Cirrus pilots are dangerous
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Cirrus pilots are dangerous
..... well apparently they are!
Worth the read. A little simplistic in some aspects but the stats are there.
The new FTDK one would say!
Dick’s blog: what’s wrong with Cirrus pilots?
Dick's blog — By Richard Collins on May 14, 2012 2:40 pm
It's not the whistles and bells, it's the pilot.
I recall when the Cirrus first came out, one of the principals said that product liability was not going to be a problem for them because the airplane would be so safe.
Since that time the NTSB shows 80 fatal Cirrus accidents in its database. Because of the litigious nature of our society, most, if not almost all, have likely resulted in legal action against the company.
Since the beginning, Cirrus has worked hard to try to see that the pilots of these airplanes are properly trained. All Cirrus airplanes have an airframe parachute, too. Without the chute there would have been many more fatal accidents because presumably a pilot does not pull the chute until he feels for certain it is necessary to save his ass.
The Cirrus was the first light airplane with a glass cockpit, too, and Cirrus has been a leader in using the latest whistles and bells to help pilots be better informed.
Despite all this, the Cirrus SR-22 has a higher fatal accident rate than most similar airplanes from other manufacturers. (We all know that SR-22s fly a lot of hours every year but that is taken into account when comparing accident rates.)
Why, with every safety advantage, has this come to be true?
It can only be because of one thing: the Cirrus pilot.
If you take at face value the benefit of type-specific training, Cirrus pilots have that. If you accept that glass cockpits give a pilot many valuable informational tools, Cirrus pilots have that. If you buy into the fact that an airframe parachute gives a pilot one last but extremely valuable option, Cirrus pilots have that. What they don’t seem to have is common sense and that is our collective fault. Both industry and government have worked to ensure that Cirrus pilots don’t know the score. Start with the FAA. A while back the instrument rating requirements were drastically reduced making the rating both less expensive and potentially more lethal. This was in response to pressure from general aviation interests, especially AOPA.
The result is that we have instrument-rated pilots who are not at all prepared for instrument flying, especially in technically advanced airplanes. The training systems that have been developed do what training systems have always done: they prepare pilots for the FAA tests. A person with an instrument rating might know something about operating on an IFR flight plan but know nothing of cloud flying.
Why would this affect Cirrus pilots more than others?
From the beginning the Cirrus has been sold as a transportation machine. That relates to weather flying like the airlines do. So a new pilot, and many Cirrus pilots are relatively new, gets an instrument rating and is suddenly trying to do what infinitely more experienced pilots are doing with airliners. And there are two of those experienced pilots in the front end of every airliner.
SR-22s are flying hard IFR trips all over the country (image courtesy of FlightAware.com).
You can look at Flight Aware’s listing by type of airplanes in the IFR system at any given moment and there will be a lot of SR-22s in there. In fact there are usually more than any other GA type that is used for transportation. Sadly, you can look at that number and, unless it is a clear day, it can be safely assumed that an unhealthy percentage of the pilots really don’t know what they are doing or at least might be unable to handle anything out of the ordinary. This is not their fault. They were certified by the government, they were sold the airplane, and they were encouraged to use it.
So, cloudy day IFR wrecks are a big part of the Cirrus problem. So are low speed losses of control. Here the FAA also has bloody hands.
Normally a single-engine airplane has to be spun as part of the certification process. The Cirrus wasn’t. The FAA waived this requirement and accepted the airframe parachute as an alternate means of compliance. I kid you not, the spin recovery in a Cirrus is based on deploying the chute. That is the only way a pilot can recover from a spin in a Cirrus.
The stall characteristics of the airplane are not bad when compared with some other airplanes but they aren’t real good, either. It might have been reasonable to expect stellar stall characteristic in a new design but, alas, aerodynamics reached a plateau many years ago.
When everything is considered, the Cirrus record is what it is and will remain ever so unless some pretty drastic steps are taken. It can’t be more training or more safety features because those things are already there. The only thing that can actually lead to improvement is the mind-set of Cirrus pilots.
