Cirrus pilots are dangerous

[VH-XXX]

..... well apparently they are!

Worth the read. A little simplistic in some aspects but the stats are there.

The new FTDK one would say!


Dick’s blog: what’s wrong with Cirrus pilots? (http://www.airfactsjournal.com/2012/05/dicks-blog-whats-wrong-with-cirrus-pilots/)

Dick's blog (http://www.airfactsjournal.com/category/dicks-blog/) — By Richard Collins (http://www.airfactsjournal.com/author/collins/) on May 14, 2012 2:40 pm

http://www.airfactsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cirrus-chute-300x249.jpg (http://www.airfactsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cirrus-chute.jpg)It's not the whistles and bells, it's the pilot.


I recall when the Cirrus first came out, one of the principals said that product liability was not going to be a problem for them because the airplane would be so safe.

Since that time the NTSB shows 80 fatal Cirrus accidents in its database. Because of the litigious nature of our society, most, if not almost all, have likely resulted in legal action against the company.

Since the beginning, Cirrus has worked hard to try to see that the pilots of these airplanes are properly trained. All Cirrus airplanes have an airframe parachute, too. Without the chute there would have been many more fatal accidents because presumably a pilot does not pull the chute until he feels for certain it is necessary to save his ass.

The Cirrus was the first light airplane with a glass cockpit, too, and Cirrus has been a leader in using the latest whistles and bells to help pilots be better informed.

Despite all this, the Cirrus SR-22 has a higher fatal accident rate than most similar airplanes from other manufacturers. (We all know that SR-22s fly a lot of hours every year but that is taken into account when comparing accident rates.)

Why, with every safety advantage, has this come to be true?
It can only be because of one thing: the Cirrus pilot.
If you take at face value the benefit of type-specific training, Cirrus pilots have that. If you accept that glass cockpits give a pilot many valuable informational tools, Cirrus pilots have that. If you buy into the fact that an airframe parachute gives a pilot one last but extremely valuable option, Cirrus pilots have that. What they don’t seem to have is common sense and that is our collective fault. Both industry and government have worked to ensure that Cirrus pilots don’t know the score. Start with the FAA. A while back the instrument rating requirements were drastically reduced making the rating both less expensive and potentially more lethal. This was in response to pressure from general aviation interests, especially AOPA.

The result is that we have instrument-rated pilots who are not at all prepared for instrument flying, especially in technically advanced airplanes. The training systems that have been developed do what training systems have always done: they prepare pilots for the FAA tests. A person with an instrument rating might know something about operating on an IFR flight plan but know nothing of cloud flying.

Why would this affect Cirrus pilots more than others?

From the beginning the Cirrus has been sold as a transportation machine. That relates to weather flying like the airlines do. So a new pilot, and many Cirrus pilots are relatively new, gets an instrument rating and is suddenly trying to do what infinitely more experienced pilots are doing with airliners. And there are two of those experienced pilots in the front end of every airliner.
http://www.airfactsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/flightaware-sr22-300x180.jpg (http://www.airfactsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/flightaware-sr22.jpg)SR-22s are flying hard IFR trips all over the country (image courtesy of FlightAware.com).


You can look at Flight Aware (http://www.flightaware.com/)’s listing by type of airplanes in the IFR system at any given moment and there will be a lot of SR-22s in there. In fact there are usually more than any other GA type that is used for transportation. Sadly, you can look at that number and, unless it is a clear day, it can be safely assumed that an unhealthy percentage of the pilots really don’t know what they are doing or at least might be unable to handle anything out of the ordinary. This is not their fault. They were certified by the government, they were sold the airplane, and they were encouraged to use it.

So, cloudy day IFR wrecks are a big part of the Cirrus problem. So are low speed losses of control. Here the FAA also has bloody hands.
Normally a single-engine airplane has to be spun as part of the certification process. The Cirrus wasn’t. The FAA waived this requirement and accepted the airframe parachute as an alternate means of compliance. I kid you not, the spin recovery in a Cirrus is based on deploying the chute. That is the only way a pilot can recover from a spin in a Cirrus.
The stall characteristics of the airplane are not bad when compared with some other airplanes but they aren’t real good, either. It might have been reasonable to expect stellar stall characteristic in a new design but, alas, aerodynamics reached a plateau many years ago.

When everything is considered, the Cirrus record is what it is and will remain ever so unless some pretty drastic steps are taken. It can’t be more training or more safety features because those things are already there. The only thing that can actually lead to improvement is the mind-set of Cirrus pilots.

Years ago, insurance underwriters put far lower rates on insurance for twins than singles. Then some wise-ass writer (that would be me) started exploring the fact that the serious accident rate in twins was actually higher than in singles (http://www.airfactsjournal.com/2011/12/50-years-ago-in-air-facts-double-trouble/). The underwriters had been basing rates on what they thought to be true as opposed to what was actually true. Insurance underwriters have done that in a lot of areas over the years.
Such might be the case with Cirrus pilots. With training, advanced equipment, and a parachute, a pilot could develop a false sense of security about flying the airplane.

I recall an accident that well illustrates this. A professional person had finished a long and full day of work. After work, and after darkness set in, he flew an IFR trip to an airport located in rough terrain. At 11:30 p.m. he left that airport on an IFR clearance. He lost control of the airplane soon after takeoff and collided with rising terrain.

This was a relatively inexperienced pilot and you can read between the lines of the NTSB report and contemplate several things.
To me it is likely that there was some sort of distraction or confusion that caused the pilot to lose control. Certainly a marginally trained and inexperienced pilot does not have a lot of ability in reserve, especially in the middle of the night following a long day.

The airplane had a good autopilot. Was the pilot not properly trained in its use? Autopilots have been known to cause confusion if not used correctly.
A question that has to be asked is whether or not the pilot would have even been flying IFR in bad weather over rough terrain at night in his single-engine airplane if it had not been equipped with a parachute. I have always thought that a pilot who would do anything in a twin that he wouldn’t do in a single is an accident looking for a place to happen. Same goes with the parachute.

