Remember Pearl Harbor [Archive]

walter kennedy

9th Dec 2011, 18:50

Shackman
<<... without Pearl Harbour I suspect most of us on this side of the pond would have German as our 'mother tongue'. >>
mmmh, can't resist a mother of a tongue in cheek alternative perspective:
Before Hess dropped in, there had been something like 9 peace offers by the Germans that not only guaranteed Brit sovereignty but kept the empire intact – their main interest was in stopping Bolshevism spreading west (remember the Red Army attempt to crash through Poland to Germany in 1920?). If it wasn't for the likes of Sikorksy then the Germans, one wonders what your mother tongue would be now – if you were still around to speak that is (this is becoming a moot point nowadays – it's not like English is the mother tongue of many in Britain's cities). Not only did the English had much in common with the Germans culturally – in the '30s about 35% of Americans were ethnic German and I think one American state (Pennsylvania?) still had German as the state language until the “50s (was it Transylvania where the stockmarket was?).
The Italians then the Germans broke out of the great depression in the '30s – we did not. It is a pity that this was achieved with such an extreme regime as the Nazis in charge – I am sure that the majority of Germans would have been happy with a more conservative administration but such was the economic and social situation that something had to be done and they perceived the national socialists were the only ones capable of standing up to the commies, to the international financiers, and for their culture and so democratically voted them in with an overwhelming majority.
Given the current economic debacle gripping the whole western world right now, perhaps we should try and return to a sovereign national state issuing its own fiat currency and stabilising by manufacturing basic essentials locally – the quality of programmes available to watch on those nice big flat-screen TVs is going down anyway, what you get to see between adverts anyway. We wouldn't need pogroms, just identify who owns all the money and agree to a reasonable settlement and then piss them off.
Of course you can always still hang onto the warm feeling that the propaganda has given you and leave it to the next generation to sort out – if there is much of a next generation without a single ethnic European group anywhere on the planet having a birth-rate anywhere near the minimum replacement rate – and with immigration taking over the living space anyway.
In WW2 we slaughtered our cousins and in the process lost so many of our best young men; we not only wrecked our mother countries but also lost control of the development of many colonies, in particular leaving those in Africa to be raped by multi-nationals that put nothing back.
Ah! I digress – the dirty Japanese sneak attack (can't say “surprise attack” as all the ships that mattered were moved out beforehand) – were you aware of the stranglehold of the oil embargo on Japan? - they only had a few months before oil shortages would have prevented large scale enterprises so were provoked to act – which was handy really as going to war with Japan automatically got them to war with Germany – so I suppose that you were correct to an extent about the implications of Pearl Harbour for Britain – it wasn't just the 30,000+ war brides (ie our womenfolk) that were fcuked. :}

If it's not politically incorrect now to say so, Happy Christmas, all. :ok:

Gnadenburg

11th Dec 2011, 04:30

It was the Royal Navy that believed and proved it was possible to sink a battleship when we did it!

So why did they send their battleships up the Malayan Peninsula without air cover?

glojo

11th Dec 2011, 09:31

So why did they send their battleships up the Malayan Peninsula without air cover?

I guess for the same reason they sent six Fairey Swordfish to attack state of the art German battlecruisers in the English Channel!

500N

11th Dec 2011, 09:45

" So why did they send their battleships up the Malayan Peninsula without air cover?"

Because of Admiral Phillips and what he believed in, that the 2 Battleships, latest armour that he thought could withstand Jap bombs (didn't factor in the torpedoes), Radar Guided AA guns (that didn't work because of the humidity) and quite a few others, including underestimating the enemy.

They had air cover, it was only an hour away but he didn't call for it until it was too late.
.

Chugalug2

11th Dec 2011, 10:24

WK:
The Italians then the Germans broke out of the great depression in the '30s – we did not. It is a pity that this was achieved with such an extreme regime as the Nazis in charge – I am sure that the majority of Germans would have been happy with a more conservative administration but such was the economic and social situation that something had to be done
The something that had to be done was to go to war. It was only by plundering the treasuries and resources, private and public, of each and every "last territorial demand" that the Germans occupied thereafter that the Reich was able to keep the pace of State expenditure going to pay for all the pre-war public works, never mind those of war-time, which had been achieved thereto by simply cooking the books. You may envy such "creativity", but to emulate it you would also ultimately have to go to war.
As to the Italians, they have refined such creativity to a fine art, though it seems to have deserted them spectacularly recently. In their case going to war seems not to have worked, except at the very start. Their strength was in losing wars of course, as exemplified in Catch 22!
You mention Hess. His "flying visit" is one of the yet to be explained enigmas of WW2. His reception committee at Dungavel included a member of the British Royal family, according to eyewitnesses present.

pr00ne

11th Dec 2011, 10:49

500N draken55

"it makes my head spin when I read some of the rules councils etc have to adhere to now - stupid rules"

500N

Take a trip to Amsterdam and take note of the mothers who cycle through the City at all times of the day with their kids in boxes attached to the front. No high viz jackets or helmets for any of them."

You also won't see ALL cyclists in London, or any of our big cities wearing high viz jackets or helmets as there is NO "EU dictat" making any of us wear anything of the sort. It's a lifestyle and personal survival choice.

By the way, just what exactly IS an 'EU dictat" other than some fictional invention of the Daily Mail?

500N

11th Dec 2011, 11:05

Come and live in Victoria, Australia, everyone calls it the "nanny state" because of all the stupid rules they like or try to bring in. We have to wear helmets.

.

pr00ne

11th Dec 2011, 11:18

500N,

Wow! Really? As in an actual law? Well, that's something that I didn't know, thanks.

Is it just a local 'State' law or a national thing?

That rather blows away the point that I was going to make on my post, that most 1st world developed countries have roughly the same level of health and safety and personal safety regs. Surely that is not a bad thing? After all we don't put 8 year old boys up chimneys or make 5 year old girls clean under moving machinery any more because the rules and regulations were tightened up to stop us doing that, not because of any sense of what was right or morally correct.

Remember, it was the TRADE UNIONS who gave us all the weekend, capped weekly hours, paid holidays, paid sickness and a duty of care to an employee, NOT benevolent employers.

SASless

11th Dec 2011, 11:34

It was the Royal Navy that believed and proved it was possible to sink a battleship when we did it!

Plainly learned a lesson from General Billy Mitchell of the US Army Air Corps....when the very first battleship was sunk by aircraft during trials off the Virginia coast. Prophetic it was an american battleship (three) and one German WWI Dreadnought.

Took place in 1921....and ignited a real war....between the Army Air Corps (now Air Force) and the Navy over strategic air power and ships. The war morphed into a very serious conflict when the Admirals almost mutinied over the issue in later years.

Air Power:Billy Mitchell Sinks the Ships (http://centennialofflight.gov/essay/Air_Power/mitchell_tests/AP14.htm)

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/1981/1981%20mcfarland.pdf

glojo

11th Dec 2011, 11:39

I agree about not requesting the air cover but is that over simplifying this catastrophe. Churchill had a history of being reckless and was never too concerned regarding the lives of those involved in any of his reckless schemes. Is it correct to say the Navy breathed a sigh of relief when Churchill moved up from being First Lord of the Admiralty? Sadly he still ruled over the navy and against all advice it was his decision to deploy the Prince of Wales and Repulse to the Far East. He was informed about how exposed these ships would be to air attack but failed to listen to those that were against this deployment at that time, under those circumstances.

It can be said that neither Churchill nor his War Cabinet could offer any practical solution to the problem of two capital ships caught in a rapidly deteriorating situation. So we may assume they'd sailed to Singapore with no-preordained battle plan. Adding weight to this theory is up until the time of his departure with Force Z. Philips didn't receive any direct orders from Britain on what course of action he should pursue. In fact at their meeting of December 9th the War Cabinet deferred reaching judgment on this issue till the following morning, by which time Repulse and Prince of Wales had been sunk.

The majority of men onboard mightn't have known their destination but Churchill wasted little time in telling others. Within days of the Prince steaming out of the Clyde he informed President Roosevelt:

As your naval people have already been informed we are sending that big ship you inspected into the Indian Ocean as part of a squadron we are forming there. This ought to serve as a deterrent to Japan

By November 10 the deployment of the ships became public knowledge; during a talk at the Lord Mayors Inaugural Luncheon at the Mansion House, he not only informed the British public of this fact his words confirmed to the Japanese that the ships were moving towards Singapore:

Never has that saying:
Loose lips sink ships been more apt.

On November 28 , 1941 the Japanese armed forces received information that the Prince of Wales and Repulse would enter port in Colombo and then head for Singapore. The Commander of the Japanese combined fleets Isoroku Yamamoto decided to send 36 warplanes of the type known as the Betty equipped with torpedoes to reinforce those already in Indo-China. On November 30 the Kanoya Naval Force was unofficially told to attack the Prince of Wales and Repulse using the Betty. They immediately began training day and night to maximise the potential of those aircraft and on December 3, a reconnaissance plane discovered the ships at Singapore. From then on the fate of those ships was sealed.

The force in Indo China that was going to be reinforced consisted of:

20 Aircraft including 90 heavy bombers. The majority of 2 fleet comprising of 12 modern cruisers, 28 destroyers now in Formosa, South China sea area. In addition, 9 submarines sighted 100 miles North of Camranh Bay on December 2 course South.

Hopefully folks will accept I was not being critical of the possibility of air cover for the Prince of Wales but the Japanese were aware of available numbers and had allowed for this contingency, would the outcome have still been the same but also the loss of all those aircraft sent out to protect these warships??

As you quite rightly point out the advanced radar could not cope with the humid conditions but RAF technicians could have modified the systems if they had been informed about it whilst the ships were at Singapore:

On the afternoon of December 8, Squadron Leader TC Carter was sent aboard with two RAF technicians to ascertain if the situation could be quickly remedied: he stated:

I was somewhat irritated, when I found that the set had been unserviceable throughout the week that Prince of Wales had been in Singapore and it was only now when she was obviously being prepared for sailing that we were called in and asked to do the job at once. In the event we could not. Had we had been called in a couple of days earlier we might have been able to do the job. So it was Prince of Wales sailed with that radar set unserviceable

My questions though are:

Could air support have dealt with the Japanese aircraft? From what I have read it would have been unlikely.

If this air cover had been provided then it would have to operate well away from the warships as the ships gunfire would not differentiate between the good guys and the bad guys. It transpires that there were numerous squadrons of Japanese Zero aircraft that had been allocated to escort the attacking air groups, it was there task to solely deal with any air cover that attempted to cover these warships plus to eliminate the aircraft carried by the carrier that should have been in company with this battle group.

Our attack on the Bismark was called ruthless and perhaps we should have shown compassion once all her guns had ceased to function, but from what I have read the attack particularly on the Prince of Wales was even more savage!

I was impressed to read that the Repulse had somehow managed to evade over fifteen torpedoes, but she had no chance of winning that conflict and apart from numerous bombs that struck her, she was also hit by five torpedoes.

Slightly back on topic :)
Pearl Harbour could have been far, far worse. Most of the ships that were sunk rested on the harbour bottom and were salvaged. Most of the crews survived and it did not take long to recover.

If those ships had been at sea with full compliments aboard then the results would have been FAR, far more catastrophic. The ships and more important, all their crews would probably have disappeared beneath the waves and never seen again. They would have received the same punishment as that inflicted on those Royal Navy ships of war!

Move along to the Falklands conflict and we have HMS Coventry turning away air cover that was ready, willing and able to take on the incoming aircraft!

Winning any war is all about team work and one day we might all realise that. Apologies for the length of post and hopefully my comments are taken in the way they are meant.

Horses for courses.... RAF supply the tankers Royal Navy supply the fast jets

:ok:
http://37peninsulacottage.co.uk/user/cimage/fishinggraphic.gif (http://[img]http//i15.photobucket.com/albums/a355/merlinmagic28/fisherman_boat.gif%5B/IMG%5D)

500N

11th Dec 2011, 11:56

glojo

I was being a bit over simplistic as I din't want to thread drift too far.
Plenty of good info to read about it all.

You are correct in everything you say, especially Churchill and the Radar which could have been fied, but ultimately isn't it up to the Admiral ? Can't fob everything off back to Churchill just because he didn't have orders. That's like ordering an infantry assault without any pre bombardment or fire support of any kind, Arty or MG's.

Re the aircraft, I believe but am not as well read as you that even though the aircraft available were not up to the jap one's, they might have made them hesitate and / or at least been able to take them on / disrupt an attack / given them something else to focus on other than dropping bombs.

Germany threw many hundreds of planes at us during the battle of Britain, it wouldn't have mattered if we only had one Spitfire left, I reckon it would still have gone up.

Repulse did do well but as you say, when those 5 hit here, that was it.

500N

11th Dec 2011, 12:03

pr00ne

State law, although most states seem to follow one another.

Re "health and safety and personal safety regs", I don't have a problem with H&S, especially having served under an SAS Major who sometimes disregarded any rules, regs and orders but it has gone way beyond that.

We call it wrapping everyone up in cotton wool to protect themselves, can't do this, can't do that, no contact sports, too dangerous, children might get hurt.

I commented on my GF's 11 year old today who had a cut / graze on his knee. That is the first cut / graze / scab I've seen on any of her 3 boys (Age 11, 14 and 17) in 2 years. Anyway, enough of that.

glojo

11th Dec 2011, 13:23

You are correct in everything you say, especially Churchill and the Radar which could have been fied, but ultimately isn't it up to the Admiral ? Can't fob everything off back to Churchill just because he didn't have orders. That's like ordering an infantry assault without any pre bombardment or fire support of any kind, Arty or MG's.

Totally 100% agree with your very valid point, an Admiral is given a task and is then expected to 'lay down the ground rules' and fight the fight in whatever manner he chooses.

It is so easy to fight any battle with General Hind-Sight sitting in his comfortable armchair, but sadly when we are working at the pit face then the task might not be as easy. I will just very respectfully suggest that this event happened just three days after Pearl harbour.

