Boeing 737 checklist policy - Confusing or is it just progress?

[Tee Emm]

The revised Boeing 737 checklist policy has the first officer conducting the majority of pre-flight, before start and before taxi checks. Although the captain calls for the checklists, it appears the F/O then reads the checklists aloud and answers himself (apart from an occasional item) - with the captain "observing".

The long established challenge and response policy where one pilot reads the checklist and the other pilot answers (responds) has been discarded in favour of one pilot reading and answering himself. It means that if the pilot challenging himself and answering himself inadvertently misses one line of the checklist the error may go unnoticed by the other crew member.

I wonder why Boeing threw out a perfectly satisfactory checklist policy that served pilots well from the first Boeings and replaced it with a checklist policy that seems to contradict the basic premise that one pilot challenged and the other pilot observed and responded appropriately. I subscribe to the adage "If it ain't broke - don't fix it.

[A Very Civil Pilot]

I think it's company specific.

For us the preflight, before start, before taxi and before takeoff are all challenge and response.

In the air, the after takeoff, descent and approach are read and do (with a challenge and response for any altimeter checks)

Landing, shutdown and secure are challenge and response.

[Ashling]

Tee emms right. In the intro to the QRH Boeing details the way the checklists are to be used. In most cases on the ground the F/O reads them, both pilots verify and the pilot whose area of responsibilty the item is in responds. Mostly this will mean the F/O reading and responding although it clearly states both pilots should verify.

My company has modified this back to the old way. F/O reads, Capt responds.

[Oxidant]

"T.E" is refering to the new "Boeing Company/Manufacturers" Sop's, introduced at the end of last year.

As to the good & bad, well ............................there is more than one way to skin a cat..

[Rainboe]

It works fine. Critical items inevitably get double checked. Boeing know how to have procedures to operate their aeroplanes working well.

[alexban]

Works ok. We are doing it like this: cpt calls for chk, F/o read the check, the one with the area of responsability give the answer and the other pilot confirms ,not just 'observing' ..it has to say the answer to chk also.
So, double check , for all items.
for ex: fo- yaw damper -ON
cpt-visual check and respond 'ON' (or OFF if the switch is not in the correct position)
Initially the response was 'CHECK ' but we've observed that this answer induced a tendency of not visually checking the switches on all times.

[Tee Emm]

Reports from one local airline using the Boeing system reveals in many cases by sticking strictly to the Boeing philosophy the first officer reads (challenges) and answers (responds) to the preflight and before and after start checklists where he does most of the actions anyway, while the captain who has little to do looks out of his window at the view outside until he hears a challenge that warrants his response. What a huge change from original Boeing philosophy of one challenges and the other responds. It's called progress?

[alexban]

TE , boeing says that BOTH crew members are required to verify all items, and the one responsible for item position will also answer the call.
The captain should not look out on the window, he should follow the check flow, and answer when required. He should also aknowledge that he verified each item.
It is a progress,but you should do the checks properly.

[Tee Emm]

Scenario. During taxi an engine fire warning occurs. In the Boeing system does the captain or the first officer close down the engine and who pulls the fire switch and fires the bottle? Let's say it is a severe fire and the captain decides to go ahead with a passenger evacuation. Again, which of the two pilots actually closes the remaining start lever and pulls the fire switches. The area of responsibility policy gets a little confused here. In the simulator it has been found that when things happen fast as discussed above, there is often confusion when it comes to area of responsibility actions. Does the captain or the first officer tell the pax and crew to evacuate? Or does it depend on whose leg it was (is going to be)?

What was crystal clear for decades of jet transport flying in terms of checklists, seems now to be a hotch-potch of head scratching in order to hastily recall exactly who is responsible to turning the landing lights off after take off - or who turns off the seat belts - the PNF or PM? These are not particularly good examples I admit - but you get my drift...

[Lemper]

Actually, the new Boeing procedural policy is that the flight deck is devided in areas of responsibility. Whoever makes the challenge of the checklist, this challenge is reponded to by the crew member who is responsible for the area of the item challenged.

[InSoMnIaC]

Actual not all the checklist's are responded by the pilot whose area of responsibility the item falls under.

Preflight, before start, before taxi, descent, approach, shut down and secure checlists are all responded by the Pilot whose area of responsibility the item falls under however,

before take off and Landing checklist is always responded by the PF and the After take off checklist is always responded to by the PM

The work is also divided into procedures and checklists. so you do the procedure first and only have vital items in the checklist. This means that there are fewer items to read in the checklist (compared to the old C/L) and if done correctly takes less time to complete.

For the engine fire and Pax evac scenario you mentioned: boeing says that thrust should be reduced on the burning engine by the PF on the ground that's the captain.
the Pax evacuation isn't a recall item anymore and if there is no fire then there is no need to discharge the extinguisher bottles.

