Flight International "Pilots must go back to basics>"

[Judd]

Flight International 8-14 April 2014 page 21 article by David Learmount. Headline "Pilots must go back to basics." Sub-heading "Flightdeck automation is rampant, and industry commentators believe it is time flight crews relearned how to actually fly."

If ever I have seen a case of flogging the proverbial dead horse, it this constant reiteration of something that pilots and commentators have been banging on about for nearly 40 years. In fact ever since the first glass cockpit was installed. For example.

A quote from the article: "Speaking during an open session at the end of the 25-26 March event (Royal Aeronautical Society's "Aircraft Commander in the 21st Century" conference in London), Capt Mike Varney of Airbus and Captain Steve Hawkins of BA separately came to the same conclusion: pilots have to be reintroduced to their aircraft as flying machines because both they and their employers have become obsessed with systems management, to the exclusion of flying. The operations and training leadership at both organisations have taken up the idea of tripping out the flight director and turning off the automatics at the beginning of type or recurrent simulator training sessions." Buy the magazine and read the rest of the article yourselves if so inclined.

All this carry-on about loss of basic flying skills blamed upon addiction to automatics, has been going on ever since D.P.Davies "Handling the Big Jets" was first published 48 years ago. David Davies saw this coming a mile away when he penned his advice to airline pilots at chapter 11 of his fine book. He wrote (edited for brevity): "Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and approach coupler. But do not get into a position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice in raw ILS, particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches."

The last paragraph has echoes of the Air France A330 high altitude stall and crash into the South Atlantic and the Asiana Boeing 777 crash on a visual approach to SFO.

Of course, most of today's airline pilots will privately concede their basic instrument flying skills are shot forever and that applies to junior copilots coming through the system who one day will take the left seat and follow their leaders in avoiding avoid hand flying like a plague. There is no doubt in my mind that automation dependency will increase further with still more sophisticated automatic pilots that are coming off the drawing tables.

That being so, what is the point in re-hashing the bleeding obvious in these feel-good expansive flight safety conferences that are known more for their networking attractions and meeting up for drinks with old mates, than serious decision making on such trivialities as sticking in the odd manually flown circuit (FD and AT on, of course) for regulatory box ticking purposes.

Forget the regulators. They are mostly toothless airline or charter pilot has-beens (it takes one to know one, incidentally!) after a nice secure Public Servant job who couldn't give a damn what the airlines do as long as the prangs are kept within sensible limits.

[Desert185]

Regardless of whether it is beating a dead horse or not, Learmount and Davies are/were right. Unfortunately, once body count reaches a certain uncomfortable and unacceptable level, the bureaucrats, both gov't and company, will finally do something about it. Sad state of affairs.

[FLEXPWR]

Desert185, yes, they do something about it... exactly the opposite of common sense!

Say a hairy landing, or an unstable approach manually flown, their answer will be to keep automation to avoid deviation in hte future. This is plain wrong.

Unstable approach, visual pattern, all need to be addressed with more manual practice, to do it better next time you really need it.

This is sad. :{

[vilas]

Raw data flying is based on good scan of parameters and prompt corrections of deviations as they develop so that they do not require major change of flight path. As PF or PM the scan more or less remains same and between the two of them even 10 seconds should not pass without one of them noticing the speed. In SFO accident a training captain and experienced captain under check both never monitored the speed which shows their scanning had deteriorated over a period. Even with full automation the scan is no different. Only that you are passively flying the aircraft. If your scanning is intact you do not need much practice to fly raw data.

[olster]

Judd, a very well written and accurate description of the post -modern angst regarding manual flying , loss of basic skills etc. The regulatory driven knee jerk is for manual handling sessions within airline training departments that really only ticks boxes but does not address the problem .

As you so astutely recognise the junkets where these quotes originate are exactly as you describe. A lot of hand - wringing and quotes post - event but come d' habitude nothing achieved . D .P . Davies was spot -on several decades ago with his forecast of lack of currency and subsequent potential for catastrophe unfortunately proven . I don't have the answers either apart from changing the system within airlines and regulation at great , unrealistic expense. Stopping the RHS being the most expensive for line training purposes might be a start .

cheers ,Olster - retired , similarly toothless , airline pilot

[main_dog]

Only that you are passively flying the aircraft. If your scanning is intact you do not need much practice to fly raw data

Just continue telling yourself that... and hope you never have a problem with the automatics!

[vilas]

main_dog
I come from DC3 era and then onto 5 commercial jets including the 747 classic so raw data never held any terrors for me. You may fly any amount manually but if you do not drive the scan into your subconscious you can never be comfortable with it. I am saying even on autopilot you need to scan same way as if you are flying manual and be in control never take things for granted

[main_dog]

Vilas, I sincerely envy your DC-3 experience. The 747-200 I also had the good fortune to fly.

Regardless, I politely disagree... one's instrument scan is one of the most delicate and perishable skills, requiring regular manual practice (not just watching the AP do it) or else it evaporates like water in a desert.

[hikoushi]

That is a good and valid piece of information regarding keeping a scan going even during automatic flight. Think about it. Say you are at the bottom of an approach to minimums, runway is in sight, and you are about to kick the autopilot off and finish the job yourself. You don't hit the big red button in the stick first, then start suddenly scanning your PFD and windshield. You have been doing that for a while now, haven't you? As you get closer and closer to pressing that button, there is a "quickening" in your scan (attitude, airspeed, attitude, vertical speed, attitude, director, airspeed, outside.... Etc) but it remains. Even in cruise, or descent (assuming you are actually engaged in flying the aircraft and not reading or playing Candy Crush) you do this, albeit at a vastly slowed rate.
So there is a "continuum" of scanning and engaging the aircraft that continues whether you have everything off and are hand flying a visual approach to a short runway, or you are at 20,000 feet in descent setting up for a CAT IIIb ILS to an autoland.

Well at least you should be doing that. And it would be a lie to tell you I sit in my seat and stare at the horizon and the instruments for 6 hours on a crossing. Though I am stuck at level 147 in Candy Crush, I can assure you that each move is simply one piece of my slow, relaxed, enroute "inverted V scan". Outside.... ADI.... Airspeed.... NAV display..... Move the purple candy on space up.... Airspeed.... ADI..... Space out for a while..... Orange candy to the right..... airspeed.... Like this, see?

When you hand fly remember.... Fly pitch and power. Your Flight Director should be though of as a "Flight Suggestor". It doesn't really direct a damn thing so you should fly the airplane, not the bars. RNP stuff, yeah let the plane fly itself. Your passengers will appreciate when you make your descent, approach, and configurations with as few uncomfortable pitch and power changes as possible. Stay engaged with the aircraft, keep your mental math going even on a managed descent, plan your deceleration, keep engaged and it can be done consistently. Using the full continuum from that broad, relaxed scan that was mentioned earlier down to the metronomic rhythm of a real hand-flown ILS scan all the way to the basic VFR division of attention you learned doing pylon-8's so many moons ago as you get the last part of the job done with finesse.

Asiana never has to happen again. It sounds like those boys (instructor captain included) were not encouraged to fly, to REALLY fly, and were actively discouraged from developing and cultivating the skills of a true AVIATOR by the culture of their training and their airline. Whether or not they previously had those skills (perhaps in the military or years ago flying short-haul) they were not only allowed to rust away, but actively discouraged. They didn't have a chance.

[vilas]

We are all trying to say the same things little differently. Take SFO for instance all the talk that they thought that the auto throttle will wake up is all bull. They were not monitoring speed period. Had they noticed speed is falling checked the thrust and set it themselves 5 KTS less or 10 knots more wouldn't have mattered. On a bright sunny day with serviceable aircraft visual approach is not a great skill it is bread and butter. If you are rusty you may not be accurate but you don't become unsafe provided you have the skill. If you were never taught or practiced then it is different matter. In this forum many times automation is blamed but incidents suggest pilots didn't understand the automation itself. It's the whole package you got have.

[cessnapete]

Even some of the big European airlines now mandate no manual throttle handing when hand flying.
When in Big Airlines on the B744, the rule was manual flight/ manual thrust levers. But I notice now that the B77 and Airbus fleets require permanent AT use when manual flying, see where that got Asiana!
I notice Lufthansa allow manual thrust when hand flying, even on the A380.

[BN2A]

If you don't understand the automation fully, just remember that if you fly it yourself if goes up and down and left and right, faster and slower!! Be it mini Pipena or gargantuan Boebus...

Have just changed type to an "Autothrottle at all times" type, and already feeling pushed slightly out of the loop.. Better to realise now though!!

