Enunciation of MCP indications. An overkill perhaps?

[Tee Emm]

Both Boeing and Airbus recommend crews enunciate all changes to MCP selections. Meaning,when selections are made someone should read out the indication aloud.
On top of that there are operators who include more "calls" to suit local SOP. Recently, a 737 operator added another requirement that the enunciation call must be promptly initiated by the PF. This caused a minor moment of irritation when an over-eager co-pilot anxious to prove something, snapped out the enunciation before the captain as PF had the chance to say anything. When the captain queried this over eager young buck, the YB said " the SOP said it had to be done promptly and you were too slow so I said it"

This type of petty point scoring is more common than realised and is often the source of friction. It is not "good CRM" as some claim, but blatant stupidity.

I flew in another era where a silent cockpit was encouraged. Both pilots had two eyes, and the argument was what is the point of unnecessary enunciation when a glance to confirm an MCP selection was all that was needed. Saying something aloud after an MCP selection does not always ensure the correct selection is made. How many time in the past have we heard the parrot-like call "Undercarriage down three greens) in reply to a checklist challenge when in fact the gear had not been selected?

The old SOP of no non-operational calls below 10,000 ft was understandable. Some may remember from years ago, the accident to a PANAM Boeing 707 approaching to land on Sydney Airport Runway 25. In those days it was a shortish runway.

The flight path was over a large public cemetery with the co-pilot remarking they were flying over the dead heart of Sydney. Laughter in the cockpit. The Australian new T-VASIS was installed for this runway and the captain remarked about the funny looking VASIS. He had not seen a T-VASIS before.

In the event, the 707 landed too fast and too long and went into the river at the far end of the runway. This was one of several accidents that prompted the now universally generally accepted SOP of no unnecessary talking below 10,000 ft.

Now we see a proliferation of cockpit enunciations below 10,000 ft starting with "N1 TOGA" as the aircraft starts its take off roll. Do we really need to enunciate that reading on the MCP? Cannot we see the reading visually?

It seems the slightest incident prompts airline managements to counter with still more voluble call-outs. Reminds me of the time in the simulator when a Japanese recruitment check pilot was observing a simulator assessment of candidates for his airline.

On the downwind leg of the assessment circuit, the candidate in the left seat was Spanish. Acting as support pilot and waiting his turn in the right seat was a voluble Eastern European captain. Man, how he could talk, prompting continually in rapid accented English. The pilot under test in the left seat simply switched off and did his own thing ignoring the babble of "advice" from the co-pilot.

It was clear the Japanese check pilot in the jump seat didn't have a clue what all the talking was about as his own English language skills were minimal. However he praised the co-pilot for "excellent CRM" for all his babbling despite the fact the assessing captain had no idea of what was actually being said. To the Japanese check pilot more talking meant good "CRM"

I wonder have we gone too far in all this enunciating of every MCP selection, and every action. Do we really need to reply to a request for flaps with "Speed checked - flap Five selected - Flap Five running- Flap Five set"?

I know nature abhors a vacuum. But have we gone too far from the silent cockpit principle, to instead filling the golden silence with superfluous enunciations of things we can see with our own eyes?

[Mach E Avelli]

Well said TM. I like the maritime method of repeating an instruction as it is executed.
E.g. PF commands "flap 15" Other guy/girl does it and simply states "15 selected". We have all sorts of disagree warnings to tell us if the flaps don't get to where we told 'em to go, so, why all the other noise about flaps running, flaps arriving, flaps happy in position?
My other pet hates are the response to the 'gear up' command of: "selected, three reds" when there is bugger-all anyone can do at that stage if there are only one and a half reds. And the 'inbound, no flags' call. One operator I had some dealings with had a hilarious response to the 'visual' call on approach. It was: "for the threshold".....doh?
The really important calls are the altitude awareness 'one to go' calls, yet these are probably more often missed than some of the lesser fly-by-mouth ones you mention. Probably because of all the other tribal cries being uttered at the time.

[framer]

I agree that we talk too much now days. Every now and again I fly with someone who only makes the bare minimum calls and it's very nice to do an ILS in IMC to a low level and have only a few words spoken. ......does this mean I'm getting old?

[Check Airman]

Do we really need to reply to a request for flaps with "Speed checked - flap Five selected - Flap Five running- Flap Five set"?I certainly hope that's an exaggeration. At my shop, the PF will call for the flap setting, and the PM will only respond verbally if there's something unusual.

