No W&B check on Challeneger caused teterboro (NJ) CL600 accident - NTSB
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No W&B check on Challeneger caused teterboro (NJ) CL600 accident - NTSB
Following is the excerpt from an Aviation Week's article on famous Teterboro (2004) Challenger accident.
Basically, and besides everything, pilots didn't do the W&B check before the flight.
Please read the whole article so to be in line what else they have missed.
Permit me to say that it boggles my mind the possiblity of these specific pilots' (are they?) level of ignorance and lack of respect for procedures.
Not to talk about the one who employees them
Also, what will happen to them next? Will they go flying in some less controlled airspace (hint Africa)? Maybe after a year or so, when things settle down (and in a different country) they will start working for an airline?
If they could have skipped so many controls (not to talk about the "right seat" guy who doesn't have a work permit in the US!) who else can do it?
Challenger can fly all the way over the Atlantic so do you calc. These type of amateurs (as an antonym for a word professional) are possible anywhere!
Here is the article:
********************************************************
NTSB CRITICAL OF FAILURES IN CHALLENGER OVERRUN AT TEB
11/06/2006
Dave Collogan
The Feb. 2, 2005 accident in which a chartered Challenger business jet ran off the end of a runway at the Teterboro, N.J. Airport (TEB) "was as sloppy an operation as we've seen" in quite some time, National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark Rosenker said last week. Rosenker's assessment of the accident - in which the fully loaded airplane departed the airport property, crashed into a warehouse and caught fire - came after investigators described a litany of mistakes and poor judgment by the crew members.
Investigators said there was nothing mechanically wrong with the Challenger, but it was far outside the forward center-of-gravity (CG) limit when the crew began the takeoff roll down Runway 6. The airplane carried two pilots, a cabin aide and eight passengers. The flight was supposed to go from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport and had plenty of fuel on board to make that trip, investigators said. But the flight crew asked ground service personnel to top off the tanks before takeoff. The additional fuel pushed the airplane's CG "well forward" of the 16 percent MAC forward limit, investigators said, making it impossible for the crew to rotate the aircraft when it reached takeoff speed.
The crew "made no attempt" to determine the Challenger's CG even though the necessary information to perform that calculation was available in the cockpit, investigators said. The airplane also was 100 pounds overweight.
NTSB investigator Steve Demko said determining an aircraft's weight and balance before takeoff is "basic airmanship," a "Flying 101 type of thing" that even low-time general aviation pilots are taught.
While that failure was the key element in the accident, investigators documented numerous other failures or violations by the crew, operator Platinum Jet Management, and Darby Aviation/Alphajet, which was the holder of the certificate under which the Part 135 flight was operating. It had been more than three years since the Challenger had been weighed to determine its basic operating weight, a violation of FAA regulations. The crew did not have a passenger manifest. The captain's employment history was sketchy.
Investigators said he could not produce a flight log, although he claimed to have type ratings on six different aircraft types. The captain last held a full-time flying job about eight months before the accident, but he was terminated from that job after about two months. Records show he was discharged from another flying job in 2003 for poor judgment and decision-making.
Seat Belts Difficult To Access
Investigators said the first officer, a citizen of Venezuela, is believed to have been in the U.S. on a tourist visa, which board members said would have made him ineligible to serve as a commercial pilot. The first officer also had not completed all of his required training to serve as a first officer. A flight attendant was not required on the flight, but PJM did have a cabin aide in the cabin who had received "some informal safety training," investigators said.
Passengers said all of the seat belts on the airplane were stowed behind or under cushions and were difficult to access. Two passengers who could not find and engage their seat belts before the aircraft started its takeoff roll were tossed into the aisle when the airplane hit the warehouse. Glass and china service items given to passengers by the cabin aide were not collected before the takeoff roll began, leading to at least one injury.
PJM did not hold a Part 135 operating certificate, investigators said, but the company paid a monthly fee to get on Darby's certificate and represented itself as a charter operator. Such arrangements "were quite common" in the charter industry at the time of the accident, officials said, noting that FAA has subsequently clarified the regulations and has developed a new Operations Specification document A008, which will be implemented soon (BA, Oct. 30/195).
