We should not point fingers

[ToTall]

but has this gone to far?

Ore. firefighter's mother sues helicopter company - NewsFlash - OregonLive.com (http://www.oregonlive.com/newsflash/index.ssf?/base/news-29/1236094172119650.xml&storylist=orlocal)

Just read in the Oregonian that the mother of one killed in California helicopter crash has sued several helicopter companies for neglect.

Why?

Am I out of line to post this?

[SASless]

Let's put a face to a bit of text.....we are talking about real people when we do the accounting.

http://blog.oregonlive.com/news_impact/2009/03/medium_PX00222_9.JPG

Family of dead firefighter sues helicopter maker, others - OregonLive.com (http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/03/family_of_dead_firefighter_sue.html)

The Iron 44 Incident - The Oregonian Extra - OregonLive.com (http://blog.oregonlive.com/oregonianextra/2008/08/the_iron_44_incident_helicopte.html)

[Gordy]

To add to SASless, lets put the rest of the names here too:

http://i76.photobucket.com/albums/j35/helokat/LaFawnduh%2008/IMG_2289.jpg

[SASless]

Gordy,

I knew Roark from days past.....another Good Guy gone!

Knowing him like I do....he is probably ragging on Elvis and keeping folks laughing!

Meeting him was one of the bright spots of my flying career.

[Pragmatic_Twitch]

It's undeniably sad. Always is.
If the cause were linked to an avoidable design flaw in the helo, then yes, of course Sikorsky would be at fault.

BUUUUT....

LAX08PA259 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20080820X01266&key=1)

NTSB's report is still only a Prelim. So while the cause of the crash may be blindingly obvious (which it doesn't even seem to be that in this case), its not really official until NTSB sez so. :=

So no, I have a hard time with this kind of lawsuit. It just seems like a no-good shotgun lawsuit. Whether originated by the grieving mother or a money-hungry lawyer telling her "you could make a big buck off this!" What if it were to come out later that the accident was pilot error? then who does she sue?

Too many what-ifs and don't really want to speculate. It's sad, I feel bad for the family, and yes, there were similar accidents in appearance, but we just don't know the actual cause yet.

Blah. :oh:

[Gordy]

SAS---Never met Roark, although one of the ladies in our office worked with him at Columbia. I did know Jim--he carded me last year and also worked for many years where I now work .

I hauled all the "contaminants", (jet fuel soaked dirt), from the site last October...Because the site is in a designated "wilderness area" the task had to be completed with minimum impact. We flew in a Hazmat team who worked with hand tools for a week filling 1,000 lb bags with "contaminated dirt" which we slung off. We had a 36nm round trip each flight, (could not land in the "wilderness" area), for a total of 90 seperate flights and over 50,000 lbs of dirt. The site is now "re-habbed" back to its natural state.

http://i76.photobucket.com/albums/j35/helokat/LaFawnduh%2008/Iron-1.jpg

[Gordy]

Former employees of carson helicopters indicted over fatal iron 44 fire crash/ (http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/02/04/former-employees-of-carson-helicopters-indicted-over-fatal-iron-44-fire-crash/)

More Here (http://www.opb.org/news/article/grants-pass-helicopter-executives-indicted-from-crash/)

Two former employees of Carson Helicopters are facing 20 years or more in prison for charges related to the crash of a helicopter in 2008 that killed nine people (seven firefighters and two crew members) as it attempted to take off from a remote helispot on the Iron Complex or Iron 44 Fire in northern California.

Last week a federal grand jury in Medford, Oregon indicted Steven Metheny, 42, former Vice President of Carson, and Levi Phillips, 45, the former maintenance chief of the company, for charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States which could earn them up to 20 years in prison if convicted.

Metheny was also indicted in 22 other counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, making false statements to the Forest Service, endangering the safety of aircraft in flight, and theft from an interstate shipment. In addition to the 20 years for conspiracy to defraud charges, he could also get a maximum sentence of 20 years for every mail and wire fraud count, 20 years for each endangering the safety of aircraft in flight count, 10 years for the interstate theft count, and up to five years for each false statement count.

According to the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board in 2010, there was “intentional wrong-doing” by Carson Helicopters that under-stated the weight of the Sikorsky S-61N helicopter and over-stated its performance in the documents they provided to the USFS when bidding on $20 million in firefighting contracts for seven helicopters. As a result, when the helicopter attempted to take off from the helispot on the Iron 44 Fire with firefighters and a flight crew of three, it was over the allowable weight even before the firefighters boarded the ship. The helicopter crashed into some trees and caught fire, just after lifting off.

Killed in the crash were pilot Roark Schwanenberg, 54; USFS check pilot Jim Ramage, 63; and firefighters Shawn Blazer, 30; Scott Charlson, 25; Matthew Hammer, 23; Edrik Gomez, 19; Bryan Rich, 29; David Steele, 19; and Steven “Caleb” Renno, 21. The copilot and three other firefighters were seriously injured.

In March of 2012, a jury ordered the manufacturer of the helicopter’s engines, General Electric, to pay $69.7 million to William Coultas (the surviving pilot), his wife, and the estate of Roark Schwanenberg (the pilot who was killed).

After the crash the U.S. Forest Service canceled their contract with Carson Helicopters. The company then surrendered their FAA Certificate which is equivalent to an operating license. After that they received a contract for seven S-61s to fly for the military in Afghanistan as a subcontractor for the company formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide, which was renamed “Xe”. In February 2010, Sikorsky announced a joint venture with Carson to supply up to 110 modernized S-61T helicopters to the U.S. government, primarily for the State Department.

The U.S. Attorney’s office in Oregon is working with the Offices of Inspector General for both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Transportation in Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington, and the FBI and the IRS in Medford, Oregon in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

[SASless]

This is very good news.

I shall hope the prosecution is successful and the those two spend the rest of their lives in Prison.

Some very good Men died as a result of their actions.

I refused to dummy up some paperwork on an aircraft one time....and some folks wondered why I refused. Hope they understand now.

[Lonewolf_50]

In all four cases, the helicopters crashed as they were lifting off, caused by a failure of a clutch mechanism that connects engines to the helicopter's five main rotors, attorneys for the pilots and their families argued in courts in Oregon, Tennessee and British Columbia.
*Sigh.*
Can't journos fact check and get their terms straight?
Rotor blades, of which an S-61 has five, are part of the main rotor(or main rotor assembly) of which the S-61 has one.
Their profession is words, and they can't get the words right.

Aside: sprag clutch failure? :confused:

[Arnie Madsen]

In March of 2012, a jury ordered the manufacturer of the helicopter’s engines, General Electric, to pay $69.7 million to William Coultas (the surviving pilot), his wife, and the estate of Roark Schwanenberg (the pilot who was killed).Several times the NSTB report states the engines were performing normally and did not contribute to the accident ..... so why would General Electric have to pay the $69.7 million ?? Strange !!

[212man]

Aside: sprag clutch failure?

Read the report. Both engines were at max Ng all the way to impact.

[ericferret]

With you there Arnie, if both engines worked as advertised why did GE get stitched for millions?

[Thomas coupling]

Probably because of this:

Jury awards $70 million for helicopter crash on Iron Complex fireWildfire Today (http://wildfiretoday.com/2012/03/27/jury-awards-70-million-for-helicopter-crash-on-iron-complex-fire/)

The whole fiasco stinks. Not only did the engine saga stink, but the Carson inditement did too. Apparently here we had an operator flying duff engines on duff airframes. WTF:ugh:

And there's me thinking Carson were a reputable company. The Carson blade kit has transformed S61 and SeaKing flight characterisitics.

Please, someone, tell me there is no connection between the Carson inditement and the 'other' Carson phenomena???

[jamnut]

Found this on Carson's facebook page

"On 5 August 2008 a Carson Helicopters Sikorsky S-61N crashed on take off. According to the NTSB, nine people were killed. These were the pilot-in-command, Roark Schwanenberg, 54, of Lostine, Forest Service safety official Jim Ramage, 63, and seven firefighters: Shawn Blazer, 30, of Medford; Scott Charlson, 25, of Phoenix, Ore.; Matthew Hammer, 23, of Grants Pass; Edrik Gomez, 19, of Ashland; Bryan Rich, 29, of Medford; David Steele, 19, of Ashland; and Steven "Caleb" Renno, 21, of Cave Junction. The copilot and three firefighters escaped the burning wreckage and survived with serious injuries. The NTSB's preliminary report determined that the cause was a loss of power on take off probably caused by an engine failure. In January 2010 the NTSB issued its final report finding that the probable causes of this accident were several actions by Carson Helicopters: intentional understatement of the helicopter’s empty weight; alteration of the power available chart to exaggerate the helicopter’s lift capability; using unapproved torque in performance calculations; and that additional causes were insufficient oversight by the U.S. Forest Service and the Federal Aviation Administration. Relatives of the victims concerned by the change in the NTSB report filed a lawsuit against General Electric and on March 27, 2012 a jury unanimously ruled that the primary cause of the accident was the failure of the GE CT-58 engines."

