Difference between Airbus and Boeing controls

[Eirefly]

Hey guys

Just wondering how long does it take to transfer from Boeing controls to the Airbus' sidestick?

And is it hard to get used to?

Thanks

[Clandestino]

Haven't flown Boeing, but I've moved to 320 after a couple of years flying ATR. It took me about...30 mins of (simulated) manual flight to adapt to sidestick. It's not difficult but as the stick has quite small throw, compared to yoke, it's very important to find proper seating and armrest positions.

Flying the A320 in direct law (autotrim and protections are lost and there's direct relation between sidestick and control deflection) was as easy as hand-flying the ATR, if not a bit easier. The most difficult part for me was remembering that FBW always tries to maintain 1G flight path (and from my limited experience, does it quite well) and there's no need to stir the stick when changing speed or config. Also not pulling the stick when banking into turn seemed unnatural to me at first, but I got used to it pretty fast.

Now, let's hear it from ex-Boeing boys.

[john_tullamarine]

.. and, my friend .. if you continue in your rude ways .. it's a period in the sin bin for you ...

[MrBernoulli]

Scarebus .................. nnnnnoooooooooooooooooooooohhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh!

[Veruka Salt]

Just converted from B767 to A330. Only takes a few mins to get a feel for the sidestick. Most annoying aspect is the relatively low roll rates available - makes the thing feel quite "wallowey" on final when trying to make small corrections.

[Eirefly]

Cool guys thanks for the info:)

[flap15]

As Veruka points out the side stick is not an issue as far as the conversion goes, even for the natural right hander in the left seat. This had been a concern prior to the simulator and I was quite surprised that it was totaly natural and instinctive.

My personal headache was the FMS. Having flown the 737-300/700 for five years, what I used to do in the Boeing on the FMS does not allways follow through for the Airbus FMS. One big thing I miss was the ability to line select to the scratch pad, amend and reinsert. At times I felt that Airbus deliberetly chose to do somthing in the opposite fashion to Boeing just to different. However once you can find your way around this box of tricks, the day to day operation in a multi sector environment is a joy. The cockpit setup is quicker than the Boeing, there is more room to work in and it is much quiter. I do miss the Boeing when a strong cross wind is around though and the ability to feel what inputs a low houred F/O has enterd rather than see an attitude change afterwards. This can be a little interesting at 30 feet !!:eek:

[AirRabbit]

I do miss the Boeing when a strong cross wind is around ...
and the ability to feel what inputs a low houred F/O has enterd rather than see an attitude change afterwards. This can be a little interesting at 30 feet !!
Two VERY astute and VERY accurate and VERY important observations! These very issues have bothered me for quite a while. Unfortunately, I don't know what to do to alleviate or directly reduce the amount of concern for either!

[CONF iture]

Two VERY astute and VERY accurate and VERY important observations! These very issues have bothered me for quite a while. Unfortunately, I don't know what to do to alleviate or directly reduce the amount of concern for either!

I would say very legitimate concern.
And I see 2 options:

1- You take control earlier than later in the approach in a kind of preemptive attitude cos you know your own capability, and on that flight you're not either an instructor or a check pilot.

2- You play the game and let your partner go knowing you may well not have the time or the proper information to try to successfully correct an hazardous situation, just because Airbus choose not to fully keep you in the loop.
But fortunately, the most of the time it's a non event, you move a bit on your seat, hope for the best, wait ... and one minute later you're taxiing to your stand.

Multicrew airplane with that kind of flight controls ...
not sure it was the smartest move ...

[DozyWannabe]

On the other hand, the Airbus design means that it's harder to inadvertantly bump the control column and disengage the automation (like the Everglades TriStar), you have more space to perform non-handling tasks in and the instrument panel will not be obscured in certain positions.

CONFiture, we know your opinions but the fact remains that you are as 'in the loop' as you want to be in both Airbus and Boeing cockpits. Even Boeing's latest production cockpit design in the 777 has computer-controlled force feedback telling you what the other guy is doing rather than a mechanical linkage, so your distrust of computers should be just as piqued there.

[divinehover]

Having a control that gives the other pilot feedback didn't help the crew in the recent accident in Indonesia. The landing was so hard there the nose wheel broke off.

[CONF iture]

CONFiture, we know your opinions but the fact remains that you are as 'in the loop' as you want to be in both Airbus and Boeing cockpits ... so your distrust of computers should be just as piqued there

I leave you to your interpretation, but I don't think I talked about computers on that one, did I ?

Even Boeing's latest production cockpit design in the 777 has computer-controlled force feedback telling you what the other guy is doing

And that's why Boeing put money and weight in that kind of stuff
... to help the monitoring pilot to monitor ... and what is it if it's not keeping someone in the loop ?

On the other hand, the Airbus design means that it's harder to inadvertantly bump the control column and disengage the automation

Actually it's quite easy, but of no concern:
- A foot on the footrest and inadvertantly displace the sidestick with your knee
- Or a fully loaded (and up to date) FCOM which slips from tray table.

But much more interesting, as mentioned by "flap 15", is at 30 feet and below on your way down ... and I would add on your way up as well.

[Possum 15]

In most cases control column movements do not tell you what the “other guy” is doing, only what he has already done (debateable I will concede). Monitoring of aircraft performance either from instruments or visual cues, or a combination of both, tells a pilot what is happening to the flight path, and therefore what the other pilot is doing.
After many thousands of hours as a training pilot on Boeing the concept of the Airbus “passive sidestick – no feedback” was disconcerting. However, as I grew familiar with the big bus I found that it had some advantages. Firstly, some small adjustments to the flight path can be made with “summed” stick inputs (in an unobtrusive manner if no dual input advisory fitted) and this can give the student confidence until stick-input versus momentum becomes built into the muscle memory. This is no different to a “helping nudge (pull)”, or a blocking hand to prevent excessive aileron input on a conventional yoke but with the added advantage that the student is not conscious of you being all over the controls. Secondly, in the worst scenario where a take-over is required the priority button ensures an instant take over with no wrestling over the controls. It is difficult to imagine the student, after an instructor calls "Taking over" or "I have control", then applying his (the student's) priority button to regain control! A conventional control wrestling bout only ever occurred to me once on the Boeing and that was when a very large and powerful student was determined to increase pitch attitude after mainwheel touchdown. Despite a very positive “I HAVE CONTROL!!” and forceful forward control column input, “Muscles” did not want to let go. I will spare you further grisly details. In any case I have no beef with either system and wouldn’t knock back a seat in either aircraft. Maybe adaptability is the key.
Happy landings!

