Virgin Aircraft 'Emergency' Landing
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ATSB releases preliminary report
The following "safety action" by atsb's beaker gives us the following:
Safety action
As a result of its developing understanding of the occurrence, the ATSB has commenced the following safety action:
Safety forum regarding the provision of operational information
The ATSB is planning to convene a safety forum in respect of the provision of operational information to the flight crews in this occurrence, and more generally. This forum is planned to include representatives from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Airservices Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, the operators of VH-YIR and VH-VYK, and other relevant parties.
Reliability of aviation weather forecasts
As a result of this and other occurrences involving observed but not forecast weather, the ATSB has commenced research investigation AR-2013-200 Reliability of aviation weather forecasts. This investigation will analyse Bureau of Meteorology data across Australian airports, with a focus on those supporting regular public transport operations, and is subject to the availability of long-term data holdings of aviation forecasts and observations.
The investigation is continuing and will:
Question is:
1. Is there any similarity with PelAir??
2. Why did PelAir report go to this??
Safety action
As a result of its developing understanding of the occurrence, the ATSB has commenced the following safety action:
Safety forum regarding the provision of operational information
The ATSB is planning to convene a safety forum in respect of the provision of operational information to the flight crews in this occurrence, and more generally. This forum is planned to include representatives from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Airservices Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, the operators of VH-YIR and VH-VYK, and other relevant parties.
Reliability of aviation weather forecasts
As a result of this and other occurrences involving observed but not forecast weather, the ATSB has commenced research investigation AR-2013-200 Reliability of aviation weather forecasts. This investigation will analyse Bureau of Meteorology data across Australian airports, with a focus on those supporting regular public transport operations, and is subject to the availability of long-term data holdings of aviation forecasts and observations.
The investigation is continuing and will:
- examine the accuracy of aviation meteorological products in Australia
- examine the procedures used to provide information to flight crews from air traffic services and management of changes to those procedures
- examine the provision by the operators of information to the respective flight crews
- examine the relevant recorded data
- review the distribution, dissemination and sharing of operational information to the aviation industry as stipulated by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, and enacted by Airservices Australia and the Bureau of Meteorology.
Question is:
1. Is there any similarity with PelAir??
2. Why did PelAir report go to this??
"From the sublime to the ridiculous???"
Has Beaker taken his politically correct, penny pinching mantra to a whole new level??
Hmm..so instead of a serious, series of "please explain" Safety Recommendations equally distributed across the various DIPs to this incident..Beaker recommends a 'love in'...FFS!
Here's Ben's take on it all
:
Comment..FFS!
Addendum: wildsky comment-
Hmm..so instead of a serious, series of "please explain" Safety Recommendations equally distributed across the various DIPs to this incident..Beaker recommends a 'love in'...FFS!
Here's Ben's take on it all
:
Are the Mildura fog incident warnings being ignored?
Ben Sandilands | Dec 19, 2013 1:03PM
There is not a word in the ATSB report about inquiring into the greedy, stupid and dangerous situation that regulatory failure in terms of fuel requirements for Australian domestic flights gives rise to, and which exposed Qantas and Virgin 737s to such a dangerous situation as the one that arose at Mildura this last winter.
Some very serious questions arose about fuel regulations and inaccurate weather forecasts affecting flights in Australia in June this year when Qantas and Virgin Australia 787s heading for Adelaide were forced to divert to Mildura and make below minimum conditions landings in dense and unforecast fog.
The sequence of events and the issues arising were reported here, and are reported again, in even more detail, in this morning’s release by the ATSB of an interim report into the incidents.
But in summary, the Qantas flight, which had originated in Sydney, with 152 people on board, landed at Mildura on its first attempt with 2100 kgs of fuel remaining in its tanks.
The Virgin Australia flight, which began in Brisbane, with 91 people on board, engaged in a more prolonged but futile wait for the fog to lift, aborted its first landing attempt, and came to a halt after its second and successful attempt with only 535 kgs of fuel remaining, which would have been insufficient for a third attempt.
The cabin was prepared for a possible crash landing, with the crew calling BRACE, BRACE, BRACE on touch down under extenuating circumstances detailed in both of these ATSB reports.
There were two things in common to each flight.
They were caught out by incorrect weather forecasting, not just at Adelaide, but at Mildura, to which they diverted on the basis of a fog free forecast.
