Boeing NON NORMAL CK LIST philosophy

[LEM]

In theory everything in the NON NORMAL CK LIST is a DO List.
What's the standard in your company?
Do you really perform the Landing ck list in the "One engine inop landing" non-normal cklist as a DO list?
How is it managed exactly? :bored: :hmm:

[E120]

Yes.
The PNF uses the QRH as a "read & do" checklist. Off course you will put the landing gear down and select flaps according to the company's SOPs. In this case, when reading the "deffered items / landing"- checklist (from "One engine inop. landing"), the gear is down already and the flaps are set before reading the items.

Hope this helped.

[LEM]

Thanks, E120, but that was my point: if the gear is down already and the flaps are set before reading the items then it's not a real DO list anymore.
This is a simple example, but in other ck lists, extending the flaps according to SOP for example, could be the wrong thing to do.
So we are back at the starting point. If it has to be a DO list, the PNF should read first, then extend the flaps electrically, for example.
But when?
When he thinks appropriate to do so?
Does the PF just fly and become totally passive?
If we really want to stick to that principle...than we have a problem...
I tend to take my time and read ALL the non normal ck list BEFORE doing it, to review it and know what to expect and how to behave.
Then, if I am PNF, I would say "xxx item NEXT", and the PF would decide when to do that.

Opinions? :ouch:

[HotDog]

LEM, if you are confronted with an abnormal flight situation that requires reference to the QRH, the particular drill necessary is clearly spelt out in the correct chronological sequence. Some abnormals are memory items that are carried out from memory as soon as that chcklist is called for. The conduct of the emergency/abnormal drills is part of your type training which is practiced every six months in the simulator and the QRH is your tool. The Flight Manual expands on the reasons and finer points of the required actions and we study both. I am still amazed at the questions you pose on this forum and wonder what kind of training you have undergone to get your command? Just tell us what type you are operating, it will be easier to supply the answers.

[BOAC]

In the case of the landing checklist to which you refer, my understanding of the 'DO' is that PNF reads and 'DOES' the CHECK as opposed to the 'normal' where PNF reads and PF 'DOES' the CHECK?

It is a 'CHECKLIST'! As E120 says, the items are (should be!) done already. I cannot see the issue, I'm afraid.

For the other parts of the NN checklists, PNF 'declares' the item and PF nods, grunts (or waves whatever is spare at the time) as an acknowledgement:O

[LEM]

HD, you have obviously flown (all your life?) for the same MAJOR carrier.
Fine.
I've never been in a major, and changed already almost ten companies: that means I've met a lot of different people from various countries.
Don't worry I manage very well my command, and if I ask strange questions here is because sometimes I recall some (strange?) theories from the people I've worked with, so I dig in that particular detail - just to hear other people's opinions.
Pprune is very interesting, but you take it if it were THE real world.

BOAC, in this case I use good common sense as you do.
But I once had an instructor very picky on the DO principle:according to that, you don't do anything by recall or SOP, but you have to read first and then lower the gear!

This is obviously an exageration, but I was curious to know if there are other people around the world who think the same.

Just that.

HD this is a forum, perhaps the only place where we can still ask dumbass questions also.
You seem to miss the real world too much.
;)

[MANTHRUST]

LEM : How interesting that you have worked for so many companies!!!!
Suggestions chaps.......

[HotDog]

LEM, I am impressed! Almost ten companies, that must be somewhat of a record. You must have amassed a vast experience of flying different types with different people. Are you in check and training by any chance?

[Traffic]

LEM

CK Lists are aid memoires for common sense, always have been always will be. The only difference these days is that common sense is a concept not readily displayed or understood.

Didn't realise that there were 10 virtual airlines on net. Shows how out of date I am.

