GOM Air Log crash and AEL ems crash

[havoc]

One dies in Gulf helicopter crash
Sunday, December 30, 2007From staff reports
An Air Logistics helicopter crashed with four people aboard Saturday about 6 p.m. two miles east of a jetty halfway up Southwest Pass, the Coast Guard said.
One person died in the crash. Of the three survivors, one was airlifted to a hospital to be treated for hypothermia, the Coast Guard said.
The Coast Guard said it received a distress call from a shrimp vessel, Sally Kim 4, reporting that a helicopter had crashed and that the boat's crew had recovered three people.
The Coast Guard station in Venice sent two boats to the scene. A rescue helicopter had to return to base because of stormy weather.
A Southwest Pass pilot boat also assisted in the search for the fourth passenger.
Air Evac helicopter crashes during search; no survivors reported
By Tom Smith
Senior Staff Writer
Last Updated:December 30. 2007 4:19AM
Published: December 30. 2007 3:30AM
Last Modified: December 30. 2007 4:19AM
An Air Evac helicopter searching for a lost hunter crashed early today in a wooded area of Colbert County. There were no survivors, authorities said.
The crash happened at about 3 a.m. just off Mount Mills Road. The crash scene is south of Barton.
It was unclear as of 4 a.m. how many people were inside the helicopter. Officials said Air Evac normally uses three-man crews.
Air Evac is an air ambulance service, which also assists in search and rescue missions.
Emergency management personnel began searching for the hunter at about 1 a.m., according to Mike Melton, director of the Colbert County Emergency Management Authority.
One man involved in the search said the Air Evac crew had spotted the man just before 3 a.m. and were holding a spotlight on him to show ground searchers where to find him. Suddenly, the helicopter crashed, causing a huge explosion.
The hunter was uninjured, officials said.
Melton said investigators with the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Security Board were dispatched to the scene just before 4 a.m. and will handle the investigation into what caused the crash.

[tottigol]

Both accidents are really self explanatory.

[Cyclic Hotline]

They are?

Maybe you could explain them to me, as I am obviously not smart enough to understand what occurred in either occurence?

[helonorth]

Self explanatory? In what way? Cause? Does your post have a purpose?

[SASless]

Perhaps I miss something here Tott?

A few quick questions....

What was an AEL EMS helicopter doing searching for a lost hunter?

Why would the helicopter hover while pointing the light....would not a safe orbit at some safe height not make the aircraft much more visiible to folks on the ground?

Just what happened to the Air Log aircraft?

Why was a survivor suffering from hypothermia....is not the Gulf of Mexico such a benign environment that immersion suits are not required in the event of a ditching?

Did the aircraft have internal or external life rafts?

Perhaps you wrote that comment while you were on night shift and were not at top form due to the lack of sleep?

Critical analysis of every accident to surface data for "Lessons Learned" ought to be a basic part of every accident investgation and then be used to improve the existing way of doing business with a view towards preventing future accidents of the same kind and enhancing the survivability of those folks involved in such events.

Sorry Tott but I can think of lots of questions posed by the two crashes.

[arismount]

GOM water temperature at this time of year is pretty cold. Latest water temperature reading from the Galveston, TX sea buoy is 60F/15C. Under those conditions and without any protective garments, you will lose dexterity in about 40 minutes. Exhaustion or loss of consciousness will occur in from 2 to 7 hours.

[MSP Aviation]

One man involved in the search said the Air Evac crew had spotted the man just before 3 a.m. and were holding a spotlight on him to show ground searchers where to find him. Suddenly, the helicopter crashed, causing a huge explosion.

So why exactly does everyone assume the aircraft was hovering?

[Cyclic Hotline]

Your powers of perception are incredible. Not one, but a second psychic genius who knows precisely what occurred without any information beyond the news reports.

Maybe you are correct, but then again maybe no-one has shared any of the information regarding what occurred?

I find this pretty amazing that anyone can offer such an informed guess. While it certainly may be one scenario, what purpose does any of this speculation serve?

I'm surprised the FAA and NTSB don't contact you directly following every accident or incident as you would be able to save a huge amount of time and effort, in fact they could probably disband both organizations.

[IHL]

This type of accident shouldn't happen. Flying at night over featureless terrain is not VFR its IFR.

In order to avoid this type of accident (CFIT) these types of operations-night offshore and SAR- require an IFR capable aircraft and 2 qualified and capable IFR pilots, and if you are doing SAR at night you need specialized training.

[tottigol]

SAS, Um, Flung, ya'll hit the nail on the head.
One small detail that got me baffled is that the GoM helicopter was flying at 6:00 PM, and it was a blue helicopter.
SAS as far as your thoughts regarding the EMS helicopter doing a "Search and Assist" mission at night, they are exactly what I though.
Maybe Devil49 can jump in and provide more detail, I believe he flies in that neck of the woods.
We have all flown both types of jobs and some in that very same type of a/c involved in the crashes, it does indeed deeply saddens me that time and time again someone can still allow himself/herself to get caught in situations like these.
My comment did not by any mean have the intention of being sarchastic nor show a lack of respect, far from that, I grieve those losses like everyone else and I am actually enraged by the uselessness of them.
The sadder part is that if the crash investigations reveal nothing wrong with the airframes (if at all), it shall than be "pilot error" and no one, NO ONE up the chain of command shall give a damn about their direct responsibilities in the chain of events, nor shall they pay a dime for them.:(
Cyclic Hotline, thank you for the compliment.

[PO dust devil]

Condolences.

I have thought this often over the years I have been involved in EMS/SAR/etc. As well as or in many cases INSTEAD of Pilot error....Maybe there needs to be a category of "tasking" error with appropriate post incident accountability.

What would possess a tasking agency/911/Operations manager to dispatch a single engined VFR single pilot aircraft at night to look for a hunter who is probably hold up under a tree, camo nomex jacket or a camo poncho. IMHO this is the type of task reserved for tasking agencies to call a crew IN TIME FOR first light departure.

