Loss of Control: Flight Crew Training Conference

[angelorange]

Dr Sunjoo Advani - ICATEE - RAeS International Flight Crew Training Conference

Video here:

Dr Sunjoo Advani - ICATEE - RAeS International Flight Crew Training Conference - YouTube

[Machinbird]

Interesting presentation. Too bad the person recording did not tend the camera better.
I hope they use swept wing aircraft for teaching the flight portion of the syllabus to swept wing pilots.

The flight characteristics at high AOA and post-departure are significantly different in a swept wing aircraft than in a straight wing aircraft. As they stated, you want to avoid negative training.

If the regulators are going to eventually require this training, it would be good if they also specified which aircraft types are appropriate for this training. No sense creating unnecessary craters.

[A37575]

The subject of loss of control has been done to death. There has been countless conferences and articles in the aviation media and it all boils down to lack of basic UA recovery training in simulators. Most operators are content to pay lip service to training pilots on how to recover from UA's and leave pilots to Google the subject.

Ab initio students should be learning this stuff during PPL training but it rarely happens perhaps due to lack of suitable light aircraft that are certified for aerobatics. Lack of experienced competent flying instructors doesn't help, either.

It takes only 15 minutes at the most, of simulator time to teach pilots how to recover from loss of control (unusual attitude recovery). But while the subject is not going to be addressed seriously in the simulator expect the occasional prang as we have seen in 737's over the past ten years

[RAT 5]

In the 3 year sim cycle UA recovery is touched on very briefly. FL100, enter a fixed scenario from the sim data base and recover. Perhaps close your eyes and the SFI leans forward to upset the a/c. How about some real incidents? Various low level pitch up and stalls on approach or G/A.. Some survived, some didn't, but I think the ones I've read about all were survivable. Then there are the high level upsets that became inverted. You've >25000' (most likely)to recover. No need to rip the wings off in over stress pull ups. Many of those incidents lasted many moments. The UA scenarios we get are over and done with in seconds. A hand full of control input and it's over. Maybe I'm just wanting to have too much fun in the sim.

[angelorange]

Good summary of findings poorly filmed - they need a tripod!

Now that CFIT accidents have been reduced through training and technology, LOC is the biggest killer.

see: http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf

Of those LOC accidents Stalling is still the lion's share of the problem.

You do not need aerobatic aircraft to demonstrate a full stall.

However you might need something like APS' Extra 300 for going well beyond the 45 deg turns, plus 15 to minus 10 pitch attitudes. A simulator is great for proeedural work but very limited in its flight envelope and motion cueing.

Sadly most civilian students whether PPL/Private or frozen ATPL/ATP do not understand the basics of stall recovery let alone spin entry recognition. Although test pilots have to certify JAR25/FAR25 aircraft using correct stall recovery, the regulators are partly to blame for emphasizing minimum height loss (using power) instead of primarily reducing Angle of Attack in their Private through CPL/ATPL stall recovery tests.

Then, for those conscientious souls who google to find out more or who have an airline interview coming up, there are some very poorly written books out there that suggest things like rolling in a vertical, speed rapidly reducing senario.......

Speaking with an approved/integrated student/pilot mill graduate, who flys A320s for a major EU airline, he had no idea what mach buffet or coffin corner was nor how it related to weight and altitude. Many line pilots don't appreciate how a swept wing stall might look very different to the one seen (usually a long time ago in basic training) in a C172 or Diamoind piston single.

History repeats itself - it has to because nobody listens (or nobody teaches the kids properly).

[safetypee]

All of the presentations given at the EASA conference are available from EASA Safety Conference: Staying in Control - Loss-of-Control (LoC) Prevention and Recovery (http://easa.europa.eu/conferences/loc/) - 'Presentations'
The one relating to the video is in the ‘Wednesday 3rd session’ folder.

As noted by A37575 the subject is near exhaustion, which might indicate that the industry is overlooking some significant points.
Accidents involving loc have multiple contributing factors, and in many, the inability to recover is secondary to the reasons as to why the situation occurred.
It is probably impossible to ensure that every pilot (at least Capts) will have sufficient loc training to cope with the ‘once in a lifetime’ rare situation requiring action, and even then the situation (circumstance) is more likely to be one that has not been considered. Furthermore, it’s likely that the stress on human behaviour in such surprising circumstances might result in erroneous situation assessment or choice of action.