[SASless]

OH Hell Yes.....By all means let's point fingers!

When a couple of guys falsify documentation to obtain contracts and later those material falsifications lead to fatal accidents...then by all means lets point our fingers at them. What's more, even if they do not wind up in Federal Prison for their felonious conduct....let's run them out the industry for good.

Here is the NTSB Accident Report.


http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2010/AAR1006.pdf


Note the explanation about how the empty weights were falsified and also how the bogus performance charts were created. The fact the USFS failed to catch the understatement until the NTSB pointed it out to them is also indicative of how they do their business in the contracting office. There are some bureaucrats in the office that need removing but then they are all good civil servants.

The USFS Check Pilots I have dealt with have all been professional and knowledgeable in their work and to the Man were very pleasant to deal with.

The lying scoundrels not only lied to the Forest Service but worse they lied to their own Pilots and the passengers they carried.

When people burn to death as a result of your actions....you deserve no mercy.

[pilot and apprentice]

SAS, you really like to use absolutes. There are a lot of fingers to be pointed.

There is a lot of data in that report, takes a while to get through it.

Thomas:The whole fiasco stinks. Not only did the engine saga stink, but the Carson inditement did too. Apparently here we had an operator flying duff engines on duff airframes. WTF:ugh:

The engines were good, but asked to do more than they were capable of. Topping is topping, that's all you get.

1.18.2 Pilot Interviews
NTSB investigators interviewed five former CHSI pilots following the accident. Four of the pilots reported that, while it was not normal to reach engine topping during passenger-carrying operations, it was a more common occurrence during water-hauling or logging operations. One pilot stated that, “when you reach topping, you jettison. This is a daily experience that pilots deal with when carrying water rather than passengers.” Another pilot stated the following:
Logging and passenger operations provide an entirely different environment. In logging, the aircraft has no interior or seats, bare metal and wiring, and carries only what is necessary for the operation. Time is money, and logging is a timed event paid by board foot. By contrast, passenger operations are [paid] by the hour. You cannot jettison loads. Topping is normal in logging, but only as an emergency measure. It is not normal with passengers, where calculations are based on takeoff power rather than topping.
In earlier times, pilots would try to carry more than the helicopter was capable of carrying. Therefore, load calculations are now made as a guide and are rigorously held to in Part 135 operations. With firefighting operations, when carrying water, these calculations are not etched in stone. You trim for comfort, check power
74
NTSB Aircraft Accident Report
75
available before loading water, then take on water. For example, you pull in 81% torque as the best power before drooping, therefore at 71% torque you stop loading water.
The pilots reported that, typically, on water-dropping missions, an in-flight power check

I agree that the Carson execs acted criminally and should be punished as such. Their acts were designed to deceive. Again, not the only operator out there that does this, by far.

I've had another operator try the same things on the same airframe.

The problem is, to quote you from another thread:

ass, tin, ticket

What were the guys thinking using topping on one take-off after another to struggle over the trees and saying the power is "good"? Clearly there was culture of exceeding limitations that they either agreed with or had aquiesced to.

I agree that the falsified charts would lead them into the problem, but they have access to an unaltered RFM. That was a huge first hole in the cheese (criminally so)and if they had restricted themselves to RFM t/o limits, they would have landed back and kicked some guys out.

NTSB:
During the two previous departures on the day of the accident, the pilots had the opportunity to realize that the helicopter was overweight or at least that it was not performing in a manner consistent with the load calculations. The NG gauges would have shown that the engines were being operated in excess of the flight manual takeoff NG limit of 100 percent (shown on the NG gauges as a red line) and were at topping power. Additionally, the droop in NR would have been audible to the pilots and visible on the triple tachometer. Nonetheless, neither
...
pilot mentioned that the engines were at topping, even though the load calculations showed that they should have been well below the helicopter’s maximum performance capabilities. Further, neither pilot called attention to the discrepancy between the predicted and actual performance of the helicopter or suggested postponing further flight until the discrepancy could be resolved.

The PIC had accumulated the majority of his experience flying helicopters in the logging and firefighting industries. As revealed by the comments of other S-61 pilots, the operating procedures are significantly different when carrying logs or water than when carrying passengers. In both logging and water-dropping missions, the pilots do not routinely rely on load calculations. In logging, the operation of flights is driven by the maximum power capabilities of the helicopter as indicated by the torque gauges, and pilots consistently load the helicopter until it reaches its maximum performance capability, knowing that they can jettison the load and instantaneously decrease the power required to hover or climb.

I can't believe that the engine manufacturer is being tagged to pay out on this. Insane.

[SASless]

I agree about the Jury finding....the NTSB clearly stated the Engines were not the cause and were operating correctly. I am sure upon Appeal the Jury Verdict shall fail.

Now that Federal Indictments are done....the two guys on the hook will have to make some decisions about how to respond to those charges. I am sure they are lawyered up and will be receiving some very expensive Legal Advice.

They are going to have consider some sort of Plea Bargain as I can bet the US Attorney would prefer to settle this out of court as the FAA and USFS are going to be wearing a lot of Egg on their face should it go to Trial. Likewise, when the civil proceeding starts....as you know the Families are going to go after these two and Carson now that the two executives are under indictment.

The major cause of the accident is the false performance data and the false Weight and Balance information.

[oleary]

SASless wrote,

"The major cause of the accident is the false performance data and the false Weight and Balance information."

Nonsense.

One of two things happened here:

(1) Whether flying a 61 or any other helicopter one must first determine whether or not one has enough power to get out of the confined area. I have flown 61's many hours at high DA's and Ng topping is always an issue. A number on a piece of paper did not cause this accident - but lousy judgement may have.

(2) The co-pilot insists he saw a torque split as they were coming out of the hole. If this was the case, it is a straightforward power loss on takeoff. There is also the issue of a (perhaps) incorrect fuel control overhaul at Columbia. This story ain't over yet.

Finally, this aircraft was purchased by Okanagan Helicopters in 1966 and we put over 40,000 hours on her. I personally flew her more than 3,000 hours. Sad end to a grand old Lady.

[SASless]

Oleary,

If the Co-Pilot saw a torque split....why does the NTSB Report state both engines were functioning normally and bases that statement upon the CVR data and the engine examination after the crash and makes no mention of that statement by the Co-pilot?

Where are you getting your information about the improper overhaul at Columbia?

While you at CHC were flying that bird at "Topping" all those forty thousand hours....were you still using standard Sikorsky TBO data based upon their initial flight testing for certification or did CHC modify that data to reflect all those hi-power settings and cycles and wear and tear from unusual forces caused by Logging and Water hauling? The aircraft TBO's on drivetrain and dynamic fatigue loaded parts are impacted by the power vs time at power spectrum as I am sure you are aware.

Carson by the use of Plus Spec Power settings and higher weights and the use of 2.5 minute OEI power for takeoffs really loaded up the aircraft in that regard and some thought might be given to what effect that has on TBO's.

As you seem to say you at CHC operated the aircraft and had Topping issues....what techniques did you use to avoid "Topping Out"? Did you limit weights, abort takeoffs that caused you to go beyond the limits for Ng...or did you do as most Loggers do....carry all the weight you could even if it meant drooping some Nr so long as you could clear the barriers?


I posted the NTSB Report earlier if you want to review that and point out any errors you may think they made for us.

[Gordy]

Caveat: I knew Jim Ramage the inspector pilot on board, he used to work where I now work, I know his widow. I did not know Roarke or Bill, but I know lots of people who do, and all speak highly of them. As shown above, I flew most of the clean-up operation.

I am not a party to any other part of the investigation or aftermath, so, let me point you towards some clues as to what is being discussed, the 15 points raise serious questions:

A helicopter crash that killed nine continues to raise questions more than two years after the accident. The accident occurred on August 5, 2008 near Weaverville, California as a Sikorsky S-61N helicopter took off from a rugged mountaintop clearing ferrying firefighters to a wildfire in the Trinity Alps Wilderness. Seven contract firefighters, a U.S. Forest Service safety inspector and the pilot were killed.

On Dec 7, 2010 the NTSB met to determine the cause of the crash and make safety recommendations. Their recommendations raised questions about the safety of government aircraft and documents indicated the chopper was overweight.

Two victims' families are speaking out through an attorney against those findings by the NTSB. The Coultas and Schwanenberg families charge the NTSB changed its initial conclusion from an engine failure to a weight issue because the report was written by the wife of the NTSB investigator that was responsible for the security of the parts, according to Gregory Anderson of AndersonGlenn, LLC.

Bill Coultas, who was severely injured in the accident and Christine Schwanenberg, wife of Roark Schwanenberg, who was killed in the crash believe there should be an impartial and unbiased investigation and that there is a conflict of interest with this report.