And they were, incredibly for a developed first world country like Australia, allowed to fly without fuel for an alternative airport between Australian cities, which was arguably an even bigger regulatory failure than the pathetic oceanic fuel rules that applied with such excellent effect to the Pel-Air air ambulance flight which was ditched in the sea near Norfolk Island in 2009.
Today’s ATSB interim report into the Mildura fog events is mainly about its saying it “is planning to convene a safety forum in respect of the provision of operational information to the flight crews in this occurrence, and more generally.
“This forum is planned to include representatives from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Airservices Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, the operators of VH-YIR and VH-VYK, and other relevant parties.”
The ATSB will also launch a research study into the unreliability of aviation meteorological forecasts.
Ben Sandilands | Dec 19, 2013 1:03PM
There is not a word in the ATSB report about inquiring into the greedy, stupid and dangerous situation that regulatory failure in terms of fuel requirements for Australian domestic flights gives rise to, and which exposed Qantas and Virgin 737s to such a dangerous situation as the one that arose at Mildura this last winter.
Some very serious questions arose about fuel regulations and inaccurate weather forecasts affecting flights in Australia in June this year when Qantas and Virgin Australia 787s heading for Adelaide were forced to divert to Mildura and make below minimum conditions landings in dense and unforecast fog.
The sequence of events and the issues arising were reported here, and are reported again, in even more detail, in this morning’s release by the ATSB of an interim report into the incidents.
But in summary, the Qantas flight, which had originated in Sydney, with 152 people on board, landed at Mildura on its first attempt with 2100 kgs of fuel remaining in its tanks.
The Virgin Australia flight, which began in Brisbane, with 91 people on board, engaged in a more prolonged but futile wait for the fog to lift, aborted its first landing attempt, and came to a halt after its second and successful attempt with only 535 kgs of fuel remaining, which would have been insufficient for a third attempt.
The cabin was prepared for a possible crash landing, with the crew calling BRACE, BRACE, BRACE on touch down under extenuating circumstances detailed in both of these ATSB reports.
There were two things in common to each flight.
They were caught out by incorrect weather forecasting, not just at Adelaide, but at Mildura, to which they diverted on the basis of a fog free forecast.
And they were, incredibly for a developed first world country like Australia, allowed to fly without fuel for an alternative airport between Australian cities, which was arguably an even bigger regulatory failure than the pathetic oceanic fuel rules that applied with such excellent effect to the Pel-Air air ambulance flight which was ditched in the sea near Norfolk Island in 2009.
Today’s ATSB interim report into the Mildura fog events is mainly about its saying it “is planning to convene a safety forum in respect of the provision of operational information to the flight crews in this occurrence, and more generally.
“This forum is planned to include representatives from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Airservices Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, the operators of VH-YIR and VH-VYK, and other relevant parties.”
The ATSB will also launch a research study into the unreliability of aviation meteorological forecasts.
Addendum: wildsky comment-
wildsky
Posted December 19, 2013 at 1:52 pm | Permalink
I guess this “safety forum in respect of the provision of operational information to the flight crews in this occurrence, and more generally” and the “research study into the unreliability of aviation meteorological forecasts” will be rolled out eventually as the Government response to:
“Recommendation 24
9.106 The committee recommends that the relevant agencies investigate appropriate methods to ensure that information about the incidence of, and variable weather conditions at, Norfolk Island is available to assist flight crews and operators managing risk that may result from unforseen weather events.”
Despite the Chief Commissioner selectively quoting the Bureau of Met’s Norfolk forecasting reliability data to disguise the real and identified risk levels, the reality was that all of the clues were presented to the ATSB and CASA that we had, and still have, a significant operational problem. Mildura, or many other mainland aerodromes, do have lower risks of forecasting errors than remote islands – but the risk still exists and the Mildura event showed just how quickly things can change from risk to actual danger to life and limb.
Safety forums and research studies are what you do when you don’t really want to do anything – they are nice shows of interest but have no weight in achieving change.
