RHS Takeoffs and RTO

[FlareArmed]

The Flight Safety Foundation identified some time ago that when the PF is in the RHS, a rejected takeoff has a considerably higher chance of a runway overrun than when the PF is in the LHS.

Boeing recommends that the LHS pilot retains control of the thrust levers throughout the takeoff, makes the reject decision and carries out the immediate actions for all takeoffs, including RHS.

I am interested in how different operators and training organisations handle rejected takeoffs during a RHS takeoff and the associated reasons if known.

[alatriste]

Nowadays I am flying for a major airline located southern Europe. Our SOP call for a RTO executed always by Captain regardless is PF or PNF cause of while on TO run he/she keeps his/her hand on throttles. Spoilers are also close to Cpt position. CPT, usually at LHS, is in comand and takes the decision. When flying as PF the malfunction will be call by copilot and the decision will be CPT choice, when acting as PNF Captain will call the malfuction and make the decision.
Same critera is used for GA procedures.
I have been rated in 4 airplanes and trained in 2 different TRTO and there was always the same policy.

REGARDS

[733driver]

alatriste,

as far as the reject is concerned we do it the same way.

I was however surprised to learn that the G/A decicion also rests with the comander in your company.

In our company a G/A is executed whenever any one of the pilots calls "GO AROUND". No matter who is flying and who is not.

Background: In contrast to a reject, a G/A is almost always a safe course of action.

How is it done elsewhere?

[FlareArmed]

Thanks for the replies.

The decision to initiating a GA is an interesting one. One of the major factors in the Qantas 744 landing overrun accident in Bangkok was the reversal of a decision to GA.

Are any operators having the RHS PF making the decision to reject the takeoff and conducting the immediate actions?

[411A]

FlareArmed,

Yes, there are a few...a small charter company I worked for some time ago allowed the F/O, if he was the flying pilot, to make the RTO decision...it should be noted that all the F/O's were very experienced.

As to the decision to G/A, have always insisted in line training First Officers, that if they do not like the situation developing, to use their initiative when they are the PF....ie; don't like the picture, do something about it, not just sit there waiting for it to get worse......go around.

Better safe than sorry.

[Capt Claret]

In the company I work for The Captain is always responsible for initiating a RTO and becomes the PF if not already.

Capt PF

Capt sets approx power, calls "check power", removes hand from thrust levers to allow PNF to adjust.
PNF adjusts thrust levers as required, calls "power set". Capt takes control of thrust levers again.
At V1, Capt removes hand from thrust levers.



RHS PF

F/O sets approx power, removes hand from thust levers and calls "check power".
Capt adjusts thrust as required and leaves hand on thrust levers in preparation for reject.
At V1 Capt removes hand from thrust levers.

[SuperRanger]

our procedures calls for Capt to do the reject even when RHS is PF. first the decision lies with him and secondly, the speedbrake lever is on the left side.

during a GA, the capt makes the decision to GA by calling "GA" but the maneuver is performed by the PF.

SR

[Flightwatch]