Both men were pilots of the helicopter, employed by Carson Helicopters. The families, through Anderson, would like to make the following facts public:

1) The original cause of the accident found by NTSB investigators was the loss of power from the No. 2 engine due to a well known issue over fuel filtration. The NTSB reached this conclusion following the inspection of the engines at a Columbia Helicopters repair facility in Aurora, Oregon on August 14th, 15th and 16th, 2008, just nine days following the August 5th accident. Columbia, an approved fuel system contractor for repair of the GE CT-58 engines involved in the accident, was the last party to have physical control of the parts. NTSB investigator Jim Struhsaker turned over control of the Fuel Control Units to Columbia on August 16th, 2008 for shipment back to the NTSB. Carson was not present, having left the inspection on the 15th to attend memorial services of the victims.

2) Columbia, GE and Sikorsky are all financially interested parties as defendants in multi-million dollar lawsuits brought by the victims and their families.

3) The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) was functioning and had 77 hours of data recorded. The NTSB investigators could not coordinate the timeline of the cockpit voice recorder with the FDR data so they labeled it "invalid" or "irrelevant". In fact, it contains information of heading, altitude and engine performance. No attempt was made to integrate this data after August 16th 2008, when the fuel system components were lost.

4) GE, Sikorsky and Columbia had been facing allegations of a dangerous defect regarding the fuel control units, specifically, stuck stator vanes due to a contamination of Pressure Regulating Valves (PRV) and clogged filters, which when clogged to a certain degree, allow the CT58 to continue to operate through the use of an emergency by-pass valve. When this occurs, unfiltered fuel is allowed into the Fuel Control Unit, and results in contamination of the system. The diameter or "clearance" of the diaphragm of the PRV is only six (6) microns in thickness. The filters in use in N612AZ, the S-61 involved in the Trinity crash, as well as the four preceding crashes from this issue, were for forty (40) micron contaminants. The US military identified the filtration issue in its S-61s in the 1990s and switched to the finer, 10 micron filter. Following the upgrade, military S-61s no longer had fuel filter issues.

5) The day following the accident, email exchanges between GE and Sikorsky engineering departments raise filtration immediately after being notified about the accident.

6) The S-61N involved, had a maintenance history that included concerns over stuck fuel system components due to fuel contamination. The maintenance history of the S61N was not considered in the Board's findings.

7) There have been four prior accidents involving the CT58 fuel system in the S-61 where fuel contamination was cited as the cause, including a 2004 detailed investigation by the Canadian Transportation Board into an S-61N firefighter crash where it determined the GE CT58 fuel filter issue was the probable cause. The prior accidents were not considered by the Board.

. 8) The sole evidence that the No. 2 GE CT58 engine in N612AZ was functioning nominally was a sound spectrum analysis prepared by GE using Sikorsky charts of the sound signature of the planetary gears in the S-61 transmission and the sound signature of the gas generator blade rpm. In order to determine whether the No. 2 engine was developing its full power, the NTSB would need four facts: first, "Nr" or rotor blade rpm; second, "Ng", or gas generator (compressor) speed; "Nf" or power turbine speed; and finally, "T5" or turbine inlet temperature, which shows the amount of heat developed in the CT58 combustion chamber (for the CT58-140 installed in this S-61N configuration, that should have been 721 degrees). The NTSB did not determine the second and third required parameters and so could not have determined whether the No. 2 engine had achieved "topping" or top rated horsepower.

9) The sound spectrum analysis is the only "quantitative" data for the conclusion that the No. 2 engine had not failed. Absent this GE/Sikorsky analysis, all of the NTSB conclusions are speculation. Objective facts supporting an engine issue include the No. 2 torque gauge found post accident with a "split" of 30% from No. 1. The NTSB theorized this could be from a power loss but wiring schematics show this to be an A/C powered gauge that would have frozen with a sudden loss of power, not wound down. Even if it had been a DC powered gauge, there would not have been a split: both gauges would have wound down to zero torque. The Emergency Throttle for No. 2 was found in the partially opened position. Bill Coultas and a second eyewitness confirm that he was attempting to open the No. 2 Emergency Throttle after he saw the torque split on the gauges. The only reason to do so was a concern by the flight crew with fuel. The Emergency Throttles are gated and require significant force to move to an open position. Bill Coultas testified they lost power and noted the loss of rotor speed before they hit any trees.

10) Comparison of the markings on the stator vanes are significant.

11) The NTSB ignored Bill Coultas' testimony that they had cleared a 50' (AGL) tree before losing power and descending into the #1, #2 and #3 trees documented to have been hit by the rotor blades in the report. The GPS plot of N612AZ's course, combined with the (NTSB commissioned) survey of the area, prove unequivocally that N612AZ climbed to 60' or more before losing power. The significance is that in sloping terrain (the NTSB survey shows between 8 and 20 degrees of ground slope once the helicopter left the immediate landing area of H-44), the "Hover Out of Ground Effect" ("HOGE") altitude could not have been more than 30' (AGL). To get to an altitude of 60-70' AGL, the helicopter had to climb out of ground effect, which renders the theory of an overweight issue as a cause, speculative. Succinctly, if the helicopter was grossly overweight, it would have never been able to climb out of ground effect (the cushion of air between the ground and the whirling disk of the rotor blades), but would have "settled" back down. This effect would have been immediately noticed by the flight crew. It is a matter of mathematical certainty that an S61N at this density altitude could not have climbed out of ground effect and over a 50' obstacle if it were in a gross overload situation. As a matter of record, N612AZ did climb out of ground effect and transition into forward flight, and climbed over a 50' obstacle. Weight was not the issue.

12) The NTSB asks the public and the aviation community in particular, to believe that a Pilot-in-Command (Roark Schwanenberg), a Second-in -Command (Bill Coultas) and a Forest Service Check Pilot (Jim Ramage), with a combined total of 29,000 hours of helicopter time: lifted off from H-44; never noticed any weight problem; never noticed the helicopter settling; never felt it reacting sluggishly; never considered putting her back down; never thought of their own safety (all three had families –Schwanenberg and Coultas with minor children); ignored the lives of the nine firefighters in the back, and essentially flew directly into the trees.

13) The NTSB took Bill Coultas' statement that "we had plenty of power" and presented it as though he was stating the condition of the helicopter as it was crashing. The transcript of his post-accident interview makes clear he was stating that he and PIC Schwanenberg had determined that they would have plenty of power for the last (crash) flight as they performed the preflight calculations, based on the observed temperature and winds. By taking the SIC's statement out of context, the NTSB presented it as conformation that the engines were producing full power. This is contrary to sound investigation techniques requiring an unbiased and impartial evaluation of the testimony.

14) The NTSB Materials Report (taken off the public docket in violation of the NTSB's "transparency" policy issued in June of 2009), was the result of complaints by the victims and the aircraft's owner/operator, Carson Helicopters to the NTSB and to members of Congress, including Oregon Representative Pete DeFazio. After Carson's request for a congressional investigation into the loss of the parts, the NTSB investigation shifted to an investigation of Carson and the weight issue. Prior to Carson expressing concerns to Congress over the parts, the focus was on the engine filtration issue.

15) In the GE/Sikorsky prepared "worst case" simulation, the helicopter was alleged to have weighed 19,008 lbs. The Sikorsky performance charts, even using the "stock" rotor blades instead of the composite, high performance blades on N612AZ, show that at this altitude, temperature and wind, the helicopter could lift over 19,100 lbs. Assuming every fact in favor of the NTSB/GE/Sikorsky simulations, N612AZ could have and did fly from H-44 until the No. 2 engine failed.

News Link (http://www.fdnntv.com/NTSB-Findings-Oregon-Helicopter-Crash)

[oleary]

SASless wrote,

Oleary,

Where are you getting your information about the improper overhaul at Columbia?

That's been around for some time.

While you at CHC were flying that bird at "Topping" all those forty thousand hours....were you still using standard Sikorsky TBO data based upon their initial flight testing for certification or did CHC modify that data to reflect all those hi-power settings and cycles and wear and tear from unusual forces caused by Logging and Water hauling? The aircraft TBO's on drivetrain and dynamic fatigue loaded parts are impacted by the power vs time at power spectrum as I am sure you are aware.

I never flew for CHC, I flew for Okanagan.

I never logged and did very little water bucketing.

At Okanagan when the engines were set at 140-2 Ng limits (and that was NOT for logging, it was at Edson) life was reduced accordingly.

Carson by the use of Plus Spec Power settings and higher weights and the use of 2.5 minute OEI power for takeoffs really loaded up the aircraft in that regard and some thought might be given to what effect that has on TBO's.

Don't know what Carson did, so I can't comment.

As you seem to say you at CHC operated the aircraft and had Topping issues....what techniques did you use to avoid "Topping Out"? Did you limit weights, abort takeoffs that caused you to go beyond the limits for Ng...or did you do as most Loggers do....carry all the weight you could even if it meant drooping some Nr so long as you could clear the barriers?

