EK Melbourne accident: final report?

[Jumeirah James]

Gents,

It's been approx 2 years since EK bonged the A345 tail at MEL. Is there any date for the release of the final accident report yet please?

cheers

JJ

[millerscourt]

JJ

A total lack of airmanship by the flight deck crew. Same applies to the A340 incident at Joburg a few years back.

Same also applies to SQ6 at Taipei and the B744 at Auckland similar to the EK Melbourne where wrong speeds were entered.

Next question.

[jackbauer]

Millerscourt the artist formerly known as kangaroocourt

[Kennytheking]

millerscourt,

Next question?.......looks like you didn't understand the first question because you didn't answer it.

Not only did you fail to answer the question, but your response is purely inflammatory and uninformed. My god, I hope you don't fly for a living.

[a345xxx]

So Millerscourt is wrong?

[tbaylx]

Yeah pretty much exactly that..wrong.

While human factors certainly played a part in both incidents, you might as well be EK management if your attitude is that it was pilot error as the only cause. Fire the pilots then problem solved!

The crew were highly experienced and well trained, so the real question should be what factors would allow that series of errors to develop so that an accident was narrowly avoided.

Never mind...that would require an unbiased inwards look at what is wrong with EK operations, something that EK has no interest in pursuing, much easier to get rid of the crew and call it problem solved.

[Sonny Hammond]

WRONG!

Anyone with even a passing interest in aircraft accident investigation understands that rarely does an accident occur where the fault can easily be traced to a single cause.

The reality is that nearly all accidents/incidents are caused by a latent failure of the 'system' and eventually this works its way through to the end user, the pilot.

I am not taking away from the responsibility of the pilots but really, in this day and age particularly, with the high involvement of non-operational management in operation decision making, how can only the pilots be totally responsible for errors and business system failures?

The pilot is an easy scape goat but rarely singularly responsible.

Millerscourt is living in the dark ages with that attitude.

[5star]

The fact of the matter is that if the MEL guys had followed SOP's, they would have picked up the mistake. Inserting the Take off data in the FMS(C) is one of the most important exercises of the day for anyone in a commercial airline...Your life depends on it...
If you follow company SOPs, any mistake you make with weights will be picked up at one stage in the FMS(C) data entry/ loadsheet verification.
And sorry, if you cut corners you shouldn't be in the left seat or right seat of a commercial airliner.

I don't know the other cases but in the MEL incident, I think millerscourt might be right.

[Alconguin Crusader]

You are ready to be an Emirates manager.
TCAS had on his desk two years before the incident a report stating what was wrong with EK procedures. The cockpit was like Grand Central Station at rush hour. Everyone and their brother came into the cockpit.
The pilots did follow SOP's. It just so happened that everytime they did a check they were interrupted. Imagine that!
The pilots did not cut corners unlike the Emirates trainning program.
Don't throw stones if you live in glass houses comes to mind.

[Left Coaster]

Regarding FD interruptions...don't your SOPs require a return to the beginning of the task underway if an interruption occurs? (Most SOPs do) Interruptions during a busy operation are a fact of life now and need to be seriously considered by a crew wanting to get away on time. Proper FD management is to simply remove the offending "interruptor" and finish that all important task, then invite the person or persons back in. Simple time management takes care of the risk of commiting a serious error like the one in question. In this case it seems like too many distractions, along with a poor decision regarding a rest period interruption (caused by implied pressure to operate?) allowed a simple error to be overlooked and compounded. Wasn't an improper rotation technique passed on by a training pilot mentioned in the intial findings as well? If all the above mentioned incidents are considered (SQ etc) the ability of a trained crew to recognise and correct such errors must be brought to question, not to assign blame, as some would like, but to correct the procedure(s) which lead to poor management. Additionally, in the MEL example, there were four qualified and experienced pilots on that FD...how did that error get missed? Proper management may have caught it, but somehow all four missed it. That's a mystery that hopefully is solved soon.

[fo4ever]

Millerscourt......

The new 411A ?

[Bring Back The Biff]

Wow, you really are a birdbrain...

If you take no interest in the critical pre-flight calculations or data entry - you are not only unprofessional, but an idiot.

If you take the time to check the OMA, you'll find that you do have a responsibility to participate in the preflight activities.