Years ago, insurance underwriters put far lower rates on insurance for twins than singles. Then some wise-ass writer (that would be me) started exploring the fact that the serious accident rate in twins was actually higher than in singles. The underwriters had been basing rates on what they thought to be true as opposed to what was actually true. Insurance underwriters have done that in a lot of areas over the years.
Such might be the case with Cirrus pilots. With training, advanced equipment, and a parachute, a pilot could develop a false sense of security about flying the airplane.
I recall an accident that well illustrates this. A professional person had finished a long and full day of work. After work, and after darkness set in, he flew an IFR trip to an airport located in rough terrain. At 11:30 p.m. he left that airport on an IFR clearance. He lost control of the airplane soon after takeoff and collided with rising terrain.
This was a relatively inexperienced pilot and you can read between the lines of the NTSB report and contemplate several things.
To me it is likely that there was some sort of distraction or confusion that caused the pilot to lose control. Certainly a marginally trained and inexperienced pilot does not have a lot of ability in reserve, especially in the middle of the night following a long day.
The airplane had a good autopilot. Was the pilot not properly trained in its use? Autopilots have been known to cause confusion if not used correctly.
A question that has to be asked is whether or not the pilot would have even been flying IFR in bad weather over rough terrain at night in his single-engine airplane if it had not been equipped with a parachute. I have always thought that a pilot who would do anything in a twin that he wouldn’t do in a single is an accident looking for a place to happen. Same goes with the parachute.
I question, too, whether or not many in the industry don’t minimize the hazards found in aviation. No manufacturer is going to tell you that a product is dangerous as such and no entity that is in the business of promoting aviation will either. But collectively we should feel an obligation to make sure that new pilots understand that an airplane can kill you quicker than most anything else. When I look at the Cirrus accidents, I get the feeling that many of the pilots did not realize how quickly an airplane can bite, hard.
I always communicated with airplanes. Mostly the chatting was about the good things but I always though the most important question to pose was, “Old buddy, what are you going to do to try to hurt me today because I can’t let you get away with that.”
What do you think it would take to rein in the Cirrus fatal accidents?
Worth the read. A little simplistic in some aspects but the stats are there.
The new FTDK one would say!
Dick’s blog: what’s wrong with Cirrus pilots?
Dick's blog — By Richard Collins on May 14, 2012 2:40 pm
It's not the whistles and bells, it's the pilot.I recall when the Cirrus first came out, one of the principals said that product liability was not going to be a problem for them because the airplane would be so safe.
Since that time the NTSB shows 80 fatal Cirrus accidents in its database. Because of the litigious nature of our society, most, if not almost all, have likely resulted in legal action against the company.
Since the beginning, Cirrus has worked hard to try to see that the pilots of these airplanes are properly trained. All Cirrus airplanes have an airframe parachute, too. Without the chute there would have been many more fatal accidents because presumably a pilot does not pull the chute until he feels for certain it is necessary to save his ass.
The Cirrus was the first light airplane with a glass cockpit, too, and Cirrus has been a leader in using the latest whistles and bells to help pilots be better informed.
Despite all this, the Cirrus SR-22 has a higher fatal accident rate than most similar airplanes from other manufacturers. (We all know that SR-22s fly a lot of hours every year but that is taken into account when comparing accident rates.)
Why, with every safety advantage, has this come to be true?
It can only be because of one thing: the Cirrus pilot.
If you take at face value the benefit of type-specific training, Cirrus pilots have that. If you accept that glass cockpits give a pilot many valuable informational tools, Cirrus pilots have that. If you buy into the fact that an airframe parachute gives a pilot one last but extremely valuable option, Cirrus pilots have that. What they don’t seem to have is common sense and that is our collective fault. Both industry and government have worked to ensure that Cirrus pilots don’t know the score. Start with the FAA. A while back the instrument rating requirements were drastically reduced making the rating both less expensive and potentially more lethal. This was in response to pressure from general aviation interests, especially AOPA.
The result is that we have instrument-rated pilots who are not at all prepared for instrument flying, especially in technically advanced airplanes. The training systems that have been developed do what training systems have always done: they prepare pilots for the FAA tests. A person with an instrument rating might know something about operating on an IFR flight plan but know nothing of cloud flying.