Risking three lives to look for someone who is missing but otherwise condition uncertain is bizarre. But, I wasn't there and DO NOT cast judgement on that unfortunate crew.

DD

[gwelo shamwari]

flungdung - How do you know what the weather conditions where like in Southwest Pass? where you out flying there when this happened? actually do you even know where Southwest Pass is? The company involved has the most restrictive policy concerning flight in marginal conditions in the entire GOMEX.

So far there is actually very little information on what actually transpired. So I suggest that before you open your mouth and put forth a baseless conclusion you wait for the details to come out.

Lets not forget that a life was lost.

People like you make me ill.

[tottigol]

Does it now? the accident apparently took place at 6PM, it was well over 45 minutes after sunset.
Care to explain THAT to us Top Gun Zulu?
The weather was less than lousy yesterday in that part of the gulf, we do get regular bulletins down here, and WE ARE HERE.

[HeloBeez]

Is it verified that it was 1800 hrs when the Southwest Pass crash occurred? And was it verified that it was a single pilot ( and thus VFR ) Airlog aircraft? If so, that's highly unusual for GOMEX ops. ( yes I fly there ). We don't fly after sunset, much less after twilight in a VFR aircraft, and sunset this time of year is approx 17:00.

My condolences to the families.
Beez

[SASless]

Seems my questions raised some interesting responses.

The conventional wisdom in the GOM is Immersion suits of any kind are not needed even in the winter.

Thankfully, the survivors were plucked out of the water within a few hours. Imagine if they had to spend the night out bobbing in the oggin without benefit of a raft or immersion suit. What would have been the probability of a safe rescue then?

Only a very few EMS operations train for Search and are capable of doing rescues. I can confirm the forested areas of Arkanasa can be mighty dark at the best of times.

How equipped are AEL Jet Rangers for instrument flight? Radar Altimeters and the rest of the goodies installed?

Tott has always been a positive contributor to Rotorheads and by his admission confirms what we all know. Ask Devil 49 about the dangers of middle of the night operations.

Air Log certainly will be trying to determine why that aircraft was out at night in bad weather in apparant violation of their policies.


We have to be careful out there.....

[helonorth]

Not much about the GOM accident makes sense unless it was a IFR ship.
I cannot ever imagine Air Log sending a VFR single after dark. It just
doesn't happen. Even in good weather as far as I know. Tottogol,
your posts are about as coherent as Vermillion Bay on a foggy
January morning. What do you know about the accident that
makes it "useless(ness)"?

[tottigol]

Well Helonorth, I am sorry to say you are wrong. The GoM accident involved a Bell 206L of the guys in blue.
It apparently happened at 18:00 or thereabouts in the SW Pass area, glad I was not there yesterday as the WX sucked with heavy thunderstorms moving W to E late in the afternoon.
Happy to see you enjoy Vermillion Bay WX, out of.....ICY perhaps?
I made no comments regarding this crash, other than self explanatory.
I could go at lenghts in discussing the EMS crash, but it's not my intent, as it seems that many experienced colleagues posting on these pages were able to reach conclusions without my support.
Enough of this, penalty the risk of lowering this forum to level of ones preferred by other types.
Cheers.


Coast Guard Responding to Helicopter Crash
Posted By John on December 29th, 2007

NEW ORLEANS - Coast Guard crews are responding to a helicopter crash with four passengers onboard which occured at approximately 6 p.m. today two miles east of the jetty approximately halfway up the Southwest Pass.

Coast Guard Sector New Orleans received a mayday call from the shrimp vessel Sally Kim 4 reporting that an Air Logistics helicopter had crashed and they have recovered three passengers.

Coast Guard Station Venice is arriving on scene with 33-foot and 41-foot small boats. Air Station New Orleans attempted to launched and HH-65C rescue helicopter crew but had to return to base due to inclement weather. A Southwest Pass pilot boat is also on scene assisting in the search for the one remaining helicopter crew member.

[helonorth]

Glad you hold yourself to a higher standard!

[Devil 49]

Y'all, I don't know anything about the AEL crash in Alabama besides what's in the media- three people went out at night, to find a somebody in the woods, and quickly found him. I've read that the search started at 0130, and at 0305, it was over, with the AEL crew dead. An aside- I've flown as part of a Gulf of Mexico multiple aircraft search that took 8 hours to find somebody less than a mile from their platform's location. The AEL crew did spectacularly well in a difficult task.
I've flown enough hunters out of the woods to understand the feeling of urgency when a solo hunter's missing. If you don't know anything except someone's not where they planned to be, that's all it is, a "feeling"- fear. That's a pretty skinny reason to put someone's life on the line.
The last night search I was party to resulted in: an arrest for false report; a search team finding a very cranky bear; and one rescuer being medevaced.
There's lots of things that can go wrong and not much opportunity for correction if you're low, slow, with nowhere to go, at night, distracted, holding a spotlight on a ground position, especially in a 206- LTE- some of the articles describe the helo as hovering before it crashed.

[tottigol]

A news update reports one of the ground rescue team members having seen the helicopter striking a feeder line to a nearby steam powerplant.
A mayday call was supposedly made.

[120torque]

after checking on a friend working for air log who thankfully wasn't flying that day I believe it was a 206L as previously reported. pilot survived. also there seems to be 2 versions of survivors in the news. 1 version is that 4 people taken to hospital 2nd ver is only 3 people found 1 missing. any more news ?

[ECB4]

I beg to differ. I believe night and bad weather were/are FACTORS in so many of these sad and sorry occurrences. ( Maybe not these two)
In my own personal experience the wisdom and the courage to say NO has been the biggest single factor in my situations that I would not like to repeat.
Condolences to the the loved ones of those lost, especially at this time of year.
Happy New Year to you all and may God grant you the wisdom to make the right decisions and the intestinal fortitude to live with the consequences.

[Gomer Pylot]

I have seen serious mistakes in FAA preliminary reports, and the media get it wrong more often than right. I've seen the wrong aircraft type on the FAA site more than once, and many of them read as if the writer had never even seen a picture of an aircraft. I'll wait for an NTSB report to see what actually happened in both these accidents.

[Cyclic Hotline]

I'm with you Gomer.

It is absolutely incredible that by post #2 of this thread;

Both accidents are really self explanatory.


and some following posts appear to agree with the same interpretation.

Now it is my turn to surmise and interpret these comments - it is OBVIOUSLY the fault of each of the pilots involved. No consideration to FACT; circumstance, for the pilot; aircraft; external or internal conditions; physical condition of the aircraft or systems; failures of any kind - nothing - just that they are really self explanatory!

Well, I'm sorry, but I don't see anything self explanatory about either? Maybe I'm not smart enough to see what is so self explanatory about any of this?

The one thing that is self explanatory is the immediate rush to ignore any facts (the outcome is the sole fact at this time) and immediately pin all the blame on the pilot.

I hope to God that no-one ever does that to you, should you have the misfortune to be involved in an accident!

Unbelievable. :mad:

[helonorth]

Yeah, the "self explanatory" thing was a pretty callous comment.
Letting people make inane comments on this "professional" forum
should not go unchallenged. As for the GOM accident, I think we are
going to find it happened closer to 4:00. Please, no more nasty-grams
tottigol.

[Cyclic Hotline]

Some FACTS. Both preliminary reports are at; http://origin.www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/preliminary_data/media/J_1231_N.txt

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 211EL Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER

Date: 12/29/2007 Time: 2350

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Fatal Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
City: NEW ORLEANS State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N211EL, A BELL 206L-1 ROTORCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, THERE WERE FOUR PERSONS ON BOARD, ONE WAS FATALLY INJURED, ONE SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES, AND TWO SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, LOCATED 65 MILES FROM NEW ORLEANS, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 1
# Crew: 4 Fat: 1 Ser: 1 Min: 2 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: NOT REPORTED

OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER


FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 12/31/2007

[Devil 49]

And a video interview with an NTSB investigator:

http://www.timesdaily.com/article/20071231/NEWS/712310326/frontpage?forceuserreg=1

[tottigol]

I have a question for the coscientious in this group:
Let's suppose you are out there not "really" doing what you're supposed to do, but you've been there before and were lucky; so you go and do it again, only this time something happens, perhaps the engine fails, perhaps you have LTE, perhaps your T/R fails, perhaps there are power lines or some embedded thunderstorm that's too dark to see.
What is the NTSB report going to say?
Are we going to blame Rolls Royce? Bell? The Power Company? Or the lack of NVGs?
Is it the NTSB job to keep us from painting us in those corners, or is the guy/girl looking at you in the mirror whom is supposed to do that?

God bless their Souls and may they all rest to the right of the Lord.

Happy New Year Celebration to all.

[C of G]

NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On December 29, 2007, at 1531 central standard time, a single-engine Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, impacted the water in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of control during approach. One passenger was fatally injured, while the commercial pilot and two other passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter was owned and operated by Air Logistics LLC., of New Iberia, Louisiana. The flight originated from offshore platform Chandelier 63 and was destined for offshore platform South Pass 38, both in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. All times in this report will be based on central standard time using the 24-hour format.

In a telephone interview with the NTSB, the pilot reported encountering a "sloping cloud deck" as he approached the offshore platform for landing. The pilot added that while in a left turn to final approach, he began slowing the helicopter to 20-25 knots and encountered a tail wind. The pilot noticed a settling tendency and reduced the left bank. Additionally, the pilot reported experiencing vibrations and shaking from the helicopter. The pilot added forward cyclic and increased power. The vibration and shaking became worse and the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event. Due to the low altitude, the pilot was unable to recover the helicopter or deploy the emergency floatation devices prior to water impact. All four occupants survived the initial crash and egressed the helicopter.

A life raft was not deployed prior to the helicopter sinking. The four personnel attempted to swim to the unmanned platform located approximately 100 yards away and were separated by the 8 to 10 foot wave swells. Personnel were located by local boats and the United States Coast Guard. The pilot, who was the last survivor to be rescued from the water, was in the water for approximately 2 and 1/2 hours.

The helicopter sank in approximately 115 feet of water. The helicopter was located and recovery is in progress. Upon recovery the helicopter will be transported to a secure facility pending examination at a later date.

The pilot reported the weather at South Pass 38 was estimated to start at 500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility and reduce to approximately 300 feet ceiling and one mile visibility on final. At 1751 an automated weather reporting facility located about 22-nautical miles to the northwest reported winds from 030 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 1,000- feet, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 51 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.05 inches of Mercury.
Index for Dec2007 | Index of months


Just thought I'd point out to Tott, that it wasn't 18:00 as he reported twice.

[tottigol]

18:00 was the time of the Emergency message from the shrimp boat, apparently when they found the survivors.
Nobody was looking for this helicopter in over two hours that it was missing?

Was a VFR flight plan ever filed with flight following?

From the NTSB report it appears that SP38 was his destination.

Guess what, I believe the rest is...............self explanatory.;)

I hope ya'll can read a report.

[slgrossman]

Enhanced operational control has made great strides in reducing the occurrence of just this sort of mishap in the Gulf of Mexico. However, this one apparently slipped through the crack. While pilot error may well be assigned as the primary cause in this accident, there appears to be plenty of blame left over for a system or supervisor which allowed him to proceed into unsuitable weather.
-Stan-

[FH1100 Pilot]

Stan Grossman noted:...There appears to be plenty of blame left over for a system or supervisor which allowed him to proceed into unsuitable weather.Maybe, Stan, but maybe not. You know better than I what the current policies are when there are areas of bad weather about. But isn't the pilot still the final judge? We know the weather that day was up and down. Is Enhanced Operation Control good enough that it can pinpoint areas and have the Lead Pilots (or whomever) say, "Don't go there." This flight was from two platforms relatively close to the beach. And the pilot did report that he generally had a 500' ceiling in the area of Southwest Pass.