Makes me so glad every time I hear “safety is our number one priority”…
Posted December 19, 2013 at 1:52 pm | Permalink
I guess this “safety forum in respect of the provision of operational information to the flight crews in this occurrence, and more generally” and the “research study into the unreliability of aviation meteorological forecasts” will be rolled out eventually as the Government response to:
“Recommendation 24
9.106 The committee recommends that the relevant agencies investigate appropriate methods to ensure that information about the incidence of, and variable weather conditions at, Norfolk Island is available to assist flight crews and operators managing risk that may result from unforseen weather events.”
Despite the Chief Commissioner selectively quoting the Bureau of Met’s Norfolk forecasting reliability data to disguise the real and identified risk levels, the reality was that all of the clues were presented to the ATSB and CASA that we had, and still have, a significant operational problem. Mildura, or many other mainland aerodromes, do have lower risks of forecasting errors than remote islands – but the risk still exists and the Mildura event showed just how quickly things can change from risk to actual danger to life and limb.
Safety forums and research studies are what you do when you don’t really want to do anything – they are nice shows of interest but have no weight in achieving change.
Makes me so glad every time I hear “safety is our number one priority”…
Last edited by Sarcs; 19th Dec 2013 at 07:41.
Déjŕ vu: Who is responsible ?? Who cares...let's have a 'love in'!
Although the Beaker politically correct future proposal/fix will more than likely be eagerly accepted by all Directly Interested Parties, I have got a feeling that Senator Nick will not be joining the party....
The following is a NX QON from the last Senate Estimates (18/03/13). {Warning: Before all the Sensitive New Age Sky Gods get on their high horses, please be warned there is ill-informed comment contained witin the hansard text from a certain grumpy old Senator...}:
Déjŕ vu moment: Like in certain passages of hansard in the PelAir inquiry again we find that we have a situation of where it would appear that no-one is responsible or wants to be responsible...
You will note that NX mentions that he spoke to BOM in the AM. Here is the hansard from that conversation:
Hmm...plenty more responsible(s) in that lot. Here's a thought for a more balanced, pragmatic and unbiased investigation perhaps the ATSB should consider commissioning the Senate RRAT committee..??
.The following is a NX QON from the last Senate Estimates (18/03/13). {Warning: Before all the Sensitive New Age Sky Gods get on their high horses, please be warned there is ill-informed comment contained witin the hansard text from a certain grumpy old Senator...
}:
161 AA 02 CHAIR Maintenance of AWIS
Mr Hood: Senator, we are also obviously doing our own follow-up on the fog incidents in Adelaide and in Mildura. My understanding is that the airport is responsible for the maintenance of the AWIS, but we are following that up and if clarification is required of which agency is responsible—
Senator XENOPHON: So it is not necessarily the Bureau of Meteorology, it is not Airservices Australia; it is the actual airport?
Mr Hood: That is my understanding. But I am happy to take that on notice and provide a full response in relation to that.
CHAIR: Just pausing there, why would that plane—is this the one that held over the airport and then did an illegal landing?
Senator XENOPHON: Well, it wasn't illegal; it was all about running out of fuel.
CHAIR: Yes, but you wouldn't—
Senator XENOPHON: He was under the minimum.
CHAIR: But why, in god's name? It could have gone to bloody Woomera or anywhere else. Why did it hang around there if the weather was ****?
Mr Hood: Senator, we are also obviously—
Senator XENOPHON: Did Hansard get the expletive on your part, Chair?
CHAIR: But it's true. That could have been a fatal—just with a simple decision—
Senator STERLE: With the greatest of respect, Mr Hood was about ready to answer and you just both jumped in on him.
CHAIR: No, no.
Senator STERLE: I reckon he could mix it with the pair of you!
CHAIR: There is no simple answer. It was not very sensible to hold it—
Senator STERLE: Chair, he didn't get the opportunity! He was just about ready to answer and then Senator Xenophon picked up on your choice of language and then you were all into it.
CHAIR: But you will—
Senator STERLE: You are doing it again. He hasn't got the answer.
CHAIR: I haven't finished the question.
Senator STERLE: You did. You just spoke then.
CHAIR: You will concede that the guy could have diverted to Woomera or somewhere instead of risking a landing that could have been a catastrophe.
Mr Hood: There are over four million aircraft movements in Australia a year, very few of which cause us significant concern. I think it is fair to say this is a concerning incident. We are cooperating fully with the ATSB. It is our hope that the ATSB will establish all of the facts and make appropriate recommendations, on which we will act.