The Japanese had overnight changed the pecking order regarding capital ships and it could be suggested all our flag officers no matter what service they were in were all very loath to consider new tactics. If it was good enough for the previous war then it is good enough for the next. Admiral Phillips was one such leader that believed in the invincibility of his ships when put against air power :\:\

This Admiral underestimated the capabilities of modern war planes and for that error he and his Captain accepted their responsibilities and both men opted to go down with their ship. As far as I am aware neither died as a result of combat; they died when they opted to remain aboard instead of taking to the life boats. I am NOT going to speculate why they made that decision but suffice it to say they did what they considered the honourable thing.

I take your point about not blaming Churchill and I for one recognise the FACT that his captaincy is what bought about the downfall of Hitler. However as head of the Royal Navy he was I will tactfully suggest a square peg in a round hole. Rather than prattle on about his failings as the First Sea Lord I will simply give just one example of what he was capable of when in that position. Click (http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/gallipoli.htm)You would like to think he would have learned from that but sadly that was not the case.

I would suggest the fate of the Prince of Wales was sealed when in the beginning of November our Prime Minister for some strange reason informed the World that both her and the Repulse were heading to Singapore!! :bored:

Unbeknown to Churchill these ships would be in the area of those islands at the same time as the Japanese were going to invade.

I am guessing that as soon as this news was received the Japanese started to plan their demise as they would without doubt have been a major thorn in the side of their invading fleets. To this end we only need to think back to how determined we were when it came to sinking the Bismark. The Japanese no doubt went about this planning with the self same vigour and unfortunately with the same effects. Would the out dated aircraft based at Singapore been a threat to the superior Zero aircraft they had at their disposal to deal with any possibility of air cover? It is academic and those Singapore based aircraft had their own problems to deal with in the coming days.

I guess we have drifted off topic but it is all within the time period of Pearl harbour and I guess we also learned a very cruel lesson regarding the use of aircraft against warships.

SASless

11th Dec 2011, 14:24

During the time period under discussion....were not the Germans and the Japanese also reading some of the coded radio communications of both the British and the Americans? Suggesting it was the public announcements alone that guided Axis conduct at this point in the War is a bit over simplified.

Add to the communications intercepts....the Axis also had a very effective intelligence gathering effort in operation. The Japanese very definitely were successful in their clandestine efforts.

A bit of study on Ultra/Magic and the background to failures in both analysing and disseminating the valuable information gleaned from that and related efforts will show there is far more to the story than most folks understand today.

Layton's book...."I was there.." has a good summary of events that led up to Pearl Harbor and the tragic results it had for the American Military. There is far more to the concern by FDR and others in the US Leadership about Germany and the Atlantic and the lack of understanding of what their decisions re that concern than what the effect was on the situation in the Pacific. Add in the gross unpreparedness of the American Military (and government in general) for a two ocean War....and two "front" War...and it comes as no surprise how Pearl Harbor, Wake, Guam, Singapore, The Philippines, and Hong Kong all came to be lost so quickly.

Right up to Pearl Harbor....it was thought the focus of the Japanese attacks would be to the North....not the South. The Japanese were very closely watching the Germans and Russians trying to figure out how that would work out....and the Americans were focused upon that and not what the Trade Sanctions were doing to Japan. The Sanctions were viewed as being a way to "pressure" Japan....and not an attempt to force them into submission as evidenced by their being called "Sanctions" and not an "Embargo". An embargo would have been considered an act of War....not mere diplomacy.

Mike7777777

11th Dec 2011, 14:57

Pearl Harbour sealed the fate of the Japanese (the fate of the Germans was sealed in June 1941). One of the primary responses to PH from the Americans being to commence a construction programme to replace their 20 knot capital ships with 30 knot capital ships.

Churchill was certainly cautious, see delays of invasion of Europe and the preparation required.

As per previous posts ad infinitum, Adolf didn't need to invade Britain when his U-boats could have starved us into submission; but Adolf's eyes were looking eastwards.

teeteringhead

11th Dec 2011, 15:17

And of course one survivor of the attack on Pearl was the cruiser USS Phoenix (ironic name.....). She also survived the war and - as happens with such ships - was sold on......

In 1982, she was still with her post-war purchaser - Armada de la Republica Argentina - who had renamed her .... General Belgrano ....

glojo

11th Dec 2011, 15:52

During the time period under discussion....were not the Germans and the Japanese also reading some of the coded radio communications of both the British and the Americans? Suggesting it was the public announcements alone that guided Axis conduct at this point in the War is a bit over simplified.Hi SASLess,
I understand completely what you are saying and totally agree with the points you raise :ok:

but......

Hopefully I am not being over simplistic when I state that at the beginning of November 1941 our Prime Minister goes public and informs the World that one of our most powerful battleships along with her battlegroup is deploying to Singapore!! Not the Far East but the name of a country. I accept what you say about codes and that is what intelligence services are paid to do.

I tend to get frustrated when folks try telling me what I may or may not have said and hopefully at NO STAGE have I hinted at or implied that it was quote:

'Public announcements alone that guided Axis Conduct'.

Germany had an extremely efficient intelligence service and to suggest otherwise would be just plain wrong.

I am however quite clearly suggesting that to tell your enemy that on such and such a date you are deploying your most powerful asset to a particular location is in my opinion irresponsible and if it were Private Prune of the 77th Light Infantry that had wrote to the News Of the World and given out this information then I am guessing he would very quickly be shovelling coal from one side of a drill square to the other!

http://www.transparencyrevolution.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/looselips.jpg

http://suspiciousminds.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/ww39.jpg

My thoughts are that the Prince of Wales would not have survived in that area even if Winston Churchill had kept quiet, she was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Aircraft that were allocated for the attack on Singapore were also either standing by, or deployed to sink that ship and without large numbers of aircraft then hopefully we all might agree that she was a target waiting to be sunk.

In defence of Winston Churchill
At the time of this deployment we were not at war with Japan.

He did not know that Japan would be invading Singapore, nor would he know the dates of this attack, but I guess this just highlights the need to keep military movements secret.

But what was to stop Germany from positioning some of her U-Boats to attack these ships (She had an excellent destroyer screen that would no doubt deter that type of attack)

Please do not think I am having a go at you, as that is not the case and I enjoy these excellent discussions.

Regards
John from a cold, wet, damp and dingy Torquay by the Sea

Chugalug2

11th Dec 2011, 15:56

Adolf didn't need to invade Britain when his U-boats could have starved us into submission
But he couldn't could he, despite trying? Nor do I think that he really wanted to do either, hence the Deputy Fuhrer dropping in on the Duke of Hamilton for tea. We are told that Dunkirk was all about the Fuhrer establishing control over his Generals, but in retrospect there is a pattern here of attempted accommodation between the Third Reich and key parts of the British Establishment. Of course, treating with an enemy in time of war is usually considered to be treason, but given who was involved in the treating we'll just have to wait and see.... 2017 is supposedly when the full details of Hess's flight are to be released. Plenty of time for them to become unavailable ;-)

Mike7777777

11th Dec 2011, 16:18

But he couldn't could he, despite trying Insufficient resource, fortunately (most of the German war effort was aimed at the USSR). First Happy Time could have been curtains for the UK.

Chugalug2

11th Dec 2011, 16:44

Insufficient resource Succinct I'll give you that, but then that just about sums up every campaign lost doesn't it? Could not other reasons be superior intelligence (the breaking of the German Naval Enigma Code), technical developments (HF/DF, Radar, both air and ship borne), hunter killer AS groups, and of course airpower! Which almost, but not quite, brings us back on thread I think.

Mike7777777

11th Dec 2011, 17:36

Could not other reasons be superior intelligence (the breaking of the German Naval Enigma Code), technical developments (HF/DF, Radar, both air and ship borne), hunter killer AS groups, and of course airpower! None of which were particularly effective until 1942. There was a window of opportunity there for Adolf, but fortunately he was generally otherwise engaged.

500N

11th Dec 2011, 18:02

glojo

Nice to see a reasoned, well read debater on here, unlike some. I won't be betting against you any time soon :O :ok:

A couple of things that stand out which I totally agree with
"this event happened just three days after Pearl harbour."
"This Admiral underestimated the capabilities of modern war planes" - as did many
"all very loath to consider new tactics." - always sems to happen
"invincibility of his ships when put against air power"

HMS Sydney was lost to "new" tactics in some ways as well, plus a bit of the Captain getting a bit close without good reason ????

Remember it was not that long after this that air power was again used in Long Range destruction of Darwin (Australia), another event that totally and utterly shocked a Government.

That poster, Loose Lips Sinks ships reminds me of my grand mother who used to say it when telling me about the war. She was one of the British (Scottish) women of indomitable spirit who raised a family while living through the war in London, ducking Bombs, V1's, V2 and Stuka's shooting her up. May she RIP.

Anyway, very good and interesting discussion.

.

TorqueOfTheDevil

11th Dec 2011, 20:59

Chugalug,

The points you raise are valid - but at the time of Pearl Harbor, the U-boat menace was still a huge threat, and senior figures at the time would have agreed with Mike that the U-boats "could starve us into submission". It was another 18 months before the various countermeasures you describe managed to neuter the U-boats (more or less). The Battle of the Atlantic was the last front where the Germans scored any potentially significant victories over any of their enemies, and it must have been a nasty shock to them when the tables were turned within two months. For all the proud talk of the Battle of Britain, many people seem to forget that Coastal Command saved this country more recently than Fighter Command! Which is largely why the death throes of the Nimrod caused such consternation...

TOTD

Thud_and_Blunder

11th Dec 2011, 22:38

Back to the original point of the thread, my Dad has no problem remembering Pearl Harbour. It was the day he joined the RAF, on his way to pilot training and eventually a career of just under 26 years (RAFTC Examiner, Russian interpreter...) before being made compulsorily redundant.

After his first night at the recruit centre, his tent-mates and he noticed an empty bedspace. Turns out their missing fellow-wannabe had finally been caught in the act, what would've been the next in a string of night-time murders. Nice - not!

Andu

12th Dec 2011, 04:11

Ref the comments in earlier threads about the serviceability (or otherwise) of the PoW's and Repulse's radars, I read somewhere some time ago that the Japanese had divers down onto both whecks within 24 hours of the sinkings recovering the radars.

The wrecksites are apparently quite close to the coast and in relatively shallow water - a Cathay friend told me quite some years ago that on a calm day, both could be quite clearly seen, one upright, the other on its side, almost on one of the airways from Hong Kong.

The Royal navy attempted to provide air cover for the capital ships going out to Singapore, but the carrier tasked with the job (forgotten the name) ran aground, I think in the West Indies, on its way to the Far East. Given the difference in the performance of the RN carrier aircraft of 1941 and the Zero, it was probably a rather fortuitous grounding for the aircrew and the carrier's crew.

Skuas and Swordfish against Val's and Zeros would have been even more "asymmetric" than it was for the poor buggers flying the RAF/RAAF 'front line' Buffaloes based in Malaya at the time.

500N

12th Dec 2011, 04:15

They are in surprisingly shallow water, from memory 60 - 80 feet so within diving range.

Not sure if you can dive on them now, does anyone know ? I thought they might be designated war graves or war wrecks.

Disreagard the above, you can dive on them.

Andu

12th Dec 2011, 04:19

They are certainly designated as war graves - and I understand that the positions shown in most history books are deliberately wrong, because the real positions are far too easy to reach for 'recreational' divers.

pasir

12th Dec 2011, 08:45

... There are several graves of survivors of HMS PoW and Repulse at
Kranji war cemetary on Singapore island - Other survivors were to suffer
years as pow's of the Japanese.

Other aspects related to the two sinkings are said to be that Admiral Tom Phillips had been promoted above his experience and ability for leading such a major force and had imposed radio silence - that was adhered to
even after they had been under air attack for about one hour
(so it is said) eventually breaking radio silence and calling for assistance from nearby RAF Malayan airfields - although whether or not the numbers and aircraft types available would have made any significant difference to the eventual outcome remains debatable.

500N

12th Dec 2011, 08:49

Andu

I think you'll find that MOST rec divers are pretty responsible when it comes to things like this, especially since human bones / skulls etc are sitting around.

I read somewhere that Rec Divers also maintain the White Ensign on the ships and replace it at appropriate times.

Chugalug2

12th Dec 2011, 09:20

Mike and ToD, I see now where you are both coming from, and concede the point that before winning the Battle of the Atlantic, we almost lost it. That seems to be par for the course for most of our campaigns in WW2; BoB, Desert, Bombing, Far East, etc. I believe Churchill said that of them all, it was the Atlantic that kept him awake at nights and it shared with the Bomber Offensive the dubious honour of having lasted from September 1939 through to May1945. I think we should give credit where it is due though not only to the gallant seamen, both Naval and Merchant Marine, who kept that vital lifeline open but also to the blinkered incompetence of the Reich Leadership. If Doenitz had been given more resource pre-war, at the expense say of the surface fleet, he could have prevailed and we would indeed have been forced to submit. But if's and but's are not as important as what actually happens. The Japanese missed the Carriers, and even the Battleships could be salvaged in some part. A mighty power was moved to wrath, and at last Churchill began to get back his beauty sleep. :ok:

glojo

12th Dec 2011, 16:51

Hi Pasir,
I take on-board your comments about Admiral Phillips and I have an open mind regarding his conduct.My thoughts are that folks that have to make decisions, will always hopefully be acting in the best possible interests of their masters\country and if at the end of the day things do not work out, then as long as they have done their best we can surely ask no more of them? My thoughts are that this Admiral was on a complete hiding to nothing, he was in a no win situation. The Royal Navy is a cruel master and had that admiral survived then at the minimum he would have faced a Board of Inquiry and possible even a Court Martial.

When he did finally request air cover do we seriously believe that the ten Buffalo that eventually arrived would have made any difference? I accept this is mainly an RAF forum and we all think we are James Bigglesworth but the reality was the Buffalo was no match for the far superior Zero and Oscar fighter aircraft that the Japanese had deployed. Would those ten aircraft had even got through to the bombers??

I say that with the greatest of respect to all who flew them but to put ten aircraft up against a far superior force would have been a one way mission. :uhoh::O

I had never researched the contribution made by the RAF in Malaysia\Singapore during that disastrous month of December but now that I have had a quick peek it would suggest that this field may not be as green as we would like it to be and during this period our aircraft were totally out gunned and outnumbered. They were possibly flying targets waiting to be shot down :( :uhoh:

Was maintaining radio silence good practice, what was the other option? There was no surface support that could come sailing over the horizon, the RAF were overstretched, and lacked the numbers that would have been needed to stop those attacks.

