a document indicating that EASA (the European Aviation Safety Agency) voiced grave concerns with Cyprus’ progress in air safety matters.

On July 19 the European Commission sent a letter to Civil Aviation, asking that the shortcomings with air safety be urgently addressed. Cypriot authorities responded on August 4, but their arguments were not considered satisfactory.

EASA officials then carried out an on-site inspection in Cyprus to review the status on the island. In a report compiled shortly after, they concluded that Civil Aviation had still failed to comply with around two-thirds of EASA’s recommendations.

The document, entitled “Mission Report,” reads:

“The report of a second follow-up visit by EASA to Cyprus on August 7-9, shows that 19 (2/3) of the previous findings are still open - all of which – directly concern the performance of the Cyprus-CAA. CAA Cyprus shows that it does not comply not only with EC rules but also with JAA requirements (JAR-OPS and JAR -FCL part of – future EU OPS).

“With regard to ajet (ex-Helios), the August-report continues to display very worrying safety deficiencies, prompting EASA to again emphasis the very urgent need for corrective actions to be taken, and for CAA Cyprus to take the necessary measures commensurate with its responsibility for the safety oversight of this carrier.”

It then featured a warning from Daniel Calleja Crespo, the European Commission’s Director of Air Transport.

“M. Calleja explained that in these circumstances, unless the COM [European Commission] received urgently clear proof of progress having been made in the rectification of these serious safety issues, the COM would proceed with:

- Pursuing infraction procedures vis-?-vis Cyprus;
- Submit the case of ajet to the attention of the next Air Safety Committee meeting (October) for possible inclusion in the EC list of banned air carriers (‘blacklist’).”

Although the wording was sinister, Civil Aviation has played the matter down; in a statement released over the weekend, it said the “open findings” referred to by EASA did not constitute flagrant violations of air safety standards.

The Mail yesterday contacted EASA’s offices in Germany for more details, but was referred to the European Commission.

It was not possible to get an immediate comment from the Commission’s Air Transport Department.

The contact at EASA did confirm, however, that no European air carrier is currently on the blacklist. The list includes some 90 airlines from African countries, such as the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and others such as Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Afghanistan.

Back in Cyprus, ajet yesterday said it would be demanding from EASA that it withdraw its comments.

The airline also wants the organisation to investigate how the leak occurred in the first place.

“Such statements are entirely misleading, may constitute libel, are danger-mongering and clearly fabrications aimed at influencing and discouraging the public from flying,” read ajet’s statement.
According to the company, during a surprise inspection last May EASA officials made “minor observations relating mostly to documentation. It is worth mentioning that none of their observations concerned flight safety issues.”

ajet said it was taking steps to become the first Cypriot airline to fully comply with IATA (International Air Transport Association) safety standards, which are stricter than those required by JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities).

“To ajet, passenger safety is paramount. It is the cornerstone of our activities,” concluded the statement.



Mission Report

ECAC 55th DGCA Special Meeting

Wroclaw, 31.08 - 02.09.2006


Cyprus

In the presence of P. Goudou (EASA), the Commission met with Mr. L. Leonidou (Director General Civil Aviation - Cyprus)

M. Calleja expressed the serious preoccupation of the COM both with regard to the Cypriot carrier- A-Jet (ex-Helios) as well as with the CAA of Cyprus itself, going on to highlight the following points:

- Following in-depth safety related analysis of the very preoccupying situation on both accounts (CAA and Helios/A-Jet) emanating from the JAA-EASA Joint Standardisation inspections carried out in October 2005 and May 2006 (first follow-up) respectively, the COM had sent a warning letter (before a formal notice) on 19 July 2006 asking strongly for resolution and closure of all findings on all accounts (civil aviation authority and Helios/A Jet). Cyprus authorities replied on 4 August 2006, which reply, the COM does not consider adequate in addressing any of the points raised in its original letter of 19 July.
- The report of a second follow-up visit by EASA to Cyprus on 7-9 August, shows that 19 (2/3) of the previous findings are still open - all of which – directly concern the performance of the Cyprus-CAA. CAA Cyprus shows that it does not comply not only with EC rules but also with JAA requirements (JAR-OPS and JAR -FCL part of – future EU OPS).
- With regard to A-Jet (ex-Helios), the August-report continues to display very worrying safety deficiencies, prompting EASA to again emphasis the very urgent need for corrective actions to be taken, and for CAA Cyprus to take the necessary measures commensurate with its responsibility for the safety oversight of this carrier.
M. Calleja explained that in these circumstances, unless the COM received urgently clear proof of progress having been made in the rectification of these serious safety issues, the COM would proceed with:
- Pursuing infraction procedures vis-?-vis Cyprus;
- Submit the case of A-Jet to the attention of the next Air Safety Committee meeting (October) for possible inclusion in the EC list of banned air carriers (‘blacklist’).

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[LNAV VNAV]

Anyone knows what this means?

Pursuing infraction procedures vis-?-vis Cyprus;

[big fraidy cat]

Continuing testimony from the Cypriot investigation per today's Cyprus Mail:


‘Media are distorting Helios proceedings’
By Constantine Markides

HELIOS employees are being intimidated and the mass media are giving distorted coverage of the Helios crash trial proceedings, a Helios lawyer told the committee of inquiry looking into the causes behind the August 14, 2005 crash of the Boeing plane near Athens that killed all 121 passengers and crew on board.

The court proceedings are taking place against a background of media speculation and mounting public frustration at the slowness of the process, with the relatives of the crash victims accusing authorities of dragging out the process to evade doling out responsibilities.

On Tuesday, relatives of the Helios victims blocked Communication Minister Harris Thrassou’s car outside Parliament and proceeded to pound on his vehicle and hurl abuse at him.

Thrassou was trapped in the vehicle for about 15 minutes as the angry relatives, who were finally restrained by police, accused him of a cover-up and called for his resignation.

The incident is indicative of the mounting ire towards public officials involved with civil aviation, as well as with Helios (now called ‘ajet’) staff.

Helios lawyer Demetris Araouzos told the court that some people “feel that they are not receiving fair treatment in this whole situation”, which he said had its roots in faulty coverage by journalists.

Araouzos said there were many examples of “statements that are erroneously conveyed or exaggerated or distorted”, which he said has resulted in the common harrasment and intimidation of Helios employees.

He gave one example of an Helios employee who was harangued in court despite having nothing to do with the Helios air crash, adding that many other employees “feel intimidated by the procedure and by the mass media’s video coverage, which is not the most pleasant thing”.

Committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis said that the video cameras are only in place for the initial stages, not the entire hearing, and that the witnesses are offered police protection.

“I am in no position and do not have the authority to judge or silence the press,” Kallis said.

Kallis also rejected Araouzos’ request that the committee consider testimonies of individuals living abroad by using teleconferencing.

Kallis noted that only through the live presence of a witness is it possible to evaluate one’s behaviour and attitude, adding that in-court attendance is an unwavering requirement under Cypriot law.

A former member of the Supreme Court, Kallis was sworn in as a member of the independent committe of inquiry on May 24, 2006.

Air consultant questioned again

During court testimonies, Helios lawyer Demetris Araouzos cross-examined Marios Pantelis, consultant inspector of airworthiness in Civil Aviation.

In response to questions, Pantelis said that until the August 14 crash, Civil Aviation had not found anything to justify suspending the airworthiness certificate of the Boeing in question or that of any other Helios aircraft.

Pantelis also said that to his knowledge Civil Aviation did not give preferential treatment to Helios airlines.

Pantelis said that the plane had been inspected on November 9 and 10 of 2004, as well as on June 8 and 9 of 2005, just over two months before its fatal flight.

Pantelis and a colleague had traveled to Munich, Germany in April 2005 to carry out checks on the fateful plane, during which a licence was granted for the aircraft to be registered in Cyprus.

The consultant had previously testified before the committee that although it had been determined that there were eight problems that needed to be fixed, the eight points did not concern air safety.

The committee had also heard that although the eight problems that had to be fixed were classified as level 1 – needing immediate repair – they were later downgraded to level 2 problems so that Helios would have sufficient time to address them.

Pantelis had said that Civil Aviation took no action against Helios when it did not meet the deadlines to comply with its air safety obligations because employees at the Department for Air Safety were undergoing training at the time and therefore lacked the knowledge and experience to question the foreign consultants who had suggested Helios should maintain its airworthiness certificate.

When Kallis asked whether it was proper procedure for Civil Aviation to accept the suggestions and advice of British experts without question and without delving further into the relevant issues, Panteli said that in many of the instances it was correct, although not in others.

The relatives of the Helios victims are expecting that the Kallis commission will name those involved in the tragedy so that the Attorney General can bring criminal liability charges against them.

