should we discuss fatal accidents?

[Pace]

The accident involving the Piper PA28 crashing in Ireland and the discussion about it in pprune was locked.

I have mixed feelings on this for the following reasons. Firstly I have lost five friends to flying so am not cut off from the feelings of relatives and pre judging the reasons for these crashes.

The prominant crash of the Citation from Biggin hill which went down into houses was very close to home. Why?

Because I actually flew that very citation before she was sold and flew in another citation with the Captain a few years ago who was killed in the crash of that jet.

Being so close to home and because I fly an identical 500 I wanted to know what would bring down a Citation with a competant pilot with what appeared to be a power loss.

It will probably be over a year until the investigators come up with their conclusions which may not be conclusive.

We are a pilot forum and going such a long time before the accident investigators come up with a conclusion means that we are in the dark for a long time.

Regarding the PA28 crash in Ireland for all we know the pilot may have had a fatal heart attack which caused the crash, but there were other signs around the flight which could be used to warn other pilots of certain possible dangers even if they were not the reasons for the tradgedy and for me discussing and disecting the possibilities can only be good.

Therefore I feel that pilots should explore the posssibilities because even if the truth is not arrrived at or certain theories are classed as speculatitve certain lessons can be learnt that may stop another pilot from going a simular way next week not after the conclusions are posted a year hence by the AAIB.

So what is the lesser of two evils in a PILOT forum. Say nothing other than offering condolences or pick what we have to pieces even if its speculative but highlights certain dangers to other pilots and makes them think?
I am sure we are all able at weeding out the trash and noting the relevant bits :)

I am not talking about the minority who get a kick from some one elses misery but using these accidents as a possible lesson and accident avoidance even if a year before the AAIB release the official conclusions.

One life saved has to be worth it?

What do you think?

Pace

[BRL]

If you have a look you will see the thread is now open.

You lot can discuss any incident until the cows come home.

What I don't agree with is the way that thread quickly panned out. People were killed and you lot were throwing mud at each other when the bodies had hardly even been identified. No respect whatsoever. I don't want to see that again in our forum.

Condolences on one thread, talking about how situations (incidents) happen on another.

[Pace]

You lot can discuss any incident until the cows come home.

What I don't agree with is the way that thread quickly panned out. People were killed and you lot were throwing mud at each other when the bodies had hardly even been identified. No respect whatsoever. I don't want to see that again in our forum.

But this is a pilots forum and as such any pilot could be the next accident statistic so anything but anything which comes from these threads which touches a chord and avoides another occurence by making people think even after a stupid post has to be positive?

Its not hard to ignore the mud throwing and pick up the bits which have a lesson.

Pace

[Pilot DAR]

I had mentioned on my thread on this theme, that in the case where an immediate safety concern is quickly identified following an action, and it is appropriate to get the infomation out to the industry fast, there is a mechanizm - the emergency AD, and it certainly gets used.

Other than that, we pilots already know all of the reasons planes crash. If it's a new reason, we'll find out fast, If it's an old reason again, we'll find out again. Stirring up emotions on top of it, at such an early phase following the event, is much more self serving in a bunch of pilots yammering on with no good cause. The learning form the mistakes can happen equally well later. It's the same lesson as before, just a different location and registration.

On the other hand, if we're talking a non-injury "look what that silly pilot did" situation, I feel differently - Learning can happen sooner!

Pilot DAR

[mark sicknote]

Learn from the mistakes of others. You won't live long enough to learn them all yourself. That what makes this forum a useful tool to low hour PPL like me.

Best.

Sicknote:ok:

[172driver]

Totally agree with you, Pace. In fact, I'd go one further - ban all the phoney 'condolences, 'RIP' etc crap from people who in all likelyhood have never met the pilot (and/or pax) involved anyway.

What some people here apparently cannot get their head round to is the fact that speculating makes you think about a situation and thus makes you revisit your own beliefs, perceptions, knowledge. There have certainly been threads that sent me back to the books or to a discussion with a more experienced pilot or instructor. None of the 'condolences' BS ever has or ever will. Keep this pilot's forum.

[vanHorck]

I fully agree with BRL (moderator) that throwing mud at each other is simply not done on such threads! It brings an air of disrespect to a thread which is otherwise valuable as a learning tool.

Similarly, we should be careful not to throw mud at the P1/P2 of the flight.

There is a substantial difference between stating possible mistakes and stating such mistakes including derogatory terms, which unfortunately happens a lot here.

I will give an example:
"I feel this flight should have never taken off given the weather forecast"
or
"how stupid can you be taking off in such weather"

In other words, I believe it is quite ok to brainstorm about the causes of a crash but at the same time we should make sure we are respectful to all the readers especially the next of kin.

Someone here said: "It s a hard world out there". Well, it is, and it is up to us to soften it a bit, and the sarcasm that such attempts would serve no purpose is utterly misplaced on these threads imho.

This way we retain freedom of speech and we show common respect

[Pace]

ban all the phoney 'condolences, 'RIP' etc crap from people who in all likelyhood have never met the pilot (and/or pax) involved anyway.

172Driver

Whether we know the pilot or not they are part of our community and when any of these tragic events happen I am sure it fills us all with sadness.
It also makes us realise how unforgiving a mistress aviation can be and that one mistake can have disastrous consequences. We have all made mistakes we have gotten away with.

Sadly most aircraft crashes are due to pilot error. We can get into a state of feeling immortal and these tradegies do pull you up and make you think.
So I am not against people offering their condolences if thats what they feel they want to do but equally I do not feel comfortable with debate being stifled with the arguement that only the AAIB can work out what went wrong.

It is the debate on what "could have gone wrong" which mentally gets other pilots thinking about the accident and possible scenarios. That process of thinking about possible scenarios also makes the pilot think about their own flying.

If it was an aircraft failure then As pilot Dar said an AD will be released but aircraft failures rarely bring an aircraft down but the way they are handled often does.

Pilots should be mindful though of the tragic circumstances and write in a dignified way and to each other too. In a way that appreciates that our views are only speculation.

Pace

[Pace]

I will give an example:
"I feel this flight should have never taken off given the weather forecast"
or
"how stupid can you be taking off in such weather"

VanHorck

Your post says it all and it was those quotes which prompted me to say that infact pilots do takeoff in weather like that infact those of us that fly for a living dont have the luxury of choosing nice days and very much have to take what the weather of the day throws at us.

Flying over house sized waves in a single is something I would have done years ago but am more cautious about now. Flying in wind conditions where the downdraughts could be stronger than the potential for the aircraft to climb would also fill me with caution.

So on such a trip I would want a powerful twin with icing protection and backup systems. Many do use low powered singles. Flying is a risk and a lot of it is about risk management and that is the pilots call on what he feels comfortable with.

Sadly and for whatever reason those people have gone and nothing will change that but the rest of us are still here and I hope we keep it that way so anything no matter how small which can contribute to keeping us here has to be worth it.

Pace

[172driver]

Whether we know the pilot or not they are part of our community and when any of these tragic events happen I am sure it fills us all with sadness.

Pace,

Again, agreed. However, I still think most of these 'RIP' posts are utterly fake, more so as the likelihood of the family of the deceased reading this forum isn't too great. And just blowing condolences into the wind, IMHO, devalues them. I'd prefer if we could stick with discussions as to what may or may not have caused a particular incident/accident. Alas, as you rightly say, the vast majority are caused by none other than us :(

[Pace]

I have no idea what happened to that PA-28, though it is odd as it looks like it went in at a reasonably shallow angle and lowish airspeed, it 'looks' like it may have descended under control into the terrain.. but lets not speculate about that.

G-EMMA

But isnt that exactly what we should speculate about? Why because it is speculation and discussion of the possible causes of an aircraft going in at a shallow angle and lowish airspeed.

Whether we hit on the actual reason in that discussion is irrelevant but discussing all the possible reasons for an aircraft going in at a shallow angle and low airspeed is not.

Given strong winds and mountainous terrain and forgetting this particular accident one possibility would be a downdraft being greater than the aircrafts ability to climb.
We could then go into interesting and educational talks about wind and dealing with mountain flying.