I question, too, whether or not many in the industry don’t minimize the hazards found in aviation. No manufacturer is going to tell you that a product is dangerous as such and no entity that is in the business of promoting aviation will either. But collectively we should feel an obligation to make sure that new pilots understand that an airplane can kill you quicker than most anything else. When I look at the Cirrus accidents, I get the feeling that many of the pilots did not realize how quickly an airplane can bite, hard.

I always communicated with airplanes. Mostly the chatting was about the good things but I always though the most important question to pose was, “Old buddy, what are you going to do to try to hurt me today because I can’t let you get away with that.”

What do you think it would take to rein in the Cirrus fatal accidents?

[Air Tourer]

Thanks for posting that VH, an interesting read and something to think about.

[VH-XXX]

I've heard from sources that a suitably experienced pilot can get them out of a spin without too much of a drama bit that is unconfirmed. Personally I don't like test flying aircraft that supposedly shouldn't be spun :{

[Stikybeke]

Great post XXX.

Alot of food for thought there. There's one that I see from time to time that only came onto the register in March 2012. It's a beautiful looking aircraft with monogramed woodwork and great leather interior, tinted windows. It has the best EFIS systems, synthetic vision, de-ice everything, it's just the best! Upon comparison with what's available on their website it would appear to be the "Bees Knees" of the type.

(My apologies to this terrific aircraft's owner if I've identified or embarrassed you in any way...my post regarding your aircraft is intended to be complimentary)

I've looked at it up close a few times now and drooled over the thought of owning one of them but after reading your post now I'm not so sure (and I have a spin endorsement!). I guess one of the main selling points is in fact the skill of the pilot with regards to managing one of these aircraft correctly in the IFR environment.

Thanks for sharing that with us. I for one am now a bit wiser about the Cirrus and even though I hope not, this knowledge might just help me somewhere down the track...

Stiky
:ok:

[fencehopper]

Could it be because the type of pilots that are buying this aircraft are doing so on a misbelief that when they get into trouble the BAS will save them.
IE they do not have the capability to be able to cope in a serious situation and believe that the BAS will save them. They may be able to pass whatever training they are given but fail when they are unable to put that training into use.
Should they be do their flying in the back of an airliner?

[PPRuNeUser0163]

Majority of accidents IFR, CFIT during takeoff and approach phase.
Weekend warriors at the helm with few hours, an overconfidence likely eminating from their occupational field and the gizmo onboard their planes , but lacking a sound, current knowledge of the rules and flying skills without frequent flying experience (read ifr) and often just due to a lack of operational experience total time wise and in crap wx ...

My understanding is the FAA lowered CIR requirements/hours some time back- why!?

Are we surprised at all then this is happening?

The cirrus is just the new dr killer, replacing the mooney, baron, bonanza etc

[PA39]

Yes, Mooney were the devils a few yrs back. They were difficult to recover from a spin, you'd lay the boot into opposite rudder and the thing would not come out for what seemed like eternity. It was patience and time ....and height !! Mooney Bros had a Mooney flt training session for new owners as well.

[baswell]

a Cirrus has never been recovered from a spin with less than 15,000 feet of altitude loss!
A link to that study would be appreciated! Otherwise I will call it an old wives tale. A normal stable aircraft with no (other) nasty aerodynamic habits that can't be recovered? I find that hard to believe...

Why Cirrus (CAPS & Stall/Spin) (http://whycirrus.com/engineering/stall-spin.aspx)

The European authorities (initially JAA, later EASA) when first evaluating the Cirrus SR20 agreed with the principles of the FAA/ELOS approach but had some further questions. A series of spins was performed on their initiative. While not a complete formal program they reported no unusual characteristics.

Then:

The fact remains that a generation of pilots has not received spin training

So to limit their liability the may have printed that CAPS deployment is the only approved recovery method. In this context of so-so IFR pilots killing themselves because they don't have enough training and experience, that makes good sense to me.

[Shagpile]

I also find it hard to believe...can anybody with some experience in spinning one please give a first hand account?

[Tee Emm]

And there are two of those experienced pilots in the front end of every airliner.

Unfortunately that is not always true nowadays; especially in Asia where 300 hour cadet pilots are often second in command on 777 and A330's.

[VH-XXX]

5,000 or 15,000 ft, it shouldn't make any difference if you know what to do...

Requiring 15,000 ft means that you are merely trying anything you can to get out of the spin. Also suspect wives tail.


Indeed it is the type of pilot, it's what the article is about.

I've been flying quite a few years and I've never come close to unintentionally spinning an Cirrus when flying from A to B but they seem to be able to manage it in the US frequently in these things.

A recent crash report in the US was that the pilot of the Cirrus banked too far at low speed when turning onto final and lost it. A pretty basic mistake really.

We lost one here at Warnervale in Christmas Day when it landed short of the runway. Standard trap of the Cirrus, so I wonder what happened to the insurance requirement for type training in Australia which should have covered that. With the dealer gone (I think) there may not be support for authorized Cirrus centres regarding type training any more.

We could easily go down the same path as the US with this aircraft. We've already lost a good number of Cirrus here.

[QFF]

Consider this:

Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%

Chance of surviving same scenario by pulling the chute - 100%.

I know which I'd choose, aircraft damage notwithstanding.

Even from an engine failure at altitude, why would you accept a 80-90% survival rate with a glide approach into a paddock when pulling the chute guarantees a 100% survival rate every time?

But the recent fatal Cirrus accidents have been base to final turn stall/spin accidents at low level with no chance of conventional or even parachute recovery. Unfortunately it's not the aircraft - it's the pilots.

