Simulator Training for strong crosswind landings

[Centaurus]

I am sure most Pprune readers would have seen this video of aircraft battling strong crosswind landings. I found myself watching it again in horrified fascination even though been there-done that, a few times in my career. .

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7P9OAng32F0

A well executed landing or take off in maximum crosswinds requires excellent handling skills and most of these are learned on the job as it were. With cross-wind component landing restrictions placed on low experience first officers you wonder how will they ever get the confidence as well as the skills needed, to handle the gusty crosswind conditions evident in the video.

I believe the solution is in simulator training. The majority of today's simulator sessions are on automatic pilot with concentration on instrument approaches. This includes type ratings. Because full use of automation is mandated by most airliner operators, and indeed encouraged by Regulators and aircraft manufacturers alike, the opportunities are getting increasingly limited for crews to keep up manual handling skills.

There are some who claim crosswind landings in simulators do not accurately reflect the real thing. In other words fidelity is lacking. If so, either the simulator is not being maintained to the required fidelity standard or it is not an airline standard simulator. I'm no expert but in my airline career I have done hundreds of crosswind landings and the Boeing 737 simulators I have "flown" in crosswinds gave as near as damn it to what I have experienced outside.

IMHO it is during type rating training where the skills at crosswind landings in jet transport types should be taught in the simulator. At present, it is probable that only three or four crosswind landings are given in the whole type rating and these are rarely above 15 knots. These are patently insufficient to qualify someone to fly on line and be deemed competent to land safely in the certified maximum crosswind for the type. That may be why company limits are applied to first officers until they have attained a certain number of flying hours on type.

Basic techniques of crosswind take off and landings have been unchanged for years. Some pilots never really master the skills needed while others are naturals. But three or four crosswind landings per year in the simulator and those rarely above 15 knots, will never adequately prepare inexperienced pilots for the crosswind gusts shown in that video. It is known that handling skills have deteriorated due to the accent on full use of automation. The problem is nothing has been done, apart from lip service by operators, to seriously combat the trend.

If it is agreed that seriously strong crosswind landings are what really reveals lack or otherwise of a pilot's manual handling skills, then surely simulator trainers should give priority to increasing crosswind landing practice so that landing at maximum crosswinds eventually becomes just another ho-hum event. Type ratings should not be signed off until candidates are able to safely and consistently land at maximum certified cross-wind components. From then on regular practice at these should be rostered during recurrent training.

[Bergerie1]

centaurus

Thanks for a good post. I flew 707s, VC10s and 747s. Cross wind landings on the VC10 were fairly straightforward because there were no engine pods to worry about, but there was still a similar limitation on roll to prevent touching an outboard flap. The 707 was more demanding. On both types, the simulators (I am talking about the 1970s) were not good enough, so we required new captains during their command courses to land under training in cross winds in excess of 20kts. This was sometimes a particularly demanding exercise for the training captain!

On the 747, the simulators were better and we cleared captains on the simulator. This was, I believe, the right thing to do. But it was necessary also to ensure that sufficient turbulence was used too.

As centaurus has said, basic crosswind techniques have not changed over the years, they are not difficult in themselves. It is the turbulence that causes the problems. And here good simulator practice can pay dividends, with plenty of practice in very demanding conditions.

I am long retired now. I just hope airline training departments allow sufficient time for this during type training.

[Chris Scott]

Also retired from a wide variety of airliner types, I think Centaurus's idea would be a step in the right direction. No doubt Bergerie1 well remembers the appalling lack of realism of the visual system in the VC10 sim at Cranebank in the 1970s, but things steadily improved after that. In my latter experience, the relative realism of modern visuals was under-used for practising visual approaches on large aeroplanes (a dying art), and I'd be surprised if much has improved in 12 years in that area.

However, the problem with simulating approaches and landings in gusty crosswinds is that, in the real world, no two sets of conditions are quite the same - even in similar surface winds at the same airfield. Although I have no experience of the latest simulators (my last being the A320 of the 1990s), I doubt that they offer a diverse set of algorithms appropriate for the ground profiles of the menu of airfields, or that a random element is available. Perhaps a current trainer will comment?

If a random element is not available, my reservation is that regulars on simulators, such as the trainers themselves, are likely to learn the limited repertoire of models so well that they can anticipate precisely the direction and intensity of the next gust. If the student fails to cope with one approach, there might be a tendency to offer a second approach using the same model. If a third approach was then required, the trainer would be tempted to intervene with advice at key moments, and the exercise would therefore be of limited value. So, if a random algorithm is available, it should be used most of the time.

Don't think I'm rubbishing the idea - but it may have its limitations.

[de facto]

Visit a chinese sim,,they love max crosswind touch and goes until you get up/down motion sickness:E

[Dan Winterland]

Every simulator I have flown has never emulated the behaviour of the real aircraft. It seems impossible to get the yaw/roll couple correct with such large inputs. Even the FBW Airbus types don't do it well enough to be realistic and they shouldn't roll with a rudder input.

[latetonite]

The simulator B737 I fly is pretty ok.
People who cannot manage a 30 kt crosswind in the sim, probably do bad in the aircraft as well.
When flying an aircraft, I do exact as I fly the sim. The crosswinds seem to have the same effect on my control as in the sim.

[Jwscud]

I have just done max crosswind training in the sim. In fact we did several raw data visual circuits in significantly more than the legal max. The simulator (level B 737, therefore perfectly legal for recurrent training) in my opinion simply did not accurately recreate the feel of the aircraft in a strong crosswind, or the effect of turbulence and shear between the 1000' and surface winds.

[latetonite]

The shear and turbulence was not the question. It was the crosswind.

[Kefuddle]

Looking at that posted video, shear and turb was part of the question. Flying a steady wind crosswind is pretty damn easy. What makes it so difficult on the line is the variability of direction and strength at a low level, which is inevitable with a strong crosswind at most places.

[Denti]

Level B simulators are simply not good enough for real in depth landing training, which is one of the reasons that they are not usable for ZFT. Level D on the other hand should be ok.

I wouldn't trust a normal Level B simulator for normal landing training, even less so for training with considerably more than the legal maximum (40 kts cross on wet and dry runways for the 737NG).

[Rick777]

I have had the opportunity to play around with crosswinds in the 777 sim. They go up to 40 kits or so. It is a good place to start but in my opinion crosswinds in the sim are much easier than in real life.

[safetypee]

In addition to the many weaknesses in simulating crosswinds as above, the majority of systems are unable to simulate true lateral acceleration, at least for a significant period covering de-crabbing and during roll out.
Also the control input / flight path behaviours are similar to those seen when simulating engine failure after take-off; because there is no sideways ‘seat of the pants’ feeling for feedback.

[Centaurus]

Flying a steady wind crosswind is pretty damn easy.

For an experienced pilot, yes. In fact I used to look forward to experiencing strong cross-winds as a challenge. But it is a completely different story for the low hour first officers that appear to be the norm in airline recruiting nowadays.

A common theme observed during crosswind landings in the 737 Level D (Full Flight) simulators, is the sight of experienced and not so experienced pilots alike making very little attempt to touch down without drift. The landings turn out OK but there is no finesse. While the Boeing FCTM talks about deliberately landing without removing drift on a slippery runway, and I can understand that technique, I am amazed at the number of times I have observed pilots plonking the aircraft sideways on dry runways without even trying to get it straight first.

It is also interesting to note that some are even seemingly unaware they still have drift on at touch down. In fact there are some pilots who for some reason cannot "see" drift. One technique to show them the drift on touch down is to "freeze" the simulator at the split-second of touch down, so that at their leisure they can see the aircraft heading and compare it to the runway heading. My guess is 90 percent touch down with 10 degrees or more of drift still in place. The usual excuse is that the FCTM allows this via the words "The airplane can land using crab only (zero sideslip) up to the landing crosswind guideline speeds" Judging by the video shown in the original post several aircraft did just that.

Earlier I mentioned that low hour pilots will inevitably show apprehension at cross wind landings until with experience they finally can hack them. Please forgive the following "war" story on my experience at my attempts at cross wind landings while flying Lincoln bombers but it shows why I have sympathy with new pilots landing their jet transports in even moderate crosswinds. Townsville in North Queensland, Australia has an 8000 ft main runway invariably cursed with a 15 knot crosswind. The Lincoln Mk 31 was a four engine bomber (bigger than the Lancaster) and known for its appalling lack of view over its long nose, and at night especially few enjoyed landing it in a crosswind. Once the tail was down there was no forward vision. During the landing run in a crosswind the Lincoln would weathercock and the rudders were none too effective so the pilot would resort to differential braking and as last resort even bursts of power from one or other of the outboard engines until the aircraft came to a stop.

I hated coming back from a long flight only to find the resident crosswind had to be faced. One fine day, a Royal Air Force pilot on exchange to the RAAF was posted to our squadron to fly the Long Nose Lincoln. He was a experienced Avro Shackleton pilot having operated both the tail-wheel Shack as well as the tricycle version. As I was the squadron QFI my job was to check him out on the Lincoln. I made a real hash of demonstrating the Lincoln crosswind crab landing to him while he looked on with a mixture of amusement and some apprehension at my terrible demo landings.

I took him up on his offer to demonstrate how he did crosswind landings in the Shackleton using the combination of decrab in the flare and touch down one wing slightly low resulting in the into wind main wheel touching first. He did the same technique perfectly in the Lincoln and I became a life long convert to that technique in all the aircraft I flew since including the 737. My confidence had been shot until that fortuitous meeting with the RAF Shackleton pilot (thanks Flt Lt Laurie Hampson).

The point I am trying to make in a rather unwieldy way, is that inexperienced first officers to jet transports will inevitably be spooked by crosswind landings, especially knowing they have a hundred plus people down the back ready to scream OMG into their mobile phones to relatives and friends on the other end. Regular training at strong crosswind landings in the appropriate level of simulator before going on line, will give new pilots to type the confidence they need and at the same time increase their basic handling skills.

[c100driver]

Cross wind landing are included in the conversion in my outfit, in line training you are very likley to get a few days with crosswinds.

Our recurrent program includes crosswind circuits every two years and they are at limits for the type and has been for years.

[grrowler]

I learnt xwind landing on pistons, then adjusted to turboprops and then jets. They don't bother me in the slightest in the aircraft.

However, maybe it's just me, but I have yet to jump in a sim in the last 10 years that can replicate a realistic landing, whether xwind or not. Not sure whether it is the visuals or the lack of "seat of the pants" feedback, or something with the control fidelity, but in my opinion it has very little bearing to how I land the real thing.

[MarkerInbound]

The FAA issued a rule last year requiring 121 (airline) training to include gusty cross wind take offs and landings. The actual requirement doesn't go into effect until 2019 to allow the simulators to be upgraded.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi grrowler,
Not sure whether it is the visuals or the lack of "seat of the pants" feedback
I think it is because there is no delta g in the sim (everything feels like 1 g) and there is no sensation of heading change detected by your inner ear (sim is bolted to ground on constant heading).

The big advantage of practicing anything in the sim, is that you won't die if you :mad: it up, giving you the chance to get the procedure correct.

[FullWings]

I agree about the lack of realism in the sim. I haven’t flown one yet which I thought had good fidelity for crosswind training, although I should qualify that by saying they were fine for demonstrating/practicing technique, which could be polished on the real thing.

I think it’s a combination of the lack of realistic turbulence, shear, wind gradient, backing/veering and ground effect, coupled with the sim model diverging from reality as the amount of sideslip increases. As these are the things that cause most of the problems with crosswind takeoffs and landings, it comes as no surprise that real life is somewhat different. It’s much easier to fly down the approach with a constant drift angle (which you could get away with in most of the sims I’ve tried) and plonk it on than to have to deal with all of the above at the same time.

[Mozella]

" ....................using the combination of decrab in the flare and touch down one wing slightly low resulting in the into wind main wheel touching first. "

I was trained to fly by the U.S. Navy where we learned everything in the classroom first and then went out in the aircraft to prove that we'd been paying attention. I'm not sure if I learned about crosswind landings before my first introductory flight or not, but certainly before my first solo a dozen or so flight hours later.

"WING DOWN INTO THE WIND ............ TOP RUDDER". This idea isn't rocket surgery, as they say. Until I took a job at a major airline, I thought it was how everyone flew airplanes. I've used it in each and every crosswind landing I've ever made; although, (sad to say) not each and every crosswind landing I've ever watched. Works in big airliners, light civilian aircraft, high performance fighters, and sailplanes. Works for take offs too.

After looking at the video twice, it's clear that many pilots don't even try to use the correct technique. Some just want to get it on the ground, crab angle and/or drift rate be damned. Others try to de-crab at just the right time hoping to plant it before the inevitable drift gets out of hand, with varying degrees of success. Quite a few come close to timing their de-crab just right but are flying too fast and then spend too long flying in ground effect (and consequently drifting) before touching down. A significant number of pilots actually use the wrong aileron input, especially on take-off, perhaps trying to steer with the yoke as you would with a car steering wheel.

I'd have to look again to be sure, but I don't recall any of them touching down with the up-wind wing intentionally held low and stabilized so as to touch down on the up-wind gear first. Certainly the majority of the landings shown result in a near wings level touch down.

The technique is nearly mechanical. One of our ........... um ............ less skilled (but very intelligent) captains used to repeat "wing down into the wind, top rudder" to himself a few times on final approach while slapping the appropriate knee so that in the flair (he explained each time) it was a simple matter of pressing the rudder with the leg which was stinging. I was never sure if he did that because he needed the crutch or if he did it to drive his F/O and F/E absolutely crazy. It certainly had the latter effect, that's for sure.

I'll say one thing after watching that video. The people who manufacture landing gear and tires are doing a terrific job ................. some pilots, not so much.

[bubbers44]

The sim would be a good start for a pilot with no cross wind landing skills but the only way to be proficient at xwind landings would be doing it in the real world.

Once you have learned it you will enjoy the challenge. They take some of the boredom out of flying.

[wangus]

Interesing thread.
I completed my first TR in Jan / Feb (A320) and found the Level D sim impossible to land well, in all scenarios. I got quite stressed out and worried.... I then did base training in 15-20 knots crosswind, 90 degrees to runway, and frankly found it DRAMATICALLY easier to land on centreline, using crab method, then straightening out in flare with rudder followed by sidestick. Sim killed my confidence, the real thing restored it....

[TypeIV]

I'm not nearly as experienced as most of you guys but here's my input regarding the 737.

For applying the correct dose of "crossed rudders", timeing and how the aircraft behaves on the roll-out, I think the simulator is quite good even though a 100% replication isn't possible.

Many people forget that the hardest part of a crosswind landing is making a perfect, sexy, straight and stable roll-out. What difference does a greaser on the center line make if the passengers sitting in the rear part of the fuselage, have their fish and chips sprayed onto the neck rest of the passenger in front of them?

However, hight above the ground, turbulence, aiming points and rotation rate during the flare is much better trained in the actual aircraft, mainly because of the limitations in graphical projection... but hey, if you land the aircraft the way it is written in the FCTM, on these points there are actually almost no differences on how they should be done whether it is a crosswind situation or not. However when the irrational stress level increases, these basic elements of a nice landing seems to suffer.

After a while flying at a homebase, most people get a good feeling on predicting turbulence depending on the season, wind direction vs orography etc, this can of course not be trained in the simulator properly.

[AirRabbit]

Centaurus (– and all the rest of the readers and contributors –)

This is one of the very best threads / series of comments I’ve read in quite a while. The interesting fact is that there isn’t a post in this thread (at least up to this point) with which I would disagree – even slightly! That is truly an amazing statement, from my perspective at least.

Those of us who have been around for a while have witnessed an evolution in simulation from what used to be, to what is available today … but, having been continuously involved in this specific aspect of the pilot training industry, I know, for a fact, that we’ve not reached the limits quite yet. Unfortunately, rather dramatic changes in realism achieved 30 to 40 years ago didn’t take a large amount of technology. Today, huge technology developments, serious amounts of professionally obtained and reduced flight test data, and very imaginative applications of both are regularly combined to achieve barely noticeable advancements in simulations. On the surface, it might appear that such advancements are not as beneficial as they once were. I assure you, this is not so! It’s generally not the easily recognizable changes in fidelity that have the largest impact on a pilot’s ability to recognize and assimilate such changes into his/her performance in either the simulator OR the airplane. It has long-been an understanding in the simulation industry that as the industry advances it takes “more and more” to achieve “less and less” – BUT, the significant issue is that often (not every time … but generally) these “lesser” advances are critical to a pilot’s ability to BOTH consciously AND subconsciously recognize and use the advances in the presentation of the simulated environment. This is because each pilot remains an individual … with individual preferences, and, therefore, individually devised mechanisms that he/she uses to take the information presented in the “real world” into his/her mental processing, from which each individual produces physical reactions/responses, again individually chosen, based on what that individual understands what has historically been used and relied upon to achieve the results that individual has desired. Basically, the goal of a simulator “engineer” is to reproduce in the simulator, ALL of the same things (plural) that happen in the real airplane – in the same sequence and same magnitude. This will allow each individual pilot to use those aspects of the presentations that he/she uses “in the real world” to provide information and allow that individual to make the same recognitions and comparisons he/she uses in the airplane to react/respond in the same manner and sequence he/she would were he/she in the airplane under the same circumstances. Long-time participants on this forum may recall my rather repetitive descriptions of “how to land an airplane.” The goal in those repetitious posts were to demonstrate that it is imperative to allow each individual pilot to pick and use the information sources that make the most sense to themselves – individually. Sure, an instructor can try to teach a student to do whatever task is at hand exactly the way that instructor does it – including the hierarchy of what informative sources that instructor uses (and many do only this). But INDIVIDUALS are not like anyone else – that is the definition of “individual.” My examples of “how to land” were an attempt to show how an instructor should allow the student to pick and choose what information sources are best understood by them – individually – while, at the same time – putting the airplane where it has to be to achieve the best airplane performance. It’s not rocket science – but it does take awareness and understanding. The exact same issues are prevalent in simulation. However, in a simulator, the student will only be allowed to select his/her information sources from those features that are present. If the simulator engineer/manufacturer didn’t include what that student would have selected in the airplane – that student is forced to use what IS available. Now, when that student gets into the airplane, that student is inevitably torn between using what he/she would have preferred to use, and ignoring that preference in order to use what he/she has been taught – which will invariably cause delay and lesser levels of precision and accuracy.

The ultimate is to use simulation that has as much of the real world incorporated into that simulation – such that the simulators response will be as close as humanly possible to the response of an airplane under the same circumstances. That will allow that student to pick and choose the information sources preferred – just as he/she would have chosen in the airplane. This is why I continue to harp on the fact that each instructor MUST know the limitations of the simulator and MUST instruct that student on the correct position in which he/she must place the simulated airplane (just like he/she would do in the airplane) to achieve the desired results.

There are on-going efforts to provide appropriate modeling and data to allow simulators to be able to be programmed in such a way that each student will have the best opportunity to see, and develop the correct response to achieve the correct airplane condition and position for each task … and these areas include gusting winds/crosswinds, aerodynamic stalls, and bounced landing recoveries. Stay tuned for additional simulator advancements!!!

[FullWings]

AirRabbit,

Very interesting to hear what’s happening (or might happen) on the technical sim side.

Do you think we are approaching the simulator equivalent of “uncanny valley”, in that minor (and not so minor) differences between them and reality that used to be all part of the experience are now becoming more obvious because of the overall increase in fidelity? The first sim I “flew” had no visuals, no sound, no motion and clockwork instruments but boy did it seem real at the time, especially to a cadet trying to impress his instructor!

[AirRabbit]

Very interesting to hear what’s happening (or might happen) on the technical sim side.

Do you think we are approaching the simulator equivalent of “uncanny valley”, in that minor (and not so minor) differences between them and reality that used to be all part of the experience are now becoming more obvious because of the overall increase in fidelity? The first sim I “flew” had no visuals, no sound, no motion and clockwork instruments but boy did it seem real at the time, especially to a cadet trying to impress his instructor!

Excellent question, FullWings.

For the unaware, FullWings’ reference to “uncanny valley” comes from the following:
The uncanny valley is a hypothesis in the field of human aesthetics which holds that when human features look and move almost, but not exactly, like natural human beings, it causes a response of revulsion among some human observers. The "valley" refers to the dip in a graph of the comfort level of humans as subjects move toward a healthy, natural human likeness described in a function of a subject's aesthetic acceptability. Examples can be found in the fields of robotics and 3D computer animation, among others. Note the movie, "Avatar."

FullWings … no … what I see has no such implications and, as far as I know, no such implication has been raised by anyone associated with flight simulation at any level. Initially, the motivation for the use of simulation was simple and direct – cost and availability … but the fact was, the simulation used was minimal and its primary contribution was that of “procedural understanding” and not “skill development.” The first sims I flew were just like the ones you describe – “no visuals, no sound, no motion and clockwork instruments” but the fact was there was very little “aerodynamic accuracy.” However, when one considers the benefit to procedural knowledge and understanding, particularly when combined with the existing level of “realism” in the function of the equipment and its relative location, it provided quite adequate practice of cockpit procedures that were notably better than referencing a page out of a manual or even an enlarged photograph mounted on a wall. When the airplane systems “interoperability” in these simulators got to the point of being mostly accurate, another rung on the ladder toward accuracy was achieved.

Actually, with each advancement made (sound, visuals, weather simulation, daylight, the introduction of high speed computers, etc., etc.) another rung (or several) was achieved. However, it was some time before competent aviation professionals actually accepted that “flight training” could be accomplished in a properly designed, constructed, and evaluated simulation device … and even then, there was a requirement that training be “completed” in the relevant airplane, and that the “check ride” would be accomplished in the airplane as well. In the US, anyway, it wasn’t until the very late 1970s that advancements were made in computer science, the methods used in acquiring flight test data, the methods used to reduce that raw flight test data into programs that could be used by the newest, highest speed computers available, and a policy was developed and refined that described the how such flight simulation would be designed, built, evaluated, and used that the US FAA moved very gingerly into the realm of what was called the FAA’s “Advanced Simulation Plan” – consisting of simulation “levels,” only the highest of which allowed full flight training AND the necessary “flight” check, to be accomplished in a flight simulator. Analysis of how do all of this better, more broadly, AND more narrowly in each area has continued over the intervening years.

Sometimes this industry gets the cart before the horse and sometimes it gets focused on one point and let adjacent points slide out of focus – the most recent out-of-focus issue was, described in general terms, as stall recovery. The term was understood differently by major participants, some wanted more details, some wanted “one size fits all,” some were more focused on “procedures to be followed,” some were focused on the accuracy of the simulation. When one considers “the viability” and “the repeatability” of something whose very definition embodies the concepts of “randomness” and “variability” (like an aerodynamic stall) it doesn’t take long to recognize that formulating a computer program to reproduce a “same conditions” profile for those kinds of random and variable events is not something that is easily accomplished – if at all. But very bright minds and very determined folks have been working to be able to provide a simulation that is closer to an actual aerodynamic stall in a simulator than has ever been achieved previously. More of the same is certainly to come – but it’s going to be harder to achieve and once implemented its going to take instructors who are specifically trained on the capabilities and limitations of each simulator they are to use in conducting that training or those checks.

[oopspff7]

AirRabbit.
I'm not a pilot but if I was and I was struggling with a concept you would be the one I would look to for the way forward.

[Tee Emm]

True story from a captain with Korean Air. Forecast wind for landing 15 knots crosswind. Local F/O was PF for the sector so the captain asked the F/O how he intended to conduct the landing. F/O briefed he would leave the automatics engaged until near the flare and then use rudder to align the aircraft with the centre line and lower the into wind wing to prevent drift.

On final it was obvious there was no wind. The autopilot remained engaged as briefed and at the flare the F/O disengaged the autopilot, gave an almighty kick on the briefed rudder and lowered the wing. The aircraft went ape as did the captain, who managed to salvage the messed up landing.

After the captain recovered from the shock of a nearly wiped out landing, he asked the F/O why he had booted in rudder when there was no crosswind? The F/O looked at him amazed and said all he had done was carry out the technique as he had earlier briefed. The captain said but there was no crosswind! The F/O replied it was obvious therefore the forecast was wrong... :ugh:

[chksix]

Here's a sim platform which could be scaled up to carry an airliner flight deck.
It seems quite capable of providing sideslip etc.

The 401: what is it? - Force Dynamics (http://force-dynamics.com/401/)
Force Dynamics 401CR - Introduction - YouTube (http://youtu.be/HJoi-1g0IzI)

[Denti]

David Learmount posted about a new simulator development a few years ago especially for crosswind training. I have no idea if that concept was mode widely adopted or not though.

Simulators get real - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2011/07/simulators_get_real/)

[Tee Emm]

Even full flight simulators (FFS), at present, are really just sophisticated procedure and systems trainers, although the aviation authorites pretend they can be beneficial to manual flying skills. But US FAA research says there is no evidence that manual flying skills can be taught in simulators (http://www.flightglobal.com/channels/mro/articles/2009/04/27/325612/civil-simulators-special-going-through-the-motions-are-motion-systems-for-simulators-on-their.html)- the skills simply do not transfer to the real aeroplane - See more at: Simulators get real - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2011/07/simulators_get_real/#sthash.PVeJtmci.dpuf)


I find that an astonishing statement and hard to believe. I recall the first simulator I flew was during a Boeing 737-200 type rating course in New Zealand 47 years ago. By todays standards it wasn't sophisticated. When on completion of the simulator training I then underwent dual instruction on the real 737, everything came quite naturally to me starting from the first taxiing. In fact the only difference I recall between the simulator and the real thing, was the aircraft I flew had extremely difficult reverse thrust lever movement which was most distracting on the landing run. It was after I flew other 737's where reverse thrust was easily attained that I discovered the first 737 was poorly maintained.

[AirRabbit]

Simulators get real
By David Learmount on 20 July, 2011 in Uncategorised

Cathay Pacific has just become the first customer airline for a revolutionary new simulator motion system that will transform what simulators can be used for.
Even full flight simulators (FFS), at present, are really just sophisticated procedure and systems trainers, although the aviation authorities pretend they can be beneficial to manual flying skills. But US FAA research says there is no evidence that manual flying skills can be taught in simulators - the skills simply do not transfer to the real aeroplane.

Well, my first, off-the-cuff response would be a resounding “HOG WASH!” After taking a breath, I would collect my thoughts and concede that there may be some who would argue (however, I believe, not successfully) that I’ve been living under a rock for the last 45 years – or in some kind of “dream world,” but the fact is that until today, I was completely unaware of Mr. Learmount … and after reading this kind of comment, I’m prone to go back to my “completely unaware” state regarding this particular individual, or at least believe the same comment about his last 45 years. The comment about the “US FAA research” that he referenced is totally unfamiliar to me and because of when, where, and how, I was personally involved with this industry during that same time period, I would immediately categorize that statement as completely false. I say this due to the fact that if there were any such research actually conducted by the US FAA, I am supremely confident that I would have been integrally knowledgeable ABOUT, and very likely involved IN, any, no, every aspect of such research. With this knowledge, I would place this statement right up there with someone claiming that the late Neil Armstrong, the first man-on-the-moon, actually said “…the moon is, indeed, made of cheese.”

Any person knowledgeable about the US FAA’s position with respect to simulation, would be acutely aware of a rather extensive research effort, of some 2 – 3 years duration, under the auspices of something called the “Advanced Simulation Plan,” AND the conclusion reached from that research … which was the publication of 14CFR Part 121, Appendix H, in the summer of 1980, that allowed the use of a specifically qualified Flight Simulator to be used as follows: Level D Flight Simulator - Training and Checking Permitted: Except for the requirements listed in the next sentence, all pilot flight training and checking required by this part and the certification check requirements of §61.153(h) of this chapter. (my emphasis underlined) The line check required by §121.440, the static airplane requirements of appendix E of this part, and the operating experience requirements of §121.434 must still be performed in the airplane.

We can have diligent discussions about where simulation came from and where it is headed – we can discuss the shortcomings and the positive assistance proper use of simulation actually provides to the successful completion of pilot training … but to state that the skills learned in a simulator do not transfer to the airplane is patently baseless and, dare I say, prejudiced against the use of a very valuable and a very successfully demonstrated training and checking tool. In fact, I am concerned about just how successful the transfer is from simulator to airplane, when some individuals are prone to use what I call “cheat-sheet” numbers or methods that were devised to “get through” a simulator check, and the use of that devised process may not be appropriate when operating the airplane. BUT – and I hasten to add the same caveat that I’ve regularly offered on this forum, and that is that the instructor or evaluator MUST be trained and able to competently and correctly use the specific simulator (including all of that particular simulator’s capabilities and limitations) and that instructor/evaluator remains personally and professionally involved in what is being trained and/or evaluated in that simulator.

[AirRabbit]

Hi oopspff7:

Just a quick note to say "thanks" for the exceptionally kind words!

[the_stranger]

@wangus

I had the exact same issue. Went from an embraer190 to a330 and during my simulator training, I couldn't land the damn thing even if my life would depend on it. Imagine the muscles in my behind being tense when I had to do my first real life landing.