Would it have been right to loose valuable aircraft attempting to prevent the inevitable sinking of that battle group? I am Navy through and through but to me the battle was lost before it even started.

It was rightly suggested that the buck stopped with Admiral Phillips but on reading further reports we can see the pressure that the Prime Minister put onto the First Sea Lord regarding the deployment of this small battle group and we know the First Sea Lord was not happy about it:

In late August 1941 the Prime Minister wrote to the First Sea Lord proposing a fleet of “the smallest number of the best ships” to create a “very powerful and fast force in Eastern waters.” In subsequent memos Churchill emphasised the political and propaganda value of sending one of the navy’s best ships – a modern “King George V” class battleship.

He believed powerful and fast capital ships in the Pacific could deter a superior Japanese fleet much like the ability of the German battleship Tirpitz to tie down British forces in the North Atlantic. A warship operating in this elusive manner, Churchill explained to Pound, “exercises a vague, general fear and menaces all points at once. It appears and disappears, causing immediate reactions and perturbations on the other side.”

The use of British battleships as “raiders” was original, but Churchill’s plan contained flawed reasoning and unrealistic expectations about Japan. The Prime Minister was criticised for comparing the narrow waters of the North Sea to the wide Pacific Ocean, noting “the two theatres were of course very different.” In addition, the protection of convoys and trade from enemy raiders, the major tasks of Home Fleet battleships in the Atlantic theatre, did not correspond to the probable offensive intentions of the Japanese fleet in the Far East.Admiral Phillips fought the fight the only way he knew how, but what else could he have done other than stand up to Winston Churchill and refuse to deploy without the appropriate air cover! I say Winston Churchill just because it was his orders that required the presence of that Battle Group in those waters.

Cowardice is not a word in the Naval dictionary and I guess that would have been the allegation if this officer had refused to deploy.

Sadly for both the Captain and the crew of the Prince of Wales a Board of Inquiry found it necessary to blame them rather than the defective radar, or the lack of any aircraft carriers. It would appear that failing to request RAF air support was not considered a factor into this loss:

Much to the embarrassment of the Admiralty the Technical Report’s comparison of the Bismarck to the “King George V” class battleships proved critical of British warship design. The DNC report questioned the effectiveness of the Prince of Wales’ side-protection system, the inadequate training and preparation of the ship’s crew, and the effectiveness of the high angle/low angle (HA/LA) anti-aircraft guns during the battle. The expansive third part of the Technical Report included a summary of these “main deficiencies together with action taken or proposed to rectify or guard against them in existing or future construction of ships.”

In reviewing the failure of the battleship’s anti-aircraft protection the report concluded, “the anti-aircraft fire of the [I]Prince of Wales did not prevent the attack upon her from being pressed home.”

However, the DNC did not blame the poor defence on inadequate or faulty guns, but rather on the lack of “considerable training and practice” for the crew to reach proper proficiency. The DNC staff maintained that the battleship’s anti-aircraft armament could have “inflicted heavy casualties before torpedoes were dropped, if not prevented the successful conclusion of attack” given proper training for the gun crews.

This point criticised the several Admiralty decisions to curtail the Prince of Wales’s working up period for special missions. The navy’s resolve to deploy capital ships before they were fully worked up demonstrated their great need for modern ships in 1941Although the admiral has been criticised over the decades regarding his decision to operate out of Singapore, to ignore the invasion of Malaya would have created a serious rift between the navy and the army and disgraced the tradition of the Fleet.

One of Admiral Phillips’s critics over the Force Z affair was Admiral A.B. Cunningham of the Mediterranean Fleet. Although Cunningham believed Admiral Phillips erred in his handling of Force Z, he respected his commitment to duty in the face of great odds.

When the Royal Navy had faced terrible losses in the evacuation of Crete Cunningham is reported to have said: “It takes the navy three years to build a ship. It would take 300 to rebuild a tradition.”

Although the events in the South China Sea helped to destroy the old-fashioned symbolism of the British battleship, the sacrifice of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse might have preserved the traditions and reputation of the Royal Navy.

Admiral Phillips was the senior Naval officer whose duty it was to go into hostile waters and ‘show the flag’. Would that Battle Group have deployed after hearing about Pearl Harbour?

Never has the saying....

Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do and die

been more apt.

History has blamed that Admiral but has history been fair? December 1941 was not a good month for our armed services and I guess the Singapore saga was not our finest hour. Pearl Harbour is perhaps also an event that with the aid of hind sight we might have seen a different outcome.

Informative Dive Link (http://www.mcdoa.org.uk/First_RN_Diving_Survey_on_HMS_Repulse_and_HMS_Prince_of_Wale s.htm)

I doubt very much the folk lore regarding diving to recover radar equipment is correct as the ship is practically upside down and in quite deep water, not too deep though :)

http://www.bobhenneman.info/POWflag1.jpg
This flag flies from Prince of Wales

SASless

12th Dec 2011, 18:04

teeteringhead

12th Dec 2011, 18:21

“The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other guy die for his.”
― George S. Patton Jr.

:ok:

pasir

12th Dec 2011, 21:25

Thanks to Glojo and Chugalug2 for their most descriptive views on the disaster of Singapore and Force Z.
The reasons for the eventual fall of Malaya and Singapore are complex
and are traced back to the late 20's when the building of the great naval base was first suggested - with years of inactivity where arrangeing inter services cricket matches were given greater priority over any consideration for jungle warfare training.

There was a particular incident in late 1940 when the German surface raider Atlantis sunk the SS Automedan that unfortuneatly was carrying
Top Secret papers in its safe addressed to Singapores RAF Air Chief Brook-Popham - showing the latest details on Malaya and Singapores strength and its defences (lack of !) including the RAFs strength of some 335 a/c - together with information that in effect gave out information along the
lines that the defence of Malaya and Singapore were not necessarily considered to be of the highest priority - (a detailed assessment is given under - "SS Autmedon - The fate of a Colony") - These highly secret and sensative documents were retrieved by a German boarding party shortly
before the Automedan finally sunk - and were passed on to Tokyo. All swept under the carpet and never investigated in common with most of the other events and reasons that led to Singapores surrender - described as Britains Greatest military defeat and disaster.

...

glojo

12th Dec 2011, 22:14

Let's ignore the patently obivious.....If the Enemy is dropping bombs and torpedoes on your dumbass....they already know where you are! Gettiing on the Radio and calling for help in plain ordinary English at that point is not exactly giving the bad guys any more advantage than they already have.who is he going to ask? :ugh::ugh: Singapore could put up TEN antiquated Brewster Buffalo but sadly they were only good for collecting lead that was being distributed by the Japanese. If the RAF had sent out every single aircraft and lost all of them then what? Think back to the start of World War II and how the RAF quite understandably pulled back from France to preserve their aircraft in readiness for air attacks on Great Britain. War in the Far East had only just begun and on the first day 60% of the RAF aircraft had been destroyed. I guess though the admiral could have put an advert in the Ipplepen Financial Times asking for help from the nearest aircraft carriers??

It is so easy to sit back and be critical but that battle group had been placed in a no win situation. Admiral Phillips had stated that if they were to have a battle group in those waters then he would need several battleships with their supporting destroyer screens but that is an old school capital ship man speaking, but he was fully aware that his battle group was way, way to small and would never be able to survive in that location. Even the Americans with their carriers at that period of the war could not steam merrily into those waters.

It was a CRAZY, ill thought out 'plan' that was typical of Winston Churchill and please accept that this great leader got us through the Second World War. I hate being critical of this iconic figure but putting those ships in that area just to play at being 'pirates' was a criminal waste of sailors lives. He had seen what a deterrent the Tirpitz was and in his mind he thought the Prince of Wales could do the same thing....... The snag was Tirpitz was located in what she believed was a relatively safe haven. He was putting the Prince of Wales into the Lion's lair where the vessel had no where to hide and no where to run. It was quite literally a dead man walking :(

On 12 March 1941, Squadron No.243 reformed at Kallang as a fighter squadron for the defence of Singapore. The shortcomings of its Buffaloes were soon apparent and when Japanese fighters came within range, the squadron suffered heavy loses and by the end of January 1942 was operating its surviving aircraft as part of a mixed force Ground crew were even removing the armour AND MACHINE GUNS from that aircraft type just to try to give it better performance. Because of maintenance issues the things were even fitted with worn out ex-airline engines!!!

This is the aircraft we are expecting to fly out, locate the battle group and then take on the fighter screen that was protecting the Japanese bombers??

The only help he could have expected was of no darn good to him. At that time and place the Royal Navy and RAF were both outclassed, outgunned, and outmaneuvered.

The RN had its share of Donkey's too!
The early part of the Pacific War for the Allies was just that....the Japanese were ready for War and we were not. Some very brave Men and Women had to pay a terrible price for that unpreparedness.

Think about being in the Philippines....being told help is on the way....and **** all was. Then with lots of luck and divine intervention...surviving the Japanese POW Camps...to discover all those years late how you had been lied to by your National Leaders.

Gallant sacrifice is not all it is cracked up to be....unless it is exactly one's own choosing to do so and is done with some sort of hope of success even if a desperate gamble. :)I agree to a certain degree with the above points but Prince of Wales and the Repulse had been in a few conflicts. Prince of Wales had only just come out of dry dock following her brief encounter with the Bismark:

SECRET MESSAGE IN
IMPORTANT 0530/27
Received:-
From H.M.S. PRINCE OF WALES Date 27.5.41.
Time 1610
Addressed Admiralty C. in C. Home Fleet

Summary of damage. Armament and controls Both forward H.A. directors disabled. Port circuit cut and pedestal canted and strained. Starboard director possibly repairable by ship's staff. After (corrupt group) office destroyed. One "Walrus" aircraft damaged and jettisoned. Both port S.L. sights destroyed. After half of compass platform severely damaged.
Hull. Following extensively damaged. Forward H.A. director supports. After funnel punctured approximately 10 new plates required. Starboard crane xxxxxxxx wrecked. Air intake to X Boiler Room severely damaged. One Boiler Room Fan Impeller and Oil Cooler damaged. M and Q coils damaged. Underwater damage follows after examination. The damage sustained in PRINCE OF WALES in her recent action has now been examined by D.N.C's representative.
SECRET
Subject.. Unexploded Enemy Shell
From .. The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. PRINCE OF WALES
Date .. 8th June, 1941 No. 001.A/1
To .. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, HOME FLEET.
(Copies to The Secretary of the Admiralty.
The Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth
During the early morning action on May 24th a heavy hit was felt abreast the Starboard Diesel Room. It was found that the outer air space 184-196, the outer oil fuel tank 184-206, the inner air space 184-194, the starboard diesel tank 184-206 were fill to the crown with oil and water.
2. On Friday 6th June, on pumping out the dry dock a clean hole in the side about 15" diameter was found, a foot above the bilge keel at 187 starboard.
Holes were also found in the light plating forming the sides of the outer oil fuel tank 184-206.
Heavy marking was found on the protective bulkhead but there were no signs of explosion.
3. When the ship's bottom was visible it became apparent that there was no exit hole and a search was made for the shell.
The inner air space 184-194 was pumped out and the shell was found to be lying on the bottom between two frames 190-192 nose forward.
The shell was in good condition with the fuse in place, but without a ballistic cap.
The angle of entry was 10° from forward and the angle of descent (measured from the ship's perpendicular) was from 2° to 4°.
4. Without rough treatment the removal of the shell either upwards or downwards presented difficulty. Finally it was decided to lower it through the bottom.
The shell was lifted, by [..] chain purchases, one inch clear, slung by a quick action grab. Special lifting bands supplied by the Bomb Disposal Officer from H.M.S. COCHRANE were then fitted and screwed firmly round the shell. It was then lowered, slung by the lifting bands and hoisted 5 ft. clear.
Seven sets of supporting blocks were removed from under the protective bulkhead in the dock, and a hole 4 ft. by 2 ft., was burnt under the shell. This necessitated cutting into two bottom plates.
The shell was lowered through this hole on to a rubber tyred ammunition trolley and wheeled aft, where a dockyard crane picked it up and it was then placed in a 'Bomb Disposal Boat' and removed.
5. The diameter of the shell measured just above the driving band was 14.875 inches. :uhoh:

This ship was in dry-dock at Rosyth in June 1941 having been involved in a sea battle with Bismark, but just six months later she was fighting for her life in the Far East. It is so easy to be critical of the lack of training for the crew but when were they supposed to have this much needed training?

The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other guy die for his.”
― George S. Patton Jr.I could not agree more but war at sea is a bitch..... It is all about sinking ships and running away is considered bad form!!

FODPlod

12th Dec 2011, 23:04

The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other guy die for his.”
― George S. Patton Jr. I could not agree more but war at sea is a bitch..... It is all about sinking ships and running away is considered bad form!! Too true. 20 months before Pearl Harbour and 5 months before the Battle of Britain:Glow little Glowworm, glimmer, glimmer... (http://www.hmsglowworm.org.uk/)
That's the fighting ethos a 300 year-old reputation induces in war. It's getting on for 400 years now but there's still no substitute for having organic air cover wherever you go.

500N

12th Dec 2011, 23:40

"I could not agree more but war at sea is a bitch..... It is all about sinking ships and running away is considered bad form!!"

And getting your main capital ships sunk leaving the whole of your empire open for invasion is not worse ?

Would it not be better in some instances to tactically withdraw and consolidate your defenses where best used ?

SASless

13th Dec 2011, 00:13

As I read accounts of combat during WWII....I am always amazed at the gallantry of the ordinary Man....and how once caught up in the action...how ordinary Men do such Extraordinary feats.

The battle fought against the Japanese Main Fleet by US Navy Task group Taffy 3 in the Philippines is one that just cannot be beat for such an account.

The idea thata handful of DE's and one or two DD's would take on Battleships, Cruisers, and lots of Destroyers....and persevere is simply amazing. It matters not which Navy they were in....Men like that are the backbone of our military forces.

My comment about gallant sacrifices....which should only be done at the decision of the folks making the sacrifice....is directed at that exact kind of situation.