Why would this affect Cirrus pilots more than others?
From the beginning the Cirrus has been sold as a transportation machine. That relates to weather flying like the airlines do. So a new pilot, and many Cirrus pilots are relatively new, gets an instrument rating and is suddenly trying to do what infinitely more experienced pilots are doing with airliners. And there are two of those experienced pilots in the front end of every airliner.
SR-22s are flying hard IFR trips all over the country (image courtesy of FlightAware.com).You can look at Flight Aware’s listing by type of airplanes in the IFR system at any given moment and there will be a lot of SR-22s in there. In fact there are usually more than any other GA type that is used for transportation. Sadly, you can look at that number and, unless it is a clear day, it can be safely assumed that an unhealthy percentage of the pilots really don’t know what they are doing or at least might be unable to handle anything out of the ordinary. This is not their fault. They were certified by the government, they were sold the airplane, and they were encouraged to use it.
So, cloudy day IFR wrecks are a big part of the Cirrus problem. So are low speed losses of control. Here the FAA also has bloody hands.
Normally a single-engine airplane has to be spun as part of the certification process. The Cirrus wasn’t. The FAA waived this requirement and accepted the airframe parachute as an alternate means of compliance. I kid you not, the spin recovery in a Cirrus is based on deploying the chute. That is the only way a pilot can recover from a spin in a Cirrus.
The stall characteristics of the airplane are not bad when compared with some other airplanes but they aren’t real good, either. It might have been reasonable to expect stellar stall characteristic in a new design but, alas, aerodynamics reached a plateau many years ago.
When everything is considered, the Cirrus record is what it is and will remain ever so unless some pretty drastic steps are taken. It can’t be more training or more safety features because those things are already there. The only thing that can actually lead to improvement is the mind-set of Cirrus pilots.
Years ago, insurance underwriters put far lower rates on insurance for twins than singles. Then some wise-ass writer (that would be me) started exploring the fact that the serious accident rate in twins was actually higher than in singles. The underwriters had been basing rates on what they thought to be true as opposed to what was actually true. Insurance underwriters have done that in a lot of areas over the years.
Such might be the case with Cirrus pilots. With training, advanced equipment, and a parachute, a pilot could develop a false sense of security about flying the airplane.
I recall an accident that well illustrates this. A professional person had finished a long and full day of work. After work, and after darkness set in, he flew an IFR trip to an airport located in rough terrain. At 11:30 p.m. he left that airport on an IFR clearance. He lost control of the airplane soon after takeoff and collided with rising terrain.
This was a relatively inexperienced pilot and you can read between the lines of the NTSB report and contemplate several things.
To me it is likely that there was some sort of distraction or confusion that caused the pilot to lose control. Certainly a marginally trained and inexperienced pilot does not have a lot of ability in reserve, especially in the middle of the night following a long day.
The airplane had a good autopilot. Was the pilot not properly trained in its use? Autopilots have been known to cause confusion if not used correctly.
A question that has to be asked is whether or not the pilot would have even been flying IFR in bad weather over rough terrain at night in his single-engine airplane if it had not been equipped with a parachute. I have always thought that a pilot who would do anything in a twin that he wouldn’t do in a single is an accident looking for a place to happen. Same goes with the parachute.
I question, too, whether or not many in the industry don’t minimize the hazards found in aviation. No manufacturer is going to tell you that a product is dangerous as such and no entity that is in the business of promoting aviation will either. But collectively we should feel an obligation to make sure that new pilots understand that an airplane can kill you quicker than most anything else. When I look at the Cirrus accidents, I get the feeling that many of the pilots did not realize how quickly an airplane can bite, hard.
I always communicated with airplanes. Mostly the chatting was about the good things but I always though the most important question to pose was, “Old buddy, what are you going to do to try to hurt me today because I can’t let you get away with that.”
What do you think it would take to rein in the Cirrus fatal accidents?
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I've heard from sources that a suitably experienced pilot can get them out of a spin without too much of a drama bit that is unconfirmed. Personally I don't like test flying aircraft that supposedly shouldn't be spun 
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Great post XXX.
