Does a pilot really need to be trained how to "monitor"?

[Tee Emm]

Aviation Week & Space Technology /1-14 February 2016, published an article "Is the FAA too soft in combating the ill-effects of automation." Auditors found that the FAA did not have "effective processes" in place to assess monitoring skills both in the cockpit and in the simulator.

In addition the audit said that FAA inspectors say "they do not know how to assess a pilot's ability to monitor the state of the aircraft, beyond observing call-outs."

A recommendation the NTSB issued to the FAA in 2007 to train pilots in monitoring skills, remains "Open-Acceptable" in advance of the new training rules going live in three years.

Where does all this nonsense stop? No wonder flight operations inspectors admit to not knowing how to assess a pilot's ability to monitor the state of the aircraft beyond standard call-outs.

I hate to say this but it seems inevitable that some University bright spark(s) with multiple degrees in flight safety disciplines, will dream up costly courses on how to monitor (watch) a Magenta Line? Big money awaits authors if Regulators take up the idea.


How on earth does one assess "monitoring?" No wonder FAA inspectors themselves are unsure of how this is done. Maybe watching the PM's narrowed eyes darting up and down left right and centre and ears wiggling and hands at the ready to whip control from the captain if the autopilot strays one millimetre from an ILS glide path?

Isn't monitoring nothing more than sitting back and keeping a general eye on where the aircraft is going? Are we in danger of making a mountain out of a mole hill? I suspect the majority of professional pilots think so.

Comments welcomed before thousands of new pilots in the future are forced to pay out of their own pockets for yet another "Safety Related" qualification.

[glum]

"How on earth does one assess "monitoring?""

By injecting faults onto the displays and noting the time it takes for a pilot to react in the correct manner?

Sounds fairly simply to me...

[B737900er]

Whats sad is that we have to train pilots to do their jobs.

[FDMII]

" Whats sad is that we have to train pilots to do their jobs. "

In one sense that's exactly the problem, but in another that's a very complex problem. Most of us do the job such that the accident/serious incident remains extremely low. That doesn't mean there aren't close-calls, it just means very few end up badly.

Though largely in the background, the reversal of the role of automation has been considered but not largely explored.

The role of automation (in general) was established by circumstance after WWII during the time when "automatic" household appliances began making their presence (and benefits) known and understood by all.

The role of automation in flight is an extension of the concept and installation of autopilots. So it was natural that extensions of automation such as autothrottles and FMCs, (this latter in the early 80's, initially by Sperry) should extend to control of complex aircraft performance and navigation capabilities.

The notion that this was not a natural way to proceed because humans make terrible monitors of ordinary, interminably non-stimulating processes, permitted autoflight systems to be "the" way that both the airlines and the manufacturers naturally chose to go.

The attraction for airlines was a reduction in crews from four, (captain, co-pilot, F/E & Nav), to three then quickly, two pilots. In fact, I submit that this is the main (really, the only true) impetus behind fully-autonomous commercial flight.

However, what about reversing the role of automation from active to passive?

That means, crews would employ normal automation just as is done today but would have the added role of monitoring (really, auditing) manual flight.

Much needs to be considered of course. Automated protections already do much of this, but in my view, they typically engage long after the fact in terms of what a pilot would do when realizing that something was starting to come off the rails, so to speak.

I've seen discussions on this elsewhere and know there are both technical and philosophical limitations to the notion. However, role-reversal for automation seem a logical alternative to considering fully-autonomous, regularly-scheduled commercial flight.

[megan]

"How on earth does one assess "monitoring?""

By injecting faults onto the displays and noting the time it takes for a pilot to react in the correct manner?A series of trials on new copilots at one operation found that none detected an oil pressure gauge sitting at zero during a half hour cruise segment on autopilot. Hard to believe maybe, but it seemed there was a reliance on the central warning panel to flash the "master caution" and "oil pressure low" segment.

[Tee Emm]

but it seemed there was a reliance on the central warning panel to flash the "master caution" and "oil pressure low" segment


I don't mean to sound a smart-arse but it is going to be literally a pain in the neck if pilots spend half their life time in a jet transport with their seat tipped back "monitoring " the overhead panel for a possible fault that failed to activate a Master Caution light.

[glum]

What else is there to do when the autopilot is flying?

[Sciolistes]

I would argue that effective monitoring is the result of high levels of situational awareness combined with anticipation and highly cooperative behaviour.