In light of the recent mobbing of the Communication Minister’s limousine, fears exist that the relatives might respond more violently if the committee does not approprtion blame on any individuals.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

From today's Cyprus Mail:

Plane addressed problems

IN AN article on the ongoing local Helios investigation yesterday, we mentioned that consultants had identified eight problems with the Helios plane.

Helios lawyer Demetris Araouzos told the Cyprus Mail yesterday that Civil Aviation had in fact cleared the eight problems that consultants found had to be fixed with the downed plane before the plane flew any commercial flights,.

Araouzos said that although the airworthiness certificate had been issued, the plane was not included in the AOC (Air Operator Certificate) until the eight points had been cleared in April 2004 upon delivery of the airplane from Germany. A plane cannot fly commercial flights if it has not been added to the AOC

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[airsnoop]

You may not have seen this on another thread so here it is again

It has been widely leaked that the investigation found that the engineer who did preflight maintenance left the press mode selector in Manual with the main OFV about 14deg from closed. There was no evidence to support this and the implication is that the accident was all his fault. Since when has it been the engineers responsibility to set up the flight deck in a "pleasing and eye catching manner" for flight!

The crew had to miss the almost closed OFV and the selector and the green light and the violent pressure fluctuations that would occur from door closed to post engine start when the aircraft would pressurise to about 1.2 psi predeparture!

There is a video of a reconstruction of this at - https://secure.ajet.com/Ajet_complete.wmv - which shows that it is highly unlikely that the engineer left the selector in Manual with the OFV almost closed. Unfortunately the whole report is based on this assumption so maybe that's the delay.
Probably why the report is still not out!

[ATC Watcher]

From today's Cyprus Mail:

Helios lawyer Demetris Araouzos told the Cyprus Mail yesterday that Civil Aviation had in fact cleared the eight problems that consultants found had to be fixed with the downed plane before the plane flew any commercial flights,.



Pardon my question, but I have difficulty in understanding the meaning of " cleared" here .
Did CCAA fixed (on paper?) the 8 problems it or did they waived the requirements ?

[airsnoop]

It may be of interest to you that the aircraft held a valid C of A and there were no deferred defects. Also the crew was licensed and qualified, held valid medicals, were adequately rested and flight and duty time were in accordance with requirements.
Also there were only four minor and insignificant items outstanding from the July audit which was overseen by UK CAA.
Can't do a lot better than that can you.

[GroundBound]

An interesting video - and quite significant to the whole incident I would think.

Also, thoughout this thread, I don't remember any crew mentioning the pressure fluctuations during start-up and ground ops.

Any flight crew care to comment on its veracity?

GB

[great expectations]

Thought it was a bit of a nonsense until i watched the video to be honest. Im qualified on type but obviously as a line pilot Ive never actually started the engines with the pressurisation in manual and the outflow valve closed so I cant be sure, however it does make sense. Certainly during normal ops you'd notice no pressurisation change during those phases and the gauge changes that were pointed out would have for sure been picked up, that sort of non normal activity would not go unnoticed by any pilot in the right hand seat below the panel. It would however have been different had the switch been left in manual and the outflow valve open.:oh:
I have and many others also have come to a cold aeroplane early morning after its been in the hangar only to find switches are not in the correct positions for flight departure when the engineers have been tinkering away. Im not sure it says anywhere that they have to returnt the switches to positions appropriate for our operation......? Its our job I would argue to make sure the switches are in correct positions, not theirs.

[LNAV VNAV]

It would however have been different had the switch been left in manual and the outflow valve open

That's right: Switch the packs on with the outflow valve closed and you probably get to the point where the relief valves have to open to let the air out and get large variations in pressure.

Switch the packs on with outflow valve open or nearly open and nothing will happen. No change in pressure at all.

[big fraidy cat]

Continuation of testimony in the Cypriot investigation from today's Cyprus Mail:

Civil aviation ‘was warned of looming air disaster’

THE committee of inquiry into last year’s Helios plane crash yesterday heard experts had warned the Civil Aviation department that it suffered from serious weaknesses and deficiencies and said that if they were not addressed an air disaster was forthcoming.

Committee president Panayiotis Kallis presented a letter dated October 12, 2003 – almost two years before the fateful August 14 crash near the town of Grammatiko in Greece which killed all 121 passengers on board – sent by British civil aviation advisor Andrew Varley to the Cyprus civil aviation department outlining six points that needed to be addressed regarding flight safety.

The committee heard that Varley’s letter had been a clear warning that an aviation accident was looming. The same letter also called for the Communications Ministry to be informed of the situation and that the necessary improvement measures had to be taken.
CyBC reported that according to Varley’s letter, aircraft on the island’s registry which were based abroad posed one of the main dangers because the civil aviation department could not inspect safety measures involving these aircraft. The aviation expert also said the Cyprus registry was mostly made up of aircraft from foreign aviation companies and stressed the need for resources for suitable supervisions or an amendment to the legislation so that the specific practice was prevented.

Meanwhile civil aviation Flight Safety Unit head Andreas Patsallides’ testimony was also concluded during yesterday’s hearing.

Patsallides said he himself was particularly strict with Helios insofar as its obligations were concerned. When Kallis asked why he hadn’t lodged these serious warnings in the official documents, Pastallides explained that the observations were made as a way of applying pressure and not officially recorded.

The inquiry proceedings will continue today.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

More testimony from the Cypriot investigation [from today's Cyprus Mail]:

Helios safety concerns were not addressed until too late
By Elias Hazou

FINDINGS that raised security concerns for the downed Helios jet were not addressed until after it was too late, the committee of inquiry into the air disaster heard yesterday.

Most of these findings were established by Jim Taylor, a British flight operations advisor for local Civil Aviation.

And although these deficiencies aboard the plane were first noted in July 2004, it took Civil Aviation eight months to carry out an inspection and take corrective measures.

However, these deficiencies should have been dealt with forthwith.

Worse, a subsequent handwritten note by Taylor is the only documentation proving that an inspection of the aircraft took place in March 2005.

The flight operations inspection in March came up with even more problems, which under normal aviation procedures should have been addressed from one to three weeks later.

But the pattern was repeated, with a follow-up inspection scheduled for September 2005 – after the crash.

Committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis asked witness Fotis Michael, an inspector with Civil Aviation, whether Taylor’s findings were directly relevant to flight safety.

Michael said some were indeed pertinent, others would be under certain circumstances, while the rest were not relevant at all.

A day earlier, the committee learned that other British aviation experts had repeatedly warned of impending doom unless Civil Aviation took steps to improve its safety standards and overall operation.

And Andreas Paspallides, head of Civil Aviation’s Flight Safety Unity, testified that though he was strict in his periodic evaluations of the department, he did not log his observations.

Served almost on a daily basis, examples such as these have reinforced the public perception of a shambolic Civil Aviation department cutting corners wherever it could.

Meanwhile Phileleftheros reported yesterday that a report prepared by SH&E was never forwarded to the appropriate persons so that action might be taken.

SH&E is a private air transport consultancy firm hired by the government late last year to conduct a “diagnostic report” on the state of Civil Aviation and suggest corrective measures.

Whereas the American company did establish serious weaknesses, the findings were deemed “classified” and shown only to the director of Civil Aviation and top-level officials there. The report never trickled down to the executive level, ostensibly for fear of leaks to the press.

SH&E was invited to carry out the report by President Papadopoulos personally while on a trip to the United States. That alone raised a few eyebrows, but Phileleftheros asked yesterday why hundreds of thousands of pounds were spent so that a report could then be filed away in a cabinet.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

More testimony from the Cypriot investigation, per the Cyprus Mail today:

US air consultants say role was misrepresented
By Elias Hazou

SH&E, an air transport consultancy firm tasked with carrying out a diagnostic report for Civil Aviation, yesterday said that reports that the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) had raised doubts over its services were misstated.

In early September, local press reports indicated that EASA had criticised the government’s hiring of services from SH&E. This was part of a broader story – based on a leaked EASA mission report – that the European Commission was considering taking infraction procedures against Cyprus’ Civil Aviation and perhaps blacklisting Helios Airways, now ajet.

But the New York-based consultants, said that EASA had “misunderstood the contractual relationships between SH&E and the UK CAA and the Cyprus DCA [Department of Civil Aviation].

“Accordingly, the remarks concerning SH&E that were reportedly made in the EASA-JAA 10.2005 CY Follow Up Report (Annex 1), under item CY 2462, are incorrect. As noted above, SH&E did not offer nor was it contracted by the Cyprus DCA to provide the technical assistance and support services currently provided by the UK CAA. It is the services provided by the UK CAA that were the subject of the remarks reportedly made by the EASA-JAA. We have made EASA/JAA aware of this delineation.”