Senator XENOPHON: These AWISs, the automatic weather information services: who on earth owns them, controls them, is responsible for them? I am not any wiser now than I was this morning when I asked the Bureau of Meteorology. I am just trying to work it out.
Ms Staib: We will take that on notice. As we said, we believe it is the airport's responsibility, but we will confirm that…
Mr Wolfe: I will be brief. The automatic weather information service, the AWIS, is as Mr Hood has indicated the responsibility of the airport operator. Inside the AWIS is an AWS, an automatic weather station, which is the Bureau of Meteorology's responsibility. The transmitter on top is the airport's; the weather station is BoM's.
Mr Hood: Senator, we are also obviously doing our own follow-up on the fog incidents in Adelaide and in Mildura. My understanding is that the airport is responsible for the maintenance of the AWIS, but we are following that up and if clarification is required of which agency is responsible—
Senator XENOPHON: So it is not necessarily the Bureau of Meteorology, it is not Airservices Australia; it is the actual airport?
Mr Hood: That is my understanding. But I am happy to take that on notice and provide a full response in relation to that.
CHAIR: Just pausing there, why would that plane—is this the one that held over the airport and then did an illegal landing?
Senator XENOPHON: Well, it wasn't illegal; it was all about running out of fuel.
CHAIR: Yes, but you wouldn't—
Senator XENOPHON: He was under the minimum.
CHAIR: But why, in god's name? It could have gone to bloody Woomera or anywhere else. Why did it hang around there if the weather was ****?
Mr Hood: Senator, we are also obviously—
Senator XENOPHON: Did Hansard get the expletive on your part, Chair?
CHAIR: But it's true. That could have been a fatal—just with a simple decision—
Senator STERLE: With the greatest of respect, Mr Hood was about ready to answer and you just both jumped in on him.
CHAIR: No, no.
Senator STERLE: I reckon he could mix it with the pair of you!
CHAIR: There is no simple answer. It was not very sensible to hold it—
Senator STERLE: Chair, he didn't get the opportunity! He was just about ready to answer and then Senator Xenophon picked up on your choice of language and then you were all into it.
CHAIR: But you will—
Senator STERLE: You are doing it again. He hasn't got the answer.
CHAIR: I haven't finished the question.
Senator STERLE: You did. You just spoke then.
CHAIR: You will concede that the guy could have diverted to Woomera or somewhere instead of risking a landing that could have been a catastrophe.
Mr Hood: There are over four million aircraft movements in Australia a year, very few of which cause us significant concern. I think it is fair to say this is a concerning incident. We are cooperating fully with the ATSB. It is our hope that the ATSB will establish all of the facts and make appropriate recommendations, on which we will act.
Senator XENOPHON: These AWISs, the automatic weather information services: who on earth owns them, controls them, is responsible for them? I am not any wiser now than I was this morning when I asked the Bureau of Meteorology. I am just trying to work it out.
Ms Staib: We will take that on notice. As we said, we believe it is the airport's responsibility, but we will confirm that…
Mr Wolfe: I will be brief. The automatic weather information service, the AWIS, is as Mr Hood has indicated the responsibility of the airport operator. Inside the AWIS is an AWS, an automatic weather station, which is the Bureau of Meteorology's responsibility. The transmitter on top is the airport's; the weather station is BoM's.
You will note that NX mentions that he spoke to BOM in the AM. Here is the hansard from that conversation:
BOM Senate Estimates 18/11/13
Senator XENOPHON: I have some specific questions for the bureau in relation to the incident that occurred on 18 June this year when a Qantas 737 and a Virgin 737 en route to Adelaide were diverted to Mildura due to fog. The Virgin 737 was required to make an emergency landing because it was about to run out of fuel after one missed approach due to further fog at Mildura. The ATSB issued a preliminary report into the incident on 18 July. The report raised a number of issues in regard to the incident, among which was the provision of weather information. The report states that 'the crew of the Virgin plane were not made aware of the conditions at Adelaide until just prior to the top of their descent, when air traffic control drew it to their attention. As such, when they departed Sydney'—I think it was Brisbane—'they had no indication of the weather in Adelaide and nothing to indicate that they needed to carry fuel for an alternate'. Why was information about the conditions at Adelaide not provided to the crew of the Virgin plane? I understand that the crew of the Qantas plane were aware of deteriorating conditions in Adelaide. Was this based on information from the bureau, or from another source?