But it was a very descent landing. Writing that off to beginners luck, I was amazed the second one was the same. And so for all the landings I made the last year. Every now and then you get the occasional slightly bad one, but overall they are textbook.

And then I returned to the sim... Horrible again...

There is something wrong or missing in the/that sim. Maybe the seat of the pants feeling, the visual, whatever, but training xwind on a/that sim would be a waste of time for me.

[AirRabbit]

I had the exact same issue. Went from an embraer190 to a330 and during my simulator training, I couldn't land the damn thing even if my life would depend on it. Imagine the muscles in my behind being tense when I had to do my first real life landing.

But it was a very descent landing. Writing that off to beginners luck, I was amazed the second one was the same. And so for all the landings I made the last year. Every now and then you get the occasional slightly bad one, but overall they are textbook.

And then I returned to the sim... Horrible again...

There is something wrong or missing in the/that sim. Maybe the seat of the pants feeling, the visual, whatever, but training xwind on a/that sim would be a waste of time for me.

Because the simulator is a mechanical device, completely dependent on computer programming, and having all the parts and pieces operating as they were designed, it is certainly possible that something could be wrong or not maintained within the appropriate parameters. However, there is another potentially fallible entity that has to be considered … and that is the operator of the simulator … either the instructor or the person conducting the check. I don’t throw that out to be deliberately controversial or to indicate that instructors or check airmen are not “up to the task.” But, the fact remains, that instructors and check persons are humans just like the pilots – and in order for them to “do the right thing” they have to be trained on all the aspects of the operation of that very sophisticated tool called a flight simulator.

I don’t know who maintains or recurrently examines the equipment you use – but there should be some person or group who are professionally qualified to do just that – and do so on a regular basis. As you would easily understand, there are multitudes of issues that can go wrong or get “out of whack.” Interestingly, the parameters that were selected may not have been the correct ones … maybe continued use has worn parts or interfaces. But equally true is the human link in this process. Instructors (and check persons) have a wide latitude as to how they set up any given scenario and how they may adjust any aspect of that scenario as it unfolds. Most do a superb job of doing precisely this. Others may believe they are doing that superb job and, perhaps through no fault of their own, may have been trained on to how to do something that is either misunderstood, incompletely understood, or, in some remote cases, just plain wrong.

What I do know is that a properly designed, constructed, programmed, maintained, and used airplane flight simulator at Level C or Level D can, and do, offer the pilot the opportunity to be properly and completely trained on crosswind landings – up to, and exceeding, the maximum demonstrated crosswind limits of the airplane. That’s not just speculation – and that is not just my opinion. I have personally flown more airplane simulators than most of my colleagues – from the very basic visual simulators (in fact, long ago I flew non-visual and even non-motion simulators) all the way up to the most modern and most advanced Level D simulators. The older the simulator, the lower qualification level, usually presents more “challenges” in doing the most “at-the-edge” kinds of flight performance … but there isn’t (or their shouldn’t be…) any Level C or Level D simulator out there in which you wouldn’t be able to fly and land in the most demanding crosswind condition authorized for that airplane and it would be (should be…) as close to your expectations as you would like it to be. Even the oldest airplane flight simulator in existence in the US – a Level A simulator for the “Jetstar” airplane, can be used to instruct and practice crosswind landings. This is not just a hopeful circumstance that only some simulators happen to meet … I’ve always operated on the premise that if the simulator doesn’t do what it is supposed to do (and you have to understand that the lower the level of simulation … the lower the level of fidelity … and, potentially, accuracy – all of which has to be understood and taken into consideration by the organization and primarily and specifically, the instructor/check person using that specific device) then that simulator should be taken out of service (or at least restricted with regards to what it can be used for) while it is examined, repaired, reprogrammed, or whatever other detail has to be accomplished or re-accomplished, before it is returned to full service authorizations.

In case you were wondering - I am a HUGE advocate of properly constructed simulation to train and test pilots, and provide for each pilot, the confidence that they need to have to do the job we all expect them to do. We cannot accept lackluster simulation. We cannot accept improper or incomplete dependence on simulation to do the teaching. A simulator is a tool - a very special tool, no doubt, but a tool nonetheless. And it should be a tool that can be relied upon to do what we expect it to do - or we need to stop using it until it can be brought up to standards.

[Judd]

I am a HUGE advocate of properly constructed simulation to train and test pilots, and provide for each pilot, the confidence that they need to have to do the job we all expect them to do.

During in-flight (not simulator) training on the 737-200 a long time ago, we were given simulated engine failures after V1 by closing one thrust lever to idle and completing a circuit and asymmetric landing or a go-around. The FD was the Collins FD 108 which we switched off for the purpose of the exercise. The engine failure climb out was quite easy to handle.

I found this in stark contrast to later versions of the 737 (Classics) where the aircraft was equipped with the now almost universal "twin needles" FD. Despite many hours in 737 Classics simulators, I have always experienced great difficulty trying to "fly" the FD needles at instant of engine failure and initial climb to flap retract height. Although well aware of the folly of `chasing` the FD needles during engine failure climb out, I find it well nigh impossible to "look behind" the FD at the aircraft attitude. In fact I do much better if I glance over and fly the miniature standby ADI, which is unencumbered by needles, to maintain an acceptable climb out attitude.

While this thread is about crosswinds operation, it has also developed into most interesting discussions on simulator fidelity in general. Hence my comment on FD use in initial one engine climb. Could this be a simulator FD fidelity issue? Are the needles too sensitive to the slightest yaw or roll thus causing over-reaction by the pilot? If I can do a perfectly accurate raw data engine failure at V1 and initial climb out without over-controlling, why is it that with FD operating I am all over the sky trying to pin the needles to the centre? Frankly, I must admit the FD spooks me with engine failure and I suspect a lot of other pilots too. In my book the FD is designed to be an aid - not a hindrance.

[Bergerie1]

AirRabbit


Thank you for your excellent posts, we rarely get ones of such quality.


I spent many years as an IRE/TRE on the three aircraft types I mentioned at the start of this thread. I was also lucky enough to fly with test-pilots to evaluate simulators and trying to get one in particular, in the 1970s, to fly like the real aircraft after training pilots had tried to improve it - but hadn't!


Your knowledge of level D simulators is vastly superior to mine but I share your confidence in their ability to provide good training for cross-wind landings. However, training at or after the stall is a different matter and I would very much like to hear your views on the subject.

[misd-agin]

The planes fly better than the simulators do(17,000 hrs on 10 different models).

Modern Level D simulators do an excellent job of normal flying. And can be used for teaching manual flying skills. But they'll never 100% replicate flying the real airplane. A simple fact is simulators don't scare you but airplanes can kill you.

But the simulators are good enough that the first flight for newly qualified pilots is normally with a full load of passengers.

Simulators built in the last couple of years are better than 3, 5, or 10 years earlier. Flying an old level D simulator is horrible compared to a new build simulator. Is the old model good enough? Yes. Is it at the level of a new build simulator? Absolutely not.

[the_stranger]

@airrabbit

While I am not exactly sure who maintains our simulator, it is done inhouse. I fly for a large (west) European airline and know from other (non simulator) processes, the "government" is really demanding a lot of procedures, documents and checking/testing, so I assume, but again, do not know for sure, the simulators are also routinely checked and properly maintained/programmed.

As far as operating the thing, I only "fly" it once every few months, do I can't comment on it, but assuming it is working properly, how can you screw it up as an operator when you input 25kts xwind? Again, I have no experience "pushing" the buttons, but I do have experience in the fact our simulators (for this type of aircraft) give me a lot of bad landings, while in real life my landings go fine.

Whatever the reasons, I can't properly land the simulator version of my aircraft. And I am not alone. When there was too little in-house capacity to train pilots, they trained them at other airlines in other countries. Different simulator, different operators, different regulators, but same experience (for some at least). Posts in this topic tell me the same, xwind training on simulators do not always work, be it the simulator, the maintaining, the operating, the pilots themselves, but the only thing my simulator training taught me was to "fear" xwind. Fortunately, real life taught me something else.
(I am specifically talking about landings, not other aspects of training. Besides that, the training does give you a rough outline of the technique used on landing. But was I prepared, sufficiently trained and confident to do a 25kts xwind on my first flights? No, not even close. After a year of flying, I get closer to that point, but purely based on experience gained in real life, not simulators).

[de facto]

After a year of flying, I get closer to that point, but purely based on experience gained in real life, not simulators).

Probably because you spent more time in the aircraft than you did in the sim?

The simulator allows you work on your scan,and set up your method how to deal with a crosswind,possibly a decreasing crosswind as you go down,hence a possible quick change in track required to maintain the centerline..the requirement to focus inside and outside....
The feel of the pants i believe is only a benefitial aid during low visibility,poor lighted runways manual landings...the rest is all about scan,looking outside including for the flare (pitch up),rudder input to straight up the nose and sink rate the rate at which one should decrease the thrust...
A croswind requires in general a longer landing distance as the pilot decrabs and the thrust stays in a tad longer...

[A37575]

Posts in this topic tell me the same, xwind training on simulators do not always work, be it the simulator, the maintaining, the operating, the pilots themselves, but the only thing my simulator training taught me was to "fear" xwind

While the various posts indicate some concern about the validity (fidelity) of simulators in crosswind landings, maybe they are better than the alternative ie nothing. Can you just imagine the OMG reactions of the captive audience down the back when a MPL cadet pilot is given his first 30 knot crosswind landing in the real aircraft without the benefit of previous simulator training to get the technique right? He may be nothing more than the captain's apprentice yet he is legally second in command.

Of course all this is hypothetical but all I can say is thank goodness for todays sophisticated simulators.

[AirRabbit]

Modern Level D simulators do an excellent job of normal flying. And can be used for teaching manual flying skills. But they'll never 100% replicate flying the real airplane. A simple fact is simulators don't scare you but airplanes can kill you.

But the simulators are good enough that the first flight for newly qualified pilots is normally with a full load of passengers.

Simulators built in the last couple of years are better than 3, 5, or 10 years earlier. Flying an old level D simulator is horrible compared to a new build simulator. Is the old model good enough? Yes. Is it at the level of a new build simulator? Absolutely not.

While I completely understand and agree with most of your comment, I think the term “horrible” really should be taken as a range of “acceptability vs realism.” Of course, no simulator – at least at this point – can do all the things an airplane can do … and probably the most immediately recognizable is the “you-are-about-to-die” aspect. Although, I can say that I’ve been on-board a simulator when the building in which it was housed was directly hit by a bolt of lightning that actually shoved the simulator’s 6-axis motion system capabilities to the maximum extension in each direction and probably exceeding at least some! Scared? You bet! The sim cab stopped in about a 30 deg nose low and as close to a 90 deg left bank that could be achieved with the 54 inch jacks. First and only time I’ve had to use the escape ropes to get out of a simulator!


Your knowledge of level D simulators is vastly superior to mine but I share your confidence in their ability to provide good training for cross-wind landings. However, training at or after the stall is a different matter and I would very much like to hear your views on the subject.

Good question … I wish I had a solidly good answer … so until one comes along … I’ll use this one. But, I warn all readers of my propensity to use “a lot of words,” so bear with me, please.

Originally, back when training was conducted almost exclusively in airplanes (yes, there were things called “simulators” back then but they were extremely limited and provided good training but only relevant to cockpit procedures and systems operations) the idea of conducting flight training was a serious issue … particularly with larger, air transport airplanes, and most particularly with stall training.

We all know that an aerodynamic stall and recovery does not necessarily result in a spin – but most instructors had that potential stuck firmly in their memory banks – and some students were prone to grab the aileron and elevators controls and literally “kick” and hold the rudder, doing both in such a manner that would rival any gorilla’s determined grip on any tree branch! It didn’t happen often, but it didn’t take many times to prepare an instructor to do almost anything to regain control of the airplane – Right Now! Of course a spin is a spin, and recovery from spins may differ from airplane to airplane … and as you would easily understand, the larger the airplane the more … um … interesting … the experience. Instructors were prone to be very observant and very demonstrative in describing and demonstrating how to get into an approach to stall and how to recover from that condition. No one wanted to get the airplane into a stall.

Recovery from stalls in most airplanes was, as you would immediately recognize, almost always accomplished by applying the proper rudder to center the ball (zero the yaw), applying elevator controls to decrease the angle of attack (sometimes this meant a rather large control movement forward), and aileron input to put the airplane in a zero bank – all simultaneously. With a slightly (sometimes a bit more than “slightly”) nose-low attitude, the power was advanced symmetrically. The result was generally a proper and effective recovery. Well … that is essentially, if not exactly, the procedures that were to be applied to recover from any approach to stall … where an “approach to stall” was defined as the initiation of any installed warning (warning horn, warning light, or stick-shaker), or the initiation of the elevator/airframe buffet. This practice became the routine for training in an airplane– take the airplane just to the approach to stall and teach these same, correct, recovery procedures – emphasizing that anything that went beyond the simple approach to stall warning or any fully developed stall, should be responded to in exactly the same way. This was the routine for airplane training – and it did not include training to recover from fully developed stalls. When simulators were on the rise, and the clear direction the training industry was moving … toward the greater use of flight simulator … the fact that full stall training in the airplane did not include anything beyond the approach to stall, the acceptance of the use of simulators to teach recoveries from the same approaches to stall was not a huge leap – and was, for quite some time, considered to be quite adequate.

Another problem that exacerbated the situation was the fact was that engine acceleration was directly coupled to the throttle position, and there was very little simulation of airflow taken into consideration for the computed level of thrust generated by the engines. If the pilot pushed the throttles forward, the engines were programmed to produce the appropriate amount of thrust based on that throttle position, regardless of the attitude/position of the engines. Unfortunately, in some simulators, slowing to an approach to stall required an increasing pitch attitude to maintain the established deceleration rate. Even those who would accept a slight rate of descent to be generated also increased the AOA to continue to airspeed deceleration. The relative airflow that would have gone into the engine with that specific AOA was not calculated or at least was not programmed into the simulator. This situation, in combination with the edict that a “minimum loss of altitude” was expected during the recovery, resulted in “perfection oriented pilots” (and I’m sure you know the kind of pilots I mean) to want to keep that pitch attitude throughout the recovery. You and I know that an airplane with a relatively high pitch attitude or at least a relatively high AOA, will not accelerate as quickly when the power is added if the pilot maintains that attitude or that AOA as it would if the attitude or AOA is reduced. Unfortunately, because of the error in the simulator programming, the pilots using these simulators found that by holding the pitch attitude (perhaps even increasing it slightly to aid in the airspeed reduction) and simply advancing the throttles, the airspeed would increase, and regain flying speed in a relatively short time.

Unfortunately, THAT is wholly unrealistic. It was an error in the simulator programming, BUT it was what was programmed into at least some simulators. Fast forward to the ABX DC-8 crash in Narrows Virginia on December 22, 1996. The pilots on that airplane (up for a post maintenance check) attempted to do exactly what they learned in the simulator – and it cost them their lives. They refused to lower the nose, and kept attempting to “fly out of the top of the stall.” With the attitude they had, the airflow into the engine intakes and the throttle position calling for “more” simply resulted in engine compressor stalls.

Despite the publicity of this 1996 accident and the conversations regarding stall training, there wasn’t much that changed in simulators and not much that changed in the way simulators were used to teach recoveries from approaches to stall. Again, fast forward to 2009 – the Colgan Air, Dash 8-Q400, crash on February 12, 2009 in Clarence Center, New York. As a result of this accident more scrutiny was aimed at the way this crew was trained, and the realism that simulation can or cannot provide in that portion of the “flight envelope.”

There had been concerted efforts proposed and some actually begun over the last 8-12 years – but without knowing exactly what was at risk and/or what could be achieved, a whole-hearted effort (as costly as such efforts have been and are likely to be in the future) pressing forward and accelerating the efforts were difficult to achieve. So, reasonable facsimiles of such a robust effort were initiated by several organizations … two of which were the US FAA and the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS). Since the Colgan accident and the publicity that tragedy generated – particularly the publicity focused on the US Congress – the FAA has taken several serious steps forward – some to initiate and some to advance or increase some programs already begun, to examine simulation and it’s potentials. The same kind of discussions have been taking place at the RAeS – and there has been considerable focus directed to these and associated flight training and simulation issues. As a result, today there are several on-going, multi-corporation efforts underway that are looking specifically at how simulators can and/or should be used to train for airplane situations that are at or outside of the normal flight operational envelope. Certainly, an aerodynamic stall would be considered outside of that normal envelope – but approaches to stall – where the recovery is initiated at the first indication of an approaching stall, is very likely at or approaching the boundary of that envelope – and, significantly, not beyond that boundary. The question then becomes how far past the normal envelope boundary can we go, should we go, and with what accuracy, to allow the programming of simulators? How does one gather data in an area where there is no consistency; where there are no accurate predictions; where airflow patterns are “random;” and all the rest of the issues that most pilots know in general concept … but few, very few, know what or how to go about defining, or measuring those factors, or know how to structure that data into a reasonably accurate aerodynamic model that reasonably represents an airplane and put that model into a computer-run, firmly bolted to the floor, reasonably accurate representation of a familiar airplane cockpit!

Well, thanks to the diligent efforts of some of these groups of professionals – today, I know we have at least one, and now, I understand, a second, transport category airplane simulators (the first one IS and I believe the second one is ALSO a B-737) that have an aerodynamic model installed that is accurate enough that the several test pilots (2 or 3 on the first, and likely up to 7 or 8 on the second) who have flown those simulators, have reported that the simulator performs and, critically, handles, as much like the airplane (the B-737) throughout the aerodynamic stall entry, the actual stall, and the stall recovery, as any anything they have seen. As an example of the competency of these pilots, one that I witnessed personally, when an interested observer quizzed one of these test pilots how far he had personally taken that airplane into the actual aerodynamic stall … he answered, “a 3-turn spin.”

At the moment, I am not aware of precisely where this program is and how much additional work on data gathering, data reduction, verification, and validation has yet to take place; nor am I aware of precisely how close we may be to the commercial development of such models. As I’ve indicated, here and elsewhere, I am now retired and working as a generalized flight training and simulation consultant – and therefore do not have the same connections to these programs as I have had for the last several decades – although I do retain some rather close friendships with many who are directly, intimately, up-to-their-necks, involved. We also have to determine what kind of rule or regulation would be necessary or appropriate for the incorporation of this aerodynamic model (these models – presuming there are 2) into airline simulator use – including the requirements that would, should, or could be leveled on the pilots using these simulators – if any. Presumably, if the process is as good as it appears to be … future questions might be, will there be any follow-on development of aero-models for other airplane types/models/series? Also yet to be determined is the cost of this whole package and whether or not a regulatory authority can or should mandate that airlines purchase and incorporate these aero-models into their fleet of simulators – or if there should be some kind of governmental reimbursement scheme. Also, I am not sure if there would be a restriction on the level of simulation that would be required to accept these kinds of simulation programming scenarios – however, it makes sense that the level of simulator would have to be relatively advanced.

As I said earlier … I believe we haven’t seen anything like we’re likely to see in the future with respect to the use of competent simulation – and personally, I’ve committed my efforts to do all I can to encourage all who might be interested to join the effort – to any degree – to any level that makes sense. Personally, I’d like to see colleges and universities who have active aviation programs, expand those programs to address the kinds of things that research will help resolve with respect to airplanes being satisfactorily simulated with a computer program and a good looking model/replica of the airplane cockpit. Simulation is very likely the very best thing that has or could have happened to the aviation industry – and it will need a lot of professional guidance, observance, critical evaluations, suggestions, and who knows what else to take the maximum advantage of what I think is a very bright future in this area.

I hope I’ve answered your questions … but, more so, I hope I generated a newly charged interest in this particular aspect of aviation. Thanks.

[Bergerie1]

AirRabbit,


Many, many thanks. I am just about to go on holiday so will not be able to study what you have written until I get back. I have done many approach to stall training exercises in the real aircraft on 707s and VC10s and also CofA test flights on these and the 747, all of which involved stalls. Obviously a careful deceleration at 1kt/sec is designed both to ensure a standard measurement of the stall warning and stall speeds but also to ensure that the aircraft did not enter an uncontrolled post stall condition.


Although long retired, I have followed the industry debate on stall training, in particular the RAeS discussions and resulting papers. Much as I applaud the efforts to improve the quality of simulation along the lines you have described for the 737, I do wonder whether the money would be better spent increasing the amount and the standard of the training within the current flight envelope. I think more of the debate should be focused on ensuring that ALL flight training personnel know thoroughly (1) the problems associated with the stall on their aircraft type, (2) the limitations of the simulator they are using, and (3) the correct piloting techniques to both avoid and recover from a stall.


Please don't get me wrong. Better simulator fidelity will always be welcome, but I also think a much greater understanding of what is involved when training in this interesting area is probably of even greater importance. It is a matter of where the available money is best spent.


Many thanks again for your excellent post.

[Centaurus]

I hope I generated a newly charged interest in this particular aspect of aviation

Flying school CFI's who read Pprune forums would be wise to carefully consider your comments. I believe they are applicable to not only jet transport simulators but synthetic training devices found in many flying schools. I am surprised that more use of these devices is not being made for ab-initio student pilots before they go for their first serious dual instructional flight. I don't include the well known TIF or trial instructional flight which introduces a would be candidate for his first feeling of flight.

Not only does a synthetic trainer allow a student to learn the names of the various instruments and levers and flight controls, it allows dual instruction to be done in a quiet room with none of the myriad distractions of a typical real flight where the racket of the engine can be nerve-wracking as is the wearing of a bulky headset with its often awkward positioning of the microphone . In the air, rapid fire ATC instructions are mostly meaningless to a student initially and even the instructor's "pattering" is frequently interrupted by the need to look outside for conflicting traffic in a training area. Air sickness may be a problem initially and that in itself can put off some students for life.

So much can be demonstrated in even a basic synthetic trainer and that includes engine starting, effects of controls right through to elementary climbing, straight and level and descending. Even basic radio procedures can be introduced in those first few sessions in the ground trainer.

Once the student steps into his first Cessna 172, Warrior or the newer trainers on the market, the distractions inevitable in real flight are soon overcome and progress towards first solo is probably halved and at far less cost to the student. Paradoxically, that may be a problem since less cost to the student means less income to the flying school instructors. Reasons will then be dreamed up why students should avoid ground trainers; the most common excuse being students would forget to look outside during real flight. Opinions will vary, of course

[the_stranger]

Probably because you spent more time in the aircraft than you did in the sim?

The simulator allows you work on your scan,and set up your method how to deal with a crosswind,possibly a decreasing crosswind as you go down,hence a possible quick change in track required to maintain the centerline..the requirement to focus inside and outside....
The feel of the pants i believe is only a benefitial aid during low visibility,poor lighted runways manual landings...the rest is all about scan,looking outside including for the flare (pitch up),rudder input to straight up the nose and sink rate the rate at which one should decrease the thrust...
A croswind requires in general a longer landing distance as the pilot decrabs and the thrust stays in a tad longer...
I know how to do xwind landings. I've been flying being paid for 11 years and although I learn every day, I know I am (was) proficient in xwind landings up to and including 38kts, as was the limit on my last type.
However all that experience and skill has not helped me make 1 decent xwind landing in any sim, on any type, or any sim. After every type qualification I dreaded my first landing, fortunately until now unnecessary.
Could it be some people actually do landings different than others? While some can see how and what to do, others feel it?
I really am not joking, I can't land the sim and had problems on earlier types too.

While the various posts indicate some concern about the validity (fidelity) of simulators in crosswind landings, maybe they are better than the alternative ie nothing. Can you just imagine the OMG reactions of the captive audience down the back when a MPL cadet pilot is given his first 30 knot crosswind landing in the real aircraft without the benefit of previous simulator training to get the technique right? He may be nothing more than the captain's apprentice yet he is legally second in command.While I will not disagree with "some is better than none", I am glad my company enforces the rule no xwind >15kts the first year.
While the sim might teach you the actions (which you already should know), line flying will teach you the skill, or at least it was that way with me, every time on every type.

[AirRabbit]

Bergerie1 and Centaurus

I probably should not be surprised that the 2 of you posted very similar comments in response to my rather “wordy” post. BOTH of you are right on target!! As I’ve said many times on this forum and in my regular discussions with members of the industry with whom I regularly interact … simulation is a tool … a very valuable tool to be sure … but a tool nonetheless. And like any tool, the user of that tool should be trained to know how to use it, what its capabilities and limitations are, and how best to take advantage of those capabilities and how to face, address, and compensate for its limitations. Unquestionably, one point that simply cannot be overstated and certainly cannot be ignored is that no matter the level of simulation, all simulation will have both capabilities AND limitations. And, of course, I’m not limiting my comments to using this tool for exposure to flight operations at or beyond the normal flight envelope boundaries – simulation tasks conducted well within the normal flight envelope do, and will continue to, demand the significant majority of training time.

Additionally, and most certainly, an increase in the amount and the quality of training within the normal envelope would prove to be valuable and I would never propose less training. Of course I am fully aware of the cost factors involved and I don’t advocate the indiscriminate increase in money thrown toward just any aspect of our industry. Any such commitment for increased funding should certainly have a very pointed target and, when and where possible, a description of the desired outcome. However, an improvement in a pilot’s understanding of any particular concept – particularly if such understanding allows that pilot to make or use better, or more applicable reasoning in their decision making and their skill levels when initiating any decision regarding airplane control in response to whatever is seen, heard, and/or felt during line operations would have significant benefit to the overall operation’s bottom line … first, in those rare times when there is a clearly identified instance that competent pilot response is necessary to prevent or to minimize the effects of any potential or actual circumstance that could or would have developed into a disaster, the value of such preparation would be easily recognized; and, second, but I think significantly, there is ALSO such benefit achieved even if the specific application of such decision making or control application cannot be specifically identified and/or measured. The thought here is that avoidance of the development of circumstances leading to a crisis may not be immediately (perhaps never) recognized, but is certainly every bit as important and beneficial.

Also, significantly, the points made by Centaurus regarding the application of simulation to basic level pilot training should not be dismissed, but should be recognized and embraced, fully. The caveat I continue to offer is two-fold: first, the accuracy of whatever is included in the simulation (even the basic “synthetic” replications described) should be championed to the greatest extent possible given budget constraints; and second, the training provided to the instructors using each piece of simulation equipment should provide complete understanding of both the capabilities and the limitations of the relevant training equipment. This instructor training should include appropriate methods and/or tasks to ensure that the student is properly trained and understands when, where, and how any simulation limitation, inaccuracy, or anomaly affects the presentation provided by that specific simulation equipment so that the student does not incorrectly believe, and therefore assimilate, an incorrect understanding that the airplane would present that same limitation, inaccuracy, or anomaly and negatively influence that student’s knowledge and understanding of the operation of the airplane being represented.

Also, I completely understand Centaurus’ concern about the potential paradox regarding instructor income … and my first “knee-jerk” would be to point out to the operators of such training facilities that any reduction in airborne training in an airplane, which certainly reduces facility revenue, is also a reduction in the direct operating cost to that facility. That reduction in direct operating cost may be used as a partial source of salary increase to instructors, who should, in turn, have to show more competency in using quality simulation equipment, as well as to cover the increased cost of such equipment. The difference that would likely continue to exist might be recouped by the attractiveness of overall reduced cost to students to acquire the desired pilot training (making the student more attractive to potential airline or airplane using companies) and thereby making the job-market more attractive and therefore generating more students seeking such jobs. My logic is that with better simulation equipment and better trained instructors using this equipment, doing so more easily and more regularly, is likely to result in better trained and therefore more competent student graduates, which, in turn, just might make graduates of such an operation more attractive to those who seek to employ persons with such quality training. And if that turns out to be true, word WILL spread and very likely attract additional students … that is providing we, as an industry, can point to the increased safety margins and competent delivery of reliable transportation services to the public.

OK … but it DOES sound good - and surely there is SOME level of legitimacy attached … right?

[Centaurus]

I know how to do xwind landings. I've been flying being paid for 11 years and although I learn every day, I know I am (was) proficient in xwind landings up to and including 38kts, as was the limit on my last type.
However all that experience and skill has not helped me make 1 decent xwind landing in any sim, on any type, or any sim. After every type qualification I dreaded my first landing, fortunately until now unnecessary

The problem could be simulator fidelity. The reason why simulators should be checked by a qualified simulator test pilot during the scheduled 120 day check is to pick up any slipping from fidelity that inevitably occurs over time. And that means not just any company pilot who happens to be current on the type. The following comment is by a former Australia Regulator expert on simulator accreditation.

"For those who believe that a high grade simulator cannot correctly replicate the real aircraft I would suggest they consider how this can be and what might be a solution to fix it.
The standards set over two decades ago were clearly set out in legislation and developed into various computer programs. For a Level Five - now Level D simulator - the credits sought by the industry were to include "Zero Flight Time Training". To achieve this there were two main requirements in achieving real-world fidelity - they were: the program had to replicate data from "actual flight test" results; the other tests were subjective as to how it "felt" to an experienced and recent set of hands flying the test manoeuvres.