The majority of the sailors involved would have qualified as citizen soldiers/sailors....war tiime service only. One can only wonder where we find such Men when we need them so.

Gnadenburg

13th Dec 2011, 01:48

As I read accounts of combat during WWII....I am always amazed at the gallantry of the ordinary Man....and how once caught up in the action...how ordinary Men do such Extraordinary feats.

Yes, I agree. This one has always been poignant to me. The battle at Kota Bahru started an hour before the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

One RAAF Hudson, flown by Flight Lieutenant John Leighton-Jones, crashed into a fully laden landing craft after being hit while strafing the beachhead, killing some 60 Japanese soldiers onboard.

... There are several graves of survivors of HMS PoW and Repulse at
Kranji war cemetary on Singapore island - Other survivors were to suffer
years as pow's of the Japanese.

Also, sadly, plenty around the beautifully maintained Commonwealth War Graves in Kanchanaburi Thailand. Victims of the Japanese on the Death Railway. I'd guess there were a few survivors of the sinkings on the Sandakan Death Marches.

Andu

13th Dec 2011, 05:51

SASless, I can only agree with your comments about the common man. If you’re looking for inspiration, look no further than the men of Torpedo 8, the crews of the eight USN Avengers who quite probably changed the course of the Pacific war – and who all died, with the single exception of Ensign Gay, who survived the battle of Midway hiding under his uninflated liferaft in among the Japanese fleet - hiding, as the Japanese had a very different way of dealing with captured aircrew than the allied navies did.

The Japanese admiral, in awe of the way they pressed home their attack, called the American crews of those eight Avengers ‘true samurai’ – not an accolade handed out lightly by a Japanese military man. Their attack, futile (and suicidal) as it was, (not one of them scored a hit on any Japanese carrier or capital ship), a bit like the Greece/Crete campaigns, had a huge effect upon the course of the war: in the Torpedo 8 case, they sucked the Zeros providing top cover to the fleet down to low level – a huge display of lack of discipline by the Japanese pilots, who couldn’t resist the easy pickings of the torpedo bombers. This left the skies clear for the USN dive bombers who just happened along minutes later and whose bombs wreaked havoc on the decks of the Japanese carriers, completely reversing the balance of naval power in the Pacific in four minutes.

The Greece/Crete campaign, which has been mentioned already in this thread, another ill-conceived, Churchill-inspired disaster of truly epic proportions, had similar consequences that truly changed the outcome of the war. It was a disaster for the British – something almost everyone even remotely involved in it knew it would be from the start, but, (not appreciated at the time by the British), it turned out to be an even bigger disaster for the Germans – and incredibly, almost certainly moreso than it would have been had they lost the battle for Crete.

To quote Peter Thompson, from p 433 of his book ‘ANZAC Fury – the bloody battle of Crete 1941’, ISBN9781741669206 (a good read):
Before committing suicide in his Berlin bunker on 30 April (1945), he (Hitler) commented on the Cretan debacle. ‘The Italians had the courage to launch themselves into the useless campaign against Greece without asking for advice and without even warning us,’ he wrote. ‘We were forced, against all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, delaying in a catastrophic way our attack on Russia. If the war had been conducted only by Germany and not by the Axis we would have been able to attack Russia by 15 May 1941.’ If the Germans had decided to call off their attack on Crete at the end of the utterly disastrous first day of the attack – (as they very nearly did, but did not because of a huge tactical error by a NZ colonel in withdrawing his victorious troops from Maleme) – they would not have thrown away the vast majority of the Ju-52 force (which was largely destroyed in landing backup forces over the next few days) nor committed the balance of the paratroopers, who were virtually destroyed by the defenders of Crete over the next week.

Had it not been for Crete, Malta would almost certainly been attacked by the German glider force and paratroopers, and had Malta fallen, it would have changed the course of the war in North Africa. Egypt and the Suez Canal, and possibly Iraq and Iran, would have fallen to the Germans, and who knows what effect that would have had on the outcome, or at the very least the duration, of the war? Needless to say, even the most unimaginative observer could see that the outcome in Russia in 1941 might have been very, very different if the Germans had been able to start Barbarossa on May 15th, as they had planned to do.

rh200

13th Dec 2011, 07:52

I'll repeat my usual mantra, "war is won by the one that makes the least/ smallest amount of f#$k ups".

There are so many things in WW11 that could have gone the other way if only. I'm pretty sure Hitler from a tactical view point would have been the toast of many an allied general. And cursed by some of his own

500N

13th Dec 2011, 08:06

I was watching a program on Hitler and the Nazis a few weeks agao and it said that exact thing about Hitler and many of his generals wished that he would stay out of the fighting side of things, as well as coming up with grandiose ideas that were militarily stupid.

Andu

13th Dec 2011, 10:50

500N, I think I could guarantee that there were quite few British generals (and admirals, and air marshals) who would have said exactly that about Winston Churchill - in two world wars!

glojo

13th Dec 2011, 11:02

The Australian government was pressing Churchill to send the ships I fully accept that and the Prime Minister should then seek the advice of the First Sea Lord regarding the practicalities and I guess recommendations. The First Sea Lord should then consult with his Senior Advisors who in turn will then produce options.

What we ended up with was a Prime Minister that chose his favourite, most modern battleship and decided that would fill the role along with the old and perhaps outdated HMS Repulse which had joined the fleet back in 1916!!

Admiral Cunningham criticised Phillips but this Admiral was serving in the Mediterranean and had at his command at least three battleships, 2 Cruiser squadrons with at least three cruisers per squadron, four Destroyer flotillas and also at least one aircraft carrier. It is easy to be critical from a position of strength and when told of his mission Admiral Phillips had very respectfully pointed out that his force was far too small to attempt the task that was demanded of him!! One modern battleship, one relic of a battle cruiser and four destroyers to take on the might of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Air Force was never going to work...

More to the point and I feel VERY RELEVANT is the fact that HMS Prince of Wales was completed and joined the fleet on I believe the 31st MARCH 1941

This is all but April and on the 22nd May of that year she was swapping lead with both the Prince Eugen and the Bismark. Unfortunately within minutes this new ship with her new and untested crew were steaming through the wreckage that was once HMS Hood..

Following a very rapid refit\repair she was tasked with taking Churchill across the Atlantic to meet with President Roosevelt (could this be when Churchill was taken in by the power of this fine ship?)

On returning from the United States in August 1941 this ship was then deployed to the Mediterranean Fleet (yup another battleship goes to Admiral Cunningham)

She arrived in September 1941,
Escorted one convoy from Gibralter to Malta and was immediately back in the thick of the action and was responsible for the shooting down of several Italian bombers. Then it was back to Scapa Flow scotland where she arrived on the 6th October 1941

She then deployed for the Far East on the 25th October 1941

She arrived in Singapore on the 2nd December and at the commencement of hostilities with Japan she set sail on I believe the 8th December 1941
and sadly she met her end on the 10th December 1941 She had been in commission for less than 10 months and I doubt if her service commitments were anything other than routine apart from perhaps that big Home fleet capital ships that seemed to be a part of the scenery at Scapa Flow!! :)!!!!! Very much a tongue in cheek comment as most ships were detached on a regular basis to other duties including the awful Russian convoy duty.

The reason I have highlighted all this is to very respectfully point out just how busy that ship was and my major point is the lack of time the crew had for training to anything like an acceptable level. Yes her gun crews managed to score hits on the Bismark and yes they managed to shoot down some aircraft but where in that schedule did they have the time to do a thorough 'work-up'? Where each man and boy learned their trade and got that thorough working knowledge of what to do when in any type of emergency? Remember how the board of Inquiry criticised the standard of training this ship had received and hopefully this resume will clarify the situation in a more balanced manner?

It would be naive to suggest they could carry out this very thorough type of training whilst deployed and yes all ships companies will always be carrying out drills but what we have to accept is that in war time as soon as a warship deploys they are either the hunter or the hunted. Sleep or at best rest is a commodity that is way down the priorities of ship's survival. the crew will always work what we term as a defence watch scheme which is normally six hours work, six hours rest. BUT...... The instant the threat level rises be it a suspect U-boat, air or surface incident then the whole crew goes to their action stations and remain there until such time as the threat is over.

Six hours of rest sounds more than ample and indeed it would be BUT.... (here we go again) During that six hour break we have to have the proverbial s**t, shower, shave and shampoo :O:O:O Then we need to be fed, and then.... we have to carry out any other duties we have that are separate from defence watch duties. Then and only then can you dive into your bunk or hammock and yes you will probably be fully clothed. What usually then happens is the instant your head hits the pillow that horrible alarm will sound and that will be the end of you 'rest period'

Apologies for that detailed ramble but as you can see a life on the ocean waves may not be the cushy number some folks try to pretend it is. Incidentally the captain will have even less sleep than the crew and again during war-time it would be VERY RARE for that officer to go his cabin whilst the ship is at sea!!

Just for TankerTrashNav click (http://www.navy.gov.au/HMAS_Toowoomba_completes_Work_Up_Progress_Evaluation_%28WUPE %29) :ok::)

This is a work of fiction but by crikey it is a very good read click here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Ulysses_%28novel%29) and my thoughts are that it lets folks know the tresses and strains that folks had to endure in the King's Navy :)

I did smile when I read the comments of Fodplod in his excellent post. I was thinking of posting the example of Gloworm but felt I had waffled on for far too long.

It is so very easy to offer alternatives, or the 'easy way out' but being thick skinned, callous and perhaps even realistic then I will very respectfully suggest that:

Would it not be better in some instances to tactically withdraw and consolidate your defenses where best used ?

Is a sound and very reasoned argument BUT........

That ethos goes against the history and traditions of what is the Royal Navy. (Should I have said 'was' :(:uhoh:)

I am certain what you say makes very sound, solid sense, but if the commanding officer, or flag officer in command of a battle group were to turn away from the enemy then they will have to be prepared for at the very least a Board of inquiry, or even a Court Martial and the point of a sword staring at you is not a very nice sight!! It would at the very least mean the end of their career.

Tradition\folklore had it that the last few feet of the main mast on our warships were made of wood just in case the hailyards got shot away, this was to allow a crew member to hammer a few nails through the ship's Battle Ensign to keep the thing flying high and proud.

I am guessing the nearest safe haven for that Battle Group would have been either Australia or South Africa. This admiral had orders to harass the Japanese in a specific area and running away for no reason would definitely have been a career ending move and one that was NOT an option. Remember we are talking with the benefit of hind sight and what is being suggested is this group runs away BEFORE being attacked by aircraft and before the fall of Singapore!! That is something that would NEVER have even been considered at that stage of the operation.

If an admiral were to assess any battle on a cost of lives\ships basis then what about the evacuation of Dunkirk! It does not need much thought to realise that very soon Great Britain would be under siege, Germany would try to put our nation under siege. We would undoubtedly need to keep our shipping lanes open just to survive. was Dunkirk worth the loss of six destroyers and a further nineteen badly damaged? Could the Admiralty have left the defence of the beaches down to both the Army and the RAF? Would those ships have been better deployed hunting down U-boats or defending the much needed convoys?

Another example of this 'never surrender' type attitude would I guess be HMS Amethyst. (http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/AMETHYST.htm) Under heavy fire. Am aground. Large number of casualtiesThis action was carried out by the British Naval Attache to China who had taken over command of Amethyst following the killing of her commanding officer.

We all sometimes laugh about how differing services or nations tend to allocate medals but on this occasion even the ship's cat (http://www.purr-n-fur.org.uk/famous/simon.html) got decorated!

:ok::O:O I am still chuntering to myself at the very thought of showing my stern to the enemy ;)

Great posts and this time I make no apologies for going off topic as I am enjoying reading all these excellent contributions. Regarding Singapore and the very nice post by pasir would I be correct when I respectfully suggest that the poorly trained British troops were not prepared for the ferocious style of fighting they had to endure at the hands of the Japanese? too much sport, too many G & T's and NOT enough jungle training was not the best of preparation to take on an enemy that did not want to take prisoners and believed in fighting to the death :( :(

500N

13th Dec 2011, 11:03

Andu

Agree.

And probably a few US Presidents ?

SASless

13th Dec 2011, 11:35

One US President for darn sure....LBJ! (Very loud sounds of spitting heard!):mad:

SirPeterHardingsLovechild

13th Dec 2011, 22:13

Part of a lecture my grandfather, Bernard Newman gave to the Empire Club of Canada in 1942.

I remember about a year ago meeting two New Zealand soldiers. I met many of them in London, but I found these two men rather down in the mouth. It surprised me immensely. I had always held, and I have not the slightest doubt the old soldiers here will agree with me, that New Zealanders are among the finest soldiers in the world. But these two fellows were definitely down. I began to talk with them. One said, "You don't expect us to feel very cheery, do you? We have been through two disasters. We were in Greece when they knocked Greece out, and then we were in Crete and they bundled us out of there. You don't expect us to be very cocky, surely."

They were very surprised when I refused to accept the description of the campaigns in Greece and Crete as disasters. They were even more surprised when I suggested that the historians in a hundred years time might look on Greece and Crete as victories for the Allied Force. Obviously they were thinking I had gone crackers. I got a map and began to show them what I meant. Hitler marched into the Balkans. (When I say Hitler, of course he wasn't there. I use Hitler as a general term for the whole of the German war machine-just as we use the devil as a general term to include everything evil.) There was Hitler. He went into the Balkans. What for? Certainly not for what he could get out of the Balkans. He could get all that without fighting. No, very obviously, his objective was a swoop to the southeast for oil-the thing that lures him on.

Now, how was he to get to the Near East? One way was by Egypt. Well, that didn't look very promising. Another way was across Turkey. That didn't look very promising either. As some of us found to our cost in the last war, the Turks have a tough country and they are mighty tough fighters. But there was another possibility, and it all depended on rapid timing-conquering Greece quickly, then seizing Crete quickly, then Cyprus, then Syria; and if he could do all these things quickly, then the way would be open to the oil fields of Irak.
Then the timing went wrong in Irak. The balloon went up a bit too soon. If Raschid Ali had seized power in Irak a few weeks later the situation might have been very, very dangerous. He was just a bit too previous. The timing went wrong; while Hitler was attacking Greece, British reinforcements were on their way to Iraq, and while British and Imperial troops were gaining a very valuable fortnight in Greece, British reinforcements arrived in Irak; and while British troops were gaining another fortnight in Crete, the British Army was establishing control of Irak. So you see, control of Irak was established, not in Irak itself, but through the gallant resistance in Greece and Crete.