[Skornogr4phy]

With aircraft as reliable as they are now, it's quite easy to forget to monitor while in the cruise. If you had some fault every 4th sector like in the old days then your monitoring would perhaps be better as you would be more wary of aircraft airworthiness.

[B737900er]

Working at 100% for 4 sectors 3-4 days a week will decrease your performance as a pilot as the week goes on. Aircraft reliability is a lot better than it was a few decades ago which reduces workload on the pilots.

[cosmo kramer]

You can only monitor, if you know what too look for.

- You need to know what are the acceptable and normal deviations.
- You need to be able to know what should happen next and to a predict how the automatics should react to a given situation.

In other words, you need to know how to fly manually (without guidance), to be able to effectively monitor the automatics. THERE IS NO WAY AROUND IT!

[RAT 5]

I don't mean to sound a smart-arse but it is going to be literally a pain in the neck if pilots spend half their life time in a jet transport with their seat tipped back "monitoring " the overhead panel for a possible fault that failed to activate a Master Caution light.

Over the past few years one XAA, perhaps at EASA behest, has added so many legally binding notes & signatures to the load sheets and Nav Logs that it is scary. No doubt they will add a 30 mins monitor check + signature to the tech-log similar to those toilet inspection signatures every few hours.

Auditors found that the FAA did not have "effective processes" in place to assess monitoring skills both in the cockpit and in the simulator.

What scares me is the techno-rush towards auto-drive cars. If we think that highly qualified/trained pilots have great difficulty in 'monitoring' their chariot then what do we think joe-public is going to do trundling down the motorway at 120kph reading the paper in total trust that HAL will steer/brake/accelerate their chariot in total safety? How often is there going to be the "WTF is it doing now?" and "what am I going to do about it?" It's frightening to think about. SUV's will become party wagons with the odd glance to find out where you are.
What will be the training program for such drivers? What will be the testing? Remember, drivers do not undergo re-tests in their life time. Even a PPL has a re-test every 2 years.
Driving at night for long periods on a motorway can be soporific as it is. Do you think reducing the concentration level to one of a monitor will enhance reduce safety? It would be like making an CAT 3B (no DH) autoland with your eyes closed in blind faith that the automatics will land, steer the a/c on centreline and the auto brakes will stop it before the end. Who would do that?
So, if FAA can not come up with an idea about training/assessing/checking pilots to be monitors what chance have the car driving authorities got?

[evansb]

Sciolistes is spot on. Humans, by nature, are rather poor monitors.
Techniques to improve and enhance the inherently boring and monotonous task of monitoring can indeed be taught..

[Mansfield]

RAT 5, I have to believe that the autonomous car folks are not planning on anyone monitoring anything. There is simply no way to possibly train the masses...it'll have to work without monitoring. Not that I think it will work...

Had a CSD overheat on the way back up from Mexico in the trusty old MD80 a couple of weeks ago. There is no master caution or annunciation; one simply has to make a routine scan of the overhead. We descended to start the APU, disconnected the generator, and the temp cooled...so we continued in that configuration. The FO remarked that, "Not many guys would have caught that..." Seriously? Why not? How much of this has to do with a generation disconnected from the habits developed while operating any type of machinery? If you like running machinery, you like watching it work...on the other hand, if you came up through the ranks of the video game crowd, monitoring may not come as naturally as it once did.

At the first moment you think you are bored, it's time to look around. But when it gets busy, active monitoring is tough if you a) don't have good SOP compliance, and b) don't communicate your intentions ahead of time. Next, as the monitoring pilot, communicate clearly...phrases like "Did you see that?" or "That looks weird" are not the least bit useful.

That said, fatigue will neutralize monitoring before it neutralizes anything else. First, they kill the sentries...

I have often joked that pilots who read in the cockpit are safer than pilots who don't, simply because on a long segment, the guy who doesn't read is staring out across the horizon, a million miles away. The guy who does read is so scared he's going to get caught with his pants down that he checks the panel every 30 seconds...

[parkfell]

Might pilots begin this journey during the MCC / JOC course?

If the rights foundations are taught here, progressed through the type course, and then during line training and beyond it becomes fairly instinctive behaviour?

[FullWings]

Sciolistes is spot on. Humans, by nature, are rather poor monitors.
Techniques to improve and enhance the inherently boring and monotonous task of monitoring can indeed be taught..
I agree with the first bit - not quite so sure about the second. Improve, yes but really how effective can you become?