Pace

[JEM60]

My daughter 'E'mail'ed me from Bristol. The pilot was her landlord for a time, and he was apparently a top guy. Although not connected with aviation, she was quite perturbed to hear critiscism so early in the proceedings, without the full facts. As someone else says, you don't know whose reading the forum.

[Rod1]

I am very firmly in the speculate all you can side of this. There was a mid air collision about a year ago which lead to many pages of speculation. The result for me was that I changed the way I operated out of my strip. A few weeks later I spotted some traffic using my new system which would have been a very real threat had I followed my old system. If we had all avoided the discussion till the AAIB report came out (still not out on this one) then I may not have been around to read it.

It is possible to speculate with a degree of sensitivity, but I do understand that relatives of the deceased would rather have no discussion at all. If I end my days in an aircraft accident please speculate all you can and stop anybody else doing the same thing.

Rod1

[Pace]

Jem60

I very much doubt anyone not into aviation would be reading this forum and if they did they probably would not understand half the stuff said I dont a lot the time :)

But it is speculation and not FACT and has to be treated that way. But to ban any speculation is against freedom of speech and to me does not achieve anything in a PILOT forum.

The way and the manner in which we talk about things and how we interact between each other for me is more important.
Here I am not just talking about accident discussions but any discussions where we are rude to another poster or treat someone like an idiot.
Recent accident discussions should be dealt with a bit of thought consideration and tact but in MHO equally should not be shelved awaiting an AAIB report 1 to 2 years down the line.

Pilots sometimes have to be shocked into examining their own flying and sometimes that is best achieved when an event is fresh rather than when its forgotten a year or more away.

Pace

[mark sicknote]

When I learned through "gossip" about a serious but fortunately non-fatal accident that occurred in one of the aircraft I fly, I immediately changed my style of flight management. I treat the aircraft with much more respect and the lesson will remain with me throughout my flying career.

Someone made a mistake and I have certainly learned from that. In commercial aviation, it is often fatal accidents that lead to changes being made.

Best,

Sicknote:ok:

[PPRuNe Towers]

The posts above from Pace and mark sicknote exactly reflect our policy and the reasons why it exists.

It gains two constant criticisms:

The wait for the report brigade.

(No we won't - ever. It doesn't change our behaviour or gain our interest. It only offers change at systemic, policy, airworthiness and technical level.)

And from those in some way 'close' to the victims(s) either directly or through imagined closeness.

These ocassions are the ultimate 'I learned about flying from that,' threads. The cartharsis of people reading with their own huge capital I in the wake of death and injury is the whole point and BRL is expected to expunge both the overly crass but more importantly the arses here who delight on dancing on the head of a pin showing off their so called debating skills.

For the regular, habitual duellers in nitpicking semantics and point scoring - you are missing the whole point of these threads. You will be dealt with accordingly.

Rob

[dublinpilot]

For me the speculation is good. I have learnt much from the discussions here in the past, and it has caused me to rethink some of the procedures that I use.

The only caution I would say is that we should attempt to discuss and speculate in an AAIB style......no criticism and no blame, just possible causes, their effect, and ways that we could seek to avoid it ourselves.

We can easily discuss the possibility that weather was a serious factor, what the weather was, what it's potential direct or indirect effects could have been, without criticising the pilot for taking off, or blaming them for a crash.

We can learn just as much without the blame and criticism. In fact we'll probably take the lesson in much better if we avoid the blame part.

dp

[englishal]

no criticism and no blame, just possible causes
But when the probable cause was the "pilots inability to maintain clearance above the terrain" can we discuss this?

I think we should - pilot error plays a role in 75% of accidents, and I tend to think that pilot error is the cause UNLESS there are other overriding factors.

In the case of the Citation at Biggin, we are pretty sure that this was contributed to by engine failure. However unless the engine failure lead to control difficulties, then this would probably be attributed to "the pilots inability to maintain altitude and directional control following an engine failure"....a Citation *should* be able to fly on one engine, which would be the reasoning behind this. This is a more complicated case which clearly had a mechanical failure and there are doubts. I don't know if they had control difficulties, the AAIB will determine that. I hope they did.

In the case of a PA28 ending up in a mountain - in good weather I'd guess they had a mechanical problem. Because of the weather on the day it is *very likely* the weather played a role. Weather typically doesn't cause planes to crash, the pilot's decisions in the way they handle the weather does. Fly through a thunderstorm and you don't have good odds. Elect not to fly and you have very good odds. Of course it could be conicidence and a mechanical failure AND bad weather may have occured, but this is less likely and then you could argue the route of flight - bad weather and hiogh ground don't mix, and if you have options to miss high ground, why weren't they taken?

So while not trying to criticise the pilot, sometimes it may be unavoidable to do so....But also remember that the Pilot has a duty of care to those he or she is flying, and it is not about "dissing" the dead but about trying to find out why the accident happened and what human factors were involved- hopefully any relatives who read these posts will realise this.

[Pace]

Enlishall

So while not trying to criticise the pilot, sometimes it may be unavoidable to do so....But also remember that the Pilot has a duty of care to those he or she is flying, and it is not about "dissing" the dead but about trying to find out why the accident happened and what human factors were involved- hopefully any relatives who read these posts will realise this.

That is a very valid point and one which is often missed. The passenegers rely totally on the pilot to determine whether a flight can be carried out safely regarding the aircraft and the pilots ability.

They in some ways are the victims and we have a large responsability to them in insuring that we not only fly within our limits but those of the aircraft.
Different horses for different courses and that applies to the pilot /aircraft combination.

I personally would question taking a light single across sea which was wipped up into 30 foot waves by strong winds although that factor played no part in the accident whether the winds caused downdrafts over the mountains which a low powered aircraft could not handle is a ? mark as maybe other causes.

In general I am wary of a single piston with a very low cloudbase. I am wary of a single over very rough seas where the chances of a successful forced landing and recovery diminish. I would be wary of flying an aircraft with a poor climbrate where I know the downdrafts could be greater than the capacity to climb. I am wary of a single at night or over fog.They are all increased risks which many are happy to take but do we have the right to take them for our passengers?

The above are not relevant to this flight although a couple could be.

Pace

[dublinpilot]

But when the probable cause was the "pilots inability to maintain clearance above the terrain" can we discuss this?


I don't have a problem with discussing such.

So while not trying to criticise the pilot, sometimes it may be unavoidable to do so

Agreed.

What I'm trying to get at is that there is a difference between:

"The pilot should never have attempted to fly over mountains with such winds. It's incompetent! I'd never do that!"

and

"Given the fact that the winds were coming from the XX direction, and with a wind speed of xx, it's likely that there would have been significant downdrafts on the lea ward side of the mountains. The performance on a XXX is not great at the likely weight of the aircraft, and it's quite possible, perhaps even lightly that the pilot would encounter downdrafts that the aircraft could not out climb on this particular route."

(Not a reference to the currently discussed accident, just an example).

The AAIB manage to attribute causes which include pilot error, without actually blaming or criticising the pilot (although it's often left open to the reader to see the criticism themselves).

dp

Ps. I don't have a problem with blame been apportioned to a pilot, but in fairness blaming someone on the basis of speculation is a bit much. Hypothetical speculation is fine, but criticism and blame based on it is unfair.

[DavidHoul52]

Whenever I hear about an aircraft accident on the news the first place I come to is PPRune to read what other pilots are thinking.

I agree that it is indeed possible to speculate about the causes of an accident without causing distress to family and friends.

[jayemm]

Death and accidents generate a natural curiosity in mankind. Many people want to talk about an event, even if just to 'offer condolences' as an expression of fear, care or "there but for the grace of God go I".

The good thing about discussion on these forums after an accident is that it is cathartic for us pilots. It can help drive home the realities and impacts of decisions we make related to GA. Like everyone else I have thought about this accident, and wondered if it's possible that with 4 on board you probably wouldn't have a full load of fuel and with very strong headwinds could run dry. I think, make better allowances on fuel for my own trips. Then I look at other people's thoughts and it all goes to educating each other and provide that all-important reality check. A good quality discussion can be just as valuable as knowing 'the truth' about an accident.

The bad thing about some discussions is the judgement and the nit-picking of some contributors who seem just to want to be 'right'. They won't rest until they have hammered home their point. It's no better than people having a stand-up row over someone's body whilst it is being lowered into the ground.

It shows an undignified lack of respect for those who have died, whatever the reason.