[CONF iture]

In most cases control column movements do not tell you what the “other guy” is doing, only what he has already done

... but it tells you a lot on what he is trying to achieve regarding airplane attitude
and it is already a lot compared to his sidestick which tells you ... nothing !

Monitoring of aircraft performance either from instruments or visual cues, or a combination of both, tells a pilot what is happening to the flight path, and therefore what the other pilot is doing.

You are right for 99% of the situations
but I strongly disagree for the remaining percent, when weather conditions mix and mess up with your inputs

I do not share either your view on "summed" stick inputs.
If a guy has to intervene, even in the most discret way, RED BUTTON must be the only way to go.
Otherwise how would you rate your action versus his, and how would he rate his action versus yours in the resulting attitude change ?
I do not think Airbus would recommend such interference.
At least have not seen anything like this in the FTCM.

You make a good point with the "Taking over" situation.
Saying so, we do not expect fighting on a flight deck.

Nevertheless, your anecdote emphasizes the point I wanna bring:
If a guy does the same with a sidestick, you will not notice his action on that sidestick, but only the result of that action: Nose pitch up
So, already, you are a little behind in your assessment of the situation, and in your intervention.
I believe you could have been much closer to tailstrike with sidestick philosophy than with your control column.

[Possum 15]

CONF, you have made some interesting observations, none of with which I would strongly disagree.
I would say that in many hours of instruction on conventional types from piston taildraggers to heavy jets I have often physically “summed” my control inputs with my students, normally by a slight nudge on the control column or a gentle “assist” with rudder. Is this too different from the sidestick situation? In practice it has the same effect. Or is the philosophy that you espouse for FBW also mean a “Taking over” situation is always appropriate for conventional controls?

[Possum 15]

CONF, another point I would make is that back sidestick does not always result in increased pitch attitude. Agree????

[CONF iture]

CONF, another point I would make is that back sidestick does not always result in increased pitch attitude. Agree????
Agree !
But if your partner pull on his control column and pitch attitude does not increase, at least you are aware he did pull.
With a sidestick you are not aware of anything ...
Maybe he pulled ?
Maybe he did not ?

So I'm not blaming FBW in this case
I'm blaming sidestick philosophy versus control columns
- which are coupled
- which are well in sight

These two characteristics are so rich in information for two pilots who share the same flightdeck.

Standard Operation Procedures request pilots to share information, any one.
- If you select Engine Anti Ice ON, you are supposed to let your partner know.
- If he switches TCAS selector from ABOVE to BELOW, he will let you know as well.

Why should it be any different with flight controls ?

In normal operation it's not a big deal
But when it's getting touchy, at low speed, and at very low altitude ...
when flight controls displacements are big
and reaction time to judge the situation at its minimum ... !?

Of course you will not loudly verbalize to the other crew member what your actions are on your sidestick ...
But that's where the MAGIC of coupled control columns is (FBW or not)

THEY TELL YOU THE REAL STORY IN LIVE ON THE OTHER GUY INTENTIONS

So you are in the game, not on the side !

Regarding the summed control inputs issue:
They make a lot of sense for coupled control columns
They have no meaning for sidesticks
... that's MY view

The Airbus flightdeck I know is VERY comfortable
too bad they did not install in the garderobe a couple of removable control columns we would plug back in place for takeoff and landing

... and even better if it was in direct law !

[divinehover]

Is there any evidence to prove that the side stick option leads to more unsafe landings. I used to fly B727-200 and am now on the A319. Whilst on the Boeing I never noticed the PNF staring at the Control Column during landing. If anyone has any statistics to prove that stick feedback reduces unsafe landing incidences could they please share them with us.

[FL245]

I have just moved from LHS B737-700NG to RHS A320/321, signed of last week.

I find the use of the stick fine, but I struggle with the finer movements on final approach, especially in the last 50' I find there is a lack of feel compared to what I am used to previously.

Leaving that aside, the lack of grunt in the A321 is dissapointing !!

Finally, the ECAM, FCOM, OEB's etc etc now I know why there is a table, its for all the books!

My preference is for the Boeing, but I guess thats because I spent the last 5 years on one.

Regards

[FlapsOne]

What books?

We have 1 - the QRH !

[FL245]

Interesting !! So you have never seen the bundle of Airbus FCOMS??? ummm

I have come to realise the airbus has some fantastic bits of info that bites you in the backside, that are only printed in the FCOM!!

I do much prefer the Boeing to be honest.

Regards

by the way, who you with??

[shark Bait]

I have flown both the 737 and 320 and quite frankly its horses for courses. the bus is very easy to fly with the sidestick and I find the 737 a much more stable aircraft in inclement weather but thats to do with aerodynamics rather than having "real" controls.:)

[Coffee Black None]

The QRH is the only book that comes in a "dead tree" version. All the other "books" are on a Toughbook.

[FL245]

shark Bait spot on fellow, thats it in a nutshell.

Coffee Black None, you might be EZY??? My operator has the old FCOMS in paper version !!

Either way folks its just a way of earning a living !!

Take Care, safe flying

[CONF iture]

Is there any evidence to prove that the side stick option leads to more unsafe landings. I used to fly B727-200 and am now on the A319. Whilst on the Boeing I never noticed the PNF staring at the Control Column during landing. If anyone has any statistics to prove that stick feedback reduces unsafe landing incidences could they please share them with us.
I don't think there is any need to stare at it.
Control column + yoke are perfectly well positioned and big enough to be naturally in your view even if you don't stare at them.