To achieve "sensitive hands" some Regulators required the simulator specialists to actually fly the aircraft over most, if not all, the manoeuvre parameters and in some cases, outside normally on-line limits. Examples were the low and high speed buffet margins in various configurations and different altitudes. Roll yaw couples were high on the objective and subjective test programs and especial had to pass to pass the subjective "feel good" hand flying.

In respect of the maintenance of fidelity as required by recurrent fidelity checks, it seems as time has passed the skill levels of simulator test pilots have eroded with the tasks often undertaken by current line pilots. This is not an accusation or slight on their ability .......but have they had the practice or recent experience required to ensure the subjective test actually replicate the aircraft?

I wonder how many simulator checkers have actually stalled and manoeuvred the actual aircraft to confirm the simulator replicates the aircraft. It was a surprise to me to feel and hear how a B747 - 200 300 400 performs, to mention one small corner of the envelope.
How about ground roll measurements with the various setting of Auto Brake and a check on the coaming cut off angle with all engines operating versus one inoperative with a different flap and body angle?
And have they actually done an alternate flap extension in the aircraft and how about an emergency gear extension?

Accreditation Test Guides, now sometimes called the Qualification Test Guide, should set out all the objective data sourced from actual flight test data. It is the computer geniuses and the recent and qualified simulator test pilots who need to address each and every test (over time) and then you might find that many actually enjoy their ability to fly the simulator ...just like the aircraft."

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Centaurus,

you might find that many actually enjoy their ability to fly the simulator ...just like the aircraft.
Until we get simulators capable of very large vertical motion (60 feet), and capable of cab rotation through 360 degs - nasa.gov/facilities/vms/index.shtml (http://www.aviationsystems.arc.nasa.gov/facilities/vms/index.shtml), then they will never "feel" just like the aircraft.

"The Motion Base, offers unequaled range of motion, moving as much as 60 feet vertically and 40 feet horizontally. This is one key to high-fidelity simulation and makes the VMS unsurpassed at simulating aircraft during all phases of flight, including the critical phases of landing and takeoff."

[Judd]

The Motion Base, offers unequaled range of motion, moving as much as 60 feet vertically and 40 feet horizontally. This is one key to high-fidelity simulation and makes the VMS unsurpassed at simulating aircraft during all phases of flight, including the critical phases of landing and takeoff
Wanted. Quick action motion sickness pills to be made available free of charge each in briefing room.:ooh:

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Judd,
Wanted. Quick action motion sickness pills....
On the contrary. I've never been sick in the aircraft, but feel horribly sick when taxiing around on the ground in the sim, because the picture doesn't agree with my senses.

That's why most of us find it more difficult to keep the sim straight on the runway - we are missing those real heading changes and lateral acceleration clues.

[Bergerie1]

rudderrudderrat,


That may be because of the latency. If the visual system, the motion system and the instruments do not all respond with exactly the same latency, and in less than 120milliseconds (correct me if this figure is wrong,) the result is a sense of disorientation and sometimes motion sickness.

[ZFT]

rudderrudderrat

I suspect what you are experiencing is due to the characteristics of modern Wide display visual systems.

Basically your brain is expecting a three-dimensional image focused at infinity, but it's actually a two-dimensional image focused on the display optics just in front of you.

Your eye gets confused and doesn't know where to focus and this in some people induces nausea. This can be more pronounced when taxying as you tend to be looking (focusing) even closer.

[zlin77]

I always tell my trainees it is a SIMULATOR not a DUPLICATOR, it will provide responses similar to real aircraft, but the last 200 feet to touchdown tends to be a little artificial, as motion and visual cues are different to the "Real World", however despite this it is possible to train for and carry out acceptable crosswind landings up to our 40 Kt. limit.

[john_tullamarine]

Probably just an admission of my own inadequacies when it comes to being perceptually on the ball ... after a few minutes in the (now old) sims, I fell into the trap of (very nearly) forgetting it was a sim and treating it (very nearly) like an aeroplane.

Admittedly the 727 was not up to that but, for my 737 endorsement - around 30 years ago - the only real differences I noticed in the aeroplane for the check to line training were

(a) it was more fun and the hosties were much better looking than the sim instructor.
(b) the visuals, certainly, were much better
(c) the aeroplane was a tad easier to fly than the sim

Sure, sims are computer driven boxes bolted to the floor.

The realism was more than adequate for me and, from such sim instructing as I have done, for most of the pilot folks ?

Surely we now are at the stage of very much diminishing returns ?

I would pose the question are we better off putting our efforts and money elsewhere in the safety and standards equation ?

[goeasy]

Interesting to read about this latency issue on the visuals, as I have always perceived it.

I always feel sick taxiing if it's prolonged. And I am sure this is why sims are harder to land, because the visuals don't give all the clues as the real aircraft does. I now forget about flaring nicely in the sim, because I see it as wasted effort with only partially invalid information.

Sim instructors, and engineers etc, get enough exposure to these differences, that they don't notice it, as much as those of us who only visit twice yearly.

As far as crosswind landings go, I have always ignored Airbuses advice for landing or takeoff. Following turboprop or Boeing procedures gives a much nicer, more controlled arrival/departure. Why is it Airbus don't seem to like crossed controls?

[latetonite]

I come across many pilots getting nervous before entering the simulator.
Could it be they are afraid for the latency of the visuals?

[Bergerie1]

John T
That was my point in my post 43. A much better understanding of the strengths and limitations of the simulator by training pilots is probably needed. A simulator has its limitations and instructors need to know these, particularly with regard to stall training. There are areas where no simulator can fully reproduce the aircraft - post stall being the main one.
Having said that, they are excellent training tools. AirRabbit's lengthy posts are some of the best I have seen on the subject. Old simulators could not adequately reproduce the aircraft in ground effect. Level D simulators are very good - so long as they have been kept in good condition and are regularly checked by pilots qualified to do this, not just any training pilot.
Even when this is the case, there is still sometimes a feeling of 'disassociation', due, I think to the inevitable small latencies in the feedback to the visual.

[john_tullamarine]

A simulator has its limitations and instructors need to know these, particularly with regard to stall training.

.. and in regard to everything not in the middle of the paddock, I suggest. Behind the box is a computer and the simulation validity is limited by what the computer driving the box might be capable of. I'm somewhat out of touch with current boxes but, going back a little, the product was limited by what the sim techs could tweak within the limitations of the computing power. I guess the situation is much the same these days albeit that the computing power is far greater and the capability likewise ?

AirRabbit's lengthy posts are some of the best I have seen on the subject.

There's a good reason for that, I suggest, confident that I know who he is. I listen attentively to what he has to say on the subject.

Even when this is the case, there is still sometimes a feeling of 'disassociation', due, I think to the inevitable small latencies in the feedback to the visual.

Indeed .. I had no great trouble finding myself experiencing vertigo in the old 727 box especially taxying. Much better when the visuals were set to 0/0.

[TyroPicard]

goeasy....
Airbus love crossed controls! When you apply rudder to align the aircraft with the direction of travel, the flight controls work to keep the roll rate zero with side-stick neutral. So the controls may well be crossed... what you cannot do is keep the side-stick "crossed" because that demands a continuous roll rate.

[AirRabbit]

Bergerie1 and John T

Gentlemen – thanks for the votes of confidence from you both – I find those comments exceptionally flattering … and particularly so when I consider who made them.

Of course simulation has come an exceptionally long way in a relatively short time – as the advancements in computer issues have advanced so have the applications of many specific uses of those computer systems. Here are some quotes from the latest attempt to standardize the technical issues regarding simulators and the testing that should be performed on each and every Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) with the tighter tolerances applicable to the higher levels of FSTD - Level C and Level D. The comments below are relative to motion, visual, and cockpit instrument responses. Latency timing in FSTDs is expressed in terms of milliseconds (ms) where 1 ms is equal to 1 one-thousandth of a second (0.001 second).


The transport delay test has become the primary method for determining the delay introduced into the FSTD due to the time taken for the computations through the FSTD controls, host, motion and visual computer modules. The transport delay test is not dependent upon flight test data, but may require avionics computer and instrument data from the data supplier for some cases

Relative response of the visual system, cockpit/flight deck instruments and initial motion system coupled closely to provide integrated sensory cues. Visual scene changes from steady state disturbance (i.e. the start of the scan of the first video field containing different information) should occur within the system dynamic response limit of 100 milliseconds (ms). Motion onset should also occur within the system dynamic response limit of 100 ms. While motion onset should occur before the start of the scan of the first video field containing different information, it needs to occur before the end of the scan of the same video field. The test to determine compliance with these requirements should include simultaneously recording the output from the pilot’s pitch, roll and yaw controllers, the output from the accelerometer attached to the motion system platform located at an acceptable location near the pilots’ seats, the output signal to the visual system display (including visual system analogue delays) and the output signal to the pilot’s attitude indicator or an equivalent test approved by the NAA.

FSTD response time — Motion. The FSTD response time for motion will be the elapsed time in ms between the pilot control input and the first discernable motion movement recorded by the accelerometers mounted on the motion platform. The latency for the motion system will be the FSTD response time (motion) minus the airplane response time in ms. This time is subject to the test tolerance.

FSTD response time — Visual system. The FSTD response time for visual system will be the elapsed time in ms between the pilot control input and the first discernable visual change measured as appropriate for the visual system. The latency for the visual system will be the FSTD response time (visual system) minus the airplane response time in ms. This time is subject to the test tolerance.
Note.— Visual system response time is measured to the beginning of the frame in which a change occurs.

FSTD response time — Cockpit instrument. The FSTD response time for cockpit instrument will be the elapsed time in ms between the pilot control input and the first discernable change measured as appropriate on the selected cockpit instrument. The latency for the cockpit instrument will be the FSTD response time (cockpit instrument) minus the airplane response time in ms. This time is subject to the test tolerance.

There are some simulators out there where, for whatever reason, they have latencies in some aspects of their operation down into the 20 - 30 ms range. Pretty impressive.

I'll have more to say later on other points raised in this thread - but for now, I've gotta run - cheers!

[AirRabbit]

Hi folks -- a little history … where I am quite sure that some of the “older heads” (sorry, I mean “more experienced professionals”) will, no doubt, recognize, and probably be able to offer similar, although, hopefully, not terribly diverse comments …

Early on in the development of visual system attachments to flight simulation, the Out-The-Window (OTW) imagery was decidedly “primitive.” Initially, the visual scenes were filmed during an approach to a specific airport, and then developed onto something like 50mm movie film which was projected directly in front of the simulator on a screen, and that visual scene was laterally adjusted (left/right) so that only one pilot would see the projected scene without any angular variance. Unfortunately, the other pilot would see that same visual scene at such an incorrect angle (depending on the distance between the 2 pilot seats) that this arrangement often led to the fact that flying the airplane from the not-optimized pilot’s seat was virtually impossible.

This method was soon seen to be fraught with problems – the major one being that when the film broke and was repaired – it turned out that final approach eventually became “shorter and shorter;” and the quality of the film image was eventually eroded due to the regular exposure to the bright projection light. This method evolved into the TV camera method, where the pilots actually “flew” a miniaturized television camera over what was essentially an “HO Gauge” model railroad board onto which was built a miniature airport, with runways, taxiways, and terminals – along with some surrounding features that sometimes included the edges of an adjacent town or city. The same direct projection issues were also present with this system, but the troubles with the film methods were exchanged for trouble with having pilots crash the TV camera into trees or buildings and the limitation of a maximum one 360-degree turn in either direction without necessitating a subsequent turn in the opposite direction later or run the inevitable disconnect of the cable from the camera, instantly providing a dark screen.

A break-through in the advancement of computer technology, resulted in the “CGI,” or computer generated image. A system of Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) visual displays was constructed to provide each pilot his/her own OTW display that could be viewed without any angular variance. Both pilots were seeing the identical OTW display – but the visual scene was limited to the size of the CRT screen. Not much time passed before the horizontal field of view was expanded for each pilot through adding an additional, side-mounted CRT to the left of the Captain’s primary CRT, and to the right of the FO’s primary CRT – expanding the horizontal scene for each pilot, again limited by the size of each additional CRT. Basically only night scenes were available, with some later versions providing a reasonably decent version of a dusk scene. Relatively soon thereafter, again as a result of computer technology advancement, and CRT screen advancements, the visual industry developed the ability to display full daylight scenes. However, each pilot was still limited to his/her own individual display – even expanded with the additional side-mounted CRT.

In the middle to late 1970’s, three significant specific occurrences were designed and implemented, where each was to have a significant effect on the art/science of simulation (AND simulation really IS both an ART and a SCIENCE):

The first was the development and adoption of a technical aspect of visual system presentation, called “collimation,” a word derived from the concept of "co-linear," that provides the imagery of the OTW scene viewed by the pilots to appear at a focal distance approaching infinity, where both pilots (seated side-by-side) are able to view the visual scene simultaneously without noticing any angular errors or distortions. This principle is used in Full Flight Simulators (FFS) to display imagery of the OTW scene to the pilots seated in the in the simulator when the pilot seats are properly located and adjusted.

The second, was a very serious effort to determine the degree to which the newest advancements in computer technology as applied to simulation could be seriously considered to not just supplement airplane training for pilots, but perhaps to completely replace airplane training. This official proposal was carefully considered and would be authorized strictly on the basis of adopting and successfully demonstrating the accuracy of these computer and simulation viability advancements; and if successfully implemented, would have the most significant effect on pilot training since Orville and Wilbur first tested the concept of flight. Undoubtedly, this was very likely THE most significant step, taken by a regulatory authority, with respect to pilot training and checking – and has now become a rather routine occurrence.

The third, was the development of a visual system that was to be mounted on top of the simulator cab, projecting a full color daylight, dusk, or night scene image, as desired, onto a transparent screen, also mounted on top of the simulator cab, which was to be viewed by the simulator occupants via a front mounted reflective surface (initially very tightly stretched very reflective Mylar film – later some attempts to use actual mirrors) mounted on the front of the simulator cab, so as to move with that cab, and providing the occupants of the simulator a completely unobstructed, reflective view of the back of the roof-mounted, transparent screen, and providing that scene through 150 degrees of horizontal viewing angle and almost 50 degrees of vertical viewing angle. The significance was that this reflective surface was curved, both horizontally and vertically – eventually making mirror installations exceptionally heavy, which had negative impacts on the ability of the motion system to effectively deal with the overall weight of the simulator system. However, this concept allowed cross-cockpit viewing of the entire projected visual scene for both pilots simultaneously. This breakthrough was developed by Rediffusion Simulation, at Crawly, England and their visual department in Arlington, Texas, and was first sold to an enterprising and motivated small airline in South Florida, called “Air Florida,” the same airline that later became famous, not for their foresight in simulation – but for another, much more noteworthy, though tragically negative, occurrence.

This new approach to visual system display technology eventually exploded into a rapid advancement of the type and quality of the screen onto which the scenes were projected, the reflectivity of the “mirror” surface, and the technical issues regarding weight, mounting methods, the number of visual projectors used – enabling a wider horizontal visual scene from the original 150 degrees up to what today approaches “wing tip to wing tip” horizontal and 60 degrees vertical fields of view. Because of the curvature of both the back-projected screen and the reflective surface from which the pilots are able to “see” the visual scene, and the now long-adopted collimation functions, today the OTW scene is viewed by both pilots at a distant focus (which approaches infinity) rather than at the focal distance of a screen onto which is projected that same visual scene.

Because of the fact that the benefits of the technology that makes up modern-day simulation are at least primarily focused on, and borders on being exclusively focused on, the pilots being trained or evaluated, the visual scene optics are adjusted specifically for those pilot occupants. Anyone not located at either of those pilot positions – and that includes the instructor or evaluator – may, at times, find that their inner ear (subject to the motion cues provided by the motion system) may not be completely “in-sync” with what images are transmitted from the eyes to that portion of the brain that is processing those external cues regarding position and position change – called movement or motion. Sometimes, persons on board a simulator may experience what is vertigo or motion sickness – either or both to varying degrees. While there is a reason that we have and use the word “individual,” it is, nonetheless, quite rare that a person occupying either of the pilot seats will experience any such anomaly – predicated, of course, on the fact that the simulator is producing all of those input cues designed to be provided to those pilots (i.e., motion, visual scene, and instrument response) within the established parameters outlined in the regulatory documents for qualification of that particular simulator.

As I attempted to point out in my last, hastily written, post I attempted to point out that the latency issue, while certainly important, has been able to be pushed toward a faster and faster rate of system performance such that a latency problem is not usually something that crops up frequently. Of course, malfunctions or wear, may, at times complicate the latency that is required. The current regulatory requirement in the US, according to Part 60 (presuming I have the latest, most current version – as I know there is another change that is currently working its way through the governmental bureaucracy) calls for a latency of not more than 150 ms for Level C and D simulators – where, as I pointed out, the latest simulator standards document published by ICAO (their Document 9625) the identical language contained in the FAA regulation for its description, the latency value for motion, visual, and instrument response is shown to be not more than 100 ms. However, as I’ve indicated, there are some simulators where aspects of latency approach 20-50 ms – that is an almost unbelievably short period of time – and there is almost no way that such latency could be recognized, even sub-conscientiously.

[ZFT]

AirRabbit

Too busy traveling to contribute to this interesting thread at present but a small correction. The Air Florida B737 you refer to had 150 X 40 degree optics not 50. (I was heavily involved with the 1st FAA Phase 3 at PSA that followed this device and that had identical optics).

[AirRabbit]

Hi ZFT!

Oops!!!! Of course it was 150 X 40, what you read was an embarrassing demonstration of my pathetic LACK of typing skills and my often committed error of NOT proof reading what I typed!! Thanks for the subtile reminder - and I was quite familiar with the machine you guys had as well.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi AirRabbit,
Anyone not located at either of those pilot positions ... may, at times, find that their inner ear (subject to the motion cues provided by the motion system) may not be completely “in-sync” with what images are transmitted from the eyes to that portion of the brain that is processing those external cues .... nonetheless, quite rare that a person occupying either of the pilot seats will experience any such anomaly...

There is very limited rotation of the simulator cabin in the horizontal plane (constant heading). During any taxiing where the visual and instruments show we've just completed say a 180 degree turn, even with a latency well within 100 ms, my inner ear tells me we have not turned and I feel nauseous.

Am I really "quite rare" or are there a lot more of us out there.

[AirRabbit]

Hi rudderrudderrat:

I’m sure there are folks out there who “know” you’re “quite rare” – but I don’t think that is what you were referencing. With respect to the nausea (more to your point), while there are some who note this kind of circumstance, they are not so numerous that I would think it to be commonplace – and even those who do, at times, experience such phenomena, would likely say that they are not subject to such feelings each and every time they do that particular something in the simulator. The reason for this is that simulators really are only capable of inducing what is known as “on-set” cueing; in the case you describe, through motion of the simulator cab initially. Once that motion is initiated, it is perceived by the simulator occupants – and as the motion system begins to approach its physical limits, it slows and begins to “reset” back to the neutral position – but it slows, stops, and reverses at a rate that is normally well below what is detectable by the human senses. This is particularly true if the person doesn’t specifically focus on the differences between what is presented and what is known. In the meantime, the other human senses – sight and sound primarily – are left the responsibility to confirm and reinforce what was originally “sensed.” The visual scene continues to move, as do the appropriate flight instruments. If there is an external sound present (like another airplane in proximity with engines running) the sound from that source is also used to confirm the continued movement. Normally, this is sufficient to allow the brain to process what is available, confirm the movement, and prevent any degree of nausea. Of course, there are some folks who, at least initially, are, or were, absolutely committed to “test” the capabilities of such subtle manipulation of the senses – like me for example. But it IS possible to convince even the most obstinate skeptic that the human senses CAN be fooled. Of course, each case is somewhat different and it sometimes takes rather substantial efforts to do that. However, as you would easily recognize, taking those extraordinary steps to convince every, and any, person who has doubts would be appropriately time consuming and expensive. Particularly, since a good portion of the believability or acceptability of any particular simulator provided cue can be simply believed or accepted by the individual if they simply relax and “go with the flow.” And by that I mean not focusing on the very limited and specific cue involved, but rather continue interacting with what is presented and performing the tasks that you know are necessary to be accomplished. In all sincerity, this works some of the time, maybe even a majority of the time, but, truthfully, not always.

This may or may not give you any peace about what you have experienced in simulators – but, to answer your specific question – I’ve never done a person-by-person interview to know for sure how “rare” an individual might be who has experienced, or still experiences, what you’ve described … so, truthfully, I’m stuck with my own beliefs and my own experiences with the simulators and the numbers of persons I’ve seen using those simulators – and that number is quite substantial. So, in my not-so-humble opinion – yes – you are, indeed, “quite rare” ... not alone, but quite rare nonetheless.

[AirRabbit]

Thank you all for your good wishes - Jameson 18 vintage - did the trick, I finished the bottle very quickly so it wouldn't go off.)
I never feel sick in the sim - never have!
Why did y`all have to go and say the word sick?

by the way Air Rabbit. You are my hero, you should write a book. I love learning from you.
(you `could` get a jealous hit, after that comment but just `turn and burn` - everyone seems very nice on this thread - it would be nice to fly with them - its a bit like the real world actually

Hi Natstrackalpha:

Thanks much for the very kind comments – and I happen to agree with you about the participants on this forum – and I believe that these participants represent the depth and breadth of the attitudes and personalities seen in the cockpits of airplanes around the globe – and that is a good thing – and is what I would suspect that John T and his moderator colleagues have been striving to achieve and maintain. They have succeeded, quite successfully, I think and in that success, it would be darn near impossible to have every point be completely agreed to by every participant all the time … and that impossibility is exactly what makes this forum the best available … and particularly so when those participants read what is posted and then have an opportunity to think about, analyze, argue with, agree with, become convinced (either “for” or “against”) whatever points are being discussed and opinions presented. THAT is where the concept of “learning” is based. One does not have to agree with every aspect of every post to actually learn something “new” or “different” about the subject being bantered about. I believe that it is the anonymity provided – through the faceless and nameless position provided – that allows the participants here to forego the concerns they might have had about jeopardizing their own personal “reputations” by stating what they believe, or by asking the questions that they might not ask in a more traditional training environment. This more complete and more frank exchange of ideas also provides the ability for participants to better understand a point that might not have otherwise been given or given so bluntly or completely, or to hear “the other side of the story” as clearly and as pointedly as is provided here. Sure, sometimes feelings may get a bit “bruised,” but it’s certainly not serious nor long-lasting – and philosophically immaterial when considering what may have been learned or examined from a different perspective.

I suspect that sometime in the future I just may write some kind of opinion-influenced position paper or something similar, although I doubt that anything like a “book” would result, certainly not a very successful book … but I do appreciate the vote of confidence. Also, I think that your personal choice of options/actions from which you were able to choose as your preferences dictated, was certainly an excellent choice …. and I am more than a little envious of your continued ability to venture down that road, because, unfortunately, as more and more pages of the wall calendar have come and gone, my physical ability, not to even address my fiscal ability, to enjoy the use of Jamesons (18), Glenmorangie (18), or Aberfeldy (21) has waned significantly … much to my disappointment. So, at any appropriate time of your choosing, please, when you next splash some of that golden liquid over an ice cube or several, think of me as you do!

[ZFT]

An interesting thread that started off on crosswinds and ‘drifted’ or evolved into visual and general FSTD issues and to a degree, human perceptions with some good historical information.

Whilst I agree with much of what has been posted, I tend to see things somewhat different to AirRabbit mainly I suspect because we operate under different regulatory regimes.

The FAA (unless they have changes significantly from my albeit not recent experience) are quite rigid about objective matching of data and the QTG results are critical to a successful initial and recurrent qualification of an FSTD, irrespective of whether it be Level D or a lower level device and FAA approved devices performance and handling qualities tends to be very close to the approved data.

EASA whilst requiring the same standard of objective matching do now recognize the basically ridiculous situation that the airframe manufacturers perform flight tests and data gathering on non-production standard aircraft which almost always results in totally inaccurate or incorrect data (then used within the MQTG) especially in the areas of sound and vibrations, which of course are the unique areas that differentiate a Level D FSTD! (Almost without fail, every simulator that we have qualified these past few years had initially excessive sounds, typically aero and excessive buffets when perfectly matching so called approved data).
With a rationale and supporting data (not necessarily flight test) EASA will allow the operator to deviate from approved data and subjectively ‘adjust’ these areas to better match the real aircraft.

So what has this got to do with Xwind landings? Actually everything. Our internal process for checking a new FSTD from the OEM is once the QTGs are 100% complete is to expose it to as many experienced TREs, Engineering Test Pilots, Aircraft Acceptance Pilots etc. as practical and to get them to check its suitability for training as they deem fit. Again without fail, Xwind landings typically on contaminated runways are high on their list of areas that needs improvement. For such a critical area, the amount of test data and testing is actually quite poor. (This is also the time we get consensus on sounds and buffets across all areas).

Now life gets interesting because the industry ‘get out of jail card’ gets played by the simulator OEM and often the airframe OEM – “It meets approved data”. This issue is in many ways what holds back the fidelity of modern FSTDs. Strictly speaking the simulator OEMs position is correct as they are contracted to manufacture an FSTD to a defined regulatory standard (EASA, FAA, and ICAO) to a specific aircraft data pack standard (e.g. Airbus A320 Standard 1.9) and the aircraft OEM is not prepared to spend any (additional) money unless it really has to, especially on a mature aircraft.

If this FSTD was offered for approval now, unbelievably it would be qualified level D even though experienced trainers and test pilots have all stated that certain critical areas are non-representative of the actual aircraft. All the regulatory authorities could do is possibly to write up these areas within their subjective evaluation which could be subsequently cleared without any corrective action as “It meets approved data”. This is why the stranger, wangus, jwscud, FullWings and other posters all experience such appalling and totally unnecessary negative training.

Who’s to blame for this? Everyone. We the operators if we accept this, certainly the regulators for failing to ensure that FSTDs are suitable for training, not just meet the applicable standards and every TRE/TRI/SFE/SFI who fails to write up ANY deficiency EVERY time they operate an FSTD. (We implore our trainers to write up everything as this is the only way that we can improve the training experience).

As operators we have the ultimate responsibility not to put any device into training until we are totally satisfied that it meets all the training requirements and believe me, it is possible. On an FSTD that is now just over 2 years old, we forced the OEM to dramatically improve the Xwind model (and other areas of concern) away from data (which we accepted full responsibility for). We did receive some limited supplementary data from the airframe OEM and the net result is during these past 2 years, not a single handling related criticism or write up!! Yes, this incurred delays before it entered service and of course owners and shareholders were not pleased but IMHO it was worth it.

Of course it is essential that the highest quality visual systems are used as visual cuing, especially peripheral is an important element and wider and higher FOV displays which are now available seem to be of benefit. Better scene content, runway surface, runway markings, runway contaminations, edge lighting stalks, signage and marker boards correctly positions around the touchdown zone all seem to help with subconscious cuing.

Simulation is nothing but one big con job but apart from the obvious there is one other massive benefit. It is the perfect and only environment to do things wrong, either unintentionally and hopefully learn from it or deliberately just to see the result (we have a FSTD with very accurate post stall modelling and every trainee experiences a deep tail stall and recovery) but of course, the FSTD must be as accurate as it can be else the FSTD is always wrong, not the trainee!


It is important we do not lose sight of the prime purpose of flight simulation. It is to prepare, train and test crews for the safe operation of their aircraft to the required standard under all circumstances. This can only be achieved if every link in the chain is sound. Quality trainees, quality trainers, quality training programs supported by quality FSTDs result in safe operations. Lose quality anywhere and someone will be headline news.

[AirRabbit]

In this thread there has been a rather wide range of comments, where I believe that at least some of the opinions expressed are formulated more from rationalizing observed actions, and then compartmentalizing those actions into a predetermined set of “cause-effect” results, from which is postulated the “reason” behind the particular action or behavior recognized during training – often thought to be an inadequacy of the simulator itself. The danger in doing this is that it completely by-passes the 2 most significant factors present in any training scenario … those are:
1) the instructor’s talent, ability, and his/her knowledge of the simulation used; AND
2) the student’s repertoire of previously learned cause-effect functions, and any “cheat-sheet” functions the student believes might provide a better performance in “today’s” simulator session (I’ll likely have more to say on this subject later).

My education, training, and experience tends to question the accuracy of establishing neatly compartmentalized behaviors that are not easy to measure, technically or otherwise, and which, in turn, are not likely to be as definitive as imagined. Of course there are simulators that have shortcomings of all sizes, shapes, and descriptions – most stemming from the obvious fact that the simulator is NOT the airplane. As I’ve said multiple times in this forum and elsewhere, a simulator is a tool – albeit a very sophisticated tool – but a tool, nonetheless. A chalk board and chalk was/is a tool that was, and continues to be, at least to some degree, a successfully used tool in the training of pilots. We, as instructors are not in the business of teaching pilots to fly the simulator … our goal should be to teach pilots to fly the airplane. I probably need not remind anyone here that simulators have come an exceptionally long way since their initial use a long time ago. But, and as I pointed out in a recent post, while there are older simulators still in operation, most of which have been modernized and subsequently upgraded to meet more current standards (some of which are qualified today at Level C or Level D), perhaps the oldest simulator in the FAA inventory still qualified at Level A, a Lockheed JetStar, L-1329-23A simulator, is still regularly used to teach and test pilots on that airplane. Obviously, that is NOT the only training mechanism that is used to teach Jetstar pilots, but that specific simulator, as used by the assigned instructing staff, does the job it was intended to provide – day in and day out. My point here is that regardless of how accurate a particular simulator may or may not be, there are likely to be some, perhaps many, areas where any particular simulator does not perform, handle, respond … in general, “fly,” just exactly like the airplane being simulated. It has always been the goal of airplane manufacturers, simulator manufacturers, training organizations, airlines, and regulatory authorities to maximize the benefits of the use of properly designed, constructed, developed, equipped, and used flight simulators to train pilots to operate the simulated airplane. This is only part of the reason that regulatory authorities (specifically the US FAA) has, over time, developed the currently existing regulatory structure that defines the requirements for putting an airplane flight simulator into service to assist in the training of pilots in the US.