I welcome open and objective discussion after tragic events in GA. But it would be so much more positive if we could all agree to avoid judgement at the personal level and the bickering. We should all be clear about the line between discussion and being disrespectful.

[Pilot DAR]

I'm sure others here have their stories, to back up their feelings, here is one of three of mine....

I don't mean to single out a poster, but I have a different perspective on the sentiment:

.....other pilots are thinking.

I agree that it is indeed possible to speculate about the causes of an accident without causing distress to family and friends.

My good friend's wife, who is also a nurse, was at the scene. I, in my capacity as a volunteer firefighter, flew in, and ran to the scene of his collision with earth. He had done something which demonstrated poor airmanship, and physics had got him.

As she and I and two other firefighters lifted him out of the inverted wreck, we were quiet and professional. I really did not want to upset her any more, she was doing so well. We could not tell if he was alive, but it seemed that he still might be. As I assisted in moving him as gently as possibly (another fire was a very real concern, there had already been one), I could feel some of his injurys, but kept this to myself, so as to be considerate of feelings. I remember thinking to myself, "for his own sake, I hope he passes away without pain, because living is going to involve huge pain for a long time". The first words spoken during this solemn task were his wife saying: "Oh, he's all broken" (and she is a very qualified observer, and had not even felt the part of him I was holding). I realized at that moment that she was emotionally distancing herself from a situation which was going to be very unpleasent. "He" was now two entities, a soul she loved, and a body she did not know any more.

The coroner told me the next day, that he had met earth at more than 200G - in a Cessna 150.

His wife searched for months for a place to lay blame. We (the very qualified flying observers) remained united in our silence on this. Nothing else could be found to blame when a perfectly servicable aircraft hits the ground in perfect flying conditions. How would explaining that to her possibly help?

Were it to be these days, and she became aware of the incredible speculation run rampent in an internet forum, it would tear her apart inside. How does that make the world better?

Those of us who knew the circumstances, rolled things over in our minds, and all fly safer for it. The pilots we talk to, get the watered down version, and are hopefully safer too.

I disagree that it can be assumed that speculation about an accident can be widely communicated without causing distress to family and friends. I think that you need to walk a mile in the other person's shoes, before you assume how they might feel, and then go off to satisfy your own unimportant desire to simply chat about it.

No attack intended, just my carefully thought out opinion...

Pilot DAR

[Fuji Abound]

Pilot Dar

The human element of an accident is tragic - and you make it very clear from your post just how tragic.

I was reading Flying today. Each month they publish an article titled “Aftermath”. I always read the article. Not for morbid curiosity, but because there is nearly always something to learn from Peter Garrison. At some point in the article he usually comments on what the official NTSB report said. In this case: “the NTSB neatly, if unhelpfully, summed up the probable cause: “The pilot’s failure to follow up the instrument approach procedure and his descent below the prescribed precision height” In this accident the commercial IR pilot and his two passengers died.

Peter points out for an instrument rated pilot the approach is a mechanical procedure which if followed correctly will always end in one of two ways - a successful landing or a missed approach. He might have said (but didn’t) if we were computers (mechanical failures during the approach aside) there would never be an accident on an approach.

Sadly, more instrument rated pilots kill themselves in this way than any other.

Peter, goes on to discuss in some detail why this might be so, by specific reference to this accident. There is little doubt that a significant part of the article is speculation, albeit informed and, for all I know, well researched speculation.

Personally, I think the article should be called “Insight”, not “Aftermath”. Peter provides an insight into what caused the accident. When a pilot dies it is always tragic. It is a waste of life, moreover, more often than not, a preventable waste of life. Clearing up the mess is always going to be heart wrenching.

However, as in this article the NTSB report is as Peter says, neat, but unhelpful. The helpful part is his insight into what may have caused the accident - what really are the factors that may cause a well trained pilot to depart from a mechanical procedure that if followed can only have a good outcome. What may cause a pilot to do anything that in hindsight is at worst simply stupid, or, at best, unfortunate?

In short, only one good thing can come from any fatal accident. That is the discussion that follows, the insight into what may have caused the accident, the factors than can result in commercial instrument rated pilot flying a perfectly serviceable aircraft in reasonable weather into the ground when the only factor probably involved was his unwillingness to give up on the approach. Read the NTSB report and none of that comes over in the neat clinical way in which the report is written.

Simply, the reason we discuss these things is that if it stops just one other pilot making the same mistake(s), just one pilot recalling as he finds himself pushing the minima just how tragic the outcome can be then not all is lost; and if as Peter does, even a few words are spent on describing just how awful the scene of the accident was, I don’t think that is such a bad thing.

[vanHorck]

Pilot Dar and Fuji

what an excellent exchange of view, so sensitive and well written! This is exactly what the Private Flying forum needs

Pace
Your interpretation of what to do and what not and why is excellent, I hope people read and remember it

This is rightly developing in a movement NOT to stifle free speech, which we need to keep, but to explain to those who like to listen to themselves so much that this is not the place for them.

Qualifying as a pilot is not the only prerequisite for this forum, another one is to value other's opinions as much as one's own and to show respect to pilots both deceased and living

[Pilot DAR]

Yes Fuji,

A read those articles, and completely agree with you. The difference (what makes me so willing to agree with you) is, as I had pointed out on the other thread, that the "Aftermath" article, and others like it, are written to discuss an accident report, more than the accident itself. Thus, it is not in "real time". I'm not suggesting that there never be discussion and learning from accidents, just that it not occur in "real time", when facts are not known (thus speculation, and non-factual information cannot be distinguished from truth). Truths which really should come out, must have the timely opportunity to follow the proper path, rather than being short circuited. The sort of time period which a society (the media) allows to exist, so as to allow the next of kin to be notified.

I helicopter I have flown a number of times was crashed last summer. The wife of the pilot found out by watching national news that her husband was dead. All because "everyone thought everyone else had told her" Nobody had. She was justifiably upset. Within hours of her finding out her husband was lost, there was ILL INFORMED guessulation being posted on PPRuNe, and I took quite a slagging for squelching it. I had been told the FACTS right away (they were totally know right away), but did not relate them then. Other posters accused me of having privilaged information (they were right, I did) and being a poor person for not posting it! Tough on them, they had no need to know. Days later the FACTS were public, and with the appropriate permission, I released those facts in the theme of safety. The report has yet to come, but will say nothing more than what we already know.

By the way, all of you "want you learns" out there, take your engine cover off before you fly! (particularly if you fly helicopters, where that cover also surrounds the rotor pitch control links)

I too, have learned a lot from reading accident reports. I learn much much less from reading hours old speculation!

Pilot DAR

[Pace]

Gemma

Pace or anyone with mountain experience, out of interest, in a downdraft situation, what would be the likely aircraft attitude? Would one be nose up fighting the downdraft, or nose down? It isn't something I've ever experienced but in turbulence when sinking fast I've instinctively been full power nose up while trying to keep the altitude. How would you know in IMC on instruments that you had hit a downdraft? Would it be a large uncommanded rate of descent whilst the instruments showed straight and level attitude? Any other indicators?

The worst I had was at FL120 over Madrid in a Seneca Five twin. I was flying single pilot with the owner in the back. As we approached Madrid there were two large storms. The ground temperature at Madrid was 45 deg c.
I went between the two cells in clear air and was horrified to see the ASI shoot in a few seconds from 155 KTS ias to 70 kts IAS. i disonnected the autopilot added full power while pushing the nose over. Nothing happened airspeed stayed at 70 kts IAS and the VSI went off the clock. The aircraft dropped 1500 feet before everything came back to normal. The best way to describe it was as if the aircraft had flown into a vacuum and dropped wings level vertically.
The whole experience surprisingly was not scary and I knew in my mind that it would come back again but I had never experienced anything like it and have never since.

You often get sink while flying over solid cloud and then come over a hole in that cloud. You will notice with the aircraft on auto a slight up on the vsi as the aircraft struggles to hold hight. The airspeed will also drop maybe 10 kts short as you come out of that sink the VS1 drops a little and the speed increases.

I once had quite a severe downdraft in a single and the above description becomes far worse. You may have the aircraft pitched to fly up with full power and in that profile find you are actually descending with little you can do other than finding your way out of the sink.