Regardless; why wouldn't you take an interest in quietly observing the important stuff?

When it's too late... it's too late...

Hope you don't ever augment for me.

[Left Coaster]

Not sure it's "way off base" as you would suggest, merely wondering if in the interest of decent airmanship that if help was available, then it would be offered. In my experiences flying heavy crew ULR, extra crew was not only required, they were essential to assist with the preflight, and were put to work. I was glad for the assist! If you feel it's ok to stay out of the way, then fine, that's how you handle your day. (You were then regarded as less than co-operative and it was noted. Eventually it would show up on a yearly evaluation...didn't help when it came time to renew contracts or upgrade...)

[fo4ever]

It is amazing how this forum get hassled by individuals who have absolutely no interest in it.

J James asked a perfectly understandable question and before you know it focus is removed from the post. If you don’t have an answer to the question Millerscourt then don’t answer it. If you wanna enlighten us with your extensive knowledge in aviation accident investigation – please – go ahead but leave the Melbourne accident out of it since you have no clue what went on before, during and after the accident.

To all other pilots with an opinion to the causes of this accident, please respect the procedure and timeframe and hold your horses until the accident report has been analyzed and completed. You cannot analyze information which is not available to you and therefore you are not able to draw a conclusion and/or judge the pilots.

The principle in Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation is PREVENTION and not appointing blame or liability.

To answer J James question:
No final date for the release of the report!!!! As far as I know the report is done but needs to go a process where all direct involved parties will have an opportunity to correct any errors in the factual information involved in the accident (60 days). After this it will be released.

If you have an interest in the Take-off performance calculation and entry errors globally then you can download the ATSB study regarding this:

Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2009/ar2009052.aspx)

If you do not feel like reading the full 100 pages then here is the conclusion of the study:

The results of this study, and that from other related research, have recognised that these types of events occur irrespective of the airline or aircraft type, and that they can happen to anyone; no-one is immune. While it is likely that these errors will continue to take place, as humans are fallible, it is imperative that the aviation industry continues to explore solutions to firstly minimise the opportunities for take-off performance parameter errors from occurring and secondly, maximise the chance that any errors that do occur are detected and/or do not lead to negative
consequences.

[White Knight]

As much as I hate to agree with Millerscourt he is in fact CORRECT...

A wilful violation of SOP led to the incorrect TOW being picked up. The lack of loadsheet confirmation procedure - and therefore missing the huge disrepency weights - led to the near loss of 250 people. I'm surprised how many of you seem to be condoning the actions of the two operating pilots here:ugh::ugh:

As for the augmenting guys - they are supposed to be tired. The 345 FCOM is very clear in that it's a TWO pilot operation. Left Coaster - whatever you did in the past on DC8s or whatever is TOTALLY irrelevant to EK operations!!! If I'm operating PIC I tell the augment guys to stay out of the flightdeck until doors close... If I'm augmenting I will stay out anyway. I will however take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!

Even with distractions we have to maintain our professionalism! Period!

[dustyprops]

It's all very easy to be all high and mighty from your armchair WK.

"However I will take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!" What a clever boy you are.


"I'm surprised how many of you seem to be condoning the actions of the two operating pilots here" Because of course all the others are wrong!!!!

[TangoUniform]

And why did they (in your opinion since nothing is official) disregard SOPs? Probably they got up that morning and said over coffee, hey guys, let's just disregard all that SOP stuff and see what happens. There is a reason why SOPs during normal ops are disregarded or not done. Find out those reasons and perhaps you are your way to understanding the accident. Oh so easy to say, bad pilots, goodby pilots, problem solved. Oh and let's throw in some more SOPs for everyone to cover our a**.

Alot of factors may have been involved, confirmation bias, fatigue, rostering, distractions just to name a few. The holes lined up nicely. But saying simply a disregarding of SOPs was the cause, you are lineing up with manufacturers, managment and lawyers and investigating the accident as was done in the 60s and 70s. Find the "pilot error" and problem solved; investigation over. Just work your way backward from the accident/incident to where the pilot error is obvious and then problem solved. Try a new approach, work your way forward as if you are in the pilots' position to where the mistake materialises and, ureka, you may come to understand the event and prevent a similar event in the future.