:oh:

[FullWings]

Pretty much everything has EFIS these days, including many aircraft that people train for their commercial licences on. I would put forward that it is difficult to develop or practice a classical instrument scan in a glass cockpit as much of the information is crammed onto the PFD, leading to a sort of glare rather than a scan. Add the hypnotic flight director into the mix and there you go.

As far as the SFO accident is concerned, I don’t think anyone was actually flying the aircraft: the aiming point was well short of the runway for some time without correction. One wonders what was going through their minds, if anything...

[clunckdriver]

At 76 years old Im just back from a six leg day in a cabin class twin, four circling approaches, one straight in precision and one straight in visual onto a very short "black hole", the young lady I have put in the left seat hand flew all of them with great skill and precision ,{I take the left seat only to stay current} So there are young pilots getting the skills needed, just give them a chance to get that experience , how this is to be done is the problem as more flight schools degenerate into "puppy farms" rather than teaching the basics. Having owned flight schools and retired from the "heavy metal" sixteen years ago, and having flown both Boeing and Airbus products along with the latest corporate tin, the decline in basic piloting skills is disturbing to say the least, there are good reasons the great mechant ships masters train in little sail boats to obtain the knowledge in ship handling required when the "magic" fails. Of one thing Im sure, unless the industry comes up with a solution ,perfectly serviceable aircraft, on perfect flying days, will continue to crash into perfectly flat ground. {by the way, as soon as the insurance company say OK to the young lady , I will at last get to retire!}

[FLEXPWR]

Vila, I think what main_dog means is that for YOU, automation is not a problem, because you have thousands of hours of manual flying, and the manual flying for so many years on some classic types was the opportunity for you to acquire a perfect scanning habit.

This is not the same story for today's baby pilots, who, with 200 hours under their belt, join companies operating today's most advanced, but also highly automated airliners, where they will routinely disconnect the autopilot a few hundred feet before landing. The rest of the time, it's just sitting here watching the clouds drift by.

I bet it took you more than 200 hours of manual flying to achieve the level of proficiency you undoubtedly acquired.

The FAA requires now 1500 hours before flying for an airline (I don't know the specifics). It is a first step in acknowledging, maybe, that the industry lacks experience and/or manual flying experience. But it does not force the airlines to change their view about automation and manual skills proficiency once the pilots have joined.

[Centaurus]

I see 1223 "views" on this thread so far and it was only started yesterday. That is an encouraging sign. I wonder how many of these people are in senior operations management, be they airline or regulator, and have the inclination and influence to initiate the changes needed to fix the problem we are seeing of automation addiction?

[despegue]

Either Autopilot/autothrottle ON or OFF but NOT a mixture of both.
SOP in all companies I flew for, both Airbus and Boeing.

[roulishollandais]

In all domains, the modern life taught us to increase our knowledge with IT, not to replace our old technical skills.


Aviation is not different in that that management, law, building our houses, aso.
Young pilots have to learn BOTH, hand flying AND using and understanding systems.


A condition is to hire others pilots profiles (pluridisciplinarity), and to train much much more.
There is enough money vasted in leasing rates.

[cessnapete]

Not in BA. Manual thrust handling forbidden on 777 and Airbus. Training dept say it is safer than letting the pilots manage!!

[captjns]

Wow!!! what a concept. Just think if management encouraged maintaining flying skills in the first place, this article would never have been printed.


I still a hands on line training captain. Pilots need to demonstrate their airmanship prior to being released to the line. I've been criticized and praised by both sides of the fence. I never wanted any of my students to be part of a new article ala Asiana.

[BN2A]

And if you fly an aircraft that is capable of single engine autothrottle, and even single engine CAT 3B................... Even the sim ILS thrust is done for you!!

Used to do the odd flight with an a/thr inop in a previous life, and was confident.. Not so now!!

:\

[Centaurus]

I understand from company sources, Virgin Australia (737NG) leave the AT armed when flying manually on final approach but de-select the speed function. I understand that this was the technique used by the former Ansett Airlines of Australia on their Classics before the airline folded over a decade ago. Pilots of AAA who joined the then start up airline Virgin Blue brought that technique with them regardless of Boeing recommended philosophy. Qantas NG AT philosophy started off leaving AT armed for manual flying then reverted to Boeing recommended procedures of AT off when manually flying unless in climb after take off.

[vilas]

FLEXPOWER
What you said is only partly correct. The basic flying skill has two aspects acquiring it and maintaining it. This applies to all irrespective of experience. SFO accident was not caused by 200 hrs guys. So what was the problem did they lose the skill or never had it in the first place? I have seen even some of the experienced pilots have weak areas which are not addressed in the refreshers and keep getting worse. Here the airline and ethnic cultural issues may come in. I am not against practicing basic skills but if you have the ability it is not that difficult to retain it.

[Lookleft]

Not in BA. Manual thrust handling forbidden on 777 and Airbus. Training dept say it is safer than letting the pilots manage!!

So is an unservicable A/T still allowed in the MEL? If pilots are not allowed to practice using manual thrust under any circumstance because of the danger it presents then an A/T should be considered a no-go item if it is U/S.

[roulishollandais]

Seeing the accidents' statistic, it seems the problem of excess of SOP dependance is typically a civilian problem.

How do Military manage that modern piloting method schyzophreny ?

Is the aerobatics training a solution to maintain enough brain's independance ?

Are you using other methods to train ? (Perhaps military keep secrecy about their AF447 type LOC, or SFO type short landing ?)

Is it a problem of human factor inside airlines to destroy benefits of experience , and Unions strength in generation competition with the pretext of technoology ?

[blind pew]

Quote:
Not in BA. Manual thrust handling forbidden on 777 and Airbus. Training dept say it is safer than letting the pilots manage!!

Sadly a legacy from the "good old Trident" with the non flying pilot holding the throttles. Demonstrated admirably by Manx at Cork a couple of years ago.
Fools never learn.
On a happier note met my first black BA pilot on thursday at the Caribean pilots exhibition at RAF museum Hendon...a bl@@dy long time coming.:ok:

[mustangsally]

I usually fly, with my hands and eyes, the first thirty minutes of about half of all my departures. Frequently, F/O expects that I'll put on the autopilot after we are cleaned up. I just keep using my eyes and hands all the way to FL and then some. This is really where the crosscheck is learned. At Mach0.84 a one degree pitch change produces an 840 foot vertical either up or down. So to keep it smooth one must learn how to do changes less than a quarter of a degree. There are times when the ATC load becomes busy and the A/P is connected. But when not I keep my hands and eyes trained.


One the way back down, I'm again on the eyes and hand below ten thousand.


The auto throttle issue comes to fuel burn. I have yet to see a manual throttle pilot beat the auto system. The savings maybe small but ten kilos of fuel saved each hour by a fleet of 40 aircraft save the company money.

[flyhardmo]

Another reason Pilots of modern airliners are reluctant to practise manual flight is the data monitoring which sends a ping every time a company specified parameter is exceeded. This is especially prevalent in Asia where exceeding a parameter can result in a tea and bicky session followed by fines, demotion, loss of face and loss of a Job.
Being a good pilot that knows their limits through practice and past experience isn't important anymore. Being a cheap bum in the seat who can recite SOP's and push buttons is.

[roulishollandais]

I'm still waiting a "DUTCH ROLL" SOP to apply in case of degenerating yaw damper failure, or cable tension failure :mad: The latter happened on MD83, happily the captain was able to hand fly that problem.

[Killaroo]

In my previous company the disconnection of all automatics was actively encouraged. Crews often flew approaches fully manual. I personally have total disrespect of the A330 A/T in gusty conditions, and since gusty was common in that part of the world it made perfect sense to disconnect it.

In my current company it is only passively encouraged, and crews seem to prefer leave the automatics in. You rarely see the FO suggesting to do a manual approach.

Recently I did an approach where the AT was behaving abysmally (I had left it engaged since that's really the unspoken norm here). So, I did the obvious and disconnected it.
Afterward the FO whinged that I hadn't briefed him before the approach that I'd be disconnecting the AT.
The 'norms' and ' SOP's' are so firmly ingrained now that logic is out the window.

[wiggy]

Lookleft, re: BA

So is an unservicable A/T still allowed in the MEL?

It is on the 777..and I agree with your subsequent comments.

b.p.

On a happier note met my first black BA pilot on thursday at the Caribean pilots exhibition at RAF museum Hendon...a bl@@dy long time coming

:confused: Well FWIW "it's" been going on a bl@@dy long time, in fact some of us joined BA at the same time as a black Caribbean lady pilot in the late 80's......