Flying a citation to Nice there were reports of severe turbulence between FL210 and FL290 I warned the passengers to expect the worst reduced the speed and nothing ! as smooth a a babies bottom. We filed out feeling like idiots on the more northerly route out of Nice over the mountains but this time empty having deposited the passenegers who must have questioned whether we knew what we were talking about! . FL210 and all hell let loose with 45 degree wing drops. The aircraft was almost uncontrollable. Cabinet doors flew open everything hurled around the cabin.
I requested an immediate climb to above FL290 and all of a sudden the citation was climbing at 3500 fpm at that level which is unheard of in an old Citation 2. we shot up through 290 assisted like a lift to FL310 so it works both ways :)


Pace

[Final 3 Greens]

I once had quite a severe downdraft in a single and the above description becomes far worse. You may have the aircraft pitched to fly up with full power and in that profile find you are actually descending with little you can do other than finding your way out of the sink.

I've been in that situation in a PA28 in IMC and it is truly horrendous.

Fortunately the gods were kind that day and we exited the cloud/sink at around 700' (having encountered it circa 3,500') and recovered.

There but for the grace of god, as we were over the Channel at the time.

[Pace]

Wind shear, sometimes referred to as windshear or wind gradient, is a difference in wind speed and direction over a relatively short distance in the atmosphere. Wind shear can be broken down into vertical and horizontal components, with horizontal wind shear seen across weather fronts and near the coast, and vertical shear typically near the surface, though also at higher levels in the atmosphere near upper level jets and frontal zones aloft.

Wind shear itself is a microscale meteorological phenomenon occurring over a very small distance, but it can be associated with mesoscale or synoptic scale weather features such as squall lines and cold fronts. It is commonly observed near microbursts and downbursts caused by thunderstorms, weather fronts, areas of locally higher low level winds referred to as low level jets, near mountains, radiation inversions that occur due to clear skies and calm winds, buildings, wind turbines, and sailboats. Wind shear has a significant effect during take-off and landing of aircraft due to their effects on control of the aircraft, and was a significant cause of aircraft accidents involving large loss of life within the United States.

Sound movement through the atmosphere is affected by wind shear, which can bend the wave front, causing sounds to be heard where they normally would not, or vice versa. Strong vertical wind shear within the troposphere also inhibits tropical cyclone development, but helps to organize individual thunderstorms into living longer life cycles which can then produce severe weather. The thermal wind concept explains with how differences in wind speed with height are dependent on horizontal temperature differences, and explains the existence of the jet stream.[1]

Final3Greens

It is scary when it happens low level like it did with you. It is an awful feeling especially in an underpowered aircraft when you have full power and feel that some giant hand is pushing you down and you feel powerless to do much about it. High level you know you will come out. IMC you must have wondered what the heck was going on with the instruments? :) In low powered singles with strong wind forecasts it is not just the crosswind components you need to consider but the fact that you may encounter severe pockets of sinking air. Some of us who have flown light singles or twins over the Alps lowish level know only too well that you dont do it on anything but the calmest days.

I have taken a jet into Engadin Airport, located at an altitude of 1707 metres above sea level, 5 km from St.Moritz, it is Europe’s highest elevated airport.
Even a jet has to be low level in the mountains approaching or departing that airport. One very beautiful but scary place with mountains both sides and not enough room to turn! I would certainly keep an eye on wind forecasts going into there.

Addendum

While on a skiing holiday in the french Alps in Meribel I went up with a french instructor in a Ski equipt Jodel. Apart from being a stunning experience those instructors have a vast knowledge on mountain flying and the perils. It is well worth treating yourselves to a course of mountain flying for a better understanding of the dangers of the medium we fly in.
Pace

[DavidHoul52]

Well, Pilot DAR you certainly have brought home the need to tread very carefully when there are emotionally vulnerable people in the aftermath of a recent accident. Point taken. It does seem that you feel there should be a complete ban on discussion of an accident until the accident report is out?

Human nature being what it is, that isn't going to happen (unless the moderators enforce it). I still don't see any harm in discussing possible causes as long as they are presented as just that (in modern science causation can never be "proved").

A couple of weeks ago I started a thread based on the October AAIB reports and I felt there some really useful contributions to that by various people.

[Pilot DAR]

I do not seek to impose a complete ban on content in posts, nor would I like to be subject to one. Rather, I hope that those of us in the PPRuNe community can strive to display behaviour toward our peers, which we would wish for ourselves. Presupposing that we do "raise the bar", it will from time to time be necessary to reign in the occassional newcomer, who may have yet to come to understand the sensativities which could be involved, and the standards of conduct acceptable to the group in general.

Perhaps if PPRuNe had some agreed guidance and behaviour paragraphs assessible, which could be cut 'n paste into posts by any of the participants, this could serve to introduce or remind posters of the "code of conduct" which the majority of the group would like to embrace. Not a ban, just a polite reminder. Leave the "banning" to the moderators, on a case by case basis.

Just thinking....

Pilot DAR

[Fly-by-Wife]

should we discuss fatal accidents?

In my opinion, yes. Many contributors have mentioned that they have "learnt something from that", as a result of the discussion of an incident / accident. If just one other accident (of any severity) can be avoided by learning these lessons as soon as possible, then surely the discussion has been of value?

Pilo DAR, I can only imagine the dreadful circumstances that you found yourself in, and this must have a huge influence on how you view these discussions.

His wife searched for months for a place to lay blame. We (the very qualified flying observers) remained united in our silence on this. Nothing else could be found to blame when a perfectly servicable aircraft hits the ground in perfect flying conditions. How would explaining that to her possibly help?


Could there be a possibility that in the circumstances a frank explanation of the facts, coming from a trusted friend - and experienced aviator - could have avoided some of those months of anguish and helped achieved closure more quickly? This is, of course, just a thought from one wholly unconnected with the incident, with no knowledge of the people concerned, and certainly not a criticism of you.

FBW

[dublinpilot]

Perhaps if PPRuNe had some agreed guidance and behaviour paragraphs assessible

That's actually an excellent idea. Perhaps PPrune already have an written policy on this, which they could publish somewhere on the website.

If not then perhaps they could do one up.

If not, then perhaps we could do one up ourselves, and they could agree to it.

If might stop these endless discussions of what's appropriate taking place after each fatal accident.

If we all know what's allowed and what's not, then we could get on with things, whether we agreed with the policy or not.

dp

[JEM60]

Been away a day or two. Just to put the record straight, my daughter doesn't read Pprune, not being interested in Aviation. She informed me that she knew the pilot etc., and I informed her of some of the critical posts.
Some very interesting views here.

[Pace]

Could there be a possibility that in the circumstances a frank explanation of the facts, coming from a trusted friend - and experienced aviator - could have avoided some of those months of anguish and helped achieved closure more quickly? This is, of course, just a thought from one wholly unconnected with the incident, with no knowledge of the people concerned, and certainly not a criticism of you.

I have lost 5 friends and colleagues in aviation. The one was a good friend and I was pall bearer at his funeral so I can testify to the anguish such an event causes relatives.

I am not qualified to make statements on how best to let people deal with any bereavement especially one involving tragic circumstances so this is just an observation.

Most people go through many emotions and that is a needed process for healing. Whether trying to cotton wool people is a good thing? I have my doubts and tend to reflect the opinion posted above.

I firmly support a Pilot forum discussing possible causes because even possible causes which are not the cause of an acccident could be in future situations. Secondly pilots are more "open" to taking in certain advice after the shock of an accident and when we think "that could have been us" rather than a year or more later when the AAIB release a report that hardly anyone bothers to read or is very interested in.

I of course am not referring to a very small minority who gain a certain pleasure or excitement from others misfortunes.

As to a code of conduct? I do not think that stifling free speech even if it becomes borderline is good as eventually the conversations lead to the required result even if a little heated on route. Moderators are in a good position to identify that small minority posting that is distasteful or insulting and deal with it appropriately.


Pace

[IO540]

Speaking of mud throwing, I actually think it should be banned from any thread, not just from accident debates.The personal attacks which repeatedly happen here (of which I have been a victim many times) are completely pointless and merely serve to make the poster look like an idiot and drive away most people with anything useful to say. IMHO any such post should be deleted by the mods and repeat offenders simply banned. Pprune has a pretty awful reputation already in many quarters, as a result of the "activities" of a small band of posters. This is a real shame since there is a lot of expertise around here - more than on any other forum - and in addition pprune does not suffer from being clicquey (sp?) like most others are (which turns most serious debates into drivel).