And now the New Zealanders were smiling again. They saw that they had done something. They had lost territory, but they had gained time, which was just as essential. They knew the value of Irak. They knew what oil meant in a war like this. Even if Hitler had broken through to the Near East, it is not likely that he would get much oil. I don't think he will get much if he ever arrives there. I take it there will be a couple of men and a box of matches somewhere handy to the oil wells.
But once the Germans or their puppets were in control in Irak, the way would be open to the occupation of Syria. It was a very dangerous moment and it was just in time that we got into Syria. The German move to the Near East was blocked-by the resistance in Greece and Crete-six weeks altogether. Six weeks of time gained by those campaigns in the spring of last year.

You remember the next move-Hitler invaded Russia. He attacked Russia-and if it hadn't been for the campaigns in Greece and Crete he would have attacked Russia six weeks earlier. Naturally, by the end of the tremendous summer and fall campaigns the Russians were tremendously strained; then the winter came, when they were better prepared and were able to turn the tide; but not even the Russians themselves would be able to say what the conditions might have been had Hitler had another six weeks of summer on which to operate on Russian soil.

Those two disasters of Greece and Crete, it may turn out, were the real turning point of the whole war.

How Goes The War?: The Empire Club Addresses (http://speeches.empireclub.org/60100/data?n=18)

Mike7777777

14th Dec 2011, 05:58

He attacked Russia-and if it hadn't been for the campaigns in Greece and Crete he would have attacked Russia six weeks earlier.
Possibly, but then the earlier advance would have been faced with rasputitsa.

The effects of Pearl Harbour were wide-ranging in December 1941, including indicating to the Soviet Union that a Japanese attack on Siberia was unlikely.

TorqueOfTheDevil

14th Dec 2011, 12:23

I can't imagine that invading Russia six weeks earlier would have made much difference to the outcome. Moscow might have fallen (though capturing a city that size would have been even harder than Stalingrad was a year later), but the loss of the city wouldn't have meant the end of Russian resistance. Even at their greatest extent of their advance into Russia, the Wehrmacht had penetrated barely one-seventh of the way across Russia, and that was one spearhead, not a uniform front.

The Thousand Year Reich was doomed as soon as Barbarossa was launched, because the whole premise was wrong. As Hitler had said in the run-up to it:

We have only to kick in the front door and the whole rotten Russian edifice will come tumbling down

Yet the Soviet Union held together just fine, and (despite some impressive early successes) the Germans and their allies were drawn into a duel with the Red Army which they could never win.

Heathrow Harry

14th Dec 2011, 14:59

Admiral Phillips was in an impossible situation. No-one thought the Japanese would strike so soon (certainly not the Americans........) and so what were the UK Govt to do?

To send troops to the (quiet) Far East while we were still under threat of invasion and just hanging on in N Africa??? Send aircraft when we needed every fighter and strike aircraft in NW Europe and the Med???

What good would it do to hold Singapore if the Germans captured Egypt??

So Churchill sent a couple of Battleships - by that stage it was clear that the chances of a major fleet action in the West were close to zero. We'd sunk the Bismark and the Tirpitz would have faced even larger forces - so we could spare a couple of ships to "show the flag".

There was no poiont in sending them in secret - they were meant to be a visible deterrent. And you can't hide them when they have to enter civilian ports at peace.

Once the balloon went up they were in serious trouble - no doubt Phillips knew what had happened to the navy in Norway, Greece and Crete -without aircover you were a sitting duck but what could he do? Everyone knew the administration in Malaya was worse than useless - if he saved his ships the Japanese would get ashore and the game would be up & the Navy would have done nothing.

there was a small chance that he might catch the invasion fleet and do it sufficient damage to allow the Army a chance of defending Malaya - the alternative was to basically set sail for Perth on 7th December. No option really.

Lonewolf_50

14th Dec 2011, 16:39

Notwithstanding any of that, please remember this thread was started to remember the events of 8 December 1941, and all that flowed from that act.
Of course, you meant 7 December, 1941. :cool: The day that will live in infamy.

pasir

14th Dec 2011, 21:08

...The date that Japan commenced hostilities in SE Asia and the Pacific
in WW2 depends on which side of the international date line events were
experienced. For the British Japan invaded Malaya soon after midnight - in the early hours of December 8th. - within an hour or two of their
attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7th.

I am not absolutely certain but seem to have read somewhere that
Malaya or Singapore was attacked 'prior' to the Pearl Harbour attack - but I leave it to greater knowledge to clarify that aspect.

...

MTOW

14th Dec 2011, 22:32

You are correct, pasir. The Japanese landed north of Kota Bahru (I think it was about an hour) before the attack on Pearl Harbour commenced, just after midnight on Monday, Dec 8th.

A lot of Americans still have trouble getting their heads around the fact that, thanks to the international date line, the Dec 8th attack on Malaya started before (what to the Japanese, was the secondary) Dec 7th attack on Pearl Harbour.

500N

14th Dec 2011, 22:35

MTOW

I was just about to post the same thing, that the 8th in Singapore
would be the 7th in the US.

.

SASless

14th Dec 2011, 23:06

However the "early" attack was due to the landings being made ahead of schedule....thus they pre-empted the Pearl attack by mistake and not on purpose.

Not that it would matter....news did not travel that fast anyway!

Gnadenburg

15th Dec 2011, 02:15

The news did reach the Philippines though.....

Gnadenburg

15th Dec 2011, 02:28

To send troops to the (quiet) Far East while we were still under threat of invasion and just hanging on in N Africa??? Send aircraft when we needed every fighter and strike aircraft in NW Europe and the Med???

What good would it do to hold Singapore if the Germans captured Egypt??

So Churchill sent a couple of Battleships - by that stage it was clear that the chances of a major fleet action in the West were close to zero. We'd sunk the Bismark and the Tirpitz would have faced even larger forces - so we could spare a couple of ships to "show the flag".

Well Churchill promised to hold Singapore. Australia had committed its best troops to North Africa and plenty else to the Commonwealth. We were then lured into sending troops to defend Malaya and Singapore under what turned out to be inept British leadership and inept strategies from Whitehall.

Malaya/Singapore wasn't indefensible. Or, it should have come at a greater cost to the Japanese.

jwcook

15th Dec 2011, 04:09

you hear a lot about Singapore but not too much about Corregidor.

Andu

15th Dec 2011, 04:12

The Malayan campaign had an interesting result in that the commander of the Australian 8th Division escaped from Singapore after the surrender in rather questionable circumstances while leaving his troops to be captured.

His career suffered as a consequence - he was given a backwater command in Perth and never commanded fighting troops again. Australian overall commander Thomas Blamey, (possibly because Bennett's escape from Singapore resembled a little too much for comfort Blamey's own escape from Greece a year earlier, where Blamey controversially included his son among the very small party (of 8?) that departed with him on a Sunderland flying boat), really had it in for Bennett after Bennett's return to Australia.

However, Bennett provided what proved to be invaluable intelligence to both Australian and American commanders who were soon to face the (at that stage of the war, seemingly indefeatable) Japanese. He wrote a handbook that was widely distributed among Australian and American forces in the Pacific (and among the British forces in Burma too, I understand), where he came up with what then, was an enormously novel idea - the 'harbour', or all-round defence.

In Malaya, (as elsewhere), the Japanese specialised in sending small parties, sometimes of not more then ten men, with a machine gun behind the British front line, where they would set up on the British lines of communication and kill rear echelon troops supplying the front line. Invariably, in Malaya, this would cause the British leadership, schooled in the fixed line trench warfare of WW1 France, to call a retreat - (or for neighbouring units to do so, leaving the flanks exposed of units in contact with the Japanese who sometimes had successfully beaten off the Japanese).

A succession of such small unit penetration actions by the Japanese was the main reason for the succession of increasingly rapid retreats of the British towards Singapore in December/January 1941.

Bennett's handbook counselled not retreating, but 'harbouring', i.e., adopting all-round defence, if a unit found its lines of communication broken, then sending out strong patrols to deal with the Japanese penetrating parties. I've read of the Americans at Guadalcanal acknowledging the value of Bennett's booklet in teaching them tactics that would defeat the Japanese. It sounds utterly logical to someone today, but in 1942, it was a whole new concept, at least for the British army.

500N

15th Dec 2011, 04:27

Andu

Very interesting, especially the booklet part.

"i.e., adopting all-round defence, if a unit found its lines of communication broken, then sending out strong patrols to deal with the Japanese penetrating parties."

I wonder if this was the start of Australian's becoming very well known for strong, aggressive patrols, culminating in their success of Vietnam against the VC by patrolling hard and denying the enemy the ground, resulting in the captured signals saying to the effect of move on because they are good - and of course the term "Phantoms of the Jungle".
.

Fubaar

15th Dec 2011, 05:38

Gordon Bennett wasn't without his failings in Malaya. He refused to demolish the towers in Johore overlooking the Singapore straits (which proved to be invaluable to the Japanese) because they belonged to his good mate, the Sultan of Johore. The British were party to a similar imbecility in refusing to destroy a large number of motor launches at Penang and other ports in northern Malaya 'because they were private property'.

The Japanese used these launches to great effect in putting the 'penetration parties' referred to in Andu's post behind the British front lines and accelerating their advance south.

It was another time... and I can just picture some long term colonial tea planter or official spluttering in indignation at the very thought of some junior military type suggesting that they destroy his floating gin palace.

Some indication of out of touch with relity they were might be gained by the fact that they held a bloody ball at Raffles the night before the surrender!

Mike7777777

15th Dec 2011, 06:45

In 1941, I doubt if the Allies recognised the capability and potential of the Japanese armed forces, particularly with regards to fighting in the jungle.

In 1945, the Japanese were in no doubt as to the capability and potential of the Allied armed forces, particularly with regards to fighting in the jungle.

With hindsight, victory over Japan could have been achieved earlier with a submarine blockade, island hopping kept to a minimum.

pasir

15th Dec 2011, 07:25

Regarding any suggested submarine blockade of Japan - by 1944 the Allied command of the Pacific was dominated by the US Navy who by then had so decimated Japanese shipping that even lowly rice carrying barges
were considered a worthy target. RN offers to assist the USN were
bluntly ignored or turned down by the US CinC of the Pacific Theatre of War (beleived Admiral King who was extremely anti-British) In addition
the Allies were faced with realising that the Japanese code of honour
meant they could be counted on to fight to the death - together with Kami Kaze attacks resulting in huge US casualties.

A tragic result of the American success in destroying and sinking vast numbers of Japanese shipping being that often their darkened holds contained hundreds of half starved skeletal Allied POWs on their way to work as slaves in Japanese coal mines or factories etc who would suffer
death blown to pieces or would drown in their battened down prison holds.

...

glojo

15th Dec 2011, 08:55

Not that it would matter....news did not travel that fast anyway!

I think it fair to say that 'news' travelled fast enough but when this news arrived then with 20/20 hindsight, :\:\ was it either ignored, not understood or appreciated and finally and I guess most importantly not given to those that most needed it?

I doubt very much that the timing of attacks in the Far East were 'early' or ahead of schedule, but some interesting explanations have been put forward.

Has anything been learnt regarding the dissemination of intelligence?

Do we still gather too much tittle tattle and then not have the means to sort the wheat from the chaff?

Did we all know about an attack on Pearl Harbour and was it in everyone's interest to get the USA to take a more active role in this World War??

Were the Japanese wrong to not go after the US carriers or return back to Pearl Harbour and finish the job off completely? Should they not have carried out surprise attacks on the carriers whilst they were at sea and sunk them?

The Japanese showed the World how to wage war using aircraft carriers, yet they opted to hit battleships, ships of a previous age, ships that played a secondary role to the new 'Head of the Family'. Japan was surely a nation that was fully aware of the need to have carriers, they were really the only means of waging this type of long distance war.

Should the US carriers have been hit by submarines at the same time as the attacks on Pearl and should those attacks on Pearl have been far more aggressive? I guess it was lucky they did not do that although I still believe the end result would have been no different.

How many British and American very senior generals abandoned their soldiers for the so called greater good? An admiral has no choice, he fights the good fight and to the victor goes the spoils, the looser is definitely on a very sticky wicket with no 1st class ticket out of Dodge!

The war in the Far East was perhaps fought in a manner which was alien to all our generals and as I said earlier, they fought the same way as they fought previous wars and flatly refused to accept an enemy would not do likewise!!

A final thought... By declaring war on the USA did Japan seriously think they could travel all the way across the Pacific and conquer such a vast country, or did they expect its citizens to just forgive and forget? :uhoh::uhoh: Yes there was an embargo on oil, but declaring war on such a huge nation was possibly a major, major cluster cluck.

His dudeness

15th Dec 2011, 11:23

A final thought... By declaring war on the USA did Japan seriously think they could travel all the way across the Pacific and conquer such a vast country, or did they expect its citizens to just forgive and forget? Yes there was an embargo on oil, but declaring war on such a huge nation was possibly a major, major cluster cluck.

I doubt that there was a 'way back' from what both, Japan and German had done and set in motion by that time. Certainly the German economy would have stalled within probably a year because of the astronomic debts Hitler had amassed. I guess it was basically the same for Japan and their expansion/aggression into China etc. They had to do it, otherwise the loss of face would have been devastating. And i think the Japanese never thought they could win against the US, but dictate a peace agreement which would have given them the opportunity to have their Empire in the Pacific.

Hitler OTOH couldn`t possibly have explained to the Germans why the 'Herrenrasse' fails economically. (In 1940 or 41)

TorqueOfTheDevil

15th Dec 2011, 14:07

I doubt that there was a 'way back' from what both, Japan and German had done and set in motion by that time

True, but it still seems daft for Hitler to initiate war against the USA when he was already fighting the USSR, not to mention us!

The Japanese showed the World how to wage war using aircraft carriers, yet they opted to hit battleships

Surely this was because the carriers weren't in harbour to be hit? They didn't set out to launch an attack on battleships, but in the absence of the carriers, they hit the biggest ships they could find.

