Well, did you ever.

[Kharon]

Investigation: AO-2010-111 - Collision with terrain - Piper Aircraft PA-30, VH-EFS, 2 km NE Camden Airport, 23 December 2010 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2010/aair/ao-2010-111.aspx)

In all your short life.

End of training. (http://www.mmsend2.com/link.cfm?r=477501398&sid=17339705&m=1755073&u=ExAA2&j=8769795&s=http://youtu.be/YqmomTUVsAw)

Hear or see the like. Long live enforcement of subjective interpretation of our beloved CAO 40.1.

[Dawny]

I know you are posting to evoke responses for the benefit of all, but dude......

speak english

[compressor stall]

It's a shame that the high value of this accident -and the chilling video - as a lesson to every instructor are lost in your cryptic, desultory writings.

This is an accident report that those young impressionable instructors (and some older ones too) need to read and memorise.

[Frank Arouet]

The extra engine in a light twin should get you to the scene of the crash. The Comanche is no aircraft I would like to be doing engine failures in below 5000ft.

CASA don't believe this to be a valid concern however.

The Queen Air in the link below has been done here on another thread and illustrates what can happen and so quickly when you have an engine failure even in straight and level flight. You will hear the engine popping moments before the pilot looses control.

GMA News: YouScooper captures chilling video of Parañaque plane crash (December 10, 2011) - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YqmomTUVsAw&feature=youtu.be)

[JCJ]

The report on VH-MAC in the ATSB report will also make your toes curl :eek:

[PA39]

Don't blame the aircraft ! The bloody CRI CRI would be lethal in the palms of a fu**wit. :mad:

[Trojan1981]

Credit where it is due though. RM is not an instructor I ever really clicked with, but he did work me very hard for my endorsement on EFS. He is a very competent and skilled pilot/instructor. No doubt it was his quick thinking actions that saved both his own life and that of the student. :ok:

[MakeItHappenCaptain]

This accident highlights the critical importance of conducting the appropriate response actions following both an actual or simulated engine failure in a multi-engine aircraft; and the inherent risks of using the mixture control to simulate a failure at low altitude.


How often does this need to be brought up???

Obviously a bit more often.....:rolleyes:

[compressor stall]

How often does this need to be brought up???

Until the crashes stop happening?

[27/09]

he Comanche is no aircraft I would like to be doing engine failures in below 5000ft.

Really, why is that? I've done a few hours in the Comanche a while ago and found them to be a comparitively good performer on one engine. They match or exceed the performance of likes of the Seminole and Duchess and several other twins.

I think you are being a bit dramatic with your comment, however like any aircraft doing silly things in them can kill you. I don't remember the details of this accident and can't be bothered clicking on the link so this comment may not apply, however some instructors do try to be too "realistic".

[Frank Arouet]

Death is "real".

[By George]

With a VMCA of 80kts and only 160Hp each, it's a horrible little monster.

[Selcalmeonly]

It's a very long time ago but it never lit me up as a great performer on one (in the tropics)!!!

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Re comparisons.....

I well remember the day at YPKG in an AC-50 which is 'supposed' to behave 'well' on one......

3 POB, not quite 'full tanks' and on a S/E approach, had a 'single climb rate' comparable to...the venerable 'Twin Com'. in that it was a negative for the density alt of the day....so, we quickly 'relit' the other one and climbed away....safely...

NOT to be 'fiddled with'.!

:=:=

And, just for the 'heck' of it...I did my 'Initial Twin' in good ole' DFH, (PA-30)mostly at Camden, and 'BARELY' missed the hill on a EFATO....TORT ME A LOT!!!. Thanks AL......:ok::D:ok:

Sorry for the 'drift' Mr 'K', But....T'was givin me the 'whoops'!!!

Cheers:ok:

[A37575]

but he did work me very hard for my endorsement on EFS

Sounds like a brilliant flying instructor. But seems he may have worked his student a little too hard this time - judging by the sorry state of the aircraft. If I recall, several years ago at Camden, an instructor cut the mixture after take off at Camden in a light twin just for "practice", and he died in the crash and subsequent inferno.

[allthecoolnamesarego]

No doubt it was his quick thinking actions that saved both his own life and that of the student

A great pilot has the ability to get you out of a bad situation, a superior pilot doesn't put you in that situation in the first place.

Why the F%# do people still shut engines down after takeoff for training???