Landing is one thing
Take-off is as interesting :

Emirates A-340 in JNB
http://www.iasa.com.au/A6ERN.htm

Reading that report, I was amazed not to find the sidestick use as a contributing factor in that very serious incident ... !??

Having a control column in his face, that Pilot Monitoring would have had a much better chance to monitor that the PF was just not pulling adequately on the damn controls to get that bird airborne.

Nowadays, Accident Report do not stick to the simple facts, but look more inclined in protecting such or such interest ... (Pilot not being one of them)
... so it's hard to prove anything, but looking at the rate of 321 tailstrikes, it could be interesting to closer analyse that aspect ...

[Dixons Cider]

When I first went onto the 'bus technology, discovered what you are discussing on my very first sim ride...it'll stick with me forever.

-First sim session, at altitude, me PNF and the sim had a spastic and suddenly we rolled and went into a nose down attitude, loss of control.

-We continued trying to fly it not knowing at that point is was a sim fault.

-steep nose down attitude, nose not coming up. I was calling "pitch up pitch up" and realised the only way to assertain if my colleague was making the correct inputs was to look up and over to his stick/hand to see what he was doing!! I was not very impressed with airbus philosophy at that point! quite sobering.

Amittedly, if it were happening for real, and there was any doubt as to the correct/sufficient input being made, one would hit the little red takeover button and do his thing. ALL a bit messy however, when compared to seeing the yoke move in your periphery and being instantly satisfied that your mate is on the job.

That being said, the stick concept and FBW control laws have some very nice features.

[FlightDetent]

There are two sides to every story. You all rememer the Lufthansa incident where CP sidestick was re-wired incorrectly. FO took over and investigators concluded that left wingtip was 15 something from ground impact.

Months later Turkish AF lost an aircraft because of cross-linked controls. I believe that separated control interface (sidestick) in fact saved lives.

[Possum 15]

CONF; you are correct, if the JNB aircraft had not been fitted with sidesticks the incident (accident) would not have happened! Remove all sidesticks, and control columns, and accident rates would drop to zero.

[CONF iture]

There are a few reasons regulation still requests 2 fellows in a flight deck
and one of them is mutual monitoring:

- You check me
- I check you

Is not it something you could or should say in your takeoff briefing ?
So why not giving these fellows the proper tools to monitor each other ...

Now, why Boeing did not switch to the sidestick on 787 ?

- Is it only to protect their ego ...
- Is it only for the 777 common rating ...

I do not have the answer, but what I know is, on a regular base, we receive from Boeing ... surveys !

And they are probably especially interested hearing from ... Airbus crews !

The Boeing Company is constantly looking for new ways to improve flight decks for their users. As part of the manufacturer's ongoing efforts to collect feedback from the flight operations community, its human factors researchers are collecting information from line pilots and flight engineers on the subject of flight deck indications and alerting.
Boeing greatly values the perspectives and operational experiences of the world’s flight crews and is inviting all of ALPA's members to participate in this worldwide research effort.

That one was for EICAS / ECAM / ...
But I especially remember one on Flight Controls.

BTW ... I'm still waiting for my first survey from Airbus !?

[DozyWannabe]

Now, why Boeing did not switch to the sidestick on 787 ?

- Is it only to protect their ego ...
- Is it only for the 777 common rating ...
You know full well it's because their design philosophy centres on retaining the central column.

There is no 'right' or 'wrong' way to do it, and as with most industries where there is a choice, some will perfer one way of doing it and some will prefer another.

BTW ... I'm still waiting for my first survey from Airbus !?

Have you tried asking them for one?

http://www.aatl.net/publications/airbus.htm

[GMDS]

1. You don't have to stare at a stick or column. Ever heard of something like a tactile feedback? Research has proven that this kind of feedback is something like 10 times faster than intellectual (visual) feedback. I rather like a faster feedback, don't you?

2. It doesn't matter if it's a stick or a yoke/column. Both can/could provide a feedback of input by the collegue or AP. It might even be a artificial one, not even symetric, but it is a FEEDBACK. I think with a feedback some cross-wirings might have been detected before it was too late, or the JNB co would have felt the old man releasing the stick when he should have pulled. Anyway, i have not heard or came across any argument who would prove any advantage of controls without feedback compared to ones with such a feature. Especially if such a feedback is a lot faster than others.

3. The same applies to the fixed throttle. There is not one valid reason not to install moving throttles. You can retain all the protections and features in any design, it does not impede the installation of movement of the throttles to give this tactile feedback of system performance. On aircraft with moving throttles the switching off of AT is far less frequent than on Airbus. Why? Because you still have full authority over the thrust. You can hold back, increase, decrease as required, retaining ALL the fancy AT protections. This is especially handy in strong and gusty wind conditions. With Airbus, if the performance of the AT is not as desired, the AOM recommends to switch it off. Now this is not dangerous, but it takes away some protections, leaving basically only Alpha Prot. I prefer the AT helping me and me helping him, both protecting each other in a certain way to the sole alternative as to let the AT do the thrust setting alone or do it only by myself. Again, i have still to hear one advantage of a AT system with dead throttles to the one with them moving.

Two very sound principals of professional aviation have been "best practice" or "optimum use of equipment". Not installing even the simplest feedback on either yoke/stick or AT does definitely not fit these principals, therefore the Airbus layout is not optimal.

GMDS

[Dixons Cider]

I think the common point here is not the merits of the INPUT medium, ie stick vs yoke..

The key difference is the OUTPUT.

Airbus - monitoring is done by the result or the performance only.

Boeing - monitoring is acheived by virtue of both awareness of the input AND monitoring of the performance.

As a note, Airbus have seen fit to allow monitoring of sidestick position on the ground only, by the means of an indicator on the PFD. Again, on ground only.

I'm sure this thread would not exist if Airbus programmed feedback into the stick, ie the thing moved. Why they didn't/don't do this I have no idea?