His dudeness

15th Dec 2011, 14:40

True, but it still seems daft for Hitler to initiate war against the USA when he was already fighting the USSR, not to mention us!

Technically he just declared war after the Pearl Harbour attack. Practically the US were in the war already (lend and lease, 30W anti submarine etcetc)

At that point it didn´t make a difference anyhow, the USSR was WAY more any German leader would have been able to swallow. The 2 front war was a trauma Hitler always told his Generals he would avoid at any price. His word on this proofed to be as trustworthy as usual...and the Russian 'Untermenschen' gave our troops quite some fights. (an uncle of mine was on one of the last Ju52s out of Stalingrad...he still shook 40 years after this experience when talking about the experience)

Now for the UK, I wouldn´t mind being the Gauleiter for, say, Wales, but then in Autumn 1940 it was absolutely clear 'we' could not win over the RAF. Without the air supremacy in invasion would simply not been possible. The plan to rely on the subs was doomed, since we simply didn´t have enough at the time. Would there have been 500-600 of em in 1940, then... maybe...

con-pilot

15th Dec 2011, 17:41

Surely this was because the carriers weren't in harbour to be hit? They didn't set out to launch an attack on battleships, but in the absence of the carriers, they hit the biggest ships they could find.

The most current intelligence report the attacking Japanese force had, showed that the carriers were in the harbor. So when the first reports came back from the attack that the carries were not there, they had no idea where the US carriers had gone. Because of that, the striking force withdrew and no second attack was launched.

From some of the research I have done it, was obvious that the Japanese were expecting much greater losses than that they actually received, but aircraft losses were acceptable and expected, the lost of any of their carriers was not acceptable, thus the early withdrawal when it was discovered the US carriers were not in Pearl Harbour.

glojo

15th Dec 2011, 19:09

From some of the research I have done it, was obvious that the Japanese were expecting much greater losses than that they actually received, but aircraft losses were acceptable and expected, the lost of any of their carriers was not acceptable, thus the early withdrawal when it was discovered the US carriers were not in Pearl Harbour. 15th Dec 2011 15:40The Japanese had a number of intelligence agents working in Hawaii\Pearl harbour, they knew exactly what ships were in port, there locations etc. Hence the instant internment of those Japanese that were resident on the islands.

We have to remember that America and Great Britain still believed the battleship was king. The battleship until that attack was still considered the capital ship of any major Navy. We all now know with hind sight that the real clout was and I guess still is the aircraft carrier.

i think the Japanese never thought they could win against the US, but dictate a peace agreement which would have given them the opportunity to have their Empire in the Pacific.

I understand what you are saying and agree with you, but their logic was in my eyes 'illogical! What leader would broker a peace treaty with a nation that in cold blood launches an unprovoked attack on its sovereign soil, sinks a number of capital ships from its prestigious Pacific fleet and also kills thousands of US citizens. Did Japan seriously think that the USA would say, 'We forgive you!'

This is a historical event and we do have to be careful what we are talking about but suffice it to say that the way the Japanese fought and treated their prisoners of war made a brokered deal impossible for any leader to accept.

My thoughts are that America tried desperately to keep Great Britain on the peripherals because they felt so aggrieved?? (One of my uncles was in the Chindits but just like my father he would never talk about this period of his life and sadly I will now never know the exact details of what he did)

500N

15th Dec 2011, 19:15

"What leader would broker a peace treaty with a nation that in cold blood launches an unprovoked attack on its sovereign soil, sinks a number of capital ships from its prestigious Pacific fleet and also kills thousands of US citizens. Did Japan seriously think that the USA would say, 'We forgive you!'"

Along similar lines, Bush / the UN did with Iraq after GW1.

glojo

What do you mean by this ?

"My thoughts are that America tried desperately to keep Great Britain on the peripherals because they felt so aggrieved?? "

"on the peripherals" of what ?

The Pacific War ?

Mike7777777

15th Dec 2011, 19:27

Regarding any suggested submarine blockade of Japan No suggestion about it, US boats were very effective at blockading Japan. RN boats were not suitable for the Pacific, with the possible exception of the "T" class; range and air conditioning being primary requisites.

The plan to rely on the subs was doomed, since we simply didn´t have enough at the time. Would there have been 500-600 of em in 1940,
There was no plan to rely on subs, the Wehrmacht reached the Channel Coast and then what? Doenitz aspired to 100 boats on patrol, 100 in transit and 100 in port, he had about 60 in total at the start of WW2. Perversely, 60 Type XX1 in 1943 could have defeated the UK (snorkel, hydraulic reload, ability to catch a convoy whilst submerged, ability to run under a convoy whilst submerged, ability to flee Fido whilst submerged, ability to flee most escorts whilst submerged). Several other factors to throw in eg cut the Enigma chatter, use FW200 purely for reconnaissance, JU88s to intercept Coastal Command over the Bay of Biscay. But the end result is the same: Soviet tanks roll into Berlin.

For Pearl Harbour, if the USN carriers were sunk it makes no difference to the end game: American industrial power destroys Japan. The concept of the Americans negotiating a compromise after PH is a nonsense.

Biggus

15th Dec 2011, 19:46

Don't forget that the Japanese had planned to inform the US that peace negotiations were over prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was just that they got their timing wrong - therefore they probably saw a negotiated peace later on as possible when they were initially planning their strategy.....

con-pilot

15th Dec 2011, 20:37

The Japanese had a number of intelligence agents working in Hawaii\Pearl harbour, they knew exactly what ships were in port, there locations etc. Hence the instant internment of those Japanese that were resident on the islands.

Very correct, but it was too late by the time that information reached the attack force. Personally I don't think it would have made any difference, the attack would have proceeded as planned, but with no thought of a second attack.

glojo

15th Dec 2011, 21:29

Hi 500N,
In answer to your question then apologies for any confusion and I guess my brain told me Pacific war but my hands may not have made that clear. :uhoh:

We have to be careful what we say as I do not want to get involved in a 'My country did this.... blah de blah de blah.'

I will tactfully suggest that the American Commander in Chief was not happy with the suggested role of the Royal Navy, there were heated discussions during which I believe the President of the US over-ruled the Admiral (but when the boss is away, the boys play to there own rules!!)

This situation was handled as best it could and the Royal Navy made the best of the situation... I could ramble on and on about RAS issues but I will shut up now :)

500N

15th Dec 2011, 21:39

glojo
Thanks. Don't worry, I am from the UK anyway.

I had a read up on that US Admiral who was very anti British, it said he was but no real reasons. Must have been from his time serving with / on British ships.

And re the "I do not want to get involved in a 'My country did this.... blah de blah de blah.'" I only challenge those who state facts that are wrong or totally out of whack, neither of which applies to you :ok:

.

glojo

15th Dec 2011, 22:01

Thanks 500N
I must confess to enjoying my time on this forum and apologies if 'mouth overtakes brain' and that then leads to going off topic. I get so engrossed and feel I have to get folks to contribute more to these excellent debates. You guys are great company and thank you one and all for putting up with my ramblings\witterings. :ok::p

500N

15th Dec 2011, 22:06

I have enjoyed this thread as well. Forums / threads always deviate, sometimes for the better.

Check out the Big Blu thread in 4 - 6 hours or so, you might get a laugh.

Gnadenburg

16th Dec 2011, 01:53

I had a read up on that US Admiral who was very anti British, it said he was but no real reasons. Must have been from his time serving with / on British ships.

Actually, from books I've read, the Americans were more anti-colonial British and had different ambitions for the Far East post WW2. I suppose the Empire was dead.

For example, British policy on Hong Kong probably interfered with the greater US ambitions for China. This US-British tension preceded Pearl Harbour!

On the troop ships, Lisbon Maru was a British tragedy. Those who do the HKG-PVG run ( 29 57 00 / 122 56 00 ) is her resting place. 2000 British POW's were aboard. The tragedy was the torpedoing by a US submarine. What happened afterwards was murder by the Japanese. The locking down of the ship as it sunk, machine gunning those on deck, rescuing those in the water and then murdering them. Another disgraceful act by the Japanese - and I have to say they got off lightly in war crimes trials!

Gnadenburg

16th Dec 2011, 02:00

In Malaya, (as elsewhere), the Japanese specialised in sending small parties, sometimes of not more then ten men, with a machine gun behind the British front line, where they would set up on the British lines of communication and kill rear echelon troops supplying the front line. Invariably, in Malaya, this would cause the British leadership, schooled in the fixed line trench warfare of WW1 France, to call a retreat - (or for neighbouring units to do so, leaving the flanks exposed of units in contact with the Japanese who sometimes had successfully beaten off the Japanese).

Very interesting!

Incidentally, there was sporadic guerrilla warfare waged against the Japanese in Malaya preying on their long supply lines. Such techniques were proposed prior to the commencement of hostilities, but pretty much dismissed by the establishment.

One Brit carved up the Japs for days with tommy guns and grenades. I just read his book but I can't recall the title.

As a rule he said, the Japs were afraid of the jungle!

HTB

16th Dec 2011, 08:06

Could it have been "The Jungle is Neutral" by (Lt Col, DSO and Bar) F Spencer Chapman (published 1948)? His main effort was operating behing enemy lines in Malaya coducting multi-ethnic guerrilla operations (for just about the duration), with some training of Aus/NZ special ops forces in those tactics.

Mister B

pasir

16th Dec 2011, 08:42

Freddie Spencer-Chapman was indeed a one-man army who initiated and operated the 'Stay behind' plan (Force 101) shortly before the fall of Malaya and Singapore - with the constant threat of being betrayed to
the enemy by some Malayans - Leading a lonely spartan semi starved life of sabotage against the Japanese for almost 4 years in the Malayan Jungle with the occassional assistance of small parties of Chinese Communists - who after the war the British knew would also become our enemy. (My self with many thousands of N/S and regular troops would later be involved against them in the the late 40s and 50s)

Freddie was a forgotten hero and after the war went back to teaching.
For reasons never explained sometime in the 60s he drove into the Surrey
countryside and shot himself dead.

...

glojo

16th Dec 2011, 08:48

It might not be Malaysia but these amazing soldiers (http://www.chindits.info/) fought in the jungles of Burma.

Brave men that did NOT get the recognition they so rightly deserved. My uncle's health was effected by the conditions they had to endure and I guess he was never A1 fit again after surviving that campaign.

As I said on another post we are so wrong to try to put any one individual service on a pedestal. EVERYONE that contributed to the war effort is a hero and we must NEVER forget the Merchant Navy...... As soon as their ship was sunk....their pay stopped!!!! This changed in mid 1941, but they would still not receive any pay when on leave. But that is another story for perhaps a different forum!

HTB

16th Dec 2011, 09:24

Just a small digression for people of a certain age - 'The Jungle is Neutral', 'The Cruel Sea' and 'Henry IV Part One' were all GCE English Lit O-Level books in the mid '60s (the odd one out being 'The Good Companions'); do you see a trend in these set works?:O

Mister B

Fareastdriver

16th Dec 2011, 09:29

I spent time working in the Solomon Islands and whilst I was there I read some books on the Guardacanal Campaign and walked the walk, as it were. It became pretty apparant that the Japanese as expert jungle fighters was a complete myth. Admittedly they had not provided a credible defence for their engineers building an airfield but after the intitial convention skirmishes Japanese afforts to use the jungle to attack the invading American were comical.
They were launched on expeditions with each soldier carrying three days ration of rice and be then expected to live off the land afterwards. Their only maps were old British Admiralty charts that had little or no topgraphical information on them. Their sense of direction was hopeless and even the direction that water flowed in a river was totally incomprehensable. They would march downstream, cross the river a couple of times and then march upstream to where they started. On at least one occasion two Japanese units charged each other.
The jungle was littered with dead and dying through starvation, sickness or a combination of both. On the final retreat sick and injured soldiers were being propped up against trees, given a gun and left behind.
The same inept behaviour was repeated across the Pacific and Burma. The responsibility for the fall of Malaya and Singapore was nothing to do with superior skills or intellect; it was the abject failure of the British Command.

Yamagata ken

16th Dec 2011, 10:28

On a geographical note, Japanese may or may not have been good jungle fighters, but even here in the north, in summer the terrain is mountains covered in dense forest with an under-story choked with bamboo and vines. Also, in Japan, streets have no names and houses no numbers. Navigation is by mud-maps. Be cautious of claims about lack of jungle experience or map reading skill. They may be based in ignorance and hyperbole. Just sayin'.

SASless

16th Dec 2011, 12:26

Jungle fighters they may not have been....but they whupped the Brits in multiple jungledly countries. It took the Chinese and Indians to beat them in Burma. Malaya and Singapore, if my memory serves me right, the Brits outnumbered the Japanese in land forces deployed. They out fought the Americans in the Philippines on the Bataan Pennisula.

I would suggest it was not the lack of ability or will power that defeated the Japanese Army but rather the power of logistics, manufacturering, and sheer numbers arrayed against them by the Allies. That takes nothing away from the courage and tenacity of the Allied troops fighting them....but in the end it did come down to who had the most kit in the long run.

Yamamoto warned his seniors of the situation before they kicked off the entire thing....he warned he could run rampant for six months then the Awakened Tiger would overwhelm them.

Mike7777777

16th Dec 2011, 14:13

The same inept behaviour was repeated across the Pacific and Burma. The responsibility for the fall of Malaya and Singapore was nothing to do with superior skills or intellect; it was the abject failure of the British Command. In part, possibly. But I think we were probably heavily involved elsewhere at the time. Very little meaningful comparison to be made between Guadalcanal and Malaya, might as well compare PH and Midway.

pasir

16th Dec 2011, 14:28

...Yes - in Malaya/Singapore Brits outnumbered Jap ground forces at something like two or three to one - However prior to Dec 8 while the British forces had in the main led a soft life - untrained in jungle warefare overnightthey were to become face to face with a a cruel barbaric bestial enemy - fully battle trained, hardened and backed up with superior air and naval power.

Of the British forces more than a third were composed of Indian troops
only recenly arrived from India where anti British feeling was at a peak towards attaining Independance - Consequently in Malaya Indian troops began shooting their British officers - resulting in an entire Indian Regiment being withdrawn from the battle line.