There’s monitoring and monitoring. On takeoff or landing, to apply extra diligence for a short while is not too fatiguing. Same during non-normal events. To keep up a sustained active level of monitoring for 5-10hrs plus is much more difficult, especially if the aeroplane is reliable to the point that things rarely go off-piste. That’s one of the reasons why we have EICAS/ECAM, along with other reasons like detailed technical information is not available any more in the manuals.

There’s Human Performance to consider: I wouldn’t say we were poor static monitors, we are appalling at it! Most of our senses work best when there is changing input - when nothing happens, eventually we start to see/hear/feel, etc. things that may not even be there.

I do a fair amount of LH and ULH flying and I find it impossible to sit there for very long just looking at the aeroplane, especially on a dark night in the middle of nowhere with the other guy on controlled rest. I have to do something that keeps my brain working otherwise I just zone out and start getting micro sleeps.

[FDMII]

"I wouldn’t say we were poor static monitors, we are appalling at it!"

Abundantly clear - all are agreed. We're also agreed that you can't change the human brain, you can only try to modify behaviour, and that never lasts.

So, why aren't computers doing what they're best at, and why aren't pilots doing what they're best at?

Why did automation take over from pilots, when really, it is the reverse that should have happened - computers monitoring pilots (and the autopilot, when engaged)?

Re, "I do a fair amount of LH and ULH flying and I find it impossible to sit there for very long just looking at the aeroplane, especially on a dark night in the middle of nowhere with the other guy on controlled rest. I have to do something that keeps my brain working otherwise I just zone out and start getting micro sleeps. "

Understand that very well, same routine before retiring. To be clear, it's obvious that the "solution" above does nothing for this phase of flight. It's the initial climb/descent/approach/landing phases that we're concerned with and is as we know, where most incidents/accidents occur.

[megan]

Don't know what you might have on your overhead panel Tee Emm, but a drop of oil pressure into the no, no region, but has not dropped low enough to bring on the lights, is certainly of concern.

The 737 that drained the wing tanks till the fuel low came on, but landed with a substantial load in the centre may have benefited from a scan of the overhead at some point during the approx four hour cruise.

Settled into the cruise when the pressure dropped into the yellow, with a corresponding temperature drop. Couldn't figure that one out, reduced power to idle to keep auxiliaries on line (twin aircraft) and landed ASAP. Following shut down ground crew reported a large amount of oil dumped on the tarmac, and inspection found the oil tank empty. Cause, a split in the tank to pump line. As long as the engine was operating it sucked air in through the split, which explained the loss in pressure and drop in temp. As soon as it was shut down the oil drained out via the split.

So yes, monitor those VITAL instruments.

[Centaurus]

So yes, monitor those VITAL instruments.

Mind you, some people can go overboard about monitoring. During take off from Canberra circa 1964 in a RAAF Convair 440 Metropolitan, and a few seconds after the landing gear had been selected up, there was a crescendo of noise from the port side with RPM needles indicating indicating an over-speeding propeller. There was no time to go through the standard identification routine so I feathered the left prop.. At this point the co-pilot had no idea what was happening and there was no time to discuss things.

It took less than six seconds for the prop to go from 2400 RPM to 3200 RPM before a stand pipe in the oil tank saved the day and enabled the prop to feather. Inspection through the port side cabin windows revealed oil covering the left engine cowls as well as the landing gear and over the tail plane. Made a circuit and did an asymmetric landing. Due for the potential for fire with hot brakes on the left wheels, we used no brakes on that side. Reverse thrust was used on the right engine and there was no problem with the landing run.

Later investigation revealed the main oil line from the engine to the oil cooler had split asunder, dumping approximately 35 US gallons of engine oil oil everywhere including on the runway during the latter part of the take off run. There were no untoward indications until the prop ran away.

In the Convair 440, the oil tank contents gauges are on the lower section of the instrument panel in front of the captain's position and hidden from view behind his control column.

It was not possible to view these gauges unless you leaned well over and looked down over the rather bulky control column. The wide cockpit layout on the Convair meant the co-pilot had almost no view of the oil contents gauges which were hidden from his view by the throttle quadrant and the captain's hands over the throttles.