Dr Vertessy : I will pass that to Dr Canterford.
Dr Canterford : I am the division head in charge of hazards, warnings and forecasts. The bureau has cooperated with the ATSB report. I understand that it is still being considered at this stage. We have provided all information on forecasts and warnings. Our responsibility is to provide these forecasts and warnings to aviation. The capability of airlines to receive that information et cetera is a matter for their undertaking. We provide the information through the standard Airservices Australia mechanisms.
Senator XENOPHON: It appears from the preliminary report of the ATSB that the Virgin crew did not have access to the information the Qantas crew did. That has nothing to do with the bureau?
Dr Canterford : I think that is still to be considered by the ATSB, but my understanding at the moment is that that would be a matter for the airline to get that information through their normal channels.
Senator XENOPHON: Excuse my ignorance in relation to this but is it a case that the bureau provides information to air traffic control, or do you actually provide information directly to the airlines?
Dr Canterford : Thank you for that clarification. We do not provide directly to each individual airline; we provide it through the standard air traffic mechanisms through Airservices Australia.
Senator XENOPHON: So it is up to air traffic control, presumably, to provide that information to the airlines?
Dr Canterford : Air traffic control but also through the standard networks of information that Airservices provide to the airlines. They have access to that information.
Senator XENOPHON: So, presumably, Qantas would have the same information that Virgin would have in terms of weather forecasts?
Dr Canterford : That would be my understanding.
Senator XENOPHON: Finally, the ATSB's interim report states that 'as the Virgin crew were descending through to about 10,000 feet in visual conditions it became obvious to the crew that the weather conditions were not as reported and that there appeared to be fog at Mildura and low cloud in the area. An indication of the actual weather at Mildura was not possible from the Automated Weather Information Service as it was unavailable'. Why was a more accurate forecast not provided, and whose responsibility was it to ensure that the AWIS was functioning?
Dr Canterford : I think that is still the considerations of the ATSB.
Senator XENOPHON: All right, but the AWISs are your responsibility; is that right?
Dr Canterford : We provide the information to the AWIS, and my understanding is that the broadcasting of information is a mechanism of the normal navigation processes at an airport.
Senator XENOPHON: You are not responsible for looking after the AWISs? That would be air traffic control or Airservices Australia?
Dr Canterford : Correct.
Senator XENOPHON: Okay, that clarifies that. So you have no idea if an AWIS is not operating somewhere. That is not really your responsibility; it is only information that goes to the AWIS?
Dr Canterford : I think we are going into some details that I would have to clarify. I am happy to take that on notice.
Senator XENOPHON: But it is a pretty basic thing, though. If your agency is not the agency responsible for the maintenance of an AWIS—is that the case? I do not want to be needlessly asking the bureau questions when in fact it might be Airservices Australia that is responsible for the maintenance and the upkeep of an AWIS.
Dr Canterford : The bureau has responsibility for the automatic weather station which provides information to the AWIS and also through a telephone or broadcasting system by phone. Those details I would have to clarify myself.
Senator XENOPHON: Hang on; it is pretty basic though. Either you are responsible for an automated weather information service or you are not. Is the Bureau of Meteorology responsible for an automated weather information service?
Dr Canterford : My understanding is that we are not.
Senator XENOPHON: Okay. So who is responsible for it?
Dr Canterford : That is normally the responsibility—and I would have to check this, but the various airports do install that, and it is undertaken through the requirements, I believe, of either the aerodrome operators or Airservices.
Senator XENOPHON: Just finally on this, and I am very grateful to the chair for the time: if an AWIS has broken down or is not operating, is that something that you are told or is it primarily the responsibility of Airservices Australia to ensure that it is operating and its upkeep?
Dr Canterford : I prefer not to go into those details.
Senator XENOPHON: Why not?
Dr Canterford : Because while there is still the report of the ATSB—
Senator XENOPHON: No, sorry, Doctor; you cannot get out of it that easily. I do not think that is a fair answer, for this reason: I am not asking you about this particular incident; I am asking now, in general principles, about who is responsible for maintaining an automated weather information service. If it is not the bureau, fair enough, but I am just trying to understand who is responsible for these automated weather information services.