Of other non UK troops who composed about one fifth of the British forces -
while in the main they fought bravely - their reputation was somewhat sullied
when in the final days many threw away their arms and were to be seen
in large groups wandering drunkenly around Singapore city- answerable to no authority.

Prior to final surrender the GOC Malaya General Percival issued an order prohibiting any troops from making any attempt to evacuate or leave the island.

...

Gnadenburg

16th Dec 2011, 16:56

Of other non UK troops who composed about one fifth of the British forces -
while in the main they fought bravely - their reputation was somewhat sullied
when in the final days many threw away their arms and were to be seen
in large groups wandering drunkenly around Singapore city- answerable to no authority.

Australian troops? Time and time again this is debunked.

4C Special: No Prisoners: Viewpoints: Lynette Silver (http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/specials/noprisoners/viewpoints/silver.htm)

Jungle fighters they may not have been....but they whupped the Brits in multiple jungledly countries. It took the Chinese and Indians to beat them in Burma. Malaya and Singapore, if my memory serves me right, the Brits outnumbered the Japanese in land forces deployed. They out fought the Americans in the Philippines on the Bataan Pennisula.

I'd suggest it was a failure in US and British military leadership that exaggerated Japanese victories in Malaya and the Philippines.

Soon after, when you look at the first US Marine and Australian infantry victories, the Japanese suffered very high levels of attrition almost unnecessarily.

Freddie was a forgotten hero and after the war went back to teaching.
For reasons never explained sometime in the 60s he drove into the Surrey
countryside and shot himself dead.

I recall from the book he was ill.

Lonewolf_50

16th Dec 2011, 21:18

Regarding Admiral Ernest King:

He was no Anglophile.

He was also not CINC PAC.

He was the head Naval Officer in Washington DC and sat on the Joint Chiefes of Staff organization peopled with US and British high ranking flag officers.

He is famously quoted, or attributed, the following bon mot (roughly recalled), regarding the infamous "Europe First Strategy" and the imbalance of men and equipment being assigned to the Pacific Theater and European Theater. Directed at one of the British generals, if I recall this correctly ...

"We have a war in the Pacific as well, against somebody who actually attacked us."

King also bickered considerably within the US defence and military establishment, and in political halls, regarding how under resourced the Pacific Theater was and why that needed to change.

Gnadenburg

17th Dec 2011, 00:35

A few years ago I took up an invitation to visit Hawaii and stay with friend's parents who live on Ford Island. Amazing. You walked out the front door and strolled over to USS Arizona.

http://i236.photobucket.com/albums/ff187/coronatower/Arizona5.jpg

I thought this shot was from the shoreline but I am not so sure now.

http://i236.photobucket.com/albums/ff187/coronatower/Arizona1.jpg

http://i236.photobucket.com/albums/ff187/coronatower/ArizonaTw0.jpg

Very nice married quarters. Captain and above from memory.

http://i236.photobucket.com/albums/ff187/coronatower/Arizona4.jpg

USN tour of Pearl.

glojo

17th Dec 2011, 08:24

Hi Lonewolf,
In my post I referred to the 'Commander in Chief' who at that specific time I believe was indeed Admiral King??

Following Pearl Harbour, King assumed the positions of commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations. I do wish you folks could learn to spell 'harbour':eek::ok::O

Questions:
I am surprised you are suggesting he was not an Anglophile as that goes against all historical records? I am NOT criticising this man for his views and I guess we all have our prejudices but are we honest enough to admit them?

Jac Cherac..... The only thing Great Britain has given Europe is Mad Cow disease.

Napaleon... Zee English are a Nation of shoppe keepuhs (Said in my 'ullo, ullo accent)

Freech National Rugby Coach... We don't like the English and it is best to say so rather than be hypocritical.

I hate folks that act shocked when we make jokes about other nations, or maybe show a prejudice, we are who we are and at least we are proud of our own country and hopefully when push comes to shove we do respect other nations.

My understanding of just a few of the many issues with King and in particular the Royal Navy was that the British Government wanted her forces to be treated as an equal on the Pacific front whereas King felt this was his conflict but the Royal Navy could assist! Am I correct to say that both Australian and New Zealand warships were merged into US Battle Groups, but Great Britain wanted its own Battle Groups?

Rumour has it that King was seconded to the Royal Navy for short periods during the First World War and it has been suggested that this may have been contributory to his dislike of that service?? I cannot find any reference to what ships he served with, location or durations of time aboard.

All sorts of arguments were put forward by King including those of logistics, refuelling etc. Roosevelt eventually over-ruled the Admiral but that man was 'not for turning' ;) (I am a huge Margaret Thatcher fan) yes he was given certain orders by Roosevelt but he was the Admiral in Command. The bottom line to me was that we eventually all succeeded in ending a very ugly period of our past and the Royal Navy did take an active role in the defeat of the Japanese.

I am however in full agreement with SASLess
I would suggest it was not the lack of ability or will power that defeated the Japanese Army but rather the power of logistics, manufacturering, and sheer numbers arrayed against them by the Allies. That takes nothing away from the courage and tenacity of the Allied troops fighting them....but in the end it did come down to who had the most kit in the long run.

Yamamoto warned his seniors of the situation before they kicked off the entire thing....he warned he could run rampant for six months then the Awakened Tiger would overwhelm them. Would I be right to suggest the Japanese believed in total war and none of this Geneva Convention, or even surrender?

Whilst talking about this Admiral I note he was awarded the Navy Cross. I was under the impression that this medal was awarded for:

Extreme gallantry and risk of life in actual combat with an armed enemy force and going beyond the call of duty. Can you please direct me to this man's citation for that medal, all I can find is a bland notation of time spent on Royal navy ships?? (I blame my inept Googling abilities)

My thoughts regarding Admiral King are best summed up by this reference: The importance of King's overall contribution should not be underestimated. Starting with the devastated fleet and shattered morale following Pearl Harbour, he directed the expansion of the U.S. Navy into the mightiest fleet in world history. HumoUr
In my time period we had a saying... US Navy = Biggest in the World, Royal Navy = Best in the World! :rolleyes:

I now say, Wot Royal Navy?? :*:uhoh:

500N

17th Dec 2011, 09:19

Admiral King Citation of the Navy Cross

"The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Captain Ernest Joseph King, United States Navy, for distinguished service in the line of his profession during World War I, as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Atlantic Fleet during World War I.Action Date: World War I
Service: Navy
Rank: Captain
Company: Assistant Chief of Staff
Division: Atlantic Fleet"

glojo
As much as I am not a fan of Wiki for it's lack of accuracy, it does lead or reference numerous articles at the bottom of the pages, especially someone with a career like an Admiral. If you are interested, see notation 7 on Admiral King's wiki page, then from the web page that link sent you to you find a link to ALL citations for every medal awarded by the US.
Hope that helps.

glojo

17th Dec 2011, 09:55

Hi 500N
Thanks for that and yes the wiki thing is not the best source of information but then again mine was not perfect.

When we read about the Navy Cross it is one of the highest awards granted to mainly the US Navy and Marines and when we read of all the other holders they have displayed degrees of bravery or courage that goes well beyond the call of duty. I accept at least here in the UK certain acts or deeds cannot be made public but is Admiral King's award in that category?

I am NOT on a witch hunt, I am not out to score points, this man has my respect and I am just curious about how a medal of this stature was earned..

500N

17th Dec 2011, 10:05

glojo

"I am NOT on a witch hunt, I am not out to score points, this man has my respect and I am just curious about how a medal of this stature was earned.."

As much as I don't like Wiki, it is a good source for general run of the mill stuff like this - as long as it's notated !!!!

In answer to your question, because the criteria according to Wiki was changed from one type of award to another and went up in order of precedence.

"Originally, the Navy Cross was lower in precedence than the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, because it was awarded for both combat heroism and for "other distinguished service." [1] Congress revised this on 7 August 1942, making the Navy Cross a combat-only award and second only to the Medal of Honor."

so he got his for "other distinguished service" even though it may have been "in combat" as in at war, it wasn't an eact act of combat heroism by the looks of it. Not that I am in any way qualified to pass judgement !

500N

17th Dec 2011, 10:08

Re Admiral King NOT being an Anglophobe, their is a quote out there which was the President of the US even saying that he was Anti British / an Anglophobe.

I just can't find it.

500N

17th Dec 2011, 10:14

A fairly interesting summary !
Lessons in Coalition Warfare: Admiral Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet

The genesis and strategy of British Royal Navy’s participation in the Pacific in 1945 is a little studied aspect of the Pacific campaign. Prior to 1945 the participation of the Royal Navy in the Pacific ended at the Battle of the Java Sea. After that the Royal Navy operated in the Indian Ocean in support of British operations in Burma and against German surface raiders. Michael Coles in “Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Octagon) published in The Journal of Military History January 2001, 65, 1 Research Library pp. 105-129 provides a good analysis of the Allied decision to allow the Royal Navy a role in the Pacific and the objections of Admiral Ernest King to the proposal.
The renewal of the Royal Navy’s Pacific role began at the 1944 Octagon Conference where the Allied Joint Staff made the decision to bring the Royal Navy back to the Pacific. Admiral Ernest King was the only dissenter in the question of Royal Navy operations in the Pacific. The strategic aspects of this decision are seldom addressed by most who chronicle the Pacific war. William Kimball in [I]“Forged in War: Roosevelt Churchill and the Second World War” never mentions the naval strategy discussed at the Octagon conference. Samuel Elliott Morison in “The Two-Ocean War” described the decision for the Royal Navy to enter the Pacific as “important” and outlines King’s opposition to it without addressing strategic considerations. John Costello in [I]“The Pacific War” described how Churchill insisted on the Royal Navy being committed to operations against Japan and how Roosevelt’s agreed to “to avoid a bitter clash.” Likewise Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett in [I]“War to Be Won” note that one of the goals of Octagon was “to determine the level and nature of British in the air-naval war in the Pacific.” However they do so as do the others without addressing the naval strategy. Max Hastings mentions Octagon in [I]“Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945” again without specific reference to naval strategy. However later in the book later discusses the Royal Navy’s limitations in ships, manning, logistics and operational art as it entered the Pacific campaign.[v] Other writers chronicle British operations in the Pacific but usually focus in the gallantry and determination of the Royal Navy and not its weaknesses.[vi]
Coles’ article is invaluable to understand the decision in relation to the political, military and economic considerations which influenced both King’s opposition to the deployment and the performance of the British fleet in the Pacific. Coles analyzes tensions between King and the other participants at Octagon. He judges King to be more realistic and informed regarding Royal Navy capabilities and more importantly its limitations than British leaders especially Churchill.[vii]
King was surprised at Roosevelt’s decision to accept Churchill’s offer of the Royal Navy without prior discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Coles notes that King may have kept silent at subsequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs, because he either assumed that his positions were logical and apparent to all or that he believed that Churchill was lying about his navy’s capabilities. Of course it was politically impossible for King to suggest such.[viii]
King’s realism on the subject was a directly related to the political tensions between American and British visions for the outcome of the Pacific war, and the pressing strategic considerations necessitated by Japanese offensives in Burma and China. The British goal of re-establishing colonial rule in Southeast Asia was a major bone of contention. Many Americans believed that the British goals were “aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in South East Asia and restoration of British prestige.”[ix] Yet the US wanted to defeat Japan’s formidable Army in Asia without the sacrifice of large numbers of American troops or material which necessitated British participation.[x] The introduction of large numbers of American troops on the Asian continent was impossible due to the lineation of the US Army to 90 divisions, most of which were engaged in Europe. Likewise US domestic issues regarding war production and the Navy’s share of it in relations to changing wartime conditions was a major concern for King. King and the Navy argued for high naval production while others including George Marshall were beginning to question it, especially if the British could provide “make substantial Naval forces available in the Pacific.”[xi]"

glojo

17th Dec 2011, 10:21

:O:O:OHave to be careful we do not get too involved with the 'Dark blue' and all I will say is that when a Kamikaze aircrfat crashed on the wooden flight decks of a US carrier it would cause severe damage. When they crashed on the armoured decks of British carrier we would get our the 'broom wallahs' to sweep off the mess.

Any contributions regarding Pearl Harbour?

If the Japanese were so ruthless then why not hammer home that attack, and then at the same time.... When they sunk the two British capital ships, why leave the screening destroyers? When a man is down, the best bet is to make sure he is down AND out!

500N

17th Dec 2011, 10:28

"
If the Japanese were so ruthless then why not hammer home that attack, and then at the same time.... When they sunk the two British capital ships, why leave the screening destroyers? When a man is down, the best bet is to make sure he is down AND out!"

I believe even though both Admiral's agreed on no third attack for various reasons, one of them later regretted not pressing home. I THINK even the American's agreed that a 3rd attack would have been devistating.

I also think they were extremely wary of losing any of their carriers but someone with more detailed knowledge may be able to provide the reasons. One I think was they wanted to preserve their capital ships instead of making them vulnerable by waiting for the planes from a 3rd attack.

Here is a question for you to continue the discussion on Pearl.

What IF the US Aircraft Carriers had been at Pearl on the 7th and ALL of them had been sunk or severely damaged ? (I assume the japs would have gone for the carriers first, then the Battleships).

What do you think the course of the war would have been then ?

How long would it have taken the US to get up and going again with 3 carriers ?

It's an interesting thought.

FODPlod

17th Dec 2011, 10:40

Are we possibly confusing 'anglophile' with 'anglophobe' here?

500N

17th Dec 2011, 10:46

FODplod

Yes, well picked up, my mistake, I have corrected my posts.

glojo

17th Dec 2011, 11:38

Regarding Fodplod's comment I guess we are all guilty as charged and what a pity that very learned gentleman did not answer your post.

I totally agree with your reasons regarding why those extra attacks were not carried out but it does go against the way they appeared to fight on the ground. was there a different ideology between Army and Navy.

Attacking the ships at Pearl harbour had a slight flaw in so far as most ships that were severely damaged or even sunk were subsequently salvaged and repaired. Sink them at sea and it removes the ship plus it will probably kill off a significant number of the crew. Hitting them in harbour at a weekend did neither!. If the carriers were in harbour then I am guessing they would have, or should have been the main targets and if it were at all possible then they would also have been salvaged and no doubt the dockyards would have worked twenty four hours a day getting those things back into service. I am guessing the US would very quickly move the Atlantic carriers across to the Pacific and may even have asked Great Britain to consider deploying a carrier or two??

I still maintain, contrary to what is being suggested here that the Japanese knew full well what ships were in harbour.

I would further suggest or perhaps ask this:

Pilots would be briefed on what ships they were to attack, the locations or berth of their target plus all the other details required to carry out a coordinated attack. To me it makes no sense whatsoever to sail all the way across the Pacific on the off chance that the fleet may or may not be in harbour or indeed the carriers may or may not be present, but I do bow to those who are far more knowledgeable on this topic..

Could I tactfully say that it was a well planned, well coordinated attack that may not have been aggressive enough? Hitting the fuel dumps, repair facilities and anything else that was a target of value. If you are going to slap a tiger then you had better hit him with all your might otherwise the thing will bite and bite back hard!

America can rightly complain about the lack of any declaration of war but they have to remember the same applies for all the other locations that Japan attacked during those early days of December.

500N
thank you very much for that research regarding the Navy Cross and I guess there is a probability that he did get that award for 'services rendered' which as you point out in accordance with the original requirements.

500N

17th Dec 2011, 11:53

My understanding was this, but I read a fair bit a long time ago.

The Japs definitely knew that the carriers were not in the harbour (as was said by another poster on a previous post).

That if the Japs had pressed home the third attack, the oil storage, docks and repair facilities that would have been bombed would have had a big effect on how quickly the US could get back into the war in strength. I THINK even a US Admiral admitted that if the 3rd attack would have been devastating.

My view re sinking in harbour / sinking at sea - it would have been a lot harder to do it at sea.

Re "If you are going to slap a tiger then you had better hit him with all your might otherwise the thing will bite and bite back hard!", I agree which is why my name is 500N which means 500 Nitro which is what I carry. We always say that Dangerous Game is not down until you put a finishing "security" shot through the head :O Same applies to the enemy IMHO. The Japs didn't do it for whatever reason.

I think these are some orders of the attack. It still has the first targets listed as 4 Battleships and 4 carriers.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/jm-097.html

.

glojo

17th Dec 2011, 13:34

A nice link and it makes you wonder when those orders were actually first drafted.The first circulation date was the 5th November 1941 (Guy Fawkes night) there is then further dates going on from the 23rd November 1941 but when did the planners actually start writing up these orders? Yes they mention the carriers but they were part of that huge fleet. I was surprised that they prioritized the US Battleships over carriers, it goes to show that even the Japanese had sill not realised what a huge game changer the carrier was.

It also shows quite clearly that a third attack was indeed planned for:

After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.

[7]. General outline. [Page 14]
If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
Using Google we can also see that a submarine from the attacking squadron actually located and followed the USS Lexington and this was the day before the attack.

In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in the daytime they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier Lexington but no trouble ensued. Link here (http://www.ww2pacific.com/japsubs.html)

The link supplied by 500N also confirms what I was saying about the fate of HMS Prince of Wales, that ship was going nowhere apart from the sea bed. She was clearly in the wrong place at the wrong time. If she had not been sunk when she was then she would have been sunk within days:

1. With the forces of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet and Eleventh Air Fleet as a nucleus destroy enemy fleets and air forces in the Philippines, British Malay, and Netherlands Indies. In cooperation with the Army, take the initiative in attacks on air forces and fleets in the Philippines and Malaya.

A few months ago I watched a very interesting documentary about the Japanese submarine contribution at Pearl harbour and it stated that the first vessel sunk at Pearl was actually a JAPANESE submarine. From memory I believe a US destroyer had seen this vessel on the surface and engaged it with her guns. With the power of Google that has also been confirmed.

06:37. Ward sees conning tower between Antares (AKS-14) and her tow, apparently headed for Pearl Harbor.
06:45. Ward fires on mini-sub with a hit, attempts to ram, depth charges and sinks it. This happened over an hour before the first US casualties

SASless

17th Dec 2011, 14:15

If the Japanese Sub spotted the Lexington....thus knowing the location of the carrier fleet....and the Japanese Admiral ordered the withdrawal of the attack forces based upon his being concerned about "not knowing" the location of the American Carriers....why did not the the Sub issue a sighting report?

It was routine for the Subs to make such reports was it not. The US Navy derived good intellligence from those reports as they had Radio Intercept Units (RIU's) on major fleet units to include the carriers at that time.

At one time in the battle of the Coral Sea (just prior actually) Halsey was instructed to "Be Seen" by the enemy and did so....and did not depart the area he was in until an RIU confirmed overhearing the Spot Report made by a Japanese Flying Boat.

The Fog of War covers all participants does it not?

Biggus

17th Dec 2011, 14:27

SASless

Surely the sub would have been ordered to maintain radio silence, to preserve the element of surprise, unless certain situations arose...

Such as maybe the sub thought the attack had been compromised. As it was, all they knew was that 1 carrier wasn't in harbour, important yes, but enough to potentially compromise the whole mission? I doubt it.

Andu

18th Dec 2011, 08:08

Re the many "what ifs" posted here (my own included): I recall reading the two volumes of the official history of the Royal Australian Air Force in the Pacific theatre (written by George Odgers) and having read them, coming to the conclusion that if the winner of a war is indeed the side that makes the fewer mistakes, the men running the Japanese war effort must have been, indeed, total clusterf**ks, because our leaders, both political and military, were certainly guilty of mega error after mega error -and not just at the beginning of hostilities, when there might have been an excuse for such errors.

Someone made the comment about the ineptness of the Japanese in not adequately supplying their fighting troops with food in the field at Guadalcanal. Exactly the same could be said of their operations in New Guinea and Burma - in both those campaigns, they hoped to feed their troops from captured enemy food stocks (and in both campaigns, to some degree, succeeded in doing so).

However, in both Burma (in particular, at Kohima in April 1944) and in New Guinea, on the Kokoda Track in 1942, their troops quite literally starved - while continuing to fight with incredible resolve. In New Guinea, there are well-documented reports saying that they resorted to cannibalism on quite a few occasions, including references in individual Japanese soldiers' diaries.

500N

18th Dec 2011, 08:21

I see subs mentioned quite a bit including Pearl Harbour.

I get the perception that the Japs never really nailed this mini sub activity,
they seemed to get there but didn't do a whole amount of damage.

The same with the sub attacks on Sydney (Australia) and I think Newcastle (Australia), made a big bang, killed a few people, put the wind up everyone but no long term strategic military damage ecept making Australia defend the North which in itself might have been enough.

Where as the plane attacks on Pearl and Darwin were devastating, Darwin especially.

Any thoughts ?

Andu

18th Dec 2011, 10:15

If I can lighten the debate for one moment, the Japanese mini-submarine attack on Sydney Harbour had a huge effect on the demographics of Sydney's exclusive harbourside eastern suburbs.

Immediately after the attack, the largely Protestant... let's call a spade a *** shovel: the wholly Protestant Sydney Establishment bailed out of the waterfront eastern suburbs in droves, to the point where, in June/July 1942, a harbourside mansion could be purchased for a couple of hundred Pounds. A large number of recently (and not so recently) arrived Europeans, predominately of the Jewish persuasion, not cowed by the Japanese attack, snapped up the prime real estate for a proverbial song - and to this day, a large proportion of the residents of those prime areas of Sydney is Jewish, to the point where prestigious Rose Bay is almost universally known to Sydneysiders as 'Nose Bay', and the nearby Double Bay as 'Double Pay'.

500N

18th Dec 2011, 10:31

Andu
That is interesting. Had never heard or read that before. Thanks for posting.

If you are ever in Sydney, apart from doing the usual touristy things,
visit the MV KRAIT which is moored in the harbour at the Australian National Maritime Museum.

Encyclopedia | Australian War Memorial (http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/krait.asp)

MV Krait - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Krait)

SASless

18th Dec 2011, 10:50

Biggus,

Thus...the Sub (I-6) I think it was....one of the over thirty Japanese Submarines involved in the cordon effort around the Hawaiian Islands during the attack....did not report the Lexington's position...and took no action against the Carrier or its escorts on the 6th....due to orders (we assume), thus one the attack took place the Admiral in charge of the operation...being worried about the location of the American Carriers....called off the follow-up raids which would have been the most devastating to the Americans.

Makes one wonder why he did not break radio silence on the 7th after the attack kicked off? Surely, the location of the carriers was of such significance they should be have been reported as soon as possible.

An interesting source of information on Pearl Harbor and later events.....

Attack on Pearl Harbor | World War II Database (http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=17)

glojo

18th Dec 2011, 12:14

500N MV Krait
What an excellent link and thanks for making us aware of the exploits of these EXTREMELY brave men, it reminds me in a small way of the daring do of our Cockleshell Heroes. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-12922554) Another Link (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/world-war-2/8090441/Cockleshell-Heroes-the-truth-at-last.html)

Once again I agree with points raised by SASLess regarding radio silence etc.

Would it be correct to suggest that once the Japanese hit Pearl Harbour the aircraft aboard the US carriers became an instant threat?

However Admiral Glojo who has 20/20 hindsight may well have smashed the bee-gee-bees out of this new threat!!!!:eek:;)

the Aircraft Carriers and one of the Battleships were not in port. (The USS Enterprise was returning from Wake Island , where it had just delivered some aircraft. The USS Lexington was ferrying aircraft to Midway, and the USS Saratoga and USS Colorado were undergoing repairs in the United StatesWe know Lexington had been sighted by the Japanese, but what did they see or perhaps what did they NOT see? Did Lexington have any aircraft on her decks? We could ask, Was she carrying ANY aircraft?

The American were still officially a Neutral country and at week-ends I am guessing most of the crew would be stood down and maybe even playing sports on her deck.. This is just me throwing in my two penarth and I guess there is a significant possibility that she may have been closed up at defence watches. My money would be on the former and what a juicy target that ship would have been. Especially for a submarine.

Until the attack there had been huge emphasis placed on maintaining radio silence and avoiding the 'enemy' AT ALL COSTS. Once the attack started then I guess the submariners had decisions to make regarding this valuable information.

Could it bed that the Japanese submarine commander saw what he wanted to see? In other words, I see an aircraft carrier, therefore it must have aircraft. How was he to know this ship was ferrying aircraft to Midway.

If the admiral of the attacking force was simply told at least one US carrier had been sighted then I stick with the post by LessSAS. The Japanese would possibly be low on munitions and probably low on aviation fuel, under these circumstances would taking on the US carriers a dumb idea?.

Finally Admiral King had made it clear how he did not want to operate with Royal Navy ships, a major argument being their method of refuelling... He intimated how that Navy preferred??? refuelling from astern of the tanker and this method was way too slow!!!

I will not wittle on about refuelling but suffice it to say that the preferred method of the Royal Navy was EXACTLY the same as the USN. This image was taken in March of 1942 in a much colder climate and shows a Royal Navy ship refuelling in the method preferred by the US Commander in Chief Navy.

https://dl-web.dropbox.com/get/large.jpg?w=b1fae1d5Makes me cold just looking at that picture :ooh:

500N

18th Dec 2011, 12:30

glojo

Some of the original M and Z soldiers are still around, I used to work with one in a job and he knew what I did but never said what he did until he turned up at my unit for an Anzac Day Parade.
Apart form being into everything war like when a kid, Cockleshell Heroes was one of the films that made me think of one of the specialist units, Paras, Marines etc. Those canoes, we called them Klepper Canoes were amazing considering how long ago they were designed. We still used them in the late 80's.

Sadly, I think I read in my last Association newsletter that due to the lack of M & Z members still alive the M and Z Association would be incorporated into the Commando Association. At least the MV Krait will always be maintained and looked after as a permanent memorial to them.

Re the Aircraft carrier, would a commander not assume it carried aircraft unless told otherwise ? A bit like saying I saw the Tirpitz but was she carrying any ammunition ? The other thing with an aircraft carrier even if it didn't have aircraft, unless under 24 hour observation, new aircraft could land on it.

It would only take 1 bomb to slow up one of his ships and that could have put the who,e task force at risk.

I believe they were also short of fuel so didn't want to steam around for no reason.

pasir

18th Dec 2011, 12:45

Further to 5000Ns mention of Operation Jaywick - The cockleshell style raid on Singapore harbour in 1943 led by Ivan Lyon in 1943 and mention of the fishing boat Krait - While no doubt being aware of the second raid
on Singapore some months later that tragically ended in disaster for the entire raiding party - I came by the following book while in Singapore which I am sure that if not already aware of then he and others will find greatly interesting -

' The Heroes of Rimau '
by Lynette Ramsay Silver via research of Major Tom Hall

Highly recommended to all having an interest in the Malayan/Singapore
WW2 war in the Far East.

...

SASless

18th Dec 2011, 14:04

Glojo,

Several War Warnings had been issued to Cincpac by Cominch (now CNO). The Pacific fleet was being deployed pretty much in two task units for three day at sea deployments per week. The at sea periods generally began on Tuesday and ended on Friday....with Sunday being the most common time for all of the ships to be in port. It was not they were in stand down....as much as they were becoming predictable and did so by trying to adhere to a Peace Time routine more or less. The crews were short handed and the watch standing requirments was imposing a hardship on the crews. Admiral Stark was trying to balance operational needs against crew rest and morale.

One of the contributing factors to the Pacific Fleet being caught in Port as they were....was the turf war Navy War Plans (Adimiral Kelly Turner), had going with Navy Radio Communications and Navy Intelligence over who would control the analyssis and dissemination of sigint and other intell. There had been some compromises of security re "Ultra"/"Magic" by several parties to include the British in the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack. This lead to CincPac being deprived of the results of the intercept and decoding of the Japanese Diplomatic Code which up to that point had been passed along for use by Fleet Intell Officers.

Had the Fleet Officers been provided the intercepts they would have been in a much better position to compare their own Navy Intell to what was trending in the Diplomatic intercepts.

The cover up by Turner and other culpable individuals during investigations into the Pearl Harbor disaster is a whole different discussion.

Fast forward to the months just before 9-11 and we can see things have not improved all that much since the early 1940's. Those that have the information are loath to turn loose of it for any number of good and valid reasons but also for some very bad reasons.