I said NOTHING about how CHC operates their aircraft - I NEVER FLEW FOR THEM.:ugh:

.... and again, I NEVER LOGGED!:ugh:

I posted the NTSB Report earlier if you want to review that and point out any errors you may think they made for us.

The veracity of that NTSB report has been contested before, and will be again, I expect.

Finally, to my original point, I don't need a number on a piece of paper to tell me whether or not I have enough power to take off from a confined area, ...

... not with a 204 (-11), 205 (-13), 212 (-3), 58T (-3) ----- or a 61.

[Shawn Coyle]

Nothing is ever mentioned about the machine being operated within the HV curve, which for a Part 29 helicopter with more than 9 passengers, is a limitation.
A limitation - something that is not permitted.
The rate of rotor RPM droop is also pretty consistent throughout, and also consistent with the rotor RPM droop in the previous takeoffs...

[SASless]

Oleary,

I thought Okanagan grew into CHC...or am I mistaken in thinking that.

You remind us the concern about the questionable overhaul has been around for sometime. Fine....but as I asked...what is the source for that conjecture....Happy Hour at a Tavern somewhere or some credible source.

So you never Logged....and did very little Water Bucket work....so may we assume you have a passenger hauling background with the 61 then....and it was done in very tightly controlled environments?

How did Okanagan calculate the TBO reductions when operating at the higher Ng....did they construct a Power Spectrum and conduct flight testing and other techniques to arrive a the revised TBO's? Or, did they over time recap component changes due to unscheduled replacement of parts and arrive at the TBO that way?

Tell us how Okanagan Procedures for 140-2 limits altered the performance charts so Pilots could calculate their Take Off performance and then adjust the aircraft's payload to account for the conditions extant at the time the flights were being made.

If you are aware of criticisms of this NTSB Report...tell us about them if you would.


Shawn,

Does the HV rules for a Part 29 aircraft apply to one being operated as a Public Use Aircraft as when this 61 was contracted to the US Forest Service? I think the NTSB discussed all that and pointed out some problems in the way the FAA/USFS systems were lacking.

I also thought about how the aircraft would perform OEI at the weights, heights, and Temps they normally do in Fire Operations. That would have been an interesting discussion by itself.

The 61 got the heave ho from the North Sea because it was considered under powered....particularly compared to the aircraft that replaced it at the big North Sea Operators and that was at Sea Level and much cooler temperatures.

[Jack Carson]

Height Velocity information is provided in either the emergency procedures or emergency performance charts sections of the flight manual not the limitations section. As such, it is provided as advisory information. I believe that HV information is not provided as rules for operation of the helicopter but rather as an advisory for those areas of the flight envelop to be avoided if at all possible.

[JimL]

Jack,

Shawn is absolutely correct - as an FAA policy letter explained some time ago. It is only advisory material for Part 27 helicopters

We may not like it (and in Europe at present it is alleviated) but that is a fact. It is alleviated for offshore operations and when taking off over water by FAR 91.9(d).

It has never been fully explained to me exactly how the take-off gradient -published in the AC 150/5390-2C - of 8:1 can be flown (other than in PC1) whilst staying outside the HV diagram. Double standards come to mind.

I have been reluctant to comment about this accident because performance and power management was so comprehensively flawed. At the very least, HOGE power should have been available.

From a distant memory, the reduction in TBO for the availability of 140-2 power limits are contained within the maintenance manual.

There should have been no doubt in anyone's mind that these were operations with exposure to an engine-failure (the probability of such being widely known); what perhaps the US Forestry Service didn't know was that, without HOGE being available, exposure was possible even with two engines operating.

The take-off power limits are quite clearly stated in the RFM - that these were exceeded routinely came as quite a shock to those of us who did not expect this in commercial operations.

Jim

[Thomas coupling]

So, for the purposes of clarity for onlookers in the industry, can I confirm the following:

There is an ENGINE issue, in that civvy CT58's have not been modded (fuel filters) in line with the mil mod done many many years ago. This is a KNOWN problem and no-one in the (civvy) industry has seen fit to elevate this issue?

There is an operator issue where Carson (allegedly) have fiddled the maths w.r.t. AUM and Take Off performance.

There is a conflict of interest within the investigating team (NTSB), who 'appear' to be derelict in their duty?

God help the victims family in trying to negotiate this cluster F*ck.

Are there S61's still flying around with these pre mod (C58) engines?
Are the company: Carson (re-incarnate) still operating? And if so, are they still up to their old tricks?

[SASless]

TC,
There is a conflict of interest within the investigating team (NTSB), who 'appear' to be derelict in their duty?

Can you tell us more about this "Conflict of Interest"?

Also, are you referring to the Mod that changes the 40 Micron filter to the 10 Micron filter?

[Lonewolf_50]

The Emergency Throttle for No. 2 was found in the partially opened position. Bill Coultas and a second eyewitness confirm that he was attempting to open the No. 2 Emergency Throttle after he saw the torque split on the gauges.

The only reason to do so was a concern by the flight crew with fuel.

The Emergency Throttles are gated and require significant force to move to an open position. Bill Coultas testified they lost power and noted the loss of
rotor speed before they hit any trees.
I don't understand the statement in bold. Resorting to emergency throttle in a T-58 engine doesn't strike me as something to do with fuel, it strikes me as something to do with power. (Well, that's how it was in H-2's when powered by the GE T-58-8F ... )

What am I missing here? :confused:
Did that statement mean to say "fuel flow to the engine" or something else?

I find interesting both the NTSB report, and the criticisms of same.

EDIT:
Apologies for any confusion. The quoted text I put in this post is from point number 9 in post #20 of this thread (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/364596-we-should-not-point-fingers.html#post7678483).

That post cited a number of criticisms of the NTSB report.
9) The sound spectrum analysis is the only "quantitative" data for the conclusion that the No. 2 engine had not failed. Absent this GE/Sikorsky analysis, all of the NTSB conclusions are speculation.
Objective facts supporting an engine issue include the No. 2 torque gauge found post accident with a "split" of 30% from No. 1.
The NTSB theorized this could be from a power loss but wiring schematics show this to be an A/C powered gauge that would have frozen with a sudden loss of power, not wound down.
Even if it had been a DC powered gauge, there would not have been a split: both gauges would have wound down to zero torque.
The Emergency Throttle for No. 2 was found in the partially opened position. Bill Coultas and a second eyewitness confirm that he was attempting to open the No. 2 Emergency Throttle after he saw the torque split on the gauges.
The only reason to do so was a concern by the flight crew with fuel.
The Emergency Throttles are gated and require significant force to move to an open position. Bill Coultas testified they lost power and noted the loss of rotor speed before they hit any trees.
I shortened it for the sake of brevity, since the point that had me interested is the activation of emergency throttle, the intent of which I assume (could be wrong) would be to get more power out of an engine during a power loss.

If in shortening the phrasing I changed the meaning I hang my head in shame. :O

[SASless]

I found this article that refers to four crashes of S-61's that have involved
Input Clutch failures and reports a survivor said he heard unusual noises that when described could point to a possible Clutch Failure.

A Clutch failure would explain a Torque Split and maybe the use of an Emergency Throttle.

The article says Sikorsky changed the TBO for the Clutch Units by half....from 1,000 hours to 500 hours and put in place a requirement to change the units after 7,500 lifts while logging or hauling water buckets.

NTSB releases documents related to crash that killed seven Oregon firefighters | OregonLive.com (http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/09/ntsb_release_initial_investiga.html)


Another article that talks about the NTSB Report and the conflict between the NTSB and the FAA. One of the things the FAA did not do was provide the NTSB information contained in letters written to the FAA by two Carson Pilots which reported Carson may have been intentionally providing false weight data. The FAA did not release the information until a year after the crash and only after the NTSB had asked for documents from all interested parties.

http://wildfiretoday.com/2010/12/08/summary-of-the-investigation-into-the-iron-44-fire-9-fatality-helicopter-crash/

[pilot and apprentice]

Shawn
Nothing is ever mentioned about the machine being operated within the HV curve, which for a Part 29 helicopter with more than 9 passengers, is a limitation.
A limitation - something that is not permitted.
The rate of rotor RPM droop is also pretty consistent throughout, and also consistent with the rotor RPM droop in the previous takeoffs...