Dr Canterford : I can talk about the responsibilities of the bureau, but it goes beyond. I would have to check. I do not know the answer to that question.
Senator XENOPHON: Could you take that on notice—
Dr Canterford : I will take that on notice.
Senator XENOPHON: and also take on notice: how long had the AWIS at Mildura been unavailable? When was it repaired? Can the bureau give an indication of how often AWISs are unavailable, on average? But of course, if it is not your responsibility, that would circumvent all this as well. Thank you very much.
Dr Canterford : Thank you, Senator.
Senator XENOPHON: I have some specific questions for the bureau in relation to the incident that occurred on 18 June this year when a Qantas 737 and a Virgin 737 en route to Adelaide were diverted to Mildura due to fog. The Virgin 737 was required to make an emergency landing because it was about to run out of fuel after one missed approach due to further fog at Mildura. The ATSB issued a preliminary report into the incident on 18 July. The report raised a number of issues in regard to the incident, among which was the provision of weather information. The report states that 'the crew of the Virgin plane were not made aware of the conditions at Adelaide until just prior to the top of their descent, when air traffic control drew it to their attention. As such, when they departed Sydney'—I think it was Brisbane—'they had no indication of the weather in Adelaide and nothing to indicate that they needed to carry fuel for an alternate'. Why was information about the conditions at Adelaide not provided to the crew of the Virgin plane? I understand that the crew of the Qantas plane were aware of deteriorating conditions in Adelaide. Was this based on information from the bureau, or from another source?
Dr Vertessy : I will pass that to Dr Canterford.
Dr Canterford : I am the division head in charge of hazards, warnings and forecasts. The bureau has cooperated with the ATSB report. I understand that it is still being considered at this stage. We have provided all information on forecasts and warnings. Our responsibility is to provide these forecasts and warnings to aviation. The capability of airlines to receive that information et cetera is a matter for their undertaking. We provide the information through the standard Airservices Australia mechanisms.
Senator XENOPHON: It appears from the preliminary report of the ATSB that the Virgin crew did not have access to the information the Qantas crew did. That has nothing to do with the bureau?
Dr Canterford : I think that is still to be considered by the ATSB, but my understanding at the moment is that that would be a matter for the airline to get that information through their normal channels.
Senator XENOPHON: Excuse my ignorance in relation to this but is it a case that the bureau provides information to air traffic control, or do you actually provide information directly to the airlines?
Dr Canterford : Thank you for that clarification. We do not provide directly to each individual airline; we provide it through the standard air traffic mechanisms through Airservices Australia.
Senator XENOPHON: So it is up to air traffic control, presumably, to provide that information to the airlines?
Dr Canterford : Air traffic control but also through the standard networks of information that Airservices provide to the airlines. They have access to that information.
Senator XENOPHON: So, presumably, Qantas would have the same information that Virgin would have in terms of weather forecasts?
Dr Canterford : That would be my understanding.
Senator XENOPHON: Finally, the ATSB's interim report states that 'as the Virgin crew were descending through to about 10,000 feet in visual conditions it became obvious to the crew that the weather conditions were not as reported and that there appeared to be fog at Mildura and low cloud in the area. An indication of the actual weather at Mildura was not possible from the Automated Weather Information Service as it was unavailable'. Why was a more accurate forecast not provided, and whose responsibility was it to ensure that the AWIS was functioning?
Dr Canterford : I think that is still the considerations of the ATSB.
Senator XENOPHON: All right, but the AWISs are your responsibility; is that right?
Dr Canterford : We provide the information to the AWIS, and my understanding is that the broadcasting of information is a mechanism of the normal navigation processes at an airport.
Senator XENOPHON: You are not responsible for looking after the AWISs? That would be air traffic control or Airservices Australia?
Dr Canterford : Correct.
Senator XENOPHON: Okay, that clarifies that. So you have no idea if an AWIS is not operating somewhere. That is not really your responsibility; it is only information that goes to the AWIS?
Dr Canterford : I think we are going into some details that I would have to clarify. I am happy to take that on notice.
Senator XENOPHON: But it is a pretty basic thing, though. If your agency is not the agency responsible for the maintenance of an AWIS—is that the case? I do not want to be needlessly asking the bureau questions when in fact it might be Airservices Australia that is responsible for the maintenance and the upkeep of an AWIS.