Despite the successful outcome, the captain (Cent) was criticised by his Commanding Officer for not monitoring the two out of sight oil contents gauges during the take off roll. The CO claimed the beginning of the loss of oil contents should have been picked up during the 35 seconds of take off roll and a rejected take off undertaken.

Of course his claim was rubbish as the last instruments one would ever monitor during a take off roll are out of immediate sight oil contents gauges. Monitoring of flight paths and various appropriate gauges should be a common sense task by reasonably competent crew members. Pilots should not be required to have special prescriptive training courses just for these simple tasks

[Uplinker]

At the risk of sounding like a cracked record; training in this area is very poor. In my experience, too much is assumed by trainers and not trained by them. They assume we have read all the books, cover to cover. They assume we have understood every word and implication. They assume we can do things that are not specifically trained. They assume that a new sentence in a manual has been spotted, read, and understood by everyone. They assume that we are all equally capable of monitoring and correcting PF effectively. I didn't think we were supposed to assume anything in flying?

Regarding boredom; I never fail to be amazed by the 'farts on guard' or 'music on guard' brigade. Considering what they have had to go through to get into a front seat of a jet, I cannot believe they find it so boring that they resort to such pathetic childishness. I guess that they are the ones whose Daddy paid for it all......

If people are bored by modern jet flying then they are missing something and not doing their monitoring job properly. If ever anyone starts getting bored, try thinking, "if we had an explosive decompression NOW, or an engine failure NOW; what would my actions be and where would I go? Where is the high ground, what airport will I head towards?" That should prevent boredom :ok:

Doing a crossword or similar keeps the brain alert and ticking over, and as someone mentioned, you are likely to check things even more often while doing so.

[alf5071h]

The FAA’s and NTSB’s problem is that they have created it for themselves. Their continued labelling of the human as a failure, concluding the need for more training and assessment adds little to the quest for improved safety, but increases the confusion and complexity of training and operation.

Operations are very safe; however on rare occasions, weaknesses in the safety process disrupt normal defences. As long as investigation and regulatory activity continues to focus on the human as the weakest defensive link, as something which must be improved, then the greater the problem of identifying what should be trained and assessed – how to improve the human.
There are many academic views of this, but the one which stands above all others is that ‘it is difficult to change the human condition, but it is possible to change the conditions of work’ (J Reason) – identify and monitor those aspects which influence human behaviour.
Thus for ‘monitoring’, how can we assess that which we cannot identify or train? Should we assess individual pilots, crews, operators; assess what, what objective, what standard, what training; safety involves all aspects, their relationships, their potential to add to the process, and the means of improving this. This is much more than training and assessment.

It is important to appreciate the effects of change. Older systems required a high degree of monitoring, this is less so now. We still need to monitor the vital instruments, but which ones are vital, when, where, how. This depends on context, understanding the situation, the task, and realisation of the overall safety objective – balanced by economics.
Modern monitoring is less focussed on instruments or systems, but more on the objective and means of achieving it – the process of flying, situation awareness, and management.

The FAA and NTSB might achieve a more meaningful output by including themselves in any criticism of human activity, revise their misguided beliefs to match the current safe operational world, to appreciate what has changed and what is required in future scenarios.
These high level organisations should improve their awareness and implementation of the safety initiatives required for an already safe industry.

[RAT 5]

I've got to go with Megan on this. EICAS alert you when limits are reached and perhaps it better to do something proactive to a trend than wait to be reactive. On B737, even B757/767 there are quite a few items that you would like to know about that are not on EICAS. I went B732 - B767. We did not dump old habits just because it was a new toy. I was appalled after joining a fledgling airline who have transited from B727 (i.e. with an FE) to B757/767. I used to do an overhead scan at TOC and a glance around every so often.
One day, on a jump seat, the instructor captain berated the F/O PF for looking at the overhead panel. He said it was unnecessary because there was EICAS. Just relax. He was also one of the "follow follow follow the FD" brigade.
I wonder if the A330 Atlantic glider might have fared better if the monitoring process and been more critical and considerate. No doubt there are many examples where different outcomes could have occurred with better techniques.

[Centaurus]

One day, on a jump seat, the instructor captain berated the F/O PF for looking at the overhead panel. He said it was unnecessary because there was EICAS

Reminded me of an incident that happened to a friend of mine (A320 captain) undergoing an assessment in an A320 simulator for a captain's job in an Indonesian airline.
Departing in CAVOK, the Indonesian check pilot cleared the LH seat pilot for a left turn after take off. As the pilot commenced the turn he took a quick glance over his shoulder to check for visual traffic. The check pilot instantly froze the simulator and demanded why the pilot looked outside.