[lizard drinking]

I also have not worked for a major, but have had contracts with five Asian carriers, so what's the problem with that?
I have seen many interpretations of Boeing philosophy, and in my opinion any change from the Boeing procedures is dead wrong. Nobody I have worked with has had the training or knowledge needed to amend the manufacturer's manuals and checklists, but so many think they do.
In the company I worked for most recently, they interpret the Recall checks in a funny way, having the PF not only do his/her own items, but detailing the items for the PNF as well. So during an engine fire drill on takeoff, for example, the PF has to fly the airplane, do his own items and also tell the PNF what to do, step by step, monitoring him to see he does it right. Confirming each control as it is moved. Lovely to see the crew in the sim flying the airplane with their tongues. Gives me a lot of confidence that they will be able to handle the real thing. Of course the locals don't have any problem with this, since they put the autopilot on at 250 feet and absolutely rely on it from then on, hardly monitoring it beyond calling out the mode changes on the PMA. Another variation from Boeing, but who's counting?

[fruitbatflyer]

I once worked for an operator who wouldn't let you crossfeed fuel without consulting the checklist, because crossfeeding was in the aircraft type's non-normal QRH. Sim checks were an exercise in 'fly-by-mouth'.
Traffic has it right - all checklists should be used as 'aide memoire' and sure, if it is something complex that you don't understand, you really need to look it up and proceed on a 'read and do' basis.
But, surely, only the most totally mechanically-inept would watch a system overtemp or run away or run out of oil while riffling through pages of a QRH to find the most likely checklist instead of at least throttling back or switching off the gadget causing all the warnings, then getting in to all the detail offered by the QRH?

[Dan Winterland]

It's happened. Anyone remeber the incident with the L1011 which ran out of fuel while the crew tried to sort out a gear problem. It turned out the gear was actually down and on of the green bulbs had blown.

Modern checklists are written with more emphasis from the lawyers than pilots IMHO.

[HotDog]

Dan, EAL 401 on Dec. 29 1972 did not crash due to lack of fuel but crashed due to lack of CRM. Three experienced flight crew, fixated on a lack of nose gear down lock indication, did not notice autopilot disconnect at 2000' and the subsequent descent in CWS mode into the ground. Out of 176 SOB, 94 pax and 5 crew perished on impact.

[LEM]

Somebody at least giving an interesting opinion instead of kidding too much ( frustration maybe?)

Dan, the Tristar didn't run out of fuel, but was simply flown into the ground because nobody was minding the shop.

Mantrhrust, f@cking around is not difficult, just do it and enjoy.
At least you'll have something to tell to your mates down in hell
(btw, just back from another entry check on the B737)!
Now you know, HD.
Happy?
Don't worry, it's a virtual one!!:D :D :D

[LOKE]

"Anyone remeber the incident with the L1011 which ran out of fuel while the crew tried to sort out a gear problem."

You may be referring to a United accident in Portland Oregon years ago. Many look at this acident as the major impetus for formal CRM training.

LL

[mustafagander]

I seem to remember the UAL incident in Portland was a B707. While the crew stuffed around with the gear problem, the a/c ran so low on fuel that they were unable to make it back to the airport. As has been said, that incident was a prime mover in getting formal CRM training up and running.

[LEM]

That was a DC8.
United N8082U from NY to Portland, on 28 December 1978.
The captain, 52, had almost 28000 hours. Everybody got distracted by the LG problem, and nobody communicated their concerns about low fuel. 4 flameouts in the holding, collided with trees.
"Only" 10 fatalities, that's why it's not in all books...
http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/ua173/photo.shtml


Taken from "Airline safety" by W. Heller, if you are intersted:

"Earlier, I mentioned the airliner that crashed short of Portland because it ran out of fuel. The pilot's file revealed that, if he ever had landing gear problems and might have to make a belly landing, he intended to use up all his fuel first. His gauges were reading less than 3000 pounds of fuel when he accepted a steer away from the airport. As a result, people died.
An airliner's captain must allocate duties so that someone is flying the plane at all times.
[...]
Apologists can always be found. A former civilian test pilot claims that corrosion problems in the landing gear system were the cause of the Portland accident. Not true.
[...]
There are excuses for every mistake, and that's why pencils have erasers it is said. When an airline captain makes a mistake, he cannot erase it. It is he, and those flying with him, who are likely to be rubbed out.
Apologists notwithstanding."