The Mail had also reprinted reports that questions were raised over whether SH&E was qualified to work with Cyprus aviation authorities, given it is based in the US and employs American air safety standards.

“The second misstatement concerns SH&E’s qualifications to conduct the work that it is performing. SH&E is one of the world’s largest aviation consulting firms. It is known for its work in aviation safety where amongst other credentials, is an accredited Audit Organisation within the IATA Operational Safety Audit Programme,” the company said.

“SH&E’s work within the region and worldwide is consistent with our international expertise and depth of knowledge of ICAO, EASA/JAA and other regulatory standards.”

The Mail yesterday contacted Louis Sorrentino, Senior Vice President and Managing Director of SH&E’s International Safety, Security and Operations Practice.

Sorentino said SH&E had played a major part in helping Greece return to its status as a Category 1 country, an important safety designator, by July 2005.

He confirmed, though, that the diagnostic report prepared for Cyprus Civil Aviation was confidential.

And he debunked local speculation that his company’s findings had been filed away, never to be acted on.

“Our collaboration [with Civil Aviation] is ongoing, and action is being taken on our recommendations as we speak. We are still providing advisory services.

“I can assure you that Cyprus will come out strong from this collaboration,” he added.

Sorentino did not wish to comment on reports that President Papadopoulos personally interceded so that SH&E would be contracted by Civil Aviation.

Civil Aviation’s co-operation with the American firm came about in the wake of last August’s air disaster amid growing press reports that Civil Aviation was incapable of performing its duties as a regulatory authority.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[airsnoop]

As far as we know the accident has not been attributed in any way to the condition of the aircraft or a technical problem - however, we do know that the aircraft had a valid C of A and carried no deferred defects - can't do much better than that.

[slipperysid]

No Helios crew refused to fly on the aircraft. DBY had NO ADD's the day of the crash and hardly any before that. It was an ex DBA aircraft and had been well maintained. The cabin crew that have given statements that are quoted in the Cyprus Mail are all ex cabin crew. One or two of them were even sacked before DBY arrived at Helios. As I've said before 90% of the Cyprus Mail is total fiction. There are no laws in Cyprus to stop the press printing whatever they like:ugh:

[airsnoop]

Well spoken that man:D The aircraft was a good one and it's pressure integrity was as good as they come. Let's put that at rest at least!

[Rananim]

just sounds funny to me that Helios crewmembers refused to fly on this particular aircraft more than once before the accident happenend.
Must be a kind of reason behind

If you take into consideration that Cyprus is a small island and that this was their first major crash,all the diversionary hysteria that we see is understandable.
The crash a/c was A OK according to reliable sources.It was an older generation aircraft as opposed to the 2 -800's which made up the rest of the Helios fleet at the time of the crash and so its air-conditioning system was far inferior and its galleys less salubrious.This may have reinforced any perceived shortcomings that the flt attendants may have had about 5B-DBY.Also there was the rapid depressurization on the Warsaw flight which helped label it as a 'problem' aircraft.
The official investigation will steer well clear of all this clutter and hopefully address far more burning issues such as:
-the design of the cabin altitude warning system;the crash of 522 was preceded by many incidents where flt crew were 'puzzled' as to just which warning they were facing.
-the effect,if any,of the new Boeing procedures;how did 2 experienced crew members miss the incorrect setting of the pressurization mode selector?522 occurred just at the time of the changeover from old to new.
-use of checklists;the new procedures have the skipper responding to oxygen,windows,parking brake,instruments,MCP and V speeds on the before start.The first officer reads and responds to the remaining items including pressurization mode selector....
-design of master caution system;essentially its a good system I think but inferior to EICAS of course.The annunciation OVHD relates to several items located on the AFT overhead panel,including the activation(manual or automatic) of the Passenger oxygen system.The passenger oxygen activation should not share a master caution annunciation with items such as PMC and flight recorder.The risk of 'masking' is too great.
-flt crew's use of master caution system;3 basic principles:a)acknowledge the source and call for the checklist when flightpath is under control b)reset the system c)prioritize ie,if you get an equip cooling and a passenger oxygen at the same time,know which one to work first....
-mindset;are crews trained sufficiently to recognize it in themselves?Its an absolute killer.
-hypoxia;traditionally the rapid decompression is the only scenario that is hammered home in the sim.The 522 scenario is far more lethal.
-CRM;the flt deck is not a democracy but the Captain must encourage and listen to any advice offered by the first officer.The press reported dissension between the crew members of 522 and I dont know how true this was.Crews must never let personal feelings invade the flt deck.
-flt crew/flt attendant interaction;part of CRM and an important part.Why did the flt attendants seemingly not know how to enter the flt deck?
-over-reliance on SOP's;some crews think SOP's will still save them.They wont.They provide a structure for normal operations.When the chips are down,a crew must think for themselves and be prepared to improvise.

[slipperysid]

'If you take into consideration that Cyprus is a small island and that this was their first major crash,all the diversionary hysteria that we see is understandable.'

I agree with everything else in your post apart from your first statement. The press in any country have a duty to report accurately and without bias. The reporting in the Cyprus Mail and a few other papers is verging on 'dangerous' (as the Minister of Transport will testify!). Feelings are naturally running high without the media adding to it and whipping up the population into a vendetta campaign that is based on outright lies and distortion. There has been no effort on the part of the press to report the truth. I find it very distasteful to say the least and I wouldn't be surprised if somebody doesn't get hurt soon as a direct result.

Other than that Rananim it's an excellent post. As well as all your points, that you have raised, I'd also like to see an investigation into the amount of decompressions that have occurred on the 300/400/500 due to the outflow valve being signaled full open. These decompressions also occur with no indications other than the Altitude Warning Horn. I know of at least 5 at 3 different operators and all in the last 3 years. (Not including the Dec Helios one) It is relevant here because if it is proved that the outflow valve was not left in Manual, as has been reported, what else could have occurred? Could the outflow valve have been signaled open at 12,000ft? The investigation should be looking at all the possible scenarios and not just trying to make one idea fit at all cost. Investigations are just not that simple and I think this is where the Greek Investigation wiil fall foul.

[LNAV VNAV]

just sounds funny to me that Helios crewmembers refused to fly on this particular aircraft more than once before the accident happenend.
Must be a kind of reason behind ...


This is the kind of talk one would expect to read in newspapers. All pilots know that:

a) If a captain does not accept an aircraft as servicable, the aircraft is either AOG according to MEL or has defects that are acceptable according to MEL but the captain does not accept them anyway. In the latter case they are either fixed or possibly but rarely a captain that accepts them is found to fly the aircraft.

b) The cabin crew (and I say this with total respect for their job), have no idea whatsoever whether an aircraft has defects or not or would understand the seriousness of defects (unless these defects are ovens, IFE, cabin lights, etc) and the fact that all the newspapers on the island are quoting cc saying that they were cold or hot on flights or that they were worried about flying with any certain aircraft would make me laugh if it hadn't made me angry.

c) unless an aircraft has a problem with its structural integrity (for example the Aloha airlines aircraft), any statement of the sort 'this aircraft is unsafe' is nonsense. An aircraft is AOG until any unacceptable defects are fixed and then it is as good as any.



I wrote it many times in the past and I am writing it again now: This accident did not happen because of technical problems. It was purely human factors that caused it. This committee that has invited all ex Helios cabin crew to say whether they saw ice on the doors or whether they were cold on the flights should be focusing on other issues like the training program of the company for example or Engineering checklists for pressurization tests.

I don't believe that the outflow valve was signaled open. The aircraft had undergone a pressurization test the night before and it seems much more logical that the pressurization control selector was left on manual. When two explanations exist for the same problem, the simpler one is most probably correct.
The fact that it was missed by the pilots is not at all surprising. Pilots have departed on numerous occasions with the pack switches 'Off', so why couldn't this have happened as well?

[slipperysid]

LNAV Have a look at the video on the Tech Log Forum. Can't see it being left in Manual at 14.6 degrees open as stated in the report. I understand that there is a rethink underway and the report will be further delayed. The pressurisation test was done to check the integrity of the door seals.