The pilot explained it was an instinctive quick look for traffic as weather was CAVOK. The check captain berated him loudly saying "you don't need to look outside even in good weather - trust the TCAS." :ugh:

[Volume]

Humans, by nature, are rather poor monitors.I am absolutely not sure about that. At the times when humans still had to hunt for their dinner, and had to take care not to become some raptors snack either, monitoring was an essential part of surviving. Humans are quite good in noticing minor changes within their field of view, or noise, smell, vibration etc. unless they concentrate on something different at that time, then they even miss the elephant in the room (and supposedly men are worse than women in that respect).
I believe that humans are very good monitors, if they want to, know what to monitor and are not distracted.
The tricky part however is to notice whether somebody else is just relaxing, or monitoring his environment. That makes the job for FAA inspectors quite tricky ideed. It only is easy if there is something to notice, and the person supposed to be monitoring is not noticing it. As long as everything runs perfect, you can not tell the difference.

[peekay4]

I am absolutely not sure about that. At the times when humans still had to hunt for their dinner, and had to take care not to become some raptors snack either, monitoring was an essential part of surviving.
Those examples are not exactly on the mark. Humans are great at visually detecting movement, and we've effectively used that skill to hunt and to prevent from becoming dino meal.

But in IMC without outside visual reference, we're very bad at detecting a slow uncommanded roll, a gradual loss in altitude, deterioration of speed / energy, etc. All items which should be part of any pilot's basic instrument scan.

We've had many many examples of these kinds of failures over the years. Eastern Airlines Flight 401, the Asiana crash at SFO, the recent AirAsia crash in Indonesia, etc. In each of these accidents none of the multiple crew members detected that something was wrong until it was too late.

If we only rely on pilot monitoring to detect slow deterioration of aircraft state, then accidents like above will continue to happen. Even if the FAA mandates additional training, hand flying, etc., it's human nature that we're not very good at certain tasks. So I think there is a diminishing returns in FAA's approach to monitoring.

Alerting -- automated callouts, warnings, etc., is part of the solution. But sometimes we're good at ignoring those, too.

[Mansfield]

Reference Karl Weick and his brilliant definition of mindfulness:

"A rich awareness of discriminatory detail"

So one of the open questions is: can we make the detail more discriminatory? This is one of my big concerns with the digital vs analog display issue, but there are many more cases where I am not sure the question has been taken as seriously as need be.

[GlobalNav]

"But in IMC without outside visual reference, we're very bad at detecting a slow uncommanded roll, a gradual loss in altitude, deterioration of speed / energy, etc. All items which should be part of any pilot's basic instrument scan."

One of the "features" of the human component of our airborne system is that it adapts to its environment - meaning its skills, awareness, attention, behaviors are affected by its experiences. The modern automated flight deck has done wonders to performance, enabled operations, and so on, but it has also, unintentionally, changed routine pilot behavior. One of those behaviors, I believe, is the instrument scan - its quality of perception and its frequency. Given the evidence of extended airspeed degradation (over a period of minutes) demonstrated in the data of some accidents over the last several years.

I think we need some deliberate flight deck display design to both compensate for and correct this trend in pilot behavior. A cacaphony of new alerts, hand slaps, and training emphases, alone, are inadequate and unsustainable. Our flight deck displays systems must not only support instrument flight they must promote good airmanship. We need to embrace the characteristics of the human component, not complain about them, and we need to design with them in mind to foster the pilot behavior (habits, performance, awareness) we need.

Alerts may address crew awareness of a non-normal condition, but they do nothing to promote pilot awareness of the aircraft state under normal routine conditions. And the latter is the main problem.

[Centaurus]

Eastern Airlines Flight 401, the Asiana crash at SFO, the recent AirAsia crash in Indonesia, etc. In each of these accidents none of the multiple crew members detected that something was wrong until it was too late.


I don't believe that theory at all. I believe certainly in the Asian SFO crash that at least two of the pilots saw what was happening (which was poor flying ability by the PF) but their ethnic culture was so dominate that both shut up about what they clearly saw the way things were going (badly) rather than cause loss of face of the PF. Time and again we have seen this in accidents involving cultural mores over-riding flight safety of the crew and unfortunate passengers.