[captjns]

I offer my F/Os 3 out of the 4 legs we may fly in a day. I encourage my F/Os to manually fly up to the mid 20s and disengage the A/P and deselect speed below FL150.


Many enjoy turning off the FDs too.

[vilas]

The airlines may have policies on automation but no one tells you to fly on autopilot unmonitored. All these incidents happened because pilots were not scanning. Aircrafts like A320 hold the flight path then what else is left to do? The N1 from level flight at green dot to descent on glide path does not vary by more than 15% and with trend arrow guiding you at all times it is not a great skill. Proper training and sincere refreshers should be able sort this out. Too much manual flying in congested air traffic environment can create its own problems.

[Kefuddle]

Too much manual flying in congested air traffic environment can create its own problems. People keep saying stuff like this, but really I don't see why manual flying would be particularly problematic. Looking at the ASRs at my place, it seems most screwups in busy ATC environments where because intended autopilot mode changes were not properly monitored and automatic mode changes were not noticed.

I would conclude that autopilot flying requires forced concentration and discipline, whereas manual flying imbibes such qualities. Therefore autopilot flying just a skill as manual flying is just a skill. Do enough manual flying and one wonders what all the fuss is about.

[Lookleft]

I'm still waiting a "DUTCH ROLL" SOP to apply in case of degenerating yaw damper failure,

You might want to Google KC-135 Kyrgyzstan and see that the Air Force also has a problem with over reliance on automation. Due to flight control problems the aircraft developed Dutch Roll and it broke up in flight. The report suggested that the crew might have been able to recover the aircraft if they had taken manual control but they instead had attempted to engage the autopilot.

So its not just a civilian problem. It has a lot to do with reducing training to the absolute minimum and hoping that the only non-normals experienced by a crew fit neatly into the QRH and ECAM/EICAS.

[captjns]

Proper training and sincere refreshers should be able sort this out. Too much manual flying in congested air traffic environment can create its own problems.

If you are too lazy to operate the MCP while your FO wants to flay, just man up and tell them.

[RAT 5]

IMHO it is not a training problem, but a culture problem. The TQ & base training should create a solid foundation for GH skills. The culture of the airline then encourages, or not, the development and maintenance of those skills. Before EFIS my airline actively encouraged manual flying. The autopilot was so basic that it was easier to do so. The F/O had only CWS and no A/T anyway. Manual visual circuits was the norm so skills were high.
I then flew B757/767 with other airlines and manual flight, visual approaches into small quiet airfields was the norm.
Later airlines with the new wizz-bang computer a/c said, very quietly, that manual flight was allowed, but then actively discouraged it. All through the winter fully automated procedures had been used. In the first week of CAVOK summer there were too many Go-rounds from screwed up manual visuals, and that meant lost money & time, so very restrictive procedures were put in place that effectively shut that door. Use of automatics and LNAV/VNAV etc. meant that the very basic skills which had not been taught that well were now in the land of Dodo.
You can increase the legal training all you like; you can increase the minimum base training circuits all you like, but if the company doesn't like its pilots to use those techniques it ain't going to happen.

As an aside, here's a discussion topic.

The modern B737NG & A320 family can be flown on the automatics like a play station. Rotate, 400' and engage George all the way to 400' in front of the runway at the other end. Trained monkey stuff. Write an extensive set of SOP's and train & check them with a vengeance. You can now expand your airline anywhere and as fast as you like. Every pilot goes through the same sausage machine process and there are base captains and local trainers to enforce the SOP's. Head office can have confidence that even cadets can twiddle the correct knobs and buttons at the correct time with any captain they meet; the captain will be doing the same and it works for any airfield. 20-30 new a/c per year spread over many countries flown by pilots from multifarious backgrounds. You have a central control with local oversight. The a/c can be flown this way, and all airfields are also to a standard. An approach plate is an approach plate, and ILS's & radar are in abundance, in Europe.
Could the same rapid massive safe expansion have been possible in the 70's & 80's when the basic a/c were B732, B727 & DC-9's? Many airfields were non radar and NPA's. No way would you take cadets into that environment; they needed an airmanship grounding first. captains had >5000hrs and should be able to watch over the neewbies, who might be ex-QFI's, military, turbo-prop, airtaxi etc. They knew about manual flying and were comfortable in the air. It was not a play-station. The a/c had to be understood and they had to be flown. The charter guys flew to some very basic places, in all seasons and all weathers. SOP's were based on FCTM and the company culture, which was more pilot orientated than accountant, as today.
IMHO the massive safe expansion of LoCO's we've seen over the past 10 years could not have happened with the equipment of the 70's & 80's. However, and here is my curiosity, SWA DID expand rapidly and used B732 and basic B733 with a down-graded instrument display. It seemed successful. Perhaps those on the inside could enlighten us. But, does anyone believe RYR could have expanded from 25 - 300 a/c over 45 bases in 12 years if they still used B732's?

[roulishollandais]

KC-135 Kyrgyzstan and see that the Air Force also has a problem with over reliance on automation. Due to flightcontrol problems the aircraft developed Dutch Roll and it broke up in flight. The report suggested that the crew might have been able to recover the aircraft if they had taken manual control but they instead had attempted to engage the autopilot.

So its not just a civilian problem. It has a lot to do with reducing training to the absolute minimum and hoping that the only non-normals experienced by a crew fit neatly into the QRH and ECAM/EICAS.Thank you Lookleft for that worthful reference. It shows too that never described strong forces build a glued 3D net around the plane during developped dutch roll, not explained to pilots, AND not understood by classical aerodynamic rules who matters only about airflow very near of the plane.
It is how successive airfoils wristed around the plane and around oneanother with different AoAs.
Systems and autopilots ignore that modell, so "automation" (what I used to call "butterfly" from the fractal equations building lift and drag) cannot bring a good response to that degenerating system, if time delays and sensitivity of the FCS are too low (and too cheap, of course). A good handflying pilot with aerobatics training (fighter pilots) is better able to feel more quickly the limit of acceptable actions.

Developped dutch roll is the easiest PIO to overcome because degree of equations are the lowest, but that degree increases with bad reactions.

We know that PIO often develop in FBW rate limitation resulting from digitalizing vs analogic solutions like Concorde (Mc Ruer and others).

Automation is like a drug near the airports : folks buy houses near the airport because they are cheaper, and then complain about noise to get money. Airports ask greater precision in lateral path, airlines request more automation during departure and arrival.... There is no limit ! At some moment you get a safety saturation.

[DOVES]

First of all: Thank You Rat5. Very good post!

I state that I have never flown the B777 and for a raw data approach I mean:
- Of course no A / P.
- No autotrim on any axis
- No A / T
- No F / D
- No FPA
- No Track
Only Stick, Rudder, Throttles, HSI, ADI, and air driven instruments.

Almost 40 years ago we used to train on SE 210 performing ILS Approaches to simulated minima, with R1 instrument, and its omni bearing selected and locked in a position very different from the ILS inbound course. It was very challenging but effective to maintain manual piloting skills.

Highlights:
even before starting the ILS, know the Following:

-Initial rate of descent is Approximately 5 times your groundspeed in knots ... 140 knots groundspeed Apch ... your initial 700 fpm descent rate ... make your calculation in advance. 600 to 700 fpm for most jets to start

-Attitude and engines / engine (OEO) pre-fixing for each configuration / speed, to maintain in the various phases of the approach ...

-Intercept localizer and make a good guess of the heading required to maintain it. Scan your needles and the basic flight instruments (classic T) ... do not chase the needles, try heading for the refinements as you go

-The drift is equal to the wind cross-component divided by the ground speed in NM / min.
So after capturing the LOC apply a first gross correction to the drift: if your GS is 140 kts = 2.3 nm / min and have a 10 knots x-wind component, add 4° to the right of your inbound course. Then you'll only make small corrections of no more than 5 degrees (the angle of bank should not exceed the amount of heading variation).

-As the glideslope needle comes alive, configure the aircraft for Landing, so as by the time you are ON glideslope, you are fully configured for landing and maintaining your 600-700fpm descent in TRIM ... and correct power.

We used to extend the landing gear when a dot and a half below the glide, landing flap when a dot below.
On glide the aircraft must be configured and at the prescribed speed, with attitude and thrust as precalculated.
Determine what is the exact attitude to maintain the glide slope and make small changes around that.
Do not chase LOC and GLIDE but anticipate their trends.
Maintaining a Sterile Cockpit.
Only standard call outs allowed.
”OUTER MARKER TIME ...” “CROSS CHECKED!”
APPROACHING MINIMA
MINIMA ... GO AROUND Or: LAND
Pleonastic?
Or a forgotten art?