As regards this accident, do we actually know anything other than the really obvious one which is that terrain clearance somehow got compromised?

People have criticised the decision to do that flight in a PA28, or any single engine plane, but I don't agree with that at all. If you are going to get say a -4000fpm downdraught (and is there any evidence, examining the airflow at the time and the terrain maps that this was the case?) then nothing short of a Tucano or similarly capable turboprop is going to outclimb it. A TBM850 certainly won't, though of course that one would be at FL250 or whatever. No civilian piston twin will outclimb it. -1000fpm is possible with a decent single or twin (my TB20 will manage 1000fpm, just). But in terms of mountain waves, the difference between -300fpm (roughly, the capability of a heavily loaded PA28 like this one was) and -600fpm (which a more powerful single or twin could outclimb) is only of the order of 1000ft in the altitude above the terrain.

Icing was probably not an issue, and neither was any in-flight breakup or even a control failure. Not a case of flying into a snow covered hill (as in the Mt Erebus one). It looks like it flew into the terrain in a pretty leisurely manner, and almost certainly in solid IMC.

In short, I am not sure what can be learnt from that accident, right now.

[Pace]

In short, I am not sure what can be learnt from that accident, right now.

10540

I think a lot can be learnt! btw a Seneca Five twin will climb at 1500 fpm if needed but I take your point on severe down air currents some which even a jet would find hard to counteract.

But equally flying in very strong winds over high terrain would mean that I would want thousands of feet clearance to give me a safety zone of air in the event of extreme down air movement.

Ie in a light twin I would want to be cruising at 10000 feet over 3500 foot mountains which means up in the icing levels not cruising at 5000 feet or less in a deiced single.

If my approach and landing was in the hills/mountains I would have to question the advisability of using an aircraft which could not outclimb the predicted down drafts.

I would also question the advisability of taking a small single over seas battered by high winds as that would reduce my chances of a successful forced landing in conditions like that.

Horses for courses and maybe a PA28 fully loaded wasnt the right horse for the job but then again maybe it was who am I to judge??? Flying is all about risk management sometimes we dont manage those risks as strongly as we could (and I have equally been as guilty of that}but then we lean towards Russian roulette

Pace

[englishal]

"The pilot should never have attempted to fly over mountains with such winds. It's incompetent! I'd never do that!"
I agree with you DP....Statements like this are stupid. If I said "I'd never take off in that", that is a different matter. As people gain more experience their limitations reduce...

People have criticised the decision to do that flight in a PA28, or any single engine plane, but I don't agree with that at all. If you are going to get say a -4000fpm downdraught (and is there any evidence, examining the airflow at the time and the terrain maps that this was the case?) then nothing short of a Tucano or similarly capable turboprop is going to outclimb it. A TBM850 certainly won't, though of course that one would be at FL250 or whatever. No civilian piston twin will outclimb it. -1000fpm is possible with a decent single or twin (my TB20 will manage 1000fpm, just). But in terms of mountain waves, the difference between -300fpm (roughly, the capability of a heavily loaded PA28 like this one was) and -600fpm (which a more powerful single or twin could outclimb) is only of the order of 1000ft in the altitude above the terrain.
I'd have gone, but in those winds I'd want to be AT LEAST 2000' above the highest peak to reduce the likelyhood of these downdrafts and rotors etc which are more likely to lurk down low or in the lee. Of course you meet them higher too, but then you *may* have more time to get out of them....or they may be less severe.....who knows. Just speculating and may have no bearing on this accident - this is my limitation.

[IO540]

I agree about extra height (a very rough rule is 1000ft above the peaks for every 10kt of wind) but that would have placed the pilot into IMC, which (it is reasonable to assume) he didn't want.

He also (reportedly) cleared the worst of the terrain, hitting (reportedly) the last hill on the route. Not knowing his route (ATC will know, of course) we can only guess here.

And looking at the radar image (the one bit of data I can get for the relevant time and place) a flight in IMC would have been pretty rough. I would not have gone airways in that type of picture, for sure. But I also know very very few pilots get radar images.

I would also question the advisability of taking a small single over seas battered by high winds as that would reduce my chances of a successful forced landing in conditions like that.

That is a different consideration though. It's a personal attitude thing entirely. Many pilots would not fly a single over mountains, for example.

[vee-tail-1]

PPRuNe at its best on this thread, so I hesitate to add my pennyworth, but something worries me. I guess its the attitude of some pilots to the activity of flying an aeroplane.
My experience of the RAF and BOAC/BA have imprinted the idea that flying is not necessarily dangeous but a wrong decision will usually be fatal.
When I flew for the airlines the drive up the M4 from home to Heathrow was cathartic. No matter what mayhem was going on in my life, divorce, builders, money problems, it was all consigned to a drawer in my head, not to be opened again untill the end of my flight. By the time I checked in the professional had emerged from the emotional wreck, and I was ready to give 100% to the job of flying 400 pax across the pond.
Now when I fly my little aeroplane I am usually solo and have long ago come to terms with the dangers. My family have reluctantly accepted that I might die, in the to them, totally unneccessary toy aeroplane. Insurance & inhertance tax taken into account, I can enjoy my flying having made allowance for the risks.
But what if a non pilot wishes to fly with me? that changes everything.
Now my decision making is based on the safety of that passenger. Marginal weather becomes unflyable, crossing expanses of water in winter without two engines, life raft, immersion suits, and full informed agreement from my passengers, impossible. Above all my recency, flying ability, state of mental health, and deterioration due to age, have to be up to spec.
In short my attitude to flying is serious but fun. That's why the casual attitudes expressed by some make me most uncomfortable. People talk of flying as a "hobby" as if it was like knitting, to be picked up and put down at will. French flyers have it defined properly, to most of them it is a Passion, a way of life, an all inclusive view of themselves and the world.
If you like knitting then fly solo, and don't put your innocent friends into your aeroplane for a casual jolly. As pilots we are intitled to take informed risks with our own lives, but not with innocent others.

[IO540]

flying is not necessarily dangeous but a wrong decision will usually be fatal.Actually, what is fatal (in VFR flight) is not keeping ahead of things and cutting off all your escape routes, through a series of wrong decisions.

Normally, when airborne, one has loads of options. You can go down, up, left, right, or even (psychologically hard, this one) turn back.

There are occassional single errors which turn out fatal but they tend to be when in IMC, like a nav error leading to an incorrect descent.

Does anybody know if the pilot had an IMCR or an IR? Did he use a GPS? One can check pilot qualifications on the FAA website but a G-reg (like this one) is unlikely to be flown by an FAA IR holder.

I agree regarding passengers changing things, Vee-Tail, but I can assure you I have absolutely no intention of killing myself either :) It would make me avoid a nasty turbulent flight, but one can get those on a perfect English summer day, flying just below the little white fluffy stuff. Rough as hell, perfectly safe but passengers hate it. And one can rarely go above it, due to controlled airspace.

[englishal]

but that would have placed the pilot into IMC, which (it is reasonable to assume) he didn't want.
And that is probably the crux of this sad accident....IMHO of course......

[Pace]

Englishall

From what I have learnt I believe he was a very experienced pilot so should have managed IMC with little problem.

Something made him descend too early and that could be a number of reasons. Aircraft failure, windshear, illness, mistaken position or descending VMC and then trying to scud run???? Most of us have been in situations we would rather not be in and there for the grace of god go We

My instincts feel it was probably flying too low IMC over mountains in strong winds and catching a downdraft which the aircraft could not deal with.
But hey only my instincts which could be way off the truth.

Pace

[IO540]

The radar track, with the Mode C return, would settle most of this, but we aren't going to get that for at least a year!

I would bet on him trying to do a "VFR" flight, intended to be below cloud, and running out of space between the ground and the cloudbase, and then either trying to turn away or even turn around (do the crash photos suggest his heading at the time of impact, and is it consistent with the journey), or climbing into IMC and hitting something.