[Kharon]

Put it up in a rush yesterday and omitted the following:-

There are some significant differences and inconsistencies between the pilots statements and witness reports which leave a lot of questions unanswered by the ATSB report.

I believe (happy to corrected) that the tip tanks were full which, if I remember correctly is a big no no for the type of airwork exercise they were going to do. (AFM anyone ?). This was not mentioned by the ATSB report.

Had the training pilot had been influenced by the current 'fad' for absolute compliance with 'black letter' law enforced by local FOI ?. Remember this was a training exercise, the aim is to get the student to perform the drills correctly, manage the flight path and land, repeat as needed until the lesson is learnt. Way back when, I remember that when the aircraft was gear up and accelerating the instructor would simulate the failure and, away we'd go; piece of cake. But this notion of a 'dead cut', low and slow gives me the heebies. The ATSB report does not provide information on the how, where and when of this incident.

The changes made to the company operation manual are interesting in that they reflect a couple of poorly thought out statements, and reflect the current mania in the Sydney basin for enforcing a 'dead cut'; or, if that freaks you out, using a 'simulator'. The simulator notion alone is worth some discussion, do they mean a simulator or a procedures trainer?. I mean it adds a whole new dimension to the 'value' of the training and it's legal validity if the 'sim' is 'generic'.

For my dollar, the ATSB have skimmed over the surface of this report in a slip shod manner and the case needs to be examined in depth. As stated previously, we keep killing folks. I would like to know exactly what happened at Camden and more importantly the underlying forces which lined up the holes in this particular bit of Cheese.

[Up-into-the-air]

Recommendation issued to: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Output No: R20040069
Date Issued: 25 June 2004
Safety Action Status:
Background:
Output Text

Safety Recommendation

The ATSB recommends that CASA consider and evaluate options to improve the suitability of industry practices for training pilots to make appropriate decisions when responding to engine failures and other emergencies during critical phases of flight in multi-engine aircraft below 5,700 kg MTOW.

This review should include an assessment of the suitability of utilising synthetic training devices for the purpose of training pilots to make decisions regarding emergencies.

Initial Response
Date Issued: 23 August 2004
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Status: Closed - Partially Accepted
Response Text:

The training syllabus for the initial issue of a multi-engine aeroplane endorsement is currently published by CASA in Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.23-1. It describes in detail the course of flight and ground training, which candidates seeking their first multi-engine endorsement (rating) should undertake.

The syllabus is also applicable to subsequent endorsements and provides the knowledge and training requirements that detail appropriate decision making procedures to be employed by pilots when responding to engine failures and other emergencies in multi-engine aircraft.

For training in decision-making procedures, it is considered necessary to replicate as accurately as possible, the situation where an emergency could take place. In Australia, synthetic training devices for this class of aircraft are typically generic in nature and are seen as a useful aid in the training of emergency procedures.
However, due to the lack of realism, it is considered that they fail to simulate the environment sufficiently to be of benefit in this type of human factors training. It should also be noted that there is a substantial cost involved in the acquisition and operation of synthetic training devices.

Assessment of human factors is currently included in all pilot licence theory examinations and an assessment is made during flight testing. With the implementation of Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 61, CAS A will incorporate human factors training in the Manual of Standards (MOS) for all flight crew licences. Additionally, aspects of human factors are embedded within the MOS as 'Manage

Flight' elements and provide for an assessment of the decision-making process and behaviour that must be achieved for the issue of a qualification.
Last update 01 April 2011

casa response to ATSB: This is the 2004 response. The Camden PA-30 loss would not have occurred if casa "stepped up to the plate" and delivered to the industry.

The British CAA say it all: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/130711_SafetyNotice_StallRecoveryTechniques.pdf

Look at the Norwegian loss of the Metro [ http://www.aibn.no/Aviation/Reports/2011-40]

and the short report:

"Description: The accident flight was a skill-test for a candidate that was to become a first officer on SA226-T(B) Merlins. The weather was not suited for flying skill-tests. It was low ceiling, rain showers and winds up to 40 kt and turbulence. The circuit breaker for the Stall Avoidance and Stability Augmentation System (SAS²) was pull presumably to avoid nuisance activations of the stick pusher in turbulence during previous demonstrations of slow flight.