It might be of greater benefit – safety and commercial, if the industry considered the precursors to the accidents and the factors which generated the pre loc situation.
There could be major benefits from reviewing normal operations. For every situation resulting in a loc incident there are many similar ones which crews are able to manage successfully in everyday operations. We should be trying to understand these aspects, to reinforce the awareness, the behaviours, and the control of the situation before it deteriorates. These contribute to safe normal operation, normal flying, and normal (average) behaviour of a crew – not just an individual.

[BOAC]

It is probably impossible to ensure that every pilot (at least Capts) will have sufficient loc training to cope with the ‘once in a lifetime’ rare situation requiring action, - I have to disagree there, sp - it should be (is) simple to teach the very basic rules for survival - how/when to roll, how/when to pull/push and what a nose-high high rate of descent means. EG - simple things like how to recover from a spiral dive - another known 'killer'. Get those buttoned up and we have probably eliminated 99% of the LOCs we have seen. Even if the 'event' was not covered in training, the basic 'golden rules' will almost certainly sort it out.

Your last para is absolutely correct, but as we have discussed many times it is the advance of 'easy to fly' technology which will be the biggest hurdle we have to face. All 'real' UPs come as a surprise, and those that happen in an 'automatic 'safe' environment' are even more of a surprise.

[safetypee]

BOAC, we have differing views on the training task / effectiveness.

One person’s view of a simple training task is rarely a consensus view, and even when the basics of survival have been taught, there is no guarantee that they will be recalled when required. It might also be argued that in the normal operation before an upset, it is the failure to recall and take appropriate (previously trained) action to prevent the upset which is the initiating problem.

People like a simple view of ‘the problem’; it only requires ‘a single solution’ - more training. However, loc is a complex safety scenario which has many contributing factors affecting the likelihood of an accident.
Most statistics represents a linear analysis (cause=effect) whereas a loc situation is like a chaotic system; a small change here or there results in a major event or just a near miss. Not always ‘catastrophic’ as the presenter said; thus we must look at the successes for those small issues.
Why are loc accidents now so dominant, who classified the incidents, and what were the contributing factors?
What ‘small’ changes have occurred to create this apparent increase in loc accidents?

Another aspect of human behaviour, particularly the stress and surprise of these situations, is where people revert to old (deep seated) habits from previous training or normal operation.
For example, see slide 28 in Avani’s presentation – depicting an upset on EFIS. Note the FD command bars (I hope that most aircraft inhibit these during an upset). I would maintain that many pilots would revert to ‘follow the FD’ (automation dependency) and push forward before rolling – pitch before roll (and which FD bar is pitch, and which roll?). This action would not be in agreement with most loc training.

[FullWings]

Note the FD command bars (I hope that most aircraft inhibit these during an upset).
I don't know any aircraft that does that, or even if it's a good idea. Windshear recovery guidance, for instance, is a very useful thing to have on a flight director and some of the attitudes reached in a WS encounter could well be classed as "upset"...

I tend to side with BOAC here as recovery from upsets / unusual attitudes is something that, IMHO, can be taught to, practiced and demonstrated at a high level of competency by any professional pilot worthy of the name. It doesn't need much more explanation than that - it's a shame that the training in some quarters isn't up to it and it doesn't need that much money or time spent on it, really.

I agree that there are almost always other causal factors involved, but if the guy at the controls doesn't have the skillset to resolve the situation, that's one ginormous hole going straight through the cheese and out the other side.

These days, out in the real world, I suspect you are more likely to be presented with a UA scenario than a V1 cut. If you had difficulty with engine failures in the sim I doubt you'd be set loose on the aircraft until you could cope... Do we do the same for UA training?

[frontlefthamster]

That conference seemed to me to be a classic case of Dracula lecturing on stock control at the blood bank.

Rather than a series of presentations by the individuals and organisations who had put in place, and maintained, the mechanisms which allowed loss of control to become the biggest killer, could they not have had some views as to how to stop it, from people who might know what they were talking about..?

Of course, the common denominator between AF447, TK1951, Spanair at Madrid, and others is that the aircraft was defective before loss of control.