[captjns]

Very good post Rat5


The latest generation of young training captains have been trained in the electronic age. They conduct line training the way they've been trained. Utilization of automation to their fullest degree.


There are but a handful of us oldies out there that flew the trusty 731s, 727s, and DC9s. Nothing more than a multi-engine aircraft with dual Nav-Coms with a coupled autopilot with the old reliable RCA CRT weather radar. When we flew NDB approaches... we flew NDB approaches. Today... when an NDB approach is generally an RNAV overlay approach which to me is not an NDB approach.


As a trainer, I enjoy imparting what I've learned over my years of flying. I encourage my students to hand fly as much as they want during the climb and descent below RVSM. I have no problems with them wanting to turn off the FDs. Turn them back on and engage the automatics if things start going pair shape. But hey...that's what the learning process is all about. After all what's going to happen if all the automatics fail?


I can only hope that more line trainers will encourage manual flying. I would like to hope that the Asiana incident would be the turning point on the total reliance of automation... but I do have my doubts.

[roulishollandais]

Please, Leftlook, do you know if any poster opened a thread on PPRuNe about the Kyrgystan crash ? I found nothing with the PPRuNe/Google search tool.
EDIT : Oh, I found it
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/513926-usaf-kc135-crash-bishkek.html

I am concerned with dutch roll since 1979, and since 1992 I try -without success- to explain the need to train airline pilots to dutch roll, and how.


The 1500 pages report which is not public seems to recognize that lack of formation and training and information. It is a great improvment, if really they modify the training and the procédures.

It seems that master's of psychology did not helped the copilot flying, and the majored Captain in engineering could not overcome better the dutch roll.


It seems that the stability augmentation system had a failure and started the dutch roll. So we typically have a new problem with FBW, which must be masterized not only with basics, but with specific Learning.

[vilas]

roulishollandais
Dutch roll demonstration and control was shown to us in B707 and A310. It was quite pronounced in 707 but in A310 it damps out and was not problematic may be same in A320. Perhaps that is why not taught.

[roulishollandais]

vilas
so long no oscillation - or sudden change (turbulence, rate limitation, modification of shape, thrust, configuration, weight, wake turbulence, etc) - and piloting resonance ... But
USAF changed their philosophy after that investigation and his 1500 pages report !!!
I hope it will be published soon !
Air Force Releases KC-135 Crash Report « CBS Seattle (http://seattle.cbslocal.com/2014/03/13/air-force-releases-kc-135-crash-report/)

[Private jet]

There was a TV programme about airline pilots I recall, it must have been 20-25 years ago and the conclusion even then was that pilots would eventually be condemned to sit on the flightdeck doing nothing just watching the automation. Automation is to my mind, in the main, a good thing and certainly prevented many more prangs than its caused but it needs to be used properly & "appropriately" The apathy lies with what can be deemed as proper & "appropriate".
I also remember that old gag about replacing the co-pilot with a dog which was trained to bite the Captain if he/she touched anything.....

[safetypee]

The Flight International headline is ‘back to basics’, but the commentary and thread focusses on manual flight skills; what about all of the other professional skills of fight. There are only a few accidents specifically identifying handing issues, which is disproportionate to the overwhelming number of successful operations, presumably involving manual flight. This data would suggest that the industry does not have a serious problem.
However, this does not dismiss that there is a problem, but it is an issue apparently relating to specific circumstances and contributing factors which need to be better understood.

I doubt if a true ‘back to basics’ training programme could be established – time or money; nor that an extensive change is necessary as current operational scenarios differ from those pre-automation and require new skills.
The problems appear to be associated with the advent of automation, but not necessarily directly due to automation. The beliefs that automation would reduce workload and training underestimated the risk of unforeseen changes or knock-on effects – even greater capability or unintended application. Automation has reduced physical workload at the expense of mental workload, but training and operations have not adjusted to this. We cannot expect crews to understand all of the implications of automation malfunctions and thus there is a need to assist with problem solving; and occasionally where crews need to revert to manual flight in surprising circumstances, they may be ill prepared.
Yet the industry still expects crews to manage with less knowledge, less experience, and reduced opportunity to refresh skills – a belief that “…the strategies of CRM, SOPs, and professional culture will mitigate these threats… professional culture is the weakest…” (ICON report 2001).

The problems involve assumptions that previous skills are adequately trained and can still be called on, less training is required for automation, crews will be able to manage complex operations, and poor standards of emergent automation interfaces are not a significant threat. The industry expects too much of the human and thus must heed the advice of James Reason – it is difficult to change the human condition (training), but we can change the conditions of work; thus the industry should look at the tasks in rare situations which the crews are expected to manage, and then consider reducing, improving, or avoiding them.

ICON Report “The Human Factors Implications for Flight Safety of Recent Developments in the Airline Industry” 2001 (www.icon-consulting.com/study_reports/human_factr_stud.html)

[RVF750]

You know there are hundreds of pilots out there who are very good at hand flying, practice regularly and can fly difficult approaches with no AT or AP with no issue.


The problem is they fly Turboprops and jet carriers don't seem to want them as they must smell weird or something....must be because they keep using their feet.....


If only the PTF cadet system was shut down and a proper career path re-established, some proper experience might get a look in again.

[framer]

True.
I was much better at manual instrument flying when I had three thousand hours than when I had six thousand hours. The above statement by Turkish is the reason.

[sheppey]

I can only hope that more line trainers will encourage manual flying. I would like to hope that the Asiana incident would be the turning point on the total reliance of automation... but I do have my doubts

In many cases, LOFT in the simulator is a time waster of dubious value, especially as the session is primarily a flight deck management exercise with full use of the automatic pilot. Time and therefore costs, are the main over-riding factor against increasing the amount of manual flying in simulator training. Airlines need to re-evaluate the purported value of LOFT exercises and instead replace them with manual raw data instrument flying practice.

For every enlightened operator that encourages manual flying under appropriate conditions during line flying, the will be a dozen or more who shy away from it to the extent that it is expressly forbidden. However, the latter must be forced by their regulator to schedule simulator hand flying raw data training on visual approaches, ILS in strong crosswinds, high and low altitude stall recovery for example. If practice makes perfect, then what more cost-efficient way to prevent the skill atrophy that has become such a serious issue, judging from the plethora of reports from research and international flight safety conferences.

[gums]

Sorry to use a paraphrase of an old song, but MSB has a good point.

I have refrained from comment until I got a feel from the "heavy" pilots here.

Make no mistake, as a single-seater for most of my flying time, I grew used to using all the automation and "help" as the technology advanced . Except for a very short tactical flight, the AP was great and allowed me to use the entire "system" to reduce workload and get the job done. No navigator, no flight engineer, no co-pilot.

The biggest difference I have seen from my experience versus the posts from heavy pilots here is I never had an AP that would climb, level, descend, hold a set speed, level off altitude, and such. Never had a "coupled AP" for the ILS except for one jet and 400 hours in it ( manual throttle). Crude, but it worked.

I realize that training is $$$$ for the airlines. Gotta fly the money-making missions. But seems to me that a a few more sim flights and maybe even a flight in the plane in the real world would help.

As a systems engineer in second career, I like MSB's philosophy. The human interface and the human skills/experience/judgement is very important for the overall system design. The human in the loop is akin to another computer that is integrated into the overall system.

Am I way off base here?

[roulishollandais]

Hi gums, msbbarratt,
I cannot agree better, as retired airline pilot and scientific and technological IT analyst.

Human belong to the "effective system" before aside effect of every other human factor.

Degenerating dutch roll, or more positive the HUD, are good examples.

Airlines should save $$$ for training better and more on sim and planes by saving the leasing rates and expensive research and investigations and increasing insurances.

Civilian aviation needs better instructors too, with experience of high performance systems: Military instructors could bring their expertise again as they did it during one or two decades after WWII,
...and how you do it on PPRuNe:)

[GlueBall]

"There are only a few accidents specifically identifying handling issues, which is disproportionate to the overwhelming number of successful operations, presumably involving manual flight. This data would suggest that the industry does not have a serious problem."