When demonstrating stalls, the examiner asked for a slow flight up to first indication of stall, and not an actual stall. He asked for call outs and a minimum loss of altitude recovery. The commander undertook the tasks of adding power and retracting gear and flaps on the candidate's request. It was IMC. During this exercise the crew lost control of attitude and airspeed. The stall warning came on, but the airspeed decreased, even with full power applied. Radar data show that the altitude increased 200 - 400 ft during the period where control was lost. Airspeed decreased to about 30 kt and a sink rate of about 10 000 ft/min eventually developed. The airplane hit the sea in a near horizontal attitude about 37 sec. after control was lost. All three on board were fatally injured."

Surely we must ensure that a flight test is not a test of how good the "tester" is, but that it ensures "demonstration".

Why not at a survivable level and a zero-thrust situation.

[LeadSled]

Why not at a survivable level and a zero-thrust situation.UP-IN-THE-AIR,

In short, because "CASA" does not "permit" it, because it "does not comply" with "their" "definition" of an "engine failure" ---- the engine must be failed ---- and running at a zero thrust setting is an engine running, not "failed", and therefor not "compliant" with having an "engine failure"., and it must be "on takeoff".

"Compliance" requires ignoring the CAAPs, CAAPs not being regulatory, the "Orders" (CAOs) trump the CAAPS.

All a matter of "black letter law", with criminal penalties for non-compliance ---- except for, apparently, the regulation requiring compliance with the aircraft AFM.

Sadly, this nonsense, with the inevitable result of a steadily rising toll of the dead goes further than CASA, the "industry" is not short of gunghoe idiots ( cf: the last fatal twin at Camden) who want to demonstrate their bigger balls ----- but CASA should be clamping down down ----- not "mandating" that such attempted suicide continue.

No doubt it was his quick thinking actions that saved both his own life and that of the student In my opinion, this is about the only thing the PIC got right, the aircraft and the student should never have been put in this situation in the first place

---- why was he, the student??? This is core issue that ATSB declined to investigate.

Tootle pip!!

PS: And I do mean attempted suicide ---- every time you go outside the certified performance envelope of any aircraft ( and you are not a test pilot with a planned test objective) you are creating an unnecessary and avoidable hazard.

We have known for years that the hazard of shutting down an engine during asymmetric training, versus zero thrust, provides no training benefit worth the risk ----- but the practice persists in Australian, despite the steadily mounting and totally avoidable death toll.

PS2: Re. the last twin fatal at Camden, the two pilots did not die in the accident, they were both horribly burned, as well as other injuries, and as I recall the PIC died the following day, but the other poor bastard lingered for weeks before he finally died ---- and he only came to Australia with his family for a flying holiday, he was an airline captain --- he would never have expected that anybody would do what the PIC did --- and was well known, locally, for doing.

[Trojan1981]

A great pilot has the ability to get you out of a bad situation, a superior pilot doesn't put you in that situation in the first place.

Why the F%# do people still shut engines down after takeoff for training???

Yep, no disagreement here. All failures were done with throttle during my training.

[PA39]

Mmmm with about 4000hrs in them (owning and instructing) I can tell you they are not "horrible little monsters" anyone with that attitude simply can't fly the twin comanche.

Hands up those who have had close calls during assymetric training,,,,,me included. You must be current, know that particular aircraft, know the students capabilities and most important know and understand your own limitations. Inattentiveness, tiredness lack of concentration all play a big part of your survival when the unexpected happens. :bored:

[Oktas8]

I have used ICO in this scenario many times in the past, not recently when the overseas CAA's for whom I worked, banned use of the mixture for low level EF training. But even when it was allowed, the mixture remained at ICO only long enough for the student to retard the throttle. From that point on the mixture went to rich. Why do people think the mixture has to stay at ICO all the way to the ground? Doesn't the CAO use the term "simulated" failure, allowing for use of either throttle or mixture at PIC discretion? Genuine question from a foreigner btw.

Anyway, sometimes I needed power back in a hurry. I never had any trouble with it. Perhaps others did.

I rehearsed on the ground, and got my META trainee-instructors to rehearse, a quick pull of both mixtures to ICO following a low-speed excursion when asymmetric. This applied regardless of the means of simulating the engine failure. Then the instructor would have time to sort out the airspeed and engine mess while wings level. But it did take practise and recency.

[Kharon]

The how's and why for's of simulating have been done to death, ad infinitum, ad tedium, ad nauseum.

This is about the bald insistence that 'simulation' is not good enough, the blind adherence to the 'letter' of the law, the piss poor, shallow analysis trotted out by the ATSB and the flat refusal to adapt to or adopt current world best training practice as recommended by ATSB, NTSB, CAA etc.