That should be a big part of the answer, but the convenience inherent in blaming the now-dead crew is just too great...

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Just-Culture-Balancing-Safety-Accountability/dp/0754672670

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t81sDiYjKUk

Sorry, the code in my post seems correct, not sure why the post looks corrupted.

[ZFT]

Both Dr Sunjoo Advani and Peter Tharp from RAeS have given similar presentations this year at APATS and FSEMC conferences and a strong message was that modern simulators are far from ideal for LOC or UA recovery because the OEM supplied data packs do not address these extremes of the flight envelope. That isn’t to say the data doesn’t exist, it currently isn’t made available to the simulator manufacturers.

Additionally, without regulatory (especially FAA and EASA) support for the rapid implementation of ICAO document 9625 Issue 3, advances in simulation technologies are not being utilised to their full potential.

[BOAC]

Yes, sp, we do have differing views.

I like the simple

"Get those buttoned up and we have probably eliminated 99% of the LOCs we have seen. Even if the 'event' was not covered in training, the basic 'golden rules' will almost certainly sort it out."

and I would suggest that preventing 99% of LOCs is a better target than generating reams of pdfs, ppts, links and slide shows. By all means we should try to prevent them, but we MUST ensure that pilots know the simple (yes, I DO like that word - no need to over-complicate it) techniques to recover from them.

Automation is, I believe, the major contributor to the LOC incidence - the sudden surprise when the 'safe', 'cosy' system dumps on you is a potential killer. Add the lack of practice at actually flying the aircraft and what do we have? AF447, A320/PGF, THY/SPL.

[safetypee]

FullWings. FD bars, yes keep them for windshear, but remove for upset, e.g. greater than +25, -10, +- 45. You didn’t comment on the FD display in the presentation.

Re “… if the guy at the controls doesn't have the skillset to resolve the situation …” and your V1 cut example; I would counter with the many examples in the PSM+ICR study where, particularly in turboprops, fully qualified pilots did not control the aircraft with an engine failure and the result was loc.

BOAC, I’m OK with simple, but you destroy your argument with example accidents; all of which involved the crew creating the upset and thus more unlikely to identify the need for recovery. (See end quote)

I sense that many contributors have similar safety objectives, but the differing views of the problem are an indication of the complexity of the issue – ‘a wicked problem’, where alternative methods of finding a solution are required.
Such strategies suggest avoiding the identification of a specific ‘cause’ - defining the problem, instead they require a broad definition of the problem area and an aim to change the system at large (the interactions) as opposed to a specific item.
Solutions for creating change in this sense might be quite small scale, e.g. more manual instrument flying or situation assessment practice, but their effect in a complex dynamic system could be quite dramatic.

“The point is not to change what we think, but to change the way we think about these issues”.

‘Connecting the Dots' (http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/connecting-the-dots) particularly chapt 5 (free download).

“ ‘Connecting the Dots’ offers an approach premised on learning and adaptation, which demands that … we… be prepared to embrace uncertainty and complexity. This pamphlet aims to lay the foundations for a new deliberative framework; one that is suited to dealing with complex issues that are unbounded in time, scope and resources.
Society has an insatiable appetite for simplicity and for solutions. More often than not this creates problems rather than solves them because policymakers become caught up in the narrative of miracle cures for complex problems.”

[BOAC]

all of which involved the crew creating the upset and thus more unlikely to identify the need for recovery. - well, we could argue all year about cause and effect on that statement, but whether a system or crew failure caused the upset is really immaterial in terms of "I've got 120 degrees of bank - I'll pull the stick back because I am losing height fast". I'm afraid I see the quote at the end of your post as (simply) words, and while how one got to the UA can be of use, it is what to do when you find yourself there that is important. I just cannot see how all the great psycho-analytical thinkers in the world are going to help my pilot at 120 degrees of bank, whereas some UA recovery training will. I do not give a fig for "policymakers become caught up in the narrative of miracle cures for complex problems" - since it is not a complex problem. Basic (simple) flying? It has been proven to work. When the skills are not there, it doesn't.

[safetypee]

BOAC, to summarise our differences, but without associating either a person or a view, I recall the difference between a ‘difficulty’ and a ‘mess’:

“A difficulty is characterised by broad agreement on the nature of the problem and by some understanding of what a solution would look like, and it is bounded in terms of the time and resources required for its resolution.
In contrast, messes are characterised by no clear agreement about exactly what the problem is and by uncertainty and ambiguity about how improvements might be made, and they are unbounded in terms of the time and resources they could absorb, the scope of enquiry needed to understand and resolve them and the number of people who may need to be involved.”

“ … when the problem is a difficulty an individual claiming to have the solution is an asset, but when the problem is a mess that individual is usually a large part of the problem!”

Thus, as ever, we should strive to make all problems a ‘difficulty’ and avoid making a ‘mess’.
And thereby I repeat my argument, that avoidance of upset conditions (a difficult problem) should reduce the need for recovery training (clearing up the mess), but in this, I concede the need for training in both aspects; it’s a matter of priority and practicality.

There’s No Silver Bullet in Effective Loss of Control In-Flight Mitigation | International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (http://icatee.org/defining-the-loss-of-control-in-flight-threat/theres-no-silver-bullet-in-effective-loss-of-control-in-flight-mitigation/)

[BOAC]

avoidance of upset conditions (a difficult problem) should reduce the need for recovery training (clearing up the mess) - absolutely no disagreement there.

The difficulty I have with the mess is the apparent dismissal of the practicality of training for UA recovery. A little like saying the trapeze artist does not need a safety net as he has trained and practised not to fall. Of course there is no silver bullet. Hence the safety net?

[A37575]

and while how one got to the UA can be of use, it is what to do when you find yourself there that is important.

Spot on, BOAC. I have always maintained that instrument interpretation is the key to prompt recovery. One thing I cannot understand is why instructors say "close your eyes while I put you in a UA, then recover" There is no way a pilot is flogging around in an aeroplane with closed eyes and so that practice is unrealistic.

Most modern airline simulators do not have the fidelity in terms of G forces. But the flight instruments still work as normal. Artificial horizons or ADI's -whatever you like to call them - are capable of 360 degrees rotation and 60 degrees or more in pitch. In the 737 simulator it is a simple task to pull to 20 degrees nose up and roll fully inverted. The instructor then simply freezes the simulator and at leisure discusses the instrument indication, position of the sky pointer and so on. The same thing is easily done on a desk top simulator.

Same with nose high attitude where the technique may be to roll to the nearest horizon while unloading. Any competent simulator instructor should be able to hop in the seat and demonstrate the recovery. Forget the aerodynamic loading fidelity - concentrate on what the artificial horizon, airspeed and heading information is telling you. It really is so simple. The feeling of disorientation that concern some pilots will lessen with proper UA training.

I don't buy the idea that it is better to teach the pilot not to get into the UA in the first place rather than show him how to get out of it. By the same principle you would not teach people how to swim but instead teach them how not to go near the water.

Doing a couple of UA's once every three years as part of cyclic training is a waste of time. It should be done at least three times a year in order to maintain confidence - and always in IMC (simulator of course). And if you cannot think of a suitable scenario then tell the student to imagine he has been caught too close behind an A380. The rate of roll would be phenomenal and the student would have to act quickly and in the right direction. Thank goodness for Sky Pointers...

[Microburst2002]

Could they make special simulators to provide that training?

They would probably very big and expensive, and espectacular, but crews would only need to use them for an initial training and then once every few years for refreshing.

They could build them multi-type, with a cockpit that could be quickly switched from a boeing 777 to an airbus 320 in half an hour. The cockpit would be mock up, anyway, except for the flight instruments and the flight controls and thrust levers. Size could be reduced by making it single seat, or double but with the instructor seating in the cockpit and having the sim controls in front.

It would be nice. Manufacturers would love the idea, too.
Then add some politicians...

[BOAC]

One thing I cannot understand is why instructors say "close your eyes while I put you in a UA, then recover" There is no way a pilot is flogging around in an aeroplane with closed eyes and so that practice is unrealistic. - I am not bothered by this. The point I am making is that a UA nearly always comes as a complete 'surprise' to the pilots - often by an unexpected dumping of the warm and cuddly automatics - and how they got there, while of use, is not so important as how they get out of it - so, closing eyes in a way simulates ARRIVING in a UA and not really knowing how you got there, which in all probability was not deliberate.