from SK61L/N RFM, Category A H-V:
This curve does not apply to vertical operations or elevated heliport edge procedures...http://www.pprune.org/ ElEQVR4nO2925bkWnJj6///09UPpc7OTifNcFsMDxfmQ4+jHWYwAIyLc5eO6vWfUkoppZRSSim/n9dPGyillFJKKaWUEqBvd6WUUkoppZTyDfTtrpRSSimllFK+gb7dlVJKKaWU Uso30Le7UkoppZRSSvkG+nZXSimllFJKKd/A/3u7e438d+DP2I/5hZmzPObhK2+VUkoppZRSPpD/eSWYX+0Q/j9R/oUKWQFlNc8R/IvsyjqPt6FdXBOBi4JPwQNyi1XTLp644vCBlkoppZRSCsv/+4/jfP5HUfrQvK6Amppnt8TQUdYhMs96m0+zicAtxyRiwC8E12dvHTIM6h8KPp9 gV5xblAhV7N/KkaL+9vD3/8fPEvxOKKWUUsoDfNXbnWPbKjF0lLWHiAveBDWtn5TD1UCqkHNXDhkexFP2t CqC86kslAgrDuLIZq0G1bQ4qxlhS76VqmK9guyy+pGteBt+h6WUUu74nrc70 7beYO4uaw9Rlu3dGWBNrj59h6uBYCFH9U8YvlROeZMLPz3PZhFEWJ9aUbhs1 rCmdikoJ1rNZFec1KYr1qeQQthK1eL0sJo/5w1oerFBKXwlraKUn+Kh///u1h9vXzNlnujOhi0BNJA1CQqyPs/VOHP03AnxuGbQm1M4NX+i7WzJ75qpokDZoG1H6mX/usCjxZu0Ym9XglLBroatYC3Bkk88MqQEqm1KRHso1K5mQCPVxqE+td1Sfh35 f/15uSisvIA/CazV7O+LQe1vTWQGLCHV27ssmEXwGbkOGkNwbs1HDynHNbP25MKp+QfajgtG 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Category B H-V:
4. When conducting Category "B" rotorcraft external load operations, this curve does not constitute a limitation.

the question would be, is the operation in question in line with an exemption? I would have to think about the answer and do a little research.

SAS asks about public use, which is a US regulatory issue I am unfamiliar with.

SAS:
Oleary,

I thought Okanagan grew into CHC...or am I mistaken in thinking that.
Yes. Okanagan was combined with Ranger and Sealand when bought which created Canadian Helicopters, eventually to evolve into CHC (which is no longer Canadian at all). I haven't met many Okkie guys who thought it was a good thing.

Gordy, the 15 points you quoted are interesting, but again they come from a lawyer, and show similar unfamiliarity with the 61 that the NTSB report did.

I went back to look at the CVR transcript and see no indication whatsoever from either pilot that there was a tourque split or that either of them was initiating emergency throttle usage. As far as the red handle being difficult to move, it gets bumped out of the detent easily and could easily be moved in a crash sequence.

This is an old airframe, there are no computers controlling the engines. When the engine is topped, the fuel flow is physically limited to provide maximum OEI (topped Ng) power and no more. If an engine fails, one need not limit the use of the remaining engine with collective, as it has already been 'topped' and one can just fly the Nr.

Using topping (OEI power) should not be normal practice for take-off just like pulling to the tourque limiter in a 212 should not be done.

[pilot and apprentice]

Even if it had been a DC powered gauge, there would not have been a split: both gauges would have wound down to zero torque. It's a 61, the Q's are only matched if the pilot does it. Pushing both throttles full forward to use topping will only in rare cases give a matched Q.

edited to add: all these 'reports' appear to be speculative efforts to muddy the issue

[Thomas coupling]

SASless: conflict of interest because the wife of the NTSB investigator was responsible for the security of the parts (that have gone missing).
Secondly the Materials report caused the NTSB to shift the investigation to the paperwork discrepancies (Carson) and away from the engine fuel control issue (and the missing parts). Don't you think the NTSB were getting hot under the collar about these (missing) parts?

The mod that changed the 40 micron to the 6 micron filter undertaken by the mil appears 'not' to have been undertaken by this operator on these engines?

Have the fuel control modules/units for these engines ever been found or stripped and investigated??

[Gordy]

Gordy, the 15 points you quoted are interesting, but again they come from a lawyer, and show similar unfamiliarity with the 61 that the NTSB report did.

The points were not made by the attorney---he just spoke the words.

The families, through Anderson, would like to make the following facts public:

[Lonewolf_50]

The NTSB report is sobering.

Thought on working at the margins of performance. While the report raises a delicate point about "winds light and variable" that influenced the HH-60 crash and may have in some ways influenced this mishap, my memory has caused me to ponder a different point. (Not gonna chase the 10 micron filters down the rabbit hole ...)

Some years ago, when I flew two engine helicopters, and did training flights doing external loads, confined area landings, and max performance takeoffs, we always had to do the following before attempting any of the maneuvers that might get us close to the margins. There were even a few actual missions I flew from the deck of a ship, fully loaded on hot days with no wind, where we did some performance checks on deck and then called up to the bridge to ask for more speed so I'd be able to take off. (The bickering with ship drivers I won't get into)

To find out what we had actually avaialable, we'd put one engine in idle, pull until two percent droop with the other engine. Record Torque and Ng. Return engine to fly. Do the same for the other engine. Took very little time. You thus had, in situ, a known performance benchmark of how much power you had available.

You also compared that to what you computed pre flight. The delta was sometimes instructive.

Anyway, I may have missed it in the report, but that little check, or something very similar, may or may not be a standard check for that company that crews do before take off when you are doing confined area landings in the environment these gents were flying in.

@ pilot and apprentice: thanks for your points on Emergency fuel control, and a few other points.

[SASless]

A simple Hover Power Check should have prevented this accident as would have using the British style Confined Area Takeoff technique of ascending to the necessary height to clear your barriers THEN translating forward. The Crew being US Army trained and checked by FAA/USFS pilots whose organizations use the same techniques as do the US Military (thinking US Army) actually, uses a different technique of a forward acceleration climbing to clear the barriers by the same safe margin the British do.....the difference is using the British method allows you to discover you do not have the necessary power while still over your takeoff point. As this was from a ridge line with some trees in the takeoff path despite the ground steeply dropping away.

The LZ was dusty, and had been watered down between the first and last flights, which may have played a role in the decision not to do the Hover Check first.

A Torque split with both engines at Topping would normally produce a Split in Torque indications as previously noted by others. As the CVR transcript did not mention any comment about a split and the CVR analysis did not mention any decrease in Engine or Transmission sounds that would indicate any kind of engine malfunction that would have resulted in Tonal or Frequency changes, we have to assume the Engines were operating normally as did the NTSB.

[Lonewolf_50]

SASless, at the risk of speculation and getting chewed out by those who know the pilots and the S-61 better than I do ...

If you can't hover (HOGE), you'll droop as you try to get to that high hover, so you then descend back down to your spot. Dump some payload, try again? :confused:

That's the essence of the British technique you mentioned, right?

I won't comment on how the Army trains helo pilots. I do know that a max performance takeoff from a confined area required you to be clear of obstacles before attempting transition to fwd flight. It was certainly a crew coordination drill, with C/P calling torques and crewman calling clearance.

What you seem to suggest happened is (and after I looked at the picture of the crash site, I surely scratched my head a bit) that the crew tried to get some lifties from forward motion, out of ground effect, before they were clear of the tree tops.

Do I read you correctly?

[SASless]

We do not know what the Crew's thoughts were or perhaps can know exactly what kind of profile they had in mind.

The takeoff point was a ridge line, dusty, LZ with sloping ground before them but with some trees as barriers. We might be able to figure out how high the trees were and that kind of thing by going back to the NTSB Report where they plotted the impact height on the tree and all that data.

You are exactly correct when you state....if you run out of power...and the Nr Droops ....and you have not rotated forward....rejecting the take off is easy....that being a vertical descent back to your takeoff position that is still right under you.

We also know that a Takeoff from the ground provides better performance as compared to a take off started from a Hover.

The CVR recordings seem to indicate that is the profile used....that being a Take off from the Ground with no Hover Power Check done beyond considering weight and balance data, OAT, and recollection of the previous two takeoffs from the first two sorties from that site.

If that is the case...no actual hovering of the aircraft to confirm what power the aircraft was demanding and what reserve was available...then in my view the Crew made a fatal mistake that day.

To be fair....one would really need to be in the cockpit...and seeing what lay before the crew to fully grasp the situation. Just how high were the barriers, how steep was the decline in terrain, did they think they would be able to trade height for airspeed as is done from a ridge line if there is sufficient terrain clearance, and all those considerations.

It is a dead certain fact....If you do not do a Hover Power Check which allows you to confirm handling and power....you have no chance to actually confirm the performance of the aircraft. Old Pilots get that way by being careful in how they go about their business and a hover check is the very insurance one can have. Guessing wrong can prove to be a serious problem.

As they drooped Nr on the earlier takeoffs, that should have been a clue.

I firmly beleive that over time they had become used to seeing some droop on takeoffs especially if the company had the culture it did about using over spec engines as an excuse to carry more weight. Add in the crew being unaware of the bogus Weight data provided by the company and compounded by the false performance data as well. I see them falling into a trap.

They should have been doing a Hover Power check for each takeoff as a good safety habit.