It's very tough, as you know Stan. The weather in the GOM is rarely "smoothly" bad...in other words, the same level of "bad" in every area. On bad-weather days, it's often "okay" in some/most places and "really, really crappy" in others. And those "really, really crappy" areas move. I'm sure the Lead Pilots rely on a variety of resources for their Operational Control decisions...primarily reports from the pilots who are actually out there.

tottigol asked:Nobody was looking for this helicopter in over two hours that it was missing?As in all things, the answer is "it depends."

If the pilot had not closed his flight plan, then Air Log would normally start looking for him at his stated ETA. However, many GOM pilots close their flight plans when they are on final or get "reasonably" close to their destination in contravention of the rules in the Operations Manual. If a flight plan is closed, then nobody will begin looking for the aircraft until two hours has passed - the famous "two-hour checks." Even when we're shut down safely on a platform all day, we still have to check-in every two hours just to let the company know we're okay.

So...*if* an immediate search was not begun, then we can assume that the flight plan was closed.

At South Pass 38 is very close to "land" (or what constitutes land in south Louisiana), just to the north and east of what most people identify as the "mouth" of the Mississippi River (although there are numerous outlets) at the entrance to what is called East Bay between Southwest Pass and South Pass. The pilot *should* have been able to be in contact with Air Log Ops while sitting on the deck.

Some pilots will close their flight plan prematurely if they are landing at a distant platform at which VHF communication with the Comm Center is "iffy" or doubtful. Some pilots then get into the habit of doing this everywhere. It is a grave error. During my 13 years at PHI, I knew plenty of pilots who would routinely call "landing" when they were still a mile or two out! Or they'd take-off and not file their new plan until they were well underway. This left them in what we called a "flight-following void"...i.e. being airborne and on a flight without a plan, which is counter to the FARs.

At such platforms without direct VHF commo (and there are quite a few in PHI's system), I used to open up a 30-minute "local" flight plan. That way, if anything happened and I was not able to get a call off, I knew PHI would start looking for me within thirty minutes. If I ended up simply landing and shutting down, I'd walk downstairs, pick up the phone, close my flight plan and start the two-hour check cycle.

So there are ways of doing it right.

We do not know whether this Air Log pilot's plan was open or closed. However, if there was a long delay in beginning the search, the ONLY assumption must be that he was not on a flight plan for some reason. But from the NTSB report and the pilot's statements to that agency, it sounds like he's already admitted to a downwind landing. Why? There is no excuse for doing that, and certainly no excuse for admitting it! At least, not until all the facts of the case are known. (We pilots sure do like incriminating ourselves - but that is another topic for another thread.)

What makes me scratch my head is the report of 8 to 10 foot swells. Eight to ten feet! In that relatively protected area?? I'll tell you what, the wind must have been howling to generate waves of that height. Something doesn't seem right. OR...perhaps the northeast surface wind was light and the big swells were from the south and leftover from the nasty system that had just passed through. (My personal assumption is that there was a storm cell in the area and the winds were high. But this is troubling; any GOM pilot worth his salt can quickly and easily discern wind direction/velocity from the water surface.)

Obviously, there was a lot of bad weather in the area. I've made my share of landings to platforms that were just about to "go under." That close to the "beach," the pilot had plenty of options if the landing had to be aborted. Dry land in the form of the levees on either side of the Mississippi River were a mere minute away to the west. Also, there were plenty of other platforms/landing sites in the area. So it wasn't like SP38 was the only place to set down for miles around...

The pilot stated to the NTSB that he didn't pop the floats "due to the low altitude." Huh? This is a strange admission. Was he not at 300 feet when he turned final? The floats were most certainly armed (that's a given) and the "trigger" is as close as your right-hand ring finger. If you know you're going into the water, even from 300 feet, it doesn't take a lot to pull that switch. So there's another thing I would not have admitted to the feds.

When the accident sequence begins, things start happening very, very quickly. It takes a few beats for our minds (and hands) to catch-up. People think that flying in the GOM is so "easy" or unchallenging. And they're wrong. I don't know what the exact weather was as this poor pilot was beginning his ill-fated approach to SP38, but it very quickly went sour and out of control. All of us who've flown in the GOM have been in his place, making a low-weather approach in high winds.

If I were to criticize this pilot now, the only thing I'd say to him is, "KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT!"...at least until things have settled and he can collect his thoughts and we can figure out what went wrong. I know he feels awful right now. But as it is, he's stepped on his unit big time already with those statements to the NTSB, no matter what his ultimate level of responsibility for the crash will be.

[helonorth]

Doesn't sound like weather had much to do with it (other than the wind
blowing the wrong way). Hard for a system or supervisor to keep
someone from making a downwind approach. Curious as why the floats
didn't get deployed. Oh, I guess that would be "self explanatory". I'll
resist the urge to put up the little winky face.

[tottigol]

Bob, you're speculating and Helonorth and Cyclic Hotline shall be stomping their feet.

Here's the wink for you HNorth;)

[slgrossman]

FH1100 Pilot & helonorth,

I had been flying that day out of Morgan City. We enjoyed the same weather system earlier that brought such joy to the Venice area. Due to the wind, convective weather, and the intermittent low clouds and vis I would not have considered flying my IFR-capable medium twin under VFR. I can't imagine that the weather in Venice was much better than what I had seen.

The scenario that seems most likely to me is that due to inadequate supervision an eager but inexperienced pilot was allowed to go out into a combintion of weather conditions that overloaded his capabilities. Did he display poor judgement? Probably. Did he display poor piloting skill? On that occasion, apparently yes. But was he solely responsible for the decision to make that flight, and if so, why?

Some may see management entering the decision-making loop as interference and an infringement on their prerogative as PIC, but on many occasions it's the saving grace that takes the pressure (real or perceived) off the back of the pilot. I'm not advocating that we absolve the pilot of guilt, but by the same token, let's not overlook the responsibility of the manager in this situation.

-Stan-

[helonorth]

Why would Cyclic Hotline and myself be stomping our feet? Apparently
you feel some new information vindicates whatever it is you've been
trying to say. I just thought it was funny that you bought the whole
thing that it went into the water at 6:00. Even I figured that out.
When I posted that it didn't make sense that a 206 would be flying
then, you "corrected" me that it was indeed a 206, when I meant that
I couldn't figure out why a 206 was out in the DARK. Oh well, have a
good time and thanks for the winky face.

To fh1100 pilot: I like the idea of opening a local when you can't get
flight following on the deck, but I bet 1 out of three times the pilot
would head for the fridge and forget to call and close, if there was a
phone. The Blue Sky system will fill the gap.

[tistisnot]

There has been a dumbing down of Pprune in the last months due to people's innate desire to display their knowledge, insider's knowledge, and wisdom before any real facts have emerged (fine they may have been correct - but not many and it just leads to stupid bitching, and now flungdung spitting out his dummy and leaping out of the cot). Probably the result of spreading the proverbial!.

Moderators ... are we there? As we seem unable to regulate ourselves and our two'penn'orth - why not simply state that comments should be left until a preliminary report (well done C of G) has been received and posted, from the authority? Thankfully this latest one, with survivors, was able to be clear and concise - and then you can say what the hell you like, before making an ass of yourself? :oh:

And quite right about keeping your mouth shut (meaning opinions) when speaking to the Feds post accident - but of course, if you had a Union that would have been the instruction you would already have had from them!!! Sorry, I digress but couldn't resist - perhaps another topic ......

[FH1100 Pilot]

tistisnot:And quite right about keeping your mouth shut (meaning opinions) when speaking to the Feds post accident - but of course, if you had a Union that would have been the instruction you would already have had from them!!! Sorry, I digress but couldn't resist - perhaps another topic ......
But the Air Log pilot *is* in a union! His union rep should have met him at the hospital. I'm surprised he did not counsel the pilot to keep his big mouth shut and just say, "I'm too rattled right now. I've just been in a crash, you know, and I don't really remember much. I'll have to collect my thoughts. Let my head clear and if you'll give me your number I'll get back to you as soon as I can."

The rules only state that we have to report the accident within a given amount of time. Nowhere does it say we have to incriminate ourselves by writing the NTSB's report for them before the wreckage has even cooled.


Stan Grossman:I had been flying that day out of Morgan City. We enjoyed the same weather system earlier that brought such joy to the Venice area. Due to the wind, convective weather, and the intermittent low clouds and vis I would not have considered flying my IFR-capable medium twin under VFR. I can't imagine that the weather in Venice was much better than what I had seen.Well that brings up a good question: Were any of PHI's small ships flying out of Boothville that afternoon?

And you are quite right about Enhanced Operational Control taking at least some of the burden off the pilot. I can't stand when somebody tells me I *have* to go, but I really don't mind somebody from management telling me that I can't go. You don't want me to make the flight? No sweat off of my...nose! Takes the pressure right of, it does.

helonorth:I like the idea of opening a local when you can't get
flight following on the deck, but I bet 1 out of three times the pilot
would head for the fridge and forget to call and close, if there was a
phone.Yeah, and so what? Worst thing that happens is that some Comm Spec has to track down a helicopter that is safely shut-down on a deck somewhere. And yeah, it's happened to me once or twice (he says with a shrug). They always acted all peeved, like I had committed some heinous crime. But I was, like, "Get over it, it's your job." Better that they have to look for me that way than have me close the plan in the air, then go in the drink have to wait for a couple of hours before they noticed I was missing.

[tistisnot]

Yup, sorry - distracted by your mention of PHI ... apple-oggies.

[gwelo shamwari]

Weather was bad enough for a Level 2 - no flight with out base manager approval - in the venice area. Seemingly he did have approval from the base manager. The pilot (relatively new with only a few months with the company) seems to have continue flight in bad to worsening conditions.

Looks like to me like inadequate supervision by management, to let an inexperienced pilot go out into a combination of weather conditions that overloaded him.

I have known many occasions that management has entered the loop to take the pressure off the back of the pilot. Does not seem to have happened this time.

Not only does the pilot but also management has a share in this.

[SASless]

Perhaps a real detailed, impartial investigation of the GOM accident might prove to be beneficial to the operator and either a validation of the flight dispatch approval method or a determination of how the system failed to prevent this tragedy could be accomplished.

Weather being rather fickle sometimes.....even the best of us with the very best of intentions can find ourselves stuck way out at the tippy end of a very high limb.

[AndyJB32]

I'm not sure if i've picked up some of the comments incorrectly, but in the GOM are the base managers involved in the decision to fly or not?
I fly in the north sea, and in 9 years of flying there have never felt any pressure to fly in weather conditions or circumstances that both crew members weren't happy with.
As i say, i may have mis-read some of the comments, but find it incredible if some other people other than the flying crew are making decisions about whether a flight can go or not.
My question is meant as a general question, and not implying anything about these particular incidents: until a final reprt comes out with all the details on it, i don't see how anyone can be sure what caused the crashes.
Andy

[Gomer Pylot]

Depends on the company, and on the manager. I've had managers try their best to get pilots to fly when they didn't think it was safe. All they cared about was increasing flights, thus revenue, to make themselves look good. I've had managers call a halt to flights when I personally thought the weather was flyable. In this case, I would never argue. In the first case, the pilots have to learn to just say no. It can be difficult, though, unless they all stick together and refuse. I've seen it happen a few times.

[ShyTorque]

In the first case, the pilots have to learn to just say no. It can be difficult, though, unless they all stick together and refuse. I've seen it happen a few times.

Well said! Sometimes saying NO can be very difficult....

I once had some distinctly cold phone conversations with a senior police control room supervisor after he tried to night task us into terrible winter weather conditions to search for two experienced and well-equipped hikers, who were unaccounted for "somewhere in the hills".

At this stage they didn't even have a start point and so we were expected to search something in the region of 400 square miles in the dark. This was in a single pilot, "floppy stick" unstabilised and definitely non-IFR helicopter.

We had already scrubbed one job early that night because of very low cloud and big, heavy snow showers coming in.

The job came in via normal channels and as the pilot, I was asked for advice by the police observers. I immediately confirmed it was unsafe to go because the search area was in hills over 2000 ft high, in a very large and heavy snow storm and dense fog, as reported by the ground units in that area.

As soon as the phone went down, it rang again and it was the supervisor (a chief inspector) trying to persuade me to get airborne because the media were involved! I again refused, He then advised me I could easily fly round the hills to the north and try from that side. I reminded him the weather was totally unsuitable for visual contact flight and that it was unsafe to launch the aircraft, if nothing else on the probability of numbers (lose three and the helicopter looking for two).

He told me he was going to contact the chief pilot the following day. I reminded him that was myself.... He then said he would contact the neighbouring county's ASU and request their assistance, I said "Go ahead!"

He did and they immediately refused to launch, same reasons. He rang me back and said he wanted us to launch; I again refused. He then told me he was going to contact RAF SAR. He did, they also refused the job due to the appalling weather; even the ground units came down off the hills due to the worsening conditions and the threat of them being trapped by snow.

A car belonging to the hikers was later found in a layby, so we had a start point. We eventually did launch into clear air, some two hours later, after midnight, when the snow storms had passed by us. Fifteen miles on we saw the hills ahead still shrouded in a huge snow storm so we returned to base and called it a night. We received a third, sarcastic phone call from the supervisor on our return. :=

The two hikers (man and son) went back to their car the following day and drove home; they had tented down for the night, eaten, drank and slept well and were perfectly safe and healthy. They were totally unaware of the search until they got home and relatives told them. :hmm:

I met with the UEO the next day; and I had my say!!

It's easy to be remembered as another sad statistic in this game.

[AndyJB32]

That's frightning. I guess in the north sea we have a fairly protected flying enviroment - if i was ever put in a situation like that, where i felt i was being put under unreasonable pressure to fly, there are management structures in place that i could use to put in complaints (either by having an off the record conversation, or if it seemed appropriate, an official complaint in writing) against either the individual involved, or the system which allowed the individual to apply that pressure.

I guess there are pros and cons to flying for big companies, but one plus side to working for a larger company is that there isn't any fear of personal come-back if one decides to put in a reasonable complaint. The large management structure and HR dept. can be the source of endless frustration, but it does also offer a large degree of protection.

Andy

[SASless]

Andy Lad,

The "big companies" are made up of small individual operations....where you are within that organization determines if "pressure is applied".

Not once in the North Sea did I ever feel pressured.....in fact the other pilots went out of their way to work together in that regard.

Same company in a very warm place know for its corruption and kidnappings was just the opposite.....but some of the management had no qualms about encouraging one to ignore takeoff minimums or the locally accepted go/no go standard (something about a radio mast and a refinery flare being visible). The TRE/IRE would regularly depart knowing the mast and flare were not in sight then find himself in a pickle getting back home.

The rest of us continued to sit in the tea room and wait for the flare and mast to appear then get going on the days work.

At another operation where bachelor pilots lived in a squalid place known as "Colditz", the CP went ballistic because two of us refused to fly until we could review the Tech Logs (seems the CP and CE had been out on the Piss the night before and slept over) which were under lock and key in the CE's office.

Being "Big" does not cure the ills.

[Devil 49]

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20080109X00032&key=1

[SASless]

No mention of power lines or towers/poles.....?

Lots of witnesses it would appear...

LTE?

[120torque]

Was there any lead found near the accident ??http://www.pprune.org/forums/images/infopop/icons/icon5.gif

[Gomer Pylot]

The lead NTSB investigator specifically said, in a news interview, that there were no powerlines found in the area. If the witnesses are to be believed (and they seldom can be, completely) there seems to be a couple of possibilities. The fireball from the engine while in flight could have been caused by severely overtemping the engine, or the engine could have simply let go on its own, causing the subsequent events. LTE is certainly a possibility, but it's too early to tell from the skimpy information available. The fireball from the engine may have been simply an illusion. I'm still waiting for the final report before I jump to any conclusions. I don't believe the cause is as self-evident as some have claimed.

[Cyclic Hotline]

I seem to have missed quite a debate while I've been gone.
Now there are a few of the preliminary facts published, at least some idea of what occurred in both instances.

If both accidents continue to be self-explanatory, in hindsight you might confirm your suspicions. But what about every other accident that occurs? Are you suggesting that all accidents follow the same precise formula of cause and outcome? If life were this simple, then we would be able to predict with precise accuracy the nature of every accident, and the specific means of eliminating all risk and accidents.

Unfortunately, accidents and their causes don't follow a formulaic process, which leaves the process of reduction or prevention of accidents with as many solutions as their root causes.

If it were this simple, then all accidents in any specific circumstance would be identical, predictable, and by nature, completely avoidable. I don't see that predictable repetition in any accident study.

A quick browse through any accident database will reveal a myriad of similar accidents with equally random causes. There are certainly some specific traits and those are indeed the ones to address first. But to proclaim that any accident is predictable and self-explanatory is as disengenious as anyone who proclaims they can eliminate all accidents.

Speculate all you want. I don't "stomp my feet" over that part. I do take exception to making assumptive conclusions based on zero knowledge of the occurrence and circumstances.

PS. I am not involved in either of the companies affected.

[Cyclic Hotline]

I'm surprised you guys haven't solved the BA 777 yet! :E

[tottigol]

I'm surprised you guys haven't solved the BA 777 yet!

I am working on it.:rolleyes:

Question for Cyclic Hotline (I may have already asked it, but I am too lazy to go back and check) and the rest:

If you (not you specifically because it will never happen to you:E, someone else), find yourself, or put yourself in a situation in which you ought not to be and something breaks in the helicopter and causes it to crash, what is the NTSB report going to say?

My bet is mechanical failure and nothing else, with no reference to the fact that the pilot should not have been there in the first place.
And THAT IS more often than not, a common factor to helicopter accidents as of late, in that those accidents are self explanatory.
The problem is that after seeing several of those, we (I) have a tendency to become jaded in our (mine?) judgement, because not enough is being done to solve the real nature of this problem.

However, I do grieve the needless loss of life and destruction of families.

[SASless]

777 crash cause....self explanatory!

The 777 was not certified for sod landings nor had the crew been trained in off airport landings thus it was an unauthorized, unplanned, improper procedure.

That being said.....a lot of skill and luck all came together at the right time!

[havoc]

AirEvac Life Team 206



GREENSBURG, Ind. -- Three people were killed Sunday afternoon when a medical helicopter went down near Greensburg Sunday afternoon, police said.

The crash happened just before 2 p.m. near County Road 700 West and Base Line Road, just outside of Greensburg, officials with the Decatur County Sheriff’s Department said.

The pilot, a nurse and a medic were killed when the helicopter crashed as it was leaving a fundraiser at the Burney Fire Department, officials said.

No patients were on board the helicopter at the time.

Police said the crew -- who has not been identified -- was about a half a mile into the flight when the helicopter fell from the sky. Witnesses told 6News' Tanya Spencer they say something fall from the aircraft just before it crashed.

Watch 6News at 6 p.m. and refresh this page for updates.

[Old Skool]

taken from the greensburg daily news



Crash that killed 3 still a puzzle


Adam Huening


As the holiday wore on Monday, federal and local crews worked under the hot sun to remove the remnants of a crashed medical helicopter that killed three.


The FAA and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in conjunction with the Decatur County Sheriff’s Department and Indiana State Police worked the crash site in the middle of a corn field about one mile northwest of Burney from sun up until sundown Labor Day, hoping to piece together the puzzle of how the tragedy occurred. Davis Trucking and Recovery of Rushville was called in to do the job of removing the pieces of the demolished helicopter. After loading flat-bed semis and trucks, the Davis crew carried the tarped remains of the air craft away from the site of its demise.

Linda Baker, aviation safety inspector for the FAA, confirmed the pieces would be taken to the Greensburg Municipal Airport for storage. She would not comment on what would happen from that point deferring to the NTSB, which had taken over as the lead investigating agency into the crash. Baker would not lend comment on any speculation as to how the tragedy occurred.

“The investigation is too premature with the recovery efforts nearing an end,” Baker said.

She wouldn’t comment if the site had been cleared or how many agencies were working to piece together a cause that led to the crash of the Air Evac Lifeteam helicopter shortly after take off from the Burney Antique Tractor Pull and Hog Roast. The three-member crew was on a public relations mission at the annual fundraiser.

Baker noted the investigation into the crash could take weeks, if not months, to determine.

Calls seeking comment from the FAA and NTSB went unanswered. Recordings noted the offices were closed due to the holiday.

An official statement from the Decatur County Coroner’s office noted the Burney Volunteer Fire Department notified the county of the incident at 1:21 p.m. Sunday. An autopsy on all three bodies was expected to be performed this morning, the release states.

The names of the crew members were confirmed by Air Evac, which has a base in Rushville, through GDN news partner WISH TV 8. The three-member crew included pilot Roger Warren, flight nurse Sandra Pearson, and flight paramedic and Base Manager Wade Weston. A message to Air Evac membership headquarters seeking further information on the deceased went unanswered Monday, but the GDN learned from the Richmond and Cambridge City newspapers Weston was a resident of Cambridge City.

The emergency responder community was still reeling after the incident that took three of its own. Brad Smith, CEO of Rush Memorial Hospital, said the organization was at a loss over the deaths.

“I can say that we are all deeply saddened and devastated by the tragic loss of Roger, Wade and Sandi,” Smith said in a statement. “They were young, at the top of their field, highly-trained and dedicated individuals. They were like family to us and will be missed in so many ways by so many people. Our community needs to rally around and support Air Evac and the families of these three individuals during this very difficult time. Our thoughts and prayers go out to their families and friends.”

Smith also said the events that brought Air Evac into their community were rocky at times, and he applauded everyone at the company for dedication and perseverance. The ironic fact that these three lives were lost in a trauma situation was not lost on Smith.

“Numerous lives were saved in Rush County by the people who lost their lives in Sunday’s crash. We sometimes take for granted our local organizations such as Air Evac, EMS, fire and police, yet they are truly the heroes of our community,” Smith said in his statement.

[havoc]

Sheriff: Main rotor came off medical helicopter


Associated Press - September 2, 2008 12:04 PM ET

BURNEY, Ind. (AP) - The Decatur County sheriff says the main rotor of a medical helicopter came off before the craft crashed into a farm field, killing three crew members.

Sheriff Daryl Templeton told The Associated Press Tuesday that the rotor was found 320 yards away from the rest of the wreckage from Sunday's crash.

Witnesses have told investigators that the helicopter's nose tipped down before it crashed and exploded in the field near the town of Burney, about 40 miles southeast of Indianapolis.

An official cause of the crash is not expected to be released until the National Transportation Safety Board completes its investigation.

The Air Evac Lifeteam helicopter was not carrying a patient when it crashed. It had been at an event for a volunteer fire department and crashed as it was returning to its base in nearby Rushville.

Copyright 2008 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

[havoc]

'No fly zone' sought after chopper crash

Updated: Sep 4, 2008 04:52 PM CDT




Ken Masters

Rich Van Wyk/Eyewitness News

Rushville - Rush County commissioners and the county hospital are at odds over the safety of its helicopter service and how quickly flights should resume in the wake of a deadly crash. The commissioners want the county to be a "no fly zone" for Air Evac Lifeteam.

Until Air Evac Lifeteam proves their aircraft are safe, the Rush County commissioners don't want them flying here.

In a letter to the county hospital and Air Evac Lifeteam, the commissioners wrote that Sunday's crash which killed three crew members "raised great safety concerns in the potential issues of aircraft reliability and maintenance."

They requested an immediate suspension of flights "to ensure the safety of the residents of Rushville and Rush County."

"Two weeks to thirty days, for them, to get everything serviced out, just to make sure things are right," said Ken Masters, Rush County commissioner.

The helicopter fell to the ground after taking off from a fundraiser in Decatur County. All three crew members died. Federal investigators determined the craft's rotor blades detached before the crash.

The chopper was based at the Rush County Memorial Hospital, taking off and landing from a heavily populated residential and business area just a few blocks from the center of Rushville.

"Say they lifted off at the hospital here and maybe went just 40 or 50 or 100 yards. There could have been a lot more fatalities," said Masters.

Air Evac voluntarily suspended Indiana flight operations after the crash, surprised by the county's request, the county hospital and the company issued a joint reply.

"Air Evac Lifeteam is in complete compliance with FAA-regulated maintenance and inspection programs," wrote Seth Myers, Air Evac Lifeteam president. "We are committed to the residents we serve in Indiana and will be returning these bases to operation soon."







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[Gomer Pylot]

From what I'm seeing and hearing, it looks like a blade failure. That's about as common as a wing falling off an airplane, and hasn't happened before on a 206, AFAIK. TT straps yes, but not blades, and no TT straps have failed in decades. I wouldn't be surprised to see an ASB or something similar from Bell on this in the near future. I'm hoping this is one of those 'out of the blue' incidents which are never duplicated.

[alouette3]

I am not sure they can do that. Oversight of AEL operations rests with the FAA. If the FAA does not see the need for AEL aircraft to be grounded, I don't think a county has any legal leg to stand on to impose this "no fly zone". Besides, how do they expect to impose it without inviting a lawsuit?
Knee jerk reaction again.
Alt3.

[havoc]

All too often its the uniformed that makes policy, I wonder what would happen if they researched ground ambulance accidents and how many EMS staff are injuried and killed.

Like you said knee jerk, but it will get momentum.

[Shell Management]

While not stated below I assume this is an MSP Dauphin. Maryland State Police Aviation Command (http://www.mspaviation.org/frames.asp)


Medevac helicopter crash kills 4 in Maryland|ABC 7 News (http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0908/557096.html):
A medevac helicopter taking accident victims to a trauma center crashed in suburban Washington early Sunday, killing four of the five people aboard, authorities said.The accident killed two police officers on board, one of them the pilot. Also killed were an Emergency Medical Services staffer and one of the accident victims, said Mark Brady, a spokesman for the Prince George's County Fire/EMS Department. A second accident victim survived the crash, which happened near Andrews AFB.

Officials lost radio contact with the craft, known as Trooper 2, around 12:30 a.m. as it was headed to the base, according to a press release from the Maryland State Police. The crew had radioed in that it needed to land due to weather conditions. After an intensive search, public safety officials found the downed helicopter on a park trail.

Only last week did 42 operators got together for a safety seminar sponsored by MSP:
http://cosmos.bcst.yahoo.com/up/player/popup/?rn=4226712&cl=9917950&src=news (http://cosmos.bcst.yahoo.com/up/player/popup/?rn=4226712&cl=9917950&src=news)

[Phil77]

Very sad, indeed :sad:

Maybe weather was not even related to the accident and the aircraft was IFR (why would the pilot report bad weather then?), but at the risk of taking fire for jumping to conclusions (not my intention), my question: the weather mins for scene calls at the Maryland State Police seem pretty tight, hu?
What are the wx mins for the other big boys in the business (STAT Medevac, AirMethod e.g)?

Weather reports at the time of accident indicate good surface visibility, but the cloud clearance (at night) :eek::

KIAD 280439Z 00000KT 10SM FEW003 BKN016 OVC022 21/19 A2991 RMK AO2 $
KIAD 280352Z COR 00000KT 10SM SCT007 BKN011 OVC090 21/19 A2992 RMK AO2 SLP129 SCT V BKN T02060194 $

KBWI 280454Z 10003KT 7SM -RA BKN005 OVC010 20/19 A2991 RMK AO2 RAB53 SLP127 P0000 T02000194 402280200
KBWI 280354Z 07005KT 10SM OVC007 21/19 A2991 RMK AO2 RAE00 SLP128 P0000 T02060194

KDCA 280452Z 06005KT 10SM BKN008 OVC016 22/20 A2991 RMK AO2 SLP129 T02220200 402670211
KDCA 280419Z 05003KT 10SM OVC008 22/20 A2992 RMK AO2
KDCA 280352Z 00000KT 10SM OVC010 22/20 A2991 RMK AO2 CIG 009V013 SLP129 T02220200

I'm very sorry for all that paid the ultimate price trying to safe others.

[Devil 49]

Air Methods Corp. WX minimums, VFR aircraft:
Day, Local- 800 & 2; XC- 800 & 3.
Night, Local- 1000 & 3; XC- 1000 & 5.

Program minimums vary, presently mine require 2000 & 5 for night XC.

[Carbon Bootprint]

This thread seems to have drifted a bit, but this article in Flight Safety (http://www.flightsafety.org/asw/dec08/asw_dec08_p17-19.pdf)might help bring it back to the starting point. It focuses on the reality of hypothermia in the GOM, and stresses the need for flight specific safety briefings and markings/placards for lift raft systems. (Apologies if this is a dupe, but a search did not turn up anything similar).