Dr Canterford : The bureau has responsibility for the automatic weather station which provides information to the AWIS and also through a telephone or broadcasting system by phone. Those details I would have to clarify myself.
Senator XENOPHON: Hang on; it is pretty basic though. Either you are responsible for an automated weather information service or you are not. Is the Bureau of Meteorology responsible for an automated weather information service?
Dr Canterford : My understanding is that we are not.
Senator XENOPHON: Okay. So who is responsible for it?
Dr Canterford : That is normally the responsibility—and I would have to check this, but the various airports do install that, and it is undertaken through the requirements, I believe, of either the aerodrome operators or Airservices.
Senator XENOPHON: Just finally on this, and I am very grateful to the chair for the time: if an AWIS has broken down or is not operating, is that something that you are told or is it primarily the responsibility of Airservices Australia to ensure that it is operating and its upkeep?
Dr Canterford : I prefer not to go into those details.
Senator XENOPHON: Why not?
Dr Canterford : Because while there is still the report of the ATSB—
Senator XENOPHON: No, sorry, Doctor; you cannot get out of it that easily. I do not think that is a fair answer, for this reason: I am not asking you about this particular incident; I am asking now, in general principles, about who is responsible for maintaining an automated weather information service. If it is not the bureau, fair enough, but I am just trying to understand who is responsible for these automated weather information services.
Dr Canterford : I can talk about the responsibilities of the bureau, but it goes beyond. I would have to check. I do not know the answer to that question.
Senator XENOPHON: Could you take that on notice—
Dr Canterford : I will take that on notice.
Senator XENOPHON: and also take on notice: how long had the AWIS at Mildura been unavailable? When was it repaired? Can the bureau give an indication of how often AWISs are unavailable, on average? But of course, if it is not your responsibility, that would circumvent all this as well. Thank you very much.
Dr Canterford : Thank you, Senator.
??
Fuel policy is a red herring.
So lets have a think about what would have happened had they been required to carry alternate fuel. Both crews have a look at the forecasts and decide to carry fuel for Mildura. Once they get to Adelaide and can't get in, they divert to Mildura where they also can't get in. Nothing has changed. The fuel policy was not the deciding factor in this particular incident.
So lets have a think about what would have happened had they been required to carry alternate fuel. Both crews have a look at the forecasts and decide to carry fuel for Mildura. Once they get to Adelaide and can't get in, they divert to Mildura where they also can't get in. Nothing has changed. The fuel policy was not the deciding factor in this particular incident.
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tch tch AerocatS2A
Fuel policy is a red herring...
The fuel policy was not the deciding factor in this particular incident...
The fuel policy was not the deciding factor in this particular incident...
I didn't say it was the pilot's fault, only that the fuel policy was not a major factor. I'm not defending the current fuel policies, just saying that this might not be the right incident to fight the war with.
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Only a GA pilot with CIR
Listening to this, I can hear the "ostrich - head in sand" explanation.
Remember, head in sand leaves "AR>SE" in air!!
Question is:
Was YMIA a suitable airport for an alternate - width, weight, length, permission owners?? for your scenario.
Remember, head in sand leaves "AR>SE" in air!!
Question is:
Was YMIA a suitable airport for an alternate - width, weight, length, permission owners?? for your scenario.
Was YMIA a suitable airport for an alternate - width, weight, length, permission owners?? for your scenario.
YPWR was not a suitable alternate as PPR is required!
The issue at hand is the in ability of the BOM to forecast and to report fog and the lack of CAT II/III in Australia.
It has nothing to do with fuel as even with a alternate policy the same result would have happened.
be warned there is ill-informed comment contained witin the hansard text from a certain grumpy old Senator
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every opportunity counts
AerocatS2A,
I was probably a bit less clear than I should have been.
In the Norfolk Island case, CASA and the ATSB blamed the pilot and then used that as the reason to look no further at the systemic issues.
I agree that fuel policy wasn't the headline act at Mildura.
My point was supposed to be that any decent investigation looks at all elements of the system and may well identify related issues that had no real influence on that particular event but in slightly different circumstances may well have become critical. They are the things you write on the white board for future consideration or clarification - or you make comment in the report about potential issues that readers might wish to contemplate in other contexts
I was probably a bit less clear than I should have been.