Look up the definition of the word "accident" and it may help an investigation. A willful disregard of SOPs (too many SOPs, too many not making sense, SOPs that actually cause distractions themselves) does not constitue the definition of the word... accident.

[Payscale]

The pilots did not cut corners unlike the Emirates trainning program.

Crusader....
Care to elaborate?

[Bring Back The Biff]

WK, although not privy to the in's and out's of the 345 FCOM - it is of course, superceded by the OM-A... which states that the augmenting crew have a responsibility to participate in the preflight proceedings etc....

I am stunned that there are supposedly professional pilots who take no interest in the calculation and input of critical data.

Disregarding the 'professional' aspect, that augmenting crews will put their blind faith in the operating crew, who are also tired - is beyond me.

Before you get excited about augmenting crew 'interfering' unnecessarily - that's not what I'm talking about - it's waiting until it is clear that the operating crew have missed a safety critical item/issue, and mentioning it in an appropriate manner (probably another separate thread in itself).

Finally, if I was augmenting and was told by the operating Captain to stay out of the cockpit until doors close... we would have some issues to resolve!

[halas]

This flight was operated under the FOM not the OMA.

There is no sense in quoting the new manual. The old one had no such clauses.

halas

[White Knight]

Finally, if I was augmenting and was told by the operating Captain to stay out of the cockpit until doors close... we would have some issues to resolve!

No issue - you'd be replaced:E:E

"However I will take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!" What a clever boy you are.

Don't need to be clever - it's just called having a vague notion of what 360 tonnes requires to get airborne! Not difficult is it?????

that augmenting crews will put their blind faith in the operating crew

You mean like the pax and CC on a normal two pilot flight from PVG do???


Save the hystrionics gents... From the safety dept I hear that the CVR is an hour of bullsh1t chit-chat. Forget the interruptions!!! It was not a classical Swiss-cheese situation! With proper use of SOP this accident would NEVER have happened And no, it didn't need new SOPs afterwards as was the knee-jerk reaction, they were robust enough beforehand if they had been followed...

TangoUniform. Willful violation of SOPS might not be in the definition of 'accident' but it bl00dy well nearly lost us a 345 and full complement of pax and crew:rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

[White Knight]

:rolleyes:Yeah Whight Knight, try demanding that from any Captain I know, to stay out of the cockpit during pre-flights. Then feel free to off-load us.

Ok! no problem. When I'm PIC you'll do as I ask during cockpit prep....

You seriously would do that to your fellow colleagues who are trying to help you out?

Very helpful when they're yakking on their Blackberry or Iphone:rolleyes::rolleyes:

I WANT input from the two guys sitting behind us.

Which is fine if you've obviously missed something major like an engine fire on the roll - but during the preflight on a two-crew aeroplane? Don't be a dick SI any more than you already are!!!!

Telling your fellow pilots to leave the cockpit during pre-flights, is not only a stupid thing to do, it is disrespectful and should adequately demonstrate a Captains lack of ability to handle situations

Bullsh1t.............. You're a weak type SI, we can tell from your previous postings:hmm:

I am not surprised that the likes of WK and WIZ have issues in the cockpit

Have you EVER been in my flightdeck????? No!!! A simply libellous statement from you SI:rolleyes::hmm:

I feel bad for our decent F/O's who have to listen to some Captains talk them through the entire approach phase or advising them to deviate 100nm around TRW's that are 5K' below

So do I!!! Any skipper doing that should be strung up by the balls.......... Oh......... You think I do that??? Silly me for thinking that you'd made a reasonable statement:{:{

If I sink to your level of command Whight Knight, then feel free to come and rip off my epilets

You'll never be anywhere near my level sunshine, so I suggest you rip those bars off now:=:=:=

[5star]

I'm with White Knight on this one.
This was not about navigating around CB's or flying a difficult approach.
A simple mistake was made during calculation of T.O. data (ok, can happen) but because of cutting corners the error did not get picked up at a later stage. You should know when to cut corners and when not. And if you intentionally remove the safety net during TO calculations...it means you have NO idea what you are doing and you are playing with the lives of hundreds of people behind you....
It's called complacency. Simple.