My other pet hates are the response to the 'gear up' command of: 'selected, three reds' when there is bugger-all anyone can do at that stage if there are only one and a half reds.We have a similar call. Never figured out the point. If it isn't up, I'll be alerted. Curiously, we don't have an equivalent call for gear extension.

Regarding the thread title, we don't verbalize AP mode changes. Really can't complain about our callouts. What gets me is our checklists. Our before takeoff checklist, for example, has thirteen (13) items.:ugh:

[Mach E Avelli]

Checkie, you should come to the Land of Oz. Most checklists here have damn near 13 items on the line up checklist! Drives me nuts.

[framer]

What aircraft type Check Airman? 13 is insane!

[Denti]

Guess my outfit is still not enlightened then. We use a mainly silent cockpit approach on our 737s. The recent introduction of the "Speedbrake" and "Reverse" callout on landing was met by an uproar as we only call out something that isn't working as intended, whereas in those two cases we now have to callout if something works.

Apart from that we do not verbally acknowledge any command, for example flaps or gear, or even MCP selections, there is however the finger pointing procedure for altitude selections which warrants only a nod or a "checked". Of course if flying manually the PF will command MCP selection, those do not require a verbal acknowledgement though, simply doing as requested is enough.

All normal checklists that have to be read while the aircraft is in motion (before take off to landing) fit on a sticker on the yoke and are kept as short as possible. There is no lineup checklist at all and the approach checklist contains only one item.

Non normal operation is of course a completely different beast and pretty much everything has to be acknowledged.

[stilton]

Minimal callouts were normal procedure for us.


If everything's working properly no need to yack about it and it worked well.


Then we merged with 'the friendly skies' adopted their procedures and it's yack, yack yack.


It's a major distraction and a major PITA.

[framer]

The new " reversers normal" call is probably knee jerk to the over runs that have been occurring around the world when reversers were not deployed. I reckon they should address the training and company cultural issues whereby they cross the fence high and fast rather than the reversers. If the over run aircraft had been on profile the pilots would have had the brain space to deploy the reversers IMO.

[Kefuddle]

Hmmm. The whole point of CRM is situational awareness. If one guy is pressing buttons, then it makes sense that he ensures the other guy knows the changing state of the aircraft. One would think the PM should simply be paying attention, but changing frequency, talking to ops/company, dealing with the CC, selecting flap, being alerted to wayward trends, reading the QRH, etc all mean the fellow may easily miss is quick stab of a button on the MCP.

I say that calling out FMA changes and the like would is entirely sensible and reasonable.

[Tee Emm]

but changing frequency, talking to ops/company, dealing with the CC, selecting flap, being alerted to wayward trends, reading the QRH, etc all mean the fellow may easily miss is quick stab of a button on the MCP.


Goodness gracious me! All this happening simultaneously. Must have been quite an exciting flight..:E

[captplaystation]

I have sympathy for both sides in this discussion, on the one hand constant repetition of what is plainly in front of you can be a bit tiresome, but. . . the 738 can sometimes change modes without any obvious warning. My current pet hate is the transition between the required mode of VNav PTH & VNav SPD, which, given our increasing reliance on this mode for intermediate & final approaches, is one you don't want to miss. One could argue that monitoring of the path deviation "should" alert you before this becomes a problem, but, I really wonder whether Boeing haven't dropped a clanger here by not giving a msg via the CDU akin to "VNav disconnect", that you are now in an unprotected (vertically at least) mode.

In an ideal world minimum is best,but it is sometimes useful when distracted, to have someone remind you what is happening. Given the number of overuns caused by late /non selection of reverse/speedbrakes I think Boeing had no choice in these calls becoming the norm, personally, I am in agreement with them, even if we are calling a "normal" as opposed to a "non-normal". . . . Landing on a short slippery runway is not the time to be glancing down to check if all that is gonna save your @ss is deployed/available. . like "autobrake-disarm" it can make the difference between following the landing by taxying/swimming.

[flyboyike]

I'm more interested in what the FMA says, not the MCP.

[energiser]

Spot on Ike.

The FMA (on the bus) is what the aircraft is *actually* doing, whereas the MCP is what you've *asked* for...the two are not always the same!!!

Therefore it is critical to annunciate any changes to the FMA state. Annunciating changes to the MCP are good for SA for the other pilot though.

I do agree though that there can be too many calls. A few years ago, my company went down the road of changing SOP to annunciate almost everything. It was a wordy nightmare, to the point of distraction (missing radio calls etc etc). To their credit, they have since cut down the number of calls once they realised the issues it was causing.