In the wake of the TEB accident, NTSB investigators said FAA surveyed about 130 operators of large aircraft to gauge the number of such relationships between Part 135 certificate holders and other operators. The paperwork outlining those arrangements ranged from "single sheets of paper" in some instances to documents the size of small phone books, investigators said. As a result of its operator survey, FAA found there are "thousands" of leased aircraft and "many hundreds of agreements" like the one between PJM and Darby.
Contributing to the accident, according to NTSB, were: "PJM's conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper FAA certification and its failure to ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 requirements; Darby Aviation's failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; the failure of the Birmingham, Ala. FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby's Part 135 certificate; and, the FAA's tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM."
NTSB recommended that FAA inspectors and Part 135 certificate holders get specific guidance, such as that contained in A-008, to learn how certificate holders can demonstrate they are maintaining adequate operational control over all on-demand flights conducted under the authority of their certificates.
It said FAA should "review all charter management, lease and other agreements between...certificate holders and other entities to identify those agreements that permit and/or enable a loss of operational control by the certificate holder and require revisions of any such arrangements."
The safety board said all Part 135 certificate holders should be required to ensure that seatbelts are visible and accessible to passengers before each flight. It also recommended that any cabin personnel on Part 135 flights "who could be perceived by passengers as equivalent to a qualified flight attendant receive basic FAA-approved safety training in at least the following areas: preflight briefing and safety checks; emergency exit operation; and, emergency equipment usage." That training should be documented and recorded by the certificate holder, NTSB said.
Basically, and besides everything, pilots didn't do the W&B check before the flight.
Please read the whole article so to be in line what else they have missed.
Permit me to say that it boggles my mind the possiblity of these specific pilots' (are they?) level of ignorance and lack of respect for procedures.
Not to talk about the one who employees them
Also, what will happen to them next? Will they go flying in some less controlled airspace (hint Africa)? Maybe after a year or so, when things settle down (and in a different country) they will start working for an airline?
If they could have skipped so many controls (not to talk about the "right seat" guy who doesn't have a work permit in the US!) who else can do it?
Challenger can fly all the way over the Atlantic so do you calc. These type of amateurs (as an antonym for a word professional) are possible anywhere!
Here is the article:
********************************************************
NTSB CRITICAL OF FAILURES IN CHALLENGER OVERRUN AT TEB
11/06/2006
Dave Collogan
The Feb. 2, 2005 accident in which a chartered Challenger business jet ran off the end of a runway at the Teterboro, N.J. Airport (TEB) "was as sloppy an operation as we've seen" in quite some time, National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark Rosenker said last week. Rosenker's assessment of the accident - in which the fully loaded airplane departed the airport property, crashed into a warehouse and caught fire - came after investigators described a litany of mistakes and poor judgment by the crew members.
Investigators said there was nothing mechanically wrong with the Challenger, but it was far outside the forward center-of-gravity (CG) limit when the crew began the takeoff roll down Runway 6. The airplane carried two pilots, a cabin aide and eight passengers. The flight was supposed to go from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport and had plenty of fuel on board to make that trip, investigators said. But the flight crew asked ground service personnel to top off the tanks before takeoff. The additional fuel pushed the airplane's CG "well forward" of the 16 percent MAC forward limit, investigators said, making it impossible for the crew to rotate the aircraft when it reached takeoff speed.
The crew "made no attempt" to determine the Challenger's CG even though the necessary information to perform that calculation was available in the cockpit, investigators said. The airplane also was 100 pounds overweight.
NTSB investigator Steve Demko said determining an aircraft's weight and balance before takeoff is "basic airmanship," a "Flying 101 type of thing" that even low-time general aviation pilots are taught.
While that failure was the key element in the accident, investigators documented numerous other failures or violations by the crew, operator Platinum Jet Management, and Darby Aviation/Alphajet, which was the holder of the certificate under which the Part 135 flight was operating. It had been more than three years since the Challenger had been weighed to determine its basic operating weight, a violation of FAA regulations. The crew did not have a passenger manifest. The captain's employment history was sketchy.
Investigators said he could not produce a flight log, although he claimed to have type ratings on six different aircraft types. The captain last held a full-time flying job about eight months before the accident, but he was terminated from that job after about two months. Records show he was discharged from another flying job in 2003 for poor judgment and decision-making.
Seat Belts Difficult To Access
Investigators said the first officer, a citizen of Venezuela, is believed to have been in the U.S. on a tourist visa, which board members said would have made him ineligible to serve as a commercial pilot. The first officer also had not completed all of his required training to serve as a first officer. A flight attendant was not required on the flight, but PJM did have a cabin aide in the cabin who had received "some informal safety training," investigators said.
