How much fast air to support 1) a Brigade, 2) a Division

[Jackonicko]

In their recent optimistic paeans to the SDSR, Generals Richards and Houghton outlined a future UK defence posture that would allow us to: "retain the ability to operate independently or in support of the US across the full spectrum of domains and capabilities."

We will, they say, remain a "first-rate military power, capable of conducting a full-spectrum of operations."

In terms of scale this means a) the "deploying and sustaining indefinitely a brigade sized force in a stabilisation and counter insurgency operation", autonomously if necessary, and b) of being able to "liberate an ally from an occupying state alone or with allies. Here we judged that we need to be capable of putting a divisional sized force in the field with substantial maritime and air support."

The SDSR factsheets give more detail for option b), outlining the following: "for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003)."

How much fast air might such a force require? Does the ability to deploy one Typhoon squadron on an enduring op cut the mustard for option a), and does a six squadron force give enough potential to support b), especially when a proportion of that force will be tied down in UK and Falklands AD, QRA, etc.?

Since Telic saw the deployment of 30 GR4s, 20 Harriers, and 14 F3s (drawn from 11 squadrons), it would follow that a 2/3 of Telic force would require the deployment of about 40 fast jets......... always assuming that the RAF would not have deployed more in 2003 had it been able to do so.

Have we made the mistake of retaining a 'first rate Army', scaled for these sizes of operation, but with a 'second rate Air Force' that's too small to do either?

[TurbineTooHot]

Jack,

In answer to your last question.... Yes.

[Jackonicko]

and at what point do senior officers have the honesty to stand up and say that:

"No, this latest defence review was not 'policy led', it's a cynical exercise in cost cutting, and the result is that we can no longer fulfil the missions that we could before it."

Rather than all of the usual 'stretched but not over-stretched', 'yes we can, albeit at risk' nonsense that just encourages the politicians to take more and more and more?

[Mr C Hinecap]

First problem:

Fine me more than one senior officer at 2* or above who understands what

deploying and sustaining

actually mean to the RAF.

Then we'll talk.

[SammySu]

There were alot more than 10 Harriers deployed on Telic, with the same number again as in Kuwait in Harrier Force South, deployed in another ME country as Harrier Force North.

That means the 2/3rds force required now is even larger than you suggest. However how much of that FJ support is now provided by Reaper, which we didn't have back then?

We are too small to do much more than an enduring small commitment with another SSFI op for surge periods though. And one day we are probably going to lose instead of win or withdraw.

Tough times.

[AutoBit]

My understanding is that, post SDSR and Harrier draw down, 60% of CAS tasking (training of course) is going un-supported. Draw from that what you will.

This is just the tip of the iceberg. I fear we will see this type of occurrence going on a lot more. Of course our dark green colleagues will simply blame us for not turning up, conveniently forgetting of course that we have been forced to cut way too much of their 'enabling assets'.

[SASless]

Here we judged that we need to be capable of putting a divisional sized force in the field with substantial maritime and air support."



In a conventional war.....one division seems a very small force. Of course...if you have to take them to some other country to assist in ejecting some invader....just how you going to do that?

At some point.....professionalism, stout hearts, and good kit are all trumped by numbers are they not?

[Squirrel 41]

Jacko,

Generic answer that the cynic is probably looking for is "Yes".

But the more interesting question is what the opposition is, and how that plays out - ie, if you're going to deploy a battle group to Trashcanistan to do peace support operations, then the FJ requirement is rather different that if you're going to take on the Berzerkistani's 3 Guards Tank Army with organic SA-15/SA-17/SA-20/SA-12 and a shedload of Su-30MKs with PL-12.

So the better answer is that it is "threat dependent".

S41

[orgASMic]

So the better answer is that it is "threat dependent".

And as long as our adversaries are armed with sharpened mangoes, then we are ok.

At some point.....professionalism, stout hearts, and good kit are all trumped by numbers are they not?

'Quantity' has a quality all its own. We are probably now too small to take on the 3rd Guards Tank Army (except in a minor, niche capability, kind of way with Uncle Sam picking up the remainder) but can probably manage the PSO in Trashcanistan as an enduring commitment. As long as we are out of AFG first.

And the Paddies don't kick off, cos we are bit short of enablers to cover 2 theatres. Which is probably the more important discussion: do we have enough of the non-sexy stuff to ensure that the sexy stuff CAN support whoever CJO has been told that HMT can afford to deploy? No comms, no bombs! etc.

[Squirrel 41]

orgASMic

Sorry, I wasn't trying to be flippant - and "threat dependant" in the wrong hands does feel like the slippery w:mad:k words one revolts at when spouted by ambitious SO1s at Northwood. (Hypothetically speaking, you understand). :hmm:

My point is simply is that Jacko asked a nearly meaningless question.

The problem is that we largely have only meaningless answers left. :sad:

S41

[Jackonicko]

Yes of course the need for air support is a bit of a "how long is this piece of string" question, but there must be an answer to a) assuming that it's a similar requirement (if not scale) to Afghanistan, and to b) assuming that your enemy is an Iraq 2003 level of threat.

As soon as an enemy has a functional IADS and significant AD aircraft, presumably it's now a 'No Can Do', as an autonomous op.

If you prefer, you could answer a different question.

How realistic is it to assume that a six squadron FJ force would be adequate to support a) or b)? How limited would those ops have to be for that size force to be adequate?

Is the force size commensurate with the size of the Army, or with stated UK aspirations?