[paulkinm]

Can you imagine what the pilot must of been trying to do in this vid then!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbLRTy5a7fo

Could not of been easy using Airbus controls in this inclement weather.:uhoh:

[Clandestino]

Having a control column in his face, that Pilot Monitoring would have had a much better chance to monitor that the PF was just not pulling adequately on the damn controls to get that bird airborne.


I think with a feedback some cross-wirings might have been detected before it was too late, or the JNB co would have felt the old man releasing the stick when he should have pulled.

Wow... and here's me checking rotation rate and pitch by glancing at PFD. Thank you for pointing out the inapropriateness of the procedure I'm applying. I'd love to check proper rotation pull by visually checking the rearward movement of the yoke but alas, yoke is gone and there's only that dreaded sidestick. :( Absolutely horrible. With such a lousily designed flight controls, I'm afraid that FBW Airbi have much greater incidence of busted nosewheels/collapsed maingear than Boeings. Also I'm pretty certain that our master of statistics, CONFiture, can gleefuly provide us with some table confirming my fears. We should really write to mr Airboos and demand some stick feedback immediatelly. But first we have to agree on what should mr A use as feedback input. You know, in normal law stick commands roll rate and g, and not control positions. To have your stick shaking like mad while elevators and ailerons are working their hearts out trying to give you smooth ride through the chop would be a bit disconcerting, wouldn't it.

[CONF iture]

I'm sure this thread would not exist if Airbus programmed feedback into the stick, ie the thing moved. Why they didn't/don't do this I have no idea?
I don't know WHO, in Airbus, decided to implement that sidestick philosophy
but I doubt they've been through a serious study before.
So after a time of operation, experiences, anecdotes, and ... incidents (?), people raised concern about sidestick philosophy ...

So Airbus had to look at it
And here is what they had to say :

In Line Feedback

The side stick operation, initially, raised 2 issues in the pilot community :
- No mechanic (or other) interconnection between sticks was a matter actually discussed.
- Sidestick dual inputs, from both pilots simultaneously, were actually experienced in line operation.

No interconnection between sidesticks

In the first years of sidestick operation, the interconnection issue was raised by certain pilots :
- new feature as compared to yoke mechanization
- potentially less feedback of PF actions on stick, for PNF

After several years of stick operation, pilots do agree that :
- tactile feedback is only beneficial with large enough deflections
- visual feedback is nil with side mounted sticks and small deflections
- interconnection might degrade present sensitivity and accuracy of stick inputs
- during instruction, feedback to the instructor provided by A/C response.

Interconnection
operationally not beneficial
technically not efficient

Note : Autopilot back-drive of stick would be a mere simulation of a stick movement.

What I understand from that:

- Pilots have concerns
- But it's too late to do anything about that
- Pilots should adapt to technology
- And live with it

But I think DUAL INPUT WARNING came at that time ... people will confirm.

[tubby linton]

What if any kind of FBW is the 787 going to have?Please let them have a table!!

[tuan74]

Hmmm... Prefer the yoke..but like the table on the bus tho'...
Can I have 'em both please...:rolleyes:

[GMDS]

Look, fellow Pro’s: Sarcasm and making fun of critics is a poor argument in this thread. It’s about differences in control philosophy, I thought.
Feedback is a essential tool in safe aviation. You can get it by audio, visual or tactile means. There’s the printed version (often after some landings…) but it’s as slow as the never used feedback through scents, as the human is not well equipped to take them in.
My point was, that the tactile feedback is faster than the visual one and that it’s absence represents the main concern/criticism of pilots regarding the Airbus philosophy. Following that, my quest was to bring up ANY argument as to why such absence (and reluctance to reintroduce it) should represent a increase of safety. Generally this should be our main concern. Technically there’s no obstacle as any Nintendo-Joystick can produce such a feedback. It would not take away ANY gimmick Airbus has added to it’s flight protection envelope and i already stated that the feedback could be artificial and non symmetric. All it should give us is IF there’s a input and in WHAT DIRECTION it is done.
So again, please, give me any valuable and professional reason as to why the absence of tactile feedback should increase safety.

[FullWings]

I would have thought that the lack of force-feedback plus coupling in the sidesticks and the non-moving thrust levers probably have a common cause: They cost money to implement & certify and these "pilot convenience" items were not deemed important enough to get on the budget.

CONF iture is providing some good HF/CRM/cockpit ergonomics pointers and I have to say I agree with pretty much all he's been saying, especially of the non-rotating A340. On an aircraft with linked flight controls (doesn't matter who makes it) it is obvious what sort of inputs (if any) are being made on a attempted rotation. If you're still on the ground a long time after Vr, you don't need to check the instruments to confirm this...

[gearpins]

been on the bus for the last 14 years never had a problem with the stick...so far...dont know any better:)

[Clandestino]

Reading that report, I was amazed not to find the sidestick use as a contributing factor in that very serious incident ... !??


I'm not. Because:

1) on the day of Johannesburg incident, and every day since it, FBW Airbuses, from 318 to 346, made a couple of thousands of normal rotations and lift-offs. If the problem was sidestick related, one would expect at least some of take-offs to end up like J'burg one. Well, they didn't.

2) insufficient rotation for lift-off can be also easily achieved with yoke; all you have to do is pull-but-not-quite-enough. Even PA-28 is capable of performing it.

Problem was that capt, as PF of the flight, used undocumented and inapropriate procedure for rotating the A343 without even suspecting it was wrong. Trainning fault, I guess.


On aircraft with moving throttles the switching off of AT is far less frequent than on Airbus. Why? Because you still have full authority over the thrust. You can hold back, increase, decrease as required, retaining ALL the fancy AT protections. This is especially handy in strong and gusty wind conditions. With Airbus, if the performance of the AT is not as desired, the AOM recommends to switch it off. Now this is not dangerous, but it takes away some protections, leaving basically only Alpha Prot.