My colleague, ZFT has pointed out that his experience has included “…every simulator that we have qualified these past few years had initially excessive sounds, typically aero and excessive buffets when perfectly matching so called approved data.” Additionally, he is of the opinion that there is a “basically ridiculous situation that the airframe manufacturers perform flight tests and data gathering on non-production standard aircraft which almost always results in totally inaccurate or incorrect data (then used within the MQTG) especially in the areas of sound and vibrations, which of course are the unique areas that differentiate a Level D FSTD!” I suspect that even he might have at least some “second thoughts” about the accuracy of, and his choice of descriptors used, in describing his experience with simulation data and its sources – although, admittedly, it does communicate the level of anguish he feels over inaccurate simulator programming. Additionally, I share every bit of the same anguish – simply because anyone would desire perfection or at least a much closer approximation, even though it is well-understood that absolute accuracy is exceedingly difficult, and perhaps impossible, to achieve. However, rather than focusing all of my emotions and efforts on criticizing the way data is gathered, reduced, developed, and incorporated into a flight simulator, and insisting that I, or anyone else, be allowed the authorization to “adjust” that data to fit what I believe to be “more accurate,” I prefer to focus on ensuring that the instructors and evaluators who would use whatever level of such data gathering, reduction, development, and incorporation makes it into an operational simulator, are competently and completely trained on that particular simulator, including its short comings and its accuracies – with a view toward the intent of ensuring they will be fully equipped to use that simulator to its maximum capabilities to assist in training pilots to fly the airplane being simulated. I do this while ensuring that the data provider(s) is/are aware of the concerns that I and those with whom I work have noted the reasoning behind any “uncomfortable” aspect of the data as it exists as part of the simulator and leave those professionals to their respective professional capabilities to review, and, if appropriate, make any necessary, competent, and verifiable corrections to that data.

Everyone should understand that the US has moved from inspecting, evaluating, and qualifying flight simulation equipment through an “advisory” document describing the desired accuracies, to a regulatory requirement for the level of accuracy desired at each level of Flight Simulation Training Device. During the development of that regulation, the major airplane manufacturers, the major simulator manufacturers, many airline management representatives, several pilot organizations, and several airplane flight testing organizations directly participated in that development process – and the FAA managed to keep other regulatory authorities fully aware of the direction that the discussions were taking. Despite the regulatory aspect of the simulator data requirements, within those regulations, there are provisions for simulator manufacturers and airline/training organizations sponsoring FSTDs, to use data from sources separate from, and independent of, airplane manufacturers, as long as these organizations are able to provide a description of their processes for gathering, downloading, reducing, and developing such data into useable programming for the simulator.

Additionally, the recently published ICAO document for simulators was developed by a consortium of the same participants joined by several country’s regulatory authorities, all fully and quite successfully representing their own interests and being able to see, hear, and “feel,” the concerns of others who would be integrally involved in the development and use of such a document. Of course, with the degree of accuracy attempted and the range of operational environments in which the simulator will be operated, the amount and the subsequent accuracy of any data gathered is most challenging – and when the variable factors are introduced, i.e., structural expansions, contractions, squeaks, and groans; the altitudes, pressures, associated temperature ranges; the airspeed, gross weight, and airplane configuration differences, through which each simulator will be expected to provide accurate simulations – it certainly should be understood that providing precision in data accuracy is most assuredly attempted, and to a very great extent, achieved – knowing that corrections and variances are likely to be necessary – the overall process cannot help but be admired and respected by us all.

[mnttech]

AirRabbit

Interesting posts. In your opinion, what has the effect on the US simulator standards been by the change from AC120-40C and FAR Part 60? What has the effect been on having most if not all of the inspectors based out of one city, instead of all over the country?

[Aluminium shuffler]

All sims are not equal, even if they are of the same spec, manufacturer and owner airline. My employer has numerous Level D sims and they all behave differently, some more realistically than others. However, all make me feel quite drunk for the first hour, presumably because of the limits of the movement simulation and their apparent slight lack of synchronisation with the visuals and instruments. However, all of them have been much harder to fly by hand than the real aircraft , of which I have flown a few hundred individual airframes - even the oldest, most abused and twisted "Friday afternoon" airframe was easier to handle than the best sim. I have been told that several EU authorities insist on "destabilising" them to ensure that the checking guarantees we can fly the aircraft even on a bad day, but whether that is true or not I don't know.

Simulator cross-wind training is currently being undertaken at my employer - I did it on my last RST and they want to increase the cross-wind limits, so we did 35kts wet t/o and ldg. It wasn't especially difficult, but despite the sim's steady and smooth wind, which is in itself unrealistic, it was much harder than real life. We more experinced folk have all landed in very high x-winds where ATC have reported the lower winds (before the averaging systems appeared in towers to stop them cheating) because they were trying to keep things moving and thought they were helping us out. Those conditions, even with the gusts and bumps were far easier than the sim.

You have to learn somewhere, and these unrealistic simulations are better than nothing. I think my employer's restriction on new cadets being restricted to 15kts x-wind is pretty good, but instead of an arbitrary 500hr rule to derestrict them, they should have to do the sim training module and then be checked in real x-winds to be allowed to operate to the aircraft limits. I also think the current wet and dry limits on the 73 are too restrictive (not so the contaminated limits, though), but that's another issue...

[Aluminium shuffler]

I respectfully, partially, disagree - the simulators I have used vary so much in their manual flight characteristics that they are almost incomparable. I'm finding them harder to fly of late, though it could be any factor (or combination) of age, increase in experience of the real aircraft, poorer quality simulation (these are not the most expensive models available) or wear and tear on the sims themselves. I fly a fair bit manually, liking to practice raw IFR and plenty of visual approaches and circuits, so am not especially rusty at hand flying. But I am finding more and more that sims are ok at procedural training but hopeless for handling training.

[AirRabbit]

AirRabbit

Interesting posts. In your opinion, what has the effect on the US simulator standards been by the change from AC120-40C and FAR Part 60? What has the effect been on having most if not all of the inspectors based out of one city, instead of all over the country?

Hi mnttech
With respect to your first question (In your opinion, what has the effect on the US simulator standards been by the change from AC120-40C and FAR Part 60?) It was just about 18-20 months ago that I was involved in a seminar where the participants were from a substantial representation of airplane manufacturers, simulator manufacturers, airlines, pilot organizations, training organizations, and training providers, as well as regulatory authorities – and during one of the session breaks, the 15 or 20 delegates who gathered around the podium were discussing what they each believed was the most significant advancement in simulation in the past decade. The rather surprising majority agreed that it was likely the publication of the US FAA’s Part 60 regulation. Some cited the fact that the document represented a regulatory requirement but that it also was full of explanations and example references. Others who cited the explanatory nature of the document also described the fact that it covered simulators and training devices for both airplanes and for helicopters, at all the appropriate levels for each; and still others felt that the manner in which the document was developed – the wide ranging participation of all interested parties – made it the most significant advancement in the use of simulators. Additionally, you might be interested to know that, actually, the Advisory Circular 120-40C was never completed and published (although there were some authorizations granted, I understand, for a few organizations to use “Draft -40C” for some applications, as there appeared to be some significant commitment and funding that might have been otherwise lost – attesting to the agreeability of the FAA to recognize the “real world” rather than maintaining a “cold, disinterested look at individuals” … and, the part 60 document did, in fact, pick up on a lot of the major differences from AC 120-40B on which -40C was to be focused. I know that the FAA cited the motivation to provide as much of the references and standards that were regularly used and relied upon as references to be contained in a single document (the Pt 60 regulation) as was possible to prevent individuals from having to continually reference 5 or 6 other documents to find the answer to a single question or determine a single requirement. I suspicion that this was not completed to the extent that some had desired, but it did provide for a wider range of answers to questions that previously required researching multiple documents.

With respect to your second question (What has the effect been on having most if not all of the inspectors based out of one city, instead of all over the country?) … The FAA organization charged with the responsibility and the authority to conduct inspections and issue qualifications was originally composed of a small staff headquartered in Washington DC, was named the National Simulator Evaluation Team (NSET), and was moved to Atlanta. This was to mirror the agency’s goal of having each of the 9 regions in the US, i.e., New England, Eastern, Southern, Central, Southwestern, Great Lakes, Rocky Mountain, Western, and Nortwestern (later an Alaskan region was established as well) be the Region-of-Responsibility for one of the major FAA functions. The Southern Region, with headquarters in Atlanta, was designated as having the responsibility of Simulator Evaluation and Qualification. But, this “team” remained organized the same way – and each of the 9 regions designated one inspector, domiciled in that region, to be that region’s representative. This structure was maintained for the first 20 years or so of its operation. However, as anyone who deals with remotely cited operations would probably recognize, the level of standardization and the understanding of directives, orders, agreements, etc., can easily become potential focal points for misinterpretation and non-standard actions. Part of the justification was that there were insufficient funds to move each NSET member to Atlanta, and leaving those inspectors in their present location would allow the simulators in their location to be regularly evaluated without incurring travel costs. However, this presented two other issues: first, only one NSET member would likely evaluate those specific simulators; and second, with any specific entity as wholly dependent on technology as are simulators, having these entities critically examined by only one individual, this could easily result in perceived or actual compromises that would not be possible and not expected or suspicioned if every simulator was at least periodically inspected by other members of the NSET. Additionally, this regional assignment of NSET members required that twice a year all inspectors would travel to Atlanta for a week-long standardization meeting, and that meant that for at least twice a year for a 2-week period (allowing time for travel) no simulators, anywhere, would be evaluated – AND there was the expense of having to have such meetings. Starting in the 1990s, the NSET first changed its identity, preferring to be known as the NSP (changing the designation from an “evaluation team” to a more broadly functioning “program”). With this change there was also an examination of the level of standardization achieved with inspectors having to attend standardization meetings twice a year – essentially suspending evaluation schedules for 2 weeks at a time twice a year – with a potential of moving all inspectors into Atlanta, where formalized week-long standardization meetings could be replaced with regular conversations on a much more regular basis … even as often as every morning for those who were present for coffee conversations, or periodic water-cooler meetings throughout the day, and/or one-on-one meetings with whomever was in the offices at the time a question needed some field experience to answer competently, and do so more easily and more regularly, without interrupting evaluation travel requirements.

As I understand the NSP functioning, this arrangement has benefitted a majority of the simulator sponsors and most of the NSP staff. However, change is preeminently on the horizon, and the NSP is not insulated from change, I am sure. Also, I am aware of several NSP inspectors who needed to be in locations other than Atlanta for personal (family or medical) reasons and in some cases, these few individuals have been authorized to permanently move their home to other locations. I do not know the numbers nor do I know the corporate attitude with respect to these few examples. Perhaps there will be additional moves in the future – perhaps not. But I am of the opinion that the central mission of this organization has been and will likely continue to be devoted to the competent structure of simulation standards and the competent and effective evaluation of such devices on a basis that can result in the assurance that those devices remain in a condition to perform the functions for which each was designed, qualified, and approved. And, as an example of that has been the dedication of the NSP toward the development, incorporation, and functioning of a reasonable and efficient Quality Management System (QMS) located at each simulator sponsor’s location. I have been told that the reason for this is the fact that the numbers of US qualified and regularly evaluated simulation devices continues to grow … but the US government is reluctant to increase the size of the NSP staff. Knowing these obviously diametrical opposed circumstances, it is easy to understand why the NSP is seeking to develop and incorporate a professionally constructed and dependable QMS.

[Centaurus]

they should have to do the sim training module and then be checked in real x-winds to be allowed to operate to the aircraft limits.

"Checked in real X-winds" Pity the unfortunate passengers and crew down the back if that happens. Passengers are entitled to have a safe no drama flight and not be an unwilling captive audience to some newbie in the RH seat trying his luck without interference from the captain, at 30 knots or more across the runway. If the sim fidelity is doubtful for crosswind landings at AFM limits then the regulator should demand first officer crosswind training be conducted in the real aircraft with no passengers or cabin crew aboard. Fat chance of that happening of course.;)

[A37575]

I fly a fair bit manually, liking to practice raw IFR and plenty of visual approaches and circuits,

Ooh, wash your mouth out.. In many companies that would be a serious no-no and dead against SOP's. You are indeed fortunate not to be hauled in for tea and bikkies for daring to fly manually, especially raw data.

[mnttech]

AirRabbit:
Additionally, you might be interested to know that, actually, the Advisory Circular 120-40C was never completed and published (although there were some authorizations granted, I understand, for a few organizations to use “Draft -40C” for some applications…

Yes sir, several of the simulators I maintained had 120-40C draft as the approval basis on the FAA NSP approval line. As all of us aircraft maintenance types know, an AC is a means, but not the sole means.

Thanks for some of the history of the NSET/NSP. I was aware of some of it, but not all. The current personnel list shows about 6 inspectors outside of Atlanta, the rest of the team there.

Knowing these obviously diametrical opposed circumstances, it is easy to understand why the NSP is seeking to develop and incorporate a professionally constructed and dependable QMS.
You might want to re-think this one, I authored the 3rd approved SQMS, and I’m pretty sure I’m not necessary a professional writer… :eek:

In somewhat line with this thread, the NSP has issued a new Guidance bulletin on full stall training maneuvers, and I have heard that the next FSTD Directive might involve crosswind landing data.

For those outside of the US, it takes about 5 years to update any FAR. The idea around FSTD Directive(s) was to short cut that time span, making simulators more like the aircraft faster. To date, the NSP has only issued one FSTD, on visual models.

[AirRabbit]

Knowing these obviously diametrical opposed circumstances, it is easy to understand why the NSP is seeking to develop and incorporate a professionally constructed and dependable QMS.
You might want to re-think this one, I authored the 3rd approved SQMS, and I’m pretty sure I’m not necessary a professional writer…

In somewhat line with this thread, the NSP has issued a new Guidance bulletin on full stall training maneuvers, and I have heard that the next FSTD Directive might involve crosswind landing data.

For those outside of the US, it takes about 5 years to update any FAR. The idea around FSTD Directive(s) was to short cut that time span, making simulators more like the aircraft faster. To date, the NSP has only issued one FSTD, on visual models.

Hi mnttech

Well … I don’t think it’s necessary to rethink my statement … I know about the level of “professionalism” that had to go into the description and the discussions relative to the development of a satisfactory QMS program described by the NSP … and … if you got paid for your job functions, and part of your function was to actually describe how your company would develop, employ, and manage a company QMS program … I’d say that qualifies as a piece of professional work … and as long as you can continue to have a say in those areas, I wouldn’t hesitate to include that as part of your professional resume.

In addition to the guidance bulletin, I know that the NSP is currently working on a revision to Part 60 – and at least a portion of that revision I understand was intended to address several new aspects of airplane operation – among them are likely to be full stalls, gusting and crosswind conditions (for takeoff and landing), as well as bounced landing recoveries. These issues were relatively high on the NSP “things-to-do” list and had been discussed to one degree or another for some time, each time getting closer to finalization. And, judging from the bureaucratic preferences that inevitably creep into governmental functions and usually manage to “elbow” their way to the surface, the NSP getting this Part 60 revision completed might well have been delayed by that bureaucracy … the most notable delay very probably being what was originally the development of a complete overhaul of Part 121 training requirements that was just short of conclusion, when the outflow of publicity generated by the friends and family members of the Colgan crash victims very publically demonstrating and demanding things specifically of the US Congress and dominating the Washington, DC local news. As a result, I understand that the multi-year effort to reconstruct those training requirements, was essentially gutted and dramatically reduced in favor of dealing directly, and only, with the issues brought to the surface through the Colgan accident publicity. For whatever its worth, the NSP revisions, some aspects of which would be seen in revised regulatory requirements and authorizations, and others would be reflected in the form of an FSTD Directive (mostly due to the fact that a majority of these combined revisions touched either directly or indirectly on some of the issues that the Colgan publicity included) it is likely that the Part 60 rule update and the FSTD Directive will proceed, but it’s not likely that either will do so with much publicity or fanfare.

And, you are also correct that the concept of FSTD Directives was the specific process that both made sense and was capable of becoming effective in a far shorter time frame to address appropriate and necessary modifications, additions, or deletions of simulation standards or qualification requirements – all structured to take the best advantage of simulation advancements as quickly as possible when simulation operation is governed under a bureaucratic regulatory process.

[AirRabbit]

After reading the post by OK465 (above) my mind immediately flashed back to my first airline employment where we all referred to the equipment we used as “the used airplane lot,” or other similar references, some not so suited for mixed audiences. All the airplanes were the same make, model, and series, but were acquired from a whole litany of differing sources. There may have been a couple of airframes that could be recognized as being somewhat similar in handling or operating characteristics to another airframe on the lot … but I wouldn’t bet anything of value that any more than a very few of the more experienced pilots would have been able to make such a comparison. OK465, sir, you hit the nail squarely on the head – and I’m actually somewhat embarrassed that I didn’t make exactly the same connection – particularly after being a part of the rather regular “hanger flying” sessions that many of my fellow aviators had at almost any gathering of any more than a couple of the line pilots. Different airframes had very distinct characteristics that were unlike any other airplane, in our fleet at least. Whether it was the necessity to sneak some speed brakes out for a couple of seconds after leveling off at say 3000 feet during descent approaching to land, so that one could get the speed down to extend the first increment of flaps … to the necessity of having to add power to keep the airspeed from plummeting too quickly after leveling off at 3000 to keep the airspeed from decreasing below the desired airspeed for the flap setting desired. Other times, there was a clear necessity to make an adjustment on short final (either from “high” to “on-slope” or from “low” to “on-slope”) that required dramatically different power and trim adjustments once the desired flight path was achieved. There was even an attempt by a small group of line pilots to categorize particular tail numbers to provide an individual memory jog for the new guys joining the group, ostensibly designed to “make their life easier.” That was stopped when one of the check airmen recognized a similar action from two of the relatively new FO’s he was paired with on one 3-day trip.

The point here is that often there are differing qualities of performance or handling characteristics that are quite obvious from airframe to airframe – and those differences are, or at least “can be,” every bit as “different,” and more so in some cases, as some of the “differences” between the simulator and the airplane. We used several different simulator sources for our training and checking – and the differences were clearly evident. Also, those differences were the topic of a lot of discussion when notifications of individual recurrent training or checks were noted when schedules were published. The ONLY similarity that absolutely must exist is the knowledge of what to do and how to do it, and then use the skill-set developed to see to it that the airplane performed the way it had to perform to get through the task at hand. The same thing holds true for operating a simulator that has shown some signs of not handling or performing the way the airplane performs or handles – and that is the same application of what to do and how to do it … the knowledge acquired and the knowledge of how to manipulate the controls available to get through the task at hand. It may sound trite – but it’s absolutely true. And it is at this point where the competence of the simulator instructor simply has to take up any slack … and with my experience with all kinds of airplanes and all kinds of simulators representing each airplane type … it is the knowledge, the competence, and the ability of the instructor in a simulator to be sure that the right “knowledge” is recognized and the “correct” manipulation of the controls of the airplane (as simulated) are exhibited and then ensures that there are no questions and no misunderstandings. I am fearful that far too many instructors leave the “instructing” to the simulator itself - and yes, I am fully aware of what that means. This kind of error is probably the most egregious error that can be made in the operation of a flight simulator. Typically, when flight training is conducted in an airplane, the instructor must stay “on top” of what circumstances exist and are or may be developing, and cannot afford to let a student get the airplane into a set of circumstances from which that instructor cannot recover. One of the oft-heard comments from the students I had was voiced almost immediately after I took control of the airplane away from that student. Their comment was “…I was just going to …” and then they would finish with what they either knew or what they saw that I had done with the airplane. Well, maybe I should have let them go just another second or two or three. To see if they really ‘would have’ done what I did. In the simulator there is no such requirement. In the simulator, an instructor can allow the student to actually DO what they intend to do – or NOT do what they should have done. There is no “…I was just going to…” However, and more often than one might realize, the intervention of the instructor may be quite a bit more subtle than physically taking control. And that comes from a failure to recognize difficulties or hesitancies with respect to the either the control application or control application sequence they observe, or fail to recognize, or fail to correct, in response to an existing or developing set of handling or performance parameters. Allowing a student to do what they think is correct, and then do it over and over and over … that student almost has the right to understand that what he/she has done was the correct and proper response. Instructors need to be aware of what that student is doing and what that student is thinking. It is true at least some of the time is that what the student has done was not necessarily based on what he/she was thinking – but very well may have been based on what that student was looking at when he/she actually did something. The more the instructor “allows” the student to do something, anything, over and over, without correction or comment, the more that student is going to believe that the action taken is what the instructor wanted to see – when the truth may be entirely different. Instructing should be a very integral and very involved process – otherwise instructing wouldn’t be as important as it is. This is why I keep harping on the fact that instructors must be trained completely and competently on each and every simulator they are going to use to teach pilots what they need to know, what they need to do, and how they are expected to put those two aspects together. Anything less will result in less – and I don’t believe we can accept less ... in fact, we should be expecting more. I've also advocated an effort to revisit instructor training - both in the larger scope of things - and in the minute, nitty gritty kinds of things that if overlooked could lead to an improper learning or reinforcement of something not intended and not wanted. I would prefer this to be international in scope and attended by both instructors (and potential instructors) and those persons to whom the instructors are to report. If its correct, there is no such thing as "too much" instruction.

[ZFT]

AirRabbit,

Some very interesting and constructive comments and varying points of view are being raised. I think there are 3 issues that maybe need to be debated independently because maybe one size doesn’t fit all. These are the fidelity of FSTDs, their use and who uses/operates them.

The user/operator is very pertinent because whilst I totally concur with your view on the importance of “the instructor’s talent, ability, and his/her knowledge of the simulation used” the last element of this i.e. the knowledge of the simulation used can generally be available only to those operations that utilise their own dedicated FSTD trainers, typically training their own trainees on their own FSTDs and probably small fleet operators only requiring minimal FSTDs to support their training needs. With large fleets (requiring multiple FSTDs) or 3rd party training or with training organisations that have a high level of dry lease of their FSTDs, the ability to gather the knowledge of the simulation used is reduced significantly, sometimes down to zero with a TRI/SFI from a new or infrequent user possibly having no experience of a specific FSTD. Therefore the ability to brief trainees on the nuances of an FSTD is just not there. (Again I wonder whether differing regulatory cultures have a bearing as whilst under your regulations trainers and testers are appointed by their respective organisations, under EASA SFI/TRI are licenced and can train and test anywhere on any EASA approved FSTD of the type they are licenced on).

As a result, the only (realistic) mechanism of briefing non company instructional staff on the FSTD is via a deferred defects procedure at the briefing stage to allow them to ‘work around’ an issue or decline the FSTD as they wish.

The use of higher level FSTDs may be, I would suggest somewhat different across the regulatory/cultural divide, possibly more so now since the 1500 hrs requirement? Regulations already seem to accept that lower fidelity is acceptable for higher (on type) experience as a Level B FFS is perfectly fine for recurrency training and checking (Mechtronix even successfully persuaded some regulatory authorities to approve their FFT product without a motion system for recurrency credits I believe), whereas a Level C/D is required for a Type Rating.

An experienced (on type) trainee might/will recognise and accept FSTD fidelity issues, the less experienced may not and as some posters have indicated, this does cause them concerns. I would suggest that if it is possible to remove these fidelity issues as opposed to briefing the trainees on them, this is a far preferable solution. Certainly within the area we operate, (too) many of the trainees are lacking in the experience to differentiate and whilst there is no substitute for experience, quality training can at least offset this to a degree.

This lead us back into the fidelity issue. As much as you advocate expecting more from the instuctors, I advocate expecting more from his training tools too. Better and more intuitive IOS stations to allow him/her to concentrate on training, not operating. More desire from the airframe and FSTD OEMs to actually replicate the aircraft (where possible and within the obvious limitations, lack of sustained G etc) and a greater desire by the operators to correct (not adjust!) obvious deficiencies within existing data and not just to accept it as “meets approved data”.

There is a requirement on an initial EASA evaluation for the operator’s evaluation team to sign and submit an attestation to EASA that confirms that, amongst other items the FFS flying qualities represents the aeroplane being simulated (GM1 ORA.FSTD.115 Part C). Admittedly ‘represents’ is a broad term but our evaluation pilots will not sign their names to a devise that has obvious fidelity issues within the normal envelope that just shouldn’t exist and some of the items I cited before, namely sound and vibs are in our opinion, too basic to be briefed away when with effort they can be corrected.

You state there is no such thing as "too much" instruction. I understand your view and I would also state that you cannot have "too much" fidelity supporting those well trained instructors. Simulation has come a long way since the very first Zero Flight Time (ZFT) training success when Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed at Tranquility Base, a procedure they had repeatedly performed on a simulator at NASA but their success was based upon the same requirements as today - quality trainees, quality trainers, quality training programs and quality training tools.

[AirRabbit]

Hi ZFT

First, let me say that there is nothing you’ve said in your post (above) that I would disagree with – in fact there are some things you said with which I would agree, and others with which I would stand-up, IN the chair, punching the air, in agreement.

Of course you are correct with respect to a contracting user of a simulator belonging to someone else – and having that contracting user be able to find out ALL of the “nitty gritty” nastiness that may be found in the bowels of a particular simulator … very likely to NOT happen.

Please understand, I would advocate the very best of fidelity and the most accurate replication of the airplane in any simulator. And after the US regulations were initially written and there was a concerted effort to prescribe a more detailed and accurate replication of a simulated airplane there was the elephant in the room. That elephant was the already qualified, approved, and long-used simulators that wouldn’t have a prayer of meeting the newly developed requirements, without substantial expenditure of additional funds. It seemed illogical to conclude that simply because a device was more than a few years old, it no longer would be accepted the way it had been accepted. However, I think it is necessary to understand that the logic was not so much addressing those older devices as it was the precedence that would likely be set with such a determination. If the older simulators were to be relegated to some lesser capability (say, something like a “procedure trainer”) who would be able to say that the newly modern simulators bursting onto the scene with the newly developed 6-axis motion systems, stereophonic surround-sound, computer generated visuals with back-projected, front reflective view through (now) up to well over 180 degrees of uninterrupted view, might someday, be relegated to the same “procedure trainer” future when the next advancement in simulation becomes apparent? That was the potential facing the older 3-axis motion, CRT visual, and (well, mediocre) sound systems equipped simulators that were “new” a couple of years, perhaps a decade, earlier. So, the problem that had to be faced was how a regulatory requirement could be used to govern simulation standards and be found to be worthless at some unnamed time in the future … and perhaps a not-distant future. Who would want to invest – particularly invest the cost of one of these new devices – when there was even a possibility that in the some-time future, it might become essentially worthless? How does an industry encourage the expenditure of significant amounts of money when there is no guarantee that those funds will soon be seen to have been essentially lost? The solution – perhaps not the best solution – but the only solution deemed capable of making sense – was to “grandfather” existing simulators – allowing those devices to continue to meet the existing standards and continue to enjoy their currently authorized use. The fact that these now older simulators were not “zero flight time” simulators made this not only a logical premise, but one that would not compromise the expanded capabilities that these newly described simulators were capable of meeting. The historically “modern” simulators, originally known as “visual simulators” became what is now known as Level A or Level B. But it should be noted that to be designated a Level B simulator, that simulator had to be modified with additional landing data, gathered from airplane flight testing conducted well within ground effect and use modified computer programming for that new data. The Level A would be allowed to satisfy recurrent proficiency checks, as long as a check airman was to observe a landing on the line within an established time frame of the simulator check. The Level B, with the addition of the landing data, could be used to satisfy the recurrent proficiency check, including the landings required. The other two levels of simulator, Level C and Level D, each had requirements that included the advanced 6-axis motion systems, visual systems with wider fields-of-view, and additional sound requirements. The requirements for the Level C were not as specific nor quite as advanced as the Level D simulator, but Level C was authorized for “zero flight time training” only for those individuals who had rather extensive experience – and that experience was specifically outlined in the newly published regulations.