[orgASMic]

S41 - I am in complete agreement. My quoting Blackadder was to illustrate the pointlessness of our position post SDSR. Our lords and masters have taken 'do more with less' to its logical conclusion.

Is the force size commensurate with the size of the Army, or with stated UK aspirations?

Neither, IMHO. There was no Defence Estimate prior to SDSR so our size and capability compared to what the Army is expected to do has not been worked out; there was no guidance from the FCO as to what our posture in the World order was to be, so none of the Services knows exactly what they are supposed to be able to achieve. We have merely had our suit cut to fit the cloth that HMT has made available. That suit might look nice in Town but will not last 5 minutes on safari, though we should get some use out of it in the country.

Don't forget that the remainder of the '6 sqn FJ force' still has to train, work up for ops, contribute to NATO and defend the home base whilst whatever portion of the force is deployed. That suit is starting to look a little threadbare already, isn't it?

(I have flogged that metaphor to death now, haven't I?)

[Caspian237]

Jacko asked Have we made the mistake of retaining a 'first rate Army', scaled for these sizes of operation, but with a 'second rate Air Force' that's too small to do either?

Excuse the cynicism but I would answer yes. The American's don't need allies with high tech navies and airforces, the have those in abundance. What they do need are foreign troops on the ground incurring their share of casualties, the politically unacceptable face of war for those voters back at home.

As others have picked up, there doesn't seem to be any serious provision for the other scenarios outlined in the SDSR other than taking action within a US led coalition.

[Jackonicko]

Unfortunately, it seems to me that a given amount of cloth was available, overall, for suits in three colours for three customers.

There was sufficient cloth for three three piece suits.

It appears to me that the customer with most 'sway' over the tailor ordered himself a natty little number in brown, three piece, with two spare pairs of trousers, and two jackets, one single- one double-breasted. He would no doubt complain that he did not also get plus fours.

The next customer got the same dark blue suit as he had bought last time, though he was not allowed a waistcoat or a spare pair of trousers, and he got home to find it all a little skimpy.

Unfortunately, with the cloth remaining, the final customer had no waistcoat, a rather tight fitting blue grey jacket with Normal Wisdom sleeves, and a pair of shorts. Because these had no seat, and because the jacket had no back, he was advised not to stand up on public transport.

[Jackonicko]

As others have picked up, there doesn't seem to be any serious provision for the other scenarios outlined in the SDSR other than taking action within a US led coalition.

Presumably the Chiefs of Staff would have told the Politicians that they were not being adequately resourced to be able to undertake operations of the scale outlined in the SDSR and its fact sheets and briefing documents?

Why then are Richards and Houghton quoting these elements of SDSR as though it were all still achievable with the resulting force structure?

I ask the question again: at what point do senior officers have the honesty and/or the moral fibre to stand up and say that:

"After this cost cutting the result is that we can no longer fulfil the missions that we could before it, and the scenarios outlined in SDSR are not realistically achievable."

Is it really the job of senior officers to be complicit in spinning this as being something that is perfectly alright? Is defence of the politicians' reputations more important than the defence of the realm?

At what point do they stop pushing out the tired optimistic 'stretched but not over-stretched' claptrap and the gung ho, can-do 'yes we can, albeit at risk' nonsense that just encourages the politicians to take more and more?

[Cows getting bigger]

I think Billy Connolly (http://www.aquilaonline.co.za/images/sounds/demands.mp3) answers the question quite succinctly.

[Geehovah]

Six sqns could barely mount 3 x 24 hr CAPs around UK (oops sorry, we don't defend UK any more) never mind mount OOA.

Am I the only one who is scratching my head that we can still talk this up?

[Clearedtoroll]

Interestingly, Jacko's question asks how much fast air we need to support land forces. Quite rightly that's exactly what the GR4s are doing and Harriers have been doing of late... But, that's 'just' CAS and we don't do ourselves any favours if we forget to argue that air can act independently of land forces quite effectively. I find it interesting how much gets done in Pakistan with UAVs... Of course, there is stuff we can't do without boots on the ground and we can't make an exact comparison, but it has been safer, cheaper and less politically awkward to use Reapers to achieve some of the same ends. Even if we insist on dismissing the possibility of a high intensity state-on-state conflict anytime soon, offensive fast air and UAVs without boots on the ground (or at least our own boots on the ground) could still be exactly what we need in the next war.

[Jackonicko]

Clearly winning a war with Air Power alone, or as the dominant means of delivering decisive effect, is no longer an ambition of the UK (or at least not as expressed under the SDSR).

It's as though Granby and Kosovo never happened.

(Keegan said of Kosovo that it marked a real turning point in the history of warfare. It "proved that a war can be won by air power alone." Diplomacy was tried before the war and didn't work, and Slobodan Milošević caved in weeks before the deployment of the large ground force.)

A charismatic senior RAF officer pointed out that "A lot of people forget how we ended up getting into Afghanistan, and it was through overwhelming firepower from the air." He explained succinctly and persuasively that we wouldn't have the foothold that we have today if that hadn't worked so spectacularly well. That Air Power was what ripped apart the Taliban regime to the point that we could walk in and begin the campaign as it is now. He said that this had been rather conveniently forgotten today, in the mantra of 'boots on the ground'.

He also pointed out that even today the very heavily specialised employment of air power is still playing a very important part in the campaign, and that Air Power is our key advantage. He suggested that the Taliban fight the way they do because we have air superiority, and that the Taliban's reliance on IEDs is largely due to the success of air power, because that’s the only tactic they’ve got left. If we did not hold them at threat from the air 24 hours per day, they would operate differently,

I would have thought that this was all pretty self-evident. But perhaps a soldier ignores or overlooks the mere 'enablers'?