Alot of food for thought there. There's one that I see from time to time that only came onto the register in March 2012. It's a beautiful looking aircraft with monogramed woodwork and great leather interior, tinted windows. It has the best EFIS systems, synthetic vision, de-ice everything, it's just the best! Upon comparison with what's available on their website it would appear to be the "Bees Knees" of the type.
(My apologies to this terrific aircraft's owner if I've identified or embarrassed you in any way...my post regarding your aircraft is intended to be complimentary)
I've looked at it up close a few times now and drooled over the thought of owning one of them but after reading your post now I'm not so sure (and I have a spin endorsement!). I guess one of the main selling points is in fact the skill of the pilot with regards to managing one of these aircraft correctly in the IFR environment.
Thanks for sharing that with us. I for one am now a bit wiser about the Cirrus and even though I hope not, this knowledge might just help me somewhere down the track...
Stiky
Alot of food for thought there. There's one that I see from time to time that only came onto the register in March 2012. It's a beautiful looking aircraft with monogramed woodwork and great leather interior, tinted windows. It has the best EFIS systems, synthetic vision, de-ice everything, it's just the best! Upon comparison with what's available on their website it would appear to be the "Bees Knees" of the type.
(My apologies to this terrific aircraft's owner if I've identified or embarrassed you in any way...my post regarding your aircraft is intended to be complimentary)
I've looked at it up close a few times now and drooled over the thought of owning one of them but after reading your post now I'm not so sure (and I have a spin endorsement!). I guess one of the main selling points is in fact the skill of the pilot with regards to managing one of these aircraft correctly in the IFR environment.
Thanks for sharing that with us. I for one am now a bit wiser about the Cirrus and even though I hope not, this knowledge might just help me somewhere down the track...
Stiky
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Could it be because the type of pilots that are buying this aircraft are doing so on a misbelief that when they get into trouble the BAS will save them.
IE they do not have the capability to be able to cope in a serious situation and believe that the BAS will save them. They may be able to pass whatever training they are given but fail when they are unable to put that training into use.
Should they be do their flying in the back of an airliner?
IE they do not have the capability to be able to cope in a serious situation and believe that the BAS will save them. They may be able to pass whatever training they are given but fail when they are unable to put that training into use.
Should they be do their flying in the back of an airliner?
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Majority of accidents IFR, CFIT during takeoff and approach phase.
Weekend warriors at the helm with few hours, an overconfidence likely eminating from their occupational field and the gizmo onboard their planes , but lacking a sound, current knowledge of the rules and flying skills without frequent flying experience (read ifr) and often just due to a lack of operational experience total time wise and in crap wx ...
My understanding is the FAA lowered CIR requirements/hours some time back- why!?
Are we surprised at all then this is happening?
The cirrus is just the new dr killer, replacing the mooney, baron, bonanza etc
Weekend warriors at the helm with few hours, an overconfidence likely eminating from their occupational field and the gizmo onboard their planes , but lacking a sound, current knowledge of the rules and flying skills without frequent flying experience (read ifr) and often just due to a lack of operational experience total time wise and in crap wx ...
My understanding is the FAA lowered CIR requirements/hours some time back- why!?
Are we surprised at all then this is happening?
The cirrus is just the new dr killer, replacing the mooney, baron, bonanza etc
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Yes, Mooney were the devils a few yrs back. They were difficult to recover from a spin, you'd lay the boot into opposite rudder and the thing would not come out for what seemed like eternity. It was patience and time ....and height !! Mooney Bros had a Mooney flt training session for new owners as well.
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a Cirrus has never been recovered from a spin with less than 15,000 feet of altitude loss!
Why Cirrus (CAPS & Stall/Spin)
The European authorities (initially JAA, later EASA) when first evaluating the Cirrus SR20 agreed with the principles of the FAA/ELOS approach but had some further questions. A series of spins was performed on their initiative. While not a complete formal program they reported no unusual characteristics.
The fact remains that a generation of pilots has not received spin training
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And there are two of those experienced pilots in the front end of every airliner.
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5,000 or 15,000 ft, it shouldn't make any difference if you know what to do...