[Jumeirah James]

Thanks for all your replies Gents. So, the report is due soon.

Cheers

JJ

[harry the cod]

sittingidly

In all seriousness, I really have to question your sanity. Are you really this dumb or do you just do it to wind people up? Your post DID suggest otherwise! You are making accusations against fellow colleagues you know nothing about. Just read the last 3 paragraphs.

You make the most confusing and contradictory posts I've ever known on these forums. You're views change back and forth by the hour. In fact, the only thing you're consistant with is your inconsistancy!

Harry

[HPSOV L]

Bah.
Subject is too subtle and complex for most of the blockheads who post here.

[captainsmiffy]

Yes, I think SI was defamatory and he does appear to like posting in an inflammatory manner (we don't have to bite though, do we?!) but he did - for once - make a good point reference these new SOPs that the airbus has been saddled with and about the manner in which they were brought in.....

In 26 years of aviation I have never seen so much confusion created about SOPs as was the case when this came in, by disc, in the post. I happened to be on leave when it did and I missed much of the time 'given' (!!) to prep for it. I was left playing 'catch up' with important stuff!

I have colleagues now telling me 'let's ignore that estimated ZFW **** and do it like we did previously'; I see confusion as to who puts the numbers in and when and I see confusion as to what are the limits before a change is required from the estimated figures to the actual figures. The info is all there buthave you reviewed the way in which it is written lately? There are yellow pages replacing other pages, pages that refer to other procedures in different sections etc etc. Doesn't there come a time when we stop 'papering over the cracks' with temporary changes and write the whole thing afresh? I am sure much of the confusion originates from both the way in which this change was promulgated and in the manner that it appears in the book. Take a look at FCOM 3 in the cruise, you will see what I mean if you read it.....especially if you read it so that you are able to teach somebody every little nuance. I wager that you will be exasperated by the number of cross references to 3.03.91 etc

Don't get me wrong, I believe that I have a reasonable grip on these new procedures - but it took reading it many times and lots of discussions with many other pilots. Believe me, what I did on day 1 and my understanding of the new SOPs was very different to what I do now! We both operated very contentedley that we had a good handle on the new procedures and yet a post flight discussion brought up so many different thoughts that we went into the books again and found a fresh perspective. Then I flew with somebody else and his understanding was different again.....and again...!!

Now EK has had 2 serious incidents in this very same area, admittedley with different SOPs. Arguably any set of SOPs might have been ignored by one crew (I don't know, I wasn't there). But if I was responsible for bringing in new changes here as a manager then I would be a bit more pro-active about the whole thing than has been shown to date. For the record, I agree with whomever said that the existing SOPs were already robust enough as they stood anyway.

One last thing; in my many years in the cockpit I would never be so arrogant as to assume that I could do it all myself to the extent that I would refuse the help/watchful eye of two other experienced and professional eyes in the cockpit and actively shun them! Yes, if they were rude enough to natter on a mobile then they would be asked to leave but, until then, their input would be valued. I have flown the 340 at 360 tonnes, but not nearly so much as other guys here and I don't neccessarily have the same 'feel' yet for the numbers as others clearly do; therefore I welcome somebody casting a critical eye over my shoulder. Indeed I usually hand the bloody computer aft with a request to check the numbers and to involve the other other crew members. (Surprisingly, once one of my colleagues pointed out that I shouldn't do this as it made the other guys culpable as well should we have screwed up the numbers and it were not noticed! I don't subscribe to that view.)

Just my ten penneth worth...

[BigGeordie]

Did Ed not issue an FCI (might have been an e-mail or an FCN. Could have been an FOM amendment. Some piece of correspondence anyway.) saying the augmenting crew were not allowed to get involved in any safety critical aspects of the flight, especially performance calculations, and weren't even allowed to do the walkround? Was that superseded along with Ed?

I'm on the Airbus. We don't do much ULR these days so I'm a bit out of touch.

[harry the cod]

Captainsmiffy

Good post. Your point on SOP confusion is extremely pertinent to our operations. This would explain Why BigGeordie is confused. The way information is promulgated in this Company is shameful and borders on negligence from those tasked with managing it. Stick it on a disc, leave it in their files and let them find the changes. Don't explain the reasons behind the change and write it in such a confusing way that it's bound to cause chaos and misinterpretation on line. Altimeter calls on the boeing fleet? Priceless and just one of many examples. Way to go Fleet!