There is a whole new generation of Cirrus pilots who are buying second-hand aircraft who have not had the factory training and are not aware of the excellent Cirrus Pilots' Proficiency Programme training with CSIPs (Cirrus Standardized Instructor Pilots), run by the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (or COPA).

I would highly recommend everyone who flies a Cirrus join COPA (it's only $65 annual fee) and attend at least one CPPP which has been happening in Australia for the past 2 years.

Flying the Cirrus means adopting a whole new paradigm shift in thinking about emergencies. Gone are the days of the macho-pilot ego, wrestling the plane to the ground in the event of an engine failure, hoping they're not the 20% who dig a wheel into a furrow in the paddock, cartwheel and ending up as a statistic. Much better to pull the chute, walk away and let the insurance company sort out the mess.

An insurance company executive in the USA has gone on the record saying that he would much rather pilots pull the chute because it's much cheaper to repair/replace aircraft than to deal with the pilot's/passengers' estate.

Some food for thought...

[Case Sensitive]

Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%

Crikey! That may be true for a modern Cessna only trained pilot but god I hope the rest of us can do better. I'd be dead many, many times over.

Scary that the view (might be) pulling the shute is better than actually knowing how to recover from or more importantly avoid altogether (these two go hand in hand by the way) the spin. 'Normal' pilots spin aeroplanes from 2k (or sometimes much lower in aerobatic types) and don't break a sweat once they have had a bit of training.

All a very sad indictment of where the training industry is at the moment more than anything in my view.

[Mr.Buzzy]

Flying the Cirrus means adopting a whole new paradigm shift in thinking about emergencies. Gone are the days of the macho-pilot ego, wrestling the plane to the ground in the event of an engine failure, hoping they're not the 20% who dig a wheel into a furrow in the paddock, cartwheel and ending up as a statistic. Much better to pull the chute, walk away and let the insurance company sort out the mess.


But my instructor told me to get into good habits now, checking the wheels are down in my fixed gear aeroplane is good airmanship for one day when I fly a machine with retracts. What will I do when I fly a Caravan or a PC12 and the engine stops? Im confused.

bbbbbbbbbzzzzzzzzzzzzbbbbbbbzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

[QFF]

I understand where you're coming from. My comments are directed mainly at owners/pilots of Cirruses (?) in which that is the only aircraft they will fly.

I agree there is ABSOLUTELY no substitute for training. But if you have an option like the chute, it is frustrating to see Cirrus planes crash with a perfectly good chute behind them - hence, I believe, what prompted Dick Collins' article.

Again - the common denominator is the pilot. Sure, if you are a proficient aerobatic display pilot who spins your aircraft on a daily or weekly basis, your chances of survival are increased already because you probably would not allow yourself to be in a position where you would need to use your much practised skill. But if you are a Cirrus owner who flies once a month, I would suggest that when the proverbial hits the fan, the parachute would be a better option that offers a 100% chance of survival after which you can walk away and book a spot on that emergency manoeuvres training course that you were always too busy to do...

[Ultralights]

Consider this:

Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%

with CORRECT training...... 100% (I'm undergoing correct training now)


Chance of surviving same scenario by pulling the chute - 100%.

Not 100% people have been killed, in OZ, after deploying a BRS chute.

[Old Akro]

Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%

Altitude loss on spin should be about 400 ft. If we did a decent job of spin training these day's the pilot would recognize the incipient spin and the altitude loss would be 50 ft.

But, most aircraft spins are gentle manoeuvres and are frequently survivable. Find a copy of " The Tiger Moth Story" and look at the photo of a tiger moth in a spin about 10ft off the ground that was survived.

There have been analyses done of Cirrus chute deployments, and I'm not sure that spinning featured. My recollection is that most chute deployments have been a result of VFR to IMC with one or more pilot medical instances.

[criticalmass]

I'm still trying to come to terms with a manufacturer building an aeroplane which is capable of entering a spin and then not bothering to develop a recovery procedure! Relying on a ballistic parachute system for aircraft recovery after a spin seems to be akin to throwing their hands up in horror and saying "too hard". Once the 'chute is deployed the aircraft is uncontrollable. Almost any other aircraft remains totally controllable after spin recovery is achieved.

At what point does negligence enter the equation? If negligence is defined as a repeated series of events or omissions which result in an accident, isn't Cirrus Design at least partly negligent by designing, building and selling multiple aircraft which can be spun without developing a procedure for recovery from the spin which leaves the pilot back in control, like any other aircraft?

Or have we reached a situation where basic "stick and rudder" skills no longer required in modern aviation?

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

But, most aircraft spins are gentle manoeuvresThey are? You could have fooled me! How many aircraft have you let develop into a full spin?

I have never been heavily into the aerobatic thing but was thinking about what aircraft I have spun: C150 Aerobat/C152, PA38, Victa, Tiger Moth and Blanik glider. I would only describe the last two as anywhere near "gentle"!

During my stint in NZ, we used to regularly spin the PA38, which often rolled on its back before entering a spin - hardly a gentle manoevre. Admittedly it gave lots of warning before it bit you - but then it bit hard. If you blundered into a spin turning final in a PA38, I suspect you would die - even if you were well trained in spins.

The C150 takes a while to wind up in a fully developed spin, but when it does it is pointed what seems like straight at the ground and has a high rate of rotation. Tends to get the adrenaline flowing even when you know what it is gonna do. Admittedly you have to hold pro-spin controls to get there - and close the throttle, let go of the wheel and centre the ball and it will sort itself out.

While I am an advocate for basic aerobatic training for all, mainly to build confidence in what you can do with an aeroplane and what the aeroplane can do with you, I don't think spin training will stop people spinning out on turns onto final or during climb-out. They are the result of poor aircraft handling - ie crap piloting!

The V-tail Bonanza, the original Fork-tailed Doctor Killer, gives lots of warning of an impending stall in the landing config - then departs from normal flight quite vigorously - some might even say violently. If it happend at 500' in the turn onto final, a well tuned arobatic/spin trained pilot might recover in time - but I suspect a change of undies would be in order after the event!