[airsnoop]

Agree with a lot of what you say but departing with the packs off is only one oversight and the system would be in AUTO with the OFV fully open from the time the flight crew took over the aircraft.
In the accident scenario, it is said that the selector was in MANual and the OFV almost fully closed. If this was the situation when the flight crew took over the aircraft, the Captain, on his walkround, would have had to miss the closed OFV and the FO, on his flight deck prep, would have had to miss the selector in MANual and the green caption above it. Both crew would have had to miss the significant pressure fluctuations that would have happened from doors closed to taxi.
Both crew members would have had to have missed the selector/green caption in the various post start pressurisation checks.
Then the crew misidentified the cabin alt warning etc etc
Too many oversights by a very experienced crew for my liking!
The problem for the Investigation is that everything has so far been based on this hypothesis - but without it there is NO REPORT and they have to start again from scratch:eek:

[LNAV VNAV]

Agree with a lot of what you say but departing with the packs off is only one oversight and the system would be in AUTO with the OFV fully open from the time the flight crew took over the aircraft.
In the accident scenario, it is said that the selector was in MANual and the OFV almost fully closed. If this was the situation when the flight crew took over the aircraft, the Captain, on his walkround, would have had to miss the closed OFV and the FO, on his flight deck prep, would have had to miss the selector in MANual and the green caption above it. Both crew would have had to miss the significant pressure fluctuations that would have happened from doors closed to taxi.
Both crew members would have had to have missed the selector/green caption in the various post start pressurisation checks.
Then the crew misidentified the cabin alt warning etc etc
Too many oversights by a very experienced crew for my liking!
The problem for the Investigation is that everything has so far been based on this hypothesis - but without it there is NO REPORT and they have to start again from scratch
'Missing' the pressurization control switch in the manual position would me far easier than 'missing' the packs in the off position. Pilots move the pack switches during preparation and are thus more likely to check them during the checklist. Yet pilots have taken off with the pack switches OFF even though they were specifically mentioned in the checklist, i.e., 'PACKS AND ISOLATION VALVE----AUTO'.
The pr. control mode selector was not mentioned in the checklist at the time.
The green light is very easy to miss especially during daylight.
Missing the outflow valve position is also easy even if a walkaround was actually done.
The crew did misidentify the cabin altitude warning, probably thinking that it was a false configuration warning. If they hadn't misidentified it they would have stopped climbing!
I saw the video and I don't believe that the valve was closed to such an extent that significant pressure could built up in the aircraft, that one's ears would be affected. If it were closed to such an extend the aircraft WOULD pressurise and we wouldn't be talking about this today.

[big fraidy cat]

Here's a bit of a hodge-podge from today's Cyprus Mail online edition:

Ajet banned from landing in fog
By Elias Hazou

AJET – formerly Helios Airways – has been barred from landing in fog, after authorities deemed the airline could not guarantee safety in such conditions.
This was confirmed yesterday by Civil Aviation director Leonidas Leonidou, who said the airline’s licence to land in low-visibility conditions – known as Cat II & III – had been revoked as of last week.

The story was broken by daily Phileleftheros, which said that the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) had arrived at the same conclusion during an inspection last May.
According to the paper, the airline lacked the adequate equipment, pilot training and experience to prove it could operate its jets in fog.

Phileleftheros said that next week officials would be traveling to Brussels to talk the European Commission out of placing Cyprus’ Civil Aviation on a blacklist.
The revelation came hot on the heels that Civil Aviation did not brief the local Air transport Accident and Investigations Branch (AIB) that a crack formed in the cockpit window of a plane run by ajet – formerly Helios airlines – on May 21, forcing the pilot to make an emergency landing at Manchester Airport.

Meanwhile Haravghi reported yesterday that the Greek team of experts investigating last August’s crash had concluded pilot error was the primary cause of the accident.
The team, headed by Akrivos Tsolakis, zeroed in on the aviators’ failure to carry out a checklist during flight or take the proper action when the decompression sounded.
Secondary causes included Civil Aviation’s long-term deficiencies, dating back to at least 1996.
Tsolakis’ finished report is expected sometime in the next few weeks.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[airsnoop]

It is agreed that each individual item is easily missed by each individual but it is the combination of oversights that is unlikely. Add to this in the same sequence with the same system, a very experienced eng has to deviate from the usual practice and it becomes, I think, very unlikely.
Re the video, the accident aircraft did partially pressurise to a differential of just over 1 psi - the reconstruction flight stabilised at just over 1 psi with the same setting as the video test where the cabin stabilised at just over 1 psi diff with the OFV posn as recorded on NVM and as found at impact so it looks pretty reasonable and a side test has shown that the fluctuations are very noticeable even with it twice that far open.

[LNAV VNAV]

Well, I guess we'll soon find out. I hear that Tsolakis will be in Cyprus next week to deliver the report to the Cyprus Accident investigation committee.

[big fraidy cat]

Update on Cyprus investigation and Tsolakis' report [from the Cyprus Mail online edition for today]:

Local Helios commission suspends hearings pending Tsolakis report

THE COMMISSION of Inquiry into the causes of the Helios air crash suspended its hearings yesterday ahead of the publication of the final report on the causes of the crash.

The announcement was made by Commission chair Panayiotis Kallis, noting that the first round of witnesses who were invited to testify was completed.

He also said that the Commission will continue with the second round of testimonies once it examines the report of the Greek Air Accident and Incidents Investigating Committee which is chaired by Akrivos Tsolakis. The report is expected to be made public this week.

Meanwhile, during yesterday’s proceedings, the Commission heard that the German captain who flew the Helios Boeing which crashed at the Grammatikos site near Athens on 14 August 2005 killing all 121 people on board, had problems in 2004 in implementing the aircraft’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

However, the he had adjusted by 2005 and implemented the company’s SOPs.

Pilot Marios Ioannou said that Hans Jeurgen Merten was a “good captain and knew the aircraft”.

However, Kallis who heads the independent commission presented a written note by the company’s British pilot Robert Lascelles which said that Ioannou was one of the co-pilots who did not want to fly with Merten, something which Ioannou rejected.

Replying to a question by Helios’s lawyer Demetris Araouzos, Ioannou said that SOPs differ from company to company and time is allowed for training the pilots who will work on contract in a company so they will become familiar with the procedures.

Sotiris Nicolaou, who worked as pilot at Helios from May 2004 until February 2006, said he had no communication problems with Merten and problems in keeping the SOPs stopped in 2005.
Co-pilot Stelios Mavrogenis, who also worked for Helios during the same period with Nicolaou, said Merten had problems in implementing the SOPs because he was working on contract but underlined he never felt unsafe while flying with him.

Asked what kind of problems Merten had, Mavrogenis cited an instance when Merten had exceeded the speeding limit as they were landing, pulled the air brakes, the use of which is not indicated below a certain altitude and as a result the plane started shaking.

Mavrogenis said he wrote to Helios about these problems and the chief pilot talked to Merten about the incident, noting that in 2005 the German captain had improved as far as the SOPs were concerned.

Co-pilot Lazaros Katsouromallis who works for Helios since 2004 said that he flew with the ill-fated plane on a number of occasions and never had any problem. He also said he had a good cooperation and communication with Merten.

On August 14 2005, an Helios Airways Boeing 737, on its way to Prague via Athens, crashed into the mountain side north of the Greek capital killing all 121 passengers and crew on board, most of them Cypriot holidaymakers.

Former member of the Supreme Court Panayiotis Kallis was sworn in on 24 May 2006 as the member of the independent Commission of Inquiry that will fully look into the causes of the air crash.

The Kallis Commission is expected to name those involved in the tragedy so that the Attorney General can bring criminal liability charges against them.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[airsnoop]

The Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Panayiotis Kallis, has been suspended ahead of the publication of the Greek AAI & ASB Final Report that is expected to be made public this week. Once it has been examined by the Commission, the inquiry will continue, and I understand that this second phase will be based on the information contained in the Final Report.
The stated purpose of the Kallis Commission is to name those responsible for the tragedy so that the Attorney General can bring criminal liability charges against them.
The Kallis Inquiry has already introduced parts of the confidential Draft Report into the public domain and now the Final Report is to be used.
ICAO Annex 13, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, states that the “sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.”
A clear warning is given that records made during an investigation include information given voluntarily by persons interviewed and that this information could be “utilised inappropriately for subsequent disciplinary, civil, administrative and criminal proceedings.”
The consequence of using the Final Report as a basis to establish criminal liability is that vital information may, in the future, not be openly disclosed to air saftey investigators, and the lack of access to such information could impede the investigation process and seriously affect flight safety worldwide.
A very dangerous precedent.

[130.4]

Hi,

This is my first post on this forum (so please excuse my mistakes), though I've been reading this thread, and the previous one, with interest ever since the accident happened. As there hasn't been a post for a couple of days, I thought I'd contribute something.

Today's Phileleftheros, the Greek-language Cypriot daily newspaper, has an article titled "There were eight causes in the Grammatikos tragedy" and subtitled "What the Tsolakis Report says." This was also reported on London Greek Radio this morning.

It says Tsolakis will deliver the Final Report in Greece and Cyprus on Tuesday. The Phileleftheros claims to reveal the eight causes in the article. Four of the mentioned causes were labelled "active" and the other four "latent." The "active" causes, according to the paper, were identified as the joint responsibility between the ground engineers and the flight crew for the outflow valve remaining in manual, the incorrect reaction to alarm signals, the procedures for the crew, and the communication between flight crew and cabin crew.