Requiring 15,000 ft means that you are merely trying anything you can to get out of the spin. Also suspect wives tail.
Indeed it is the type of pilot, it's what the article is about.
I've been flying quite a few years and I've never come close to unintentionally spinning an Cirrus when flying from A to B but they seem to be able to manage it in the US frequently in these things.
A recent crash report in the US was that the pilot of the Cirrus banked too far at low speed when turning onto final and lost it. A pretty basic mistake really.
We lost one here at Warnervale in Christmas Day when it landed short of the runway. Standard trap of the Cirrus, so I wonder what happened to the insurance requirement for type training in Australia which should have covered that. With the dealer gone (I think) there may not be support for authorized Cirrus centres regarding type training any more.
We could easily go down the same path as the US with this aircraft. We've already lost a good number of Cirrus here.
Requiring 15,000 ft means that you are merely trying anything you can to get out of the spin. Also suspect wives tail.
Indeed it is the type of pilot, it's what the article is about.
I've been flying quite a few years and I've never come close to unintentionally spinning an Cirrus when flying from A to B but they seem to be able to manage it in the US frequently in these things.
A recent crash report in the US was that the pilot of the Cirrus banked too far at low speed when turning onto final and lost it. A pretty basic mistake really.
We lost one here at Warnervale in Christmas Day when it landed short of the runway. Standard trap of the Cirrus, so I wonder what happened to the insurance requirement for type training in Australia which should have covered that. With the dealer gone (I think) there may not be support for authorized Cirrus centres regarding type training any more.
We could easily go down the same path as the US with this aircraft. We've already lost a good number of Cirrus here.
Consider this:
Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%
Chance of surviving same scenario by pulling the chute - 100%.
I know which I'd choose, aircraft damage notwithstanding.
Even from an engine failure at altitude, why would you accept a 80-90% survival rate with a glide approach into a paddock when pulling the chute guarantees a 100% survival rate every time?
But the recent fatal Cirrus accidents have been base to final turn stall/spin accidents at low level with no chance of conventional or even parachute recovery. Unfortunately it's not the aircraft - it's the pilots.
There is a whole new generation of Cirrus pilots who are buying second-hand aircraft who have not had the factory training and are not aware of the excellent Cirrus Pilots' Proficiency Programme training with CSIPs (Cirrus Standardized Instructor Pilots), run by the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (or COPA).
I would highly recommend everyone who flies a Cirrus join COPA (it's only $65 annual fee) and attend at least one CPPP which has been happening in Australia for the past 2 years.
Flying the Cirrus means adopting a whole new paradigm shift in thinking about emergencies. Gone are the days of the macho-pilot ego, wrestling the plane to the ground in the event of an engine failure, hoping they're not the 20% who dig a wheel into a furrow in the paddock, cartwheel and ending up as a statistic. Much better to pull the chute, walk away and let the insurance company sort out the mess.
An insurance company executive in the USA has gone on the record saying that he would much rather pilots pull the chute because it's much cheaper to repair/replace aircraft than to deal with the pilot's/passengers' estate.
Some food for thought...
Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%
Chance of surviving same scenario by pulling the chute - 100%.
I know which I'd choose, aircraft damage notwithstanding.
Even from an engine failure at altitude, why would you accept a 80-90% survival rate with a glide approach into a paddock when pulling the chute guarantees a 100% survival rate every time?
But the recent fatal Cirrus accidents have been base to final turn stall/spin accidents at low level with no chance of conventional or even parachute recovery. Unfortunately it's not the aircraft - it's the pilots.
There is a whole new generation of Cirrus pilots who are buying second-hand aircraft who have not had the factory training and are not aware of the excellent Cirrus Pilots' Proficiency Programme training with CSIPs (Cirrus Standardized Instructor Pilots), run by the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (or COPA).
I would highly recommend everyone who flies a Cirrus join COPA (it's only $65 annual fee) and attend at least one CPPP which has been happening in Australia for the past 2 years.
Flying the Cirrus means adopting a whole new paradigm shift in thinking about emergencies. Gone are the days of the macho-pilot ego, wrestling the plane to the ground in the event of an engine failure, hoping they're not the 20% who dig a wheel into a furrow in the paddock, cartwheel and ending up as a statistic. Much better to pull the chute, walk away and let the insurance company sort out the mess.