It's also about CASA being satisfied that, in a generic procedural trainer (simulator) that "you" can handle a specific aircraft type OEI. (Duchess or C421 same same ??).

Whether you throw a cat down the intake, remove the mixture lever or cut through a fuel line don't signify, provided you've got all the bets covered.

[PA39]

To quote Dear ol' Bob Hoover, the undisputed pilots pilot.........One MUST have either airspeed or altitude...should you have neither you're in big trouble. :ouch:

[27/09]

Death is "real". My point exactly Frank.

How many pilots have been killed or nearly scared themselves to death doing stuff like is mentioned here.I did my 'Initial Twin' in good ole' DFH, (PA-30)mostly at Camden, and 'BARELY' missed the hill on a EFATO....

Why do instructors insist on such stupid reality?

We all know that the approach or departure phases of flight are the most critical times to stall an aircraft BUT do we do stall training at theses times? No we don't. So why do some instructors insist on engine failure drills at times and places that put the aircraft and occupants at unnecessary risk. By all means do engine failures after take off but at a sensible altitude and place with respect to terrain etc.

Regarding this comment,

The Comanche is no aircraft I would like to be doing engine failures in below 5000ft.

CASA don't believe this to be a valid concern however. and this one as well

With a VMCA of 80kts and only 160Hp each, it's a horrible little monster.

I did a bit of research

PA30B S/E Roc 260 fpm S/E ceiling 5800 feet
PA44 S/E RoC 212 fpm S/E ceiling 3800 feet
BE76 S/E RoC 235 fpm S/E ceiling 6170 feet
GA 7 S/E RoC 200 fpm S/E ceiling 4250 feet
PA31-310 S/E RoC 245 fpm S/E ceiling 15800 feet
C402B S/E RoC 225 fpm S/E ceiling 11320 feet
DA42 S/E Roc 170 fpm S/E ceiling 10000 feet

Of this group the PA30 has the best S/E RoC, and second only to the BE76 for S/E ceiling among the nromally aspirated aircraft on the list.

Guess what guys? If CASA needs to have concerns about the Comanche there's quite a few other aircraft they need to have in their sights as well and there's quite few other horrible little monsters out there.

Reading a few of the other posts it would seem that one of the real issues is how CASA, or perhaps more correctly some CASA staff interpret what is a failed engine. Sounds to me that some CASA personnel need to be taken aside and put straight on a few points. Requiring an engine to be completely shutdown for the complete exercise is raising the level of risk to unacceptable level in my book.

[Checkboard]

This accident highlights the critical importance of conducting the appropriate response actions following both an actual or simulated engine failure in a multi-engine aircraft; and the inherent risks of using the mixture control to simulate a failure at low altitude.
That's a bad statement, on a couple of levels. There is only a "critical importance" for conducting the correct actions when actual or simulated failures occur in a "critical situation". :ugh: It is up to a professional instructor to ensure that failures for training NEVER occur under critical conditions.

The reason for using the mixture to simulate a failure is so that the student must identify the failed engine correctly (i.e they always have control of the throttles, and can't see which mixture has been moved to ICO). The ONLY "inherent risk" in using the mixture is that the student will mis-identify the engine - but that is a risk inherent in any training scenario (i.e. it's not inherent in using the mixture) - that the student will from time to time, get it wrong.

[Kharon]

PA 39 - "horrible little monsters" anyone with that attitude simply can't fly the twin Comanche. So true -

27/09 - We all know that the approach or departure phases of flight are the most critical times to stall an aircraft BUT do we do stall training at theses times? No we don't. So true– edit "NO we bloody well don't"; and yet stall related 'frights' greatly out number actual 'real life' engine failures (think black hole, ice and a tight approach).

27/09 - Guess what guys? If CASA needs to have concerns about the Comanche there's quite a few other aircraft. etc. Not a care in the world FAR 23 certification rules supreme.

27/09 - Sounds to me that some CASA personnel need to be taken aside and put straight on a few points. Right, with gentle education, kindness, understanding, forgiveness, warm fuzzy words, feel good outcomes, a nice big bonus and nice new pair of sox.

[Oktas8]

Regarding "putting straight" some examiners.

I would have thought that the public liability insurers would have had input by now.

CFI to examiner: "I'm sorry Bob, but our insurance company won't allow us to do 'x' any more, as it is not a legal requirement and they won't cover us for it."