Switching off the autothrust does not take away any of the protections. Holding AT disconect for 15 seconds disables ATHR for the rest of the flight and disables alpha floor only.

As English is not my native language, would you please confirm if I understood you correctly that you advocate fiddling with throttle levers while keeping the autothrottle on. Thank you.

[CONF iture]

If tomorrow, the 380 or the next supersonic generation is single pilot certified, put whatever flight controls you like, as that single pilot will be the only one in need to know what he is doing with these flight controls, in the attempt to get what he would like to !

But as long there are 2 souls up front, my belief is it is much better if they share what I consider vital information.

2) insufficient rotation for lift-off can be also easily achieved with yoke; all you have to do is pull-but-not-quite-enough. Even PA-28 is capable of performing it.
And you exactly make my point here:
If, as PF, you do not realize you are not pulling enough, the PM, at least, will have a chance to SEE or to FEEL you are not pulling enough.
Maybe he will not get it either ... but as the team you will get more cards in your game.

JNB could have ended up with a complete disaster, but you do not need to reach that level to realize how the sidesticks philosophy can be insidious.
Time on the bird teaches a bit ...

I can see two critical areas, or let's say uncomfortable:

- For any reason, get it badly wrong on your CG, and PM will go for a double surprise during take-off roll.

- Everything below 500 AGL by turbulent gusty cross wind.

As mentioned by "GMDS", manually overiding Boeing A/THR in a very limited period of time is common practice.
Simple, easy, NATURAL !

Not much to see with the technic and sequence to follow for Airbus A/THR disconnection or reconnection.

Not to mention the FCOM BULLETIN:
A/C HANDLING IN FINAL APPROACH

- A/THR is recommended even in turbulent conditions
- BUT if SPEED decreases, move temporarily T/LVRS slightly above CLIMB detent to reduce A/THR response time.
- BUT do that carrefully, as not to trigger GO-AROUND mode.
- REMEMBER not to do that below 100 feet Radar Altimeter as it will result in A/THR disconnection and you will get CLIMB THR when placing back THR/LVRS in CLIMB detent, ... which is great above threshold.
- OF COURSE, if PF is not satisfied, he may take over thrust manually.
- ALSO, FCOM says that PF should disconnect A/THR above 1000 AGL, if he plans to do so.

[GMDS]

Clandestino posts:

Switching off the autothrust does not take away any of the protections. Holding AT disconect for 15 seconds disables ATHR for the rest of the flight and disables alpha floor only.

As English is not my native language, would you please confirm if I understood you correctly that you advocate fiddling with throttle levers while keeping the autothrottle on. Thank you.

Switching off the AT takes away Vgroundmini, allthough i don't like it, it's still a form of protection. More importantly it takes away the very original action of the AT, meaning that it wants to fly the manged/selected speed or Vls and intervenes BEFORE Aprot. I would also call this a form of protection.
As to your "fiddling" coment. I suspect you have never flown a modern moving AT/throttle system i.e. on a 744, 777, MD11. The characteristic of a Heavy, beeing basically more stable in terms of speed, however beeing slightly more vulnerable once in a speed deficit (harder to get out), you would appreciate the coordinated effort of a AT with the pilot. At least i would not call this symbiose "fiddling". The AT has different sensors to mine, the latter sometimes superior to his and vice versa.
What i said is that having the AT engaged, it will aim to fly the managed/selected Va, switched off it will only prevent the aircraft to go below Vs (minus some design tolerance) or A prot. So with AT engaged, flight is slightly safer and more comfortable. I further stated that beeing capable of intervening, or overriding a engaged AT, leaves more options to the pilot as either having to rely solely on the AT or, in case of performance doubts, disengage it. He can momentarely intervene, just to let the AT continue once the intervention is over.
You may call it fiddling, but i strongly believe that, with the same protections and performance, a moving AT where the pilot can assist or interfere, is safer than a fixed one where he can either only observe or disconnect.

GMDS

[Clandestino]

Thank you for the info, your suspicion was correct. My previous airplane was ATR-42 and it had no autothrust (or autotorque for that matter).

However, sometimes I feel we're talking about slightly different aircraft when we are talking about Airbus.

On A320 I fly, GSmini is available as long as you fly with managed speed. A/THR or no A/THR. If you fly manually, then it's your turn to move thrust levers in order to match magenta triangle on the speed tape.

On A320 I fly, moving thrust levers above CLB gives you MCT as long as both engines are alive and kicking. It definitively can't be used to reduce A/THR response time.

On A320 I fly, there's pitch ladder on PFD atitude display, very convenient to check your rotation rate and pitch, once runway dissapears below nose (as a result of rotation, that is, and not the impending overrun)

On A320 I fly, sidestick inputs are arithmetically added up to maximum value and there's nice red stick priority button that enables you to put your significant cockpit other out of the control loop if you're not a) satisfied with what airplane does and b) suspect that airplane's behaviour is result of your companion's control inputs. And that was something that was rehearsed a lot during my type rating sim trainning. Probably it's a consequence of DLH incident. (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20010320-0&lang=en) Granted, you can't see what your buddy is doing with sidestick, you have to deduct it yourself from airplane behavior, but whether this is safety critical, remains open to debate.

Just my 2 fils worth.

[Pugilistic Animus]

It does seem Airbus control philosophy has taken a whipping on this site in recent times. I do feel there should be an absolute requirement, in all planes! i.e for a artificial feel and force-feedback system---I know it isn't the case.

Not having ever flown Airbus planes myself and only having superficial knowledge of it's flight controls or systems I can only respond based on the inputs of the pilots on that type who've commneted in recent postings---that having been said- here are some thoughts/concerns I have based on my observations of the above pilots comments and concerns.

1. Some of the items described are very counterintuitive to the majority of pilots on 'conventional planes' for instance the fact that back pressure isn't required for turns and that roll rates are commanded instead of bank angles by control stick deflection, but it also seems these particular items cause little relative concern and are easily adapted too.