An insurance company executive in the USA has gone on the record saying that he would much rather pilots pull the chute because it's much cheaper to repair/replace aircraft than to deal with the pilot's/passengers' estate.
Some food for thought...
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Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%
Crikey! That may be true for a modern Cessna only trained pilot but god I hope the rest of us can do better. I'd be dead many, many times over.
Scary that the view (might be) pulling the shute is better than actually knowing how to recover from or more importantly avoid altogether (these two go hand in hand by the way) the spin. 'Normal' pilots spin aeroplanes from 2k (or sometimes much lower in aerobatic types) and don't break a sweat once they have had a bit of training.
All a very sad indictment of where the training industry is at the moment more than anything in my view.
Crikey! That may be true for a modern Cessna only trained pilot but god I hope the rest of us can do better. I'd be dead many, many times over.
Scary that the view (might be) pulling the shute is better than actually knowing how to recover from or more importantly avoid altogether (these two go hand in hand by the way) the spin. 'Normal' pilots spin aeroplanes from 2k (or sometimes much lower in aerobatic types) and don't break a sweat once they have had a bit of training.
All a very sad indictment of where the training industry is at the moment more than anything in my view.
Last edited by Case Sensitive; 26th May 2012 at 14:41.
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Flying the Cirrus means adopting a whole new paradigm shift in thinking about emergencies. Gone are the days of the macho-pilot ego, wrestling the plane to the ground in the event of an engine failure, hoping they're not the 20% who dig a wheel into a furrow in the paddock, cartwheel and ending up as a statistic. Much better to pull the chute, walk away and let the insurance company sort out the mess.
bbbbbbbbbzzzzzzzzzzzzbbbbbbbzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
I understand where you're coming from. My comments are directed mainly at owners/pilots of Cirruses (?) in which that is the only aircraft they will fly.
I agree there is ABSOLUTELY no substitute for training. But if you have an option like the chute, it is frustrating to see Cirrus planes crash with a perfectly good chute behind them - hence, I believe, what prompted Dick Collins' article.
Again - the common denominator is the pilot. Sure, if you are a proficient aerobatic display pilot who spins your aircraft on a daily or weekly basis, your chances of survival are increased already because you probably would not allow yourself to be in a position where you would need to use your much practised skill. But if you are a Cirrus owner who flies once a month, I would suggest that when the proverbial hits the fan, the parachute would be a better option that offers a 100% chance of survival after which you can walk away and book a spot on that emergency manoeuvres training course that you were always too busy to do...
I agree there is ABSOLUTELY no substitute for training. But if you have an option like the chute, it is frustrating to see Cirrus planes crash with a perfectly good chute behind them - hence, I believe, what prompted Dick Collins' article.
Again - the common denominator is the pilot. Sure, if you are a proficient aerobatic display pilot who spins your aircraft on a daily or weekly basis, your chances of survival are increased already because you probably would not allow yourself to be in a position where you would need to use your much practised skill. But if you are a Cirrus owner who flies once a month, I would suggest that when the proverbial hits the fan, the parachute would be a better option that offers a 100% chance of survival after which you can walk away and book a spot on that emergency manoeuvres training course that you were always too busy to do...
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Consider this:
Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%
Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%
Chance of surviving same scenario by pulling the chute - 100%.
Last edited by Ultralights; 27th May 2012 at 00:42.
Chance of surviving an inadvertent spin from 2000ft with conventional recovery - say, 50%
Altitude loss on spin should be about 400 ft. If we did a decent job of spin training these day's the pilot would recognize the incipient spin and the altitude loss would be 50 ft.
But, most aircraft spins are gentle manoeuvres and are frequently survivable. Find a copy of " The Tiger Moth Story" and look at the photo of a tiger moth in a spin about 10ft off the ground that was survived.
There have been analyses done of Cirrus chute deployments, and I'm not sure that spinning featured. My recollection is that most chute deployments have been a result of VFR to IMC with one or more pilot medical instances.