In terms of simulation, I would have thought there was some merit in having the ability to 'throw' the instruments into a UA at the press of a button without having to 'manoeuvre' the sim, somewhat along the lines of being able to introduce a gentle, subtle departure of PF's attitude indicator.

[angelorange]

Whilst I appreciate many of A37's comments,

"The subject of loss of control has been done to death" is literally true for the 1756 people who lost their lives on commercial jets as a result of LOC between 2001 and 2010.

Safetypee says "the subject is near exhaustion"...... really ?


Without repeated action through awareness, legislation, better training and continual review as BOAC suggests to improve piloting skills, many more lives will be lost. Those skilled crews will overcome upset senarios where, more often than not, it is the automation that takes an aeroplane to the scene of the stall or LOC.

Training in Threat and Error Mgt, CRM, Human Factors and a sound SMS all have their place but should compliment fundamental flight skills taught at the earliest stages of pilot training.

The old adage "Aviate, Navigate , Communicate" can be written "Fly it, Point it, Sort it"

Basic flying priorities that can be foundational to others such as automation airmanship.

Perhaps we should add to the list a post flight "admit it". Most of the incidents we hear about because they became accidents. Even with todays systems monitoring and engineering post flight data downloading, some think it ok to just walk away without telling anyone why they entered a minor upset.

However, most schools do not teach spinning or signs of approaching spin aloft. Many do not cover stalling in real depth and certainly not Stall recovery for swept wing FAR/JAR25 aircraft. Students need repetition of these exercises to become competent at prevention and recovery.

Sim limitations are not just degrees of freedom you see on an EHSI/AI nor motion queing. These Sims are designed for proceedural work and once outside that envelope they do not give the pilot true rates of roll, pitch etc or force feedback, flutter effects etc. Yes I agree snapshot Upset pictures could be shown and recovery discussed, but what you do in a SIM can result in an accident - Airbus Fin removal is an example: AA 587, A300-600 excessive rudder inputs overstressed fin. This "technique" was taught on SIM elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Training Program.

Dr Sunjoo Advani and the ICATEE/RAeS team are to be congratulated for re-highlighting an very real problem that can be resolved 99% of the time through airmanship and a more transparent interface between pilots and a "stricken" aircraft. This you tube presentation is just a snapshot of the work done around the world by concerned aviation specialists including pilots.

For more info see: http://www.safeopsys.com/docs/RAES_URT_MASTER.pdf

[safetypee]

There are several concerns about simulator training.
There is no guarantee that post-stall simulation will be representative, and even if a good approximation it may only represent one very narrow view of a whole range of possible scenarios. One of the aircraft that I am familiar with has differing wing drop characteristics with increasing weight, thus a very benign medium-weight stall would be unrepresentative training for a rapid wing drop high-weight stall.

Any simulation training will be limited – time, money, availability (crew and equipment), thus at best a pilot will have a limited exposure to a small range of conditions. A possible negative aspect of this training might result in a false sense of confidence which is either misused, or is the mental backdrop to a greater surprise factor in a real event.

As with most aspects in safety a compromise solution has to be found. In this instance the industry should not ‘compromise’ on the belief that simulator training will solve the problem; it is not certain what all of the contributing factors in upset events are. We should consider using a range of generic solutions which address some of the dominant contributing factors – before and during the event.

Weaknesses in human performance stem from situation assessment and, with accurate assessment, decision making for the choice of action. Simulator training is focused on the end aspect – the action, whereas both pre and post loc require assessment and understanding, and a choice of action for every situation. A parallel aspect of this is that in loc accidents all crew members appeared to have a similar erroneous understanding of the situation and/or choice of action; we have to understand these aspects to ensure that any further training is to be effective.
Also, many loc accidents involve disorientation; it is not clear what if any benefit loc simulator training would provide in these events.

Whilst we hope that a small change in safety efforts might make a large difference in safety, we still have to inquire what ‘small change’ in recent normal operations might have contributed to the apparent increase in loc events; if we don’t know that, then how can we be sure that we are fixing the problem.
This is a circular argument which I believe is near exhaustion. Thus the industry needs to consider a different approach to this problem – it’s a ‘mess’ (#16). We need to have a much broader view of the contributing factors, the links between them, and parallels with other accident groups with similar influencing factors.