For the "latent" causes the newspaper says the blame lies on the Cyprus Department of Civil Aviation for "seriously insufficient monitoring" by , Helios for "shortages" (presumably of staff?), and what surprised me was that even Boeing was blamed, for "failing to take corrective measures" for problems it already knew about, as well as JAA, ICAO and EASA, which "knew but tolerated" the situation with serious problems in the Dept. of Civil Aviation and the aviation industry in Cyprus.

What I don't get is how the newspaper claims to know the causes identified in the report, when it says in the same paragraph that the report is not going to be published until Tuesday. It also suddens me to see that the article just talks about blame, instead of what can be done to avoid similar accidents. I hope the actual Report won't be as bad as this newspaper article makes it out to be.

[130.4]

Yesterday I wrote:

> Four of the mentioned causes were labelled "active" and the other four "latent."

That was a poor translation. Of course, what I meant was "direct" and "indirect" causes.

[airsnoop]

Well we will all know by Wednesday morning. The various leaks about the content of the Final Report give credibility to an excellent quote I saw recently:

“I'm not sure that there is a Greek word for 'objective evidence' unless it's the same as 'my opinion'.”
:D

[ATC Watcher]

“I'm not sure that there is a Greek word for 'objective evidence' unless it's the same as 'my opinion'.”
:D

The French have a similar saying when investigating a specific carrier which displays a colorful bar code on its aircraft.:hmm:

But to be fair , let's read the original report before asuming it is what we fear it will be.

[ThinkRate]

http://news.ert.gr/en/10/21317.asp

[quote]
Chairman of the Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board Akrivos Tsolakis is to hand Tuesday morning the finding on the crash of the Helios airliner, which crashed in the area of Grammatiko on 14 August 2005, over to Transport Minister Michael Liapis. The finding puts the crash down to human error, sources said. In particular, it primarily holds the pilot and the co-pilot responsible, for failing to shift the compression valve from the manually-operated mode to the automate one. They are also blamed for not realizing that it was the partial decompression that prompted the alarm to sound. The partial decompression raised oxygen levels inside the cockpit and the pilots lost their senses. Responsibilities are also attributed to the technicians who performed the last inspection prior to Helios airliner’s fatal flight, because they left the compression valve to the manually-operated mode.
[END QUOTE]

Sources: ΝΕΤ-ΝΕΤ 105.8

TR
----------------------------
ThinkRate! ThinkRate! Don't Think!

[LNAV VNAV]

All this was more or less expected.

I wonder if he will give a definite reason why the Cabin crew didn't enter the cockpit sooner. I doubt it though. I don't think we'll ever know for sure.

[130.4]

When I read the following in the previous post...

"The partial decompression raised oxygen levels inside the cockpit and the pilots lost their senses."

I thought that was a translation error. But when I looked at the original Greek text on the same website, it really did say "high blood oxygen level." Surely that's wrong??

[fox niner]

On the Beeb.....

A report has been published.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6036507.stm

[ajamieson]

..on the wires...
Report: Human error main cause of 2005 Helios air crash
Eds: LEADS to UPDATE with more from report, ADDS details; RESTORES background; ADDS byline
By PATRICK QUINN
Associated Press Writer
ATHENS, Greece (AP) – Investigators cited human error Tuesday as the main cause of the Helios Airways crash that killed all 121 passengers and crew near Athens last year, in the deadliest air disaster in the history of Cyprus and Greece.
The two pilots of the Cypriot 737-300 failed to competently operate controls regulating cabin pressure and misinterpreted a subsequent warning sign, which eventually led to the Aug. 14 crash of the jetliner on a hill north of the Greek capital, according to a report delivered to Greece’s transport minister.
Maintenance officials left pressure controls on an incorrect setting, the report said, and the aircraft’s manufacturer, Boeing, was cited for “ineffectiveness of measures taken in response to previous pressurization incidents in the particular type of aircraft.”
The report was prepared by Akrivos Tsolakis, head of Greece’s National Aviation Safety Board.
It also said that the direct causes of the crash were the crew’s failure to recognize that the plane’s pressurization switch was in the “manual position” before takeoff and not set to automatic – which would have allowed the cabin to pressurize by itself.
After takeoff, the plane failed to pressurize and the two pilots did not recognize “the warnings and the reasons for the activation of the warnings,” including one showing that the oxygen masks dropped.
That failure led to the “incapacitation of the flight crew due to hypoxia,” or lack of oxygen, and resulted in the plane being flown on autopilot for two hours until it ran out of fuel and crashed.
Maintenance officials in Cyprus were also indirectly blamed, along with Cypriot civil aviation authorities.
The report said latent causes included Helios’ “deficiencies in the organization, quality management, and safety culture and the regulatory authority’s “inadequate execution of its safety oversight responsibilities” over time.
The captain contacted Helio’s operations center after takeoff and as the aircraft climbed though 16,000 feet (4,879 meters), reporting that there were warnings going off in the cabin, according to the report.
“Several communications between the captain and the Operations Centre took place in the next eight minutes concerning the above problems and ended as the aircraft climbed through 28,900 feet (8,810 meters). Thereafter, there was no response to radio calls to the aircraft,” the report said.
During the climb, “the passenger oxygen masks deployed.”
The report did not say if any of the passengers had managed to put on the masks, but it found that at least one man without a mask was seen alive in the cockpit 14 minutes before the crash by the pilot of a Greek F-16 fighter jet that had been scrambled to intercept the airliner.
“The F-16 pilot tried to attract his attention without success,” the report found. The plane issued two Mayday signals when the first engine flamed out and crashed 13 minutes later after the second engine flamed out, it said
Earlier this year, Tsolakis said a flight attendant on the plane had wrestled with controls for at least 10 minutes before the crash, in a failed effort to regain control of the airliner.
Helios Airways Flight 522 had been traveling from Larnaca, Cyprus, to Prague, Czech Republic, with a scheduled stop in Athens.
The aircraft was shadowed by Greek fighter jets before it crashed at Grammatiko, some 40 kilometers (25 miles) north of Athens. All 115 passengers – all Greek Cypriots and Greeks – and six crew were killed in the crash.
Helios Airways, a budget Cypriot airline, was replaced earlier this year by a new carrier called ajet. 100831 oct 06GMT

[big fraidy cat]

According to the Cyprus Mail [below], the report hasn't been handed over quite yet.

Helios report to be handed over today

THE LONG awaited report into last year’s Helios air crash will today be handed over to President Tassos Papadopoulos.

Following the conclusion of the Greek Air Accident Investigating Committee’s probe into the August 14 tragedy, which killed all 121 passengers and crew on board, committee chairman Akrivos Tsolakis will fly to Cyprus early this afternoon to hand over the final report, after first handing it over to Greece’s Transport Minister.

Tsolakis is expected to land at Larnaca airport at around 3.30pm, where he will meet with Communication and Works Minister Harris Thrassou at 4.30pm.

From there, the chief investigator will be driven to the Presidential Palace where he will present President Tassos Papadopoulos with copies of the document in English and Greek.

Cypriot Air Accident Investigating Committee Chairman Costas Orfanos is also expected to receive a copy of the report.

Speaking to the Cyprus News Agency yesterday, Thrassou said the report would be made public without delay and a copy would also be given to Panayiotis Kallis, the chairman of the independent Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the air crash, on Wednesday.

The minister said the report would clarify the cause of the accident and that anyone held responsible would be named during the Kallis inquiry.

The Kallis Commission is expected to name those responsible for the tragedy so that the Attorney-general can bring criminal liability charges against them.

It is believed the report will blame human error and oversights for the accident. The Civil Aviation Department has also been showed to have cut corners in its handling of the safety measures.

The Civil Aviation Department and ajet, formerly known as Helios, will also receive copies of the report this week.

Meanwhile, the independent Commission yesterday resumed its hearings, after suspending them last week ahead of the publication of the Tsolakis report.

During yesterday’s hearing, Michael Agisilaou, who worked as co-ordinator at the Aviation Safety Division, was recalled to testify, as was ajet co-pilot Andreas Aristedou.

The Commission will continue its hearings today at 11am. It will suspend the proceedings and continue with the second round of testimonies once it examines the Tsolakis report.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[big fraidy cat]

There are two articles on the CNN International edition today, and from the second one, link below, I have extracted the following statement (which I am sure will be well debated on this forum):


"The report also found that the man in the cockpit had been in communication with other aircraft during the last 30 minutes of the flight."


http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/08/22/greece.crash.mayday/index.html

[130.4]

According to Reuters, Tsolakis has already submitted the report to the Greek Ministry of Transport, and will hand it to the Cypriot authorities this afternoon. All the articles I've read so far in the press appear to be too brief and most of them inaccurate. Will we eventually be given a link to the actual report somewhere on the web?