I have flown with too many new-schooled copilots who have an acute aversion for manual flying even in day VMC. I believe this to be a dangerous trend, especially in situations when the automatics go on vacation. :{

[Centaurus]

I have flown with too many new-schooled copilots who have an acute aversion for manual flying even in day VMC

From talking to many airline pilots in my profession as a flight simulator instructor, and at the risk of generalisation, I would guess that the majority of todays co pilots as well as captains on current jet transports have that aversion to manual flying. It starts with their initial introduction to airline flying in simulators where the accent is more about SOP call-outs and heads down entries into the FMCS than basic instrument flying skills. When you see and hear of pilots leaving the FD in view and calling it raw data simply because they have their hands on the controls, then you know automation has them totally in its grip. More's the pity.:confused:

[RAT 5]

One has to wonder what the reaction is of the newbies who dream of 'being pilot and then is one'. Perhaps those on tailored courses with only 148hrs are better honed to the new world, but the flying school QFI self-improvers who fly around insight of road, rail & river and enjoy the thrill of being in the air might have a big shock of what is really means to be an airline pilot. I wonder if the dream is fulfilled. This brings me to think about the selection process of new entrants. Reading the blurb that is spewed out by the big airline HR departments about the characteristics their 'ideal candidate' will have I wonder if they are in sync with reality. Is the 'right stuff' sitting up front in todays bells & whistles wizz-bang do almost nothing aircraft?

[Armchairflyer]

IMHO the massive safe expansion of LoCO's we've seen over the past 10 years could not have happened with the equipment of the 70's & 80's. However, and here is my curiosity, SWA DID expand rapidly and used B732 and basic B733 with a down-graded instrument display. It seemed successful. Perhaps those on the inside could enlighten us. But, does anyone believe RYR could have expanded from 25 - 300 a/c over 45 bases in 12 years if they still used B732's?No idea if the uniqueness of this criterion described in a book on SWA first published almost twenty years ago still applies and/or can be a potential explanation (apart from the arguably quite unique management style of SWA with collaborative rather than adversarial employee relations):
"Southwest Airlines is the only company in the airline industry that requires a pilot to have a 737-Type Rating before he or she is considered for hire. This rating, given by the Federal Aviation Administration, essentially says a pilot is qualified to be the captain of a Boeing 737. This means that all first officers are qualified to fly as captains."
(Freiberg, K. & Freiberg, J. (1996): NUTS! Southwest Airlines' Crazy Recipe for Business and Personal Success. Austin, Texas: Bard Press, p. 98f.)

[flyhardmo]

Can anyone tell me whether any of the airlines involved in recent accidents caused by a lack of pilot skill have instituted a seriously back-to-basics training regime? Or has the response merely been to fix the defective sensor / landing aid?

Ask Asiana! There might be more to fix then just lack of piloting skills and system management.

[clunckdriver]

Recently we had a few minutes on the ground at a field in NE Ontario, now used as a destination for one of our Ontario Government owned "puppy Farm" flight schools, if our meeting with an instructor and pupil from this school are anything to go by the lack of skills and common sense is programed from the very beginning of training in this place. We heard their endless transmission as we were joining IFR for the GPS approach for the North South runway, they informed the world {and the other four fields on the same freq} that they would be doing a "full stop", well that's nice to know but "landing" would do the job according to our standard RT booklet, {I am by the way a radio examiner} but to their credit we didn't get the "currently, at this time" babble which seems to be the latest in "Yuckspeak" on the radio these days. On meeting the two crew in the FBO we were astounded to see them dressed in white shirts, slip on shoes, and a very light jacket, now for those who don't live in this part of the world they have just flown for about three hours over pretty rough bush which still has a few feet of snow on the ground, on top of their lack of suitable dress we found they are not carrying any survival gear, the chances of them surviving two nights in the bush are about zero, even less as they were both "city boys". In conversation with the student we were informed, in the most authoritative manner, that on graduation from this school they would have little need for hand flying skills as the "modern aircraft fly themselves" end quote. The other crew member of our corporate aircraft waited until I was out of ear shot and let them know in no uncertain terms that I had some time ago retired from Boeing/Airbus products and would most likely give them a new orifice if the said this again, so there it is, the blind leading the blind, a bit of topic but its typical I fear of our government sponsored schools in Canada, the nation which once taught the world to fly.

[RAT 5]

Is it just me or have we read on here, over the past 18 months, an increase in serviceable a/c accidents. Start with such things as going off the end of the RWY in TSL Greece and then add in all the others we've discussed in many 'civilised' aviation countries. There seemed to be more crew induced prangs than broken a/c calling it a day and capitulating to Mother Nature & Gravity. Am I wrong?

Further; I heard from the head of a flight college that the idea was the future cadets for MPA CPL could be trained >75% in a sim. They would earn the basic PPL in a prop and then spend the rest of their 150hrs in a MPA sim learning MMC/CRM/AFDS/QRH etc. etc. All that good twin prop IFR, VFR Nav, aeros, circuits etc. etc. was not necessary to be an airline pilot. But, I asked, what about the MPA Turbo-prop/Biz-jet pilot who flew into tiny little airfields in all regions in all weathers? No answer. What about the charter airlines who fly big jets into some inhospitable places? No answer. What dos the guy do who wants a CPL but not an MPA? No answer. It seems the authorities have decided there is only o e sort of pilot. My 250 schools hours is already reduced to 150hrs, but at least they are airborne. What's next, a Play Station or Wii-Wii? Perhaps the ground based pilot is closer than we dread.

[gums]

Some good points, Rat.

I flew two single-seaters that had decent sims to help before first flight. Great for procedures and such, but little else. One of them had no "training" models, so first hop was truly "solo". Good deal, and I would not diminish the value of the sims as long as they accurately reflect the aero properties of the jet and the training shows the "bad things" that can happen and how to handle them. The KC-135 sim apparently could not model dutch roll, and the crew could not cope with it. Ditto for the 'bus in a reversion mode where the stall protection did not prevent the jet from entering a deeply stalled condition ( recoverable, but had to know what to do and not to do).

I am not a dinosaur WRT new avionics and "aids" to make the flight safer and reduce workload. But sooner or later it will come down to basics, and that is what I fear we are losing. I preached use of the AP from the time I was a nugget until I retired, as we could use it while we pulled out the approach plate for a divert base. We could use it while we took a sip from our coffee thermos or a can of juice. Of course, there were biological needs that had to be satisfied and we couldn't go back to the latrine at row 3A. Heh heh. Secondly, our official manuals emphasized the use of the old steam gauges even tho we had cosmic HUD systems that showed all you needed to fly very precisely ( the flight path vector was the best thing). It's called "cross check", huh?

I realize that training in the real jet is expensive compared to the sim. But somewhere in my mind is the thot that a certified pilot must experience exactly what the plane does under various conditions. But what do I know...

[Denti]

The MPL is not replacing the CPL. However it is an alternative which is only aimed at airline operation, not at the business jet market or any other non-airline environment.

Interestengly enough MPL students cope very well in the charter segment though, flying a nice visual circuit in a 737 or A320 is apparently not a big issue with the right kind of training, even in challenging conditions. LIFUS is usually longer than with CPL candidates, they need more landings during base training (i believe it is 12 or 14 with ours instead of 6 for CPLs) and the learning curve is indeed quite steep, which requires certain personality traits to begin with.

The MPL is in theory not an hour based training, it is purely competency driven, however many current implementations leave quite a bit to be desired. Still, there needs to be a thorough selection of applicants in those programs, the whole training is monitored very closely and conducted in close coordination with the sponsoring airline, and yes, a sponsoring airline is a required part of an MPL. Since the whole MPL thing is still kinda new there is monitoring in place during normal line flying as well, mainly during training and checking of course.

[RAT 5]

I would qualify my thoughts with: a cross channel ferry captain does not necessarily need to be able to sail a dinghy, but, it does teach them respect of the sea, wind & current. All good stuff, but you don't need to be Ben Ainsly to be a captain of a Frigate.
Food for thought washed down with a good slosh of sea water & fresh air.
It is a discussion for many moons. However, I do feel we have gone down the new/wrong path very quickly without due diligence. It has been a very slippery slope and one that will be extremely difficult to climb back up. Indeed it is proving difficult to brake the slide.

[llondel]

Is it just me or have we read on here, over the past 18 months, an increase in serviceable a/c accidents. Start with such things as going off the end of the RWY in TSL Greece and then add in all the others we've discussed in many 'civilised' aviation countries. There seemed to be more crew induced prangs than broken a/c calling it a day and capitulating to Mother Nature & Gravity. Am I wrong?

It's not the crew's fault. Chances are the SOPs require them to sit there and push buttons. It's the automatics that got it wrong...:E

[roulishollandais]

It's not the crew's fault. Chances are the SOPs require them to sit there and push buttons. It's the automatics that got it wrong...
already answered :
When people have been trained by their culture to defer to authority, how do you get them to speak up when they really need to?

[RAT 5]

It's not the crew's fault. Chances are the SOPs require them to sit there and push buttons. It's the automatics that got it wrong...

Ouch: Oh dear! I refer you to "Children of the Magenta Line" for reference. I always thought any SOP starts with A.N.C.