Altitude loss on spin should be about 400 ft. If we did a decent job of spin training these day's the pilot would recognize the incipient spin and the altitude loss would be 50 ft.
But, most aircraft spins are gentle manoeuvres and are frequently survivable. Find a copy of " The Tiger Moth Story" and look at the photo of a tiger moth in a spin about 10ft off the ground that was survived.
There have been analyses done of Cirrus chute deployments, and I'm not sure that spinning featured. My recollection is that most chute deployments have been a result of VFR to IMC with one or more pilot medical instances.
Last edited by Old Akro; 27th May 2012 at 00:52.
I'm still trying to come to terms with a manufacturer building an aeroplane which is capable of entering a spin and then not bothering to develop a recovery procedure! Relying on a ballistic parachute system for aircraft recovery after a spin seems to be akin to throwing their hands up in horror and saying "too hard". Once the 'chute is deployed the aircraft is uncontrollable. Almost any other aircraft remains totally controllable after spin recovery is achieved.
At what point does negligence enter the equation? If negligence is defined as a repeated series of events or omissions which result in an accident, isn't Cirrus Design at least partly negligent by designing, building and selling multiple aircraft which can be spun without developing a procedure for recovery from the spin which leaves the pilot back in control, like any other aircraft?
Or have we reached a situation where basic "stick and rudder" skills no longer required in modern aviation?
At what point does negligence enter the equation? If negligence is defined as a repeated series of events or omissions which result in an accident, isn't Cirrus Design at least partly negligent by designing, building and selling multiple aircraft which can be spun without developing a procedure for recovery from the spin which leaves the pilot back in control, like any other aircraft?
Or have we reached a situation where basic "stick and rudder" skills no longer required in modern aviation?
But, most aircraft spins are gentle manoeuvres
I have never been heavily into the aerobatic thing but was thinking about what aircraft I have spun: C150 Aerobat/C152, PA38, Victa, Tiger Moth and Blanik glider. I would only describe the last two as anywhere near "gentle"!
During my stint in NZ, we used to regularly spin the PA38, which often rolled on its back before entering a spin - hardly a gentle manoevre. Admittedly it gave lots of warning before it bit you - but then it bit hard. If you blundered into a spin turning final in a PA38, I suspect you would die - even if you were well trained in spins.
The C150 takes a while to wind up in a fully developed spin, but when it does it is pointed what seems like straight at the ground and has a high rate of rotation. Tends to get the adrenaline flowing even when you know what it is gonna do. Admittedly you have to hold pro-spin controls to get there - and close the throttle, let go of the wheel and centre the ball and it will sort itself out.
While I am an advocate for basic aerobatic training for all, mainly to build confidence in what you can do with an aeroplane and what the aeroplane can do with you, I don't think spin training will stop people spinning out on turns onto final or during climb-out. They are the result of poor aircraft handling - ie crap piloting!
The V-tail Bonanza, the original Fork-tailed Doctor Killer, gives lots of warning of an impending stall in the landing config - then departs from normal flight quite vigorously - some might even say violently. If it happend at 500' in the turn onto final, a well tuned arobatic/spin trained pilot might recover in time - but I suspect a change of undies would be in order after the event!
I have never flown a Cirrus, and can't say I have any great desire to do so, but I suspect that 99% of Cirrus accidents are due to poor piloting/decision making - not the aeroplane itself.
Dr
Last edited by ForkTailedDrKiller; 27th May 2012 at 02:57.
By gentle, I really meant g and velocity (forward and downward). Its an unsettling manouevre for the pilot, but not violent.
This is a bit esoteric, but a 1g entry to a spin should have a wing drop only, not a corresponding wing rise. The awful "flipping on its back" sensation comes from an accelerated spin entry. Its really a quasi snap roll entry. It scores badly in competition.
A developed spin is inherently stable with typically relatively low descent rates.
This is a bit esoteric, but a 1g entry to a spin should have a wing drop only, not a corresponding wing rise. The awful "flipping on its back" sensation comes from an accelerated spin entry. Its really a quasi snap roll entry. It scores badly in competition.
A developed spin is inherently stable with typically relatively low descent rates.