[Dan Winterland]

Sorry, got my incidents mixed up.

[Chokdee]

Fruitbat, best to keep the job simple, i.e. utilise checklists instead of committing to memory. I am sure you use the checklists rather than memory for take off and landing, and we do those on a more regular basis than non normals. Fuel crossfeeding or balancing is best left alone unless the non normal message appears. I have never seen a huge imbalance yet if the system is left to do the job it was designed for. Know the recall items, operate the checklists as boeing designed them, but as stated there may be occassions where you will need to operate outwith the scope of the checklist, until then keep it simple. Rgds.

[E120]

LEM, Ic ould not let the subject go. I still stand for what I said in my innitail reply. But, as always, the next question is "wher can i find that?" Plaese look up the "Checklist Inroductio" of the QRH. For the Boeing 737 NG, look up page CI.2.3. It sais: "The PF may also direct reference procedures to be accomlished by recall if no hazard is created by such action, or if the situation does not permit reference to a checklist." Whith these lines you get away with it. (And should). Again, I hope this cleared things up a little bit. Greetz, E120:ok:

[fruitbatflyer]

E120, exactly what I was trying to say, but Boeing say it better!
Thanks for the reference, I knew I'd seen it somewhere.

[Menen]

Boeing might say it better - but try telling that to the check pilot who often has his own interpretation of the Boeing statement . If the Boeing FCTM was written more clearly and concisely, and without regard to legal niceties, then we wouldn't have all this to-ing and fro-ing on Pprune about who is up who, and who is paying the rent. It beats me that Boeing must have done an enormous amount of research before writing stuff in their manuals, yet only the bare necessities are actually published, leaving pilots to speculate over the Boeing intent.

By the way, with the dreaded engine fire warning on the runway after V1 - and you have no idea of the severity of the fire - how long between first hearing the bell and the subsequent firing the first bottle would you consider reasonable? Have heard lots of theories from 15 seconds maximum, to let it burn until the flaps are up and the PNF has time to recall the recalls. Have seen upwards of one minute before someone fires the bottle. Wings have burnt through in that time.

[fruitbatflyer]

Keep flying the aeroplane, call gear up, make sure your mate selects it up - say 5 seconds max. Don't wait for it to actually come up, because if it won't there's ****** all you can do about it at this early stage.
Both pilots identify, another 5 seconds if you are really slow.
Tell your co-pilot to get on with the recall actions for engine fire, maybe 15 seconds to do the lot, so that's 25 seconds in all.
What often makes it hard, and I have so often experienced it in the simulator, both as instructor and 'victim', is that various operators set up their own cumbersome requirements to have the poor ****** trying to fly the thing get a bit too involved in the actual drill, instead of properly training all co-pilots to do the drill in a methodical manner, with the pilot flying just monitoring.
Seems a bit less emphasis on word perfect 'fly-by-mouth' and more on really knowing just a couple of vital drills really well is maybe what's called for. As I said before - if you know what to do, just DO it - if in doubt get the book out. A fire is one you have to know.

[HotDog]

Having a flight engineer would be a great help!

[john_tullamarine]

Another view is to assign priorities to actions on the basis of addressing that which is going to kill you first ... first ..... the fire warning may well be false ... the consequences of a real fire may not kill you in the next 20 seconds or even the time it takes to recover the aircraft to a landing...

... but losing sight of the bigger picture and flying back into the ground ... or into the hill which the departure turn you overlooked (in your enthusiasm to shut down the engine) was intended to avoid .... can definitely spoil your day very quickly and permanently.

Horses for courses chaps ....