Let's open up another bucket of worms about the FAA and USFS mindsets.

Should the Industry and the USFS and FAA start using Restricted Weights in consideration of OEI operations should an engine fail?

What kind of performance would this passenger carrying aircraft have had if it had experienced an engine failure during the take off, cruise, and landing? Is the FAA supposed to require Large Helicopters to operate in compliance with Part 29 performance standards?

Right now....if those large aircraft hauling passengers are not doing so....are they in violation of Part 29?

Does Safety for the Passengers not mandate they do?

[pilot and apprentice]

Quote:
Gordy, the 15 points you quoted are interesting, but again they come from a lawyer, and show similar unfamiliarity with the 61 that the NTSB report did.
The points were not made by the attorney---he just spoke the words.

Quote:
Quote:
The families, through Anderson, would like to make the following facts public: Still nothing to indicate they were originated, credited, whatever, to someone who knows, really knows, what they are talking about. More like a layman paraphrasing what they heard an industry insider talk about.
=================
SAS,
Should the Industry and the USFS and FAA start using Restricted Weights in consideration of OEI operations should an engine fail?
I am having trouble opening the report so I can't confirm but I remember reading that the USFS was using a calculated max weight reduction as the safety margin, rather than OEI stay-up.
=================
Regarding droop in the 61: the Nr in the 61 isn't static or rigidly governed. It is controlled by the non-flying pilot (as is Q matching) by manipulating the throttles. In a normal t/o the throttles are full forward, or full forward then Q's matched. Nr will reduce as power required increases. Ng, Q and T5 must be observed to prevent exceeding limits. If the pilot does not restrict his power demands the engine will continue to match them until topping is reached.

Again, progressive droop is normal. Exceeding limits is not. Sorry for repeating so much info but I wanted the explanation to be clear.
=================
Thanks Lonewolf.
=================
BTW: The 61 is an elegant old girl. My favorite (perhaps because i missed my chance at a tandem :-) )

[JohnDixson]

Just a note about this:

Topping on this engine is an Ng limit mechanical adjustment. The maintenance test pilot and crew make an adjustment using the NG topping screw to result in a T5 of 721-727 as I recall the topping T5 limit range for 2.5 min power.

At the conditions existant for this accident, neither the NG physical limit nor the torque value limit would have been reached before reaching the T5 limit.

Thus when lifting to a hover, the pilot can get a good idea of his margin by looking at T5 and seeing how much margin he has between where the T5 is, and the 721 number. He knows that at 721, increasing collective produces no more power, and only results in Nr droop.

I do recall some ambient condition rules whereby if the operating area conditions change by so much ( altitude/temperature ) then maintenance should recheck/ reset topping, but if I recall the accident report, engine topping had been checked fairly recently.

[SASless]

When we talk Nr droop here....we are concerned with droop below Normal Nr operating RPM are we not. The Normal droop seen is not the issue...but rather abnormal droop below the Minimum Power On Nr limit is what matters.

[pilot and apprentice]

Agreed SAS, but some comments from other posters led me to believe that they were not aware how much different it is flying the 61 as opposed to a more modern twin. There is no one number that the Nr is expected to be sitting at on its own.

John: 721 C (-1) or 758 C (-2) are the maximum 2 1/2 minute T5's, so yes, all basically correct except the topping is achieved by limiting Ng. T5 and Q limits must not be exceeded when Ng is topped. During the check 2% Nr droop with the Ng steady at the limit (102.3/103.4) is used.

I disagree a little with the comment:He knows that at 721, increasing collective produces no more power, and only results in Nr droop.If the Ng hasn't topped yet (102.3/103.4 Ng), it will still spool up and provide more power, but the engine has been using in excess of t/o (5 min) power since passing 696 C and 100 Ng.

Again, the report won't open for me right now but I recall both Ng's were steady at 102 (102.3...???) as the Nr drooped. No T5 calls were made so we don't know.

[JohnDixson]

P&A,

I was referring to how the maintenance test pilot or the SA production test pilot would check and adjust topping. In temperate/warm conditions, the Ng adjustment was set so that the Ng limiter would result in reaching and not exceeding the limit T5. The engine would then limit at an Ng that would result in the limit T5, which would, in those conditions, be less than the limit Ng number for 2.5 min power.

It had to be extremely cold for that engine to reach the Ng limiter ( i.e., the posted Ng 2.5 minute limit ) prior to reaching the T5 limit.

Some 61's had remote topping adjustments built in, accessible from the cabin ceiling area, but I cannot recall if the commercial models were so equipped. Sure made this task easier.

[SASless]

John,

Short version of what you are saying....Topping should be done for the normal conditions the aircraft is going to be operated in....Altitude, OAT?

Meaning to me.....a machine at say Newfoundland working offshore to the rigs from a sea level heliport in the Winter time would have a different setting say as for an aircraft working in the mountains of California in the summer....say 5,000 feet and +25 OAT.

Am I right in what I think you are saying?

[JohnDixson]

SAS, you are correct.

Remember, the technology utilized in this generation* of GE turboshaft engines is designed so that one is setting up the engine to limit itself to a given T5, by means of setting an adjustment on the mechanical Ng flywheel governor limiter.

This hydro-mechanical control incorporated sensors for both altitude and temperature, and these acted thru levers to adjust fuel flow, but there was a finite range within which an Ng limiter setting would ensure that the resultant Ng value would then result in the T5 limit.

* the USN version of the T-58 which has an analog electrical control superimposed on the hydro- mechanical control ( was called PMS, for Power Management System ), actually controlled engine limiting by measuring and limiting to, rated T5. I forget the dash number of this T-58, but I certainly recall that the reliability of this, GE's first shot at electronic engine control, was such that the USN insisted on installing a PMS OFF switch on the cyclic. Can't blame the USN aviators: 50% of their flying was at night, max altitude 150 ft, multiple approaches to sonar dip points, time spent in an IFR hover etc etc., an environment wherein any uncommanded shenanigans by the engines is really unneeded.

[SASless]

Night IMC Hovering over the Sea....now that would be great fun....riding the SONAR Hobby Horse!

[JohnDixson]

SAS, see a PM on a related past event, but unrelated to the subject at hand.

[John Eacott]

Night IMC Hovering over the Sea....now that would be great fun....riding the SONAR Hobby Horse!

Easy: just took two pilots to press the 'down' or the 'up' button and try not to fall asleep :p

[Jack Carson]

I don’t know if this applies to the T-58 but the GE-T-64 had a similar remote topping adjustment. For the reasons discussed in this thread NAVAIRSYSCOM and Sikorsky decided to eliminate the requirement for remote topping adjustments on the T-64 sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s. The adjustment knob on the fuel control was rotated to its maximum adjustment position thus requiring the pilots to closely monitor the limitations when operating at maximum power. In, the fuel control incorporated a mechanical flywheel type governor that limited the maximum Ng to 102.5%. This flywheel governor was removed on the latest 419 series of engine allowing the engine to achieve maximum absolute power (5000 ESHP) during OEI situations. Ngs greater than 102.5 were considered a one time event thus requiring engine removal once these extreme power levels were utilized.

[pilot and apprentice]

John:
Some 61's had remote topping adjustments built in, accessible from the cabin ceiling area, but I cannot recall if the commercial models were so equipped. Sure made this task easier. Yes they are equipped. I was doing this as recently as this past summer and referred back to the company SOP we were using (140-2).

Even in extremely hot environments we would achieve topping with T5 margins (choosing an appropriate test flt altitude).

I believe from your notes above that your experience is on the Sea King. I am unsure which engine variant you are talking about, as it may explain our different experiences.

[SASless]

P and A.....what is your take on the NTSB Report re Engine Topping procedures being used by the Operator for Iron 44's operations (considering Altitude/OAT)?

Which parameter would the Crew have used to limit power that day...T5, Ng, Q? Which limit would they have hit first?

[JohnDixson]

P and A,

I think the 140-2 was the last iteration of commercial T-58's that we saw. And your note does bring to mind that there was some difference in setting up topping on those engines, which in all honesty I can't recall, thus I am sure you are correct. During my time at SA, I had a chance to fly the SH-3A,D,G,H. CH/HH-3C,E. S-61L,N. S-61R, S-67. RH-3A ( minesweeper ). VH-3A,D. HH-3F ( USCG ).

The report didn't say which version were installed in the accident machine, and I am guessing that you are saying they had 140-2's?

[pilot and apprentice]

John,
I have had trouble getting into the report to verify but I recall the Ng's were reported as topped at 102%. 102.3% Ng is the target for topping the 140-1. I am sure it would be in there.
I have been explaining the 61 in general as much as talking about this incident. I am envious of your experience! Learning the in's and out's of a new type is one of the few things I really enjoy about this business.

SAS,
I would expect that the Ng and T5 would be reached at close to the same time for -2, unsure right now what they were using.