So … the concerns that you described are quite real – but it was at least attempted to be addressed in what requirements had to be met for each of the newly described 4 levels of full flight simulator. Of course, there remains a lot of issues that we all would like to see have a method of addressing. Not the least of which are individual issues with some (really any) individual simulator. Any user not employed by the owner/operator of the simulator may not be made knowledgeable of the specific short-comings of any particular device. The only way I know to deal with those kinds of problems is to have the instructor using that simulator be as knowledgeable about the simulator as is allowed by the owner/operator AND to be sure that the instructor has substantial experience in the airplane (being represented by the simulator) so that if the simulator demonstrates an anomaly not present in the airplane, the instructor will be knowledgeable as to the following: 1) whether or not that anomaly should be written up in the simulator log – and whether or not that log entry should include information about the known airplane response; and 2) whether or not it would be necessary or appropriate to point out that anomaly to the student being trained, and if it were appropriate, to know how to describe both that simulator anomaly and the correct airplane response, leading to instruction as to how the student would be expected to address that airplane response.

I think that regulatory authorities have a responsibility to ensure that the parameters of simulator operation are appropriate and fairly applied. But by the same measure, those authorities should not necessarily see a requirement to “move the goal” simply because technology improves. There is nothing wrong with expanding the technical capabilities of existing simulators, and most regulatory authorities do have methodologies in place to ensure the competence of pilots licensed by that authority, and when or if it becomes appropriate those authorities should use the existing process to alter the training requirements for pilots to ensure their individual competence … and if that means adjusting simulator qualification criteria, at least that process would ensure fair and equitable requirements are levied on both the pilots and the training mechanisms used to meet those requirements.

[ZFT]

AirRabbit,

I have no issues with Grandfather Rights. The pragmatic approach taken globally by the regulatory authorities was the correct decision for the reasons you state and the qualification certificate clearly indicates this status to the user. Likewise I would never underrate the importance of the person occupying the middle seat both for training and feedback.

I will disagree with you somewhat about “moving the goal”. I believe that the regulatory authorities do have the responsibility to do just that to ensure the FSTDs being designed today do take advantage of the latest technologies and take into account the current training needs. Sensible and realistic implementation times should alleviate any pain and already qualified devices should either be exempt or given very realistic timeframes to comply.

This chances of this ever happening are of course quite remote so the onus is back on to the operator to drive the FSTD manufacturers by means of tech spec requirements etc to keep moving forward.

Interestingly CASA (Singapore) unilaterally moved their regulatory goal posts and the industry was somewhat caught out initially.

OK465

EASA too no longer require glareshield ambient lighting for any FSTD qualified under CS-FSTD(A).

(A little bit of history, they came about because of a certain FAA inspector by the name of Sam Van Dyke and the original requirement for a certain level of reflected light from a face).

[AirRabbit]

I will disagree with you somewhat about “moving the goal”. I believe that the regulatory authorities do have the responsibility to do just that to ensure the FSTDs being designed today do take advantage of the latest technologies and take into account the current training needs. Sensible and realistic implementation times should alleviate any pain and already qualified devices should either be exempt or given very realistic timeframes to comply.
Once again, I agree with your statements – and to clarify, I do not believe that taking advantage of newer and better technology is necessarily moving the goal.

My statement had to do with establishing criteria after having discussed it thoroughly and after it becomes a part of a particular simulator saying that because newer or better technology has become available, the regulatory authority will no longer accept that now “older” technology to do what it was designed to do – and does. To make it a requirement to acquire and use the new technology, I believe it would have to provide significantly better understanding, significantly better, hands-on training, or both, to require that technology be incorporated. It’s been my experience that when newer technology makes headway into simulation, it allows new tasks, tasks that up to then could not be accomplished, or accomplished only to allow an entry into an accomplishment checklist, to now be adequately addressed. That’s not moving the goal.

For example, we’ve been discussing the current development process of software that can better use existing or yet to be gathered flight test data that is supposed to more realistically be able to represent a flight simulator in the post-aerodynamic-stall portion of flight (…presuming, of course, one would or could consider post-stall to still be flying …) In this particular example of technology providing something that had not been available previously, it’s not something to make what we already do quite well, just a slight bit better … what this appears to be providing is to allow a whole new adventure into actually taking a flight simulator into and past the aerodynamic stall – and have the simulated airplane realistically perform and handle just as the airplane would under similar circumstances.

With the number of “upset/stall” or “inattention-induced stall” scenarios apparently being seen to have caused some very serious compromises to safety – and doing so on an increasing level – and, now, with this newly developed capability, if we can effectively train pilots to be better able to determine the insidious nature of stall onsets in some cases, and how to take the proper action to prevent that circumstance from developing into a stall … or if the flight crew were to surprisingly find themselves in a nose high, buffeting descent, they will be able to recognize what is happening and know what to do in order to correctly recover the airplane to normal flight … would, certainly in my opinion, and I would think in the opinions of many other aviation professionals, be worth changing the existing requirements to ensure these serious compromises to safety can be adequately addressed – and hopefully permanently eliminated.

Again, in my not-so-humble-opinion, that’s not moving the goal … that would be finally establishing a goal that now can be met in an environment that is safe and almost without any significant degree of danger. In this particular case, a rule change – requiring each pilot to be trained on the recognition of and recovery from both approaches to stall and fully developed stalls would likely not find any significant objection and would provide a level of safety that the previous requirements were thought to have provided … but did not.

A little bit of history, they came about because of a certain FAA inspector by the name of Sam Van Dyke and the original requirement for a certain level of reflected light from a face.
I cannot let an old friend’s name go by without acknowledging it … I knew Sam quite well and still think of him regularly … in fact, his wife, Thelma, and I continue to exchange Christmas cards each and every year. Thanks for noting him. And for those of you who did not have the good fortune to know Sam … the light reflected from a person’s face was an issue that long dogged the development and incorporation of daylight visual scenes and the resulting amount of light that fills the airplane cockpit during the daylight hours – as it was difficult to achieve that amount of light in the darkened environment of a simulator cockpit.

You see, Sam’s skin color was black ... and the reflected light from Sam’s face was often the subject of this somewhat controversial "discussion" - as it was always good for a "reflective review" of the requirements (pun intended). However, the thing that was, without a doubt, THE most telling color of Sam’s personality was that he had a heart of pure, very shiny, GOLD!

[Judd]

Air Rabbit. I for one thoroughly enjoy reading (and learning ) from your posts. But please break up the large amount of text with appropriate paragraphing. This contributor's eyes reading through trifocals start to glaze over after being forced to read line after line without a break. I wouldn't be surprised if others echo my thoughts but are too kind to say something. The pity is you write such thoughtful stuff and yet some may turn away from it due eye fatigue. No offence intended. :ok:

[AirRabbit]

Hi Judd

I certainly don’t take any offence, and actually, I appreciate your honesty. In fact, I am fully aware that I use “a lot” of words to get my points across … and that comes from my educational and instructing background … where, over the years, I’ve found that some folks see/hear and understand the same point(s), but quite often do so from differing perspectives – meaning that to ensure the widest level of understanding, it is usually better to fully explain the points desired, and do so preferably from more than one perspective, or using more than one approach to the subject. The resulting problem is being … well … “wordy,” and I’m certainly guilty of that.

I will attempt to remember what you’ve said and post comments that are structured with a bit more space to avoid the “eye problems.” But, knowing me, even with all the good intentions I may muster, I am relatively sure that, particularly on subjects that are of significant importance to me, I’m likely to open the flood gates. Again, thanks for the honesty and for the compliment it contained.

[mnttech]

ZFT
There is a requirement on an initial EASA evaluation for the operator’s evaluation team to sign and submit an attestation to EASA that confirms that, amongst other items the FFS flying qualities represents theaeroplane being simulated (GM1 ORA.FSTD.115 Part C).

FAA Part 60 has the same requirement:
§60.15 Initial qualification requirements.
(b) The management representative described in §60.9(c) must sign a statement (electronic signature is acceptable for electronic transmissions) after confirming the following:
(1) The performance and handling qualities of the FSTD represent those of the aircraft or set of aircraft within the normal operating envelope. This determination must be made by a pilot(s) meeting the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section after having flown all of the Operations Tasks listed in the applicable QPS appendix relevant to the qualification level of the FSTD. Exceptions, if any, must be noted. The name of the person(s) making this determination must be available to the NSPM upon request.

[mnttech]

There of course are always at least two sides to any subject. Years ago, a local Director of Operations went to fly a major airlines “qualified” MD-80 simulator. During the engine out work, he stated that the simulator needed a lot of rudder to keep the aircraft straight. Upon further investigation, it was found that both engines center of thrust were about 10 feet farther out than they should have been.

I had a new dry lease crew come out of the simulator and complain it did not handle correctly. When I asked, I was told it was “not stable in the horizontal axis!” I replied, “Lateral or longitudinal, rotation of, or rotation around?” The crew walked away…

AirRabbit has done a great job in this topic, and reading between the lines (and adding my own 2 cents) I would say that simulation training is more of a group (pilots, instructors, certification, evaluation, maintenance, data gathering) effort than operating the actual aircraft.

[AirRabbit]

There of course are always at least two sides to any subject. Years ago, a local Director of Operations went to fly a major airlines “qualified” MD-80 simulator. During the engine out work, he stated that the simulator needed a lot of rudder to keep the aircraft straight. Upon further investigation, it was found that both engines center of thrust were about 10 feet farther out than they should have been.
Quite some time ago now, when I first qualified on the DC-9, the guys were going to issue me a DC-9 Type with my initial ATP, but it was going to be limited to Center Thrust. When I questioned them on that issue, they initially explained that the DC-9 was a Center Thrust airplane, and started to explain to me that it was because an engine out didn’t require a lot of rudder! One of the instructors happened to be standing right behind me – and I turned to get his reaction to that statement. He was dumbfounded! He insisted that they call the FAA HQ in Washington to check. The guy in DC said it was because the Airplane Type Certification Data Sheet had no “minimum control speed with an engine out” and gave the reference page.

The guys in the office I was in, pulled that manual off the shelf, and turned to the referenced page … and sure enough, there was no value typed in that spot! So the instructor grabbed the book and turned back to the previous section, which was Douglas DC-8, and turned to the same page. He found that there was no entry typed into the same location for that airplane. He merely pointed to the blank entry and asked if the DC-8 was also “limited to centerline thrust.” The guy on the phone asked the bloke in DC to turn to that same referenced page in the DC-8 section … and, after a couple of shuffled feet, he agreed that they could issue my rating and the ATP without a Centerline Thrust limitation. After that phone call, all the instructors and students in the office were describing the almost full rudder pedal deflection it took to maintain heading with an engine failure (simulated) on takeoff … and that was in a DC-9-15 (“-10 series” – no leading edge slats) and at training weights, speeds, and thrust settings. This was a training program that did not use a simulator at all. All of the training and the check was in the airplane.

Additionally, what I have seen, while it is certainly not in every case, but in a significant portion of cases, where crew members complain about the simulator, they are complaining because they are attempting to fly the simulator – as they remember their training – and not flying the airplane. Unfortunately, again, in my “not-so-humble-opinion,” at least some of the “training” that passes today is training to get through the training program or the check in the simulator … where at least some of the training, perhaps a lot more than “some,” is “default training” where the instructors rely waaaay too much on the simulator to do the training, while they simply push the buttons and type in the scenarios. These students then go out to fly the airplane – get comfortable in it – and come back to the simulator with a view toward trying to remember and recapture the feelings, the sights, the sounds, and their responses (as they remember them) in an attempt to fly the simulator … as they remember it. They normally wind up using a combination of what simulator techniques they remember and what they’ve come to expect in the airplane. As a result, they get confused and frustrated … and because they “know” they can fly the airplane, they blame their problems on the simulator.


I had a new dry lease crew come out of the simulator and complain it did not handle correctly. When I asked, I was told it was “not stable in the horizontal axis!” I replied, “Lateral or longitudinal, rotation of, or rotation around?” The crew walked away…
This is the kind of complaint that I was attempting to describe, above. It sounds like they really don’t know what the problem was. They didn’t even know what axis was involved. What they probably DID know was that they had trouble flying the simulator. Since they don’t have a problem flying the airplane … the problem MUST be with the simulator. They are completely unaware of why that is … when it is highly likely that the "real" problem is that they were incorrectly or incompletely trained.


I would say that simulation training is more of a group (pilots, instructors, certification, evaluation, maintenance, data gathering) effort than operating the actual aircraft.
THAT is the point that a lot of folks completely miss. If the work product made available from any of those sources has some rough edges, those edges will come into play in the simulator – it almost HAS to – but a competently trained instructor would recognize what the student is doing to compensate for the particular “rough edge,” and would explain what was happening, why it was happening that way, and instruct the student on the proper, airplane generated, in-put cues and what that student needs to do to respond correctly. If the student does what he/she was told to do by that competently trained instructor, that student will find that the control application response described by that instructor will provide the correct (desired) simulator response ... AND will get the correct response when flying the airplane.

When that student gets to the airplane, and sees the same circumstances, what is recognized will be like the instructor’s description, and the control applications described by that instructor will provide the proper airplane response initiated by that student. NOW, when that student returns to the simulator, and the same incorrect input cue is displayed by the simulator, that student should know what control application is necessary, apply it to the simulator controls, and the simulator will respond correctly … everyone is happy. All because of the competence of that instructor! That is what instructing is all about.

[Centaurus]

but a competently trained instructor would recognize what the student is doing to compensate for the particular “rough edge,” and would explain what was happening, why it was happening that way, and instruct the student on the proper, airplane generated, in-put cues and what that student needs to do to respond correctly

I must be dumb because I cannot visualise what you mean. There are some professional simulator instructors who have never flown the real aeroplane they are instructing for in the simulator. After all not all simulator instructors have flown the A380 or a Boeing 787 yet have passed the interviews and a type rating course on the simulator and certified competent to test and instruct.

In fact there are many airline retired simulator instructors who may only "fly" their specific simulator twice a year for a couple of hours each time to maintain the minimum currency required by the regulator. I bet the majority of that is on automatic pilot as well.

In my experience it is rare to see a simulator instructor whether he is a current check pilot or simply a retired pilot, actually take a control seat and demonstrate to a candidate how to conduct a high speed rejected take off with all its after stopping SOP's. Or demonstrate to a candidate that is having problems with an engine failure, manual reversion, low level circling approach, or all flaps up landing. Most of the time the simulator instructor has a rigid set of SOP to stick to during a type rating sequence or recurrent training sequence. He sits back in the instructor panel and reads the syllabus and presses the required buttons on the IOS. The syllabus is usually approved by the local regulator and due to limitations of time available and cost of simulator time, there is rarely time for extra handling training that may be needed. Certainly he won't have the time to change seats with the candidate and show him how it should be done.

I find it difficult to get my head around the points that some contributors to the debate say, when they mention instructors need to be familiar with the perceived differences between the real aircraft and what is experienced in the simulator. This is especially so when the same instructors could have conceivably not flown the real aircraft for ten years or more.

[AirRabbit]

I must be dumb because I cannot visualise what you mean.
Centaurus, my friend, of all the participants on this forum, you would be among the very last to whom I would attribute “dumb” as an accurate description.

There are some professional simulator instructors who have never flown the real aeroplane they are instructing for in the simulator. After all not all simulator instructors have flown the A380 or a Boeing 787 yet have passed the interviews and a type rating course on the simulator and certified competent to test and instruct.
…which, I believe, is a part – a substantial part – of the problem. That problem being someone has determined that those who have the kind of “training” and “experience” you have described is all that is necessary to be deemed competent and experienced enough to convey their acquired “competency” and “experience” to others who will then be deemed competent enough take the airplane and all of its passengers and cargo across whatever distance, at whatever altitude and airspeed, through whatever meteorological conditions, without care or concern for the safety and efficiency of that effort.

In fact there are many airline retired simulator instructors who may only "fly" their specific simulator twice a year for a couple of hours each time to maintain the minimum currency required by the regulator. I bet the majority of that is on automatic pilot as well.
Of course, those retired airline pilots who have taken positions as “simulator instructors," do have some (perhaps a substantial amount) of airplane time on the respective airplane, on which they can depend, or at least, to which they may refer, when they make judgments with respect to what and how they are instructing in the simulator. Clearly, the longer the time between “the real airplane” and “the simulated airplane,” the less value results from the dulled sharpness of the memories that are formulating the information being relayed. This results in the value of what is instructed being inversely proportional to the recency of any and all experience gained in having regularly performed those same tasks now being instructed. And, it should be distinctly recognized that having to depend on “the automatic pilot” to get through the short time required for that so-called “currency,” is a pitiful substitution for the competency and experience that should be relied upon to achieve the quality of whatever “instructing” is being attempted.

In my experience it is rare to see a simulator instructor whether he is a current check pilot or simply a retired pilot, actually take a control seat and demonstrate to a candidate how to conduct a high speed rejected take off with all its after stopping SOP's. Or demonstrate to a candidate that is having problems with an engine failure, manual reversion, low level circling approach, or all flaps up landing. Most of the time the simulator instructor has a rigid set of SOP to stick to during a type rating sequence or recurrent training sequence. He sits back in the instructor panel and reads the syllabus and presses the required buttons on the IOS. The syllabus is usually approved by the local regulator and due to limitations of time available and cost of simulator time, there is rarely time for extra handling training that may be needed. Certainly he won't have the time to change seats with the candidate and show him how it should be done.
There is a “saying” in the US … “you get what you pay for.” The accuracy of this “saying,” comes to realization – unfortunate realization – in recognizing the accuracy of your comment. Those posing those SOPs, structuring those training sequences … (i.e., “if it’s the 4th training session we must get through RTOs and Emergency Descents” … even though normal landings that were addressed on the 2nd training session are still misunderstood and unsatisfactory) are more interested in what looks good on paper, and what looks good to those who pay the bills, than anything else. In fact, the instructors that we do use are unbelievably good at putting the students through just enough rote-memory-practice that they are able to squeak through a demonstration. Unfortunately, in doing so, invariably, there will be several student pilots who “complete” the course with improper or incomplete or misunderstood cause/effect relationships with improper or incomplete or misunderstood actions that they may believe to be appropriate or believe must be taken … unfortunately … ONE such student is all it takes to generate bent metal and spilled blood … and, if … or perhaps more properly … when … the appropriate circumstances combine in just the right sequence … IT WILL HAPPEN … and we are completely at the mercy of “lucky stars” or “accidental correctness” to avoid such tragedies.

I find it difficult to get my head around the points that some contributors to the debate say, when they mention instructors need to be familiar with the perceived differences between the real aircraft and what is experienced in the simulator. This is especially so when the same instructors could have conceivably not flown the real aircraft for ten years or more.
I could not agree with you more, my friend. It borders on the impossible for any competent aviator to misunderstand the necessary differences of having pilots who pointedly perceive, understand, and act accordingly with respect to a simulated airplane’s presentation of contrived events and their response to those inputs … and their being able to correctly perceive, understand, and act when the real airplane contributes in-put cueing to pilots … day-in and day-out. Unfortunately, almost any list of accidents, which may be generated by any who read these words, are replete with questions like, “why didn’t they recognize what was happening?” I think we need to seriously look at who, how, when, with what, to what end, do we, as an industry, conduct pilot training. That look and those questions simply have to address the tools, the persons who use those tools, and training of those persons to use those tools, and what kind of competency do we expect those persons to achieve in order to competently and completely train the pilots who will be putting all that training into use. I don’t think it will happen if we continue on the path that we all find ourselves at the moment.

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[Bergerie1]

ZFT says; "Simulation is nothing but one big con job but apart from the obvious there is one other massive benefit. It is the perfect and only environment to do things wrong, either unintentionally and hopefully learn from it or deliberately just to see the result (we have a FSTD with very accurate post stall modelling and every trainee experiences a deep tail stall and recovery) but of course, the FSTD must be as accurate as it can be else the FSTD is always wrong, not the trainee!"


I have a question to both ZFT and AirRabbit.


How can you be sure that the post stall modelling is correct and that your simulator replicates the real aircraft's behaviour post stall? It is my understanding that no large transport aircraft is tested in the post stall regime (especially in a deep stall) and therefore all simulators use extrapolated data, aerodynamic modelling and wind tunnel data.


I would be very interested in your views.

[underfire]

Chiming in a bit late on this thread (the video scared the F out of me) So, I must apologize, as this is an extensive thread.

I have been in the sim at Alteon quite a bit for RNP procedure validation, and we certainly did a bit of crosswind simulation depending on the location.

One thing I had noticed, looking around, was very seldom did I see a sim on full motion, in fact when we went full motion they had some 'concerns'. As a general question, when training in the sim, are they using full motion?

In the sim, I didnt experience the severe gusting crosswinds (as shown in the video) We took some of the settings to the limits, but didnt get that severe gusting effect on full motion. We did get sideways, but I dont remeber the ac rolling around like that.

Again, late to the party, so apologies in advance.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi underfire,
but didn't get that severe gusting effect on full motion. We did get sideways, but I don't remember the ac rolling around like that.

I'm glad you notice the same limitations also.

Since the sim motion is limited to the amount of travel of the jacks, and at full jack extension / retraction the sim motion must approach zero - then it can't faithfully imitate real life. Your sideways acceleration is simulated by rolling (banking) the cab but at the same time keeping strong visual clues to being level. It sounds like you can sense the sim cab rolling also. Glad I'm not alone.

[Bergerie1]

Further to my post above on the simulation of post stall behaviour, and at the risk of thread drift (this thread has evolved into a very interesting discussion on simulator fidelity), may I offer the quote below from Captain William Wainwright's paper entitled "Airplane Upset Recovery, a test pilot's point of view".

QUOTE:-
USE OF SIMULATORS
We manufacturers were very concerned over the types of manoeuvres being flown in simulators and the conclusions that were being drawn from them. Simulators, like any computer system, are only as good as the data that goes into them. That means the data package that is given to the simulator manufacturer. And we test pilots do not deliberately lose control of our aircraft just to get data for the simulator. And even when that happens, one isolated incident does not provide much information because of the very complicated equations that govern dynamic manoeuvres involving non-linear aerodynamics and inertia effects.

The complete data package includes a part that is drawn from actual flight tests, a part that uses wind tunnel data, and the rest which is pure extrapolation. It should be obvious that firm conclusions about aircraft behaviour can only be drawn from the parts of the flight envelope that are based on hard data. This in fact means being not far from the centre of the flight envelope; the part that is used in normal service. It does not cover the edges of the envelope. I should also add that most of the data actually collected in flight is from quasi-static manoeuvres. Thus, dynamic manoeuvring is not very well represented. In fact, a typical data package has flight test data for the areas described in Table 1.

Table 1 Sideslip Angle of attack

SLATS OUT
All Engines Operating Around neutral Between 0°and 22°
Between + 15° and -15° Between 0° and 12°
One Engine Inoperative Between +8° and -8 Between 5° and 12°

SLATS IN, LOW MACH
All Engines Operating Around neutral Between 0° and 12°
Between +10° and -10° Between 2° and 9°
One Engine Inoperative Between +8° and -8° Between 2° and 8°

SLATS IN, HIGH MACH
All Engines Operating Around neutral Between 0° and 5°
Between +5° and -5° Between l° and 3°
One Engine inoperative Between +2° and -2° Between 1° and 3°

In other words, you have reasonable cover up to quite high sideslips and quite high angles of attack (AOA), but not at the same time. Furthermore, the matching between aircraft stalling tests and the simulator concentrates mainly on the longitudinal axis. This means that the simulator model is able to correctly reproduce the stalling speeds and the pitching behaviour, but fidelity is not ensured for rolling efficiency (based on a simplified model of wind tunnel data) or for possible asymmetric stalling of the wings. Also, the range for one engine inoperative is much less than the range for all engines operating and linear interpolation is assumed between low and high Mach numbers.

Wind tunnel data goes further. For example, a typical data package would cover the areas described in table 2. In fact, this is a perfectly adequate coverage to conduct all normal training needs. But it is insufficient to evaluate recovery techniques from loss of control incidents. Whereas, the training managers were all in the habit of demonstrating the handling characteristics beyond the stall; often telling their trainees that the rudder is far more effective than aileron and induces less drag and has no vices! In short, they were developing handling techniques from simulators that were outside their guaranteed domain.

Table 2 Sideslip Angle of attack

SLATS OUT From +18° to -18° From -5° to 25°
SLATS IN, LOW MACH From +18° to -18° From -5° to 12°
SLATS IN, HIGH MACH From + 8° to -8° From -2° to 8°

Simulators can be used for upset training, but the training should be confined to the normal flight envelope. For example, training should stop at the stall warning. They are “virtual” aircraft and they should not be used to develop techniques at the edges of the flight envelope. This is work for test pilots and flight test engineers using their knowledge gained from flight testing the “real” aircraft

END QUOTE

Captain Wainwright is Chief Test Pilot of Airbus Industrie. I quote from his full paper because I think sometimes we expect too much from simulators when it comes to manoeuvres at or beyond the edge of the flight envelope.

Simulator training in severe crosswinds is good up to a point, it can certainly be used to develop the correct technique even though the simulation of all the sensations experienced in the real aircraft may be lacking in some areas (as noted by some contributors in previous posts on this thread). However, I have grave concerns about simulator training post stall for the reasons Captain Wainwright has stated, hence my concern over ZFT's remarks about this.

[AirRabbit]

Hi Bergerie1:

In reference to your quotes from Bill Wainwright …(I met Captain Wainwright when he was still at Airbus … although I understand he’s now moved to Boeing, and, of course, I wouldn’t desire to argue with his statements – particularly, as his vantage point is firmly, and rightly, based in the technicality of flight test data) … I would refer you to an earlier post of mine on this thread …

…today, I know we have at least one, and now, I understand, a second, transport category airplane simulator (the first one IS and I believe the second one is ALSO a B-737) that have an aerodynamic model installed that is accurate enough that the several test pilots (2 or 3 on the first, and likely up to 7 or 8 on the second) who have flown those simulators, have reported that the simulator performs and, critically, handles, as much like the airplane (the B-737) throughout the aerodynamic stall entry, the actual stall, and the stall recovery, as any anything they have seen. As an example of the competency of these pilots, one that I witnessed personally, when an interested observer quizzed one of these test pilots how far he had personally taken that airplane into the actual aerodynamic stall … he answered, “a 3-turn spin.”
This Thread; June 7, 2014 @ 19:23; Post#42

The 2 specific B-737s to which I referred in that post were, first, the B-737 located at the FAA’s Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, OK, and the second one is a B-737 located at the training facilities of Boeing in Seattle, WA. When I described the answer provided by one of the test pilots, during his demonstration of the simulator’s presentation of the stall and stall recovery when asked how much experience he had with stalling the B-737 and his response was “…a 3-turn spin…” that person was a former Boeing test pilot who, at that time, was an instructor/check airman at American Airlines, assisting on the development of the aerodata package incorporated into the B-737 simulator at the FAA Academy.

Simply because I haven’t been personally involved with this particular effort in quite a while now, I cannot be sure, but I would be more than a little surprised if I were to learn that the Boeing B-737 simulator in Seattle, having exactly the same goal as that of the simulator at the FAA Academy, having been flown regularly by the Boeing technical staff, including test pilots, has not been “flown” personally by Captain Wainwright. As I indicated in that post, these 2 simulators are currently (or were, at my last understanding) programmed with a wholly new aerodynamic program (and not the same program) generated under a whole list of parameters to help assure that the result would provide aerodynamic response and “input cueing” to the pilots aboard, that are substantially more realistic in that portion of the flight envelope that is AT and BEYOND the traditional normal flight envelope boundaries. Significantly, with the involvement of anyone associated with such an effort, particularly if they report to someone like Captain Wainwright, I would be more than a little surprised if any release of such an aero-data program for training on stall/approach to stall recognition and recovery would be allowed if there were any significant hesitancies or concerns - unless, of course, there were adequate limitations and admonitions that accompanied such a release.

As I’ve said, and I think has been said by others here, a simulator is NOT an airplane. It is bolted firmly to the floor; it can provide definitive motion input cueing only through, and to, the limits of that motion system, with a limited magnitude envelope; can provide additional input cueing of both the simulator’s sound and visual systems and through the instrument displays. The key is to be able to provide input cues that are as close to the same cues that would be recognized in the airplane – and we must recognize that these cues are, and it must be understood why they are, limited to “on-set” only. For example, g-forces simply cannot be produced beyond those very briefly recognized at the on-set of the movement. As a result, anyone, particularly a pilot, is able, with relative ease, to recognize and consciously understand the inaccuracies between the airplane and the simulator. However, the simulator’s “pilot” occupants, particularly those who are, indeed, pilots, actually have the option of “playing the game;” that is, recognizing what the simulator is providing (i.e. “on-set” cueing) – which is very likely dead-on accurate at the very initiation of that cue, or, is at least accurate to within a very small deviation of what the “real” on-set cue would be.

Of course, if the occupant’s attention is focused on those differences, it merely reaffirms to that pilot, that what he/she is seeing, hearing, and feeling, is only a simulation and is not real. However, with a very minor adjustment in attitude or intent, basically a willingness to “play the game,” the simulator experience can, and often does, generate a MUCH more realistic response – to the extent that, according to some of the scientific/physiological data gathered, the pilots actually experience reactions quite similar to those experienced in the airplane, i.e., heart-rate and blood pressure increases and decreases, pupil dilation and restriction, breathing rate alterations, etc.