I say this only because it is far more common than a competent instrument pilot doing a CFIT. Such pilots do know how to draw a line on the map, add 1000ft to the highest bits, and fly at/above that level. If in IMC anyway, it's a case of in for a penny in for a pound so you may as well fly high enough. Airspace was not an issue on that route, from what I can see. And instrument pilots do not descend in IMC unless they are close to the destination, when they execute some sort of DIY instrument approach.

But who knows? Maybe he did simply descend too early. I bet ATC knew the answer immediately, but it won't be published for ages.

I do like my big GPS running copies of the real printed VFR charts, with elevations on them...

[wigglyamp]

"And instrument pilots do not descend in IMC unless they are close to the destination, when they execute some sort of DIY instrument approach."

Perhaps not always the case - reference the Seneca on approach to Oxford which descended early on a stepped approach and hit trees on a hill-top.

[AMEandPPL]

Yet another fatality in Norfolk today . . . . what a dreadful month we have had !

Colliding with a tractor is REALLY unusual. It will be interesting to see what the AAIB makes of this one in due course.

[dublinpilot]

When considering IMC conditions, remember that the IMCR is not valid in Irish airspace.

Staying high over those mountains will generaly require a clearance into Dublin class C.

I've no idea of the qualifications of this pilot, but I would imagine that any IMCR pilot (as distinct to an IR pilot) would be reluctant to request a clearance into IMC conditions in class C if they knew it was illegal, especially so if they thought it was possible to complete VFR below cloud.

This enters into the area of hypothetical really, as I've no idea of the pilots qualifications. In fact it's probably unlikely given that they signed off with Dublin ATC. But something that should be borne in mind when considering IMC issues.

dp

[IO540]

It is however true that pilots who are instrument capable (no idea if this one was) tend to be quite happy to fly in IMC anywhere, UK or not. The IFR privileges of the IMCR are limited to UK airspace but that doesn't stop many people.

The trick is to do this only enroute. If one turns up at the destination, an ATC airport, which is OVC005, and the pilot is at FL100 and calls up for a "VFR" arrival, he looks a bit silly :)

Of course I have no experience of this myself ;)

Whether this practice is responsible for a significant # of CFITs I don't know, but I doubt it. Many times more genuinely-VFR-only pilots get killed through unplanned entry into IMC and losing it. It will however depend on what "instrument capable" means.

[englishal]

If it is a case of hitting a mountain or climbing into cloud, I'd take the second choice. But I am instrument capable despite not having the papers / having the wrong letter on my tail. Of course I have no experience of doing this either ;)

[dublinpilot]

If it is a case of hitting a mountain or climbing into cloud, I'd take the second choice.

But what if your choice was requesting an illegal climb into cloud, and a VFR run below that you felt confident to achieve? Then you may opt for the VFR run.

But of course conditions could change, and climbing back into cloud becomes a much more dangerous proposition at that point.

[IO540]

If one is talking about a VFR to IFR transition, this better be planned as to MSA, otherwise just a climb into cloud could take you into a hill which is hidden in the cloud (unless you are flying an F16 and can climb to the MSA vertically).

Personally I plan every flight as if it was fully IFR, fly it at/above the MSA, and if it is below cloud then one gets a much better view. That is how all flying should be done. Additionally, a plain PPL pilot must not enter cloud, which usually means having to remain below it. One just cannot do this (legally) outside the UK on a VFR flight, and one cannot do it on an IFR flight because one flies those at/above the airway MEAs....

Unfortunately it is obvious that much VFR flight is done way below the MSA. In bad weather (low cloud), it's called scud running. You could fly around the south east UK, on routes where the MSA is say 1800ft, at 1800ft, and most traffic will be seen way below you. These pilots have no concept of "MSA" - they just fly along, enjoying the view, and who can blame them? One just cannot do that in dodgy weather.

Anyway "we" have no idea if any of this is relevant to this accident.

[Pace]

But of course conditions could change, and climbing back into cloud becomes a much more dangerous proposition at that point.

Conditions change?? Pilot X is attempting to fly VFR longdistance Cloudbases are below the hill tops but he thinks "thats ok" I can navigate around the hills.
His destination becomes closer and that urge to get there becomes stronger.

Low level with winds gusting 45 kts the ride is hell. His passenegers are feeling or are sick wings are dropping left and right. Every now and again an even more pronounced air pocket hits the plane and Pilot X bangs his head against the roof.

But now the visibility drops and the cloudbase is all over the shop with wisps of cloud floating past underneith the plane.

Now he cannot any longer see clearly the hill shapes and sides. Patches of rain intensify reducing the vis even further.

He peers at his map unsure of where he is. he looks up and sees a white screen as he realises he has run into a patch of cloud. He is now in extreme danger low level, lost and almost blind.............................

His only way out is to climb into IMC to a safe level and to get radio and radar assistance. If he has NO instrument ability he should not contemplate a journey with those forecasts. Even at the best of times a trip of that length is unlikely to have constant weather along the whole route.

Pace

[DavidHoul52]

His only way out is to climb into IMC to a safe level and to get radio and radar assistance.


There is a small amount of instrument training in the PPL. Surely that should be sufficient to allow a climb while keeping the aircraft level on a horizontal plane and enable a slow turn out of trouble?

[DavidHoul52]

I'm talking about flying into cloud at low level in mountainous terrain. Obviously I don't mean flying back over the sea. Wouldn't it be better to climb to a safe height and fly using the AH and radio for help then continuing and facing almost certain death? Why the training on instruments in the PPL if it cannot be used to save your life?

[DavidHoul52]

As an inexperienced pilot it has reminded me never to put myself into a situation where I could run out of options when flying.

Absolutely.

I appreciate that PPL only teaches the bare minimum on instrument flying but in zero visibility one would have no choice. What I am asking is this - It's often given out that a VFR rated pilot would only have seconds to live if in IMC. Could it be that that is the reason pilots prefer to continue at an unsafe height? Even the basic PPL involves relatively long periods "under the hood". There must be a reason for this training.

I have made a mistake - I am not where I should be. I am in cloud and I know there is higher ground nearby. I am going to climb - instrument rated or not! Maybe I will crash anyway - but at least I have a chance.

[DavidHoul52]

Could it be that he misread the landscape due to the poor conditions and thought he was well over the mountains? He signed off his flight plan yet he was still a considerable distance from his destination. If the headwind was much stronger than he thought his ETA would be incorrect? (This is was happened in the famous accident in the Andes with the football team aboard in the 70's)

[bookworm]

There is a small amount of instrument training in the PPL. Surely that should be sufficient to allow a climb while keeping the aircraft level on a horizontal plane and enable a slow turn out of trouble?

Over flat land in calm conditions, through a couple of thousand feet of stratiform cloud? Perhaps. Over mountains at lowish level in 30G40KT? That's a completely different game. Most instrument rated pilots have never done that -- they're not going to get themselves into that situation.

[Pilot DAR]

A study was done in Canada years ago, and as it occurred during my PPL training, it was in the forefront of our minds back then.

A number (20+-) of eager keen private pilots, each with only the few hours of instrument awareness training they had received during PPL training, were put in a full motion simulator, with zero visual. They were each set off from stable, level flight, with no system failures, to fly instruments unassisted for as long as they could - straight and level only, just keep the thing flying, nothing fancy.

ALL of them spiraled in. I recall the shortest time to loose control irrecoverably was 10 seconds, with the longest being many minutes. The average was 178 seconds, which became the title of the report, and a Canadian mantra for not attempting IMC flight without COMPLETE training and recent experience. Remember, ALL of the pilots lost control and "died".

Who can beat those odds without the proper training? Don't fool yourself, you can't! Sadly the very well known fellow off Nantucket at night a decade or so ago couldn't either, for one of the so many examples....

Pilot DAR

[DavidHoul52]

John Kennedy's son, wasn't it?

Scary in any case.

So I take it best to stay visual if possible even if it means going really low to get out of cloud.

I remember that the PPL training is designed to allow one to turn back out of cloud into visual safely.

[IO540]

Though it is clear to me that many non-instrument rated pilots fly in IMC regularly,I am not sure that they do. I would say that most pilots who have a lapsed IMCR or a lapsed IR (and I reckon most non commercially employed IR holders are long lapsed) do routinely fly in IMC, and many/most of them do it when abroad too. Strictly legit VFR is so horribly limiting that the temptation to penetrate a bit of cloud here and there is absolutely massive.