[oleary]

140-1 and 140-2 are the same engine and fuel control, just set to higher Ng limits.

To set Ng topping we simply climbed (standard lapse rate with spec engine would put you at ~ 8000) until we could get Ng topping (2% droop) without exceeding (696) T5 limits.

Also, normal T/O power doesn't change bewteen -1 and -2 limits, you just have more power available OEI.

Whether you to will hit the Ng or T5 limit first would depend on how the engine was built. You can "trade" Ng for T5 on overhaul. In this case, it is likely he hit T5 first.

[pilot and apprentice]

Finally opened the report (computers :mad:).

The report doesn't specify but some details indicate -1's installed.

I agree O'Leary.

[oleary]

Yeah, there has been confusion about this for a long time.

A chap who went on to become one of Okie's C/P's and I had an uhmmm, ... strong debate about it.:p He insisted we could use 721 and 102.3 for T/O with both engines operating. My take from the GE manual was 696 and 100.

Where -2 really helped us was if we lost a donk.

And loggers? Well, they are .... loggers - after all :ugh:

[pilot and apprentice]

I've been in that debate.....the RFM seems clear to me that t/o power is 100%/696C/103Q.

All I can say is...there are more outs with a jettisonable cargo.

[oleary]

I agree.

I have always taken the position that the customer was paying for one of 4 limits: 696 T5/100 Ng/103Q or max weight (20,500 internal and 22,000 external) But sometimes when night (IFR? :uhoh:) slinging in the Arctic keeping to 22K lbs was a bit of a battle ;)

And I tried to apply the same conceptual limits to all the other rockets I flew, as well.

[Lonewolf_50]

The CVR recordings seem to indicate that is the profile used....that being a Take off from the Ground with no Hover Power Check done beyond considering weight and balance data, OAT, and recollection of the previous two takeoffs from the first two sorties from that site.
But with less fuel on board ...
If that is the case...no actual hovering of the aircraft to confirm what power the aircraft was demanding and what reserve was available...then in my view the Crew made a fatal mistake that day.
My thinking was in that direction as well, from what I gleaned from the NTSB report.

Add in the crew being unaware of the bogus Weight data provided by the company and compounded by the false performance data as well. I see them falling into a trap.
Plenty of holes in this block of cheese. The USN mishap report formula used to have a category of finding called "supervisory error" that I believe is smeared all over this accident. :mad:

They should have been doing a Hover Power check for each takeoff as a good safety habit.Yeah. It doesn't take that long, and it tells you what your bird is doing that day in that locaiton. If it varies significantly from your preflight calc, flags begin to go off.

[Brian Abraham]

http://www.ainalerts.com/AINsafety/021813.html

Jury Indicts Two in Helicopter Accident
Two former Carson Helicopter Services executives, Steven Metheny and Levi Phillips, were indicted by a federal grand jury February 1 for “endangering the safety of flight” by falsifying aircraft documents, including weight-and-balance and performance charts on a Sikorsky S-61N helicopter owned and operated by the company. The helicopter crashed in December 2008 while performing firefighting duties for the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). Nine of 13 people aboard were killed in the crash, while four others received serious injuries. Metheny was a former vice president of Carson, and Phillips was the former director of maintenance and reported directly to Metheny. Both were charged with conspiracy to defraud the USFS involving contracts awarded to Carson in 2008. Metheny was also charged with mail and wire fraud, making false statements to the USFS, endangering the safety of aircraft in flight and theft from an interstate shipment.

[Lonewolf_50]

Accountability. This may be quick, a plea deal, or long and drawn out.

For John D, and the variations on the T-58's in use by the USN.

I seem to recall that the SH-3's were powered by the T-58 Dash 10 engines (-10), while the H-2's I flew were powered by the Dash 8 (-8) and the CH-46 by the Dash 16. (-16) ... but my memory may be screwing this up.

[oleary]

Lonewolf,

FYI, the accident aircraft was a SK 61N not an H-3.

[Lonewolf_50]

I am fully aware of that, oleary.

I was following up on a point John D was making about the SH-3's, topping, and the engines the USN had equipped on that family of variants (USN's various H-3's) of the S-61.

[SASless]

Rest assured....one of the two guys is being offered a Plea Bargain in order to get his cooperation against the other. The Feds always look for a way to win a conviction and the best way is to get one or more of the Indicted to go for a Plea Bargain. They generally try for those that were not the Prime Actors and who can benefit from reduced sentencing without the Government giving up more serious charges against the Prime Actor(s). Granted, if there is information that points to a larger involvement and particularly if it goes across to someone within the Government....then perhaps they will be more likely to offer Plea Bargains with the intent to cast a larger net.

No Idea if that has been done here....but it is a standard practice within the DOJ and other agencies.

[HeliTester]

SAS,

Are you suggesting that someone within the Government might be complicit? Like the Aviation Authority that approved the bogus Flight Manual data?

HT

[oleary]

Helitester,

What "bogus" Flight Manual data?

[HeliTester]

oleary,

Brian Abraham wrote:

Two former Carson Helicopter Services executives, Steven Metheny and Levi Phillips, were indicted by a federal grand jury February 1 for “endangering the safety of flight” by falsifying aircraft documents, including weight-and-balance and performance charts on a Sikorsky S-61N helicopter owned and operated by the company.
I assume that the falsified performance charts were included in the Flight Manual. Perhaps "bogus" Flight Manual data was a poor word choice, and I should have said "falsified" Flight Manual Data.

HT

[oleary]

Helitester,

Your assumption is incorrect.

[SASless]

HT.....I am not.

What I am suggesting is that in the event the Feds do have any information that "others" of any description are involved....they will pursue those investigative leads.

The most effective means of doing that....is gaining the cooperation of the "small fish" in order to catch "big fish". That is a standard tactic.


The other thing to be remembered here folks.....Gaining an Indictment by a Grand Jury does not mean the accused are guilty. The famous saying of "A Prosecutor can get a Grand Jury to indict a Ham Sandwich!" holds true.

In the Grand Jury proceeding....only the Prosecutor calls witnesses and presents evidence so the Jury does not get to hear much in the way of information that shows an Accused to be innocent.

Before you pass judgement on the two accused by the Grand Jury.....wait for the legal proceedings to be completed.

It would be interesting if the Federal Prosecutor looked a bit further afield and see where that line of inquiry took him as I would suspect there are some other operators that might bear scrutiny when it comes to weighing of aircraft.

[HeliTester]

oleary,

You said I was incorrect in my assumption that the falsified performance charts were included in the Flight Manual. If they were not included in the Flight Manual then where did they reside, and how were they made available for mission planning?

HT

[pilot and apprentice]

HT, a good start would be to read this entire thread, and then the NTSB report.

Asking us to do your research for you.....?

[oleary]

Thank you, P&A, for your common sense and obvious 61 knowledge.

Helitester, two points:

(1) The approved Sikorsky RFM and/or its supplements where not affected (or amended) by the alleged manipulation of weights.

(2) Basic Helicopter Flying 101. Regardless of what the damn charts say, if I am flying a Bell 47 and attempt a vertical take off (which this was) from a confined area without sufficient power I simply come back (usually involuntarily!) to a IGE hover - then I land and boot somebody out. I also use the same procedure in the 61 and all the other a/c I fly.

Mission planning is all well and good and I strongly encouraged it when I was a CP, but in the final analysis, any pilot who needs a damned piece of paper to tell him whether or not he has enough power to conduct a takeoff in any particular situation (considering downflow, obstacles, high temp, turbulence, etc) should not have a licence in the first place!:ugh:

Finally, I have over 3000 hours in this very aircraft and it saddens me no end to see her end her life with such acrimony.

[HeliTester]

Pilot and apprentice, and oleary....Your criticism of me for not doing my homework is valid. While I had been following this entire thread, I admit that I had not read the NTSB report. From Section 2.2 of the report it is clear where the falsified performance data came from, where they reside, and how they came to be used used in mission planning. As I previously mentioned to SAS, I was concerned that the falsified data might have somehow become FAA approved.

[oleary]

Helitester,

No worries, mate!

I clearly understand that your interest in this accident is in no way vindictive.

[Shawn Coyle]

Has anyone commented on the fact that the helicopter was placed in the avoid area of the H-V curve? For this helicopter with this many people on board the H-V curve is a limitation, not a performance item?

[pilot and apprentice]

Like he said, no worries.

It's all about learning to prevent it happening again

[Thomas coupling]

Shawn was this flight under Part 27 or 29? If the former - advisory only???

[SASless]

Performance Categories is not something the FAA, USFS, NTSB, or American Helicopter Industry care to get involved in....as evidenced by history and the absolute lack of discussion of the subject.

If we did....think about the impact that would have on the way we do business on a daily basis!

Those passengers sitting in Iron 44 that day were just Self Loading, Talking Ballast.