Perhaps it's unsurprising that General Richards should have viewed the analysis in the National Security Strategy as "excellent", and as being an "impressive piece of work."

It's perhaps understandable that the more single-service focused soldier would believe that this 'boot-and-bayonet centric' Strategy should be "given more prominence", and that it represents a "balanced strategy to deal with a wide range of diverse threats."

[Squirrel 41]

Jacko,

(Keegan said of Kosovo that it marked a real turning point in the history of warfare. It "proved that a war can be won by air power alone." Diplomacy was tried before the war and didn't work, and Slobodan Milošević caved in weeks before the deployment of the large ground force.)

Interesting. As one of a light blue persuasion, I've always though this quote from Keegan is politely, hoop.

Rather Op ALLIED FORCE / Op NOBLE ANVIL demonstrated the reverse: a modern state with ostensibly lots of a juicy targets can hold out for 79 days as long as there was no credible ground threat to their territory. It was precisely the deployment of the ARRC with 4th Armoured and 5th Airborne Bdes under Mike Jackson that tipped the balance and forced Milošević to withdraw.

Clearly winning a war with Air Power alone, or as the dominant means of delivering decisive effect, is no longer an ambition of the UK (or at least not as expressed under the SDSR). It's as though Granby and Kosovo never happened.

Similarly, it's not clear to me that the decisive effect in GRANBY was delivered by air power - land was clearly the supported commander, not air. Air was an enabler in Gulf I and Gulf II, but it was never going to force the Iraqi army from Kuwait or remove Saddam's regime from power (even if we'd have killed him directly - Dos Gringos notwithstanding). And please don't forget that both of the conflicts you cite we were hardly acting alone - many (most?) of the most important multipliers were Allied, not RAF/RN.

Can we do the highest intensity stuff by ourselves now? Probably not (or not without significantly higher risk appetite than currently exists). But let's remember that we haven't been in a position to do this by ourselves for many years - probably, arguably, since V-Force with Blue Steel (hurrah for whizzy standoff nuclear rocket bombski).

I'm not for one second saying that I'm happy with the immediate future of the RAF FJ force, but then I'm pretty unimpressed with the number of FF/DD, SH, AT/AAR etc etc and the imbalance of force multipliers across the three environments. But unless you can show that there is a serious chance of us doing something like GRANBY again (where?) then it's awfully hard to justify a force structure able to do GRANBY when we are cutting everything else.

We're not in the mid-80s of spending 5% of GDP on defence. And it's not going to be much above 2% for as far ahead as I can see - so it's not going to be much better for a long time - the 2020 in "Future Force 2020" seems about as optimistic as the 2000 in "Nimrod 2000".

And on that happy note,

S41

[XV277]

Unfortunately, it seems to me that a given amount of cloth was available, overall, for suits in three colours for three customers.

There was sufficient cloth for three three piece suits.

It appears to me that the customer with most 'sway' over the tailor ordered himself a natty little number in brown, three piece, with two spare pairs of trousers, and two jackets, one single- one double-breasted. He would no doubt complain that he did not also get plus fours.


The customer intending to order the brown suit made sure that he sought favouritism with the tailor most likely to be chosen before the tender was issued and the cointract awarded. The customer ordering the light blue suit was far too friendly with the tailor who lost to contract to be popular with the new tailor.

[Clockwork Mouse]

S41
Thank you for injecting a measure of intelligence, common sense and wisdom into this thread. It needed it.

[Jackonicko]

S41,

Yes indeed. The claim that Kosovo was won by air power alone may be a tad ambitious, and of course, ground forces were vital in Granby/Storm. But it is fair to say that air power was the dominant means of delivering decisive effect in both campaigns, and I would suggest that the quoted claims for the import of air in Afghanistan are not unduly exaggerated or over-optimistic.

I guess my starting point is that in a world that is admitted and acknowledged to be unpredictable, dangerous and ever-changing, I can't really grasp the wisdom of taking the most recent real world examples of when we have needed military force (within or just outside the last decade) and then deciding that we need just a little less than that today.

How is that alright? What has changed to warrant such a scaling back? How can we be sure that we won't need to do something similar (or even bigger) again? When did we last predict a threat developing far enough ahead to re-equip to meet it? Not in Iraq, not in the Balkans, not with Al Qaeda. Not in Sierra Leone, not even in the Falklands.

It would therefore not be unreasonable to assume that the next contingency might actually require just a little more effort, rather than a little less.

It's not as though either Telic or Deliberate Force were 'once in a generation' large scale wars that were somehow the 'war to end all wars.' These are operations of a scale that we might easily have to undertake again.

I may be being stupid or obtuse, but to look at these ops and then conclude:

"We need to be able to do today two-thirds of what we did yesterday".

Just seems to be insane, or at least recklessly irresponsible, to me.

Now clearly, we're never going to go back to the force structure that allowed us to mount a 'Granby' sized op, and no-one is seriously suggesting that we should go back to 30 Fast Jet Squadrons.

But 18 really doesn't seem excessive. 12 seemed like too few, and 6-8 feels like the 1920s all over again.

And the Army and Navy have not trimmed down by anything like the same amount, so it looks as though we no longer have 'balanced' forces.