Passengers said all of the seat belts on the airplane were stowed behind or under cushions and were difficult to access. Two passengers who could not find and engage their seat belts before the aircraft started its takeoff roll were tossed into the aisle when the airplane hit the warehouse. Glass and china service items given to passengers by the cabin aide were not collected before the takeoff roll began, leading to at least one injury.
PJM did not hold a Part 135 operating certificate, investigators said, but the company paid a monthly fee to get on Darby's certificate and represented itself as a charter operator. Such arrangements "were quite common" in the charter industry at the time of the accident, officials said, noting that FAA has subsequently clarified the regulations and has developed a new Operations Specification document A008, which will be implemented soon (BA, Oct. 30/195).
In the wake of the TEB accident, NTSB investigators said FAA surveyed about 130 operators of large aircraft to gauge the number of such relationships between Part 135 certificate holders and other operators. The paperwork outlining those arrangements ranged from "single sheets of paper" in some instances to documents the size of small phone books, investigators said. As a result of its operator survey, FAA found there are "thousands" of leased aircraft and "many hundreds of agreements" like the one between PJM and Darby.
Contributing to the accident, according to NTSB, were: "PJM's conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper FAA certification and its failure to ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 requirements; Darby Aviation's failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; the failure of the Birmingham, Ala. FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby's Part 135 certificate; and, the FAA's tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM."
NTSB recommended that FAA inspectors and Part 135 certificate holders get specific guidance, such as that contained in A-008, to learn how certificate holders can demonstrate they are maintaining adequate operational control over all on-demand flights conducted under the authority of their certificates.
It said FAA should "review all charter management, lease and other agreements between...certificate holders and other entities to identify those agreements that permit and/or enable a loss of operational control by the certificate holder and require revisions of any such arrangements."
The safety board said all Part 135 certificate holders should be required to ensure that seatbelts are visible and accessible to passengers before each flight. It also recommended that any cabin personnel on Part 135 flights "who could be perceived by passengers as equivalent to a qualified flight attendant receive basic FAA-approved safety training in at least the following areas: preflight briefing and safety checks; emergency exit operation; and, emergency equipment usage." That training should be documented and recorded by the certificate holder, NTSB said.
Last edited by Grunf; 7th Nov 2006 at 17:42.
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thanks for posting this bit of information:
sadly, I'll bet there are a few less than mediocre, that's right, less than mediocre pilots flying around.
In my history as a pilot I have seen people fly without licenses because they couldn't read enough to pass the written exam!
I know someone who flew on an IFR clearance without an instrument rating (no cfii either).
talk about FLYING 101.
and yes, I'll bet these folks end up flying in the nether regions of the aviation third world.
It is quite easy to fake a log book, and do in 200hours what one needs 1500 hours plus to do.
sadly, I'll bet there are a few less than mediocre, that's right, less than mediocre pilots flying around.
In my history as a pilot I have seen people fly without licenses because they couldn't read enough to pass the written exam!
I know someone who flew on an IFR clearance without an instrument rating (no cfii either).
talk about FLYING 101.
and yes, I'll bet these folks end up flying in the nether regions of the aviation third world.
It is quite easy to fake a log book, and do in 200hours what one needs 1500 hours plus to do.
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Some people are just a crash looking for a place to happen. 
How in hell, do some people get to fly this type of aircraft when there are so many others who will do the right thing?
How in hell, do some people get to fly this type of aircraft when there are so many others who will do the right thing?
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Plovett
you asked a good question...how...
well the people doing the hiring are not forthright and honest themselves...you can't cheat an honest man, be glad YOU were not hired to be copilot at this joint.
where in AUS are you?
j
you asked a good question...how...
well the people doing the hiring are not forthright and honest themselves...you can't cheat an honest man, be glad YOU were not hired to be copilot at this joint.
where in AUS are you?
j
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Appalling!!!!
My opinion....
Appalling....
However, this nonsense (Feel free to substitute another eight-letter word.) doesn't surprise me. And this will get worse!!!
I remember a few years ago, when I was about to retire from my legacy carrier, I was looking around for a retirement job. One telephone interview was interesting and quite candid. The guy came right out and told me he wouldn't hire me. "You airline types...., because you'd put me out of business. You, all, go by the book. I can't make any money like that!"
During my 28-year airline career, I've seen the effects of politics on aviation and aviation safety. It's become common for fly-by-night outfits (And, now, sadly, some of the low-cost upstart carriers in the U.S. can be categorized in this manner, too.) to hire people with questionable backgrounds. It's also become vogue to hire illegal aliens...they work cheap. (Some are quite competent; most are not.)
While it's easy to blame the Bush administration, I blame previous administrations, too...all the way back to Reagan. With deregulation, the government's 'hands off' policy has not only eroded employee compensation, but safety, as well.
It's difficult, almost impossible, to make money in the aviation business when your competition cuts corners and gets away with it. FAA inspectors do the best they can, but the true solution lies in average, every-day people like ourselves blowing the whistle on these criminals. As employees, we are in a good position to see these criminal acts being committed, but our protections have also eroded with the downfall of unions and union strength. (We can thank present and previous administrations for this, too!)
The result is simple: Innocent people get seriously hurt or killed, while rich @#$holes line their pockets. What a shame that aviation over the years hasn't evolved beyond that.
PantLoad
Appalling....
However, this nonsense (Feel free to substitute another eight-letter word.) doesn't surprise me. And this will get worse!!!
I remember a few years ago, when I was about to retire from my legacy carrier, I was looking around for a retirement job. One telephone interview was interesting and quite candid. The guy came right out and told me he wouldn't hire me. "You airline types...., because you'd put me out of business. You, all, go by the book. I can't make any money like that!"
During my 28-year airline career, I've seen the effects of politics on aviation and aviation safety. It's become common for fly-by-night outfits (And, now, sadly, some of the low-cost upstart carriers in the U.S. can be categorized in this manner, too.) to hire people with questionable backgrounds. It's also become vogue to hire illegal aliens...they work cheap. (Some are quite competent; most are not.)
While it's easy to blame the Bush administration, I blame previous administrations, too...all the way back to Reagan. With deregulation, the government's 'hands off' policy has not only eroded employee compensation, but safety, as well.
It's difficult, almost impossible, to make money in the aviation business when your competition cuts corners and gets away with it. FAA inspectors do the best they can, but the true solution lies in average, every-day people like ourselves blowing the whistle on these criminals. As employees, we are in a good position to see these criminal acts being committed, but our protections have also eroded with the downfall of unions and union strength. (We can thank present and previous administrations for this, too!)
The result is simple: Innocent people get seriously hurt or killed, while rich @#$holes line their pockets. What a shame that aviation over the years hasn't evolved beyond that.
PantLoad
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I have flown dozens of jets and the only one that wouldn't rotate because of CG problems was the DC9 super 80 out of SNA with flaps 24 for noise abatement. That was back when the non smokers all sat in front. We couldn't rotate without retrimming at Vr. Non of the corporate jets I flew ever had a problem. Checking load figures always showed we were legal but the plane would not rotate because of the long fuselage and the way our company computed passengers being seated uniformally throughout the cabin. It is hard to believe a corporate jet with a full passenger load couldn't rotate regardless of where they put the fuel. They don't put much fuel in front of the wing. 100 pounds overweight can hardly be calculated and is a taxi fuel figure that may or may not be used before takeoff. I would be interested in what our overweight takeoff and landing weights are on a daily basis at our airline using average bag weights.
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Weight Check
Having just joined the forum my input may sit in quarantine until it's no longer relevant ... but here goes.
I live and travel (very frequently) in an area where SOP compliance and safety concerns are not always on top of the list of priorities and weight is a particular concern inasmuch as passenger bagagge excess weight finds its way on board unrecorded against a small contribution to the 'check-in staff welfare fund' and where belly cargo weight is often drastically underdeclared by shippers and no weighing device is used to cross-check before loading.
I asked in a different thread if there is any airport or carrier where the actual weight of an aircraft and the distribution of the weight on its 3-point suspensin is ever ascertained by the relatively simple expedient of roll-on electronic load cells (as used for trucks and heavy-lift trailers).It would be interesting to see a comparison between the real weight & weight distribution and the calculated one.
Having just joined the forum my input may sit in quarantine until it's no longer relevant ... but here goes.
I live and travel (very frequently) in an area where SOP compliance and safety concerns are not always on top of the list of priorities and weight is a particular concern inasmuch as passenger bagagge excess weight finds its way on board unrecorded against a small contribution to the 'check-in staff welfare fund' and where belly cargo weight is often drastically underdeclared by shippers and no weighing device is used to cross-check before loading.
I asked in a different thread if there is any airport or carrier where the actual weight of an aircraft and the distribution of the weight on its 3-point suspensin is ever ascertained by the relatively simple expedient of roll-on electronic load cells (as used for trucks and heavy-lift trailers).It would be interesting to see a comparison between the real weight & weight distribution and the calculated one.
With the greatest respect, and speaking as an Engineer trained in maintenance strategies and suchlike although merely a PPL, I need to make one point.
The aircraft in service today, from light to the very very heavy, are designed and built on the basis that their operators can be trusted to religiously follow, to the best of their abilities, what is written in the maintenance manuals, POH and suchlike documents, on the basis that they subscribe to western values.
In other words, they are designed to be maintained and flown by people who have a basically Judeo - Christian outlook as regards to responsibility, the rule of law, guilt, fear, fate, and their duty to their fellow man. This is not to say that others are inferior or subhuman or whatever, merely that the design considerations assume these values on the part of the maintainers and the operating crew.
In other words, if the manual says "Change the oil at 200 hours" then it means "Change the oil at 200 hours". It doesn't mean to change the oil only if you can afford it, or if you can on-sell it, or if the oil change doesn't fall on a religious holiday, or if you have been paid a bribe to do it, or if you feel like it, or if the pilot is from the same tribe or family as you, or if you can get ersatz oil for cheap and make a few dollars on the side, it means change the F%^&kiing oil.
Similarly with loading and operations.
Now it IS possible to build aircraft according to other cultural mores, but I suggest history has shown that a culture of trust and cooperation is the least cost option.
For example, we can build in weight and balance systems that will prevent the aircraft from taking off if overloaded although the simplest safety measure is to ensure that the undercarriage will collapse if excess weight is applied. We can quadruple safety limits and maintenance times so that it is physically impossible to load an amount of Pax that the aircraft can't cope with. We can build in systems that will prevent an engine from starting unless it has been properly maintained. We can even build in systems that will prevent the aircraft from operating without a master password, reset every few thousand hours by its insurers. All this is technically possible, but it is expensive and time consuming.
The simplest solution is to ensure that the regulatory authorities around the world adhere to a common set of standards and enforce them by punishing anyone who does not follow them to both the letter and spirit, even to the point of the death penalty, because that is what they are exposing their passengers and crew to.
The aircraft in service today, from light to the very very heavy, are designed and built on the basis that their operators can be trusted to religiously follow, to the best of their abilities, what is written in the maintenance manuals, POH and suchlike documents, on the basis that they subscribe to western values.
In other words, they are designed to be maintained and flown by people who have a basically Judeo - Christian outlook as regards to responsibility, the rule of law, guilt, fear, fate, and their duty to their fellow man. This is not to say that others are inferior or subhuman or whatever, merely that the design considerations assume these values on the part of the maintainers and the operating crew.
In other words, if the manual says "Change the oil at 200 hours" then it means "Change the oil at 200 hours". It doesn't mean to change the oil only if you can afford it, or if you can on-sell it, or if the oil change doesn't fall on a religious holiday, or if you have been paid a bribe to do it, or if you feel like it, or if the pilot is from the same tribe or family as you, or if you can get ersatz oil for cheap and make a few dollars on the side, it means change the F%^&kiing oil.
Similarly with loading and operations.
Now it IS possible to build aircraft according to other cultural mores, but I suggest history has shown that a culture of trust and cooperation is the least cost option.
For example, we can build in weight and balance systems that will prevent the aircraft from taking off if overloaded although the simplest safety measure is to ensure that the undercarriage will collapse if excess weight is applied. We can quadruple safety limits and maintenance times so that it is physically impossible to load an amount of Pax that the aircraft can't cope with. We can build in systems that will prevent an engine from starting unless it has been properly maintained. We can even build in systems that will prevent the aircraft from operating without a master password, reset every few thousand hours by its insurers. All this is technically possible, but it is expensive and time consuming.
The simplest solution is to ensure that the regulatory authorities around the world adhere to a common set of standards and enforce them by punishing anyone who does not follow them to both the letter and spirit, even to the point of the death penalty, because that is what they are exposing their passengers and crew to.
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Being pilots, we are only as professional as we try/want to be.
Its within ourselves and our choice to follow SOP, common sense airmanship etc. Yes we corporate jockeys operate on our own without fancy gizmos watching our everymove and constantly changing destinations..so it behooves us to strive to be as good as possible.
Having been only in the bizjet world I have seen and flown with pilots who have no place in the cockpit, but yet they have fallen thru the filters and controls.
This means they have somehow accrued the total time to comply with insurance requirements to fly as captains, and considering the lack of experienced captains the CheifPilots in the industry choose to hire them and refuse to see all their other flaws ("Because we NEED a captain, never mind he/she is old/confused/drunkard/a looney") As an example of the JAA farce we had a contract captain show up and start doing line checks?! again, a large company that needed to "check boxes" and hence comply with JAROPS regs..never mind common sense.
Also maybe the fact they have changed companies more than underpants thru the years might clue you into something is very wrong with said muppets..
BUT these nutjobs also exist in the Airline world and again, having friends higher up the managment chain who can hold their hand over them (you know..hes my old mate from the forces..hes alright..) So the fact that every F/O the guy has flown with thinks he dangerous yet fear saying anything, as they dont want to be the one to "bring down" the much heralded/much respected "Captain".
Either way lets drop the swweping generalizations as they serve nobody and wait for the report to come thru. The Aircraft hadnt been weighed in several years, rumoured to have had some strange galley configeration and myabe the trim was set after what the PIC thought it should be and therefore you have alot of cheeseholes lining up for the crap/fan interface.
Its within ourselves and our choice to follow SOP, common sense airmanship etc. Yes we corporate jockeys operate on our own without fancy gizmos watching our everymove and constantly changing destinations..so it behooves us to strive to be as good as possible.
Having been only in the bizjet world I have seen and flown with pilots who have no place in the cockpit, but yet they have fallen thru the filters and controls.
This means they have somehow accrued the total time to comply with insurance requirements to fly as captains, and considering the lack of experienced captains the CheifPilots in the industry choose to hire them and refuse to see all their other flaws ("Because we NEED a captain, never mind he/she is old/confused/drunkard/a looney") As an example of the JAA farce we had a contract captain show up and start doing line checks?! again, a large company that needed to "check boxes" and hence comply with JAROPS regs..never mind common sense.
Also maybe the fact they have changed companies more than underpants thru the years might clue you into something is very wrong with said muppets..
BUT these nutjobs also exist in the Airline world and again, having friends higher up the managment chain who can hold their hand over them (you know..hes my old mate from the forces..hes alright..) So the fact that every F/O the guy has flown with thinks he dangerous yet fear saying anything, as they dont want to be the one to "bring down" the much heralded/much respected "Captain".
Either way lets drop the swweping generalizations as they serve nobody and wait for the report to come thru. The Aircraft hadnt been weighed in several years, rumoured to have had some strange galley configeration and myabe the trim was set after what the PIC thought it should be and therefore you have alot of cheeseholes lining up for the crap/fan interface.
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Hey, Sid, we is nose heavy!
Scene, Singapore, circa 1977 (or thereabouts).
CV880 freighter operated by AirTrust Singapore to Abadan Iran (oil company flights) failed to rotate and went off the end, due to severe mis-loading (confirmed later by weighing the boxes, which were grossly mislabeled).
On board this particular flight was an FAA inspector giving a final check to a new (to the company) Flight Engineer.
Yes, the FAA still does this overseas, if you ask nicely, and know those higher up, and indeed, there is absolutely no charge for this service.
Anyway, the F/E pulls all the fire handles, fires all the bottles, and all crew exit the aeroplane, no injuries.
The FAA inspector then says to the F/E....'well, we've covered all the emergencies, the next flight we can concentrate on the normal procedures, I hope!'
An absolutely true storey.
Scene, Singapore, circa 1977 (or thereabouts).
CV880 freighter operated by AirTrust Singapore to Abadan Iran (oil company flights) failed to rotate and went off the end, due to severe mis-loading (confirmed later by weighing the boxes, which were grossly mislabeled).
On board this particular flight was an FAA inspector giving a final check to a new (to the company) Flight Engineer.
Yes, the FAA still does this overseas, if you ask nicely, and know those higher up, and indeed, there is absolutely no charge for this service.
Anyway, the F/E pulls all the fire handles, fires all the bottles, and all crew exit the aeroplane, no injuries.
The FAA inspector then says to the F/E....'well, we've covered all the emergencies, the next flight we can concentrate on the normal procedures, I hope!'
An absolutely true storey.
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411A
I've just had a long day getting the very substance on ones being hammered out by the heat thermals and then I read this..........
You have made me feel much better. Thank you. 
I've just had a long day getting the very substance on ones being hammered out by the heat thermals and then I read this..........
The FAA inspector then says to the F/E....'well, we've covered all the emergencies, the next flight we can concentrate on the normal procedures, I hope!'
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From AVWeb
Charter Operator Guilty Of Fraud
By Russ Niles, Editor-in-Chief
The co-founder of Platinum Jet Management, whose Challenger business jet went off the end of the runway at Teterboro Airport in 2005, has pleaded guilty to fraud charges for flying more than 100 charters without the proper certification. Andre Budhan could go to jail for up to four years after the investigation into the Teterboro crash turned into a criminal probe. A total of 23 charges were laid against Budhan and he pleaded guilty to the fraud charge. Even though the passengers on those flights got to where they were going, the fraud occurred because Platinum didn't tell them they didn't have the paperwork for conducting on-demand charters, according to North Jersey Crime Examiner.
There are five others charged in the alleged scheme and they've all pleaded not guilty. A trial is set for next January. Prosecutors allege that the Challenger that crashed was overfueled and couldn't get off the ground because the center of gravity was too far forward. The indictment alleges that Platinum routinely overfueled aircraft at Teterboro and other locations where fuel was less expensive. The flightless Challenger crossed a highway and plowed into a furniture warehouse, injuring all 11 people aboard and four bystanders.
The co-founder of Platinum Jet Management, whose Challenger business jet went off the end of the runway at Teterboro Airport in 2005, has pleaded guilty to fraud charges for flying more than 100 charters without the proper certification. Andre Budhan could go to jail for up to four years after the investigation into the Teterboro crash turned into a criminal probe. A total of 23 charges were laid against Budhan and he pleaded guilty to the fraud charge. Even though the passengers on those flights got to where they were going, the fraud occurred because Platinum didn't tell them they didn't have the paperwork for conducting on-demand charters, according to North Jersey Crime Examiner.
There are five others charged in the alleged scheme and they've all pleaded not guilty. A trial is set for next January. Prosecutors allege that the Challenger that crashed was overfueled and couldn't get off the ground because the center of gravity was too far forward. The indictment alleges that Platinum routinely overfueled aircraft at Teterboro and other locations where fuel was less expensive. The flightless Challenger crossed a highway and plowed into a furniture warehouse, injuring all 11 people aboard and four bystanders.
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Challenger 600 Weight and Balance
Grunf:
The Limitation section of the Flight Manual shows the forward limit is 25% M.A.C. Do you have information on how far forward of this limit the actual M.A.C. was on the crashed aircraft.
Please confirm that the total weight was 100 pounds over maximum all up weight.
I used to fly the Challenger 600 and so have an interest in the subject.
Tmb
The Limitation section of the Flight Manual shows the forward limit is 25% M.A.C. Do you have information on how far forward of this limit the actual M.A.C. was on the crashed aircraft.
Please confirm that the total weight was 100 pounds over maximum all up weight.
I used to fly the Challenger 600 and so have an interest in the subject.
Tmb
Last edited by Tmbstory; 28th Jun 2009 at 11:57. Reason: Forward limit is 16.0 M.A.C.
The NTSB Official Report (link in post 11) says the forward CG limit is 16% MAC whereas on the accident plane it was actually 12.46%.
The NTSB Official Report says the aeroplane was 100 lbs overweight.
You aren't mounting a challenge to them are you ?
The NTSB Official Report says the aeroplane was 100 lbs overweight.
You aren't mounting a challenge to them are you ?
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Tmbstory:
Check Sections 1.6.2 and Appendix C of the NTSB report.
CG range at Max Ramp weight was 16.0 to 33.0 %MAC.
The Limitation section of the Flight Manual shows the forward limit is 25% M.A.C.
CG range at Max Ramp weight was 16.0 to 33.0 %MAC.