[splitty]

Pull the Mixture .... Pull the Death Cord ...........Cutting the Mixture was banned in NZ many years ago in the PA 30's after many fatals in the USA.

[Kharon]

8/8 - I would have thought that the public liability insurers would have had input by now.
The answer to a pagans prayer, I wish they would.
Could be voodoo or perhaps the sweet siren song of spin, spin spin lulls them into their current somnambulist state.

Quote of week that man 8/8. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

[Sarcs]

I would have thought that the public liability insurers would have had input by now.
:ok:

Insurers have their own risk assessment departments that weigh up the risks vs money to gain from a dodgy client. That's not to say they won't file away for a rainy day any info on dodgy ops carried out by a 'valued client'!:(

[Up-into-the-air]

"With a level of officialdom mixed with stupidity, the FAA recommended that Vmc demonstrations in twins be done at low altitudes to ensure maximum power from the live engine. Even in the placid Apache, low-level Vmc demonstrations could be terminal.

For training schools the PA-30 was an ideal Apache replacement. Small, economical and with great handling, it was a popular choice as a primary multi-engine trainer.

The only problem is that its high performance wing does not cut the pilot much slack or tolerate abuse from pupils.

With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight we now know that no light twin, (except Cessna's 336/337) should be stalled with one engine dead.

The wide distribution of weight in the engines and fuel has an aggravating affect under asymmetric thrust.

Once the rudder has run out of effective control (below Vmc), a stall may quickly turn into an unrecoverable flat spin. At FAA recommended low altitudes, this was a great prescription for killing pilots in training and is exactly what happened.

It led to the Twin Comanche acquiring a totally undeserved reputation.

In belated recognition of demonstrating the dangers of Vmc, the FAA responded in 1969 by a simple stroke of the pen, to increasing the PA-30's Vmc from 71 to 77 kts. The implications of this can be seen when evaluating the aircraft."

From: Fliteguide / Imperial Aviation

Keep the PA-30s' flying and respect their ability.

[27/09]

Splitty Pull the Mixture .... Pull the Death Cord ...........Cutting the Mixture was banned in NZ many years ago in the PA 30's after many fatals in the USA.

What a lot of unmitigated Cr*p. Where ever did you get this idea from?

Isn't there a lot of uninformed clap trap about some aircraft?

Up-into-the-air

Vmc went from 71 KIAS to 77 KIAS at the stroke of the FAA's pen not the 81 to 91 as quoted in your reference. 91 kts is Vy. Otherwise a good brief summary.

[Checkboard]

As Vmc is a performance number, and is determined by the engine power/rudder authority, how can a "stroke of the pen" possibly change it? :confused:

[27/09]

As Vmc is a performance number, and is determined by the engine power/rudder authority, how can a "stroke of the pen" possibly change it?Correct, the stroke of a pen doesn't change it at all.

It was a knee jerk reaction to a string off accidents which were largely caused by the FAA stupid Vmc demonstration requirements.

Interestingly Vmc for the the PA 39 is still 71 knots which was the original figure for the PA30. Perhaps there was some more flight testing done on the PA 30 and it was determined with the critical engine inoperative the Vmc was 77, but so far as I am aware it was just a "stroke of the pen". Perhaps someone with a good knowledge on such things may be able to tell us if 6 knots difference in Vmc between the critical and non critical engines is the sort of difference to expect.

[Sunfish]

As a learner, one of the most exquisite issues for me is the relationship between the edges of the actual flight envelope and the published flight envelope.

Without a detailed understanding of how the published edges of the envelope were promulgated, one is asking for trouble.


This from a mug that has only once neared the edge (as far as he knows) - stall warning on a hurried base to final turn in a C172.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Hi 27/09,

Yep! We 'barely' missed that bloody hill. And, guess what? ITS STILL THERE!

And so are 'we'.

It was quite apparent that we were going to go 'close' but, close and clear.
(Unless the 'good one' coughed), then the plan - yes, there was always a plan - bring up the other one from 'zero thrust' and keep on going, to the clear ground beyond.

I reckoned it was better to maintain the 'ole girl' in S&L, trying to climb, rather than make a turn 'away' from the hill which we were going to clear anyway, and invite 'trouble'.....

Even in the AC-50 as described earlier, there was certainly a 'plan'...

I guess that its when we don't consider much beyond the 'now' that we are likely to get into problemos....

