EK Melbourne accident: final report?
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EK Melbourne accident: final report?
Gents,
It's been approx 2 years since EK bonged the A345 tail at MEL. Is there any date for the release of the final accident report yet please?
cheers
JJ
It's been approx 2 years since EK bonged the A345 tail at MEL. Is there any date for the release of the final accident report yet please?
cheers
JJ
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JJ
A total lack of airmanship by the flight deck crew. Same applies to the A340 incident at Joburg a few years back.
Same also applies to SQ6 at Taipei and the B744 at Auckland similar to the EK Melbourne where wrong speeds were entered.
Next question.
A total lack of airmanship by the flight deck crew. Same applies to the A340 incident at Joburg a few years back.
Same also applies to SQ6 at Taipei and the B744 at Auckland similar to the EK Melbourne where wrong speeds were entered.
Next question.
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millerscourt,
Next question?.......looks like you didn't understand the first question because you didn't answer it.
Not only did you fail to answer the question, but your response is purely inflammatory and uninformed. My god, I hope you don't fly for a living.
Next question?.......looks like you didn't understand the first question because you didn't answer it.
Not only did you fail to answer the question, but your response is purely inflammatory and uninformed. My god, I hope you don't fly for a living.
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Yeah pretty much exactly that..wrong.
While human factors certainly played a part in both incidents, you might as well be EK management if your attitude is that it was pilot error as the only cause. Fire the pilots then problem solved!
The crew were highly experienced and well trained, so the real question should be what factors would allow that series of errors to develop so that an accident was narrowly avoided.
Never mind...that would require an unbiased inwards look at what is wrong with EK operations, something that EK has no interest in pursuing, much easier to get rid of the crew and call it problem solved.
While human factors certainly played a part in both incidents, you might as well be EK management if your attitude is that it was pilot error as the only cause. Fire the pilots then problem solved!
The crew were highly experienced and well trained, so the real question should be what factors would allow that series of errors to develop so that an accident was narrowly avoided.
Never mind...that would require an unbiased inwards look at what is wrong with EK operations, something that EK has no interest in pursuing, much easier to get rid of the crew and call it problem solved.
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WRONG!
Anyone with even a passing interest in aircraft accident investigation understands that rarely does an accident occur where the fault can easily be traced to a single cause.
The reality is that nearly all accidents/incidents are caused by a latent failure of the 'system' and eventually this works its way through to the end user, the pilot.
I am not taking away from the responsibility of the pilots but really, in this day and age particularly, with the high involvement of non-operational management in operation decision making, how can only the pilots be totally responsible for errors and business system failures?
The pilot is an easy scape goat but rarely singularly responsible.
Millerscourt is living in the dark ages with that attitude.
Anyone with even a passing interest in aircraft accident investigation understands that rarely does an accident occur where the fault can easily be traced to a single cause.
The reality is that nearly all accidents/incidents are caused by a latent failure of the 'system' and eventually this works its way through to the end user, the pilot.
I am not taking away from the responsibility of the pilots but really, in this day and age particularly, with the high involvement of non-operational management in operation decision making, how can only the pilots be totally responsible for errors and business system failures?
The pilot is an easy scape goat but rarely singularly responsible.
Millerscourt is living in the dark ages with that attitude.
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The fact of the matter is that if the MEL guys had followed SOP's, they would have picked up the mistake. Inserting the Take off data in the FMS(C) is one of the most important exercises of the day for anyone in a commercial airline...Your life depends on it...
If you follow company SOPs, any mistake you make with weights will be picked up at one stage in the FMS(C) data entry/ loadsheet verification.
And sorry, if you cut corners you shouldn't be in the left seat or right seat of a commercial airliner.
I don't know the other cases but in the MEL incident, I think millerscourt might be right.
If you follow company SOPs, any mistake you make with weights will be picked up at one stage in the FMS(C) data entry/ loadsheet verification.
And sorry, if you cut corners you shouldn't be in the left seat or right seat of a commercial airliner.
I don't know the other cases but in the MEL incident, I think millerscourt might be right.
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You are ready to be an Emirates manager.
TCAS had on his desk two years before the incident a report stating what was wrong with EK procedures. The cockpit was like Grand Central Station at rush hour. Everyone and their brother came into the cockpit.
The pilots did follow SOP's. It just so happened that everytime they did a check they were interrupted. Imagine that!
The pilots did not cut corners unlike the Emirates trainning program.
Don't throw stones if you live in glass houses comes to mind.
TCAS had on his desk two years before the incident a report stating what was wrong with EK procedures. The cockpit was like Grand Central Station at rush hour. Everyone and their brother came into the cockpit.
The pilots did follow SOP's. It just so happened that everytime they did a check they were interrupted. Imagine that!
The pilots did not cut corners unlike the Emirates trainning program.
Don't throw stones if you live in glass houses comes to mind.