I worked for many years for a European major (no prizes for guessing which one) which has a reputation for having “different” SOPs’ from most other airlines. In the take off case the standard briefing was:-
Either pilot may call stop for the following malfunctions.
1. Engine failure indicated by two or more parameters
2. Any fire warning
3. Take-off configuration warning
4. “Windshear ahead” annunciation
Additionally, 5. if the co-pilot is PH he can call stop if the runway is blocked or he has significant control difficulties.
To amplify the rationale, 1. two or parameters ensures the engine has actually lost power, if, for example, the N1 indication disappears or drops to zero but the EGT, oil pressure, temp etc. are normal, chances are the engine is developing normal power. 2. Any fire warning because it is just as dangerous being in the air with a wheel well fire, cargo fire etc as an engine fire. 3. Self evident. 4. In a/c fitted with predictive windshear system. 5. PNH should be monitoring the EICAS and may not see an obstruction as early as PH who will largely be looking out of the window!
Could anyone argue with this? The few extra seconds gained by not having to communicate the failure to the Captain, his thinking time and subsequent reaction could make the difference between stopping on the paved surface and an overun and at V2 speeds potentially in excess of 180kts this is significant. I doubt any captain would knowingly get airborne with any of the above conditions present. Whilst the emphasis at speeds approaching V2 was to “go” it was more likely that a successful reject would be made near this speed.
To expand the thread slightly, at the same time all duties were exchanged when it was P2’s sector, from the flight planning stage to thrust lever handling etc., the only exception was at the end of an RTO after the parking brake had been set, so that the Captain could make the decision whether or not an evacuation was neccessary.
I now work for another European company, on the same type, who use the standard Boeing “one man and his dog” procedures where, in theory, a co-pilot will never make a decision on fuel required, nor even taxi the aircraft until his upgrade course. No wonder in my previous company the upgrade was largely a matter of routine regarding aircraft operating procedures whereas in my present company it is a major trauma!
Before someone jumps in and says “but didn’t you use the split approach philosophy also”, yes we did and I would argue in favour of it, but that is a whole new topic. At the end of the day, so long as the whole pilot force use the same SOPs’ neither is better or worse than the other.
The only problem I have is to remember to say “reject” on an RTO after 30+ years of saying “stop” Fortunately during my last few sim checks P2 hasn’t misunderstood my intentions!
Best wishes.

[Carbon Life Form]

We used to train to allow either CA or FO to make the decision and undertake a reject, years ago but now have changed to the industry standard.


Fo can still go-around on his own judgement.

[swish266]

Flown for 4 different a/l.
C always does the RTO.
F/o must GA if C fails to call "Land" or "GA" immediately after a "decide" call.
In all other sit C calls a GA.
Finally:
Typical Boeing QRH on Non-Normal Man - Captain does RTO.

[Centaurus]

Gets awfully complicated doesn't it? I remember way back a deputation of 15 disgruntled first officers demanded an audience with the chief pilot, who was a gruff aggressive character handy with his fists. The complaint was that in the simulator each check captain they had flown with had a difference in abort technique - ie who was up who, and who was paying the rent. The first officers were sick and tired of getting hacked around and written down for non-standard procedures. They assembled outside the chief pilot's office accompanied by one of the senior check pilots.

The check pilot timidly knocked on the door, and a loud voice bellowed "Come in". They all trailed in and stood in silence until the chief pilot looked up and said "What the f---k's this all about?"

Clearing his throat with a polite cough, the check captain said that the first officers were cheesed off because none of the check captains seemed standard in the engine failure after V1 actions and that they wanted a ruling from you, sir.

Jeez - said the chief pilot - is that all! It's easy. The PNF calls failure - the PF sez state the type of failure - the PNF sez fire No 1 - and puts his hand on the throttle - the PF sez confirmed - the PNF sez .. The chief pilot stopped in mid-sentence, and said what the @#%$+# wrong with you mate, - to the check captain who had put his hand up.

At this point, the check captain again coughed nervously, and apologising profusely, interrupted the chief pilots burst, saying "Sorry about this, boss, and I hate to correct you - but that's not we're teaching in the simulator.

Seems the first officers had a valid point, when even the chief pilot had got it wrong.
............................................................ ...................................
Interesting also is that although many airlines have a formal "Taking over - handing over policy" when changing handling control, some ignore this policy when it comes to the point where the captain takes over from the co-pilot in order to initiate an abort. That has led to real confusion. Perhaps it should be "I have control - rejecting" Or a similar phase, rather than simply assuming an unspoken change of control responsibility

In addition, I would hazard a guess that any captain that has complete blind trust in the first officer to decide and initiate a high speed abort (the captain becomes just an interested party) would be in for a massive litigation shock if this resulted in an accident. As much as it would be nice to give the first officer his head in the instantaneous V1 abort situation, the legal fact is the captain wears the full blame if the abort was less than successful.

[Ninjaman]

Is that not the whole point!

In the time taken for the Capt to recognise the failure, decide to stop and then take control the chances of a sucessful reject are reduced by a big margin.