We need to go beyond political correctness and accident investigators need be blunt about this serious problem because history is bound to repeat itself eventually. Mark my words.:sad:

[peekay4]

but their ethnic culture was so dominate that both shut up about what they clearly saw the way things were going (badly) rather than cause loss of face of the PF.
You are entitled to your opinion & cultural biases.

But the NTSB accident report does not support such conclusion. In fact earlier in the approach (around 1000' AGL) the Observer pilot noticed the high sink rate and he spoke up. Six seconds later, when the high sink rate remained, he spoke up again.

So clearly he wasn't concerned about "loss of face" of the PF. He did not shut up.

But none of the pilots noticed that the airspeed gradually deteriorated from 137 kts MCP target speed down to 120 kts. And this loss of airspeed was only detected because at 200' the automated callout made the PM check the airspeed.

And because the pilots assumed that A/T will take care of the airspeed, none of them noticed when the airspeed continued to decay to 109 kts. Like before, PM only checked the airspeed again when the 100' automated callout was made. Go around was initiated 1/2 second later but it was too late.

Again Asiana demonstrates that while pilots may notice "obvious" events such as high sink rate, they have difficulty perceiving more gradual deterioration in state (i.e., the speed decay). They were already 17 kts below target speed before the PM noticed it, and only because an automated callout prompted him to look.

[Uplinker]

Just as when driving a car, where it's a good idea to check the rearview mirrors every 20 seconds or so, PM and PF should glance at their PFD regularly.

With the tape displays and everything on the one screen, one can assimilate whether the situation is normal in about a second. It is very easy to check if the speed, atttitude and altitude are where they should be with just one glance.

I suspect the problem stems from pilots no longer working their way 'up' to big jets as we used to, via small and then large turbo props, but going from flight school straight into the RHS of a modern airliner that seldom goes wrong.

Such pilots perhaps do not develop the vital need to monitor because the modern jets' automatics rarely go wrong, whereas those of us who flew aircraft with crude and unreliable 'automatics' (or no automatics) quickly developed a good regular scan to check that all was well, or to do something about it if it wasn't.

This ties in with automation dependancy.

[RAT 5]

PM and PF should glance at their PFD regularly.

Correct; but as was touched on in another topic, this glance is often only to see of the FD is centred, which with A/P in CMD it will be. Let's remove the FD when A/P is in CMD. This will force a better scan

Such pilots perhaps do not develop the vital need to monitor because the modern jets' automatics rarely go wrong, whereas those of us who flew aircraft with crude and unreliable 'automatics' (or no automatics) quickly developed a good regular scan to check that all was well, or to do something about it if it wasn't.
This ties in with automation dependancy.

Let's make a/c and flight-decks where things go wrong more often and the back-up system has to be selected manually if the re-set function doesn't work. Ha! Back to the future. Yippee said the ex-FE.

[Mansfield]

Correct; but as was touched on in another topic, this glance is often only to see of the FD is centred, which with A/P in CMD it will be. Let's remove the FD when A/P is in CMD. This will force a better scan

I don't know if they still do, but I believe United Airlines used to do just that. My understanding was that when you selected autoland on the 767/757 fleet, the flight director would disappear.

Of course, on the 727, we never engaged the FD unless we were actually flying an instrument approach...the rest of the time it was just pitch and power. Therein, perhaps, lies the problem...

[RAT 5]

I don't know if they still do, but I believe United Airlines used to do just that. My understanding was that when you selected autoland on the 767/757 fleet, the flight director would disappear.

When I was flying these in UK the CAA stipulated this setting. I then moved to a european airline, different CAA, and the FD remained. So it was not a type issue.
I am leaning strongly towards the idea that to improve monitoring of 'what the a/c is really doing' the FD's should be absent when A/P is in command.
However, and sad to hear, there are airlines who forbid switching off the FD when either manual or automatic flight. That comment might be more relevant on the 'too much auto-dependancy' topic when considering manual flight, but does has some relevance during automatic flight.

[glum]

Perhaps a system prompted scan would work?

Have the aircraft call out a check, and once confirmed the crew press a reset button. Continue this until the scan is done.

Repeat every 15 / 30 minutes.

Once every three scans, the aircraft deliberately sets one of the checklist items to an incorrect value, and ensures the crew do not 'pass' that check.