BigGeordie

God only knows where that information came from and if it's still valid. What I remember, vaguely, was that the augmenting crew could do the walkround if delegated. However, you were still responsible. Bearing in mind this crew should be tired, it would be your decision whether you used them. Even if you did, they should not take part in critical safety checks or performance calculations.

So, there you go, typical Ed missive that's clear as mud! All the onus on you with the Company playing it's usual trick of taking no friggin reponsibility or offering clear and unambigious guidelines. Whilst we're quick to blame the talking horse, his boss is still here and it's his responsibility to tackle the problem.

Perhaps when he's finished counting his profit share he will spend the time resolving these issues. The problem is, he may be some time.

Harry

[Gillegan]

While not trying to minimize the responsibilities that we all have individually, this company is notoriously deficient when recognizing its own responsibility and whenever possible, tries to simply fob off any issues as individual issues rather than identifying root causes and addressing them as such. Jo'burg is an excellent case in point. While it is tempting to simply point to a trainer teaching an incorrect technique, where was the standardization and quality control of the trainers that was the company's responsibility and where was the acknowledgement of such? The 340-300 was introduced in a rush of commercial pressure with little or no training (the takeoff in Jo'burg was the first time either crew had actually flown the type I believe) and it was at least 6 more years before the training department even made an effort to standardize their instructors.

[White Knight]

One last thing; in my many years in the cockpit I would never be so arrogant as to assume that I could do it all myself to the extent that I would refuse the help/watchful eye of two other experienced and professional eyes in the cockpit and actively shun them!

I sincerely hope you can do it yourself - well, at least as a two crew op, because that is how these aeroplanes are designed to be operated and flown........ The cockpit prep itself is exactly the same for a Doha as it is for Melbourne! Do you need help to organise a trip to Doha???? Then again, as an augment guy I have seen some incredible fannying around up front:rolleyes: You know, do we take 2.3 tonnes extra to MEL or 1.9 tonnes?:D:D:D:D

[TangoUniform]

WK, you are a CRM "wet dream". :E Gotta love a guy who knows he is the master of his domain, under all circumstances. Well at least that's what your posts indicate to me. So please forgive me if I am reading them incorrectly, as I do most FCIs, SOPs, FCNs and weekly summaries.;)

[White Knight]

TU ;):ok:;):ok:;):ok:

[captainsmiffy]

WK, you know VERY WELL that you are responding to a part of my sentence and ridiculing it to score a cheap point whilst ignoring the rest. The actual statement I made was this.." I would never be so arrogaant as to assume that I could do it all myself to the extent that I would refuse the help/watchful eye of two other experienced and professional eyes in the cockpit and actively shun them". Now that is a million miles from saying that I 'need help' in setting up a cockpit......:= That is an acknowledgement that man is not infallible; why is there an augment team there? Because of the duty times and that implies that we might, just might be tired etc....So that extra pair of eyes is a welcome thing. Get off of your hobby horse and do a CRM course, learn to be a team member again. If my statement really is that hard for you to follow, WK, then let's put it in a more basic format - if the resource is there then use it! Do I really need to spell that out?!:ugh:

Interestingly, you posted earlier that

'If I'm operating PIC I tell the augment guys to stay out of the flightdeck until doors close... If I'm augmenting I will stay out anyway.'
You then posted this
'Then again, as an augment guy I have seen some incredible fannying around up front You know, do we take 2.3 tonnes extra to MEL or 1.9 tonnes'
How would you know if you, presumably, were following your own rigid rules and hadn't actually entered the cockpit as the augment?!:) Is it one rule for you and a different one for everybody else?

[White Knight]

Smiffy - I said I've SEEN. Past tense! Now I just stay the heck out until doors close:ok: Mind you - as we have hardly any augment trips on the 'Bus it's academic at the moment!