The admonition I continually repeat is that the student must “FLY” the simulated airplane JUST LIKE one would fly the airplane … and at least some of the time that may require a gentle reminder by the instructor. However, this periodic instructor input has to be learned … that is, the instructor has to either recognize or be taught to recognize when a student in the simulator is “flying the simulator and not flying the airplane,” and then that instructor has to learn the best way to bring that student back to the business at hand … learning to fly the airplane, or flying the way they “know” to fly the airplane.

In order to do that, the instructor MUST know and understand the simulator’s tendencies – likely best understood by knowing how the simulator is programmed, what the limitations are in that programming, and the limitations of the simulator to replicate the actual airplane. And, that is in addition to being able to recognize an issue that I’ve only recognized in the last couple of years. This issue is that some students approach their simulator sessions armed with a whole litany of “cheat-sheet” methods to employ to assure, or at least to assist, in getting satisfactorily through the “mission” of completing the training or passing the check. Very observant simulator users are sometimes able to recognize how to “game the game,” by learning specific power settings or magnitudes/direction of control input, etc. and when and in what order those values should be employed by that student … and doing so will, at least most of the time, provide at least an acceptable presentation to an instructor or check airman who doesn’t recognize the use of such pre-determined values.

In case you haven’t guessed … I am a huge proponent of simulation … but I hasten to had that my support is specifically focused on the accuracy of the simulation (to the greatest extent possible); the abilities of the instructor/evaluator to know and apply the limitations of the specific simulator being used; and the student’s focus being on “flying the airplane” and forgetting (as much as possible) that he/she is actually in a simulator.

[ZFT]

Bergerie1

To address your first post. I would totally concur with your comments with regards large jet transports. The particular Level D FSTD I referred to represents a large regional turboprop that does have surprisingly good aero data within this region.

Additionally we are fortunate to have a Chief Pilot who was a test pilot for the airframe manufacturer and who has on numerous occasions performed this manoeuvre on the aircraft. He confirms that the approach to stall, stall and (most importantly) the stall recovery technique is very accurately represented on this FSTD. (It is for this reason the he has incorporated the demonstration of this within the type rating program).

Your second post raises a multitude of issues. Whilst not for 1 second would I dispute the accuracy of what you stated, I do think that at times the major airframe manufacturers are somewhat too dictatorial and maybe too conservative.

e.g. Airbus repeatedly state that “training should stop at the stall warning” yet (EASA) regulations clearly state that FSTDs should be tested both objectively and subjectively up to the point of stall. Additionally, many of our airline users also want to train their crews beyond the “Stall Stall” but the current data beyond this point is somewhat lacking and certainly unrepresentative.

Better and more accurate data does already exist now, both the large airframe manufacturers have stated this at conference, however the manufacturing ‘industry’ is quite content to provide the minimum to satisfy their perception of what is adequate to (just) meet regulations and adequate for their perception of normal training needs.

I would suggest the recent experience has shown that something more than their perception of normal training may well be required to ensure safe flight?

Data (to the operator) is not cheap. With initial costs starting from US2M upwards per FSTD and with literally hundreds of datapacks being sold over the typical life of a major airframe there really is really no excuse from the major manufacturers not to invest more effort into what is the heart of an FSTD.

I still firmly believe that this is a regulatory responsibility to fully enforce current regulations and to find a better way to fast track required changes. At least the FAA has shown some initiative with their new requirements for stall recovery and bounced landings training etc, but 5 years!

[Bergerie1]

AirRabbit,
Thank you for your detailed reply, I also, am a devotee of simulators and find them fascinating machines. I also fully agree with your comments on 'onset' cues and the need to fly the simulator as one would the real aircraft. I note with interest your statements about the 737 simulators that have improved data that replicates the aircraft's behaviour post stall.

ZFT,
Thank you for your reply too. You are lucky to have a company pilot with the knowledge to extend the scope of your simulator's data into the post stall regime. I also take your point about the airframe manufacturers' not providing the additional data.

But this leads to three questions which I would like to put to both of you:-
1. I wonder whether instructors throughout the airline community are taught enough about the limitations of simulators. Are there still people out there who train inappropriately in areas beyond the flight envelope that has been programmed into their particular simulator?
2. Is the industry doing enough to address the above issue?
3. Do we really need to spend the additional money to acquire test data in these extreme areas? Or would it be better to concentrate on teaching a greater understanding of the aerodynamic and control principles instead?

I know this discussion is deviating from the original one on cross-wind training. Nevertheless, it has relevance in this area too, since flight data in ground effect is a very complicated area. Perhaps this may be one of the reasons why contributors to this thread have experienced a lack or realism during cross-wind landing training.

[ZFT]

Bergerie1

A quick response for now.

I wonder whether instructors throughout the airline community are taught enough about the limitations of simulators. Are there still people out there who train inappropriately in areas beyond the flight envelope that has been programmed into their particular simulator? Really 2 questions. Are instructors taught enough about limitations? Undoubtabley no but this issue is not as significant on the latest generation of FSTDs where the instructor and trainee can expect and should demand to experience 100% fidelity with systems and performance and a very high degree of fidelity in all ‘normal’ manoeuvres within the obvious limitations of the device. Within this thread we are really only debating the exceptions, albeit highly important ones.

I also do not think there is a significant issue with instructors using FSTDs outside their designed and/or qualified envelope. The issue I believe is more that (some of) the qualified FSTDs don’t subjectively perform appropriately in areas within their flight envelope!!

I am in total admiration of the trainers and their abilities to utilise these tools in the way that they do, sometimes with very limited knowledge of the specific device.

2. Is the industry doing enough to address the above issue? I’m not sure what ‘the Industry’ can do about how trainers use the FSTDs (other than make the IOS operation as simplistic and intuitive as possible). This is more an operator/user issue. I would hope that a good CMS and equally good HoT would ensure correct and appropriate usage?

3. Do we really need to spend the additional money to acquire test data in these extreme areas? Or would it be better to concentrate on teaching a greater understanding of the aerodynamic and control principles instead? I don’t believe that any significant expenditure is needed. Most, if not all of the raw flight data already exists. It just needs to be processed and made available.

As to whether it would be better to concentrate resources as you suggest – I will leave that response to those far more qualified to give their views.

[DozyWannabe]

Regarding flight testing and data gathering, I think it's pertinent to point out that Capt. Wainwright's paper was published back in 1999, and while he is absolutely correct in what he says, recent events have caused something of a shift in how both Boeing and Airbus approach stall testing:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVt6LiDbLos

AF447 and similar incidents have effectively proven that in certain circumstances, teaching "approach to stall" simply isn't enough. And while simulators will not be able to mimic the real aircraft's behaviour entirely, I can't help but think that instilling a general feel for the process of stall recovery at least can't hurt.

[AirRabbit]

Hi Bergerie1

I wonder whether instructors throughout the airline community are taught enough about the limitations of simulators. Are there still people out there who train inappropriately in areas beyond the flight envelope that has been programmed into their particular simulator?
First ... I'm not at all sure if everyone using a simulator is aware of what that simulator can and cannot do. To many, "if it happens in the simulator - THAT is what you can expect in the airplane." That is likely because someone, someplace, said that same thing - or something similar - and they have not yet seen (or at least recognized) anything to counter that understanding. I am quite sure that most simulator instructors would likely say that they are adequately trained – but my concern is that many (and only because it smacks of an insult do I not say “most”) are not fully informed about what the limitations are, and even those who do have some knowledge about some limitations, they likely have not been instructed on how they, as instructors, should deal with those issues … and I say this because simply acknowledging something like “…oh, don’t pay attention to that … that’s not the way the airplane does it ….” just doesn’t address the gap that now exists in the mind of that (those) student(s). However, like I indicated in my earlier post, there is now underway several individual efforts – some of which directly address the competencies of pilots, instructors, and evaluators.

Many instructors teach what they, themselves, were taught, and teach the way they, themselves, were taught. Most instructors are likely to have not taken the time to understand what it is they are teaching and what they are likely to see, and, from that make appropriate modifications to what it is they should teach and what it is they should expect. Interestingly, many of them might have a problem in explaining "why" they expect what they expect - other than "that's what the syllabus calls for."

For your information and your consideration, the Annual International Flight Crew Training Conference, a “premier” event in the Royal Aeronautical Society’s annual calendar is scheduled for Tuesday, the 23rd, Wednesday, the 24th, and Thursday, the 25th of September at the Society’s Headquarters in London. The plan is to examine the work undertaken by the International Pilot Training Consortium (IPTC) with a view toward seeking to determine what further work is required and under what auspices it should be conducted.
Is the industry doing enough to address the above issue?
Ouch – I guess the proper response here is “how much is enough?” Realistically, there is an on-going effort (see above) … which, in itself, says volumes to those of us who have been IN this industry for more than a little while. Will it be enough? That is yet to be seen. One good way to find out, would be to attend the conference and ask that same question.
Do we really need to spend the additional money to acquire test data in these extreme areas? Or would it be better to concentrate on teaching a greater understanding of the aerodynamic and control principles instead?
I’m not sure how to answer this question because as of now there are two aero-programs that are reported to be quite good in the stall / post stall portion of flight. It’s my opinion that the remainder of the flight envelope is pretty well addressed with appropriate data at the moment. Of course, there are a full range of simulators in operation at this time – and collectively they represent the full history of data gathering, reduction, modification, and incorporation into simulation. Unfortunately, not everyone who has flown an airplane simulator, has good experiences – and often it’s not the simulator’s fault. In some cases, at least, the simulator is used inappropriately or incorrectly.

The result, at least at some level, can be interpreted as the simulator being the target of the “negative” comments. In the cases I’ve seen personally, which is a substantial amount by most measurements, a huge portion of the reasoning lies directly at the feet of the individual students – primarily because of they are trying to “fly the simulator” instead of flying the airplane. That may sound “weird” to some degree – but I promise, there is more truth in that comment than there is “weirdness.” Overall, in those cases where it is clearly not the student or the instructor, I say for the most part, the “jury is still out” – as to whether or not the “fault” lies with the simulator itself – and I say that because sometimes the persons making the accusations don’t really know why they feel as they do.

A lot of folks do not know what data is collected, where it is collected, and how it is collected; nor do they understand where and how it is used in the simulation of an airplane. I really think most would be quite surprised if they were to read just what kinds of data are required, how that data is actually gathered, and how much work goes into converting all those numbers into a legitimate aerodynamic program. For those interested, I’d suggest checking the internet for the FAA’s regulations on simulators: It’s found at Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 60. Once there Appendix A addresses airplane flight simulators – and to really understand what is included, it’s necessary to read the WHOLE appendix – (sorry, but, it’s true).

Here's a link - eCFR ? Code of Federal Regulations (http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=f59eb8144b313aa52f64d0dbf11734c1&node=14:2.0.1.1.1&rgn=div5)

Do we really need to get the data for these “extreme areas?” I say, yes – primarily because the simulator is going to be put into those situations ... by error or on purpose, whether or not the person(s) in the simulator actually intended to get to and/or beyond those boundaries. And, because it IS a simulator, a lot of folks will take with them at least some aspect of what they saw, heard, and/or felt … whether or not the simulator was accurate or only partially so. Besides, it has always been a desire that students understand what an aerodynamic stall is, how to recognize it, and most importantly, what to do to recover the airplane to a safe flight condition. Without the accuracies provided by accurate data and programming … I think we’re still “whistling in the dark.” Besides, I'm of the opinion that there will always be a better, more accurate, more detailed, less expensive, etc. etc., manner found to collect the data and a better, more accurate, more detailed, less expensive, etc. etc., method of reducing that data into a useable simulator program. Someone once asked me if I knew how expensive training really was to an airline ... my answer (admittedly taken from an older and much more experienced aviator than I) was "...not really, but I'd bet it would be less than an accident."

Also, you might want to check that same document I referenced above to check on how the FAA, at least, deals with crosswinds, specifically how the data is gathered for that specific portion of the simulator’s programming.

[Jwscud]

Whilst I don't have anything like the training or simulation experience of some of the very erudite posters on this thread, I have just finished a type rating on a completely new type and size of aircraft (a smallish bizjet) in UK CAA approved Level D sim, followed by flying the aircraft itself and have some observations on sim fidelity.

The simulator was very bad at simulating the aircraft behaviour below about 100ft. The ground handling was very over-sensitive, with PIO being very easy to induce on the takeoff or landing rolls. The landing behaviour, especially in crosswinds, bore little resemblance to the real aircraft (which is the easiest to land I've yet flown). This was mainly down to the modelling of the control loading. The aircraft in question uses direct cable controls - I imagine it's harder to model actual aerodynamic loads than the various artificial feel systems in aircraft with hydraulically assisted flight controls?

Separately, I have read a few articles in Flight of late about Lm2 lateral acceleration modelling which seems to make handling exercises seem significantly more realistic - can anyone tell me what it is and how it works?

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Jwscud,

About Lm2 | AWx - Acceleration Worx (http://www.awx.aero/about-lm2/)

You are not alone. We must use our sense of lateral acceleration (poor in most sims) and heading changes (non existent in most sims) to anticipate track deviations earlier. When those clues are missing or lag the real world, then we tend to over correct which causes PIO.

& I'm glad this effect is now admitted:
"Many pilots also develop nausea in simulators due to the poor correlation between visual and motion cues."

Lateral thinking for simulators - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2014/07/lateral-thinking-simulators/)

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/civil-simulators-special-going-through-the-motions-are-motion-systems-for-simulators-on-their-325612/
"This is because pilots have been taught to rely on their eyes to judge aircraft performance, and whereas in a modern FFS the visual systems faithfully represent a real world perspective - as do the aircraft instruments - the motion systems cannot represent real-world sustained accelerations and the sensations associated with sustained attitude change.

Motion systems can only represent the onset of a physical cue, such as vertical or lateral acceleration, pitching or rolling, but then they have to bleed it off, which provides human physiology with a feeling of acceleration in the opposite direction. The latter sensation tends to lead to pilot induced oscillation, and if, during long simulator training sessions, a pilot's handling performance improves, it tends to be because he/she is becoming an expert at "flying" the simulator, which is not the same as flying the aircraft. This is a description of a phenomenon that rings true in most professional pilots' experience."

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-chooses-lm2-simulator-motion-modifier-for-kc-135-400950/
"Lm2 is a patented software solution that modifies the conventional lateral accelerations applied by six-axis motion systems in full flight simulators – which frequently cause trainees to overreact, resulting in pilot-induced oscillations."

[AirRabbit]

As I’ve said regularly here, in my sordid past I’ve had the pleasure of working with some of the brightest and best thinkers in this industry – why they allowed me to be regular part of their business may be open for a lot of heavy criticism or ridicule, but that is a story/discussion for a later time. Because this LM2 issue seems to be provocative, I’ve talked with a very good friend of mine who happens to be the FAA’s Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Flight Simulation Systems (I hope I got that title correct) and the result of my recent conversation with him … and his providing some correction of my thinking and confirming other portions of what I thought, is contained below … and I think many (most?) of you might find the following to be of some interest.

Basically, adding the “LM2” algorithm into a simulator does several things, and probably the primary aspect is that the lateral motion cue (side-to-side movement) is considered primary. With understanding this position, the LM2 forces the lateral movement cue provided by the aero-model (determined from airplane flight testing) to be “in phase” with that model. Note, it is the “phase” of the movement that is being kept the same, not the “magnitude.” The method used to achieve this is to combine the lateral motion (left and right) of the simulator WITH the rolling motion capability of the simulator. When these motions are forced to be “in phase” the resulting lateral motion “feel” in the simulator is quite often better than it would have been previously. However, the rolling motion that is used is NOT the rolling motion of the airplane, it is the rolling motion of the simulator.

It is these 2 motions that are essentially forced to be "in phase." At the same time, this additional LM2 programming also adjusts the rolling movement when the pilot inputs a control wheel movement (either left or right) so that a spurious, or false, side-force in the lateral (side-to-side) direction is not generated – which, by itself, is probably a good thing. However, this is achieved by limiting the roll capability of the simulator, resulting in a situation where the simulator cab cannot roll much to represent the aircraft's roll, effectively decreasing roll fidelity – and, some would say, critically decreasing that fidelity, meaning that the potential for experiencing a false roll cue has been increased.

Of course, there are some who would say that there is a darn good reason for having “good lateral cueing.” Certainly, I don’t argue with that premise. However, providing this “good lateral cueing” is accompanied with both, the lessening of the quality of roll cueing and establishing a potential for introducing a false roll cue.

It might be interesting to know that according to the data gathered by a myriad of research involving flight simulation there is an understanding that it isn’t absolutely necessary for the lateral cueing of the airplane and the lateral cueing of the simulator to be exactly at the identical phase (again, we’ve never attempted to match magnitudes - the size and actual movement of the simulator would be prohibitive). This research, I’m told, indicates several things:
1) These two motion values can be as much as 30 degrees out of phase and still be providing a good cue;
2) There is nothing wrong with having some side-force due to roll. In fact, the indications are that up to 0.05g's is acceptable before that lateral movement begins to infringe on the rolling cue recognition by the simulator occupants - primarily the pilots;
3) At the same time, rolling the simulator to produce a good lateral (side-to-side) cue such as is provided by this LM2 algorithm can make the occupants “feel” that the cab is rolling in addition to moving laterally, which would be at least confusing. (Note: a typical person will feel the cab rolling when it is rolling at 2 degrees/second or more); and
4) “Over filtering” the roll cue can, and usually does, provide poor roll cueing, and the method the LM2 algorithm uses to increase lateral fidelity, actually reduces the roll fidelity.

There shouldn’t have to be an “either/or” decision that has to be made. The fact is that “the best of both worlds” can be achieved by using the algorithms typically installed in simulators today by improving the lateral cueing at the expense of the roll cueing … but that does not mean that one should have to go as far as what LM2 does.

I understand, and it has now been confirmed, that some time ago there was a petition filed with the US FAA to add a requirement to include the LM2 approach to the US Simulator Qualification Regulations. This was carefully reviewed and the conclusion was that as long as adding LM2 into the programming of a modern simulator did not negatively affect the required objective testing results and did not negatively affect the required subjective test results, the FAA would not object to its being included as a part of the simulator’s programming … but the FAA also decided that they would not require that LM2 be incorporated into any simulator.

Finally, and according to all the available data and professional and objective analysis, what LM2 provides, is probably somewhat better than where most folks are today, but logically, the question should be one of finding the “happy medium” and not necessarily compromising one cue for providing an increase for another cue. After all, we are attempting to make the simulator as “real” as possible … right?

[AirRabbit]

You are not alone. We must use our sense of lateral acceleration (poor in most sims) and heading changes (non existent in most sims) to anticipate track deviations earlier. When those clues are missing or lag the real world, then we tend to over correct which causes PIO.

& I'm glad this effect is now admitted:
"Many pilots also develop nausea in simulators due to the poor correlation between visual and motion cues."


Of course it is true – and has been acknowledged, for well over 3 decades, that visual cues that precede or lag an associated motion on-set cue can, and does in many cases, cause some degree of discomfort – and that often varies widely from person to person. However, there is more than a modicum of a requirement to accept that what is seen and what is felt is, indeed, mutually generated causes-effects … AND … because the visual systems are adjusted to provide the appropriate cueing to pilots who are occupying the pilot seats, and those seats are properly adjusted to the appropriate pilot eye-position, those who see the visual scene from a position other than the pilot’s position, have a greater potential for suffering from this effect.

I suspect that you are very likely aware that as a requirement of simulator evaluation for qualification – by all of the regulatory authorities with whom I am familiar – all require that the motion and visual systems fall within a published range of initiation/response. Also, there are times when, for whatever reason, this authorized range of initiation/response has become compromised – and the required daily preflight would likely catch this anomaly, but surely if such a distracting situation were to be written up in the simulator discrepancy log – the maintenance folks are usually quite good at reviewing and correcting those kinds of issues.

While I acknowledge that some simulators don’t provide lateral cues that are as good as the same cues in an airplane, it is also true that they do exist, in each and every simulator – perhaps not to your liking or expectation – and, to some degree, the LM2 addition can provide a better lateral cue – but, as I described in the above post, it does so with at least the potential of compromising the roll cue, and that potential is either not realized, or is realized, or is not only realized but is exacerbated, depending on the individual experiencing the phenomenon and to what degree the roll cue has been compromised by that programming.

[Miserlou]

With the level of technical knowledge here, I wonder if I may ask if anyone has any data about friction on crosswind landing and take off, more specifically, the difference between the nose and main wheels.

We have been having an ongoing discussion about whether the main wheels would give up first allowing the aircraft to be blown off the downwind side of the runway or whether the nosewheel would give up first allowing the aircraft to weathercock toward the upwind side of the runway.

It would appear from the copious video evidence on youtube that there are several variations but seems to boil down to two scenarios.
1. The upwind wing is allowed to lift (poor aileron technique usually) which allows the whole aircraft to be pushed toward the downwind side.
2. The into wind wing remains level or low but poor rudder technique or excessive gust strength cause the nose weathercock.

Scenario 2 seems the most common. Any other views?

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi AirRabbit,

Thanks for your explanation for the reluctant introduction of LM2.

You say “Note: a typical person will feel the cab rolling when it is rolling at 2 degrees/second or more.”

Similarly, I would have thought a typical pilot could also sense the cab pitching at 2 degs/second or more. During take off, the cab rotates backwards quite steeply and quickly to simulate the acceleration on the runway. (The converse is true during braking.) With strong visual clues, we pilots interpret that as an acceleration and not as a rotation.

Similarly prolonged sideways accelerations can be simulated with cab roll and provided we have strong visual clues, we would interpret the roll as a sideways acceleration.

One of your reasons for not accepting LM2 is “However, this is achieved by limiting the roll capability of the simulator, resulting in a situation where the simulator cab cannot roll much to represent the aircraft's roll, effectively decreasing roll fidelity”

I was not aware that the cab rolled at all during a balanced banked turn. Please could you expand some more.

[piratepete]

Its really quite simple.In an airplane we absorb all the cues that come our way and respond to them.

In a simulator, what the machine does is directly related to input ("fidelity").Once you have memorised the NUMBERS, PITCH ATTITUDE, POWER SETTINGS, CONFIGURATION etc etc, you will always get the same result.Simulator "technique" will never be the same as real world technique, this is not possible.Real world is too complicated and dynamic.

[AirRabbit]

Thanks for your explanation for the reluctant introduction of LM2.

You say “Note: a typical person will feel the cab rolling when it is rolling at 2 degrees/second or more.”

Similarly, I would have thought a typical pilot could also sense the cab pitching at 2 degs/second or more. During take off, the cab rotates backwards quite steeply and quickly to simulate the acceleration on the runway. (The converse is true during braking.) With strong visual clues, we pilots interpret that as an acceleration and not as a rotation.
Actually, the acceleration and rotation for takeoff cueing typically works as follows (and there are some alterations, substitutions, and variances from manufacturer to manufacturer and operator to operator): the initial acceleration of the airplane is replicated closely by the platform moving forward and the movement is at such a rate that it is recognized by the on-board crew. However, the platform jacks cannot go on moving without reaching their “limit stops” and a technique is used that prevents the stops from being reached without being discernible to the crew. This technique is to gradually decrease the displacement rate (known as a “washout”) where that rate of change is below the sensory threshold of the simulator occupants (typically called the “recognition threshold”), eventually reaching the zero, and begins “resetting” the simulator to the “neutral” position fore/aft (again, below the recognition threshold rate).

Sometimes, a simulator may be adjusted in "pitch" - again, below that threshold rate, to provide a cue that the simulator is continuing to accelerate. Depending on the rotation angle for the takeoff/climb, the rotational angle of the simulator cab, may or may not be gradually lowered. If the cab remains tilted up, it will provide a sensation of continuing to accelerate, but if the attitude is not significant, the acceleration rate will not be “felt” as significant either, although it will be present and very likely noticable. At the point where the simulated airplane is to be rotated to achieve a climb angle, the simulator cab is rotated, this time at a rate that is noticed by the on-board crew, and the rate of rotation is gradually reduced, again below the threshold rate. At some logical point during the first portion of the climb, the rotation angle is eventually reduced all the way to zero – removing all acceleration and rotation cues.


Similarly prolonged sideways accelerations can be simulated with cab roll and provided we have strong visual clues, we would interpret the roll as a sideways acceleration.
Unless you are describing something unusual, I think you might want to re-examine that conclusion. In an airplane, a sideways displacement – either to the right or to the left, is normally not a long-lived experience. Flat, long term, level movements are not normally experienced, and when they are, they are almost always short lived, brief duration excursions, usually caused by disrupted airflows, and are typically recognized in the airplane as little more than “turbulence,” and turbulence models are typically available in a simulator.

If you’re describing a level turn, either right or left, in the airplane, the occupants would physically recognize the left or right bank, and from that point forward the prominent force recognized is more of an increase in “g-forces” to maintain a constant altitude and is the reason your coffee doesn’t spill in your lap. To have the simulator accurately replicate an airplane level turn, either left or right, you would want the simulator occupants to recognize the on-set cue of the initiation of the airplane bank, but as the desired bank angle is approached, the bank angle should be removed, and return the simulator cab back to a level attitude ... all accomplished below the recognition threshold ... at the same time an increase in simulator nose-up attitude is also achieved ... also below that same threshold. By doing this the force of gravity would provide a recognition by the simulator occupants as an increased “g-load,” as would be recognized in an airplane under the same circumstances.

Rolling out of that turn would essentially be achieved in a simulator by reversing the sequence of the adjustments used to achieve the simulation of the turn in the first place; i.e., reduce the pitch attitude of the simulator (again, below threshold), provide a simulator cab roll in the opposite direction (simulating a roll-out of the bank angle), and again after initiation of the on-set cue, remove that input, again below recognition.


One of your reasons for not accepting LM2 is “However, this is achieved by limiting the roll capability of the simulator, resulting in a situation where the simulator cab cannot roll much to represent the aircraft's roll, effectively decreasing roll fidelity”
Please understand, it’s not that I don’t “accept” LM2 – it’s just that the technical folks with whom I’ve worked regularly, tell me that today's existing algorithms can provide a better mix of roll and lateral cueing than LM2 can provide … and doing this would achieve the same, or better, lateral cueing as provided by LM2, and do so without compromising the rolling cues that are present all the time with existing programming; where by using LM2, the roll rate cueing is likely to be compromised in all situations where a roll is accomplished. However, the fact is that one has to know what they are doing to achieve that “better” mix, and most people do not have the experience in doing that. It is for these reasons that the FAA allowed LM2 to be used, but refused to mandate its use.


I was not aware that the cab rolled at all during a balanced banked turn. Please could you expand some more.
Each time the flight crew initiates a bank angle, the simulator is actually rotated (banked) in the direction of the airplane’s bank (and very likely also tilted up, but at a rate below threshold) to indicate a slight increase in “g-force,” with the simulator cab rate of roll and bank angle being washed out, again, below the recognition threshold, and returned to neutral. When the simulated airplane is rolled to a wings level attitude, the simulator cab is rotated in the opposite direction, to provide that rolling on-set cue, and then both the roll rate and roll angle is washed out and the position is reset to neutral – both, again, below the recognition threshold … as I indicated above.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi AirRabbit,

Thanks very much for the info on sim motion cueing.

Flat, long term, level movements are not normally experienced, and when they are, they are almost always short lived, brief duration excursions,
During taxiing with big turns, we experience long term sideways accelerations. During the take off and especially during a Rejected Take Off, the sideways accelerations in the sim are not realistic and often result in over controlling and PIO. (Please see article by Learmount)

it’s just that the technical folks with whom I’ve worked regularly, tell me that today's existing algorithms can provide a better mix of roll and lateral cueing than LM2 can provide …
Well I for one am really looking forward to your technical folks providing better algorithms. How long do you think we will have to wait?

[AirRabbit]

Thanks very much for the info on sim motion cueing.
You are very welcome.


Flat, long term, level movements are not normally experienced, and when they are, they are almost always short lived, brief duration excursions,
During taxiing with big turns, we experience long term sideways accelerations. During the take off and especially during a Rejected Take Off, the sideways accelerations in the sim are not realistic and often result in over controlling and PIO. (Please see article by Learmount)
Well, first, I apologize … I wasn’t aware you were speaking about ground based operations. However, I can say that I don’t believe I’ve encountered the kinds of PIO you describe (i.e., during Take Off or Rejected Take Off) in any simulator. So, I’m somewhat at a loss to know exactly what you mean.