Or better still, bring back the FE who's primary role is to stop the pilots killing everyone!

[Uplinker]

The first commercial passenger aircraft I flew was a turbo prop that had no A/P and no F/D.

In fact I remember during the ground school for my next type, our instructor talking about the 'flight director'. We thought 'why is he going on about the guy in head office?'! What he was saying didn't make sense, but nobody said anything so muggins here eventually puts his hand up "errm.....sorry, what's a flight director?"

And as RAT 5 says, this could be the crux of the problem. On that first type I developed a true scan: and even today when I glance at the PFD I look at the speed tape, the pitch, the bank, the altimeter tape and the V/S tape. I don't really look at the F/D much if the A/P is in - there is no point, because even if the square is centered in the cross, the A/P and F/D might have both gone wrong and it would still look right.

I like the idea of flying with EITHER A/P or F/D but not both. On Airbus, switching both F/Ds off forces the A/THR into speed mode, so I don't know if this would be practical for all phases of flight though?

[Microburst2002]

the scan rate is what we forget, not how to fly.

That is why I want to take this oportunity to advocate for the FPED (Flight Path Envelope Director)

It is like using the FD, with all its modes, but the FD bars are "armed", so when you deviate from the target speed, v/S, track, etc... by a given amount, the FD bars come and you are prompted to follow them.

Using this would keep us as safe as flying with FD and we would have good flying skills

Any engineer out there, put my name on the patent along with yours, please

[glum]

"It is like using the FD, with all its modes, but the FD bars are "armed", so when you deviate from the target speed, v/S, track, etc... by a given amount, the FD bars come and you are prompted to follow them."

Not sure how this is different from directions given now?

If I recall AF447 correctly, the "Stall" warning sounded for minutes and the pilot kept pulling back on the stick.

It is perhaps a case of changing the way the aircraft communicates with crew such that they can still fathom out what's going on, or at least unfreeze enough of their brain to follow guidance.

What would be a better attention getter?

[Microburst2002]

Well, the difference is that you don't see the bars as long as you are maintaining your flight path. When you deviate beyond a prescribed threshold, the bars will pop up immediately, then the FD is ON as usual, and you follow it.
But if you keep the flight path on your on, the FD bars remain hidden, and you enjoy the flight more, keep your skills honed and stay sharp.

[InSoMnIaC]

I have an Idea. Why don't they just leave us alone! We are under constantly scrutiny in this job. Medicals, sim checks, line checks, Flt monitoring. not to mention the countless refresher courses we have to do. Just leave us the F alone.

Is there any other profession out there that is so highly scrutinised? IMO there is no safety benefit in creating some course or whatever that is designed to improve/test or monitoring skills.

If the industry is serious about having more alert pilots why not do something about FTL rules. give us more rest and we will perform better. I promise.

If you can prove in the sim and in flight that you are capable of doing the job correctly as PF then it stands to reason that as PM you should also know when something is not right. If you miss something then it's a lapse not due to inability but probably due to tiredness/fatigue.

[Uplinker]

What would be a better attention getter?

Can't remember where I originally posted my idea but by putting a vibrating element similar to those found in cellphones into the top of the Airbus side-stick, where that oval thumb rest panel is. Drive the vibrating element from the "stall stall" logic and hey presto, you have a haptic stall warning in the form of a vibrating side-stick.

And so simple to engineer, it could probably be retro fitted to all Airbuses, (assuming successful flight trials and certification, obviously).

I thought about a patent but decided to give this out free in the interests of increased safety and to make it more likely to be put into practice - we don't ever want another AF447.

[Zaphod Beblebrox]

Here is a link to a joint AlPA / FAA conference and training event on Active Pilot Monitoring.

http://safetyforum.alpa.org/portals/31/2013/Reidemar_7-17-13.pdf


This workshop is part of the development of a training system to help address automation complacency. It is the FAA responding to a demand from the NTSB to find a way to address the problems inherent in complacency in highly automated aircraft.

[Centaurus]

Here is a link to a joint AlPA / FAA conference and training event on Active Pilot Monitoring.

I sincerely tried to study these points carefully but my eyes glazed over starting from page one. Can you imagine the sheer boredom of some "expert" droning on and on and on reading from a Power Point presentation? :*

[slast]

Here's a more recent version of the same thing...
http://aspaasuntostecnicos.org/seminario2015/Info/docs/alpa.pdf