2. The second item, the one that causes me most concern---although it is hopefully adressed in training and OpSpecs--- is the lack of a artificial feel/feed back system, that philosophy is truly opposed to natural flying sense for a two-crew aircraft [actually all aircraft]. I don't feel 'takeover-procedures' as printed OpSpecs could ever adequately adress an issue that may take fractions of a second to execute.

3. Those thrust levers also leave me with some obvious concern for the same reasons aforementioned by others.

It seems that Airbus attempts to circumvent years of honed senses and that they present a drastically different way to fly an airplane-physically shielded and insulated from the very aerodynamic laws that sustain flight.

lastly, it does seem that the Airbuses are always climb limited compared to Boeing? no matter what!!!

In my book Airbus should be more conformist with the rest of aviation and 103 years of developed airsense

For this pilot- if it ain't Boeing, I ain't going---Sorry!

[togaroo]

In response to the last post, I will admit that I am an airbus pilot and therefore lean towards the bus technology however before arguing against a system perhaps it is worth understanding the big differences.

The side stick is not a control column, it is a g selector, rather than having a direct relationship it will give a rate of turn as you have mentioned which is very different to a conventional powered flying control. The movement required to initiate a turn is quite small and once the attitude is set the control can be released and it will return to neutral but the aircraft will continue the turn so with a system that is designed to operate as such how do provide feedback? Do you make the other side stick harder to nudge? We are talking about very small inputs here that generate quite large reactions. There is no slack in the controls and big inputs mean bigger outputs. PIO for new bus pilots is not unheard of remember the aircraft is pitch stable and so it will fly the trajectory you set, which is different to a conventional aircraft. Often it is better to wait before adding another input as this can increase an effect rather than decreasing it.

The airbus FBW control is a sea change in concept as was jet engines to pistons, some people get over it sooner than others. Its different, it has its pros and cons as do all systems. Will it change, I doubt it as it has many advantages that far outweigh the negatives. The biggest problem that the bus has is changing peoples attitudes to the way things have always been done. If we didnt embrace change then aviation wouldnt be where it is today.

It is also true that the airbus is a visual aircraft - there is a lot of information that must be scanned in but you learn to scan important things during different phases of flight.

As for thrust levers Airbus at one stage in the design process didnt even want to have thrust levers merely switches, so you can see how 'different' the design philosophy is. The debate will go on between Airbus and Boeing but until you have tried it and understand fully what the aircraft is designed to do and how the pilot is to 'operate' it, then you will have preconceptions against it. If you want stick and rudder stuff - go and find a sligsby or vans and have some fun on the weekend, the airbus is an accountants money making machine - it just happens to fly and needs pilots to operate it, they are even talking about pilotless aircraft, how do you feel about that? The reality of flying an airliner, is that it is mainly operated with the AP in and in a controlled environment. For me having a table and space to do the 'other' parts of my job makes sitting on the flight deck for 8+ hours much more comfortable. For the 10 mins max that I spend in manual flight each time we get airborne, using the side stick seems so natural and intuitive I now would find it difficult wrestling with a control column. In a cross wind on a short runway with an Airbus it still requires pilot technique and skill, a different skill but still the same principles as a boeing. The interface might be slightly different but the result is the same. As for monitoring pilots there are sufficient cues to replace tactile feedback and you get a good feel for what amount of pitch is too much. You can still follow through with the rudders and covering the controls is always good airmanship, with the priority button on the stick control can be taken over in an instance.

Its just different - please get over it!

Technology will move on - Boeing aircraft will all be flyby wire soon, and all plastic (CFRP) - does that mean you wont fly on a plastic aircraft? There will be bugs for them to sort out as much as Airbus has its problems at the moment. But the number of Airbus in worldwide fleets must say something that they are doing something right.

This debate always boils down to whos team are you on - I like both, for different reasons, I get paid to fly the bus and so thats what I do. If I had a choice I would probably stick with the bus because the ergonomics and noise level on the bus is better. Perhaps the 787 will be a sea change but both aircraft still do the same job - just with a different philosphy.

[Pugilistic Animus]

togaroo, my first response did not go through too long???, but basically in a extremely short version of my original post I don't think its an airmanship difference, and certain facts of the air planes functioning are squarely on the engineer's back but reinventing the wheel is not always best, side stick is great ergonomically, those ten minutes you mention before are the most critical minutes T.o. and ldg?---- hours and hours of 'coventional flying' will not completely extinguish with 50 hrs of initial sim training

i'm sure i would enjoy a sim ride on the airbus but in a critical condition I'd want sensory redundancy too.

as a professional one learns too live the pros and cons and love their ship no matter what


no I woundn't want pilotless aircraft because I don't think it would know when to abort AFTER V1 overrun destroy itself and save as many as possible... or how too ditch in a fifty knot double swell and not hit the face by all means.

but,

I have no trouble with innovation electric pressurization bring it---a fair and square engineering problem of no concern to pilots, unlike flying qualities?

and lastly Boeing have a stable stick force v. 'g' gradient in the longitudinal sense

they also have a normal 'g' v. bank angle even the freaking engineers agree that the airbus follows g=1/cos[bank angle] rule?
so why if I had to jigger around in the winds with wing tips and engines near to the ground I want to command a bank angle--- the appropriate to the g's they will follow automatically? but I don't want roll rate in that situation.

I wish my prior more elegant post wasn't lost to cyberspace:(

[energie]

as a bystander, i have a question

from this i understand that the airbus fbw system doens't provide any feedback to the PM. That's just how the sidestick is setup

What about 777's FBW? i know that in addition to the FBW there is a redundant hydrulic system. Can the PM feel what the PF has input?

e.

[GMDS]

Togaroo wrote:

“The airbus FBW control is a sea change in concept as was jet engines to pistons, some people get over it sooner than others.”

“The biggest problem that the bus has is changing peoples attitudes to the way things have always been done. If we didn’t embrace change then aviation wouldn’t be where it is today.”