Boeing research indicates that the average pilot will take 3 seconds to indentify a failure, decide to stop, and initiate braking. In Capts only rejects you have to add the change of control time on top again.

I'm sorry but i feel that two people flying the aircraft at one time is a very silly idea.

I demonstrate my ability to perform safe rejects as FO in the sim every 6 months, i'm yet to experience a smooth and effective reject from a pilot that has to take control midstream, and i am certain they will never do it quicker than i could have done.

[LEM]

I've always worked as described by Capt. Claret.
The GA also is a Capt decision, but the FO always retains his emergency authority...

Ninjaman, take off calculations assume only one second dalay between the failure and the decision to abort. The Captain keeps his hand on the thrust levers and executes the manouver promptly - and only he, is responsible for what will follow...

[Eff Oh]

In 2 previous companies Captain always performed the RTO. In new company the PF will perform RTO regardless of Capt or F/O. In the case of the STOP call either can call it, if the F/O calls the Capt can elect to continue by calling CONTINUE. If the Capt calls it then the stop must be initiated.
As for the G/A anyone can call Go around and the other must do so.

[GlueBall]

Our SOPs specify that only the Captain's hand is on the throttles (power levers) after 80 knots; and that his/her hand must come off no later than at Vee One.

Super Ranger: The location of the "Speed Brake Lever" may be inconsequential, as the speedbrakes may deploy automatically when reverse thrust is applied (...when flaps are set in T/O position while airplane is in "ground logic" mode, etc...).

[LEM]

There was an interesting thread somewhere about manually deploying the speed brakes in an RTO, or relying on the automatic deployement following reverse application.

It seems generally accepted that, despite this feature, we should manually raise the speedbrakes as any difficulty in deploying reversers will prevent the wheels from getting the whole weight on them (which is a must for stopping the airplane).

[Menen]

No question about it. The order of events according to Boeing is that the speed brakes are first selected manually in order to dump the lift. The back up action in case the manual action is inadvertently forgotten is that when reverse is selected it will also actuate the speed brakes.

If the abort is due to a fire warning in an engine, then depending on the severity of the fire, it would be unwise to select full reverse on a burning engine. In any case, by the time you have got through the interlocks into meaningful reverse, the RTO action would have reduced your speed into the area where the retardation of reverse is nearing minimal. Thus it is vital to immediately select manual speed brake as part of the immediate abort actions.

[swish266]

Quote: "I'm sorry but I feel that two people flying the aircraft at one time is a very silly idea"
You r absolutely right. So at all times there must not be any doubt about who's in control.
In my a/l f/os don't train for RTO but they do so for incapacitation...
Have u heard about a "go-oriented T/O"?
Also FSF says in 90% of accidents after RTO, the decision to stop was wrong "The crew could have safely completed the t/o, dealt with the emergency and landed"...

[mk1eyeball]

on the 744 after reject decision made and thrust levers closed , speedbrakes must be manually deployed followed by symmetrical reverse thrust etc etc.
reason s.brakes done manually is that there are potentially several single path failures tied into the reversers+thrust levers that may result in s.brakes not auto deploying.

[Sheep Guts]

We operate exactly as Capt Claret has described.


Well the only difference being an Otter has the Nose wheel Tiller on the Capts side only so really it can only be done that way.


Hi Claret how art though? Hows Darwin these days mate?

Regards
sheep

[L337]

With an eye on the thread police!

several single path failures tied into the reversers+thrust levers that may result in s.brakes not auto deploying.

What might these be? I am interested as a 744 driver.

L337

[GlueBall]

Menen: Our abort sequence is: (The Captains hands are always on the power levers up to Vee One).
1. Max Brakes, simultaneously with retarding the power levers.
2. Max Reverse
3. Speed Brake (if not deployed automatically).

Especially at high gross weights and close to Vee One, it can be a violent maneuver.

An engine fire wouldn't affect this sequence, nor would it call for "selective" deployment of reverse. It is strictly an instinctive reaction, because usually there is insufficient pavement remaining to think or to hesitate.