[LNAV VNAV]

http://www.politis.com.cy/other/downloads/helios_porisma_20061010.pdf


The link above is the report in brief both in greek and in English. It says at the end 'by the press office' but doesn't say of what.

[big fraidy cat]

This just received from the Ministry of Transport (in Greek, with Synopsis in English, which is posted below):

On 14 August 2005, a Boeing 737-300 aircraft, registration number 5B-DBY, operated by Helios Airways, departed Larnaca, Cyprus at 09:07 h for Prague, Czech Republic, via Athens, Hellas. The aircraft was cleared to climb to FL340 and to proceed direct to RDS VOR. As the aircraft climbed through 16 000 ft, the Captain contacted the company Operations Centre and reported a Take-off Configuration Warning and an Equipment Cooling system problem. Several communications between the Captain and the Operations Centre took place in the next eight minutes concerning the above problems and ended as the aircraft climbed through 28 900 ft. Thereafter, there was no response to radio calls to the aircraft. During the climb, at an aircraft altitude of 18 200 ft, the passenger oxygen masks deployed in the cabin. The aircraft leveled off at FL340 and continued on its programmed route.
At 10:21 h, the aircraft flew over the KEA VOR, then over the Athens International Airport, and subsequently entered the KEA VOR holding pattern at 10:38 h. At 11:24 h, during the sixth holding pattern, the Boeing 737 was intercepted by two F-16 aircraft of the Hellenic Air Force. One of the F-16 pilots observed the aircraft at close range and reported at 11:32 h that the Captain’s seat was vacant, the First Officer’s seat was occupied by someone who was slumped over the controls, the passenger oxygen masks were seen dangling and three motionless passengers were seen seated wearing oxygen masks in the cabin. No external damage or fire was noted and the aircraft was not responding to radio calls. At 11:49 h, he reported a person not wearing an oxygen mask entering the cockpit and occupying the Captain’s seat. The F-16 pilot tried to attract his attention without success. At 11:50 h, the left engine flamed out due to fuel depletion and the aircraft started descending. At 11:54 h, two MAYDAY messages were recorded on the CVR.

At 12:00 h, the right engine also flamed out at an altitude of approximately 7 100 ft. The aircraft continued descending rapidly and impacted hilly terrain at 12:03 h in the vicinity of Grammatiko village, Hellas, approximately 33 km northwest of the Athens International Airport. The 115 passengers and 6 crew members on board were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) of the Hellenic Ministry of Transport & Communications investigated the accident following ICAO practices and determined that the accident resulted from direct and latent causes.

The direct causes were:
· · Non-recognition that the cabin pressurization mode selector was in the MAN (manual) position during the performance of the Preflight procedure, the Before Start checklist and the After Takeoff checklist.
· · Non-identification of the warnings and the reasons for the activation of the warnings (Cabin Altitude Warning Horn, Passenger Oxygen Masks Deployment indication, Master Caution).
· · Incapacitation of the flight crew due to hypoxia, resulting in the continuation of the flight via the flight management computer and the autopilot, depletion of the fuel and engine flameout, and the impact of the aircraft with the ground.
The latent causes were:
· · Operator’s deficiencies in the organization, quality management, and safety culture.
· · Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its safety oversight responsibilities.
· · Inadequate application of Crew Resource Management principles.
· · Ineffectiveness of measures taken by the manufacturer in response to previous pressurization incidents in the particular type of aircraft.

The AAIASB further concluded that the following factors could have contributed to the accident: omission of returning the cabin pressurization mode selector to the AUTO position after non-scheduled maintenance on the aircraft; lack of cabin crew procedures (at an international level) to address events involving loss of pressurization and continuation of the climb despite passenger oxygen masks deployment; and ineffectiveness of international aviation authorities to enforce implementation of actions plans resulting from deficiencies documented in audits.

In the months following the accident, the AAIASB made seven interim safety recommendations: five recommendations to the National Transportation Safety Board and to the manufacturer, four of which already resulted in the implementation of corrective actions, one recommendation to the Cyprus Air Accident and Incident Investigation Board and the airlines based in Cyprus, for which corrective action had already been taken, and one recommendation to the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA), which also resulted in the implementation of corrective action. In addition, the FAA in the United States issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) which informed flight crews about upcoming, improved procedures for pre-flight setup of the cabin pressurization system, as well as improved procedures for interpreting and responding to the Cabin Altitude Warning Horn and to the Takeoff or Landing Configuration Warning Horn.

The report also identifies a number of additional safety deficiencies pertaining to: maintenance procedures; pilot training, normal and emergency procedures; organizational issues of the Operator; organizational issues related to safety oversight of maintenance and flight operations by Cyprus DCA, EASA/JAA and ICAO; issues related to the aircraft manufacturer’s documentation for maintenance and flight operations; and issues related to handling by the International Authorities of precursor incident information so as to implement preventive measures in a timely manner. As a consequence of the above, in its Final Report the AAIASB promulgated an additional eleven safety recommendations, addressed to the Republic of Cyprus, EASA, JAA and ICAO.

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3, copies of the Draft Final Report were sent on 18 May 2006 to the States that participated in the investigation, inviting their comments. The comments sent to the AAIASB by the relevant Authorities in Cyprus, the United Kingdom and the United States were taken into account in the Final Report.

Note: All the above times are local.

[172driver]

...and here's a link to a story in The Times (they seem to have an aviation day today...)

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2396691,00.html

[cwatters]

...and here's a link to a story in The Times (they seem to have an aviation day today...)
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2396691,00.html

Seems the company doesn't understand who is responsible for what....

The company said today that it had not yet seen the final report into the accident but was "deeply dismayed" that more emphasis had not been placed on the actions of the ground engineers who had moved the cabin pressure control from its normal position.

[ATC Watcher]

At 11:49 h, he reported a person not wearing an oxygen mask entering the cockpit and occupying the Captain’s seat.

at 34.000 feet ?

something does not add up here.

[Midland63]

Hi, I'm just a piece of SLF but have been following this story with interest.

Every report I read refers to the F/O being "slumped over the controls" - what does this mean? Are "the controls" the control column? If someone "slumped" on the c/c might that not have disengaged the A/P (a la Everglades L1011)?

Sorry for ignorance displayed here - look forward to being corrected (and reading the full report on this accident).

Thanks, Neil

[Sven Sixtoo]

ATC Watcher

Hand held oxygen set?
Not in the airline business, but I've seen the sets in stowages ready to be grabbed - a bottle with a mask screwed directly on to the regulator - would only be against the face when you needed to breathe.

Sven

[aegean]

The summary of the report in both english (scroll down) and greek from Greece's Ministry of Transport

http://www.yme.gr/pressdetail.php?section=21&pressid=651&sessdata=cf417da3246a721d3412d7e8f3ca6fb4&PHPSESSID=cf417da3246a721d3412d7e8f3ca6fb4

SYNOPSIS IN ENGLISH


On 14 August 2005, a Boeing 737-300 aircraft, registration number 5B-DBY, operated by Helios Airways, departed Larnaca, Cyprus at 09:07 h for Prague, Czech Republic, via Athens, Hellas. The aircraft was cleared to climb to FL340 and to proceed direct to RDS VOR. As the aircraft climbed through 16 000 ft, the Captain contacted the company Operations Centre and reported a Take-off Configuration Warning and an Equipment Cooling system problem. Several communications between the Captain and the Operations Centre took place in the next eight minutes concerning the above problems and ended as the aircraft climbed through 28 900 ft. Thereafter, there was no response to radio calls to the aircraft. During the climb, at an aircraft altitude of 18 200 ft, the passenger oxygen masks deployed in the cabin. The aircraft leveled off at FL340 and continued on its programmed route.

At 10:21 h, the aircraft flew over the KEA VOR, then over the Athens International Airport, and subsequently entered the KEA VOR holding pattern at 10:38 h. At 11:24 h, during the sixth holding pattern, the Boeing 737 was intercepted by two F-16 aircraft of the Hellenic Air Force. One of the F-16 pilots observed the aircraft at close range and reported at 11:32 h that the Captain’s seat was vacant, the First Officer’s seat was occupied by someone who was slumped over the controls, the passenger oxygen masks were seen dangling and three motionless passengers were seen seated wearing oxygen masks in the cabin. No external damage or fire was noted and the aircraft was not responding to radio calls. At 11:49 h, he reported a person not wearing an oxygen mask entering the cockpit and occupying the Captain’s seat. The F-16 pilot tried to attract his attention without success. At 11:50 h, the left engine flamed out due to fuel depletion and the aircraft started descending. At 11:54 h, two MAYDAY messages were recorded on the CVR.