Second, I am familiar with David Learmount, and his article on LM2. I’m also familiar with Capt. Filip VanBievliet, the guy who “developed” LM2 (Lateral Maneuvering Motion), while he was with Sabena – and it was Sabena that was originally offering LM2 for sale. Mr. VanBivliet, an engineer by training, has, I think, spun off his company from Sabena, and I, believe, is now the owner/principle operator of “AWx” or “Acceleration Worx” – still out of the Netherlands. While I have no personal issues with Mr. VanBivliet and have no intent or desire to insult or criticize him or his work, I do know some in the business who would take that opportunity. Of course, I’m sure I have my own detractors out there as well. If you would like to know a bit more about what at least some in this industry have to say on this subject – please send me a PM and I’ll share some of them with you. I understand if this would not be of interest to you.


it’s just that the technical folks with whom I’ve worked regularly, tell me that today's existing algorithms can provide a better mix of roll and lateral cueing than LM2 can provide …
Well I for one am really looking forward to your technical folks providing better algorithms. How long do you think we will have to wait?
I suppose, as you would likely imagine, that would depend on the level of urgency those folks feel about developing such algorithms … and what it would mean to them … and that likely would be directly related to either job security or some other financial benefits. Of course, a regulatory authority could mandate that such improvements be made … and the likelihood of that happening is also directly tied to the amount of public clamour that might be generated. So, I don’t have an answer for you … but I suspect it is likely to happen – sometime.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi AirRabbit,

However, I can say that I don’t believe I’ve encountered the kinds of PIO you describe (i.e., during Take Off or Rejected Take Off) in any simulator.

I have quickly scanned this page and the first two pages of this thread and found these comments:

Jwscud #104
"The ground handling was very over-sensitive, with PIO being very easy to induce on the takeoff or landing rolls."

FlightGlobal "Lm2 is a patented software solution that modifies the conventional lateral accelerations applied by six-axis motion systems in full flight simulators – which frequently cause trainees to overreact, resulting in pilot-induced oscillations."

safetypee #12
"In addition to the many weaknesses in simulating crosswinds as above, the majority of systems are unable to simulate true lateral acceleration, at least for a significant period covering de-crabbing and during roll out. ... because there is no sideways ‘seat of the pants’ feeling for feedback."

wangus #22
"I completed my first TR in Jan / Feb (A320) and found the Level D sim impossible to land well, in all scenarios.... Sim killed my confidence, the real thing restored it"

Many experienced pilots (I would say over 50%) find the ground handling of the sim during take off & landing far more difficult than real life. It sounds like you require the regulatory authority to mandate that such improvements be made before it will happen.

I think we need more competition between the sim manufacturers - like there is between the airlines.

[AirRabbit]

However, I can say that I don’t believe I’ve encountered the kinds of PIO you describe (i.e., during Take Off or Rejected Take Off) in any simulator.
I have quickly scanned this page and the first two pages of this thread and found these comments:

Jwscud #104
"The ground handling was very over-sensitive, with PIO being very easy to induce on the takeoff or landing rolls."

FlightGlobal
"Lm2 is a patented software solution that modifies the conventional lateral accelerations applied by six-axis motion systems in full flight simulators – which frequently cause trainees to overreact, resulting in pilot-induced oscillations."

safetypee #12
… are unable to simulate true lateral acceleration, at least for a significant period covering de-crabbing and during roll out. ... because there is no sideways ‘seat of the pants’ feeling for feedback."

wangus #22
"I completed my first TR in Jan / Feb (A320) and found the Level D sim impossible to land well, in all scenarios.... Sim killed my confidence, the real thing restored it"

Many experienced pilots (I would say over 50%) find the ground handling of the sim during take off & landing far more difficult than real life. It sounds like you require the regulatory authority to mandate that such improvements be made before it will happen.

First, the comment you quoted from FlightGlobal sounds very much like the sales pitch offered by AWx. Again, it is not my intent to impugn the reputation of FlightGlobal or that of David Learmount, but that quote sounded very much like it could have been part of an advertising brochure. Additionally, as I indicated previously, I have it on pretty good authority that those specific words have been used by the developer of this algorithm, and his “forceful” personality is apparently approaching legendary status in the world of simulation engineering “geeks.” So, an article that was specifically looking at this particular product, using this quote (sounding like something that the company representatives say, in that the algorithm apparently does pretty much what it is advertised to do) is not at all surprising. However, like I indicated earlier, of those in the industry who acknowledge what this algorithm does, there are some who point out characteristics that can point to weaknesses or compromising aspects of the same program.

Second, notwithstanding the quotes from Jwscud, safetypee, and wangus, and without meaning to criticize or disparage any of them or what they say, and while I fully acknowledge that there are specifics of almost any simulator about which some pilots can, and often do, offer criticisms (some of them very specific, some quite general, but all of which certainly convey personal concerns or objections), and without attempting to sound self-centered or anything approaching some kind of “paragon of truth or accuracy,” the fact is that I have had the opportunity to fly a substantial number of simulators, not only in the US but around the world, and most of the airplanes they represent. Certainly, this does not come close to including every simulator currently in service. However, as I said, the simulators I have flown have not demonstrated the kinds of PIO during Take Off or Rejected Take Off described in these pages. Now, that may be because I have flown such a broad spectrum of so many airplanes and simulators, that I’ve become immune to some of the minor attributes that often crop up in any given piece of machinery built to replicate/simulate another piece of machinery; however, I’m not at all convinced that this is the case.

What I am saying is that if any regulatory authority were to believe that the competency of pilots being trained and/or checked using simulators that have the kinds of problems described here, is being compromised, they would likely have little option but to either remove the authority to use simulation, or those specific simulators, or at least those specific tasks from those specific simulators for the training and/or checking of those pilots.

To make the case that has been claimed here, someone would likely have to document it ALL, as completely as possible, and as clearly as possible, and present that information to whatever regulatory authority is appropriate. If that regulator were to believe that a sufficiently robust case has been made, they would likely share that with the other regulatory authorities with whom they regularly confer. Again, presuming the accuracy of the data and the potential issues that might arise as a result, it would make sense that the regulatory authorities would, en masse, mandate that such lateral cueing be improved. Again, it is my opinion that no regulatory authority would require any simulator sponsor to purchase a particular product from a particular source – rather they would invariably address the technical requirements that would have to be met in order to achieve the level of fidelity deemed appropriate, and leave each sponsor to their own methods of achieving those ends.

The other alternative would be to make the same case to individual airlines or simulator sponsors (either one at a time – or several of them together) and convince them that additional fidelity is required (in this case, lateral fidelity) to better ensure that crewmembers would be trained and tested against appropriate standards using equipment that allows those standards to be met using the newly established fidelity standards. The question that would wind up being “the elephant in the room,” is why should they take this position and spend whatever monies might be required to either purchase the programming and appropriate support, or provide for the additional training of their own simulator maintenance/engineering staff so that their own personnel would have the capabity to provide that same end. The remaining issue would be cost – since actually doing this would be completely voluntary. The answer to this issue is very likely what I was told a hundred years ago by a very astute trainer … and that is “while training is expensive, it is nowhere as expensive as an accident.”

Beyond those alternatives, I have only one additional relevant suggestion ... below.

I think we need more competition between the sim manufacturers - like there is between the airlines.
The competition factor between simulator manufacturers is probably one of the very few logical events, other than the end points I’ve pointed out, above (either regulatory requirement or sponsor recognition of competency to avoid accidents) that might achieve the end points that have been outlined in your posts.

If the simulator manufacturers were to be put on notice that further simulator acquisitions would be directly dependent on any such purchases including the established level of lateral fidelity (and you would very likely be asked to provide some specifics with respect to what fidelity measurement you would find acceptable) the degree to which this might be realized is the degree to which simulator manufacturers were factually convinced that without such additional fidelity their simulator sales would likely suffer. Logically, such suffering would be in direct relation to the level of support that could be mustered from current and future simulator users/purchasers or those who use the services of simulator manufacturers for their maintenance and servicing requirements. The caveat is, clearly, that without the simulator manufacturers being able to independently verify the accuracy of customer demands for this additional fidelity, such ... well, threats ... would very likely be essentially worthless.

[Linktrained]

Newbies used to gain some INSTRUMENT FLYING practice on a Link Trainer. This did not have an A/P, so one learned to fly manually, using the somewhat basic instruments in front of one. These could be further restricted to just a Limited Panel.
Earlier exercises had one flying a list of timings, speeds and headings to produce a drawing of a hand on the Instructor's table.
Instrument let downs with QDM or ADF patterns could be practiced with various strength of W/Vs, down to a low approach level, followed by the overshoot procedure, as one did not have the R/W in sight... The hood was still in position !
The equipment could be set for " Calm" or a rudimentary " Rough Air".
Many Newbies stalled and spun the trainer and learned that recovery on instruments was possible ( even if not quite perfect).

[Jwscud]

Airrabbit, I understand your points completely.

However, as a bloke of limited experience who has only sat in the right seat for a shortish period of time and only have two type ratings, in some respects I am more the target demographic for Level D sims than yourself. A simulator that is slightly unrealistic and over-sensitive to the point of being able to induce PIO in a pilot without the benefit of your experience, or on a new size or type of aircraft is manifestly not doing its job properly.

One is able to achieve a Type rating solely through training in the sim, then 45 minutes flying the aircraft to do the required circuits. Therefore the significance of any handling defects is amplified. Obviously in this case it makes life easier as the sim is hard to handle but the aircraft significantly easier. It was however a source of unneeded frustration and distraction on the type rating. It also wastes time on Line Training, as with no experience on type, one is not well positioned to differentiate between solely sim flying techniques and how to actually fly the aircraft as you have advocated previously.

Call me a cynic, but it is also not in the interest of sim manufacturers to document flaws in approved sims in a way that might require investment of large quantities of cash to fix their flight models slightly. Equally, minor issues (I agree that these don't particularly affect the sim overall) may indeed be masked by the skill of the pilots testing the simulators.

[Linktrained]

P.S. to #116,
Drawing the harid took about an hour and any lack of precision would show up.
On the outbound part of the let down one tried to assess the drift, perhaps 10 degrees Port, which would be something like 10 degrees Starboard on the final approach. (" Try and remember !")
The Magnetic Compass would have shown acceleration errors, as would the ball or slip needle ( these may well have been artificially induced). Flying by the seat of one's pants was NOT the right thing to do.


By chance I went to the French National Gliding Centre, where landing along the wide top of a ridge, which usually had a cross wind ( useful for ridge soaring for endurance flights) The cross wind for landing must have been more than half one's landing airspeed, landing on the one wheel or skid and hoping to lower the into wind wing in the last moments of the landing run. ( The instruction was in Franglais, both learning !)
Some of the landings were up the slope and with the usual ( now) tail wind, aiming to stop close to the top for a turn around for a further flight. Interesting, Not airline!

[AirRabbit]

Hi Jwscud

Thanks for your understanding – and, let me return the compliment – you make your points both clearly and succinctly – and, having done so, it is evident that there is being generated at least some (perhaps a great deal MORE than “some”) confusion and questions. I don’t know of anyone who claims to be a professional aviator who would accept the kinds of questions and the degree of confusion you, and the others on this thread, have described.

Not that it will make any difference to anyone, yourself included, but I can acknowledge that the level of concern expressed over these last few days (weeks? more?) has not gone unnoticed, at least by me. Of course, I certainly cannot even suggest that one little ‘ole voice (mine) could do much of anything toward addressing those question or those concerns, as the “bully pulpit” I now occupy has nowhere near the “bully-ability” as the one I used to occupy … but, let me say this … I AM going to discuss these issues with colleagues of mine – some of whom are still integrally involved in this particular business – and the others, in addition to having their own theories and opinions, also have their own colleagues and professional contacts.

I have been impressed with what has been said – particularly if I filter out the rhetoric and the emotions (both of which are totally understandable, by the way), and I am now pondering …
1) what I may be able to do to advance the concerns you have expressed and do so with those who might be in positions to do something meaningful about it … and
2) just how I might be able to present that information in a manner that would allow a better grasp of the facts involved.

I would love to be able to guarantee that whatever it is I am able to generate will, indeed, “fix the problems” you’ve outlined. Unfortunately, all of whatever I can generate may only be acknowledged and dismissed – although, I think the dismissal option is really quite minimal. The question might be, not only what can be done, but might be the cost involved and who, logically and correctly, should be required to bear that cost. As I’m quite sure you know, as we say here, in the Colonies, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.” But check back once in a while and I’ll try to keep you abreast of whatever is going on.

Best regards,

A/R

[safetypee]

To add to the deficulties of simulating crosswind landings, consider ground effect. At best (still wind), good quality in-flight data is difficult to obtain; it would be interesting to know what data (or assumptions) is used in simulating ground effect with the effects of drift or turbulence.

A further thought, in real conditions most pilots’ experience of crosswinds is gained by extending their previous limit, this differs from most other operations where conditions are often repeated and, perhaps excepting turbulence, are similar. For crosswinds, some conditions can be a significant extension of previous landing experience (#1), thus with additional demands in turbulence, perhaps there is some apprehension (the unknown) driving the need for quality simulation.

[AirRabbit]

To add to the deficulties of simulating crosswind landings, consider ground effect. At best (still wind), good quality in-flight data is difficult to obtain; it would be interesting to know what data (or assumptions) is used in simulating ground effect with the effects of drift or turbulence.

A further thought, in real conditions most pilots’ experience of crosswinds is gained by extending their previous limit, this differs from most other operations where conditions are often repeated and, perhaps excepting turbulence, are similar. For crosswinds, some conditions can be a significant extension of previous landing experience (#1), thus with additional demands in turbulence, perhaps there is some apprehension (the unknown) driving the need for quality simulation.

Hi safetypee
Obviously, I am unaware of how familiar you might be with the simulation requirements of your, or any other, regulatory authority, so ... here, for your reading pleasure (or for treatment of your insomnia) is the US FAA requirements – initially contained within Advisory Curculars – until their legal officers let them know that they could not withhold the issuance of a qualification or interfere with the issuance of an approval to use a simulator simply because it didn’t match a “recommendation,” which is all that an Advisory Circular really is. That is the reason the FAA developed and published these requirements as a full-fledged regulation, 14CFR Part 60.

For information, here are just a few of the relevant requirements (at least now they're requirements) regarding “ground effect” and “crosswinds” as found in the above-referenced rule. Suffice it to say that the amount of data and the method of collection has been through several trials, errors, corrections, trials again, modifications, etc., etc. The bottom line is that what is produced today, and essentially for the last decade or two, while it may have some inevitable shortcomings, is actually pretty darn good data.
From the FAA Part 60 Regulation:

OBJECTIVE TESTING FOR CROSSWIND TAKEOFF.

TOLERANCE: ±3 kts airspeed, ±1.5° pitch angle, ±1.5° angle of attack, ±20 ft (6 m) height, ±2° bank angle, ±2° sideslip angle; ±3° heading angle. Correct trend at groundspeeds below 40 kts. for rudder/pedal and heading. Additionally, for those simulators of airplanes with reversible flight control systems: ±10% or ±5 lb (2.2 daN) stick/column force, ±10% or ±3 lb (1.3 daN) wheel force, ±10% or ±5 lb (2.2 daN) rudder pedal force
FLIGHT CONDITIONS: Takeoff
TEST DETAILS: Record takeoff profile from brake release to at least 200 ft (61 m) AGL. Requires test data, including information on wind profile for a crosswind (expressed as direct head-wind and direct cross-wind components) of at least 60% of the maximum wind measured at 33 ft (10 m) above the runway.
INFORMATION: In those situations where a maximum crosswind or a maximum demonstrated crosswind is not known, contact the NSPM.

OBJECTIVE TESTING FOR CROSSWIND LANDINGS.
TOLERANCE: ±3 kt airspeed, ±1.5° pitch angle, ±1.5° angle of attack, ±10% or ±10 ft (3 m) height ±2° bank angle, ±2° sideslip angle ±3° heading angle. Additionally, for those simulators of airplanes with reversible flight control systems: ±10% or ±3 lb (1.3 daN) wheel force ±10% or ±5 lb (2.2 daN) rudder pedal force
FLIGHT CONDITIONS: Landing
TEST DETAILS: Record results from a minimum of 200 ft (61 m) AGL, through nosewheel touch-down, to 50% decrease in main landing gear touchdown speed. Test data must include information on wind profile, for a crosswind (expressed as direct head-wind and direct cross-wind components) of 60% of the maximum wind measured at 33 ft (10 m) above the runway.
INFORMATION: In those situations where a maximum crosswind or a maximum demonstrated crosswind is not known, contact the NSPM.

OBJECTIVE TESTING FOR GROUND EFFECT.
TOLERANCE: ±1° elevator ±0.5° stabilizer angle, ±5% net thrust or equivalent, ±1° angle of attack, ±10% height or ±5 ft (1.5 m), ±3 kt airspeed, ±1° pitch angle.
FLIGHT CONDITIONS: Landing.
TEST DETAILS: The Ground Effect model must be validated by the test selected and a rationale must be provided for selecting the particular test.

REQUIREMENTS FOR OBTAINING GROUND EFFECT DATA:
a. For an FFS to be used for take-off and landing (not applicable to Level A simulators in that the landing maneuver may not be credited in a Level A simulator) it should reproduce the aerodynamic changes that occur in ground effect. The parameters chosen for FFS validation should indicate these changes.
(1) A dedicated test should be provided that will validate the aerodynamic ground effect characteristics.
(2) The organization performing the flight tests may select appropriate test methods and procedures to validate ground effect. However, the flight tests should be performed with enough duration near the ground to sufficiently validate the ground-effect model.
b. The NSPM will consider the merits of testing methods based on reliability and consistency. Acceptable methods of validating ground effect are described below. If other methods are proposed, rationale should be provided to conclude that the tests performed validate the ground-effect model. A sponsor using the methods described below to comply with the QPS requirements should perform the tests as follows:
(1) Level fly-bys. The level fly-bys should be conducted at a minimum of three altitudes within the ground effect, including one at no more than 10% of the wingspan above the ground, one each at approximately 30% and 50% of the wingspan where height refers to main gear tire above the ground. In addition, one level-flight trim condition should be conducted out of ground effect (e.g., at 150% of wingspan).
(2) Shallow approach landing. The shallow approach landing should be performed at a glide slope of approximately one degree with negligible pilot activity until flare.
c. The lateral-directional characteristics are also altered by ground effect. For example, because of changes in lift, roll damping is affected. The change in roll damping will affect other dynamic modes usually evaluated for FFS validation. In fact, Dutch roll dynamics, spiral stability, and roll-rate for a given lateral control input are altered by ground effect. Steady heading sideslips will also be affected. These effects should be accounted for in the FFS modeling. Several tests such as crosswind landing, one engine inoperative landing, and engine failure on take-off serve to validate lateral-directional ground effect since portions of these tests are accomplished as the aircraft is descending through heights above the runway at which ground effect is an important factor.

Additionally, should you want to check a bit more, here is a link …
eCFR ? Code of Federal Regulations (http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=7d5144ab146b62c27a1cc835cdc15778&node=14:2.0.1.1.1&rgn=div5#14:2.0.1.1.1.0.1.9)

[mnttech]

In re-watching the video (until I wanted to lose my dinner :eek:) some points crossed my mind:
1. For each landing/departure, would it not be fun to know what the ground level TDZ, mid field, and far end (departure end?) reported winds were?
2. The same points 100 and 200 feet in the air.
3. The demonstrated cross wind component of each aircraft.
4. How many times the wind exceeded the aircraft component?

I’m not sure, but I do not think that FAR 60 discusses the runway random vertical deflection as shown in the video. Slope yes, deflection, I do not think so. I’m also pretty sure there is not a lot of data or design on what the wind does coming over the top of the buildings. All of which are going to be needed to improve the software.

The NTSB report on Continental Airlines Flight 1404’s Runway Side Excursion in Denver, Colorado on December 20, 2008 has the following recommendation:
Gather data on surface winds at a sample of major U.S. airports (including Denver International Airport) when high wind conditions and significant gusts are present and use these data to develop realistic, gusty crosswind profiles for use in pilot simulator training programs. (A-10-110)
I’m not aware that has happen as of yet.

I do think Part 60 should have discussed both the instruction of the instructor and the maintenance staff training, or at least made them required points within the SQMS.

Quick question for the current pilots: On a United States ILS runway with center line lighting, are the center line markings over the lights, or are they off to one side? And if off to one side, which side? Let us limit it to KSFO, KFJK, KDEN, KPHX, or some other major. I’ll answer the why in a day or two.

[AirRabbit]

Hi mnttech-

You might be interested to know that the FAA is about to publish a brand new notice that they are proposing some rather lengthy modifications to the Part 60 rule governing simulator evaluation/qualification.

It should be available in the US Public Register today or tomorrow, and if all else fails, certainly at the beginning of next week, and public comments are certainly invited.

This proposal would incorporate changes into part 60 that would either directly or indirectly address the following NTSB Safety Recommendations through improved FSTD evaluation standards to support the outlined training tasks:
- Stall training and/or stick pusher training
- Upset Recognition and recovery training
- Engine and airframe icing training
- Takeoff and landing training in gusting crosswind conditions
- Bounced landing training.

In general, the proposed changes to the technical standards would apply only to those FSTDs that are initially qualified or upgraded in qualification level after the final rule becomes effective. For previously qualified FSTDs used to conduct extended envelope, airborne icing, gusting crosswind, and bounced landing training, the FAA is also seeking comment on a proposed FSTD Directive that would require FSTD Sponsors to retroactively evaluate those FSTDs against certain objective and subjective testing requirements as defined in the QPS appendices and modify them if necessary to meet the proposed requirements.

[Goldenrivett]

Hi mnttech,
On a United States ILS runway with center line lighting, are the center line markings over the lights, or are they off to one side? And if off to one side, which side?
The painted line is to one side of the RWCL lights.
Google Earth shows KFSO 10R has the line to the RHS of the CL lights.

EGKK is similar, image of KDEN doesn't resolve the lights well enough.

[mnttech]

AirRabbit,

I see being friends of Dr. C has some advantages. I thought they could release a FSTD Directive without going through the US Public Register time? i.e. #1 on the visuals.

Goldenrivett,
Thanks, I was hoping a pilot would answer from experience… I’ll post over the week end my center line fun:ugh:.

[AirRabbit]

mnttech -

As you probably know, the definitions section of Part 60 contains the following:
FSTD Directive — a document issued by the FAA to an FSTD sponsor requiring a modification to the FSTD due to a safety-of-flight issue and amending the qualification basis for the FSTD.

Perhaps one of the key words used in this definition is the word “requiring” – which certainly carries a note of imposing some thing on some one (individually or corporately) and, apparently, doing so “by right and authority,” as that is generally and, I believe, legally, the understood application of that term. Additionally, it has been, and continues to be, my personal impression that the FAA (or any other regulatory authority for that matter) would not be allowed (either by statute or internal standards) to impose new regulatory requirements, or change existing requirements, without providing the public an opportunity to comment on, even question, the proposal.

Of course I wouldn't have any first-hand knowledge, but I could easily believe that claiming to be a “friend of Dr. C” might sound like the comment one might offer through the peep hole provided in an overweight and demonstrably thick wooden door, located at the end of a darkened backstreet alley, when one desires admission to a mysterious establishment in order to engage in some likely illicit and/or potentially compromising business or activity. I, for one, wouldn’t necessarily go around uttering that statement, even whispering it.

[mnttech]

AirRabbit,
My apologies if I have offended you or your reputation in any form or manor. I was trying to make a small joke (and failed) that you had been in contact with the NSP on the release of the change. I knew it was coming sometime this summer, just not a set date. Again, my apologies.

Downloaded Part II of the change, not sure where Part I went to…
A little more than a small change (293 pages worth) to Part 60, now I understand the NPRM. I still think at some point it was discussed that a FSTD Directive would not have to go through the NPRM. Typically it takes 5+ years (as stated at this year’s AEA convention) from the start of the change to see the change to any FAR. I did notice in a March 2011 NSP briefing that a FSTD Directive is “Similar in nature to an Airworthiness Directive.” ADs have to go through the NPRM, unless they are emergency AD’s. We shall see…

[AirRabbit]

Hi mnttech

No sir … it is I who should apologize … I was not offended at all and, in fact, I, too, was attempting to respond in a “humorous” manner … obviously … not very successfully, it would seem (and, even if I had been “verbally poked,” I am fully aware that my reputation is very likely beyond repair anyway …… hint – that’s another attempt). However, you are correct … I was, indeed, in contact with some on the FAA’s NSP staff (although “Dr. C” is no longer there), but I’m also in contact with other colleagues in the simulation industry – and hopefully I can stir up enough interest between those sources that someone, somewhere, might be motivated sufficiently to pursue a path of determining the best way to improve the lateral handling qualities of simulators.

The problem, as I see it, is that the handling qualities of today’s simulators is pretty darn good (certainly, not perfect, but darn good) – and making it noticeably better – even in only one aspect – is likely to further exacerbate the cost-for-benefit issues that have always been present – but historically has provided significant gains in benefits for the comparatively (and that is comparatively!) nominal increase in cost.

As I understand some of the posts on this thread, the majority of the concerns voiced with respect to “lateral stability,” or “lateral cueing,” has been primarily noticed during ground operations … either during taxi, during ground acceleration prior to takeoff, or during ground deceleration after landing. I’ll certainly attempt to make those points to whomever I can get interested in these issues – and maybe, just maybe – someone might be able to initiate some kind of “re-think,” or recognize, as at least one of my contacts has indicated, that merely modifying the existing programming might result in the improvement that many believe is, or should be, required. The “nitty-gritty” of such modifications is not my area of expertise, but I certainly understand it and I’m determined to follow through to see if a logical solution – or partial solution – may be possible.

[ZFT]

It seems that the thread has more or less now gone full circle, with interesting and pertinent deviations here and there.

The motion ‘deviation’ showed a general issue with simulation and motion specifically. All motion systems algorithms (quite nicely described in previous posts) basically fool or trick our balance sensors, the very same sensors we are training pilots (in FSTDs) to ignore and of course ignore in actual flight!

Some 7 years ago when the LMfC motion (as it was called then) ‘enhancement first raised its head it generated a lot of debate within this industry. (The major manufacturers were already having ‘issues’ with the FFT concept at that time and this was viewed by many as another unwelcome intrusion). The following extract was sent to me and I think it is as pertinent today as it was then;

“Simulation lacks the rigour of other aeronautical disciplines and this is a very good illustration of my concerns with flight simulation. Quite possibly, the Belgians are wrong, but there is nothing that you can put forward to show or prove they are wrong. Moreover, their motion system may be less exact but actually lead to more effective training - we just don't know. But, to say that other simulators are more modern and therefore better or to say that you flew a simulator last week that felt good is not factual evidence - it's yet more subjective opinion and one opinion is then no more accurate or relevant than another.

All the time simulation backs off from doing real research it will suffer from this sort of stigma and we will have a discipline founded on nothing more than common sense and gut feel, with a few long technical words spread around to give the air of respectability."

What is certainly true today is that under current EASA and I assume FAA regs, there is still no requirement for any objective testing of motion systems (other than technical performance, vibs and latency). Every motion cue on a current Level C/D simulator is still only assessed subjectively!

ICAO 9625 Edition 3 does address this issue with both frequency and time domain objective testing BUT neither EASA nor the FAA have any plans to adopt Ed 3 in the foreseeable future.

I’m not going to repeat myself on the fidelity issue other than to reiterate that there really is no excuse with todays Level C/D FSTDs for anything less than perfection with systems simulation and performance within the normal envelope (within the confines of the obvious technical limitations).

There will be an issue with older FSTDs and hard and/or costly choices will need to be made. Excuses such as data or against our training policy are not limitations.
The FAA notice, whilst welcome will not in reality do anything to address the majority of the concerns raised here and with all the regulatory agencies being so ponderous it will not effect any changes until the next decade anyway.

Data does already exist to address many of the issues, the regulations are already there to be enforced and to quote AirRabbit “the handling qualities of today’s simulators is pretty darn good”

Better initial testing, more rigorous evaluations by both the operator and the qualifying body and the end User being more prepared to write up any defect not just accept them would go a long way.

[AirRabbit]

Offered with no intent to be argumentative or accusatory - merely to provide yet another view - accurate by my training and experience, but not to suggest anything beyond that.


What is certainly true today is that under current EASA and I assume FAA regs, there is still no requirement for any objective testing of motion systems (other than technical performance, vibs and latency). Every motion cue on a current Level C/D simulator is still only assessed subjectively!
In that it was never a requirement for me to do so, I have not (as yet anyway) found it necessary to become familiar (let alone, intimately familiar) with the requirements levied on simulator users/sponsors by EASA, or any other regulatory outside of the US. But, I think it very likely to be misleading, at least, to indicate that there are no requirements for any objective testing of motion systems beyond those of vibrations and latency.

First, the testing for vibrations is not merely to see if the simulator can produce vibrations at the points and under the circumstances where the airplane is known to vibrate and do so within some established time frame. Of course it is true that the simulator must provide for the recording of the motion system response time(s) and a Statement of Compliance and Capability (SOC) is required for each. This SOC is a declaration that a specific requirement has been met, explaining how the requirement was met (e.g., gear modeling approach, coefficient of friction sources, etc.) and must also describe the capability of the FSTD to meet the requirement, including references to sources of information for showing compliance, rationale to explain how the referenced material is used, mathematical equations and parameter values used, and conclusions reached.

Additionally, with respect to vibrations, the simulator must provide characteristic motion vibrations that result from operation of the airplane if the vibration marks an event or airplane state that can be sensed in the flight deck. The simulator is to be programmed and instrumented in such a manner that the characteristic buffet modes can be measured and compared to airplane data. That is a description of an “objective” test.