[Check Airman]

but changing frequency, talking to ops/company, dealing with the CC, selecting flap, being alerted to wayward trends, reading the QRH, etc all mean the fellow may easily miss is quick stab of a button on the MCP.

...and the solution to your example of an overloaded PM, is to give him more stuff to deal with by requiring him to acknowledge a callout?

If I'm particularly busy (which your example isn't), I expect the other guy to focus on the flying bit, and leave the rest to me. If I'm ever wondering what the plane is doing, I can look at the FMA and question anything unusual. We have a master warning sound, and a master caution sound. No need for my voice to be the master normal sound.

[RAT 5]

I'm more interested in what the FMA says, not the MCP.

That is what the call should be: if any. The FMA. PF announces that you've made the selection after you see the FMA. PM then verifies it by glancing themselves.

More importantly, in some companies they call all changes, even automatic ones. I as PM called them out and PF said"check." (what else.) However, the FMA was an unhelpful one. I called it again and received the same response. I called it again in the hope the hint would ring a bell. The response was, "check, i heard you the first time." Unfortunately, VNAV PTH at SID cap altitude was not what we wanted when ATC had requested us to climb. But the guy had pushed the VNAV button, so that must be alright then. Ya!

Being a parrot is not being a pilot; neither is being a trained monkey. The combination of the two is deadly.

[Kefuddle]

Goodness gracious me! All this happening simultaneously. Must have been quite an exciting flight..
Very funny. Well, I was trying point out that the mundane can also be distractions leading to degraded SA, but I guess in the egonostic world of pprune I should have assumed it would be interpreted as being written by some poor sod who can't keep up :ouch:

...and the solution to your example of an overloaded PM, is to give him more stuff to deal with by requiring him to acknowledge a callout?.Not my solution, it is a Boeing recommendation and an Airbus Golden Rule to call out FMA changes and in every SOP I have seen, so nothing radical in my post at all.

So, given that it is pretty much standard practice for FMA changes, surely it is reasonable that the principle extends to any other change in aircraft state actioned not in response to a request or by the aircraft itself. VNAV SPD was a great example, ARM has caught some out too. Who calls out thrust mode changes? I have never seen it done, despite it being also a Boeing recommendation, I would still argue good practice though.

[Tourist]

energiser


"Spot on Ike.

The FMA (on the bus) is what the aircraft is *actually* doing, whereas the MCP is what you've *asked* for...the two are not always the same!!!"




No.


The MCP is what you asked the aircraft to do.
The FMA is what it is trying to do.


The instruments and looking out the window is what it is actually doing!


Critically important in my opinion.
Watching and understanding the FMA is not the end of airmanship.

[Check Airman]

Not my solution, it is a Boeing recommendation and an Airbus Golden Rule to call out FMA changes and in every SOP I have seen, so nothing radical in my post at all.

So, given that it is pretty much standard practice for FMA changes, surely it is reasonable that the principle extends to any other change in aircraft state actioned not in response to a request or by the aircraft itself.

Never having flown an Airbus (currently on the E145), I can't make a specific comment. However, what's the point of calling out normal, expected reactions to MCP input? At my company, the only FMA callouts are when an unusual mode change has happened. Even so, we're not expressly told to make a callout, we just do. Common sense, I think.

If we're going to call out the expected result of a normal input, why stop at the MCP/FMA? Why isn't there a "rotating" call as the nose leaves the ground? Wouldn't it also be beneficial to have the PF call "idle power" during the flare, then have the PM aurally verify that the engines are spooling down?

How do people find time to listen to ATC with all these callouts being made?

[chimbu warrior]

MCP/FCU = Rumour

FMA = Fact

I can remember when we used to land and taxi off the runway without saying a word; now it is "speedbrake up/spoilers", "reverse normal/reverse green" "decel" "autobrake disarmed" etc.

These changes originated with the manufacturers, as a consequence of accidents (and no doubt some legal action against the respective manufacturers). It should be remembered though that many of these aircraft are now being flown by 500-hour pilots, where that was an unheard of situation 30 years ago. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the manufacturers are allowing for the lowest common denominator.

Like an earlier poster said, I can see both sides of this argument, and neither is perfect, but it is what we are stuck with.

[energiser]

energiser


"Spot on Ike.

The FMA (on the bus) is what the aircraft is *actually* doing, whereas the MCP is what you've *asked* for...the two are not always the same!!!"




No.