As we are now back to the actual accident, I can't help looking at the attitude of that plane and looking at the lack of disruption to the airframe. I'm wondering if it was gliding at the point of impact, it certainly was in a fairly gentle nose down attitude which might have meant a controlled descent or an engine failure. As it doesn't look like there was an attempt to avoid the ground, can one assume it was in IMC already? I recall reading it went into a peat bog. There is a massive difference in the G force (deceleration) between stopping from 100kt in say 5cm (hitting a mountain) and 2m (hitting soft muck). In the former case, the aircraft usually ends up in many pieces. In the latter case, it could IMHO end up hardly damaged - though the G will still probably incapacitate or kill the occupants.

But you could be totally right; he may have been going very slowly (70kt?). I would not read too much into the nose-down attitude because the gear could have hit first and caused that.

ALL of them spiraled in. I recall the shortest time to loose control irrecoverably was 10 seconds, with the longest being many minutes. The average was 178 seconds, which became the title of the report, and a Canadian mantra for not attempting IMC flight without COMPLETE training and recent experience. Remember, ALL of the pilots lost control and "died".I recall that famous article. I also vaguely recall that some were very high-hour (but still VFR-only) pilots. However, I do not believe that very basic instrument flight is that hard. As bookworm says, it can be a piece of cake, or it can be really hard work. I have trained, for fun, passengers to fly on the horizon and hold altitude, and most manage it in minutes. My 12 year old son can do it easily on the sim and fly an ILS at the end of it. The really hard stuff is making decisions and doing the radio at the same time. And a decent GPS makes a huge difference; without a GPS, preloaded with the planned route, an entry into IMC is a disaster.

If the headwind was much stronger than he thought his ETA would be incorrect? (This is was happened in the famous accident in the Andes with the football team aboard in the 70's)And in that more famous "Stendec" accident too. But I simply do not believe that any GA pilot would be such a masochist so as to do this kind of trip in IMC by dead reckoning. That was done in the old days when men were real men and the rest just died, and there was no other navigation option.

So I take it best to stay visual if possible even if it means going really low to get out of cloud. No, because once you are really low you may not be able to turn around without hitting the ground, or entering IMC. And if you enter IMC having been really close to terrain, you are likely to still be close to terrain when in IMC, and may hit it then. The only option then is a steep climb to MSA - a russian roulette.

The decision to do something (like turn back) needs to be done a long time before things get bad.

In flying, one must always play a long game - VFR or IFR.

When VFR, one must not get into a tight spot IMC-wise. Unless instrument capable, flight IFR-planned, and already at/above the MSA, and stuff like icing is OK, but you don't have any implied CAS clearance and this (trying to avoid a CAS bust while avoiding weather) probably kills many pilots.

When IFR, the game is similar in that one works hard to remain VMC and works to avoid nasty big clouds ahead, or (if not de-iced) any cloud if likely to be freezing. The difference with IFR (I mean proper IFR on an airways flight plan) is that you already have an implicit controlled airspace clearance so CAS is irrelevant. This is why pilots chuck out a chunk of their life to get the IR - the flexibility.

[bookworm]

A study was done in Canada years ago, and as it occurred during my PPL training,...

You're older than you look then ;)

This is a chinese whisper. The "178 seconds" statistics comes from a study conducted at UIUC more than 50 years ago. The interpretation of the results has been considerably distorted. The experiments were not conducted in a simulator, but rather in a Beech Bonanza. It had no AI, no DI, just a turn indicator. The pilots had had no instrument training of any sort as it wasn't part of the PPL syllabus at that time. Some of them had considerably less than 40 hours total time. None of them had soloed the Bonanza.

The point of the study was in fact to demonstrate the efficacy of a small amount of instrument training. Before that training, the mean time to loss of control in simulated IMC was indeed 178 seconds. After an average of 2 hours IF training, the experiment was repeated, and in 59 of 60 trials successfully made a 180 degree turn, maintaining control.

A number of aviation authorities have abused the 178-seconds statistic in the worthwhile cause of persuading pilots with little or no instrument training that flight in cloud is a risky proposition. It undoubtedly is.

[172driver]

Pilot DAR, out of interest - is the Canadian PPL very different from the FAA one? Reason I ask is that in FAA land part of the training and the checkride is recovery from unusual attitudes by instruments. Admittedly, this is done under the hood (although my instructor and I did practice it at night...), but still I'd find the times you give and which I don't doubt, worrying. 10 secs ???

Strictly legit VFR is so horribly limiting that the temptation to penetrate a bit of cloud here and there is absolutely massive.

Actually it's not too bad and you can fly cross Europe in it, if you can go 'on top'. But then, I'd know that only from my FAA ticket ;)

Bookworm, I think you clarified that bit.

[IO540]

Actually it's not too bad and you can fly cross Europe in it, if you can go 'on top'. But then, I'd know that only from my FAA ticketI agree, but actually you can do that (VMC on top) if you have the IMC Rating, too :)

Now get out fast while we have another 100 posts arguing that old chestnut :)

All my long VFR trips, all the way to Crete, would have been quite impossible without flying VMC on top. Well, not to anything even remotely resembling a time schedule.

Unfortunately, VMC on top is rarely a useful tool in the UK because the weather which gives us low cloud (warm front stuff) also brings high tops (FL100+) which is unflyable in most of the UK due to controlled airspace. It works a treat in France, Spain, Germany, and Austria (over the Alps).

[Pilot DAR]

Bookworm,

It would appear that I stand to be corrected. I'm old (ask my kids) but not that old! I recall in the mists of age, that if not that, a very similar study was done in an Air Canada DC-9 simulator, with what must have been very similar results. The Air Canada check pilot who participated was also a member of the flying club where I took my training in the 70's, and gave a presentation on the results of that effort. I conceed that it may not have been the same event, but it seems to me that the outcome was very similar. The intent was to demonstrate that although trained to a modest level, the pilots had difficulty maintianing the concentration, and scan of the instruments, and failed to recognize, or mis-identified an unusual attitude resulting from the failure to maintian straight and level.

Thus, my point being partly supported by my errant recollection, I stand by it, as it receds into history older than me!

172 driver, I cannot speak for the instrument training required during PPL training of this era, in Canada. I'm sure things have changed in the 35 years since I did my PPL. I can say that during my recent examination for PPL helicopter, I was examined for under the hood flying, simply to assure that I could indeed fly a safe 180 turn. I did, though only got a three out of four as a mark (I forgot to ask what I missed). The instruction given to me during my helicopter training was too brief. When the instructor came to be aware of my fixed wing flying experience, the instrument training was a check, not training. I passed, but should have done more and better.

I am therefore not the best person to ask about the differences in training on instruments - probably every pilot licensed since me has a better answer!

Pilot DAR

[Fuji Abound]

Bookworm is indeed correct - all those pilots spiralling to their death is a gross distortion.

Argue the case as you will, talk to the end of time about all the reasons why a pilot should not get himself into a situation when his scud running luck has run out, but it will still go on happening - it is why we are human.

The trick is dealing with it when it happens - because it will, and it could happen to you.

At best you have two options, at worst one.

A forced landing is one, if the terrain permits. The vast majority of forced landings even in poor terrain are usually survivable so long as the pilot does not depart from controlled flight.

The remaining alternative is inadvertent IMC. The trick is knowing when this is the only means of escape AND putting the plan into operation before it is to late. Clearly it is to late if the climb in IMC does not give you time to avoid terrain. Making that decision can only come with experience - it is always going to be a difficult decision to way the pros and cons of a forced landing, against a climb into IMC against pushing on in marginal VMC knowing that you might reach a point when a safe climb into IMC is also no longer an assured option.

In such an emergency can a non instrument rated pilot expect to survive?

I think they can. The instrument appreciation training in the PPL is reasonable. Maintaining a climb straight ahead on instruments really should not be beyond the wit of most pilots. With luck you will find the climb will take you through the layer. Even if it does not with help from AT you have a chance.

G-EMMA points out that she would be unable to handle partial panel. Well if there is a cascade of disasters, it is just not your day, and, I agree, you will do very very well to survive, but the chances of such a failure is very small.