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Regarding FD interruptions...don't your SOPs require a return to the beginning of the task underway if an interruption occurs? (Most SOPs do) Interruptions during a busy operation are a fact of life now and need to be seriously considered by a crew wanting to get away on time. Proper FD management is to simply remove the offending "interruptor" and finish that all important task, then invite the person or persons back in. Simple time management takes care of the risk of commiting a serious error like the one in question. In this case it seems like too many distractions, along with a poor decision regarding a rest period interruption (caused by implied pressure to operate?) allowed a simple error to be overlooked and compounded. Wasn't an improper rotation technique passed on by a training pilot mentioned in the intial findings as well? If all the above mentioned incidents are considered (SQ etc) the ability of a trained crew to recognise and correct such errors must be brought to question, not to assign blame, as some would like, but to correct the procedure(s) which lead to poor management. Additionally, in the MEL example, there were four qualified and experienced pilots on that FD...how did that error get missed? Proper management may have caught it, but somehow all four missed it. That's a mystery that hopefully is solved soon.
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Wow, you really are a birdbrain...
If you take no interest in the critical pre-flight calculations or data entry - you are not only unprofessional, but an idiot.
If you take the time to check the OMA, you'll find that you do have a responsibility to participate in the preflight activities.
Regardless; why wouldn't you take an interest in quietly observing the important stuff?
When it's too late... it's too late...
Hope you don't ever augment for me.
If you take no interest in the critical pre-flight calculations or data entry - you are not only unprofessional, but an idiot.
If you take the time to check the OMA, you'll find that you do have a responsibility to participate in the preflight activities.
Regardless; why wouldn't you take an interest in quietly observing the important stuff?
When it's too late... it's too late...
Hope you don't ever augment for me.
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Not sure it's "way off base" as you would suggest, merely wondering if in the interest of decent airmanship that if help was available, then it would be offered. In my experiences flying heavy crew ULR, extra crew was not only required, they were essential to assist with the preflight, and were put to work. I was glad for the assist! If you feel it's ok to stay out of the way, then fine, that's how you handle your day. (You were then regarded as less than co-operative and it was noted. Eventually it would show up on a yearly evaluation...didn't help when it came time to renew contracts or upgrade...)
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It is amazing how this forum get hassled by individuals who have absolutely no interest in it.
J James asked a perfectly understandable question and before you know it focus is removed from the post. If you don’t have an answer to the question Millerscourt then don’t answer it. If you wanna enlighten us with your extensive knowledge in aviation accident investigation – please – go ahead but leave the Melbourne accident out of it since you have no clue what went on before, during and after the accident.
To all other pilots with an opinion to the causes of this accident, please respect the procedure and timeframe and hold your horses until the accident report has been analyzed and completed. You cannot analyze information which is not available to you and therefore you are not able to draw a conclusion and/or judge the pilots.
The principle in Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation is PREVENTION and not appointing blame or liability.
To answer J James question:
No final date for the release of the report!!!! As far as I know the report is done but needs to go a process where all direct involved parties will have an opportunity to correct any errors in the factual information involved in the accident (60 days). After this it will be released.
If you have an interest in the Take-off performance calculation and entry errors globally then you can download the ATSB study regarding this:
Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective
If you do not feel like reading the full 100 pages then here is the conclusion of the study:
The results of this study, and that from other related research, have recognised that these types of events occur irrespective of the airline or aircraft type, and that they can happen to anyone; no-one is immune. While it is likely that these errors will continue to take place, as humans are fallible, it is imperative that the aviation industry continues to explore solutions to firstly minimise the opportunities for take-off performance parameter errors from occurring and secondly, maximise the chance that any errors that do occur are detected and/or do not lead to negative
consequences.
J James asked a perfectly understandable question and before you know it focus is removed from the post. If you don’t have an answer to the question Millerscourt then don’t answer it. If you wanna enlighten us with your extensive knowledge in aviation accident investigation – please – go ahead but leave the Melbourne accident out of it since you have no clue what went on before, during and after the accident.
To all other pilots with an opinion to the causes of this accident, please respect the procedure and timeframe and hold your horses until the accident report has been analyzed and completed. You cannot analyze information which is not available to you and therefore you are not able to draw a conclusion and/or judge the pilots.
The principle in Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation is PREVENTION and not appointing blame or liability.
To answer J James question:
No final date for the release of the report!!!! As far as I know the report is done but needs to go a process where all direct involved parties will have an opportunity to correct any errors in the factual information involved in the accident (60 days). After this it will be released.
If you have an interest in the Take-off performance calculation and entry errors globally then you can download the ATSB study regarding this:
Take-off performance calculation and entry errors: A global perspective
If you do not feel like reading the full 100 pages then here is the conclusion of the study:
The results of this study, and that from other related research, have recognised that these types of events occur irrespective of the airline or aircraft type, and that they can happen to anyone; no-one is immune. While it is likely that these errors will continue to take place, as humans are fallible, it is imperative that the aviation industry continues to explore solutions to firstly minimise the opportunities for take-off performance parameter errors from occurring and secondly, maximise the chance that any errors that do occur are detected and/or do not lead to negative
consequences.
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As much as I hate to agree with Millerscourt he is in fact CORRECT...
A wilful violation of SOP led to the incorrect TOW being picked up. The lack of loadsheet confirmation procedure - and therefore missing the huge disrepency weights - led to the near loss of 250 people. I'm surprised how many of you seem to be condoning the actions of the two operating pilots here
As for the augmenting guys - they are supposed to be tired. The 345 FCOM is very clear in that it's a TWO pilot operation. Left Coaster - whatever you did in the past on DC8s or whatever is TOTALLY irrelevant to EK operations!!! If I'm operating PIC I tell the augment guys to stay out of the flightdeck until doors close... If I'm augmenting I will stay out anyway. I will however take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!
Even with distractions we have to maintain our professionalism! Period!
A wilful violation of SOP led to the incorrect TOW being picked up. The lack of loadsheet confirmation procedure - and therefore missing the huge disrepency weights - led to the near loss of 250 people. I'm surprised how many of you seem to be condoning the actions of the two operating pilots here
As for the augmenting guys - they are supposed to be tired. The 345 FCOM is very clear in that it's a TWO pilot operation. Left Coaster - whatever you did in the past on DC8s or whatever is TOTALLY irrelevant to EK operations!!! If I'm operating PIC I tell the augment guys to stay out of the flightdeck until doors close... If I'm augmenting I will stay out anyway. I will however take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!
Even with distractions we have to maintain our professionalism! Period!
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It's all very easy to be all high and mighty from your armchair WK.
"However I will take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!" What a clever boy you are.
"I'm surprised how many of you seem to be condoning the actions of the two operating pilots here" Because of course all the others are wrong!!!!
"However I will take a glance at the speeds and flex as I take my seat!" What a clever boy you are.
"I'm surprised how many of you seem to be condoning the actions of the two operating pilots here" Because of course all the others are wrong!!!!
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And why did they (in your opinion since nothing is official) disregard SOPs? Probably they got up that morning and said over coffee, hey guys, let's just disregard all that SOP stuff and see what happens. There is a reason why SOPs during normal ops are disregarded or not done. Find out those reasons and perhaps you are your way to understanding the accident. Oh so easy to say, bad pilots, goodby pilots, problem solved. Oh and let's throw in some more SOPs for everyone to cover our a**.
Alot of factors may have been involved, confirmation bias, fatigue, rostering, distractions just to name a few. The holes lined up nicely. But saying simply a disregarding of SOPs was the cause, you are lineing up with manufacturers, managment and lawyers and investigating the accident as was done in the 60s and 70s. Find the "pilot error" and problem solved; investigation over. Just work your way backward from the accident/incident to where the pilot error is obvious and then problem solved. Try a new approach, work your way forward as if you are in the pilots' position to where the mistake materialises and, ureka, you may come to understand the event and prevent a similar event in the future.
Look up the definition of the word "accident" and it may help an investigation. A willful disregard of SOPs (too many SOPs, too many not making sense, SOPs that actually cause distractions themselves) does not constitue the definition of the word... accident.
Alot of factors may have been involved, confirmation bias, fatigue, rostering, distractions just to name a few. The holes lined up nicely. But saying simply a disregarding of SOPs was the cause, you are lineing up with manufacturers, managment and lawyers and investigating the accident as was done in the 60s and 70s. Find the "pilot error" and problem solved; investigation over. Just work your way backward from the accident/incident to where the pilot error is obvious and then problem solved. Try a new approach, work your way forward as if you are in the pilots' position to where the mistake materialises and, ureka, you may come to understand the event and prevent a similar event in the future.
Look up the definition of the word "accident" and it may help an investigation. A willful disregard of SOPs (too many SOPs, too many not making sense, SOPs that actually cause distractions themselves) does not constitue the definition of the word... accident.
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WK, although not privy to the in's and out's of the 345 FCOM - it is of course, superceded by the OM-A... which states that the augmenting crew have a responsibility to participate in the preflight proceedings etc....
I am stunned that there are supposedly professional pilots who take no interest in the calculation and input of critical data.
Disregarding the 'professional' aspect, that augmenting crews will put their blind faith in the operating crew, who are also tired - is beyond me.
Before you get excited about augmenting crew 'interfering' unnecessarily - that's not what I'm talking about - it's waiting until it is clear that the operating crew have missed a safety critical item/issue, and mentioning it in an appropriate manner (probably another separate thread in itself).
Finally, if I was augmenting and was told by the operating Captain to stay out of the cockpit until doors close... we would have some issues to resolve!
I am stunned that there are supposedly professional pilots who take no interest in the calculation and input of critical data.
Disregarding the 'professional' aspect, that augmenting crews will put their blind faith in the operating crew, who are also tired - is beyond me.
Before you get excited about augmenting crew 'interfering' unnecessarily - that's not what I'm talking about - it's waiting until it is clear that the operating crew have missed a safety critical item/issue, and mentioning it in an appropriate manner (probably another separate thread in itself).
Finally, if I was augmenting and was told by the operating Captain to stay out of the cockpit until doors close... we would have some issues to resolve!