Remember there was a USFS Check Airman onboard the aircraft during the operation and he saw nothing wrong in the way those flights were being planned, conducted, or monitored. He was not typed rated in the 61 either.

[Thomas coupling]

Saya it all really:ugh: Thanks SAS

[Shawn Coyle]

Thomascoupling:
I'm surprised at your question - the S-61 helicopter is certified under Part 29 - what other part of the FARs are used for operating rules (or the operating rules used other countries) is immaterial. Part 29 covers the airworthiness of the helicopter. And that's regardless of whether it's used by the government or the paying public.
The only minor differences might be whether it has passenger seats in it or not - if it has more than 9 passenger seats fitted, it has to be operated with the H-V curve as a limitation. Simple as that.
Then again, I'm not surprised by the lack of understanding of this aspect within the helicopter world.
A good comparison from the FW world would be - let's load our 747 with passengers, cargo and fuel and see whether we can get it airborne in that length of runway - who needs weight-altitude-temperature (WAT) charts? Engine failure partway down the runway? Why worry about that?
How long do you think the authorities would sit still for that way of thinking?

[oleary]

Shawn,

When fire-fighting you are not operating under Part 29. Think of 702 vs 703/4 in Canada.

And I'll leave the fact that you can sucessfully land/autorotate, m/e or s/e, from any point in the H-V curve, the fact that some helicopters have this chart in the "Limitations Section" but some have in the "Performance Section", and the requirement for a "smooth, level, hard surface", ... etc for another day.

[JohnDixson]

Part 29 machines do not to my experience, publish multi-engine H-V diagrams, only the loss of one engine H-V.

[Shawn Coyle]

oleary:
In an S-61, you're always certified under Part 29. The configuration (>9 passengers) will determine whether you have to obey the limitation of the H-V curve or not. It's like any other limitation in the flight manual.
Whether you are fire-fighting or carrying passengers, you have to obey the limits in the flight manual, at least in any country I've ever heard of.

[Thomas coupling]

Shawn - at the time of me writing the previous post I was under the impression that the firefighting/logging purpose of the aircraft meant the seats had been taken out and it was being used as a van. I understand now that it had up to 16 seats fitted in it...apologies.
But still the NTSB report makes absolutely no reference whatsoever to the H/V curve. Why is that then?

[HeliTester]

Shawn,

Earlier in the discussion you and SASless (and others) discussed operation within the H-V curve. Once again you correctly point out that In an S-61, you're always certified under Part 29. The configuration (>9 passengers) will determine whether you have to obey the limitation of the H-V curve or not. It's like any other limitation in the flight manual.
Section 1.6.33 (p-24) of the NTSB report indirectly addresses limits when it states In an April 26, 2010, memorandum, the FAA responded to a request from NTSB investigators for clarification as to whether the use of performance charts contained in RFMS #8 was appropriate when no external load was being carried. The memorandum noted that, because the helicopter was being operated as a public aircraft, it was not subject to 14 CFR 91.9(a), which states that “no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual.” However, if the helicopter had been operated as a civil aircraft, “use of the performance figures in RFMS [#8] for maximum gross weight calculations when no external-load was being carried would be contrary to the limitations contained in the RFMS, and therefore contrary to 14 C.F.R. § 91.9(a).In addition, Section 1.18.6 (p-82) states Both the USFS and the DOI conduct firefighting flights on behalf of the U.S. Government. Aircraft conducting these flights are considered to be public aircraft, which are exempt from many FAA regulations applicable to civil aircraft.
What am I missing here? Public Use Aircraft can’t possibly be exempted from all Operating Limits. If they are exempted from certain limits, then who grants those exemptions?

HT

[Gordy]

Public Use Aircraft can’t possibly be exempted from Operating Limits.

Yes indeedy they can. This is an excerpt taken directly from the current draft of AC 00-1.1A on Public Aircraft Operations:

g. Which Regulations in 14 CFR Do Not Apply to PAOs? In general, regulations that include the term “civil aircraft” in their applicability do not apply to PAOs (i.e., part 91 § 91.7, Civil Aircraft Airworthiness).

See Here (http://www.rotor.com/rotornews/Feb12/PublicAircraftCircular.pdf)

Tis is a huge mess. Basically after the Carson accident everyone pointed fingers away from themselves, including the FAA. Nobody really knew who had oversight. It is still being worked out now. I just got yet more contract modifications with respect to Public Use Status.

Basically as of right now, we would inform our FAA office that we "may" be required to operate "public use". The forest service would then determine at the beginning of a flight if it fell under public or civil use. If under public, then they would assume oversight until they release us back to "civil" at the end of the flight. The FAA would have NO oversight during the flight, or until we were released again. The USFS has agreed they will issue the "public use declaration" for each flight, and have no problem doing so. The Dept. of Interior however, do not agree with the USFS and have only issued the declaration one time that they have admitted to.

So......there I am on a National Park fire, and they will not issue the declaration---I am not able to carry their firefighterws with their tools to the fire. Conversely, if I am carrying USFS firefighters, (exact same uniform etc) I can do it.

The whole thing is a mess with too many different agencies trying to maintain control. For once I praise the FAA and USFS who are both being pro-active and trying to sort this out.

Let us not forget....it is a miracle that anyone got out of this aircraft;

http://i76.photobucket.com/albums/j35/helokat/Helo-general/IMG_3579_zps417a2776.jpg

[Shawn Coyle]

Godry et al:
A real mess!!!
Somewhere, someone must have dictated that some limitations must be followed. Please tell me that is at least true...
Otherwise, I think the government is leaving themselves open for a real mess.

[SASless]

The Government is a Mess.....and we all know that.

As usual....every agency wants to do it their own way.

The best thing that could happen would be for a single Federal Agency be designated as the aircraft Lease Control Agent, and all the various agencies have to go to that single agency with their demand for aircraft. That way the Operators would have a single standard to meet and only one contracting office to deal with.

If that agency adopted the most strict standard used by any/all of the mulitiple agencies....Safety would be very much enhanced.

The Killer to the idea is when the other agencies had to start paying the Aircraft Agency for its Administrative Costs.....the Bureaucrats would rebel!

[Gordy]

Somewhere, someone must have dictated that some limitations must be followed. Please tell me that is at least true...

I do NOT KNOW of anyone who exceeded the limits of the aircraft. Or anyone in fire who advocates doing so.

As for the H/V diagram being in the limitations section---I cannot comment on that as I do not know. I will say that the departure did not look like a confined area departure. All of the take offs I did form the same spot were normal airspeed over altitude..... I will go back and see if I can find more pictures from the LZ itself.

[Thomas coupling]

Can someone confirm then whether the a/c was operating inside the H/V curve at the time of the accident (whether it was advisory or a limitation).

Secondly, why isn't the FAA the place where the buck stops?
What is so difficult for the FAA to certify all flights and place them into certain categories? Public/private/aerial etc.

A flight manual description of the H/V curve affects the flying performance of the aeroplane. The aeroplane doesn't know or care it is public or private flight??? It doesn't know or care it is advisory or mandatory. If the fan(s) stops inside the H/V curve you will suffer the consequences - given certain conditions.

[500guy]

Thomas,
You are correct that the airplane does not care, but the people do. The FAA has made clear in the case of class B HEC just as public use that risk is relative.

Essentially, it is too much risk to expose paying passengers for hire unbeknownst to them, but not so dangerous as to disallow trained persons who accept the risk in the course of an effort to perform such critical duties.

Give it the common sense test. Is it realistic to pull firefighters out of the northern california forrests without entering the HV curve, Nope. The only thing they could have done differently in that regard is limit the aircraft to 9 seats.

[Jack Carson]

500guy makes a very good point.
“Give it the common sense test. Is it realistic to pull firefighters out of the northern California forests without entering the HV curve, Nope. The only thing they could have done differently in that regard is limit the aircraft to 9 seats.”

Are we confusing HV curve avoidance with Cat A type operations? Once the helicopter departs an area with a smooth hard surface most capabilities for an emergency autorotative or OEI landing are dramatically reduced or eliminated. Unless the helicopter is operated in these remote areas at a weight that allows for an OEI fly away it will always be at risk of having no choice but to land without regard to the local terrain.

[Brian Abraham]

Are we confusing HV curve avoidance with Cat A type operationsDon't think so Jack. What is being mentioned is that the H-V curve for the aircraft is a flight manual limitation, whereas for others it's put in the flight manual only as advisory information ie not a limitation. It seem from the discussion that the H-V limitation is not applicable to public use aircraft.

[Shawn Coyle]

My reading of the NTSB report is that the crew were in fact, exceeding limitations. On all of the takeoffs from the crash site helipad, they were using 2.5 minute OEI (and co-incidentally, topping) N1 limits (the rotor was drooping at a constant N1, which would only happen when the compressor can't turn any faster.
Takeoffs at lower altitudes did not result in rotor RPM droop.
If that's not exceeding a limit, I don't know what it's called.