And I reiterate my point - it's a TWO crew op. Simple. And I was talking about the preflight prep which you seem to have missed.... As for fatigue, well, you'd better get an augmenting crew on every night turn by your logic:{

[captainsmiffy]

let's agree to differ then......agreed it's a 2-crew op but if there are extra resources available then, in my book, use them. There might well be the occasion that these guys happen to pick up an error that might have gone un-noticed by me and my oppo...and, as you again well now we are all going to work tired on the 'bus. Your way works for you, mine works for me - hope that you don't ever make a mistake, I know that I do....

[thrash]

All EK airplanes are designed for 2 pilot crews.
The fact we operate with 3 or 4 pilots on occasions does not detract from the fact that there are only 2 pilots at the controls and in charge of the plane.
In the case of Australia trips we depart 10am Dubai time and are acclimatised. The return for operating crew is 36 hours rest and departure around 4pm Dubai time. The times are reasonable and certainly much better than some flights operated back of the clock with only 2 pilots.
There is nothing worse than catching straying fingers on center and overhead consoles with peripheral vision during the cockpit set-up. This increases workload as we must then ask what have you done?
There is a requirement for dispatcher, engineer and refueller to be in the cockpit. If both augmenters remain in cockpit it makes this very difficult.
Please make yourselves scarce during pre-departure phase.
When I call for pre-flight checks I am not interested in your 'tested 100%' response.

[captainsmiffy]

.....new identity?!!

[captainsmiffy]

So it has been pointed out to me that this is a 2-crew aeroplane, rightly so. But one (!) of the subscribers to this point of view also states

"If I'm augmenting I will stay out anyway. I will however take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!"

Is this, by his own arguement, an oxymoron? Either it is a 2crew aeroplane and we thus trust the 2 pilots to get on with it 'and stay the hell out' or we check critical stuff ourselves. If we check the critical stuff ourselves, as augmenters, then why the hell is he arguing against me?!!

I would suggest that being anti towards the augmenters inthe cockpit either hides a dislike of being professionally judged or that an augmenter may have had a lapse of discipline in the cockpit and overstepped the mark sometime in the past. Nobody should be touching switches except the takeoff crew, unless specifically invited to do so. To do otherwise is a major breakdown of both discipline and cockpit etiquette in my book. Please don't judge all augmenters, however, by the actions of a few. EK should write more in the way of guidance here for augmenting crew as to exactly what their responsibilities are - there is precious little that I have found.

[White Knight]

.....new identity?!!

NO....................

I would suggest that being anti towards the augmenters inthe cockpit either hides a dislike of being professionally judged or that an augmenter may have had a lapse of discipline in the cockpit

I'm not ANTI at all. I just don't need them when I'm prepping the flight! You could put 10 TREs in there for an ALC and I wouldn't give a monkeys!!! And no augmenter has had a lapse of discipline in MY office:E
As for EK writing guidance for augmenters. Try using common sense This job is not rocket science except for the minority that make it out to be:ugh::ugh::ugh:

Anyway Smiffy - Blue side up and safe flying:ok::cool:

[pool]

If the crew rest hadn't been removed (by EK) then EK wouldn't have to do so much writing of guidance because (in the case of the B777) the augment crew would be out of the way in the take-off/landing certified roof space CRC.

This is the essence of the problem. Greed of our dear leaders led to a decision that proves now to be detrimental to safety.

If we had the CRC as designed by the manufacturers, the whole problem would not have arisen. I even pretend MEL would not have happened (not sure about JNB).

In my previous company the acting captain had the choice of sending the augment crew to their comfortable seats. He had the operational choice of having a professional and calm cockpit with the two crew only in charge.

- Which by the way enabled civilized eating and reading during the 7h rest, not some Houdini-like contortion of my neck to only watch TV, let alone simply eat. Now we have to either starve in the bunk or eat in the cockpit on seats that do not recline a bit and disturb flight operations. -

If the captain needed or wanted help, he simply called for it, at any time help was there in seconds and not creating stress to eating passengers and hard working flight attendant from two hurrying guys making their way through 350 passengers.
The captain had the choice, not imposition. That makes a world of difference.

At EK there is no choice. When you sometimes don't want the p.i.t.a behind you, EK imposes him on you. When you could need every hand on deck, in emergencies, EK has banned help 100 meters away from you with 350 panicking passengers in between.
So much about "use of all resources" and safety gets kicked in the proverbial by greed again.