In the Norfolk Island case, CASA and the ATSB blamed the pilot and then used that as the reason to look no further at the systemic issues.
I agree that fuel policy wasn't the headline act at Mildura.
My point was supposed to be that any decent investigation looks at all elements of the system and may well identify related issues that had no real influence on that particular event but in slightly different circumstances may well have become critical. They are the things you write on the white board for future consideration or clarification - or you make comment in the report about potential issues that readers might wish to contemplate in other contexts
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white board?? shelf ware??
Which is this one??
or is it:
white board = shelf ware??
or is it:
wh....................................b..................... ..d
whoops all gone.
They are the things you write on the white board for future consideration or clarification
white board = shelf ware??
or is it:
wh....................................b..................... ..d
whoops all gone.
When you live....
Was YMIA a suitable airport for an alternate - width, weight, length, permission owners?? for your scenario.
Biggest question (and likely gotcha) - who knew TTFs couldn't show PROBS?
Upon the issue of the 2100 TAF combined with the 'code grey' an alternate really ought to have been required but the TTF over-rid that. Did the BOM forecasters understand what they'd done by issuing a prob30 lasting for the same period that the TTF said all clear?
Did crew of VRK assume that because the TTF had no sign of fog then they were ok to continue past YMML diversion point.
How did VIR get so close to Adelaide without knowing about the amended TAF, METARS and ATIS?
Why did either crew consider YMIA as an alternate given it had TEMPO BKN 060 (edit:BKN006) on the forecasts they got at planning? Well below the alternate minima - as a TEMPO - have the METARs been relied upon too much?
From my reading of the report:
- BOM have let everyone down
- Not allowing PROB on TTF is a real gotcha (as such BOM should have erred on side of caution and not put TTF:NOSIG).
- Both crews seem to have relied on YMIA as their option (YIR may have had no choice) when it was inappropriate to do so
- Both crews don't seem to have been proactive in monitoring the deteriorating YPAD conditions (YIR especially) - I assume they had access to ATIS via ACARS?
- what on earth was the Virgin ops centre doing during all this
- the captain of YIR has been a little generous in allowing VRK to push in.
Last edited by UnderneathTheRadar; 26th Dec 2013 at 10:02. Reason: Fix URL/Fix TEMPO
Bottums Up
Originally Posted by UnderneathTheRadar
Why did either crew consider YMIA as an alternate given it had TEMPO BKN 060
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Why did both crew consider YMIA, have a look at the flight plan tracks for each aircaft. They both flew past YMIA on the way to YPAD and at the times they flew past YMIA was clear.
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questions
Clarrie,
Under what circumstances would a cloud base of 6000' qualify as relevant for advice as a TEMPO?
UnderneathTheRadar,
The system must work for all aircraft and should never depend on what an ops centre may or may not be doing.
Is there a requirement for an airline to have the capability to provide real-time met and NOTAM info to each of its aircraft inflight?
It was a good question about TTFs and probs - I didn't know that, but then I also knew that any TTF is only valid until it is replaced (ie, generally good for 30 minutes but sometimes less!).
Stay Alive,
Under what circumstances would a cloud base of 6000' qualify as relevant for advice as a TEMPO?
UnderneathTheRadar,
The system must work for all aircraft and should never depend on what an ops centre may or may not be doing.
Is there a requirement for an airline to have the capability to provide real-time met and NOTAM info to each of its aircraft inflight?
It was a good question about TTFs and probs - I didn't know that, but then I also knew that any TTF is only valid until it is replaced (ie, generally good for 30 minutes but sometimes less!).
Stay Alive,
When you live....
BPA
Why did both crew consider YMIA, have a look at the flight plan tracks for each aircaft. They both flew past YMIA on the way to YPAD and at the times they flew past YMIA was clear.
Just reading the appendix again - VYK had calculated and advised a diversion point for YMML and at that time, YPAD had a SPECI and an ATIS which were below the landing minima but a TTF that said they were fine to continue. And at 2302 new TAFs for YPAD and YMIA (admittedly for the 0000 commencement) also indicated visual conditions. They were completely screwed by the BOM.
4Dogs:
The system must work for all aircraft and should never depend on what an ops centre may or may not be doing
I also knew that any TTF is only valid until it is replaced (ie, generally good for 30 minutes but sometimes less!)