Who does what should be explained in you comoany SOP. boeing just says that it has to be done.

[Tee Emm]

Whoever makes the challenge of the checklist, this challenge is reponded to by the crew member who is responsible for the area of the item challenged.

In other words most of the current Boeing checklist calls result in the same man challenging himself and responding to himself while in theory the other man or woman looks on with interest hopefully.

[A37575]

the Pax evacuation isn't a recall item anymore and if there is no fire then there is no need to discharge the extinguisher bottles.

Just imagine. Smoke and screaming going on down the back and the steely-eyed captain decides maybe it's time to to initiate an emergency evacuation. Calmly he asks his Number One to grab the QRH and read aloud the Evacuation Checklist. The smoke has filtered by now into the flight deck and The F/O starts coughing as his lungs are affected by the acrid smoke and his eyes start to close involuntarily caused by the smoke stinging his eyes. Believe me, this is a well known effect of smoke in the cockpit.
Still, the redoubtable captain waits patiently foir the unfortunate first officer to regain his composure and again requests him politely to please go ahead with the Evacuation checklist. Meanwhile the engines are still running and the pilot call chimes are ringing insistently.
Sorry about this Skipper chokes the F/O but I can't seem to find the godammed QRH so can we just get the hell outta here.
Steady my good man - says the captain as the soot gathers on his bushy eyebrows and he is forced to flick the black crap of his white uniform shirt and gold bars. The SOP states quite clearly the Evacuation is not a Recall Item anymore and now you are telling me you can't find the bloody QRH.
The smoke and flames have by now penetrated the cabin and the screams grow louder as the F/O finds the QRH and runs his blackened finger down the line starting with ""Condition" - Evacuation is Needed....
Makes you wonder if the recent very prompt passenger evacuation of the burning 737 at Naha was ordered by the crew carefully reading from the QRH - or whether the crew ripped into the old Recall items and baled out FAST...

[Lemper]

Insomniac,

Yep indeed, I had overlooked those three phases. Thanks.

[Lemper]

Tee Emm,

Right on! So far, it works fine for me, after a little period of adjustment.
Change of old habits is always a bit painfull, but smart people have been working on this for a long time as a response to several events where a checklists was responded to and the items to be checked were in the wrong position.
Now, instead of an Abott & Costello duet like checklist, where one pilot reads a litany and the other shoots back the responses, sometimes regardless of the item to be checked, each CM is to insure that the items in his area of responsibility are in the proper position (Exception made or the three phases mentioned earlier) the other one being somehow more compelled to look that the challenge AND the response are correct and in accordance with the item's position. Give it a chance, and we'll see how it works.

[xetroV]

Totally agree, A37575.

In my experience, reading and doing the new Evacuation Checklist as a do-list takes significantly more time as doing the old-fashioned evacuation drills by heart. That is with no smoke and with the QRH being neatly stowed in its proper position (not thrown around the cockpit as would happen in a typical crash).

But I still dream those drills sometimes, so I guess they've been etched into my brain. Could be handy one day, if a QRH goes mysteriously missing. :hmm:

[ManaAdaSystem]

The new Boeing procedures, as Tee Emm points out, are potentionally dangerous.

Scenario:

Capt is PF and FO PM.
FO does the preflight checks, but fails to see that the outflow valve is in MAN.
Capt calls for preflight checklist. FO duly reads and responds all overhead items, and because he has already done the drill, does not carefully recheck each item. Capt fails to crosscheck (it's not his area of responsiblility), and the valve remains in MAN.
Capt calls for After take off checklist, which now is done and read by the FO. By now he/she has "checked" that area 3 times, and in any case, the checklist only calls for checking of packs and bleeds. The valve remains in MAN.

Unlikely? I admit I don't know what procedures Helios used, but that accident happended just after the new procedures came into effect.

There simply is no challenge and response anymore. In the left seat I can read the newpaper or be asleep during most of the checklist reading. Not that I should be, but that's a fact.

I simply do not understand why?

[BelArgUSA]

Maybe this is another drop in the bucket to say that a crew of three in an airplane, (call them 2 pilots and 1 F/E or, 3 pilots) is better than a crew of two.
xxx
When in flight, one flies the aircraft, the other two, do challenge/response...
xxx
In our 747-400s, we have 3 flight crewmembers (because of the long sectors anyway), but the 3 participate in check lists on the ground, after takeoff, on approach and landing... and in cruise if the 3 are present in the flight deck.
xxx
I have seen these new 737 checklists... they are rubbish. Although we go "Boeing" publications "all the way" we shall not use these.
xxx
Our 747-400 check lists are very similar to 747 Classic checklists, because of the presence of 3 crewmembers at takeoff, departure, approach and landing time. Any abnormal/emergency item assumes two crewmembers to perform any actions, such as shut-down of engines, besides a pilot flying.
xxx
:)
Happy contrails

[Hydrant]

A37575 imagine this sceanario.

Captain and F/O come to screaming halt with engine fire abort prior to V1.

Mad panic from steely eyed captain ( to use your analogy) to execute what is going to be an evacuation after fire doesn't go out. Forgets basic recalls during evacuation and sends passengers scurring out into an engine that hasn't been shutdown because of the mad panic and rush to do this checklist from memory.

The time differential to find the evacuation checklist, which in my experience is very conveniently located for ease of access, execute the checklist calmly, methodically and with reference is a far better situation than madly pulling fire handles , closing down engines and cocking up just because it "used to be done from memory".

[international hog driver]

I agree with most responses here but you have to look at the reasoning behind it all.

When we transitioned from “old” Boeing to “new” Boeing , most of us looked upon it as ….WTF is this schmozzel! (737NG BTW)

However after getting into the nitty gritty with a FSR and some others about it I can see Boeings reasoning’s and those pointed out to us were:

1/ Standardization of procedures to bring the 73 closer to the T7 and 787.

2/ This above is intended to reduce transition training for crews, not the full CCQ of Airbus but reduced training all the same.

3/ The intent of the change also had to do with Boeings push to have the conversion for new 787 crews reduced to 1 week if the pilot had a) 500 hrs 73NG or T7 & b) “New” Boeing procedures….. (don’t know if this has got past the regulators yet).

4/ Apparent data (whose??) that shows FNGs (<300TT) had a better time in the sim during initial training with “New” rater than “Old” because it is simply more …. Yes Sir – No Sir – READ & DO!

Personally I am not too fussed, it’s a lot better than some checklists that have been designed by people who believe TOSS is what they do to themselves not what we achieve after takeoff….:E

[alexban]

ManaAda ,each of the crew members should check any switches position, no matter in which area of resp the switch is.
The one who has it, should move the switch and give the response,but the other one should check if right.
So ,your example ,is an example of a crew not doing the check properly..it may happen no matter how the check is written,the new or old way.
For ex: the FO leave the switch to manual ,and the cpt ,who should answer the check (old version check ) , knowing 'by memory' the check ( as we all do,after some time ) ,says 'CHECK' ,or 'AUTO' ,without looking. The FO ,who was responsible for that switch, doesn't bother to look again and goes on with the check. It is possible ,right?
BelArgus - no question, 3 brains and 3 pairs of eyes are better than 2. But then again, on older plains we flew we had 4 or even 5 crew members...much better,right ?
Now,try to compare the level of automatization between such old planes and new ones. You are fortunate to have the third crew member,but I think it's a mistake to disregard the manufacturer's procedures.
Most of those procedures are made as a result of cooperation with client airlines..I've seen some of our suggestions incorporated in the QRH or the FCTM.
Most resistance to the new checks is met with the old, experienced pilots.Why?..cause we know better how to fly the plane..the way we've learned it was the right way..It's human nature.
I've seen funny situations like: hey, don't touch the lights ,those are mine ...or ..I would select the fuel pumps,those are important items,the cpt should do those....after a while they all learned the new way,and now feel familiar with that.The FO does most of the preflight switches now, while the cpt monitors and crosschecks. What's wrong with that?

[Centaurus]

far better situation than madly pulling fire handles , closing down engines and cocking up just because it "used to be done from memory

I guess that 35 years of 737 operation with a QRH policy that required the crew to conduct the Evacuation procedure by recall, has now found to be fatally flawed - according to the above assessment of the new Boeing checklist policy. I don't recall in the simulator any crew "madly pulling fire handles" - although no doubt "cock-ups" occur from time to time.

A competent crew should have no trouble at all remembering the few essential items needed to complete the Evacuation checklist. After all, most pilots have very little difficulty in remembering the many meteorological codes in a TAF... so why should they have difficulty in the Evac checklist?

[Hydrant]

Centaurus again just because there has been "35 years" of doing it one way doesn't mean that a change, yes change, is a bad thing or blow me down a good thing.

I hardly see the similarity of decoding the TAF in a pre flight briefing room, to having to possibly execute a drill from memory in a high pressure enviroment after the initial shock of the event that has just occured as tangible.

Again the time to locate the checklist and to reference it in my opinion is a good thing.

Enough said.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Challenge and response involves both pilots in an active way. Yes, it's still possible to miss items, but the system was better than what we have now.

We have aready had one incident in my airline as a direct result of the new procedures.

Can other Boeing drivers confirm that this is the way it's done on 74, 75, 76 and 777 fleets? FO does, reads and answers most preflight actions with the captain only responding to a few items?