“The debate will go on between Airbus and Boeing but until you have tried it and understand fully what the aircraft is designed to do and how the pilot is to 'operate' it, then you will have preconceptions against it.”


The sea of change is not as big as that. If you’ve flown a DC10, you would know that the 60ies technology CWS was on a similar track already and, believe me, much better to interact with. What bothers me, are your following remarks, shared by the AB-fan committee, about how some are “AB-enlightened” a little earlier than others. It reminds me of the only argument of the street-harassing religious freaks: “…. I thought the same, but then enlightenment struck me …”
I agree with change, but not EVERY change brings us forward and if critics are dismissed with the enlightening factor and not with down to earth arguments, then it gets sectarian.
I am still waiting for a VALUABLE argument as to why “dead” controls enhance safety as opposed to my arguments in previous post trying to deduct why they are not.
Simple “you will get used to it, you will see, we shall overcome….” is insufficient to me for a professional debate. I have tried both prevailing technologies and find the one less adapted to us humans, the other being at least just as safe.

“It’s just different - please get over it!”

Simply: No. I would like the best and safest aircraft today’s technology can build, with the best acceptance of its jockeys as well.
Your last argument is somewhat naïve. Would you say the same if they took away the second pilot, or the side-stick for good? - It would be different ….

GMDS

[DozyWannabe]

energie:

777's FBW force feedback is entirely artificial and computer-controlled, i.e. no less susceptible to computer failure than any part of the Airbus system. Some see it as an innovative way to retain comfort and familiarity for the pilot, others see it as a crutch. It's a shame everyone's so polarised about it.

GMDS:

Sounds like you decided to dislike the Airbus system before you even tried it to me. Non-active controls neither enhance nor detract from safety as long as a viable form of feedback is supplied, be it visual, aural, tactile or otherwise.

What gets me is that we're getting the tired old 'ain't Boeing, ain't going' canards coming up again, fortified by the same old misinformation that's been around for the last 20 years. The primary anti-Airbus rant was that they were taking the third cockpit crewmember away, even though Boeing had done this in the old 737 25 years previously. Another was that 'the computer was doing away with direct control by the pilot', something that had been around since the 757 in the early 80s - as far as the FMS was concerned anyway. As for sidestick-oriented FBW, you didn't hear F-16 pilots complaining that the old column was done away with in the late '70s. It not only made the aircraft more agile than it otherwise may have been, but made it a more comfortable work environment than other similar aircraft (the original F/A-18 for example).

Of course, a lot of this was thinly disguised 'NIH'-phobia from the US (even though the initial FBW production aircraft was indeed theirs), plus a desire to counter a percieved 'downgrading' of the pilot's responsibility with the new computer-assisted control architecture. Airbus didn't help the latter initially, their training could be on the patronising side and they did put too much faith in the computer's ability to out-think a pilot making a mistake. The loss of Nick Warner did show them the error of their ways, and now the operative word is that the Airbus is a 'different' piloting experience rather than 'easier'.

I did laugh at the '103 years' of doing it the Boeing way though - I didn't realise that wing warping was controlled by a heavy column with a wheel in the middle of the Wright Flyer... The truth of the matter is that controls have evolved throughout the brief history of aviation, it's just that they remained static for the longest period between WWII and the late 1980s, with innovation coming within other areas (propulsion, cabin comfort, pressurisation) during that period. What gets me is that the same people on this thread dissing the Airbus controls are leaving out that the 777 FBW feedback is entirely artificial, and like I said above - if you don't trust computers to the extent that you refuse to fly Airbus, you probably shouldn't trust what the 777 column tells you either!

It boils down to what you want from your job I suppose - if you're more into your stick-and-rudder flying and like the older office layout then you're probably going to prefer to fly the Boeing line. If you like a more neatly laid-out office that helps you get the other aspects of piloting done more easily, then you're more likely to enjoy the Airbus experience.

[GMDS]

Wannabe
I can agree with a lot of your thoughts.
You miss the point though. Read my previous posts, please, especially the points about artificial feedback.
You will also see first that i have AB experience and i do not just dislike it,
this thread is about difference in controls.
GMDS

[DozyWannabe]

Don't worry, I got your point - it was the more sophomoric stuff on this thread I was taking issue with.

My counterpoint to your argument is that artificial feedback is precisely that - artificial. It is provided by a computer based on what it thinks the pilot should be feeling, not directly from resistance from the cable or hydraulic system as was the case in the past. It may subjectively 'feel' more natural to a pilot that has come from older airliners, and that in itself is a laudable goal - but it is objectively no safer, because like any electro-mechanical system it can go wrong.

Practical example - the incident mentioned by FlightDetent where the Captain's sidestick was cross-wired (something that can be done just as easily in the 777 cockpit, remember). The FO's stick was correctly wired, so he took control and performed the landing. Artificial feedback in that instance would have pushed the FO's stick in the opposite direction and he may not have been able to recover the aircraft as easily, or (god forbid) at all.

[GMDS]

Your practical examle (crosswiring):
Let's assume it would have happened on a 777. After take-off, in the very first turn the crosswiring would have produced such a awkward feeling and looking situation (Captains yoke turns one way, Copilots the other) that any crew would have picked it up. On a Airbus, with dead sticks, only if the Captain would have done this first turn manually. Apparently this was not the case and they only picked it up at landing.
I will stop by now, not wanting a A vs. B match, but this example very nicely sustains my argument.
Off to a nice flight with my Airbus!

[DozyWannabe]

I wasn't talking about what would (or might) happen on the 777, I was talking about your suggestion that Airbus use force feedback. In that case you'd have the force feedback working against the FO's input for as long as the Captain deflected his stick - it would have been physically harder to right the aircraft until the crew realised what was happening, which can be a long time depending on the crew.
Your training obviously taught you to watch/feel the yoke to see what's happening, but not everyone's does and I'd wager that in the 777 not *every* crew would work out what was going on as quickly as you might assume.
At the end of the day, people have their own opinions of which 'office environment' they prefer and they will defend that choice - it's only human. But to then state that one system is empirically safer than the other based solely on that opinion (and occasionally cherry-picked research to support it) is a step too far.