And if you think this is all 'in hindsight', then I have been 'lucky' and have had good instructors and colleagues who think this way, and it 'rubbed off'.

Fortunately. I'm now 'old enuf' to enjoy the 'mistakes'.......

Cheers:ok:

[Kharon]

And all good yarns, no doubt. But off the point lads, away off. Finally hunted down a 1996 AFM, page 3-7 presents a small paragraph referring to 'Simulated Single Engine Operations'. The manufacturer holds (held) the type certification data and, produces the AFM against that data and as correctly pointed out, meets the pertinent FAR 23 requirements.

The AFM paragraph mentions a couple of small items which the ATSB have managed not to mention such as. "Simulated engine failure should be performed at an altitude that will allow enough room for a safe recovery (5000 ft min, terrain clearance is recommended) should control of the airplane be lost".

Left engine throttle - - Retard.

**Note**. "While Vsse is the accepted airspeed below which an engine should never be intentionally failed, it is recommended that the airspeed should never be allowed to fall below the blue line (105 mph) when operating single engine".

It is of interest to us that these are from the Emergency Procedures section of the AFM.
The proposed changes to the Operations Manual (refer ATSB report) do not comply with the manufacturer procedures, are accepted by CASA and the ATSB fails to mention the fact.

Questions: you bet, lots of. But first, lets see what the esteemed members make of the 'Bible' version of how it is recommended that single engine operations be conducted in an aircraft which is not certified for low. slow. dead cut failure and climb out. Not the practical stuff, but as it would be heard in a Coroners Court.


"well M'lud, seems they operating contrary to etc. etc".

[LeadSled]

Sounds to me that some CASA personnel need to be taken aside and put straight on a few points. Requiring an engine to be completely shutdown for the complete exercise is raising the level of risk to unacceptable level in my book.

27/09,
Actually, they need to betaken out and shot, so they can't pass their dominant stupid gene on to another generation.

Much of Polar Air's troubles started with a argument about how EFATO training would be conducted, with the owner of Polar flatly refusing to "fail" and engine as required by "CASA" ----- then followed the "special audits" etc. There is a thread here somewhere with all the details ---- this case is going to the High Court of Australia.

I am not short of other examples on the easy coast.

Tootle pip!! http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/buttons/reply_small.gif (http://www.pprune.org/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=6986927&noquote=1)

[Kharon]

Sunfish - This from a mug that has only once neared the edge (as far as he knows) - stall warning on a hurried base to final turn in a C172. Scary stuff, but infinitely controllable on base, tougher on final and below, but you have good cards, field within gliding distance, donkey ticking over, enough sense, training and time to get your derriere out of the blender. Now look carefully at the engine failure situation, very few good cards in your hand. You really need to learn how to manage this animal there is no Vmca horn obligingly bleating in your ear ; EFATO has for many years been taught very well to a large number of pilots by their instructors, quite calmly (ish) and sensibly without resorting to extreme measures due to a few words written in a different era. Enter the Dragon (roll of drums). Today, we ignore it.

Had a beer with a wise man last evening, clever fellah. Suggested I read between the lines of the ATSB report on this and see what could be gleaned from the oh so subtle, tongue in cheek way it penned. Suddenly the light came on – 'lighty training incident, no broken bones' – Alt/F/Del.

Except there are matters outstanding on this account, in primus the conflict between the eye witnesses (which are pretty hard to find alive), the 'candidate pilot' and his erstwhile instructor. Secundus the method employed to train the hapless victim, the reason for the training being conducted as it was and to finish; why has there not been a deep and meaningful recommendation made to the puzzled plebs.

ATSB are probably sick to death of passing along recommendations which are blithely ignored, all those lovely shiny brochures, carefully written sage advice and bright hopes dashed. Got some very interesting numbers (NFP) related to 'ignored' recommendations.

Bring back Russ Evans, before we all end up crispy critters. Steam off.

[LeadSled]

And all too many posters on this (and previous similar) threads could do themselves a service by reading "Understanding Light Twin Engine Aeroplanes" by, wait for it ---- Russ Evans.

Tootle pip!!

[SW3]

A light twin like the Twin Comanche on one engine is fairly similar in performance to a heavy C150 with two up on a hot day, will climb if you're lucky and flying it how it should be flown. That's one aspect to consider, thrown in with controlling asymmetric forces. Less performance, less forgiving. Your two out of jail for free cards, height and speed, don't come easy.
Respect for what you're flying, it's limitations and currency in it goes a long way!