[latetonite]

RAT5, I read your posts regarding this topic, and could not agree more..
Seems notwithstanding the slippery slope downhill in this matter, I am pleased to find common ground.

[roulishollandais]

Rat5,
Oh Please, what does A.N.C. mean ?

[BOAC]

Aviate
Navigate
Communicate

Simples?

[roulishollandais]

I'm red of shame, I should have found that by myself.
thank you BOAC !
Did you mean "Simple!" (en français dans le texte) ?

[roulishollandais]

Return to topics.

Let us compare that SOP's context :
"Aviate-Navigate-Communicate"
to the old cockpit work repartition in four tasks ( I write it in French, as I learned it) :
"Pilotage, Navigation, Communication, Mecanique".

The latter disapeired with the flight engineer in the airliners' cockpit.
Pilot Unions were unable to explain during the 80's why a new threat came in the cockpit.

That threat was not "electric" or electronic but "mecanic", but that happened totaly only with FBW, when systems were supposed to replace the flight engineer.

PIO (Pilot Induced Oscillation) are showing us how the mecanic function may be connected to piloting.
The April 2014, 1500 pages, USAF investigation report, after the KC-135 crash in Kyrgyz Republic (May 3. 2013) emphasises how the Duch Roll - the lowest level PIO- induced by pilots, autopilot, SOPs and training, destroyed the plane.

Modern black boxes let us show all the significative parameters of that KC-135 Dutch Roll as it could never be done earlier, and USAF did a large study showing how the pilots signed their death, after everybody forgot the "Mecanique" Crew function in the cockpit, during the flight.

FBW, systems, let us forget that the fourth term : "Mecanique", belongs to human cockpit BASICS, knowing if limits of flight domain are respected, if phase planes don't show instability, and avoiding to put the aircraft in a wrong state, and correct it when it is still possible.

With algorithms hiden to pilots for supposed commercial reason, FBW expedites the possible beginning unstability of the flight.

[Natstrackalpha]

Quote: " I am saying even on autopilot you need to scan same way as if you are flying manual and be in control never take things for granted" Unquote.

Excellent!:ok:

[roulishollandais]

Same with other threads - I recently read a post claiming that FBW was primarily intended to replace the flight engineer with technology, when in fact there were several jetliners from the '60s onwards that were well pre-FBW, yet deleted the FE station from the flight deck
I know there's a romantic attachment to the days of yore, and that's not just true of piloting - but I suspect thatI did not say that FBW was "intended" to "delete" (!) the Flight Engineer from the flight deck, but a wrong analysis has been done by some megalomaniac political activists, puting Airbus (B the son) against Airbus (H the father), seeing - without enough correct analysis of the fourth function - in increasing possibility of digitalised systems, the unhoped occasion to destroy the supremacy of flying crews organised in Unions - supposed to be dangerous "CGT communists" or "WWII terrorists" -. The other son (M) suffered the longest SNPL strike of pilots on planes without FE ! That is just history of our professions. For grounded system engineers it was an unhoped promotion : they were ignorant of the four cockpit functions.

The dutch roll is a significative exemple : it was taught in the former time, "romantic [attachment to the ] days of yore "- ie. "Hands off" on DC8 - and the bad analysis of the cockpit oganisation with that FBW forgot it. But facts have the last word. Dutch roll still existed ; automatic SOPs were introduced (A/P off, Y/D off, and then ?????) bad trained, bad known, bad teams, etc. : Read the KC-135 report... until in flight destruction of the plane.
Nobody did see that the "M" was missing after "A.N.C."
AA587 is another exemple of that lost M inside the cockpit and lost Basics.

[DozyWannabe]

puting Airbus (B the son) against Airbus (H the father)

All due consideration - what the heck does that statement even mean?

but a wrong analysis has been done by some megalomaniac political activists, ... seeing - without enough correct analysis of the fourth function - in increasing possibility of digitalised systems, the unhoped occasion to destroy the supremacy of flying crews organised in Unions - supposed to be dangerous "CGT communists" or "WWII terrorists"

I'm sorry, but that's just utter rubbish. Aviation technology has been evolving at a fairly consistent pace since the days of the Wright Brothers. Digital technology made its way into aircraft control systems via the space programme - usually first with military technology, then filtering down into civil applications.

Just as the move from sextants to radio beacons and INS technology obviated the need for a dedicated navigator on the crew, so did the advance in terms of automated systems monitoring make the FE position a thing of the past. This was not a political move - it was simply that the third generation of jetliners (i.e. widebodies) had a set of ancillary systems so complex that they were pretty much at the limit of what a single human being could effectively monitor and operate. With future jetliners only getting more complex, the only viable option was to look into automating operation of, and rationalising feedback from those systems.

It was the French SNPL who tried to make it political when they attempted to take on Airbus over the lack of an FE station on the A300 - apparently they came off worse and have never forgiven the company.

NB. The A300 was *not* a FBW aircraft.

The dutch roll is a significative exemple : it was taught in the former time, "romantic [attachment to the ] days of yore "- ie. "Hands off" on DC8 - and the bad analysis of the cockpit oganisation with that FBW forgot it.

Modern aero science and aerofoil design have tended to reduce the likelihood of aircraft developing dutch roll characteristics. Early jetliners suffered more from it because the phenomenon took some time to understand.

Read the KC-135 report... until in flight destruction of the plane.

The KC-135 is a 707 airframe, and therefore an early design with pronounced Dutch Roll characteristics - which should have been taught on that type.

I have not yet heard of a FBW generation airliner that developed a Dutch Roll, but if you have please let me know.

AA587 is another exemple of that lost M inside the cockpit and lost Basics.

I thought it was due to improper application of a wake turbulence recovery procedure which was not appropriate for that airframe.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

I have not yet heard of a FBW generation airliner that developed a Dutch Roll, but if you have please let me know.


Why do you think FBW precludes Dutch Roll which is an aerodynamic characteristic?

The Embraer 195 was prone to Dutch Roll.

[DozyWannabe]

Hey LSM,

I wasn't suggesting FBW itself *precludes* Dutch Roll, for the reason you give (being an aero phenomenon).

What I said was that I hadn't heard of an FBW-generation (i.e. A320/B777 or later) type getting into trouble with Dutch Roll. I believe the Embraer E-Jets are partial FBW (excluding ailerons).

[vilas]

Dozy
As I mentioned before we were given the demo of Dutch roll in B707which was notorious for it and how to control it also in A310 which had tendency to dampen on its own. It is no longer taught. So it is true that modern aerofoils do not have vicious Dutch roll tendencies.

[roulishollandais]

Rio-Paris : le crash est dû à "une réaction inappropriée de l'équipage", selon une contre-expertise (http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/accident/rio-paris-le-crash-est-du-a-une-reaction-inappropriee-de-l-equipage-selon-une-contre-expertise_599247.html#xtor=EPR-51-)[alerteinfo]-20140513-[bouton]-[site-web]
Not the good thread, but AF447-11 is closed.
Judicial counter-experts report published

[alf5071h]

Roul, an ideal post for this thread as it provides an alternative view of what ‘basics’ are required.

From a rough translation, the key issues being debated / contested are:-
“Inappropriate response of the crew”,
“Lack of structured failure analysis",
“Not understanding the situation"
“The division of labor in the cockpit."
“Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure."

Inappropriate response depends on awareness and understanding, which can be influenced by training; thus these are some of the important basics. These aspects don’t exclude the underlying technical failure and the operational / regulatory approvals to continue flying reliant on additional training.

[DozyWannabe]

Indeed - Learmount's "crusade" on this point was in part pre-empted by the findings on AF447. Specifically the fact that the PF ignored a minute of stall warning and continued to pull nose-up (precisely the opposite of the required response) and that the PNF seemed unable to overrule him - instead waiting for the Captain to return and wasting precious seconds.

[Zaphod Beblebrox]

I attended a training conference for US University Aviation Departments were this discussion was active Some University's have moved to the Garmin model where the displays are actually more sophisticated than those in some transport aircraft.

However if their first job is with a turboprop carrier flying older equipment, and this particular carrier had older Dash 8's the training situation was less than ideal. These new candidates were called "Children of the magenta line".

They sometimes had difficulty in getting from "A" to "B" because there wasn't any line to display where "A" and "B" actually were. They had to tune radios, and read dials and interpret where they and "B" were. All the while they had to look at other round dials and figure out which way was up and how fast they were going and which way they were pointed.

The airline actually had the audacity to require them to be able to do this all at once one one engine and then even respond to checklist challenges. Oh the agony of it all. How can anyone be expected to look a round dials and actually move across the country and find and airport and land like that?

"Gimmie back my Nintendo game."

[hifly787]

Fact remains both AF 447 and Asiana pilots didn't come from the so called new generation of pilots.

[vilas]

I said before the pilots of 447 had no idea about what was going on. They were not profficiently trained to recognise and recover from the situation they faced. It was slaughter of the innocents. Surely the airline must take some stick. High quality training remains the cheapest means to safety.

[latetonite]

"Fact remains both AF 447 and Asiana pilots didn't come from the so called new generation of pilots."

Maybe not, but they were definately no barnstorming aces either.

[Kefuddle]

From a rough translation, the key issues being debated / contested are:-
“Inappropriate response of the crew”,
“Lack of structured failure analysis",
“Not understanding the situation"
“The division of labor in the cockpit."
“Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure."

In other words, this has very little to do with handling the aircraft and more to do with non-technical CRM skills.

[latetonite]

No, it is basic IFR flying on a limited panel. Call a cat a cat.

[alf5071h]

Kefuddle, essentially yes. I prefer to avoid ‘CRM’ as it consists of many aspects, like airmanship, and there are few universal definitions of these; and if there is, the application varies.

Latetonight, well taught IFR instrument flight will contain many these aspects, but overall it’s the application of skills in managing a wide range of situations which appears to be deficient.
Previously many of the required skills were attained by experience; they are tacit knowledge which comes with time, exposure, and example. Modern operations severely restrict these opportunities and there might be false belief that the skills can be taught with more of this or that.
Applying the basics of these skills during automatic flight might sharpen up some of them, but only if they are there in the first palace … …

[vilas]

Kfuddle
If you rearrange what you pasted it makes very clear.
1. "Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure." Read "formality of a demo of UAS procedure was completed during their type rating"
2. "Not understanding the situation" Read " they had no clue as to what had happened"
3. "Lack of structured failure analysis", Read " they failed to plan threat management."
4. "Inappropriate response of the crew" Read " Since they couldn't figure out the situation they decided to do something which turned out to be disastrous.
5. "The division of labor in the cockpit." Read " Since the other pilot was equally in the dark about the situation he could not suggest another course of action and did not take any part in the proceedings."

[latetonite]

I lost my ASI at 13000', at night, single pilot IMC. Broke clouds at 400' on the ILS. No FD, let alone FMC. Not even a co pilot.

Another time on a ferry flight lost all airspeed during TO in a A310. Came VMC at 10.000'.

In both cases I relied on raw data and hand flying. Worked as advertised without indept knowledge of non technical CRM skills.

Have to say though, that where I come from, we spend 60 hrs in a Frasca box before we were even allowed to take up IFR training in an airplane.

Nowadays I see so called airline pilots with 'frozen ATPL's, MCC courses, Jet conversions and what have you not, not being able to determine a holding entry raw data.

The industry invented many gadgets to make flying easier.
Problem is that pilots nowadays rely on it 100%.

And I strongly disagree that one learns to fly by watching an autopilot fly.

[alf5071h]

Vilas, formal demonstration – exam / tests, may have little relevance in unusual and surprising situations. Part of the national authority’ clearance to continue flying until all aircraft had modified pitots included refresher training of UAS procedures. If the operators put this into practice without further explanation, then simulator instructors could easily over-focus on the loss of airspeed during takeoff.
Both take off and cruise are on the same check list, to the uninitiated the dynamic after-takeoff case is more demanding and has memory items, ideal simulator material. This would refresh and possibly bias crews’ initial reaction to any IAS failure towards the after takeoff case, particularly if associated with many other faults and warnings. If the incorrect procedure was used, crew’s should be able to identify their error, but this will depend on the level of distraction, available mental resource, and degree of surprise.

Rather than conclude that the crew ‘had no clue’ or ‘did not plan’, it might be better to consider and post, what might have been done or how we all might avoid such errors.

Latetonight, my post did not state nor I hope infer that crew’s should just watch the autopilot. Crews have to mentally engage with all of the aircraft systems with skills of awareness, understanding, planning, thinking ahead, and most important learning about themselves and the aircraft.

[DozyWannabe]

In other words, this has very little to do with handling the aircraft and more to do with non-technical CRM skills.

I'd say that the initial catalyst for the situation was very much a handling problem - the failure to effectively diagnose and rectify the problem was more within the CRM "domain".

[alf5071h]

DW, your view depends on how you define ‘handling’; is this the physical flying skills or the more wider management skills, where awareness (mental activity) should precede action.

Re CRM, which part, which aspect? There may be a consistent understanding of what CRM is for – definitions can be quoted, but as to what CRM involves in application, then there is a vast range of views, personal, operational, cultural, national, etc.
How might CRM help to diagnose or rectify a problem; please don’t quote ‘the use of all resources …’ as this is meaningless without defining which resources can be of value in a particular situation, which requires understanding the situation, etc, etc.

[DozyWannabe]

DW, your view depends on how you define ‘handling’; is this the physical flying skills or the more wider management skills, where awareness (mental activity) should precede action.

Both, really. The handling pilot seems to have instinctively begun pulling up without first assessing the situation, and continued to do so in spite of the resulting zoom-climb and stall. Once the stall warning sounded, it seems to have been disregarded and the nose-up command maintained consistently to impact.

Re CRM, which part, which aspect?

The role of the non-handling pilot in terms of the requirement to assess the actions of the handling pilot, and if they are inappropriate to say so verbally, culminating in taking control of the aircraft if the verbal communication is ignored.

In fact it could arguably go back to the Captain's somewhat sketchy handover to the two F/Os before taking his rest period, as the flight deck gradient was never explicitly stated and confirmed.

The non-handling F/O therefore seems to have been reticent to act decisively and instead defers to the Captain, calling him back from rest. By the time the Captain arrived, a significant amount of time had been lost, and the situation had deteriorated almost to the point of being unrecoverable.

[glofish]

Rather than conclude that the crew ‘had no clue’ or ‘did not plan’, it might be better to consider and post, what might have been done or how we all might avoid such errors.

Dear Alf

Your argument displays all the cheap elements of diversion most regulators, manufacturers and many busy contributors to these forums use:
"Give me solutions or shut up".

Apart from it's poor weight as a contribution, because you yourself have no solution but to shut up and you don't, it is simply wrong:

Read the title of the thread ffs! :ugh:

[vilas]

alf5071
UAS is taught as a guided exercise/demo in type rating. Since it is not part of regulatory tick boxes of OPC/refresher it is not practiced again. This is not my idea. I stated the reality. There are more than 100 posts about. should, would. could have been done. You can't add more to that. To learn something from a disaster we need to take in the reality and that is they didn't know what happened and when they knew they didn't know how to deal with it. Then comes why and how. SFO and 447 are not same. One is about degraded ability to scan and the other is about lack knowledge to deal with a specific abnormality.

[Kefuddle]

Lateonite,
And I strongly disagree that one learns to fly by watching an autopilot fly.
No, but one essential aspect of learning to fly is by knowing how the autopilot works, what modes are best suited for what situations, how to respond to unexpected behavior, when to use a specific level of automation and when not to and anticipating specific inadequacies and complications. As well as having the wherewithal to brief such strategies in a brief, concise and informative manner. Oh and watching it fly too!

Alf,
DW, your view depends on how you define ‘handling’; is this the physical flying skills or the more wider management skills, where awareness (mental activity) should precede action.
That's my angle alright :ok:
Re CRM, which part, which aspect? There may be a consistent understanding of what CRM is for – definitions can be quoted, but as to what CRM involves in application, then there is a vast range of views, personal, operational, cultural, national, etc. How might CRM help to diagnose or rectify a problem; please don’t quote ‘the use of all resources …’ as this is meaningless without defining which resources can be of value in a particular situation, which requires understanding the situation, etc, etc.
I was not sure if CRM would cause such a question. Let's forget the term CRM and lets use the term NOTECHS (http://www.midss.org/content/notechs-behavioural-marker-system)which is black and white. This is the basis of the CRM at my place and I think it is an excellent model to kills the waffle.

[alf5071h]

DW thanks. I am sure that you appreciate accidents have many contributions, but focus on a single issue can distort understanding.
w.r.t. a ‘reticent F/O’ failing to intervene, this assumes that the F/O’s understanding was superior to that of the PF. This might have been so, yet equally whilst the understand was different it, was similarly confused and insufficient to act on. Both crew members were attempting to understand the situation, unfortunately one acted, perhaps further complicating the situation requiring more assessment … and the rest is history which is formed in hindsight.