The acting captain in other carriers doesn't have the two poor supernumeraries breathing down his neck during crucial preparations, in addition to the dispatcher, purser, mechanic, station representative, ATC, SMNC et al.
Distraction comes from each and every body/voice in the cockpit, be they nosey or trying to hide.

No FCI or SOP or any kind of directive can take away a huge chunk of responsibility of TC of adding unnecessary distraction and crowdedness into the preflight phase in the cockpit. They simply added risk and now shove down the unsafe outcome on their crew -- again..

but please, dear colleagues, do not ask for more written drivel by the company in that respect!

The only solution to improve the situation would be a decent and safe CRC, so let's all keep discovering and dreaming.

Over and out.

[halas]

Can't remember the last Sim or LC anyone did with an augment crew.

Most manage to pass without. However there appears there are some that may require them on all flights? :}

halas

[givemewings]

Question here from a CC...

Pool, you bring up something which has been bothering me for some time now, concerning the CRC and the ability of the resting crew to access the cockpit in an emergency.

It seems the other airlines with A380 have all kept the manufacturer default location for the CRC however EK chose to move theirs to a less optimal, noisy, and inconvenient location. The reports have been going on for ages and the company keep saying they are going to do something about it (soundproofing comes to mind) however I personally haven't noticed any major improvement. (Toilets flushing, babies crying etc- on one recent flight we even had children banging on the walls and I got up three times to shut them up as the operating CC were busy doing the service)

I wondered why they chose this option and randomly browsing the other day came across this rather interesting Flightglobal article on the differences in A380 config between operators, an excerpt of which I quote here:

Only Emirates' "long-range" configured 489-seat A380s have a crew rest zone, which is at the rear of the main deck in the centre of aft economy cabin. The space freed at the front of the main deck by the elimination of the flightcrew rest zone has been used for three lavatories. Clark says the decision to put the cabin-crew rest on the main deck was basically to preserve cargo capacity. "There is not much volume on the bottom deck," he says, adding that cargo can account for up to 20% of the airline's overall income. (Bolding mine)

So, the cargo is more important than the quality rest of the operating crew on a ULR flight? Is that what they're saying or am I missing something here???

I recall several Qantas crew saying that the putcome of QF72 near Learmonth would have been very very different had the CRC for the FD crew been at the aft of the aircraft and not where it is. Thoughts??

Full article: Double luxury - how the airlines are configuring their A380s (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/09/01/315369/double-luxury-how-the-airlines-are-configuring-their.html)

[pool]

givemewings

Trying to answer your questions.

Concerning the quality our CRCs provide in terms of rest quality - the company couldn't give a damn. They are not a bit concerned about our rest quality and subsequently safety. It's all about gaining space for either headroom for F passengers, or toilets. Nothing more or less.

The other safety aspect is basically virulent in the case where the commander rests and two FOs are on the flight deck. I don't doubt the ability of most FOs, but strictly legally it is only the commander who is responsible for the operation. If he can rest close to the cockpity, the issue is none, because he can be called up in due time, even in emergencies. At EK though, the distance of the location and the fact that panicking passengers can obstruct his way back to the cockpit hinders his capability of coming back on deck. He rest the sole responsible though.
(I guess this was the reference to the QF72 flight, although I am not sure, and potentially also to the AF447 accident).

This is a safety issue with some constellations on the flight deck. EK had an incident over the Himalayas that might have turned ugly with two FOs on the deck making a potentially fatal mistake. EK was lucky that day that the aircraft had no CRC and therefore the captain had to rest in F and had the possibility to access the cockpit very rapidly as he sensed the danger. On todays aircraft, with the CRC in the very remotest place on the aircraft, this incident would have been potentially fatal.

No lessons were drawn from this incident.

The other issue i dealt with above is distraction , a consequence of the location of the CRC and the lack of seating capabiliy of the supernumeraries outside the busy flight deck.

[givemewings]

All pretty much as I thought then. Would be interesting to know where they would stand legally after an accident/hull loss could it be proven that the location of CRC hindered crew from getting back to the cockpit in an emergency.(as has been speculated about with AF) I guess the issue of distraction has already been answered by the event that is at the main subject of this thread...

Thanks for the insight, will let you guys get back to it now...:ok: