Preserving the monitoring function of PNF.

[A-Z]

In the company I work for the SOP for altimetry seems to go against the grain of tried and tested methods used around the world.
The handling pilot is responsible for lateral navigation, and for selecting which mode to climb or descend in. Vertical navigation is quite rightly prioritized, but is the responsibility of the non handling pilot, as it is him or her that is responsible for setting the altitude pre-select.

The problem is that the PNF is taken off monitoring duties, at the same time that the PF’s ability to monitor in return is seriously compromised. It is done in the interests of “bringing the PNF into the loop” but in fact negates the benefits of operating multi-crew. It is a legal requirement to operate our fleet of aircraft multi-crew, so is negating the benefit of having multi-crew negligence? And will it stand up to scrutiny in court the day after something unmentionable happens?

[A-Z]

DIRECTOR: “IMAGINAIR 123, turn right heading 280 degrees, descend now flight level 270, speed 280 when level.”

In the company you work for: the PNF was probably writing down the clearance as it came in, while the PF dialled the numbers into the boxes. Then the PNF looked up and checked that all the boxes had the right numbers in them, and if that was the case said “Heading checked, flight level 270 checked”. This is a robust executor and monitor loop, suited very well to all scheduled and charter type operations.

This is what happens in the flight deck I work on, when it works.

PF starts to turn the heading bug, but he hears the level change request from director so moves his hand away to give priority to the PNF to do his task while he holds the information he needs in his head (280 and 280).

PNF captures the information he needs (270) and dials it into the altitude pre-select. His hands are needed to do this, so he doesn’t write the clearance.

PF looks at the alt pre-select window and with his head full of 280 says 270 checked (because he remembers that there was another number, and he’s pretty sure that is what he sees in the alt pre-select window. With the absence of annotated comparison, is this a form of confirmation bias?).

PF then completes dialing 280 into the heading window while remembering speed 280 for when he levels out.

That was when it works! Can you imagine what happens when PNF dials in 280 into his bit? Exactly, “IMAGINAIR 123 TCAS decent”, or if the numbers were slightly different, “TERRAIN TERRAIN”, or worse, silence.

[411A]

Your second reply is slightly hard to follow, however, having flown one type (L1011) for a very long time, all operators I've worked for, do things thus...

PF makes his own heading and VNAV selections, and the First Officer, whether he is PF or not, makes the alt alert selection...simply because the box is way over on the right hand side of the glareshield.

In over twenty five years of flying this aeroplane, I cannot recall one time where this procedure did not work as advertised, quite safely.

I sometimes wonder if a few pilots 'worry' too much about who does what...and when.
Absolute strict regimentation sometimes leads to a few folks not seeing the forest for the trees.:}

[A-Z]

"First Officer, whether he is PF or not, makes the alt alert selection."

So you do have a clear delineation of who controls what.

My point however, is that I do regularly see minor problems occure in the monitoring loop, with this technique, and I submit that it is important to not erode the quality of the monitoring function. So, in your experience of busy airspace, when in say JFK, or LHR, do you believe one of the crew has to be work-loaded in such a way as to be able to "see the wood from the trees" and monitor the pilot flying?

[despegue]

Don't understand this.
PF handles the MCP, PM confirms. simple as that. No two hands doing the same job, that always will cause confusion. KISS Keep It Simple Stupid!!!!!

[Rananim]

A-Z,
We live in a world of dwindling flying skills,nervous chief pilots and unforgiving insurance men..the result is this obsession with SOP and political correctness.
As 411a so rightly says:
Absolute strict regimentation sometimes leads to a few folks not seeing the forest for the trees

In a two-crew aircraft,one pilot flies the thing and the other guy(PM/PNF whatever the politically correct term is these days) keeps an eye on what hes doing and handles the radio.A lot of these new airlines dont really know all that much about flying so they make it up as they go along.I came across one that prohibited visual approaches,another that didnt like VS mode(the sweetest vertical mode there is),yet another that said you had to use intercom on a friggin jetliner.If the truth be told,the only SOP's you'll ever need can be written on a couple of lines and they'd include the two-communication rule,the V1 GO rule,the standard minima call-outs,the MCP altitude x-check,and good checklist discipline.

[411A]

Rananim is, in my not-so humble opinion...100 percent CORRECT.
Full stop.

[A-Z]

This is good stuff. Keep it coming. I initiated the thread because I am largely in agreement with you about our prescribed SOPs and hoped to find some consensus. I do think that in an organization that attracts people from different backgrounds (such as ours) it is important to have a robust set of SOPs, call-out triggers and responses, but as you so rightly point out, communication and good checklists are the key. As for political correctness I just treat people the way I would want to be treated.

Now if I can only persuade the company to do it the tried and tested way...:ugh:

[Rananim]

Rananim is, in my not-so humble opinion...100 percent CORRECT.


Okay,I exaggerated a little to illustrate a point.Always keep things simple.Thats the key to good flying.The procedure described by A-Z is convoluted and for no valid reason.The PF brings the PNF into the loop by having him cross-check what's just been set on the MCP.

[A37575]

Makes you wonder how these people would ever cope with a pilot incapacitation where one pilot does the lot. Maybe he couldn't cope and the aircraft will crash...

Also how on earth do pilots today cope with a single pilot operation and I mean real single pilot like a F18 or in my days a Mustang (the Rolls Royce type - not the baby jet). Man - it must be a real jungle out there in 2008..

[A-Z]

In single crew operations the executor and monitor functions of the pilot are optimised differently. Surely the differences between single crew and multi crew operations were made quite clear during your military flight training.

The reason this thread is here is in an effort to encourage and collate some serious and objective assessment of flightdeck procedures of multi-crew aircraft operators across the board.

Thank you all for your responses so far.