I have never flown a Cirrus, and can't say I have any great desire to do so, but I suspect that 99% of Cirrus accidents are due to poor piloting/decision making - not the aeroplane itself.

Dr :8

[Old Akro]

By gentle, I really meant g and velocity (forward and downward). Its an unsettling manouevre for the pilot, but not violent.

This is a bit esoteric, but a 1g entry to a spin should have a wing drop only, not a corresponding wing rise. The awful "flipping on its back" sensation comes from an accelerated spin entry. Its really a quasi snap roll entry. It scores badly in competition.

A developed spin is inherently stable with typically relatively low descent rates.

[jas24zzk]

Liking your response Dr.

Having a fair amount of time on C-150's and blaniks, I do agree. Though I never really regarded the blanik as being an agressive spinner, more that it settled into the spin more readily than some other types I have flown.

Whilst to a degree I advocate spin training, I advocate recognition of an impending spin even more. I am not aware (and am open to suggestions) of any type that does not give a warning signal for the impending stall/spin. This is something glider pilots practice heavily. When a glider pilot progresses into a new type, one of the first things on their list is a couple of full spins to get the recovery down pat, then there is a lot of time incipient spinning to learn the warning signs. The LAST place they want to be learning this is in a thermal with 10 gliders below. They want to know it so intensely, that when they do enter a point where the spin is imminent, they merely release some back pressure, or a little rudder, with no disruption to the flight path, nor reference to the flight instruments. They practice until the required input is automatic.

Look at the difference in attitude. A glider pilot spins EVERY type they fly, a power pilot is on the cusp of fearing spins!.

Old akro,
some types the spin entry can be quite violent. One that comes to mind is the Pilatus PC-11-AF. Like the PA-38, it rolls onto its back first, but it does it in a manner more akin to a flick roll, it pauses for up to 1 second, then flicks again into a fully developed spin before the end of the first rotation after the inverted stage. (this scenario for the traditional turning final gentle control input style of entry)
If you push it into a spin, it behaves differently. I.e the control inputs are there forcing the spin, Full rudder to begin with. With a forced spin, it will rotate straight into a fully developed spin quite aggressively. (whole lot of fun lemme tell ya!) But the type is benign enough to recover the moment you take corrective action

As I said above, i am not sure full spin training is appropriate, but certiainly incipient training, so the that the pilot has some understanding of what indicators to be looking for and take remedial action the moment the airframe gives its warning.

[Cloud Basher]

We have a Cirrus online at our little flying club. There is no type rating imposed, but there are very strict minimums imposed by the insurance company. Plus a ground school and checkout by the CFI. We have had guys with close to the minimums but the insurance companies wouldn't budge and they had to fly with a safety pilot appropriately experienced in type with decency requirements.

A very nice bird to fly, no more difficult than any other higher performance GA aircraft. Personally I think part of the problem is pilots seem to think FIKI, oxygen, a turbo and high speeds with a chute as backup means you can punch through weather you might not try in your C210. Nothing could be further from the truth. And the pilots that I have read about that are making that call are lower hour, with less REAL IFR experience.

Just my thoughts...

Cheers
CB

[VH-XXX]

There is no type rating imposed, but there are very strict minimums imposed by the insurance company.

If I happened to mention "type rating" earlier, it was in reference to insurance minimums as you have noted here.

there are very strict minimums imposed by the insurance company. Plus a ground school and checkout by the CFI.

We used to have this arrangement. Unfortunately it didn't stop people from breaking it; cracking cylinders, hitting the tail on the ground, flat-spotting the tyres and the list goes on! :oh: Probably something that happens in Cessna's too after all :)

[Flying Binghi]

It would be handy if the accident aircraft referenced in the thread starter had a breakdown of what panels were in the aircraft. From what i've seen over the years many cirrus started out with the 'traditional' six pack then the Avidine panels were popular and now theres the Garmin panels. Do it make a difference ?




.

[VH-XXX]

Can probably find that fact easy enough, they started pumping out Avidyne glass panel models circa 2002-2003 if I'm not mistaken.

[Jabawocky]

Panels or 6 pack instruments will not be the deal breaker. It is pilot training, profficiency and recency.

Having blind faith in "the chute will save me" combined with lacking or degraded flying skils and decission making is what the problem is.

The same as was the FTDK, the SRDK is today.

[LeadSled]

It would be handy if the accident aircraft referenced in the thread starter had a breakdown of what panels were in the aircraft. From what i've seen over the years many cirrus started out with the 'traditional' six pack then the Avidine panels were popular and now theres the Garmin panels. Do it make a difference ?

Folks,
In a word, yes!

FAA studies into factors relating to "glass cockpits" are instructive, many of the anticipated benefits of glass, versus a GA fleet equipped in many cases with WWII surplus round dials, have not been realised.

The problem is not limited to Cirrus.

We all accept that there are many "accidents" that start of as VFR pilots flying into IMC. The expected reductions of accidents and incidents from the benefits of "advanced cockpits" are not being realised. That almost all of the newer aircraft with "glass" also have seductively good autopilots is probably a contributing factor.

The quick and dirty analysis is that pilots are pushing that little bit further than they would done in an older aircraft, with the same outcome.

I don't really think that the Cirrus spin recovery characteristics ( or lack thereof) has much to do with the problem under discussion.

The rules of survival have not changed, if you are not qualified AND CURRENT for flight in IMC, don't!!

Tootle pip!!

[paulp]

You hear a lot about Cirrus crashes because, since 2002, the SR22 has been the number one selling aircraft in the world and still is today. There are a lot flying and they are (rightly or wrongly) flying challenging missions. If you look here (http://flightaware.com/live/aircrafttype/) you can see how many are in the US ATC system at any time. It can lead to interesting things. For example, I took two snapshots during the peak of the day and compared the SR22 to the DA40. The ratio exactly matched the ratio of fatal DA40 accidents compared to SR22 fatals in the US NTSB database.