In short I am not making light of a non instrument rated pilot feeling compelled to enter IMC in such circumstances - it is an emergency, it requires a mayday, but I think it is more than survivable. It is a measure of last resort, but, as I suggested earlier there will be times when some poor pilot somewhere will be out of options, he will judge that eventually inadvertent flight into IMC is his only option - the difficult part is making that decision before entry into IMC presents a serious threat of CFIT during the climb. However, he should not approach the emergency with the expectation of failure because he has read so many times disaster is inevitable. Follow the training you have been given, ensure at all cost the aircraft is properly trimmed to maintain the rate of climb and is balanced and assure yourself that you will handle the emergency as well as possible.

[Pace]

Fuji

You do make a very valid point which many VFR pilots forget in the press home itis.

Should the VFR pilot with no or little instrument training feel that he cannot any longer maintain VMC he can always make an off airport landing.
Most light aircraft especially singles have a low approach/touchdown speed and any reasonable field or clearance will usually allow a controlled landing.

Better to have a controlled landing even if you hit a hedge or damage the aircraft than an uncontrolled crash from altitude or blind into terrain.

Pace

[IO540]

I think the word press-on-itis should not be used.

It is just an excuse used by the PPL training business to deliver a partial product, without accepting responsibility for its shortcomings when the customers try to use it for something half real.

Same with all the other daft proverbs like 'better to be down withing you were up than being up wishing you were down' etc etc etc.

Imagine two airline pilots, having to turn around in 20 mins or whatever. Imagine the pressure. Yet, they don't crash very often, do they? Why not? The pressure is massive.

Pilots should instead make go/no-go decisions based on technical data, initially by looking at the weather etc before departure. This needs a bit of training on the procedures. Then keep the turn-back option open (always) during the flight. Or, if IFR, the climb on top option, etc. When I fly IFR, if I cannot outclimb the tops I turn back. Not had to do it yet, touch wood, but had to go to FL190 a few times.

[Pace]

10540

I cannot agree that the turn back option is always available especially in circumstances where the weather is moving in from the side rather than from the front of you and in the situation where the pilot is no longer sure of his/her position. Press-on-itis reflects a real situation where a pilot is put in a situation where he is no longer flying within his or the aircraft limits. It is natural for a pilot to want to get to his destination the Graham Hill accident from years ago was a good example. Typically for the VFR pilot its often a case in deteriorating visibility or lowering cloudbase to go on a little bit further in the hope that things improve.

Flying IFR long distance I have only ever turned back due to mechanical technical problems which mean going back to base to rectify the problem.
I have had diversions at destination or on route but they maybe 90 degrees to my track and not back.

If you are comparing airline pilots then that is because they are flying within their own and their aircrafts limits. Obviously their and their aircraft limits are far far higher than the basic PPL in a small light aircraft.

To G-EMMA it is well worth investing in a copy of Microsoft flight simulator or another instrument training programme for your home PC. Even these gamey flight sim programmes make excellent instrument scan and nav aid trainers.
When you are not flying they do keep you current.

In inadvertant flight into cloud consider how easy it is to fly the aircraft VFR when you have the aircraft properly trimmed. You need only the slightest touch and you can often fly along quite happily with your hand off the controls using the rudder pedals only to maintain a heading.

Aircraft fly quite happily its the pilots who cause the problems. Most light singles at least have some form of wing leveler to aid you.

when you start instrument training its like riding a bike but after a while it becomes second nature and you can be miles away thinking about what you are going to do at the weekend while naturally flying instruments :)

Pace

[Fuji Abound]

I recall a flight some years ago in a Chippy. The pilot was not instrument rated, and the aircraft was certainly lacking the nav aids. We set off in pretty marginal VFR conditions and proceeded very low level to our destination. I was “impressed” with the pilots ability to complete the flight, the accuracy and comfort with which he operated at very low level. Were we ever in any danger - probably not given the forecast, sea to the south and an improving base en route. Inevitably an engine failure would have required some quick reactions.

More recently my destination did not have an instrument approach. Moreover the passenger wanted to enjoy the scenery. I really enjoy flying low level. Conditions were marginal VFR below the base - it was typical scud running. As always the flight required a great deal of concentration (far more exhausting than flying on instruments). The weather conditions were both forecast and proved to be pretty consistent along the entire route. However this meant than even a small deterioration in the weather along the route would considerably erode the margin between the terrain and the base.

An area of rising ground and a small deterioration in the weather over the area demonstrated how easy it was for every escape route to quickly disappear. Turning back would not have produced a solution.

My point: Turning back can provide a very good solution to deteriorating weather and should be taken when ever possible. However it is not the panacea it is often made out to be. I suspect the problem often arises among more “experienced” pilots who feel capable of setting off in the first place in marginal VFR conditions. Since the conditions were always marginal, it is these very pilots who can quickly find the margin has been eroded, and when they are, the margin can be eroded over a wide area when the base descends by only a few hundred feet or the terrain rises by only a few hundred feet. Very quickly turning back is not an option.

Is the pilot guilty of press home itis? Probably not. He knew he was operating close to the margin in the first place and was more than capable of completing the trip in those conditions. The fatal mistake he makes is not recognising that the margin has become too small.

The ability in these circumstances to transition onto instruments can be a life saver. With a good GPS if in any doubt a 180 onto the reverse track and an immediate climb closely following the reverse track above the MSA provides a reasonably assured escape route without having to forward map read to ensure you are not going to run into something during the climb. Once above the MSA, with a predetermined instrument let down available the flight should be completed successfully.

In short if only a small change in the weather over the area you are flying would result in an inability to maintain VMC then in my view in the real world don’t be too surprised if turning back does not provide the solution you hoped for.

[IO540]

Not sure I agree there, Pace.

Every aircraft has limits and the pilot should not fly unless he knows what they are. Every pilot also has limits - legal ones (which likewise he should be aware of) and limits on what he and his passengers are willing to put up with.

The difference between an airline pilot and a private pilot is that the former has to follow strict go/no-go rules, written down in the company manuals and approach plates etc, and the other pilot is supposed to spill the beans on him if he busts them. PPL training is much more vague and that's what I don't like; IMHO with a little bit more one could achieve quite a lot.

As regards Graham Hill, the accident report (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/14_1976__n6645y.cfm) does not suggest he was reckless, IMHO. He was flying long before the days when every pilot with more than 2p to rub together could have perfect situational awareness delivered on a plate (a moving map GPS), when the best you could get was a VOR (a few miles out if a few tens of nm away from the navaid), an NDB (much worse, usually), and perhaps a DME/DME fix (accurate but impractical as a moving target) and he was relying on visual cues and other stuff.

[Fuji Abound]

Pace

Yes, I agree for the untrained instrument pilot the autopilot is the best gift the manufacturer has to make. Truly it is a life saver for inadvertent IMC.

With an increasing number of aircraft being fitted with three axis autopilots maintaining control in IMC should not be an issue. Combined with a decent moving map and bases that are not actually on the deck at your chosen diversion you have a very good chance if you let the automatics do the work.

The usual caveats apply that the autopilot does give up on you, or the weather is not so atrocious that either the autopilot, the airframe or the engine are unable to cope.

To save any pendant comment I am not recommending in any way a non instrument trained pilot embarking on IMC with or without an autopilot other than in an absolute emergency. :}

[Saab Dastard]

Maintaining a climb straight ahead on instruments really should not be beyond the wit of most pilots.

Fuji, I agree with that - but only in reasonably smooth air (even I have accomplished that as a vanilla VFR PPL!).

But in moderate to severe turbulence, where the wings are rarely level and there are significant up / downdrafts?

I am pretty sure that I couldn't cope on instruments for more than a few minutes before losing control in those conditions - and those are likely (although not always) to be the conditions in and around clouds, especially with high / rising ground.

SD

[chrisN]

CAP 780 Aviation Safety Review – 2008 has just been published. If interested, you can download it - go to the CAA website, search for CAP 780, save as target, and read at leisure.

"The most prevalent risk areas identified were:
• controlled flight into terrain;
• approach and landing accidents;
• loss of control in flight;
• in-flight fire;
• runway excursions; and
• runway incursions."

(Not read it yet, but that is all aviation, not just GA).

No doubt plenty of food for thought and discussion among those who wish to talk about accidents.

Chris N.