Centaurus
3rd Dec 2009, 09:45
This report from India when a check pilot pulled a radio altimeter circuit breaker during an ILS. While clearly this was not a wise move, what amazed me was the spokesman who said: "A pilot can do the job of an autopilot - he can land albeit with difficulty without the help of a flight director".
God help us all if todays airline pilots are so automatics dependant that landing with the FD off is considered "difficult" and by inference fraught with danger.
Recent accidents such as Turkish Airlines B737 that crashed in Amsterdam is proof positive that this headlong push to avoid manual flying at all costs is breeding a different type of airline pilot - one that is apprehensive of touching the controls unless forced to in a dire emergency. One has only to read the accident report on the Flash Air B737 that crashed into the sea with the captain still screaming for the autopilot to be engaged.
Here is the extract from the Indian A320 incident:
When the commander was interrogated, he said (and gave it in writing) that after the aircraft landed, the ACM revealed to him that he had pulled out the circuit-breaker on Radio Altimeter 1 ``just to see his reaction to failures''.
The incident took place on October 20 on flight 9W 332 around 8.50am, during the morning peak hour. The check pilot was flying as an additional crew member (ACM) in the jump seat located behind the pilots' seats. An ACM's status is that of a passenger and s/he is not supposed to touch the flight controls. ``The aircraft was established on the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for runway 27,'' an official said, implying the aircraft was coming in to land from the east and was about 3,700 feet high and had got visual guidance to help it descend and touch down on the runway 27 centre line.
``At that instant, the autopilot tripped and the flight director disappeared,'' he added. A flight director gives visual cues to the pilot who follows it by, say, turning left or right or pitching the aircraft up or down to take it to its destination.
So, with both vital navigation instruments failing, the commander took over the flight controls to bring in the plane for landing entirely manually. ``But the aircraft started sinking fast. It was going down faster than 1000 feet a minute, the maximum prescribed descent rate. It was a dangerous situation as the approach to runway 27 was over hilly terrain,'' the official said.
When an aircraft has a higher-than-normal descent rate, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) blares out a loud aural warning, ``sink rate whoop whoop pull up'' continuously till the descent rate is slowed down.
But no such alarm went off in this cockpit. ``A pilot can do the job of an autopilot; he can land, albeit with difficulty, without the help of a flight director. But neither can he nor any other instrument in the cockpit do the job of an EGPWS,'' said the source.
It is such a critical equipment to prevent crashes that the International Civil Aviation Organisation mandates that no passenger aircraft should fly without a functioning EGPWS. Jet Airways confirmed that the EGPWS warning was not received. This confirms a system malfunction or a deactivation of the system.
``Since the sink rate was very high, the Digital Flight Data Recorder showed up an `exceedance report', which was picked up by the airline's flight safety department after the aircraft landed,'' said the source.
``It is a very dangerous thing to do as pulling out a C/B can render unintended systems to fail, like the EGPWS failure in this case. No pilot would want to fly without an EGPWS,'' an official said. Aircraft manufacturers are so careful about C/Bs that these switches are not installed at locations easily accessible or even viewable from the pilot's seat. It is located behind the seat as Airbus and Boeing did not consider the possibility of an ACM pulling out a C/B.
God help us all if todays airline pilots are so automatics dependant that landing with the FD off is considered "difficult" and by inference fraught with danger.
Recent accidents such as Turkish Airlines B737 that crashed in Amsterdam is proof positive that this headlong push to avoid manual flying at all costs is breeding a different type of airline pilot - one that is apprehensive of touching the controls unless forced to in a dire emergency. One has only to read the accident report on the Flash Air B737 that crashed into the sea with the captain still screaming for the autopilot to be engaged.
Here is the extract from the Indian A320 incident:
When the commander was interrogated, he said (and gave it in writing) that after the aircraft landed, the ACM revealed to him that he had pulled out the circuit-breaker on Radio Altimeter 1 ``just to see his reaction to failures''.
The incident took place on October 20 on flight 9W 332 around 8.50am, during the morning peak hour. The check pilot was flying as an additional crew member (ACM) in the jump seat located behind the pilots' seats. An ACM's status is that of a passenger and s/he is not supposed to touch the flight controls. ``The aircraft was established on the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for runway 27,'' an official said, implying the aircraft was coming in to land from the east and was about 3,700 feet high and had got visual guidance to help it descend and touch down on the runway 27 centre line.
``At that instant, the autopilot tripped and the flight director disappeared,'' he added. A flight director gives visual cues to the pilot who follows it by, say, turning left or right or pitching the aircraft up or down to take it to its destination.
So, with both vital navigation instruments failing, the commander took over the flight controls to bring in the plane for landing entirely manually. ``But the aircraft started sinking fast. It was going down faster than 1000 feet a minute, the maximum prescribed descent rate. It was a dangerous situation as the approach to runway 27 was over hilly terrain,'' the official said.
When an aircraft has a higher-than-normal descent rate, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) blares out a loud aural warning, ``sink rate whoop whoop pull up'' continuously till the descent rate is slowed down.
But no such alarm went off in this cockpit. ``A pilot can do the job of an autopilot; he can land, albeit with difficulty, without the help of a flight director. But neither can he nor any other instrument in the cockpit do the job of an EGPWS,'' said the source.
It is such a critical equipment to prevent crashes that the International Civil Aviation Organisation mandates that no passenger aircraft should fly without a functioning EGPWS. Jet Airways confirmed that the EGPWS warning was not received. This confirms a system malfunction or a deactivation of the system.
``Since the sink rate was very high, the Digital Flight Data Recorder showed up an `exceedance report', which was picked up by the airline's flight safety department after the aircraft landed,'' said the source.
``It is a very dangerous thing to do as pulling out a C/B can render unintended systems to fail, like the EGPWS failure in this case. No pilot would want to fly without an EGPWS,'' an official said. Aircraft manufacturers are so careful about C/Bs that these switches are not installed at locations easily accessible or even viewable from the pilot's seat. It is located behind the seat as Airbus and Boeing did not consider the possibility of an ACM pulling out a C/B.