The MCP is what you asked the aircraft to do.
The FMA is what it is trying to do.


The instruments and looking out the window is what it is actually doing!


Critically important in my opinion.
Watching and understanding the FMA is not the end of airmanship.


Really?

I never thought about that.

I never look at the instruments, or out of the window.

Thankyou for your invaluable lesson on airmanship. I'll give it a try next time I fly.

[rich_g85]

Potentially stupid question from a non-commercial pilot, but are any of the callouts purely 'for the benefit of the tape' in the event it all goes wrong?

I've watched one cockpit video (from a Virgin 747) where during the taxi out the captain appears to simply read the FMA aloud.

[Chris Scott]

Some interesting stuff here, and I identify with much of what the OP has said. I retired 12 years ago, but the cockpit that was my office for my last 14 years is still regarded as pretty much state-of-the-art. If I understand him/her correctly, an MCP is what the manufacturer of my a/c calls the FCU (the Flight Control Unit for all auto-flight selections, i.e., FD and AP).

I used to be a bit of an anorak on calls, and the standardisation of the particular ones that my fleet had chosen to adopt. They had to be compatible with the aim of cross-fleet standardisation, the other fleets all being Boeing or MD.

Reading the previous twenty-odd posts demonstrates that you are unlikely to find two pilots in a bar that are in agreement on what should be verbalised and what is unnecessary. I guess "noise" is any unnecessary and unproductive sound. To be justified, a call must at the very least be succinct, unambiguous and informative. Even then, a plethora of them can be distractingly counterproductive. But some are so important that they justify their existence as verbalising the cross-monitoring between the two pilots, and confirming understanding. It's a compromise, but whatever standard calls we decide to make must be planned and executed properly, or they are no more than a noise.

Standard calls can probably be categorised into three types: commands, responses, and verification calls. When the PF calls for (commands) "Flaps (x)" it is important that the PNF reads back the command BEFORE making the selection (s)he thinks has been commanded. That's what I mean by a response. If the response is not what the PF wanted, there needs to be time for him/her to prevent the wrong selection being made. If all is well, nothing else needs to be said, because both the pilots and the flight-warning system will monitor that the selected flap has been achieved.

This thread, however, seems to be mainly about what I have described as verification calls. Someone has pointed out that, as far as AFS selections on the MCP/FCU are concerned on a/c of the current generation, it's only the changing FMAs that need to be observed and, if necessary, verified verbally. On these a/c, all indications visible on the MCP/FCU are reflected on the FMAs of each pilot's PFD.

There may still be pilots who, while turning the appropriate knob, observe the changing parameter on the adjacent readout (where present) like they did on B757s. The trouble is that - for example - having carefully selected a new altitude and armed it, turbulence may cause you to fumble the knob as you remove your hand. So it's better to avert your gaze to your FMAs at the beginning, and observe the whole process through to its conclusion there.

This philosophy reads across to the FMA verification call, as follows.
(1) It should NEVER be made by the pilot who performed the selection. If the other pilot fails to make the call, making it yourself is valueless at best. This is not a competition, nor a box-ticking exercise. Wait for your colleague to come back into the loop. If necessary, any prompting should be on the lines of "Check your FMAs?" If his/her workload is too high, best leave it be.
(2) It should only be made AFTER the selecting pilot has removed his/her hand from the relevant MCP/FCU selector.

[Kefuddle]

Chris,
(1) It should NEVER be made by the pilot who performed the selection. If the other pilot fails to make the call, making it yourself is valueless at best. This is not a competition, nor a box-ticking exercise. Wait for your colleague to come back into the loop. If necessary, any prompting should be on the lines of "Check your FMAs?" If his/her workload is too high, best leave it be.Our SOP is that the PF calls the FMA change, the intention ensures that the PF communicates their actions. This I bought into. However, I'm thinking it would make more sense the way you describe.

Thread contributor Check Airman doesn't see the point of calling out expected FMA changes, which I kind of agree with, yet I still think it would be wrong to not actively recognize such changes. With your philosophy, if the PM is required to male the call, then the PF is also armed with strong cues alerting him to possible PM is overload/distraction. Works for me.

Just edited to add that PM/PF in this case is assumed with A/P engaged.

[Check Airman]

Thread contributor Check Airman doesn't see the point of calling out expected FMA changes, which I kind of agree with, yet I still think it would be wrong to not actively recognize such changes.

What's the value of making a call when each pilot can plainly see what's going on? If the PM has his head down dealing with something else, wouldn't the call be more of a distraction?