Basically, the motion system tests outlined in the FAA regulations are intended to qualify simulator motion cueing systems from a mechanical performance standpoint. Additionally, the list of motion effects provides a representative sample of dynamic conditions that should be present in the flight simulator. An additional list of representative, training-critical maneuvers, which are to be selected from performance tests, and handling qualities tests, are recorded during initial qualification (but without tolerance) to indicate the flight simulator motion cueing performance signatures have been identified, and are intended to compare with similar results from the airplane and from previous tests of the simulator itself. This was formulated to help improve the overall standard of simulator motion cueing, and to assist in ensuring that this cueing does not deteriorate over time.

The Motion System tests in the FAA rules are intended to qualify the simulator’s motion cueing system from a mechanical performance standpoint. Additionally, the list of motion effects provides a representative sample of dynamic conditions that should be present in the flight simulator. An additional list of representative, training-critical maneuvers, selected from Performance tests and Handling Qualities tests, that are to be recorded during initial qualification (but without tolerance) to indicate the flight simulator motion cueing performance signature has been identified for each of those points. These tests are intended to help improve the overall standard of FFS motion cueing.

Motion System Checks, such as frequency response, leg balance, and turn-a-round check, as described in the FAA rule, are to demonstrate the performance of the motion system hardware, and to check the integrity of the motion set-up with regard to calibration and wear. These tests are independent of the motion cueing software and should be considered robotic tests.

Motion System Repeatability tests are to ensure that the motion system software and motion system hardware have not degraded or changed over time. This diagnostic test is to be completed during continuing qualification checks in lieu of the robotic tests. This will allow an improved ability to determine changes in the software or determine degradation in the hardware. The following information delineates the methodology to be used for this test.

(1) Input: The inputs should be such that rotational accelerations, rotational rates, and linear accelerations are inserted before the transfer from airplane center of gravity to pilot reference point with a minimum amplitude of 5 deg/sec/sec, 10 deg/sec and 0.3 g, respectively, to provide adequate analysis of the output.

(2) Recommended output:
(a) Actual platform linear accelerations; the output will comprise accelerations due to both the linear and rotational motion acceleration;
(b) Position of motion actuators.

Motion Cueing Performance Signature tests are designed to document and verify the following.

(1) The intent of this test is to provide quantitative time history records of motion system response to a selected set of automated QTG maneuvers during initial qualification. This is not intended to be a comparison of the motion platform accelerations against the flight test recorded accelerations (i.e., not to be compared against airplane cueing). If there is a modification to the initially qualified motion software or motion hardware (e.g., motion washout filter, simulator payload change greater than 10%) then a new baseline may need to be established.

(2) The conditions identified in the rule are those maneuvers where motion cueing is the most discernible. They are general tests applicable to all types of airplanes and are to be completed for motion cueing performance signature at any time prior to or during the initial qualification evaluation, and the results included in the master qualification test guide – as benchmarks.

(3) The motion system should be designed with the intent of placing greater importance on those maneuvers that directly influence pilot perception and control of the airplane motions. For the maneuvers identified in the rule, the flight simulator motion cueing system should have a high tilt co-ordination gain, high rotational gain, and high correlation with respect to the airplane simulation model.

(4) The minimum list of parameters that are to be recorded should allow for the determination of the flight simulator's motion cueing performance signature for the initial qualification evaluation. The following parameters have been accepted as sufficient to perform such a function:
(a) Flight model acceleration and rotational rate commands at the pilot reference point;
(b) Motion actuators position;
(c) Actual platform position;
(d) Actual platform acceleration at pilot reference point.

Motion Vibrations are not merely “to be present.”

(1) Presentation of the characteristic motion vibrations may be used to verify that the flight simulator can reproduce the frequency content of the airplane when flown in specific conditions. The test results are to be presented as a Power Spectral Density (PSD) plot with frequencies on the horizontal axis and amplitude on the vertical axis. The airplane data and flight simulator data are to be presented in the same format with the same scaling. The algorithms used for generating the flight simulator data should be the same as those used for the airplane data. If they are not the same then the algorithms used for the flight simulator data should be proven to be sufficiently comparable. As a minimum, the results along the dominant axes should be presented and a rationale for not presenting the other axes should be provided.

(2) The overall trend of the PSD plot should be considered while focusing on the dominant frequencies. Less emphasis should be placed on the differences at the high frequency and low amplitude portions of the PSD plot. During the analysis, certain structural components of the flight simulator have resonant frequencies that are filtered and may not appear in the PSD plot. If filtering is required, the notch filter bandwidth should be limited to 1 Hz to ensure that the buffet feel is not adversely affected. In addition, a rationale should be provided to explain that the characteristic motion vibration is not being adversely affected by the filtering.

The amplitude should match airplane data as described below. However, if the PSD plot was altered for subjective reasons, a rationale should be provided to justify the change. If the plot is on a logarithmic scale, it may be difficult to interpret the amplitude of the buffet in terms of acceleration. For example, a 1×10−3 g-rms2/Hz would describe a heavy buffet and may be seen in the deep stall regime. Alternatively, a 1×10−6 g-rms2/Hz buffet is almost not perceivable; but may represent a flap buffet at low speed. The previous two examples differ in magnitude by 1000. On a PSD plot this represents three decades (one decade is a change in order of magnitude of 10; and two decades is a change in order of magnitude of 100).

All of the above should be sufficient to refute the idea that motion cues on a current Level C or Level D simulator is assessed only subjectively.


ICAO 9625 Edition 3 does address this issue with both frequency and time domain objective testing BUT neither EASA nor the FAA have any plans to adopt Ed 3 in the foreseeable future.
While the official FAA response was somewhat clouded when delivered by former FAA Administrator Babbitt, at the Annual RAeS International Flight Crew Training Conference, in September, 2011, where, from the podium, he said the following:

On the subject of flight simulation training devices, let me address some questions we have received about our position on ICAO Document 9625 (Manual for Criteria for the Qualification of Flight Simulation Training Devices). We appreciate the ground-breaking work that ICAO and the Royal Aeronautical Society have done in developing this document, and we support the principles and standards it contains. We share the view that those principles and standards will lead to significant improvement in simulator training worldwide, and the FAA is working to adopt them.

The timeframe for adoption is the challenge. The magnitude of the changes recommended in 9625 is significant, and many will require rulemaking. And, as you probably know, the FAA’s rulemaking resources and priorities are currently driven by the requirements Congress mandated last year in the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010. But we are committed not only to looking at adoption of the principles and standards in 9625, but also to all manner of new technologies and new methodologies for improved flight crew training.

The specific reason there has been little movement in the direction Administrator Babbitt had indicated is 2-fold: first, Mr. Babbitt is no longer the FAA Administrator; and second, there is a small faction of former and current managers who desire to eliminate, or drastically reduce, the requirement for simulator motion from the requirements of a simulator for a proficiency check or for the ATPC certification check. There are also many FAA Safety employees who are mightily fighting this nonsense, but without any outside look, this ridiculous attitude may not be seen for the stupidity that it really is.


I’m not going to repeat myself on the fidelity issue other than to reiterate that there really is no excuse with todays Level C/D FSTDs for anything less than perfection with systems simulation and performance within the normal envelope (within the confines of the obvious technical limitations).
Unfortunately, this statement borders on suffering an internal, self-defeating conflict. The “obvious technical limitations” are what is limiting in some cases and preventing in others, the “perfection of systems simulation and performance.”


There will be an issue with older FSTDs and hard and/or costly choices will need to be made. Excuses such as “data” or (being) “against our training policy” are not limitations. The FAA notice, whilst welcome will not in reality do anything to address the majority of the concerns raised here and with all the regulatory agencies being so ponderous it will not affect any changes until the next decade anyway.
I so wish that the “ponderous” nature of regulatory achievements was not so “ponderous.” But, for whatever it is worth, having some built-in slowness in such endeavors, is probably a good thing, lest we wind up being “hoisted by our own petard.”

Even still, the regulatory requirements that I recognize are far more specific and far more productive toward achieving the kinds of things that make simulation good. Yes, of course, we have further to go … and initiating that movement cannot start earlier than now … I for one am going to attempt to provide information and interest to the persons who may be able to more than acknowledge the existence of todays’ somewhat “menial” standards – at least with respect to where it is I think we all would like to have them … and have them around the world. Also, I would encourage anyone here to do whatever they can to push this effort forward … talk to your management, talk to your fellow pilots, talk to your regulators, get your union involved, write letters or make phone calls to ICAO, to the RAeS, whatever thing you can and are willing to do.

There is an old, old saying that … “for evil (and, here I’d exchange “evil” to “mediocrity”) to triumph, it takes only good men to do nothing.”


Better initial testing, more rigorous evaluations by both the operator and the qualifying body and the end User being more prepared to write up any defect not just accept them would go a long way.
No one in their right mind would challenge any aspect of this statement.

[ZFT]

AirRabbit,

Offered the same way.

I did state "other than technical performance, vibs and latency" My point with Motion systems is that whilst by regulation (on a Level D FSTD) the various buffets and vibrations are accurately matched and that there is aircraft data to support this, all other motion cues are very much subjectively assessed and are typically tuned by the acceptance team at IPA time. All the EASA regs state is that they should be representative! There is no objective standard and no 2 FSTDs of the same aircraft type would necessarily 'feel' the same.

Quote:
I’m not going to repeat myself on the fidelity issue other than to reiterate that there really is no excuse with todays Level C/D FSTDs for anything less than perfection with systems simulation and performance within the normal envelope (within the confines of the obvious technical limitations).
Unfortunately, this statement borders on suffering an internal, self-defeating conflict. The “obvious technical limitations” are what is limiting in some cases and preventing in others, the “perfection of systems simulation and performance.” I didn't express this too well. By "obvious technical limitations" I was referring to issues such as sustained G. I still strongly believe that today's FSTDs are far more capable and that with desire far more can be achieved from them.

I so wish that the “ponderous” nature of regulatory achievements was not so “ponderous.” But, for whatever it is worth, having some built-in slowness in such endeavors, is probably a good thing, lest we wind up being “hoisted by our own petard.” It's 3 years already since that FAA response and none of the major regulatory authorities are anywhere nearer adoption. The new technologies they were looking at are probably obsolete already!!

[AirRabbit]

There is no objective standard and no 2 FSTDs of the same aircraft type would necessarily 'feel' the same.
If they use the same data, including specific data points, there may be some areas where a really astute pilot might notice some differences, no doubt. Also, one might expect to “feel” some differences with traditional hydraulic vs. newer electric motion systems. Additionally, I’ve flown airplanes of the same make/model/series and have found tremendous variations in feel and in performance. As I said, in one case all of us pilots referred to the fleet of airplanes as “Ed and Eli’s Used Airplane Lot.”

It's 3 years already since that FAA response and none of the major regulatory authorities are anywhere nearer adoption. The new technologies they were looking at are probably obsolete already!!
…and, as Mr. Babbitt said, the US Congress was running around (pants and hair on fire!) attempting to get ahead of the Colgan accident-generated family/news media hype about what rules were “in need” of change. One major FAA regulatory “over-haul” was almost completely gutted, and that effort’s basis and history was usurped to address the more panic-driven efforts. Of course, Mr. Babbitt could not say what was happening in those terms (I believe, because he was unaware) – but, as everyone surely recognizes, the FAA is a politically driven government agency – just as vulnerable to political and public pressures as any government organization … particularly when they’re standing at the edge of a gaping hole. So the rule that was likely to have incorporated a major portion of the ICAO details was sidetracked (very probably to die a death of inattention) and the focus and attention was given over to getting out a rule that was to address what the Congress was demanding be addressed.

What is unfortunate and will probably not be recognized, is what I indicated in my earlier post … and that is that small group of FAA safety employees (and I use that descriptor only because that is their FAA organization, NOT their personal or professional goal) that have historically allowed individual airlines the authority to deviate from published rules (without having the public and other airlines review and then concur or object to what was being granted) and granting the authority to complete the training and conduct the check, even for the issuance of a type rating or issuance of a certificate in a non-motion, Level 5 or 6 Flight Training Device (which as you know, is substantially less technically capable than a Level C or Level D simulator!) continues to offer essentially the same program - and some continue to believe that program will continue to compromise the production of competent, well trained aviators.

As you likely are aware, the ICAO document requires motion on the highest 2 levels of device (Type 6 and Type 7) – and the final training and all testing would be required in one of those 2 highest levels – even though the Type 6 has not yet been fully developed. This was not what that small group wanted. You might recall the huge “stink” raised when United Airlines merged with Continental. United was under the same authority to deviate but continued to use Level D simulators for those purposes, but Continental had been granted and had used the authority to use FTDs for those same purposes.

It was THIS that made up the primary differences between the management officials at the 2 airlines AND the Union representatives of each. This turned into a high priority, hotly debated issue. And the FAA stood by hoping that the specifics would not make it into the pubic venue – or if it did, they were hoping that “John Q Average-citizen” wouldn’t recognize the stupidity involved. It is this same stupidity that still today allows some specifically authorized airlines to replace required training tasks with other “approved” tasks, such that one major US airline had not been required to train or test in either recognition of, or recovery from, either approach to stall OR aerodynamic stalls – and had operated like that for several (likely close to 10!) YEARS!

With this recognition, some apparently reluctant FAA officials ensured that each such airline was told to ensure they were properly training and checking on stalls – as THAT was the basic premise of concerns coming out of the Colgan accident. It’s my personal opinion that had all of this been raised and the proper public and political recognition been taken, the FAA could have suffered very serious negative publicity and lots of “heads” would likely have “rolled” … some appropriately, and some not. I think no one wanted to take that risk – so better to keep it under wraps, make the changes that the Colgan factions were pounding the table about – and look like a governmental agency that responded to public pressure and once again achieved the public confidence. If the public only knew! With all of this, moving forward with an acceptance or an adoption of even a portion of ICAO 9625 just didn’t make the primary “to do” list – as you might well imagine.

Let me quickly add … I don’t believe that Mr. Babbitt was aware of the specifics with respect to the differences of opinion within the ranks, nor do I believe he was aware of the critical issues those differences included. He was briefed the way he was briefed, carefully, but not necessarily completely. And, with his own personal issues happening at just about that same time … I think a good share of the “worker level” blokes were relieved that Mr. Babbitt would not be around to look into such things – as his piloting background would likely have picked up on the seriousness of it all quite quickly.

In the “aftermath” of all this – about the time that the revised rule was being advanced to satisfy the Colgan contingent – quietly and “below the radar,” one rather senior manager retired (quite quickly) and one other was “reassigned.” No fanfare … lots of good words uttered … and we’re “done.” Unfortunately, what was done … won’t do the job … and the attitude remains. Unfortunately.

The specific reason there has been little movement in the direction Administrator Babbitt had indicated is 2-fold: first, Mr. Babbitt is no longer the FAA Administrator; and second, there was a small faction of former managers who desired, and there are some current managers apparently continue to desire, to eliminate, or drastically reduce, the requirement for simulator motion from the requirements of a simulator for a proficiency check or for the ATPC certification check. There are also many FAA Safety employees who are mightily fighting this nonsense, but without any outside look, this ridiculous attitude may not be seen for the stupidity that it really is. Motivation? Well, they say motion is not needed. I think, and there are many who feel as I do, that the overall authorizations wind up saving the airline significant amounts of money.

If this is true (and from all I can understand, that IS true) the airline managers, echoing the statements coming from the FAA, saying the crews are “better trained” and “more competent” under the “new” training and testing authorizations (of course there is NO, NONE, ZERO evidence of this) and the airline managers echo this, and in doing so, compliment the FAA managers for having the foresight and nerve to adopt this “new thinking” … which, in turn, is a “pat on the back” of those FAA managers, and that, then, justifies their being awarded bonuses and promotions. I’ve described this as the clearest example of a non-verbal “you-scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours” agreement known to exist today.

And, finally, without attempting to set the US up for anything in particular, I suspect that if the US were to have adopted ICAO 9625, we would have seen other national regulatory authorities doing the same thing.

[ZFT]

AirRabbit,

My gasp is flabbered. (Something similar did occur with a European NRA going it alone during the JAA era approving what would be a Level 5/6 FTD under FAA standards for initial type training and checking but nothing near what you have related).

I can appreciate your stance.

[mnttech]

Interesting, there has only been 2 comments to date on the proposed change to FAR 60.

[AirRabbit]

I suspect that is because there was “a lot” of discussion about what was going to be required of simulators to be able to comply with the kinds of training that was going to be mandated after the huge effort that was mounted by the relatives of the Colgan accident victims and had the US Congress pretty much dictate the kind of rule that the FAA was going to have to institute. The specifics that were included in that Congressional mandate was training on Full Stall Training Maneuvers, Upset Recognition and Recovery Training Maneuvers, Airborne Icing Training Maneuvers, Microburst and Windshear Recovery Maneuvers, Takeoff and Landing in Gusting Crosswinds, and Bounced Landing Training Maneuvers, all of which were to be fully addressed in airplane flight simulators.

Because of the fact that the training that is going to be required, is going to be required to be conducted in an airplane flight simulator, the FAA has to make sure that when the simulator is used, it has been programmed for, and tested to ensure, that it is able to be used for the newly prescribed tasks to train and test pilots – who will be required to be knowledgeable about how to recognize and, where necessary, recover from any of these kinds of occurrences.

The logic they are using for this program is based on the potential of inadequate fidelity of any FSTD used to conduct such training that could then lead to a misunderstanding of recognition cues, learning of inappropriate recovery techniques, and an unrealistic understanding, or a lack of understanding of dangerous flight conditions that must be avoided – and actually, this specific kind of “look” at any simulator, is exactly the kind of thing some of us have been advocating for quite a while. As a result, the additions to simulators described by the FAA, and after proper evaluation of those FSTDs that have been modified (and I understand that this will include those previously qualified FSTDs that hold “grandfather rights”) must be used to conduct these training tasks.

Apparently, according to what they’ve said, the plan that the FAA is going to follow is designed to keep the “cost” of modifying both new and previously qualified FSTDs to a minimum, and to do this, they have proposed to apply the requirements of this FSTD Directive ONLY to those FSTDs that would be used to accomplish specific training tasks as described in that FSTD Directive. This would allow the sponsors to choose to qualify any number of FSTDs to conduct the individual tasks as required to meet the needs of their training programs. Again, according to the FAA, those FSTDs that have included these necessary modifications in accordance with the FSTD Directive would have their Statements of Qualification modified to indicate the FSTD has been evaluated and qualified specifically for those specific tasks.

The concept of a Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Directive (similar to an “AD” – Airworthiness Directive) is to ensure that the simulator that is to be used for this kind of training or testing has been modified to be able to be used properly for those specific applications. The FSTD Directive is not a “new” way to get a simulator evaluated or qualified, but rather is a way to address the specific kinds of capabilities in any specific simulator that is to be used to conduct a specifically designated training/testing application.

So … essentially, we have some enraged family members pounding the tables at the governmental/congressional level – someone puts together something that sounds like it might be appropriate to do – and the regulatory authority is saddled with the responsibility of putting it all together and making it work. It will be interesting to see how it all turns out.

[AirRabbit]

As I sometimes do, I’ve just gone back and re-read what I posted not long ago – but it became apparent that, because of the somewhat narrow focus of the topic of this thread and the even more narrow focus of that particular post, I did not point out at least some one of the major concerns that I believe remain real and important.

The FAA has, indeed, published a proposal to expand the areas from which data will be required to more accurately and more completely program simulators, and has done so with the understanding that this data will be incorporated into the simulator to more accurately simulate the performance and handling of the airplane when subjected to the environments and circumstances where this “new” data would be representative (see the above posts). And, while this is very likely to be advantageous to being able to provide an even higher capability of “realism” in a simulated environment, there remains a glaring disconnect that has not yet been addressed. That “disconnect” is the determined effort on the part of some who continue to desire to redefine the features that are, and should be, required to be provided in an accurate and complete (as complete as physics will allow) airplane flight simulator.

Some “history”… observed by some outsiders and, likely, many more insiders, may be in order:

It is apparent that the current practice of allowing some training program applicants to be granted the use of “non-motion” devices on a case-by-case basis, under the provisions of an “alternate” training program development process, commonly referred to in the US as the Advanced Qualification Program, or “AQP,” will continue to be used. I am fully aware that those who have adopted AQP as a training philosophy do not automatically incorporate the use of non-motion simulators, and not all AQP training programs use non-motion simulators – but the fact is that some do. And, that fact, at least to me, flies in the face of realism and accuracy – which, should generate some level of concern on the part of the management of this particular regulatory authority – particularly when they are quite actively insistent that we modify the requirements for the inclusion of these new data driven training applications.

The operation of the AQP office in the FAA was seen for quite a while as the venue for very highly educated and very capable professional educators. As a result, none of the proposals for how they desired to “do their business,” regardless of how odd those proposals may have seemed, and regardless of what other, less educated pilot inspectors may have said in opposition, the positions taken by the AQP office was considered “forward thinking” and a “pathway into the future.” As a result, none, or very few, of the AQP positions were ever challenged, at least not successfully. Behind the scenes, there was an attitude that the need for motion systems, and their associated costs (purchase and maintenance), could be eliminated without compromising the quality of airline pilots being trained.

For some time, at least initially, most of the managers and most of the staff within the AQP office were not pilots, but rather educators (some with exceptionally fine resumes) who were not familiar with (…and I’m resisting saying “and oblivious to”…) the various inputs and perceptions pilots regularly use to fly an airplane. These inputs, provided through motion, visual, and/or feel cueing, when operating an airplane, either on the ground or airborne provide the pilot with an indication of what is happening and what he/she do to maintain – or regain, if necessary – the desired flight condition. Some of these AQP “non-pilots” adamantly stood on the premise that they, themselves, had personally seen pilots perform in simulation equipment, both with and without motion, and were convinced that what they saw was virtually identical performances in each – justifying, in their minds, that motion systems were irrelevant to competent and complete pilot training.

It didn’t take long before, there, in the isolation that was, and still remains, the AQP venue, that attitude eventually became “uncontested fact” – fact that had been verified by professional educators – motion systems were, indeed, irrelevant. There is little doubt that an AQP approval can include the authorization for the completion of pilot training, and the final “line oriented evaluation” (used for the issuance of a certificate or type rating) can be completed in a completely non-motion device. All of the AQP-assigned personnel were advocates of this strictly internal, AQP-approval-required training authorization.

It shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone, that eventually, those persons having served as part of the AQP office would eventually be moved or promoted to other positions within the Air Transportation Division of the FAA. In fact, the final position of the FAA in response to a request from the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society in regards to the FAA’s position on ICAO Document 9625 (which, by the way, was developed through an RAeS working group) was overseen and approved by a senior FAA manager who had previously been a very active part of the AQP office and had previously and personally approved AQP training programs using non-motion devices for the final training and the LOE/Proficiency Check/Type Rating evaluation.

I understand that, for some time now, there has been a rather nonchalant but determined effort, on the part of some in the FAA, to remove the motion on-set cueing requirement from the US rules. Some mid-level FAA managers, who apparently had “the ear” of some higher level managers, were apparently convincing enough to advocate the proposal to authorize US airlines to use simulation without the necessity of having properly programmed and validated on-set motion cueing systems – similar to what is and has been regularly authorized under AQP. It was (and still is thought by some) that doing so would enable airlines to retain full FAA-approval for training equipment that would be substantially less expensive. Less expensive? Yes, somewhat - usually in the neighborhood of 5% to 10% ... but substantially less? I'll leave that determination to you. Additionally, it is rumored that, in at least some cases, unsolicited accolades from some airlines, may have provided, or supported, some FAA managers with advancement or promotional opportunities or recommendations. There was evidently a somewhat surreptitious effort to expand the philosophy of fully accepting training programs that did not include the use of motion system equipped airplane flight simulators.

At least up to this point, such authorizations to deviate from regulatory requirements are limited to AQP applicants. Clearly, if the FAA were to outwardly acknowledge the value of simulators with functioning motion systems, which would certainly be the case by endorsing ICAO Document 9625, let alone adopting those standards, that would have resulted in either pointing up the problems with motionless simulation, but at least would complicate the widening of US airlines reaping the cost benefits of motionless simulation outside of the AQP approach.

This does not mean that the previous effort on the part of some in the US FAA who apparently remain determined to remove, or at least relegate to a significantly lesser level of importance, the current requirement in the US regulations for a motion cueing system in airplane flight simulators has waned or has been ended. That effort, as far as many can tell, remains alive and well – even if limited to only a very few advocates. It is a fact that those advocates are relatively highly placed within the FAA. Additionally, and I think importantly, this attitude is certainly the primary and perhaps the singular, reason that the FAA objected to the out-right adoption of the newly developed ICAO standards (Document 9625) for airplane flight simulation equipment, citing that the proposal was “too restrictive.” Actually, this language was used as a non-threatening and non-argumentative reference, but still communicating little more than “Opponent-Speak,” meaning that the FAA was not intending to adopt the provisions of that particular ICAO document. The specific reason was that this document specifically outlines the requirements for a motion system for the top 2 “types” of simulation.

At the moment, there appears to be 2 separate actions with respect to simulation: one to incorporate new areas of concern, bolstered by new data gathering and incorporation requirements – and one to eliminate (or at least minimize) a basic and important on-set cueing recognition capability in flight simulation – are at least questionable when seen simultaneously – and demonstrates what I believe to be the incongruent absurdity that exists as a result. The newly established requirement to gather and use more extensive airplane flight data to support the very deliberate attempt to ensure that simulators can and do provide the capability to more completely and more accurately provide more accurate and more complete training for pilots. Unfortunately, and, in my view, disingenuously (bordering on dishonestly) this is being done simultaneously with continuing a program that allows pilots to participate in a very specific program to complete their training AND demonstrate their competency as airline pilots, through the use of simulation that is completely devoid of one of the three (3) primary cueing inputs that forms the acceptance and realism of flight simulation. This primary cueing input is that of motion cueing.

Under the on-going approval of AQP training programs, the training and the testing completed by pilots may very well be accomplished in simulation equipment that has no motion capability. While training under traditionally developed training programs, can, and often do, provide the introduction of some flight maneuvering tasks in a device without motion capability … but, in each such case, the completion of the required training, and the demonstration of competency, is accomplished by using ALL of the appropriately recognized in-put cueing that would be present in an actual operating/airborne airplane – including motion on-set cueing. Eliminating the requirement for providing motion on-set cueing is eliminating what that pilot would be able to recognize and respond to in the airplane – and, therefore, we, as instructors/trainers, OWE it to those pilots to allow them to receive the very best simulation that we are capable of providing.

Of course, simulators today do NOT completely represent every aspect of an operating/airborne airplane – but they come VERY close – and they do it in a manner that will not require those pilots to “re-interpret” what they’ve seen, heard, and felt in that simulator when they get to the airplane. This simulator capability, together with competently and completely trained instructors, provides the very best opportunity to acquire the very best in operating flight crew members. The cueing recognized in the simulator, for all intents and purposes, will be the cuing that they will recognize in the airplane – of course, the cueing recognized in an operating/airborne airplane, in some cases, but not all, will likely be somewhat more robust – but it will be at least familiar and in some cases quite realistic.

My agitated sensibilities come from the fact that with the current regulatory environment (in the US at least) the only way these additional simulation requirements can be recognized as good and proper is IF the allowance to disregard the requirement for having and using a properly designed, and functional on-set motion cueing system is kept “under wraps” and out of the view of the public. Proceeding with both of these programs simultaneously is irony that rivals the most aggressive fantasy movie plot line – and makes no sense, what-so-ever!

[mnttech]

So … essentially, we have some enraged family members pounding the tables at the governmental/congressional level – someone puts together something that sounds like it might be appropriate to do – and the regulatory authority is saddled with the responsibility of putting it all together and making it work. It will be interesting to see how it all turns out.

Ah so very very true. I have felt the 1500 hour requirement was just a “do something” reaction to the Colgan accident, as it has been discussed here.

Of course, simulators today do NOT completely represent every aspect of an operating/airborne airplane – but they come VERY close – and they do it in a manner that will not require those pilots to “re-interpret” what they’ve seen, heard, and felt in that simulator when they get to the airplane. This simulator capability, together with competently and completely trained instructors, provides the very best opportunity to acquire the very best in operating flight crew members.

Like so many other “systems”, this takes a complete buy in from management, finance, instructors, pilots, maintenance, and certification.

[AirRabbit]

Thanks mnttech, I appreciate your recognizing the “big picture,” so to speak. I’ve always believed that while “tunnel vision” often has its very valuable contribution to a myriad of applications, I think it imperative to recognize that when it is used it must be used with frequent and regular glances at “the big picture;” if for no other reason than to maintain a realistic understanding of both position and direction. While, of course, this applies to flying an airplane, it is equally applicable to developing and following progressive procedures for any business function – and, if nothing else, the choices evident here are blatantly in contradiction to this basic understanding. Often, if tunnel vision is the only perspective used, when the activity is observed from the outside, what is seen is usually recognized as actions chillingly (and regretfully) reminiscent of something between the Marx Brothers and the Keystone Cops!