Kefuddle, “Let’s forget the term CRM” :ok:
NOTECHS is a valuable assessment / rating tool, but does not address how such skills are acquired or maintained. A danger is that rating puts issues into boxes – good / not so, the latter is often addressed with more training, but what training, how do we teach awareness, decision making, etc.

Some views of human behaviour suggest replacing awareness and understanding with ‘sensemaking’; see ‘Perspectives on Sensemaking’. These are erudite views, but with some thought and practical interpretation key points might be established.

sensemaking is about the process of achieving these kinds of outcomes, the strategies, and the barriers encountered.
simply connecting the dots; no, it’s understand what constitutes a dot in a given situation – what is important and why.
When people try to make sense of events, they begin with some perspective, viewpoint, or framework
Sensemaking can involve elaborating the frame by adding details, and questioning the frame and doubting the explanations it provides
Mental model vs mental simulation (thinking ahead)
Training might be better aimed at increasing the range and richness of frames, particularly causal mental models, and skill at noticing anomalies.
Training scenarios and decision support might be developed for all the sensemaking activities questioning a frame, evaluating a frame, comparing alternative frames, reframing a situation, and seeking anchors to generate a useful frame.
Training would aim to provide a larger, richer repertoire of frames rather than to improve each aspect of sensemaking as if it were a separate skill.

Consideration and application of these points may help improve thinking basics, thus aiding the choice and application of the basic physical flying skills. Think before acting.

http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projects/EssaysOnHCC/Perspectives%20on%20Sensemaking.pdf
http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projects/EssaysOnHCC/Sensemaking.2.pdf

[sheppey]

With regard to recovering from unusual attitudes. One well known SE Asian B737 operator has, in its simulator recurrent training syllabus, a requirement to conduct high and low altitude approach to stall recovery. The technique for recovery is different in each case.

For the low altitude case, company policy requires the aircraft to be placed in the landing configuration on a coupled approach. At 1500 feet the auto-throttle system is then disconnected and both thrust levers closed to idle. The autopilot is still coupled to the ILS resulting in the aircraft trying to maintain the ILS glide path by raising the nose and considerable back stabiliser trimming takes place. By the time the airspeed reaches VREF minus 30 knots, the stabiliser under the influence of the coupled autopilot, reaches close to its rear limit.

At that point the stick shaker operates and the pilot is required to recover from this condition. That is, on glide slope, VREF minus 30 knots and nearly maximum back stabiliser trim. This then is a recovery from a low altitude stall.

However...company policy is that, even in IMC, rather than going around, the pilot must continue the ILS approach during the stall recovery actions despite it being impossible to make a stabilised approach during recovery from VREF minus 30 knots at 1000 ft. This astoundingly dangerous policy can only encourage pilots to disregard stable approach criteria in real life. It becomes a box ticking challenge to maintain the ILS glide slope regardless of the high go-around thrust levels and varying pitch attitudes required to both recover from the stall - and yet maintain the ILS glide slope within mandated tolerances. Is it any wonder this operator has an appalling accident record when this type of low level stall recovery "training" is not only mandated by the airline but also approved by the Regulator of that country.

[island_airphoto]

If I had a student try and LAND out of a stall recovery at low altitude on an ILS I would be whacking them on the head with the control lock :confused:

[BN2A]

Simple recovery though.. Leave the autopilot engaged and firewall the power!! The aircraft will stay on the ILS, the stab trim won't have to be fully nose up due to the pitch couple of the engines, and the speed will increase back to Vref as required!!

Maybe they've stumbled on something there??

:D

[Kefuddle]

Maybe they've stumbled on something there??Yup, they stumbled upon the Boeing QRH, the old version, that had the "Approach To Stall Recovery" procedure that promoted power over pitch which is now replaced by the "Approach To Stall or Stall Recovery" procedure that predicates pitch reduction and accepts altitude loss over the application of power.

[RAT 5]

The non-handling F/O therefore seems to have been reticent to act decisively and instead defers to the Captain, calling him back from rest.

Staggering! Was it not the case, s someone has said, that these pilots did not come from the 'new generation'. From this I would suppose that they had considerable experience and that the SFO was on the command upgrade list. Why then not exercise the qualities one would look for in a suitable future commander? It is unbelievable that 2 trained & experienced pilots could not recover this a/c, and they felt that only the captain could save the day. Anyone who is in the same (boat) should return their salary forthwith.

[Centaurus]

Maybe they've stumbled on something there??

The only person that stumbled was you for suggesting the autopilot should left engaged during the approach to stall and recovery. Good try , but :ugh:

See 737 QRH MAN.1.1 where it states "Initiate the recovery.....hold the control column firmly.....disconnect the autopilot and autothrottle"

[roulishollandais]

Did technology try to deny "basics"? Does technology add new "basics"?

[DozyWannabe]

Technology is just a tool. It does not "add" or "deny" anything of its own volition - in fact it cannot.

It is the responsibility of the *humans* that use the technology on a day-to-day basis, as well as those who integrate the technology into the work pattern to ensure that it is applied in the most effective and efficient way.

[roulishollandais]

It is the responsibility of the *humans* that use the technology on a day-to-day basis,Basics is not day-to-day basis

[DozyWannabe]

@roulis:

I think you misunderstand me - that's not what I was getting at. The point I was trying to make is precisely what I said, namely that technology is just a tool - in and of itself it cannot make a difference in terms of, as you put it, "add"ing or "deny"ing anything.

The point that I think Learmount is trying to make, and one I've seen echoed on here is that the industry - particularly those in airline management - have tended to apply the use and training of some technologies (and SOPs) in such a way that the basics of aerodynamics and aircraft handling techniques have become sidelined to a degree.

This isn't something that can be laid at the door of technological progression in my opinion - in fact I'd say it has more to do with modern airline management being of the MBA generation and trained in general business models rather than being long-term "airline" people brought up from the ranks, as it were. The reason I believe this is because in most industries, there is little need for basic recurrent training - once the basics are ingrained they stay there, and even if the occasional lapse or bad habits start to drift in, it's not usually a safety issue. Operating complex machinery, and particularly large transport vehicles such as aircraft is very much a different beast though, because techniques such as hand-flying and maintaining scan require a degree of co-ordination, and in the case of the latter, repetitive tasks - something that humans are innately unsuited for, and as such, bad habits need to be found and nipped in the bud as soon as possible.

As such, the intent behind every generation of airliner technology as I see it has been to assist the human pilot with as much of the "grunt work" as possible and reduce the amount and level of repetitive tasks that the human pilot must perform. Later generations of autoflight technology and the separate concept of FBW also assist in keeping the aircraft pointed in the right direction and with the shiny side up. But even with this level of assistance, the technology does not absolve the human crew (or those who define their training) from things such as maintaining instrument scan and monitoring the aircraft functions. And, to the best of my knowledge, it never has done. If airline management has taken its eye off the ball there, and the regulators have failed to pick up on it, then this is a problem likely dispersed across the entire industry.

The same applies to the less repetitive, but equally important aspect that is maintaining knowledge of basic aircraft handling and hand-flying. For example, one thing which came out of AF447 was that with an industry-wide shift to focusing on stall prevention techniques at the expense of stall recovery in recurrent training, you effectively had pilots with a decade or more on the line and many thousands of flying hours who had nevertheless not practiced basic stall recovery techniques in recurrent training since they passed their PPL (or equivalent) at the very beginning of their career. This was not a result of technological impact, this was a case of the airlines interpreting the change in focus in a way that, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, was completely inappropriate. And for their part, the rest of the industry (manufacturers, regulators etc.) failed to pick up on this unintended consequence of the change.

I remember when the third interim report on AF447 was published after the flight recorder retrieval, and the subsequent incredulous dismay from many pilots on here on discovering that the PF made instant and aggressive control inputs upon AP disconnect that not only first caused the aircraft to bust the FL that they had been discussing as the safe maximum only a few minutes previously, but also - through near enough a minute of the stall warning sounding - maintained those aggressive nose-up inputs (being the precise opposite of what was required to avoid or recover from a full-blown stall) all the way to the ground. It's fair to say that the modern practice of having pilots switch in the autoflight at gear-up and off on finals (or even later) has allowed airlines to make some dubious decisions on training priorities, and it's true that this state of affairs wouldn't have been possible without the advancement in technology.

But it is the decisions made by human beings - *not* the technology itself, which is the crux of the matter. If the use of technology allows much of the day-to-day work of flight crews to avoid things like manual handling at high altitude (and lets not forget the fact that the technological advances have very much improved safety and efficiency in terms of normal ops), then the industry (primarily the airlines) *must* keep those basic skills current and honed to a decent edge some other way - meaning training that includes refreshers on maintaining scan, manual handling, stall recovery etc.