I get your point about keeping both pilots in the loop, but if there's something else going on, do I really need to watch every move the other pilot makes? Isn't he rated? What about CRM? He's trusted me to deal with the abnormal, and I've trusted him to fly the plane. I really don't need to be told that we've levelled off and the AT has adjusted power. If for some reason, the AT hasn't adjusted the power, I expect the PF to take care of it. That's CRM isn't it?

Furthermore, for the guys who are required to make FMA calls, how many of you have made a call in error? You made the usual/expected call, only to realize a moment later that you should have said something else, because the usual/expected FMA wasn't there?

With your philosophy, if the PM is required to male the call, then the PF is also armed with strong cues alerting him to possible PM is overload/distraction.

If we started making FMA calls, I'd like this idea.

[A37575]

Reading the previous twenty-odd posts demonstrates that you are unlikely to find two pilots in a bar that are in agreement on what should be verbalised and what is unnecessary You are so right:ok:

One of my several pet hates is the common call in many airlines of "SPEED" (shouting intended..) when the airspeed is not in accordance with what ever the company tolerances are. Similarly "ALTITUDE"

A glance at the Boeing 737 FCTM reveals no mention of a standard recommended alert call for an outside airspeed or altimeter tolerance. The FCTM however does say: "The PM calls out significant deviations from command airspeed or flight path." It is then up to the operator to specify the limit of those deviations which would then attract a call from the PM.

I fail to understand the logic of the one word call of "SPEED" or "ALTITUDE". Would it not be more logical for the PM to call "SPEED LOW/HIGH?" so that an immediate corrective action is taken to rectify the speed problem?

If one airspeed indicator shows the speed as above the high published company tolerance, and at the same time the other pilot's speed shows a markedly different indication, at least a rapid glance at the standby ASI may resolve the anomaly.

Same with the call of an altimeter reading. "Altitude High" or Altitude Low" alerts the PF to a problem. But "ALTITUDE" means SFA, IMHO.

And don't you just hate it when an eager beaver sings out "SPEED" when you are a mere one or two knots above or below the published tolerance. Then keeps babbling "Speed" even though the PF is clearly taking corrective action.

Or the idiot who calls "Speed" in a triumphant tone of gotcha then innocently explains to a pissed off PF that although the speed was OK at the time of the call, the speed trend arrow indicated the PF would soon be outside the tolerance. :mad:

[cosmo kramer]

Our SOP is that the PF calls the FMA change, the intention ensures that the PF communicates their actions.

...and when someone engages in the reckless and dangerous practice of disconnection the autopilot (for planes where this is possible - that is) and even the Flight Directors too?

1/8 high on the glide
- checked
lowering nose and reducing thrust
- checked
- nose is confirmed coming down, N1 is confirmed as decreased 3%
Glide coming back, increasing thrust
- checked
..... :{

Silent cockpit please! Call out anomalies only.

When the PF calls for (commands) "Flaps (x)" it is important that the PNF reads back the command BEFORE making the selection (s)he thinks has been commanded. That's what I mean by a response.
In my company the response to e.g. "flaps XX" is to select flap XX and the call out " " (thank god). We don't have any incidents of flaps being wrongly selected. Both pilots know which gates are being used pr. SOP. No one moves the flap handle from flaps 1 to 40, because they think that is what they heard. They know the next step pr. SOP is flaps 5. If you are hard at hearing, and heard something else, that doesn't correspond with SOP... ask! What has this come to?? Might as well put robots in the cockpit (or monkeys), if people can't think or communicate.

[Denti]

Same here, flaps/gear are asked for and the confirmation of that call is the action, after the PM silently checked that the conditions are within limits for that command. No further callous needed. If a non-standard flap setting (2, 10, 25) is used one says so when asking for that setting.

Interesting thing about the speed call. There is no published limit in my outfit and it was trained from the first day that no call is necessary if corrective action is already taken. Interesting enough that leads to more calls "speed is checked" by the PF before any speed call was done by the PM.

[Chris Scott]

Quote from cosmo kramer (my emphasis):
In my company the response to e.g. "flaps XX" is to select flap XX and the call out " " (thank god). We don't have any incidents of flaps being wrongly selected. Both pilots know which gates are being used pr. SOP. No one moves the flap handle from flaps 1 to 40, because they think that is what they heard. They know the next step pr. SOP is flaps 5.