Clockwork Mouse,

Intelligence, commonsense and wisdom are always welcome - especially when a journo is trying to get his head around an issue that he feels passionate about. S41's contribution is therefore most welcome. As would yours be should you choose to deploy or display any of those three attributes on this thread. :rolleyes:

[Clockwork Mouse]

Oh Jacko! It would appear from your final sentence that my comment about the quality of the posts on this thread has wounded you! Do you assume I was referring to you?

[Jackonicko]

Not at all. I have the hide of a rhino. But having read and enjoyed many of your posts in the past, and knowing that you devoted a lifetime to military aviating, I'd have expected something a bit more thought provoking. Something that added to the debate.

Even a reasoned argument as to why Fast Air is no longer relevant, or as to why the proposed force size will be adequate, and how the reductions make no difference to the aims of policy (as outlined in SDSR) would be rather better than anything I've read by Richards and Houghton.

[Squirrel 41]

CM - thank you, I think I'm blushing... :\

Jacko,

I think that we're closer to agreeing than it appears. I am a vociferous critic of the SDSR process, precisely because it was rushed and did not lay out a credible foreign policy framework; instead, we got a pile of warmed-up woolly thinking that didn't help at all because it provided almost no direction.

This woolly thinking then led to yet more salami slicing to meet the HMT budgetary envelope, whereas a strategic approach would have taken the view that its better to make 20% savings by taking - as far as possible - 100% of the least useful 20% of the budget rather than 20% across the board.

So, we have a level of tasking and op tempo that would've astonished RAFG and, probably the SDR98 planners. And we have a much smaller force to deliver this, retrenching all the time.

My principal criticism is that we've always gone for the best equipment specification we can reasonably conjure up (or, to the cynic, the most expensive option BAES presents :hmm:) and for the same money we could have more less sophisticated but more than adequate platforms - eg Gripen viz Typhoon, Horizon or Arleigh Burke viz T45 - the list goes on. And it is from this tyranny of the fleet size numbers that the problems you allude to arise. (That, and a propensity for service chiefs to focus on their home turf toys - e.g. FJ, CVF, rather than other capabilities, eg FW MPA.)

Is 6 FJ Sqns the right answer? No, probably not even in theoretical terms, let alone current op tempo terms. But if I had a little more funding or flexibility, I'd add FW MPA and save ASTOR before I added another FJ Sqn.

S41

[andyy]

Jacko, I think that "The claim that Kosovo was won by air power alone may be a tad ambitious" is very understated. My recollection of the post conflict BDA is that despite the massive claims to the contrary, very few Serbian AFV were destroyed despit that being one of the aims.

From a US Army War College Paper:

"Independent accounts from reporters covering the battle for Kosovo offered an entirely different set of battle damage statistics from those offered by either General Clark or the Pentagon. Their perspective is interesting for it is offered from firsthand, on-the-ground analysis, just like the latter NATO and Pentagon estimates.

The first newspaper reports on battle damage appeared at the end of June. Indications were that only 13 Serb tanks and fewer than 100 armored personnel carriers had been destroyed. Reporters noted the ruins of many different types of decoys hit by NATO forces (e.g., rusted tanks with broken parts, wood or canvas mock-ups). Carlotta Gall of The New York Times, a veteran war correspondent from the first Russian war in Chechnya, saw little damage. Newsweek reporter Mark Dennis found only one destroyed tank after driving around Kosovo for ten days. Did the Serbs manage to extricate all of their destroyed vehicles during their publicly filmed withdrawal, did they hide them, or did they really experience much less damage than NATO sources declared?

In late July, Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that NATO had dropped 3,000 precision-guided weapons that resulted in 500 hits on decoys, but destroyed only 50 Yugoslav tanks. ....

U.S. News and World Report, in its 20 September 1999 edition, stated that a NATO team visited 900 "aim points" targeted by NATO in Kosovo and found only 26 tank and similar-looking self-propelled-artillery carcasses. This would again throw NATO's revised number of 93 tanks out the window. However, how many tank carcasses were in Serbia, where the NATO team did not visit, is not known, making this figure less provocative and contradictory than it originally appears. The article also reported increased friction between General Clark and his NATO air operations chief, Lieutenant General Michael Short, over target selection and strategy (mobile targets such as tanks versus infrastructure, respectively). The article concluded that it was not air power but Russia's withdrawal of support for Serbia that probably brought an end to the air war in Kosovo. The article noted that in future conflicts, the most merciful way to end them may be to conduct them swiftly and violently instead of by the trial-and-error, phased approach used in Kosovo.[19]

Finally, several British officers, both retired and serving, also noted that damage was much less than originally stated. One newspaper report, citing British Ministry of Defense sources, stated that the damage done to tanks was perhaps even less than the lowest quoted figure of 13 tank kills.[20] But the most damning comment could prove to be from an International Herald Tribune article on 1 October. Written by Frederick Bonnart, the editorial director of the independent but highly authoritative NATO's Nations, the article discusses how NATO "propaganda" was used against the West. He notes:

In democracies, it is the duty of the public services to present the truth even in wartime, and particularly when they are in sole control of the information. If it is deliberately designed to engender fear and hate, then the correct term is propaganda.[21]

In particular, Bonnart believes the armored vehicle totals did not properly represent the vehicles actually destroyed, and that NATO deliberately used the West's reputation for truth and fairness to carry out a highly charged information policy against the Serbs. This made NATO's information policy rife with propaganda, Bonnart contends

[Clearedtoroll]

As an engineer whose closest contact with an enemy was a surprised sea lion on Sealion Island, I am definitely no expert on this war or the next. But humour me and suppose we wanted or felt we needed to intervene in somewhere like Somalia or Yemen. I hope we don't, but if we did, I think perhaps the aim of such an intervention might be to keep a lid on things without getting any more involved than we had to, much like NATO's limited involvement in Pakistan with Reaper etc. If we we going to do that then surely our aim has to be monitoring or taking out key people, communications and supply routes. Or something like that but I haven't read AP3000 recently... So we become the embuggerence factor to the bad guys and not the other way round. To do that is somewhere like Somalia or Yemen perhaps it would be nice to have:

1. Some good Int
2. A Navy to control the sea lanes
3. Some good ISTAR (perhaps even some MR...)
4. Persistent or fast air (ISTAR-integrated) to do what needs doing
5. Substantial SF to do the many bits air can never do
6. Some rotary and tac AT to support the SF
7. All the bits needed to support the above
8. A government with a clearly defined strategy

I can see more of a role for typhoon in this particular scenario than infantry.

[andyy]

By Clearedtoroll:

As an engineer whose closest contact with an enemy was a surprised sea lion on Sealion Island, I am definitely no expert on this war or the next. But humour me and suppose we wanted or felt we needed to intervene in somewhere like Somalia or Yemen. I hope we don't, but if we did, I think perhaps the aim of such an intervention might be to keep a lid on things without getting any more involved than we had to, much like NATO's limited involvement in Pakistan with Reaper etc. If we we going to do that then surely our aim has to be monitoring or taking out key people, communications and supply routes. Or something like that but I haven't read AP3000 recently... So we become the embuggerence factor to the bad guys and not the other way round. To do that is somewhere like Somalia or Yemen perhaps it would be nice to have:

1. Some good Int So keeping ASTOR might be useful in this scenario
2. A Navy to control the sea lanes & to provide logistic support, C3, the rotary assets "home", the "jumping off point" for SF etc, all without the need for HNS
3. Some good ISTAR (perhaps even some MR...) AGREED, inc UAV maybe
4. Persistent or fast air (ISTAR-integrated) to do what needs doing Doesn't need to be fast air, Reaper might be enough
5. Substantial SF to do the many bits air can never do
6. Some rotary and tac AT to support the SF
7. All the bits needed to support the above Yes, a full amphibious/ Carrier task group
8. A government with a clearly defined strategy Good grief, now your asking....

I can see more of a role for typhoon in this particular scenario than infantry. I can't - Harrier, maybe! F/A-18, Rafale. You can't rely on HNS in this scenario

Of course, other scenarios will require adifferent asset mix!

[TurbineTooHot]

Fast Air.

Just to throw the obvious in the works, especially for those who assert that "Reaper can do that" with abandon.

FAST Air.

SPEED, Reach, Ubiquity.

Anyone getting it now?

[andyy]

Speed - certainly but that might not be needed in the scenario painted

Reach - yes, to a certain extent.

Ubiquity - I don't think so. On call, maybe, depending on basing, but omnipresent?

[Clearedtoroll]

I agree with your points on carriers... In Somalia we might make use of friendly neighbours (or at least neighbours who might grudgingly not notice a small det) and in Yemen we almost certainly would, but who knows about elsewhere. Even with HNS, I agree carriers would be helpful, and without it essential. Carriers make sense to me and having a reasonable chunk of the UK's FJs able to operate off them would seem sensible too.

My point was more that sizing air (and sea) capabilities based upon everything existing to support a land deployment was a bit blinkered (perhaps deliberately so in MoD). I picked the Yemen/Somalia scenario to illustrate that point and in that particular context I think Typhoons for speed and reach (with Reapers for persistence) would still prove more useful than infantry. That's not to say carrier-capable ac would not be as good or better, but I'll leave that to another thread!

[Canadian Break]

OK, so let's admit here what we all know to be true - the Review was financially driven. If the Government had come out and said so, what do we think the reaction on this site would have been? What would the post Review RAF have looked like if it had been designed by PPruners? Tin (or should that be Kevlar) hat on and and waiting for incoming - bit like Basra really! Should be an interesting discussion.

[Clockwork Mouse]

Jacko, whom I respect and admire, quite understandably tore me off a strip for commenting on others' posts while not putting forward my own cunning plan for military aviation and in particular fast air, so here goes!

There is a widespread public misconception that the punch-up in Afghanistan in which we are currently involved is a war. Despite the scale of the fighting and of casualties on both sides, it is not. It is a COIN operation in support of and at the request of the (legitimate) government in Kabul. We are not at war with Afghanistan or the Afghans. Any lasting solution must be political. The scale and nature of our military involvement needs to keep this in mind.

Success in a COIN campaign can only be achieved by winning the hearts and minds of the populace among whom the insurgents live and hide. If there is no likelihood of that outcome, then it is a lost cause and we should pull out without delay. Winning hearts and minds requires feet on the ground, maximum stroking of the locals and minimum bashing them. When they have to be bashed, it must be seen to be necessary and proportionate. Collateral damage must be avoided if at all possible.

Fast air can only provide kinetic effect (things that go bang) or the threat of it in order to influence what happens on the ground. Understandably the locals’ hearts and minds tend not to respond positively to being attacked indiscriminately (as they are likely to perceive it) from the air. If fast air intervention is required to save lives, then of course it must be available and be used. However, as an indicator, the less that fast air is needed to protect the ground forces, the greater the likelihood that we are winning the contest.

After the traumatic recent experiences of the Blair decade, I think (and hope) that it is most unlikely that British forces will get involved in another substantial conventional punch-up in the foreseeable future. The people and politicians no longer have the stomach for it. I can, however, envisage the possibility of limited small scale and low risk COIN and intervention operations in support of our true friends and allies, similar to that in Sierra Leone, but anything more serious and larger than brigade level is most unlikely.

I am therefore not overly concerned at the anticipated (temporary?) shortage of land based fast air. The availability of sufficient effective AT and SH are a greater concern, but my greatest concern is the loss of our maritime capabilities. We are an island nation but we no longer have the means to patrol and protect our own waters, let alone project force at a distance. The ability to demonstrate an effective deterrence of foreign aggression against our overseas interests and territories is an important component of our sovereignty, and I do not believe that we possess the means to deter convincingly any more. No MPA; no carriers with any fixed wing aircraft; no air support for our surface ships or submarines; reduced ISTAR. These are real causes for concern. Shortage of land based fast air, especially if it is optimised for air to air as seems to be the intention with Typhoon, is the least of our worries. Mine anyway.

Those aviators who maintain that fast air will be more useful in future conflicts than infantry have my pity. Please don’t aspire to air rank!

Though I will humbly admit to my own ignorance of the employment of airpower (I am after all only a pongo, and ex-infantry too), I would set our national priorities for aviation capabilities in these straightened times as:

1. CC and ISTAR, including UAVs
2. MPA
3. SH
4. Carrier based attack and AD
5. AT
6. Land based CAS, including UAVs
7. Land based AD

There now, that’s opened a can of worms! Weapons free!

[Canadian Break]

No incoming from me, it's your opinion. Perhaps would beg to differ on the issue of defence of the Homeland, with land based AD coming at the bottom of your list though.

[Clockwork Mouse]

What's the realistic threat?

[Jackonicko]

That's the point exactly.

If anyone had said in 1972 that Argentina would invade the Falklands, or in 1980 that Iraq would invade Kuwait, or in 1979 that the Berlin Wall would topple, or in 1929 that the Germans would invade Poland, or that Yugoslavia was going to violently break apart, then you'd have been rightly scornful.

The politicians keep telling us that this is a dangerous and unstable world, in which the threat is changing and dynamic.

And so we scale our defences to be able to cope with 2/3 of what we've most recently had to deal with.

Bloody madness. It's like the post Great War 'Ten Year Rule' all over again.

And with that in mind, I'd invert your list of air power priorities, because it looks like one that has been drawn up by someone viewing the requirement through the prism of the expeditionary war requirements of 1995-2005, and I'm not confident that they are necessarily the only future threat.

1. Land based AD1. You need to defend the UK and Falklands, and defence of the UK has to be the primary duty of Government. Whatever else you do, you might need to defend the forces you deploy.
2. CC and ISTAR, though UAVs are niche, and I'd sacrifice them if required
2nd equal. Land based CAS/BAI/Interdiction, though UAVs are niche, and I'd sacrifice them if required. Land-based because if Host Nation Support isn't available, my guess is that the op isn't politically tenable anyway, and if you can't get HNS, your carriers are going to be screwed for their port facilities, resupply, ISTAR and AAR.
4. AT/AAR.
5. SH. Mobility for whatever you deploy.

6. MPA/ASW.

7. Carrier based attack and AD, if and only if I can have enough of everything else, because while it's sometimes useful, it's niche, and seldom essential.

[Canadian Break]

Jack
Pretty much spot on with my thoughts; defence of the Homeland just has to be the No 1 priority - who would have predicted 9/11? WRT "what's the realistic threat"; with the benefit of several years experience since 9/11one would like to think that the warnings and indicators would now be in place to give us the "heads up" and posture accordingly and, from experience, I do think there is a threat, albeit relatively small - but that's all it takes if you are not prepared. However, that does not detract from CM's opinion.
CB

[Mr C Hinecap]

Just to throw a spanner in from a very different angle....and this is very relevant to the RAF.....

Apart from the nuclear submarine fleet, all other capabilities across the 3 Services require us to burn oil in one form or another.
Given the RAF uses over 60% of all fuel burned in the MoD (the largest carbon emitter of any govt dept) and carbon limits will be applied as part of UK law (already passed), coupled with the increased cost and scarcity of fuel, can you see us being able to fly those jets to meet any task?

Real world stuff we will see in most of our Service careers - not tree-hugging pish either - real operational limits.

[Clockwork Mouse]

Perhaps I am like like the single-service focussed soldier who is the current CDS and who apparently believes in a boots-and-bayonet centric strategy. However, as a veteran of 34 years military experience and several staff colleges, not all of them British, I think I will stick to my guns on this.

Of course air defence of the homeland must be assured. However, the REALISTIC threat is minimal and easily countered. It is the least likely capability of them all to be put to the test for real, and I don't accept intercepting the odd Russian recce aircraft as a real test. It is also the only one that has not been put to the test since WW2. Therefore to limit all the shiny new Typhoons we are getting to a single AD capability, which is apparently now the case, defies reason and perhaps says something about the focus of the top brass in the RAF.

The defence of the Falklands would be far better assured by the threat posed by the existence of a quickly deployable carrier force with multi-role fast jets embarked than by a handful of land based AD Typhoons with little realistic prospect of support or reinforcement.

No. I'll go for carriers before, though not instead of please note, land based AD. But ISTAR comes first. The general who can see over the hill holds the initiative.

And by the way, the Argies had been threatening the Falklands for years, Saddam had been claiming Kuwait for ever and Hitler made no secret (though admittedly not in 1929) of his ambitions for Lebensraum in the East. Unfortunately the governments of the time chose to disregard the indicators. The fall of the Berlin wall came as a bit of a shock though.

[Easy Street]

Jacko - your list of priorities is actually fairly representative of the outcome of SDSR, if you accept that cuts across the board were inevitable.

Obviously we kept a carrier and binned MPA, so perhaps 6 and 7 are the wrong way round. However my belief is that the carrier was retained for contractual, political and inter-service reasons, rather than military necessity, so in purely theoretical terms you could argue that the outcome is roughly in line with your thinking.

The only major disparity in your list is that CAS/BAI/AI have taken a major hit with the withdrawal of GR9 and the reduction in GR4 numbers, with no foreseeable possibility of Typhoon filling the (deployable) gap. That is a reflection of the Army thinking that while CAS is nice to have on Op HERRICK, it is not essential to the current strategy.

If you accept that Jacko's list is roughly in line with the outcome of SDSR, then why his angst? Along with other posters I would argue that the quantity is now the problem; "more with less" has been taken a step too far.

[Finningley Boy]

all the shiny new Typhoons we are getting to a single AD capability, which is apparently now the case, defies reason and perhaps says something about the focus of the top brass in the RAF.



Quite wrong actually, the Typhoons, it would appear, are having to pick up the slack of the disappearing Tornado GR4s. Wasn't suppose to happen that way and with the Typhoons greatly downsized in number, the F35C numbers all but written off ala TSR2 and the Harriers and Jaguars well and truly short serviced. All in all with the Nimrods gone and the Sentinels going all leaving the R.A.F. with a loss of comfortably more than 70% of its air combat capability (the actual reason for having an air force) I think to suggest the air chiefs are a little narrow in focus is a tad unsympathetic. Rather as if the General Staff were trying to cling onto the last dozen or so Infantry Battalions.

FB:)

[Clockwork Mouse]

FB
Not "quite wrong actually". My source is current and reliable.
As for my being a tad unsympathetic about the air staffs, just take a gander at what is being said above about the CDS, General Staff and anyone else in a brown suit! I feel positively threatened!

[Finningley Boy]

Ever since the advent of T Blair, the military establishment of this country has never been worse served by the government. To the point where quite recently, unseemly squabbles and surprisingly dismissive comments by officers (usually former) of one service have been made about one or both of the others. I do hope that when TB appears, for the second time, before Chilcot on Friday, he steps on the ultimate Banana skin and we get to find out just what kind of nonsense was said in these papers which some civil servant has decided can't be released in the public domain.:E

FB:)

[Jackonicko]

Not "quite wrong actually". My source is current and reliable.

No, QUITE wrong. Typhoon is not a single role air defence aircraft (though the Tranche 2 aircraft currently being delivered are, temporarily, as I hope is explained below).

This is because the software required for the Austere A-G capability (CP193) is UK only, and Tranche 1 only, though it could quite easily be 'ported' to Tranche 2.

Typhoon is already a multi role aeroplane (via CP193) though aircraft numbers and training hours mean that the existing squadrons (which are effectively tied to the UK AD/Falklands/QRA commitment) cannot actually exercise it.

The T1 Typhoons have demonstrated their ability to drop and self designate in Red Flag, Green Flag West and at least one Magic Carpet, but with 3 squadrons and less than 17.5 hours per pilot per month, it simply isn't possible to keep the capability going. Which is why journos like me have asked why we spent all that money on CP193 in the first place?

With FCP arriving in c.2015, Typhoon (including Tranche 2) will be employing all of the weapons carried by Tornado. Not ALARM, which will have gone, but strafe, EPW, PWIV, Dual Mode Brimstone, and soon afterwards Storm Shadow too.

[Clockwork Mouse]

So I'm wrong but I'm right!

[Jackonicko]

You are fundamentally and essentially wrong, but are temporarily and partially right.

Your simplistic claim was more wrong than right.

The bulk of the fleet is multi role CAPABLE now (though that capability isn't being exercised, though it has been demonstrated and could be made available), and by the time Tranche 2 jets represent the bulk of the fleet they will be swing role capable.

Once we have four Typhoon squadrons (2013?) I would expect the MR work up to begin in earnest.

[Finningley Boy]

4 Squadrons you reckon Jacko old fruit. Like to see some country have a crack at us with that little lot up our sleeve!:E

FB:)

[MG23]

Pretty much spot on with my thoughts; defence of the Homeland just has to be the No 1 priority - who would have predicted 9/11?

I remember plenty of talk about the threat of hijacked airliners as weapons in the 90s; I seem to recall Tom Clancy or some other thriller writer putting it in one of his books and in March 2001 the 'Lone Gunmen' spinoff from the X-files began with a show about some shady government agency hijacking airliners to crash into the World Trade Center.

Lots of people predict lots of things that later come true; the hard part is figuring out which of those predictions are correct _before_ they come true :).

[HEDP]

Perhaps in considering the paucity of CAS squadrons and the armies percieved lack of demand in current ops one should consider the larger picture. The army has integral CAS (RW) to the tune of six squadrons and when considering the larger joint picture perhaps this should be factored into the assesment. The success of Apache has peviously been talked about as counter to the requirement for CAS but I havent seen it mentioned in the context of this debate.

I dont pretend it fulfills every aspect of what can be done by something pointy and fast but in the context of persistence, ISTAR and the employment of proportional effects perhaps it leads the field in this area. Indeed with GR4 migrating to dual mode Brimstone for proportionality then perhaps some COIN lessons were learnt froom AH.

HEDP

[Clockwork Mouse]

You're in the wrong job, Jacko! You are a born politician.

[Timelord]

CM

"Those aviators who maintain that fast air will be more useful in future conflicts than infantry have my pity. Please don’t aspire to air rank! "

What about the containment of Sadam by fast air between Gulf wars 1 and 2 with no "boots on the ground", no allied casualties and at minimal cost?

[andyy]

Jacko, no one doubts that AD of the homeland is important, but I contend that that can be achieved with Carrier capable assets that can be land or carrier based, depending on the threat at the time. Thus the AD of the UK culd be achieved with, say 6 quadron of F/A-18 E/F or Rafale etc if that is where the greatest need is, but some of those same aircraft could be deployed to sea if we had overseas commitments/ dependencies/ events that needed our geater attention. Typhoon cannot.

For the same reason, all SH & AH should be marinised.

The UK cannot afford to have specialised, single domain assets any more; it needs to have assets that it can deploy to concentrate power where the effect is most greatly needed.

Flexibility s the key to air (& sea) power.

[Clockwork Mouse]

TL
Yes, they did a great job of containment, though the Marsh Arabs of Basra might not agree. However, what role does containment contribute to the end result in war fighting? Everyone needs everyone else to do their bit in the team, but only infantry can take and hold ground, which tends to be a basic requirement in most conflicts.

[Timelord]

Why "take and hold ground" if the effect you require is being achieved from the air ?

[Clockwork Mouse]

TL
It depends on the desired end result. In this case containment was not enough and we ended up having to invade Iraq, which could not have been achieved without infantry. Of course fast air played a vital role in that invasion, but the end result is inevitable taking and securing the objective on the ground.

[Jackonicko]

Who says that containment wasn't enough? It was cheap, and it kept Saddam in his box. It did so without resulting in a massive insurgency, and without stirring up too much of a hornet's nest of Islamacist hatred of the West. If you remember the excuse for a full scale 'take and hold ground exercise' was the supposed presence of WMD......

Andyy,

Carriers are massively expensive, and very slow moving. Keeping one in place to do Northern Q, Southern Q and the Falklands would, I suggest, be both inefficient and costly. So you base the carrier aircraft on land, so that once in every 30 years or so (when a carrier is essential rather than merely useful) you can use them on a carrier.

And if you keep their crews fully carrier capable, the training burden is such that they won't ever do much else. How often have we seen the Aéronavale Rafales do an enduring land based deployment? Or US Navy Tomcats or Super Hornets.

In the real world, carrier-capable tends to mean carrier-fixed, unless you go down the STOVL route.

[Clockwork Mouse]

So the solution for the future of the UK's armed forces according to the proponents of fast air is to abolish the Army and navy and contain any future threat using fast air which may, at some point in the future, be dual roled if we are lucky.
I think I can detect the odd flaw here.

[andyy]

Jacko - You may not have noticed but land bases are also very expensive and do not move at all, not even slowly.

[Mr C Hinecap]

Why "take and hold ground" if the effect you require is being achieved from the air ?

If the effect is to 'take and hold', then we've not got the loiter to do that from the air. The other rather large factor here is cost. The RAF are not cheap - the effect we bring is very expensive for what it is.

[Timelord]

I am not suggesting the abolition of the Army or the Royal Navy, I am simply saying let us not forget the efficacy of fast air. Given the UK's unhappy experiencies in Iraq and Afghanistan it is extremely unlikely that any future governement will commit us to an extensive ground commitment. So, if we want to influence anything happening anywhere in the world then the use of air power may be the only politically acceptable way to do it.

To nearly quote the outgoing AOC I Gp; "The deterrent and coercive effect of combat air seems to have been lost in the mix" (or something like that)

[Clearedtoroll]

I think anyone who thinks we don't need infantry is clearly not thinking straight, but I haven't seen anyone suggest that here.

My original point was that determining how much fast air we need should not only depend on how big our land forces are... Except insofar as they all get paid for out of the same pot, which although important tends to impinge on reasoned argument. I think a lot of people would agree that our CAS capability should be sized to support what the land commanders need, as it is there to support them (the same applies for other primarily tactical assets in support of land forces such as SH, ASTOR etc).

But fast air because of its speed and reach (alongside UAVs for persistence) has a strategic role when we can't or don't wish to commit land forces. The use of Reaper in Pakistan is a current example and the use of Tornado and Jag between the 2 Gulf wars another. Given that Typhoon will end up doing CAS, AD, recce and all the non-CAS offensive roles, we shouldn't dismiss its importance. That's not to say that we need 200 of them, or that a carrier capability wouldn't be good, or that infantry isn't essential... Just that air can play a useful and (occasionally) decisive role not in direct support of land forces.

[Clockwork Mouse]

TL and CTR
Can't argue with that.:D

[Timelord]

Thanks CM, all we need to do now is convince CDS, Dr Fox and Mr Cameron.

[Not_a_boffin]

None of those mentioned are the real problem. It's Mr Osborne , Mr Alexander and the SCS in the treasury that need to understand.......

[John Farley]

Since this has drifted back to saving money my I say that some years ago my family neded to make some cuts in our budget.

My wife said - "Right, cancel the papers, the TV, the magazines, the monthly trip to the cinema and a couple of other things for the kids which add up to what you want to save".

No, I said - "That will have an enormous effect on our daily lives and overall lifestyle. Let us cut the biggest single item by 9% which will save the same amount and we will not really notice the difference" So I gave her 9% less for food.