At 12:00 h, the right engine also flamed out at an altitude of approximately 7 100 ft. The aircraft continued descending rapidly and impacted hilly terrain at 12:03 h in the vicinity of Grammatiko village, Hellas, approximately 33 km northwest of the Athens International Airport. The 115 passengers and 6 crew members on board were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB) of the Hellenic Ministry of Transport & Communications investigated the accident following ICAO practices and determined that the accident resulted from direct and latent causes.
The direct causes were:

Non-recognition that the cabin pressurization mode selector was in the MAN (manual) position during the performance of the Preflight procedure, the Before Start checklist and the After Takeoff checklist.
Non-identification of the warnings and the reasons for the activation of the warnings (Cabin Altitude Warning Horn, Passenger Oxygen Masks Deployment indication, Master Caution).
Incapacitation of the flight crew due to hypoxia, resulting in the continuation of the flight via the flight management computer and the autopilot, depletion of the fuel and engine flameout, and the impact of the aircraft with the ground.
The latent causes were:


Operators deficiencies in the organization, quality management, and safety culture.
Regulatory Authority diachronic inadequate execution of its safety oversight responsibilities.
Inadequate application of Crew Resource Management principles.
Ineffectiveness of measures taken by the manufacturer in response to previous pressurization incidents in the particular type of aircraft.


The AAIASB further concluded that the following factors could have contributed to the accident: omission of returning the cabin pressurization mode selector to the AUTO position after non-scheduled maintenance on the aircraft; lack of cabin crew procedures (at an international level) to address events involving loss of pressurization and continuation of the climb despite passenger oxygen masks deployment; and ineffectiveness of international aviation authorities to enforce implementation of actions plans resulting from deficiencies documented in audits.

In the months following the accident, the AAIASB made seven interim safety recommendations: five recommendations to the National Transportation Safety Board and to the manufacturer, four of which already resulted in the implementation of corrective actions, one recommendation to the Cyprus Air Accident and Incident Investigation Board and the airlines based in Cyprus, for which corrective action had already been taken, and one recommendation to the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA), which also resulted in the implementation of corrective action. In addition, the FAA in the United States issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) which informed flight crews about upcoming, improved procedures for pre-flight setup of the cabin pressurization system, as well as improved procedures for interpreting and responding to the Cabin Altitude Warning Horn and to the Takeoff or Landing Configuration Warning Horn.

The report also identifies a number of additional safety deficiencies pertaining to: maintenance procedures; pilot training, normal and emergency procedures; organizational issues of the Operator; organizational issues related to safety oversight of maintenance and flight operations by Cyprus DCA, EASA/JAA and ICAO; issues related to the aircraft manufacturer’s documentation for maintenance and flight operations; and issues related to handling by the International Authorities of precursor incident information so as to implement preventive measures in a timely manner. As a consequence of the above, in its Final Report the AAIASB promulgated an additional eleven safety recommendations, addressed to the Republic of Cyprus, EASA, JAA and ICAO.

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3, copies of the Draft Final Report were sent on 18 May 2006 to the States that participated in the investigation, inviting their comments. The comments sent to the AAIASB by the relevant Authorities in Cyprus, the United Kingdom and the United States were taken into account in the Final Report.

Note: All the above times are local.

[ThinkRate]

Amazing! A full copy of the original report (alas in Greek) can already be found and is currently being circulated around various aviation-related discussion groups in Greece:

Copy of Report in Greek (http://download.yousendit.com/1A87544B09DEDA50)

TR
---------------------------------
ThinkRate! ThinkRate! Don't Think!

[big fraidy cat]

What I would like to see is the full 250 page report, including FDR and CVR data, all in English, of course. The size of the report was mentioned in a blurb today in Kathimerini.

[bear11]

Maybe I'm missing something (although I've done my best to read the various threads in Prune on this topic), but one line from the report interests me:

"lack of cabin crew procedures (at an international level) to address events involving loss of pressurization and continuation of the climb despite passenger oxygen masks deployment".

I am aware in the past that other manifestations of the same problem were helped by cabin crew going to the cockpit to advise that masks had dropped and what was going on - these incidents happened before 9/11 and cockpit security doors. Are the Greeks suggesting that SOPs need to be updated as a result of increased cockpit security, or am I misreading?

Regarding the specific Helios incident, has the report or anybody else come up with a satisfactory explanation for the large amount of time it took for the cabin crew to get into the cockpit? I realise it's subsidiary to the failure of pilots to find the problem using SOPs, but surely in terms of preventing reoccurrences, it's an important point?

[special_ig]

Quote:
"Non-recognition that the cabin pressurization mode selector was in the MAN (manual) position during the performance of the Preflight procedure, the Before Start checklist and the After Takeoff checklist"

Does the checklist item "cabin pressurization mode selector to AUTOMATIC" appear in the ALL THREE procedures/checklists??? If so, is it fair to say that the crew missed SIX clues about this switch being in the wrong position (three checklists plus the Cabin Altitude Warning Horn, Passenger Oxygen Masks Deployment indication and the Master Caution signal???)

[cwatters]

Maybe I'm missing something (although I've done my best to read the various threads in Prune on this topic), but one line from the report interests me:
"lack of cabin crew procedures (at an international level) to address events involving loss of pressurization and continuation of the climb despite passenger oxygen masks deployment".

I'm no expert but I suspect cabin crew proceedures say to prepare for a rapid descent when there is a depresurisation and/or the masks drop. I suspect there is no corresponding proceedure to follow if the climb either continues or simply nothing happens. I suspect the proceedure will be changed to include making contact with the pilot to confirm awareness. Just as they would if there was a cabin fire or similar.

[cwatters]

Does the checklist item "cabin pressurization mode selector to AUTOMATIC" appear in the ALL THREE procedures/checklists??? If so, is it fair to say that the crew missed SIX clues about this switch being in the wrong position (three checklists plus the Cabin Altitude Warning Horn, Passenger Oxygen Masks Deployment indication and the Master Caution signal???)

I seems like the terms Automatic and Manual are inadequate when in this situation they effectively mean on and off.

[SeniorDispatcher]

Amazing! A full copy of the original report (alas in Greek) can already be found and is currently being circulated around various aviation-related discussion groups in Greece:

Copy of Report in Greek (http://download.yousendit.com/1A87544B09DEDA50)

There's also one now available in English: About an 8 meg zipped file that unzips to a .PDF file. The one available at the site in Greece ended up being an error-plagued download for some reason, so someone uploaded it at the site below, and I think the link below will be good for about 7 days...

http://download.yousendit.com/9EC42D2E175FECCB

[Blues&twos]

[Military reported seeing a person entering the cockpit and occupying the captain's seat]

at 34.000 feet ?

something does not add up here.


I don't understand this either. Assuming they had somehow avoided the effects of hypoxia e.g. had been breathing oxygen in the cabin shortly before - is it sensible to assume that whoever was seen to occupy the captain's seat wasn't flight crew? I base this assumption on the report that there was no comms from the a/c for some time before the military intercepted or up until the crash..

:confused:

[nick s]

Blues I know its a long thread, but the answer's in there.

A flight attendant with some 737 sim experience somehow remained conscious and tried to sort the situation out once the door unlocked, sadly and notr unsurprisingly he failed. His mayday calls were recorded on the CVR but not received by other stations.

[BOAC]

Worth downloading the report. It is long and I have not read it fully.

The issue of why the c/crew did not APPEAR to enter the cockpit for around 2 hr 28 mins 'puzzles' the enquiry team - and me. How they - probably 2 - retained consciousness also is a mystery.

Hopefully all c/crew now know that if a rapid descent does not start when cabin masks drop, ask questions.

A truly sad event.

[Yiorgos]

[Military reported seeing a person entering the cockpit and occupying the captain's seat]

I do not think that the aircraft was @FL340 at this time :=

[At 11:24 h, during the sixth holding pattern, the Boeing 737 was intercepted]

I have still to see holding patterna @FL340 ;) . . .

cheers

[Stu Bigzorst]

Interesting.

The FO's slightly poor training record is there in some detail. One of the causes is cited as CRM. There is this:

There were numerous remarks in the last five years by training and check
pilots on file for the First Officer referring to checklist discipline and
procedural (SOP) difficulties.

But absolutely nothing at all on the captain and his extraordinary record(s) at previous airlines.

Need to read some more :)

[archae86]

A flight attendant with some 737 sim experience somehow remained conscious
At least two supporting clues as to how are in the report:
1. three of the four portable oxygen bottles found had their valves in an open position.
2. as approximately 1 psi over external ambient was provided by the balance between inflow and outflow, the cabin altitude is estimated to have stabilized about 24000 feet pressure altitude--which gives substantially longer useful consciousness (heavily dependent on the individual) than 34000.