I have a good friend who has intentionally spun and recovered an SR22. I have read that it takes assertive forward stick and you must pull power. In other words, follow PowerAileronRudderElevator and not the remove hands form controls method.

Twins aren't spin certified. Why is there so much concern over singles and spin certification and yet it doesn't seem to bother the same people when it comes to twins? As another poster noted, Cirrus spin deaths have come at 500' on a base to final stall spin scenario. I do think there is a design factor involved. SR22 pattern speeds are 100 knots downwind and 90 knots base. If you fly a 172 style pattern and try to make it rectangular you can wind up banking too much. You have to widen the pattern or make the downwind-base-final more curved than in a 172. There's no magic here. It's just a faster plane in the pattern. In many ways it's more like being in a 310 than a 172.

If you go through the US NTSB and FAA databases and compare the percentage of the fleet involved in fatal accidents since 2000 you find:

SR22 1.86
C182 1.11
C310 1.95
C210 2.19
V35 1.50
A36 3.28

Helping the SR22 is the fact that I used present FAA listed fleet size and the fleet was small in the first few years of the time period. Hurting the SR22 is that, by definition, pilots were low time in type during the first few years of SR22 sales. During that period the plane had a lot higher accident rate. If you read the book "The Killing Zone" there is a good analysis of when pilots are more accident prone and the first 200 hours in type is one of the killing zones. Even today there are a lot more low time in type Cirrus pilots than Bonanza pilots.

[paulp]

The quick and dirty analysis is that pilots are pushing that little bit further than they would done in an older aircraft, with the same outcome.

I was once asked if I thought there was anything dangerous about an SR22. I said there was and got asked to explain. I said that the SR22 is fast and comfortable with great avionics. It screams to be flown long distances. Weather planning and judgement are in a different league than when I was flying a 172.

There is a concept called risk homeostasis which states that we increase the risk we take on until we reach our personal comfort level. If we get a better handling car we tend to drive a little faster. The problem is that we do this based on perceived risk. Comfort and cool avionics can, I think, cause us to subconsciously perceive a lower risk level and hence we take on more risk to adjust. Unfortunately, real risk reduction is lower than we perceive.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Aye Leadie,

Re "The quick and dirty analysis is that pilots are pushing that little bit further than they would done in an older aircraft, with the same outcome."

Was this not the same 'logic' when VOR's in the USA became 'commonplace'?

Previously, some pilots would not venture in 'poor' weather, then, with the advent of the VOR, some pilots reckoned they 'knew where they were'...so pushed the envelope a little further, and, lo and behold, a few 'overdue' aircraft were finally located right under the flight track between two VOR's or in close proximity to one of them....

A 'little knowledge' comes to mind....:=

Be careful out there....:ok:

[gileraguy]

Looking through the last three years of the NTSBs database, I think one could equate the casualties rate of helicopters to the casualty rate of Cirrus Aircraft.

Has anyone compared the accident rate between fixed and rotary wing?

It seems to me that on a basic level, the fatality rate in rotary wing would be as high or higher than in a Cirrus.

[Sunfish]

PaulP is right - Cirrus seems to suffer from a classic case of risk shifting - a subject that has a Nobel Prize attached to it for the first person who can quantify and predict the behaviour.

The lovely glass and the parachute are a temptation, as are ABS and stability augmentation systems in automobiles.

To put that another way, I wonder if the aircraft was deliberately made a little less forgiving and slightly more difficult to master, the accident rate would decline?

[VH-XXX]

Would be interesting to know what the fatality rate of the FTDK of the time (yester-year) would be in comparison to the SR2X now days....

[boofhead]

Side note: What's a spin endorsement? Why would you need it? Doesn't every flight instructor do spins as part of training for the instructor rating?

[Tinstaafl]

In the US an instructor trainee must gain a sign-off that they've demonstrated competency recovering from spins. The equivalent in Oz is called an endorsement. Further, in Oz, an instructor is not authorised to teach spinning unless endorsed to teach spins.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

Would be interesting to know what the fatality rate of the FTDK of the time (yester-year) would be in comparison to the SR2X now days....

The kill rate of the FTDK will be much higher than the SR2X because the V-tail is an extraordinarily difficult aeroplane to fly.

I never cease to be amazed by my incredible piloting skills! :E

Dr :8

[Clearedtoreenter]

Heres another one:

Plane crashes in Kane County, 4 killed | ksl.com (http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=20625165&title=plane-crashes-in-kane-county-4-killed&s_cid=featured-1)

Couldnt happen in a Cessna eh?

(sounds like the ELT worked)

[Stationair8]

Not only the Cirrus owners, talking to a guy restoring a c172, he is busy putting an autopilot into it in case he gets IMC and gets disorientated. He thinks I was yanking his chain, when I explained to him the autopilot may not save him when he has a loss of control IMC or the bit of cloud he punches through actually is hiding a CB!

Some pilots with well euipped aircraft seem to forget that autopilots fails, EFIS does fail, electrical systems pop cb's etc and you are back to hand flying on very basic instrumentation on a dark night and then have to hand fly an ILS to the minima.

[paulp]

Two UT crashes. A 172 with 4 adults (160 or 180 HP) and an SR20 (200hp). High, over gross (I suspect) and in the mountains.

[paulp]

Some pilots with well euipped aircraft seem to forget that autopilots fails, EFIS does fail, electrical systems pop cb's etc and you are back to hand flying on very basic instrumentation on a dark night and then have to hand fly an ILS to the minima.

I've seen fewer accidents from failed autopilots than I have of planes with a good autopilot that would have saved the pilot if he had known how to use it. Being able to hand fly is important but so is knowing how to use what you have. The latest Garmin and Avidyne AP's have straight and level buttons and will recover even if initially upside down.