We are fortunate to operate in a very safe industry and seek to maintain this – hence the frustration of repetitive accidents. However to achieve this aim we might not be able to employ ‘more of the same’ training, checking, etc, (it could be those items which caused the problem), instead we really do have to change the way we think about these issues.

[angelorange]

Safetypee - agree with your view of SIM limitations. I wonder what happened to Cranfield's FORCE idea?

Flight safety takes centre stage (http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/news/pressreleases/news/page2724.html)

[safetypee]

I’m embarrassment to admit not knowing about this work, although I know of or am aware of many of the individuals in the linked press release.
I suspect that as a commercial organisation dependent on funding, current financial restrictions might not help with the start-up of new safety initiatives. Also, guessing that the UK CAA would be a prime source of funding – they are also suffering cutbacks; and I am not sure where CAA research work fits in with EASA.

The EASA view on this subject appears to be following the progress of industry initiatives and aligning more with the FAA. This would to produce a much needed ‘world-wide’ solution, even if the FAA appears to be doing its own thing.

The latest from the UK CAA appears to be in their document ‘Significant Seven’ in the 'loc task force report' (I had overlooked the reference to FORCE in this document).

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/2011_03.pdf

[infrequentflyer789]

Whilst we hope that a small change in safety efforts might make a large difference in safety, we still have to inquire what ‘small change’ in recent normal operations might have contributed to the apparent increase in loc events; if we don’t know that, then how can we be sure that we are fixing the problem.

Not sure that the implication is that LOC has increased, rather that other causes (primarily CFIT) have significantly decreased, due to being "fixed". Leaving LOC maybe only as bad as it's always been, but now stands out as the biggest problem - hence the renewed attention on fixing it.

[Microburst2002]

With the very low number of crashes and accidents that occur nowadays it is difficult to make statistics and put the blame on this or that.

Just two crashes of one kind will reverse all statistics...

[Prince Niccolo M]

You say:

... it all boils down to lack of basic UA recovery training in simulators.
...Ab initio students should be learning this stuff during PPL training...

Competence and confidence in dealing with LOC requires aerobatic training in real aeroplanes with real vestibular and other sensory cues. The reason that ab initio students don't do it is because regulators won't mandate it and most barge arse S&L pilots haven't believed that it was necessary (despite the growing and contrary evidence). Bit like Airbus stall training, really! Trying to solve the problem in the simulator is just a band-aid, sort of convenient and a bit expensive.

But then, perhaps not:

...It takes only 15 minutes at the most, of simulator time to teach pilots how to recover from loss of control (unusual attitude recovery)...

If it was that bluddy easy, we wouldn't have a problem.

What we are looking for in LOC protection is resilience - deepseated, confident and measured response to a very rare event. Most people these days would take more than 15 minutes just to fully understand what the attitude indicator was telling them, let alone the performance indicators!

But I get the impression that you sort of know that it isn't a 15 minute solution, because you later say:

...Doing a couple of UA's once every three years as part of cyclic training is a waste of time. It should be done at least three times a year...

But how many sim exercises do you think it takes before they actually start to develop some resilience?

Some other posters were quite gentle, but I was actually startled by:

... One thing I cannot understand is why instructors say "close your eyes while I put you in a UA, then recover" There is no way a pilot is flogging around in an aeroplane with closed eyes and so that practice is unrealistic...


Most of your modern 'children of the magenta' wouldn't even see a UA developing if they were watching the attitude indicator, because their expectation is simply that the autopilot will be doing its job and they are commonly incapable of seeing past the flight director bars to see the true attitude. They have, for all intents and purposes, their eyes shut. And the reality is that they need the ability to rapidly and accurately interpret raw attitude information on a flash card basis - because when they finally wake up to the fact that something is wrong, they have to see it as it is right now.

I absolutely agree with:

... I have always maintained that instrument interpretation is the key to prompt recovery...

but I am cautiously curious about your passion for:

...Thank goodness for Sky Pointers...

Is that your "instrument interpretation" silver bullet? :{ :{