[chrisbl]

I don’t think there was anything wrong with the procedures but you actually have to follow them for them to work. There's only one word for this "accident"...Negligence!

Incompetence even.

[GroundBound]

Lots of newspapers have been printing edited findings from the report for several days. So presumably they have had access to it.

I've searched the web and I can't find any published report for it.

Anyone know where the official report can be accessed?

GB

[HundredPercentPlease]

I've searched the web and I can't find any published report for it.
Anyone know where the official report can be accessed?
GB

What's wrong with this?
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2903002&postcount=238

[safetypee]

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2903002&postcount=238
The link appears to have expired – exceeded its download limit.
Can anyone provide an alternate for the report in English?

[Rananim]

The issue of why the c/crew did not APPEAR to enter the cockpit for around 2 hr 28 mins 'puzzles' the enquiry team - and me. How they - probably 2 - retained consciousness also is a mystery

The FA's knew the code..but they didnt use it to save themselves and everybody on board.I dont blame the cabin crew at all just the system.You know the one where it says flying can be learnt in a book by rote.Same for pilots as for FA's.When the situation calls for it,throw the book out and do whatever is necessary.In all honesty,I belive the SOP's for any airline can be written on one or two pages and the first line would start with "use of your best judgement and airmanship takes precedence over anything that follows".

[big fraidy cat]

From today's Cyprus Mail online:

Helios disputes Tsolakis findings
By Elias Hazou

ITS back to the wall, ajet, formerly known as Helios, is disputing the report into last August’s air disaster, questioning the reliability of chief investigator Akrivos Tsolakis.

Though not naming names, the fact-finding report established human error – primarily by the captain and his co-pilot – as the primary cause of the calamity, but it also noted several latent – or underlying – causes, such as the inadequate workings at Civil Aviation.

Hounded by the media ever since arriving on the island to hand over the report, Tsolakis caused controversy when he said that Helios Airways did not exist as an entity.

He was responding to a question as to why his report did not make any safety recommendations to the airline.

“We cannot deal with ghosts,” Tsolakis offered.

“Let us not try to delve into grey areas…our report flies only in clear skies.”

Helios changed its name a few months after the crash, provoking a general perception that the airline was attempting to avoid its responsibilities towards the victims’ families.

But Helios’ lawyers were yesterday up in arms over the comment, arguing that Tsolakis was contradicting himself.

They say it does not make sense for Tsolakis to mention the airline under the latent causes of the accident while at the same time not make any safety recommendations to Helios.

“It would be far more professional of Mr Tsolakis to admit that Helios is not at fault in the first place, rather than insult people’s intelligence,” challenged lawyer Demetris Araouzos.

Christos Neocleous, another Helios lawyer, added: “The company does exist, though under a different name. It makes no difference – this does not mean the airline will shirk its responsibilities.”

But the airline went a step further, casting doubts over the accuracy of the fact-finding report. According to the probe, on the night before the doomed flight airline engineers left the depressurisation switch on manual. The pilots failed to notice this and to reset the switch to auto; as a result, the plane did not pressurise properly, leading to a lack of oxygen supply in the cabin – the primary cause of the accident.

The final report features evidence of this – pictures of the scarred decompression panel.
But Helios insisted it had conducted extensive tests showing that it was “next to impossible” for a commercial jet to take off with the decompression switch on manual.

Yet Boeing pilot Costas Pitsilides told the Mail yesterday that this was not necessarily the case.

He said a plane could take off on manual, depending on the position of the airflow valve.

Assuming the valve was partly open, that would allow for some pressurisation at low altitudes.

“In my view, this is the most likely scenario: ground crew left it in manual, but the pilots should have carried out a checklist of the components. This is standard procedure. Evidently, they did not, and one thing led to another.”


The situation was compounded in the air because, on Boeing 737s, the sounds emitted for faulty pressurisation are identical to those for a glitch in the positioning of the flaps.

In his report, Tsolakis recommended to Boeing to take corrective steps to resolve this issue.

Yesterday, the Greek aviation expert said the manufacturers had already acted on his recommendations.

There are approximately 2,500 Boeing 737s in service today.

“I think that [based on these recommendations] an accident under similar circumstances shall never occur again worldwide,” Tsolakis told state radio yesterday.

Meanwhile Helios hinted it might altogether walk out of the committee of inquiry tasked with apportioning liability for the crash.

Based on its conclusions, the Attorney-general will next decide on whether to prosecute.
Araouzos suggested the company was not getting a fair trial.

“Why does the committee not call on Tsolakis to testify before it, so that he might back his claims?”

The company has filed a motion with the Supreme Court to have the hearings cancelled because, as it says, the committee’s proceedings are “flawed”.

The report itself contains some chilling details. In one passage it reads:

“The accident was not survivable for any of the aircraft occupants. The remains of the victims were removed from the wreckage area by fire fighters of the Fire Corps Special Rescue Forces. Most of the victims were found strapped in their seats. The seats had broken out of their rails in the aircraft floor during the impact sequence.”

The 121 passengers of flight ZU522 evidently did not realise what was happening, gradually slipping into hypoxia, a condition characterised by light-headedness, a feeling of euphoria and loss of cognitive performance.

From the mobile phones recovered from the crash site, “no data related to the accident flight were obtained”.

Tsolakis has therefore recommended to EASA and JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) that henceforth flight crew and cabin crew undergo hypoxia training:

The report also appears to put to rest speculation that co-pilot Pambos Charalambous was unfit to fly:

“On the basis of the data that were given to us, such as the height of the flight, the fact of the existing heart function (pump function) upon crashing, and the fact that there is a similar pathologo-anatomical image both in the ‘suffering’ heart (myocardium) of the co-pilot, and in the ‘healthy heart’ of the pilot, we estimate that the brain hypoxia was the dominant and determinant cause that incapacitated the flying crew, with the findings of the heart being the matter of course and epiphenomenona [symptom] of the prolonged hypoxia.”

Further, from Tsolakis’ findings it can be inferred that the department of Civil Aviation – accused of cutting corners when it came to safety – was poorly organised and staffed:
“The structure of the DCA [Civil Aviation] to support safety oversight is inadequate to support current and future operations;
“The Systems supporting the technical programmes are not fully implemented in the areas of safety and security;

“At the time of this Diagnostic, there was no evidence that confirmed the existence of any Risk Management process within the DCA.”

Last month, it emerged that ajet and the civil aviation department in Cyprus were in trouble with the European Commission and EASA for not complying with EU air safety standards. It was even said the airline risked being placed on the EU’s blacklist – effectively banning it from operating inside EU airspace.

However, latest reports quoted EU officials as saying that ajet had not been blacklisted.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006

[SeniorDispatcher]

No trace of the report on Megaupload, or the sendit site. Any better ideas?

If you'll email me at [email protected] I'll be happy to email you a copy...

[TheShadow]

I imagine that they had the older non-digital panel (the top one)?
Anybody know for sure?.
http://www.b737.org.uk/cpcspanel.jpg
http://www.b737.org.uk/dcpcspanel.jpg

[vapilot2004]

See Post 40 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2336897&postcount=40) by CaptainSandL.

[LNAV VNAV]

http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/all/0E014F5B6043799CC22572040027B427/$file/ΤΕΛΙΚΟ%20ΠΟΡΙΣΜΑ%205B-DBY.pdf


Check this link. Go to page 63. It's in greek but there is a photo of the actual panel. Also check the previous page. A photo of the air conditioning panel. Are the pack switches off or are they just bent like that??

[LNAV VNAV]

One interesting thing that comes out in the report is that whoever entered the cockpit actually used the code to do so. I always thought that it was when the engine failed that the door opened.

[vapilot2004]

http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/all/0E014F5B6043799CC22572040027B427/$file/ΤΕΛΙΚΟ%20ΠΟΡΙΣΜΑ%205B-DBY.pdf
Check this link. Go to page 63. It's in greek but there is a photo of the actual panel. Also check the previous page. A photo of the air conditioning panel. Are the pack switches off or are they just bent like that??

For those of you unable to download due to bad links or download restrictions at other links - the DCPCS panel photo from the report:

http://members.cox.net/flyme2thamoon/Cypriot/63_0001.jpg


Magenta marks are investigator references as to how the panel was found.

I always thought that it was when the engine failed that the door opened.

Even without AC or DC power the door will remain locked.

[Rananim]

LNAV VNAV,
Yes,the report confirms two interesting things:
a)the crew knew the code
b)the PAX O2 dropped when MASTER CAUTION was ON(ie not reset)