[VH-XXX]

or the bit of cloud he punches through actually is hiding a CB

So it's not just me that this happened to :cool:

The latest Garmin and Avidyne AP's have straight and level buttons and will recover even if initially upside down.

Now that is a very good idea. Adding to the whole issue we are talking about in this here thread, however technology wise, very clever.

[paulp]

Now that is a very good idea. Adding to the whole issue we are talking about in this here thread, however technology wise, very clever.

The latest Cirrus aircraft do even more. When off the AP, the AP still monitors flight. It gives warnings in some cases and in others, such as excessive bank, gives a gentle nudge to the yoke to tell the pilot to be careful. I suspect Cirrus is trying to decrease accelerated stalls - the base to final turn in particular. I've noticed that the faster a plane is in the pattern the greater the tendency to excessively bank since turns are wider for a given bank angle. Many of us seem to try to fly the same tight 172 style pattern even when in a faster plane.

The SR22T also has protection against hypoxia when above a certain altitude. It monitors the comms and if they haven't been used in awhile the system flashes a message which the pilot must acknowledge with a button push. If the message isn't acknowledged then the plane descends to 10,000'. A very seasoned pilot died after he passed out at 25,000'. The plane flew at that altitude till it ran out of fuel. Hence the new system.

[VH-XXX]

If the message isn't acknowledged then the plane descends to 10,000'.

Straight into a moutain range one wouldn't be hoping for!

A very seasoned pilot died after he passed out at 25,000'. The plane flew at that altitude till it ran out of fuel. Hence the new system.

The descent to 10,000 wouldn't have helped him then!

(Don't take those as negative comments, am just sayin')

[paulp]

Straight into a moutain range one wouldn't be hoping for!

Maybe but better than sitting at 25K till fuel runs out. Either way you come down. One case gives you a chance. Certainly our friends in Oz would be fine as would those in the US east of the Rockies.

The descent to 10,000 wouldn't have helped him then!

Had his plane had the system the descent would have begun shortly after he passed out. Why wouldn't that have helped? I guess I'm missing something.

[VH-XXX]

Had his plane had the system the descent would have begun shortly after he passed out. Why wouldn't that have helped? I guess I'm missing something.

No, you are correct, it was late when I wrote that sorry.

[paulp]

But if we know how to use an autopilot, one hopes our training would have surpassed a level where we need to be saved by it? Maybe a state of the art G1000 with GFC700 could recover from a spin? I doubt it in a Cirrus. Other auto pilots might just disengage and say something like 'you fix it'. Some seem to actually make matters worse as they chase rates of climb or descent and turns that are inappropriate and/or unsustainable.

Actually, knowing how to use an AP is great for a VFR pilot. Prior to getting my instrument rating I was told I had no business flying in clouds. I replied that I agreed and would do a 180. The instructor said "No!". He told me to sync the heading bug, hit HDG-ALT on the AP and slowly turn the heading bug to do the 180.

Where stall/spin accidents seem to happen is where an AP, spin training or a BRS system have little value. When less than 500' above the ground the main thing is to avoid it in the first place.

The GFC700 is also good if hand flying and you get disoriented in the clouds. I don't think getting disoriented is unique to Cirrus. However, you have to use it. Buying fancy stuff but not mastering it is a waste of money.

It's just that people talk about the need for hand flying kills (I agree) but I also think you need to know how to use everything available. For all of the fear of a bad AP I have seen more deaths caused by not using the AP than by a failed AP.

[paulp]

Here is a nice video on using automation properly vs. getting overwhelmed by it. It is an old American Airlines training film.

Children of Magenta - YouTube

[flying-spike]

Admittedly the A5 doesn't have the performance of the Cirrus but the Cirrus can't land on water. This is their way of solving the problem: ICON Aircraft | ICON A5 Spin Resistance Safety Milestone Video (http://www.iconaircraft.com/video-icon-aircraft-a5-safety-spin-resistance.html)
It does beg the question , what would happen when an A5 pilot moves to a conventional, spin capable aircraft and tries the same thing?

[scroogee]

For all this, the basic cause of many of the accidents is the pilot attitude (much like the FTDK in it's day etc.).

My very limited expeience in a SR20 as a passenger consisted of a long cross country flight. What was noticable was that at most aerodromes (and to a degree enroute) the pilot spent a lot of the time monitoring the panels (gps, traffic, engines) which is good, except that it was at the expense of a proper lookout.

The only join, approach and landing where I felt the pilot was demonstrating actual piloting skill was at an airfield not in the GPS database. At that airfield the lookout, speed and height control were good, and the pattern and aircraft flown correctly and as part of a plan. To me the pilot felt like he was ahead of the aircraft, not sitting on the back seat.

Many of the people who buy the 'best' aircraft, buy with the anticipation that the gismo's will save them (though in the case above the pilot didn't remove the safety pin from the chute deployment system before flight 'in case it got knocked' so that was poor logic).

Unfortunately also is the fact (supposition on my part) that particularly when these aircraft first came out, the people who bought them were highly motivated, successful individuals, who generally don't like 'no' as an answer and were often their own boss. People like this have a hard time taking instruction and following direction. Of course if they wern't how they were, they wouldn't be sucessful in the first place, but equally it makes them more confident (or pigheaded) in the aircraft, and can lead them into situations beyond their actual skill level.

[VH-XXX]

It is an interesting read to see why the SR2X's are crashing.

Of the ones that I have personally heard of, it's interesting to think about the possible cause.

- Bouncing down the runway and ploughing off the end
- Flatspotting 2 tyres and running off the end at high DA
- Bouncing down the runway and prop striking
- Engine failure x 2 (Chute didn't work properly)
- Unable to maintain altitude at high DA smacking into a mountain
- Tail strike x 2
- Stalling when turning onto final, too slow, too much bank
- Overspeed when inadvertant non-VMC

Most of those don't sound too different to your average Cessna, but it appears that the US are leading us in the rate of Cirrus write-offs.

[Ovation]

I've long maintained there is a false sense of security that comes with the ballistic recovery systems the Cirrus offers. The following excerpt from the NTSB report suggests the pilot had a lot of trust in his "get out of gaol/jail card". Fortunately he and the passenger survived, but there have been events where the BRS didn't help.

The pilot told the NTSB investigator during an interview that he informed the controller that he was instrument-qualified because he was getting concerned. His wife was six months pregnant and he feared they would end up in the water. The pilot stated he was struggling to keep the airplane level; he was in instrument conditions in a black hole with out a visible horizon or ambient light. The pilot further stated, "I became spatially disoriented and pulled the chute." When the pilot was asked if there was anything mechanically wrong with the airplane or the flight instruments, the pilot stated no. Review of information on file with the FAA Airman's Certification Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed the pilot was issued a private pilot certificate on April 12, 2004, with ratings for airplane single engine land. The pilot did not have an instrument rating. The pilot's last biennial flight review was conducted on March 25, 2007, in the SR20. The pilot held a third-class medical issued on April 24, 2007, with the restriction "must wear corrective lenses." The pilot indicated on his application for the third-class medical certificate he has 500 total flight hours

Full narrative (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20070821X01216&ntsbno=ATL07LA115&akey=1)

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Paulp, mate. Thanks for that utube. Priceless copilot!:ok:

[jas24zzk]

Mock the 172 guy some more if you like.

I've had 2 VFR into IMC incidents. Only one scared the bejesus out of me...and that was the one without auto.

Having seen both sides of the coin, i'd rather do the 180 turn to fly back out using an autopilot than hand fly it. Many more arguments can be put forward to justify the cost of installing an auto. But if you are not one scared by marginal Wx, using it correctly may just save your A when it all turns to crap.

As a point, there was an SR-22(citation needed on actual model) parked up at Locksley Field that had a VFR into IMC incident whilst on autopilot a few years back. The pilot instead of dialing up the 180 heading to fly and let the computer manage it chose to do a disconnect and hand fly the reciprocal. That very quickly turned to crap, and the airframe was spiral dived. FORTUNATLEY the PIC realised what was going on and rectified the situation, so no ghecko's were injured. Unfortunatley, his decision to hand fly it rather than tell the computer what to do wrote the airframe off...less than 500 hrs TT.
Autopilots have a place, and we've all flown with/without them. If you can afford to fit one to your aeroplane, and want it, then go for it. You won't see me lining up to can you for it.

[The Green Goblin]

A fool and his money are soon flying more aircraft than he can handle.*

[LeadSled]

Was this not the same 'logic' when VOR's in the USA became 'commonplace'?
Previously, some pilots would not venture in 'poor' weather, then, with the advent of the VOR, some pilots reckoned they 'knew where they were'...so pushed the envelope a little further, and, lo and behold, a few 'overdue' aircraft were finally located right under the flight track between two VOR's or in close proximity to one of them....

Ex FSO Griffo,
PAULP has put the problem well, I was rather oversimplifying the conclusions of a study by the US AOPA Air Safety Foundation. With modern glass cockpits and autopilots, the general problem extends beyond the various Cirrus.
The anticipated "safety dividend" of the all singing, all dancing glass ( and they really are great, I love synthetic vision) has proved to be somewhat elusive.

Tootle pip!!

[VH-XXX]

As a point, there was an SR-22(citation needed on actual model) parked up at Locksley Field that had a VFR into IMC incident whilst on autopilot a few years back. The pilot instead of dialing up the 180 heading to fly and let the computer manage it chose to do a disconnect and hand fly the reciprocal. That very quickly turned to crap, and the airframe was spiral dived. FORTUNATLEY the PIC realised what was going on and rectified the situation, so no ghecko's were injured. Unfortunatley, his decision to hand fly it rather than tell the computer what to do wrote the airframe off...less than 500 hrs TT.

Aaaaahhhh, the stories you hear!

Indeed this did happen, the aircraft exceeded VNE (supposedly only to 215 or so knots - VNE 195 from memory) the aircraft was written off from an insurance perspective, it was advertised for tender, a submission was entered for $20k, the tender was successful and the successful tenderer flew the aircraft home (legally) and is still flying it around. (it was at Temora at Easter)

The magical $20,000 Cirrus SR22 !

Sum total of damage = a creased flap skin.

This is a true story in every way so help me god !

PS: this is relevant because this particular aircraft was per-Avidyne and was fitted with a 6-pack of analogues.

[Checkboard]

The anticipated "safety dividend" of the all singing, all dancing glass ( and they really are great, I love synthetic vision) has proved to be somewhat elusive.
There never was an anticipated "safety dividend" - simply because glass wasn't introduced for safety! It was introduced because one screen is cheaper than six mechanical instruments, because GPS became accessible (so you had to put in a computer of some sort to access that, anyway) and because computers give greater functionality (for those geeky enough/disciplined enough to learn ALL of the functions of a particular system).

[sludge]

This is the airplane that the AF academy is training in now, no?

[VH-XXX]

Nope, it's privately owned.

[paulp]

The USAF bought a fleet of SR20 aircraft for training.

- Bouncing down the runway and ploughing off the end
- Flatspotting 2 tyres and running off the end at high DA
- Bouncing down the runway and prop striking
- Engine failure x 2 (Chute didn't work properly)
- Unable to maintain altitude at high DA smacking into a mountain
- Tail strike x 2
- Stalling when turning onto final, too slow, too much bank
- Overspeed when inadvertant non-VMC

Here are my thoughts on these.

The Cirrus gear is springy with small tires. The G3 increased prop clearance and the SR22T added a shock to the nose gear so Cirrus has certainly worked to address prop strikes and pilot induced oscillation. Many people land too fast. The max gross is 3400 lbs and you are almost 80 knots over the numbers. This is a huge difference from a 172 even though the tires are similar in size. Hit hard and you can get a pilot induced oscillation. It's a great landing plane when properly done but I sometimes envy the gear on my friend's Bonanza when I see the shocks and large tires on the mains.

The small tires and 3400 max gross also means respecting needed runway length at high DA airports. Nothing new here. Ask the people in Leadville, CO about what they see when people come there. They'll talk about the low land Mooney and Bonanza pilots too. Small tires and high weight mean you need more runway. It isn't a 182.

You have to be careful on zero flap landings. It actually takes a large nose up pitch to tail strike. However, this is easier than some think when new to the plane because the sight picture out the front makes the plane appear nose low when transitioning from many other aircraft. You hear less about prop strikes and tail strikes than you used to. Higher tail and prop clearance, tail "bumper", and nose shock have probably helped some but I suspect the biggest deal is that now a high percentage of pilots are high time in type.

I know of one chute failure and that resulted in an AD. Since then I don't know of any.

The high DA comment must involve a 20. The SR20 is relatively fast and comfortable but at 200 hp it doesn't have much more raw power than a 172sp. The 22 will climb to 18K' but be winded when it gets there. The 22T will happily go to 25K'. The biggest difference going from a 20 to a 22 is climb performance. Because the 20 is fairly fast and very comfortable I suspect some people forget that it isn't a raw power plane. I was in Brisbane talking to a lady about an SR20 I saw take off. I commented that it had done a shallow climb. She said she was the instructor in that plane and that it was a Vy climb. At that time I hadn't flown one. Over the next couple of days I got some time in one and saw what she meant. The plane felt like an SR22 until I went to climb.

Speed management is an acquired Cirrus skill. I would love speed brakes. To descend into an airport it is often best to pull power, nose up and get flaps in. If you get disoriented and in a dive I can imagine speed building fast. On newer planes this is time to use the straight and level button. On older ones it may be chute time if seriously disoriented and in the clouds. There's a point where it is better to let others tell you how their superior skills would have allowed them to pull out and save the plane than be dead with people saying "Why didn't he pull?"

I saved what I consider the most interesting one for last and that is the base to final stall and variants of it. I think this is a real issue and I suspect it is directly do to pattern speed combined with moving from a trainer like a 172 or Warrior. In training I was taught to do nice rectangular patterns. I was also taught to not be too far from the runway lest something happen such as an engine out. But the downwind to base turn in a Cirrus happens at about 100 knots. That means that it takes more room. If you level out for the straight base segment it is easy to be where you now need a sharp base to final turn and this is at about 90 knots. That means it is easier to get focused on the final approach line and over bank trying to make this turn with the result being an accelerated stall. I don't see this as so much a Cirrus issue as a trainer to high performance aircraft transition issue.

[VH-XXX]

All perfectly logical comments there PaulP and backed up by my experience in them. A quick elaboration - comment re chute not working properly x1 meant that it didn't have the desired effect, eg pulled too late. There was of course the Sydney engine failure where the chute basically didn't deploy at all. Very lucky those guys to get out of that aircraft alive.

Probably a good way to approach flying a Cirrus would be to fly it like an airliner. Fly it on instruments when properly rated, fly a stabilised approach and go around if necessary, fly a practical and safe wide circuit, fly by the numbers and don't do anything in it that the 100 passengers behind you wouldn't enjoy.

When you are more experienced, then you can try and fly it like you would a Cessna 172.

[paulp]

The Sydney incident is the one that resulted in the AD.

There have been way too many deaths where a chute pull would have saved a life. In one case the pilot was known to be dismissive of CAPS. He had engine trouble and did an off field landing. The landing didn't go well and he died along with a passenger.

As far as CAPS, I can see people not liking it because of initial cost, repack expense, space utilization and/or weight. However, if you have it then realize it has it's place. The system itself has an impressive record and has worked well even outside the stated design limits.

To the previous poster, you hit on what is really dangerous about a Cirrus. It is a high performance plane. I tell people to treat it with the same respect you would stepping up to a 310 or a Baron and you will be fine.

[LeadSled]

----- simply because glass wasn't introduced for safety

Checkboard,
I suggest you acquaint yourself with the literature on the subject. There is enough of it about.

In the airline environment, the introduction of "glass" and the safety outcomes are well known and understood ( as are some of the "new" problems, see the AA training video) and the benefits, including much better situational awareness, was expected to be seen in GA.

Largely, it hasn't happened. Again, some of the "syndromes" in the AA video are probably even more applicable to GA.

The interesting matter of relative cost needs to compare apples and apples, the "glass" cockpits ( except the very elementary ones) have such greater potential capability, that comparing to a sixpack is not a comparison. Even the expected much reduced maintenance costs are not being evenly realised ----- given the generally low utilization in GA, this benefit was grossly over stated.

Tootle pip!!

[paulp]

I had a discussion with Alan Klapmeirer a few years back regarding the adoption of glass by Cirrus. It may point to something interesting. Alan said he didn't fly much IFR because his scan was lousy with the small AI. He said that he pressed Avidyne to make the AI as large as possible so he could tune radios and still see the AI with peripheral vision. The result was that he now felt much more comfortable flying in IMC. He said he thought what he had done here was more important than CAPS. I was recalling this while thinking about why glass hasn't improved things. Perhaps this is another example of risk homeostasis. It might be that the extra capability of glass has more people flying more serious IFR and the result is a relatively unchanged accident rate. People buy twins in order to take on more challenging missions. Maybe it is the same thing. Just a thought.

[Flying Binghi]

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...now seating 5, split rear seat, etc..:ooh:


...first bit of junk mail i've read front to back..:cool:







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