Response from Denti (my emphasis):
Same here, flaps/gear are asked for and the confirmation of that call is the action, after the PM silently checked that the conditions are within limits for that command. No further callous needed. If a non-standard flap setting (2, 10, 25) is used one says so when asking for that setting.

Yes, I agree with the parts I've highlighted. I'm out of touch with the current generation of Boeings, but I presume that - like the Airbuses - the PF can monitor the selection and the results on EICAS/ECAM. As you say, any non-standard command for flap would (hopefully) be acknowledged as such by the PF when making the command.

BUT that's not the main problem my philosophy is addressing. When the PNF's workload is either very high or very low (perhaps mind-wandering), (s)he may interpret an unrelated command or mere comment/observation as a call for the next flap selection. In a noisey cockpit, for example, "Yeah, I'll try that too." could be misheard as "Yeah, I'll take flaps two." If the PNF responds with "Speed checked, Flaps two", there needs to be time for the PF to shout "NEGATIVE!" before the selection is made. Flap calls, of course, are not the only ones that can be misinterpreted - as in "Cheer-up!"

We are all capable of hearing what we expect or want to hear. Most of you are too young to have been airframe drivers at the time of the Staines accident in 1972, when a BEA Trident deep-stalled into a reservoir after T/O from LHR. (I was on VC10s with another airline.) The PNF who retracted the leading-edge flaps ("droops") prematurely was very new, and knew that the next thing he would hear from the dour old captain would be his command for that. The captain was having a heart attack...

"Check Airman",
CRM is not about blind confidence in the infallibility of your workmate - least of all about expecting him/her to have blind faith in yours. To err is to be human, which is the main reason we still need to have two pilots in present-day, automated airliner cockpits. Otherwise, one would suffice 99% of the time.

[Jwscud]

On the modern Boeings (737) you get an instant indication of the detent position the flap lever has been PLACED IN by the appearance of the speed on the speed tape - once the lever is in the Flap 5 detent for example the "5" speed appears on the speed tape and so on.

My company has the SOP on extension of PM only calling the Flap when the indicator shows the flaps have reached the commanded position.

[A37575]

The PNF who retracted the leading-edge flaps ("droops") prematurely was very new, and knew that the next thing he would hear from the dour old captain would be his command for that. The captain was having a heart attack...


My recollection of that accident is somewhat different. From what I read the captain was in a foul mood after being involved in a trade union altercation in the crew room prior to the flight.

The two minions on the flight deck were understandably frightened of his martinet personality. While climbing steeply as part of the noise abatement procedure in cloud, the new first officer inadvertently selected the droop lever to up instead of the flap lever to the called for setting.

At the low speed the aircraft was flying at during the noise abatement climb, a stall happened. I don't recall the heart attack theory or if the captain did suffer a heart attack at the crucial second.
Or whether the autopsy found he was in serious danger of a heart attack.

In any case, realising his F/O had whipped the droop lever up at low flying speed and relatively low altitude would be enough to scare anyone into a heart attack!

[cosmo kramer]

In a noisey cockpit, for example, "Yeah, I'll try that too." could be misheard as "Yeah, I'll take flaps two." If the PNF responds with "Speed checked, Flaps two", there needs to be time for the PF to shout "NEGATIVE!" before the selection is made. Flap calls, of course, are not the only ones that can be misinterpreted - as in "Cheer-up!"
Below 10k feet adherence to sterile cockpit (avoiding unnecessary chatting, like the underlined above), will avoid that. Especially if hard at hearing I would advice that...

Besides, even if we did chat about which mood we are in (cheer up buddy), it doesn't change what I wrote in my previous post. Everyone is equipped with a brain and the ability to think for themselves.

If misinterpreting chatter for flaps 2, while being outside flaps 2 operational limits and then selecting flaps 2, the person in question shouldn't have been in the cockpit in the first place. More appropriate would be to use the brain and make you colleague aware that you are outside flaps 2 limits - which would then clear up the confusion (that shouldn't have been there in the first place, had sterile cockpit been adhered to). If indeed inside operational limits for flaps 2, and it is selected prior to what the PF had desired, tough luck... the he will learn only to make standard call outs during critical phases of flight.

[cosmo kramer]

...regarding speed, I envy you Denti :(

In my airline we have the often standard -5/+10....
It makes it especially "funny" on a gusty day, with Vref + 20 knots speed additive and a few knots below flap limit speed, especially with a new guy besides you, who as soon as the speed fluctuates to Vref + 15 starts to call out "SPEED SPEED"... :oh: