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Two's in
4th Dec 2011, 15:54
Well, that's if you regard the Daily Fail as "scrutiny".

Grounded! Almost half of RAF's Typhoon jets unable to fly because they don't have the spare parts to fix them | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2069745/Grounded-Almost-half-RAFs-Typhoon-jets-unable-fly-dont-spare-parts-fix-them.html)

The comment that caught my eye was at the end of the article, where an MoD spokesman said "it was 'perfectly normal' for such a high proportion of jets to be grounded at any one time. This was because of the level of sophistication in their systems."

So is he saying you can't have many serviceable airplanes because it's complicated? Interesting theory.

High_Expect
4th Dec 2011, 16:06
Nobody told the Aussies. Didn't they fly 20 of there 24 Super Hornets in formation recently? The other 4 were probably on Q.

Art of flight
4th Dec 2011, 17:09
In a previous job I was brought to book by the engineering boss for trying to field too many serviceable Lynx. Thats when I found out the budget only allowed for 66% to be serviceable during 'peacetime' tasking. Not sure how it's done these days, but perhaps that story is spot on.

Mach Two
4th Dec 2011, 17:10
Two, you are in! Well spotted and thanks for the post. I have to say, having been involved in this project for quite a while, I'm not in the least bit surprised. In fact, (BIG HEAD ON FOR A MOMENT) I bloody told them so. (BIG HEAD OFF AGAIN - for now).


Now, about this (in the article):

Conservative MP Chris Heaton-Harris said: 'It suggests that, yet again, the MoD signed contracts that were not good value for money.

Many was the time when several people (way above my pay grade) tried to improve/scrap/look elsewhere/etc, but were told they had to stick with Eurofighter (as it was then) no matter what. Where do you think most of the defence budget went all those years?

And this. We tried to set milestones so that a certain British defence manufacturer would only get paid as they delivered and as they acheived each stage of development/production. But, no! The Mod had to keep paying them regardless of acheivement because they couldn't afford to keep going and we couldn't 'punish' them for lack of acheivement.

Anyway, when did we ever get a logistics contract right? Especially when we're asked to save 10% a year?

Goodness, what a rant. Sorry.

Mach Two
4th Dec 2011, 17:12
Oh, God. I'm going to get slammed for that one, aren't I? Ho hum. Come on then.

Willard Whyte
4th Dec 2011, 17:57
So is he saying you can't have many serviceable airplanes because it's complicated? Interesting theory.

Doesn't bode well for Lightning II.

Buy 60
Plan as 50
Brief as 40
Walk as 30
Start as 20
Taxi as 10
None in the air.

Courtney Mil
4th Dec 2011, 18:38
I suspect you might, M2. It'll be good for you. Not quite sure how the shambles that the project was is entirely relevant to the spares issue. Maybe it's a cntinuation of the same thing - care to explain?

The spares of major items issue was the same with F4 and F3, as you remember. Radar packs moving from jet to jet. Admittedly the F3 suffered because all the spares were going to a certain oil-rich customer, but we still had to rob aircraft the whole time. Why should this be any different when cash is (supposedly) even tighter?

I think we know this would happen. No suprises here.

APG63
4th Dec 2011, 18:43
Courtney, that's true, but it still doesn't excuse getting all so badly wrong again. I seem to remember everyone proclaiming how we weren't going to let it go so wrong. Why didn't the MoD guys listen to themselves?

P.S. I think I know the answer.

Courtney Mil
4th Dec 2011, 18:47
Don't get me wrong, there were some really top people in that project. I mean TOP PEOPLE. But seemingly powerless to fight off the continual cost restraints, politics and red tape that kept on scuppering every stage of the programme.

Personally, I really enjoyed my involvement in it, but it was probably the most frustrating time of my life. So still not surprised this has happened.

Pontius Navigator
4th Dec 2011, 19:07
"Almost half"

Buy 7 jets, have one in deep maintenance. Have another in routine maintenance. Have one US so only almost half are available for flying.

Sounds pretty normal.

BEagle
4th Dec 2011, 19:35
Mach Two, one understand that a certain ex-Flt Cdt J St*r**p decided that budgeting 'at risk' for TypHoon spares would be A Good Thing? Or so an ex-VSO told me.....

Will Questions be Asked, one wonders?

Mach Two
4th Dec 2011, 21:49
BEagle, you have read my mind. The "at risk" rubbish went on and on and it never ceased to amaze me that no one ever questioned it.

Now, I worked with a lot of people, as I know you will have done, that explained that it was the only way they could keep projects alive and "moving forward" within budget restrains. Hence the "black hole" in MoD spending. Was it inexcusable or were people just trying to live up to the expectasions of financial constraints AND achieving success for their programmes?

Having seen both sides of the coin, I really don't know how to answer that one. I'd like to hear your thoughts.

BEagle
5th Dec 2011, 07:08
Perhaps some sycophantic Koalas were eager to smile at their superiors, so adopted a policy which, outwardly, seemed to keep the project rolling along.

Whereas in fact they were trusting in 'NIMTS'. Not In My Tour Syndrome - the policy of ensuring that the poo resulting from his policies wouldn't descend until after the sycophant had left office, probably on promotion.

Which puts me in mind of the ridiculous FM-immunity saga. European requirements were such that after a certain date, all our VHF radios (VHF RT, VOR, ILS) had to meet the new standards. As the date approached (and having had to update the flying club's radios....), I asked the IPT what was being done for HM's mighty FunBus fleet to meet both FM-immunity and 8.33 Khz requirements. He'd no idea what I was talking about, then did some digging and found the requirement buried deep in the files of a predecessor. So for several months we were unable to meet international requirements. New radios (utterly dreadful things) did eventually appear - but what a procurement farce. It had been the same when I'd raised the point about the 137 MHz extension a few years earlier and we'd been non-compliant for several months.

Pontius Navigator
5th Dec 2011, 07:35
BEagle, the same at Coningsby. I was SNavO and was browsing throught the pink and yellow leaflets. Found the .25 one and berated my clerk for just filing everything in the NFI file. Seemed that in the absence of my predessor no one had ever read them.

Went to OC EES, same blank look. He promised to look in to it, eventually came back as said it was in hand - in hand with days to go!

KarlADrage
5th Dec 2011, 07:50
Some of these comments seem, perhaps indirectly, to back up a theory I've pondered for a while:

Would procurement be such a mess if people at the top were responsible for projects for longer - maybe even right from the beginning up to the point whereby it's received its RTS?

As an outsider looking in, it seems that every time the reins are handed over the goalposts get moved, leading to inevitable cost and time overruns, which then get exacerbated further another few years down the line. Of course, some of these goalpost moves could still happen (real world changes etc) and it probably wouldn't help if the right appointment wasn't made to begin with, but surely we'd be in a far better position than we currently are? :confused:

Mach Two
5th Dec 2011, 08:16
Yes, Karl. It's a theory I too have pondered for many years. In fact, I think the same goes for a lot of posts in the MoD.

As BEagle and others have said, people stay just long enough to tick the boxes for promotion and then move on before they've really acheived anything. Even if the next guy hits the ground running, each handover results in disruption and some of the "too difficult" stuff getting quietly dropped.

Of course, who would want to be in an IPT for 10 years?

lightningmate
5th Dec 2011, 08:53
One thing would concentrate minds on such matters - Accountability declared and enforced; notwithstanding that persons may have moved on or even retired. However, chances of that happening almost zero of course !

lm

Courtney Mil
5th Dec 2011, 09:01
Accountability? Are you mad? That's the whole point of getting posted out of a job. Good grief, if we were all held accountable for our actions, everyone would have to do it properly and stop sloping it over to the next guy.

It's thinking like that that causes all sorts of problems. Now stop rocking the boat LM!

Mach Two
5th Dec 2011, 09:03
Courtney,

We know who you are. Be careful, some may think that's your real thoughts on the matter! In fact...

LowObservable
5th Dec 2011, 16:11
I ran into a bloke from FMV the other day who had been on the Gripen program since it started. There's a lesson there.

And if you think the 'Phoon situation is bad, you haven't looked at F-22 lately. Lots of ten-digit numbers between now and 2020, for two new weapon integrations, two new-weapon-variant integrations, no HMD and no way to communicate with anything other than another F-22 except voice radio.

And only 80-some of the 187 jets ordered will ever be full capability...

//weeps softly, bangs head on desk

Pontius Navigator
5th Dec 2011, 16:32
There are people who see a project through from start till they, or the project, dies. Unfortunately in the military their rank is usually capped at sqn ldr. If they work for the contractor they tend to stick at one level as well.

That is the nature of the beast.

BEagle
5th Dec 2011, 16:39
Ah yes - JAS-39E/F Gripen NG. A totally superlative, reliable and affordable jet.

Switzerland has just ordered 22; perhaps Brazil will now follow suit for its F-X2 programme?

Some Luftwaffe A310MRTT chums who flew AAR trials with the Gripen couldn't believe how serviceable the Gripen was. But then again, they were used to the Tornado....:uhoh:

Two's in
5th Dec 2011, 16:53
There is a balance to be struck with tour length for procurement jobs. Although this example smacks of short-termism (made up word) and the lack of a coherent support strategy, the flip side is ending up with incompetent or possibly deranged acquisition desk officers who can't be moved from post. There's also the risk of getting too cozy with the contractor over a long period of years, knowing you have the rest of your career to commit malfeasance and hide your tracks before anyone rumbles you. Of course, to be fair that all comes down to personal integrity and whether or not the MoD and the Government of the day engender a sense of public duty and moral responsibility in those who serve - oh wait...

tucumseh
5th Dec 2011, 17:34
From memory, when materiel and financial provisioning was done properly (scrapped in 1987), the Long Term Costings Permanent Instructions (not annual assumptions) stated that the Engineering Pool (aircraft in maintenance beyond 1st Line) should not exceed 13% of the fleet. You then added Training, IR and IR6 aircraft to that figure and what was left was, theoretically, available to front line, serviceable. It was the job of the "Provisioning Authority" (an old name for what was later split into Requirements Manager and ILS Manager) to maintain the figure, in that he (a civilian) was accountable to the 2 Star. The question that should be asked is what the equivalent Instructions require these days - if there even are any.

Obviously, in a relatively small fleet, and if there is a lot of initial training going on, the final figure may seem on the low side. Also, one aircraft going u/s can make a large percentage difference.


Beagle - -re your valid point about 8.33 spacing, in about 1995 OR issued a list of aircraft that would never need or get it. Many are still in service, while some who got it are not. That OR officer later became the IPTL of an aircraft that didn't get it and had the embarrassment of seeking an overturn of his own ruling. Not helped by the aircraft suffering break through every time it went near an airport (as predicted). :uhoh: In fact, as the project office assumed the regulations would be implemented, it cost more to scrap the 8.33 design and revert to an old design. That's where the money goes folks.

Mach Two
5th Dec 2011, 17:39
Buy me a SAAB for Christmas and I'll be happy. I'd even fly Rafale to be honest - depends what you want to do. But we have our FJ hardware at the moment so I'm not expecting any change just yet.

As far a the politicos are concerned we have our Cold War designed one-size-fits-all so there we have it. Until JFS falls apart copletely they're not going to look at anything else no matter how worthy.

I have always said, why do we need the sparkliest, newest, highest-risk technology when it's immature and expensive when there are so many, perfectly adequate alternatives on the shelf.

But I'm just a pilot. Give me something to to the job and I'll get on with it.

Ogre
5th Dec 2011, 20:39
Having been on the supplier end of more than a few military led projects, the constant gripe is that every so often the customer changes as the old bod gets posted out and the new one posted in. This has led to numerous occasions where we have had to go back to the drawing board or overturn decisions because the new bod doesn't agree. End result - cost goes up, programme slips, supplier/contractor gets the blame for incompetence.

In the civvy world, if you were buying something from a supplier you would have a manager who understood the task or at least had an interest in making it happen. You would not shuffle your office staff around every two years just so they can claim to have been involved. It is a ludicrous situation, so why does the military not learn? Many of the august members of this forum have in their time slagged off major contractors for their inability to deliver on time / on budget / with the capability they want. How many of that same august body would be happy to take on the responsibility for any one of those programmes for the duration, or should that be left to people who don't have a career?

Pontius Navigator
5th Dec 2011, 21:19
numerous occasions where we have had to go back to the drawing board or overturn decisions because the new bod doesn't agree. End result - cost goes up, programme slips, supplier/contractor gets the blame for incompetence.

I remember a conference I attended in about 1987 to 'fix' the moving map display for the Typhoon. It was to determine how the TAPs would be displayed given the limit of 16 colours. One issue was whether it would be a north up display or a track display. If the latter how would the text be handled if it was to be track up.

A mere 20 years on and 64k or 256k displays are normal and everyone expects for a few quid a track orientated multi-coloured GPS for their car.

Things do change rapidly.

Mach Two
5th Dec 2011, 21:52
Ogre, I have seen this. Valid point.

Pontius Navigator
6th Dec 2011, 08:28
happy to take on the responsibility for any one of those programmes for the duration, or should that be left to people who don't have a career

Having done one, albeit very minor role for 10 years I suffered 4 contract managers in the same period. Continuity is everything and something that was lacking in the last 4 years or so, almost as if the Contractor had lost interest in a contract that they had held securely for over 15 years. They lost then rebid.

The contract manager turnover was the same as the miltary gain experience, get promoted, move on syndrome.

John Blakeley
6th Dec 2011, 08:40
Perhaps someone can enlighten me - hasn't MOD paid a great deal of money to the Typhoon airframe and engine manufaturers to "guarantee" certain levels of availability with a series of support contracts, eg these "notes to editors" taken from a BAES Press Release 094/2011 of 19 May 2011 (Google "Typhoon Support")

BAE Systems also takes a major role in ensuring the availability of the Typhoon fleet to meet its standing and operational commitments. The contract, known as Typhoon Availability Service (TAS) aims to deliver best practice support solutions. The arrangement will see the RAF’s Typhoon aircraft maintained and supported by the Company until the end of 2013.

- A key requirement underpinning TAS is to drive the, reduction of Typhoon support costs over the lifetime of the jet. Working in partnership with the RAF and UK MOD, a range of innovative support solutions has been identified to maximise value and minimise costs.

- Although BAE Systems have had a presence at RAF Coningsby, in Lincolnshire, since 2004, the Typhoon Availability contract has expanded the BAE Systems population at the base to over 400 employees.

Where is it going wrong or wasn't it a very good contract from MOD in the first place I wonder?

JB

Mach Two
6th Dec 2011, 20:46
I refer the honourable gentleman to the answer I gave earlier. And don't those lines sound a bit like something from an advertising campaign? Whom do we trust? This programme was f***ed up decades ago and it hasn't got any better since. If you want, I can really rant about it. As can three or four others in here.

tucumseh
7th Dec 2011, 05:54
In summer of 1996, the EFA (as it was known) project office wrote to other aircraft offices announcing they had discovered a new phenomenon that would impact support and availability. They termed this “component obsolescence”. They had arranged a “workshop”, to be held in AbbeyWood on 14th August 1996, to which we were invited in case we encountered similar problems.


Intrigued as to why EFA would employ embryos to manage such things, we went along. They had made progress. A stonking great consultancy contract had been let which had proposed a number of strategies which MoD had been invited to consider.


My input was limited to handing the Chair (a) a copy of MoD’s long mandated policy for dealing with component unavailability (of which obsolescence is but one cause) and (b) a copy of AMSO’s ruling from 1991 that these mandated regulations shall no longer be implemented. The observant among you will realise these are part of the basic airworthiness regulations.



Of course, the fact everyone outside EFA knew of this problem didn’t go down well, as it made certain people look foolish. I still have the minutes. They end with: “The current support policy is one of Do Nothing, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. However, it is envisaged this will not prove to be the best policy”. No ****, Sherlock.

force_ale
7th Dec 2011, 07:22
What needs to be done is to create a few more airship posts to control the lack of leadership that allows this nonsense to happen in the first place. One per station should do it..........SOMEONE PLEASE MAKE THIS STOP!!:ugh::ugh::ugh:

jamesdevice
7th Dec 2011, 08:51
UK’s Eurofighters Fly To Availability-Based Contracting (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uks-eurofighters-fly-to-availability-based-contracting-04337/)

"The first A330 Voyager had been due to be handed over in October, but isn’t now expected at its new home of Brize Norton until the New Year. The private company that will operate the aircraft says it is down to the availability of Typhoon fast jets for air-to-air refuelling tests.”
The RAF Typhoon fleet’s base availability rate been a subject of some controversy (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uks-eurofighters-fly-to-availability-based-contracting-04337/) lately. This problem could also stem from the need to have Typhoons in the air for Libyan operations and home patrol missions, which would leave few planes available for other missions. It’s hard to tell from the information given.
Dec 4-5/11: Availability is reportedly an issue for Britain’s Typhoons. The Sunday Express reports (http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/287658/RAF-hit-by-crisis-over-spares-for-fighter-jets) that:
”...the number of Typhoons in Britain’s Forward Fleet, used to protect our skies, varies from month to month between about 40 and 50 aircraft. Yet at times so many are undergoing repairs that fewer than 20 are available. The RAF has had to scrap three… for spare parts…. it is the fighters’ computers that are most frequently “liberated” to keep other jets in the air. Tim Ripley, defence analyst for IHS Jane’s, said problems had come to a head because of the Libya campaign…. Earlier this year a critical report by MPs on the cross-party Public Accounts Committee revealed only eight pilots had been given sufficient ground attack training because of the lack of aircraft.”
Britain’s Ministry of Defence fires back on their blog (http://www.blogs.mod.uk/defence_news/2011/12/defence-in-the-media-5-december-2011.html). They don’t give contrary figures, which would offer a fully credible rebuttal. What they do say, is that:
”[Reports that half the fleet is grounded are] not true. We regularly carry out routine maintenance programmes… but that does not mean they are undergoing ‘repairs’.... The RAF has not ‘scrapped’ any Typhoon aircraft for spares and we do not routinely take aircraft off flying duties to remove spare parts….. It is standard practice to use parts from across the whole fleet…. This only affects a few aircraft in maintenance and ensures we have the operational aircraft we require.”

Chugalug2
7th Dec 2011, 09:49
Force Ale:
SOMEONE PLEASE MAKE THIS STOP!!
That someone, or more correctly some two, will eventually be the head of an independent MAA and the head of an independent MAAIB, separated both from each other and from the MOD. That has yet to happen and when it does it will then take much angst and time to achieve what we all want, airworthy UK military aircraft and an end to so many avoidable airworthiness related military aircraft fatal air accidents. Until then, lack of availability will go on being a problem. Further avoidable fatal accidents though will be tragedies; for families, friends, colleagues, and for the whole of UK military aviation. Of course it has to stop!!

Mach Two
7th Dec 2011, 09:58
Chug,

Good. I hope you're right there. Wasn't every new system in the last 25 years supposed to speed things up, improve availability and ensure airworthyness?

M2

Chugalug2
7th Dec 2011, 10:22
True, but then they all came under a procurement policy that worked on the basis that the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations should be disregarded when they became a hindrance, and woe betide those that then tried to enforce them. Ask Tuc. In the meantime remember that:
Self Regulation Never Works and in Aviation It Kills!

Mach Two
7th Dec 2011, 10:27
Yeah, can't argue with that!

tucumseh
7th Dec 2011, 11:25
What needs to be done is to create a few more airship posts to control the lack of leadership that allows this nonsense to happen in the first place.


Don't know if that was tongue in cheek. The chief enforcer of the 1991 policy was Director General Support Management, an RAF AVM 2 Star. His immediate boss, who did nothing despite highly critical audits and reports, was the RAF Chief Engineer. Across in MoD(PE), their counterparts (Director General Air Systems 2 - 2 Star and Chief of Defence Procurement - 4 Star) adopted the same stance; one they maintained for many years and, in fact, officially remains extant. This has been upheld by five successive Mins(AF) and two PUSs although there are visible attempts to change.

In the example I quoted, to be fair to EFA they identified the risk and tried to do something. What speaks volumes is the failure to appreciate there were extant regulations - something their most junior project officer would have been expected to both know and have spent many years implementing. However, the risk identification was their permitted limit, as the above PE Stars had ruled that no risk mitigation should be undertaken. The very act of convening the meeting risked disciplinary action, although I seem to recall their 2 Star was more flexible about his staff breaking such rules. Ours, DGAS2, was not and sought regular reassurance his staffs were not implementing the regulations; with staffs being instructed not to attend risk meetings or notify risks.

As ever, the best type of person to sort this out is one who has nothing left to lose!

backseatjock
7th Dec 2011, 13:17
Beagle - worked on Gripen programme for a number of years, kicking off support for campaigns in a number of markets including Czech Republic, Hungary and Brazil among others.

It's an excellent platform but does have it's own limitations, as all do. Switzerland was a strategic important order for the NG variant and the production line in Linkoping. It's great news for many of my former colleagues at Saab, many of whom were hurt badly when Austria selected Typhoon over Gripen.

Biggest loser in new generation fighter competitions, so far at least, would appear to be Rafale. And Dassault's reaction to both UAE and Swiss government decisions was certainly interesting from a customer/future customer reltionship perspective.

APG63
8th Dec 2011, 09:30
BSJ,

I missed out on that one. What was Dassault's reaction to UAE and Switzerland? Sorry, been away for a while so a bit out of touch.

LowObservable
8th Dec 2011, 10:37
Google: clown repartee

for a clue to Dassault's reaction....

APG63
8th Dec 2011, 10:47
Ah. No need. I get it.