[Possum 15]

DozyWannabee,
Well put. I couldn't agree with you more. After 8 years on A340 and now flying Boeing again I look back fondly to the comfort, ergonomics and aerodynamic "balance" of the Bus. Unfortunately the 744 is not the same technology generation as the 340 so direct comparison is unfair. Would love to get my hands on a 787 but, alas, this is unlikely.
Cheers.

[DozyWannabe]

Why, thank you sir.

I'm sure the B744 must be a buzz to fly though, so I wouldn't get too despondent! :)

[Dixons Cider]

There has been the odd comment here that there a customers aplenty are buying the 'bus product, so they must have it right.

I'm afraid the decisions made by the been counters as to which manufacturer they will go with when buying airframes has nothing at all to do with pilot preference...the $$ is king in these decisions.

As lowly drivers, our job is to merely go and steer the thing - no matter what they put our arses into. End of story.

[747dieseldude]

I have a feeling this discussion could go on for ever.

However, I would like to put in my two cents. I have never flown an Airbus, and know its systems only from reading.
I don't have anything against FBW. The protections it has are welcome, and the ease it seems to bring into hand-flying is also welcome. I don't even care if it's a "g-keeping" or a "rate-keeping" system, and most important, I don't care if it's a yoke, stick or track-ball operated (In fact, a small table up front would be welcome). I guess you could get used to any control device or laws, and it will feel natural after some time.
And I don't care in which continent it is made and what language are the manuals written in.
But, as many before me has written, I do believe that as long as the airplane is a TWO-c/m airplane, there should be active, tactile feedback on what the other c/m is doing. It can be interconnected, it can be artificial (I am not afraid of computer failures, or cross wiring - cross controls have happened on conventional airplanes too, you know...) but I want to know, damn it, I HAVE to know what the other c/m is doing. Sometimes it's just not enough to wait and see what the aircraft is doing.
More important, during training, I want to know what the student is doing. I understand the airplane sums up the control inputs. How would I know if the result was what I did, or what he/she did, and just how wrong did he/she did it?
And as a student, I would want to know just what the instructor did to correct the situation, and what should I do next time? Just rely on my other c/m to provide his/her half of the summed input?
I expect to hear stuff in the debriefing like "you pulled too early" or "use smaller corrections next time". How would my instructor know what I did? Was it a gust that blew the wing down, or was it me?

Further, and here we get to the non-moving throttles, every airplane with a pilot (now we're talking even single-pilot), has to have the option for a quick, simple, straight-forward override of it's automation.
Meaning, if the A/P is connected, you can pull on the yoke/stick, and the airplane will pitch up. You retard the throttles, and the engines spool down. You push them forward, and the engines spool up. Without having to disconnect anything first.
To put it simple - if you are battling the A/P or A/T, you should win. Always.

From what I've been reading on Airbus, it seems that day-to-day operation is a lot easier and simpler than other brands. However, when the **** hits the fan, you never see it coming.

[Dream Land]

Not having ever flown Airbus planes myself and then there's However, I would like to put in my two cents. I have never flown an Airbus :ugh: :=

[GMDS]

Here we go sectarian again. - QED -
"You'v not flow Airbus, Dude, you're not entitled to a opinion."
747 dieseldude makes some sound arguments and gets a bashing.
How many of the Airbus advocates bring in theirs without having flown a 744 or 777? Are they not entitled to their opinion either?
We will probably never agree, but leave every pro his opinion. It's entertaining, interesting and everybody can learn something without necessarily getting fully converted. ;)

GMDS

[Dream Land]

Not looking for agreement, just a little more education, you can't argue with someone that has no training on the beast, on the other side of the coin I would bet that most Airbus captains have plenty of experience on conventional jets. :cool:

[DozyWannabe]

GMDS :
Here we go sectarian again. - QED -
"You'v not flow Airbus, Dude, you're not entitled to a opinion."

Make of it what you will, but that's not what was being said. You're perfectly entitled to your opinion, but actual experience of what is being discussed will tend to add weight to it.

747diesel has a point, no-one's disputing that. There are caveats to his argument though. For example, Airbus-style FBW isn't really appropriate for basic flight training, but it was never intended to be used for that. To make up for that in conversion training, a lot more time gets spent in the simulator to get a feel for what the thing will do. Another point is that you are not always at the mercy of the computer. In Direct Law the pilot is not prevented from doing anything, and it is as simple to engage DL as it is to disengage automation on more conventional airliners.

[Clandestino]

Further, and here we get to the non-moving throttles, every airplane with a pilot (now we're talking even single-pilot), has to have the option for a quick, simple, straight-forward override of it's automation.
Meaning, if the A/P is connected, you can pull on the yoke/stick, and the airplane will pitch up. You retard the throttles, and the engines spool down. You push them forward, and the engines spool up. Without having to disconnect anything first.
To put it simple - if you are battling the A/P or A/T, you should win. Always.


:confused: On A320 I fly, moving throttles to idle always disconnects the A/THR. Moving throttles to TOGA always gives TOGA. Moving throttles to MCT gives you MCT if your both engines are alive. Also there are two red buttons on throttle levers aptly named 'A/THR instinctive disconnect buttons' and that's what they do. Zee red button on stick (surprise, surprise!) disconnects the autopilot. As far as I'm concerned, that's simple and straight-forward enough override of the automation.

As for battling the A/P, well - DON'T EVER DO THAT!!! Most of the autopilots will disconect after some stick force in pitch is achieved, but before they disconnect they will trim against your input and it may end up very nasty - keywords are CAL and Nagoya. If you're not satisfied with George's performance, red button always comes before the push/pull on the yoke.

From what I've been reading on Airbus, it seems that day-to-day operation is a lot easier and simpler than other brands. However, when the **** hits the fan, you never see it coming.

Links and other reference please. As an Airboos driver I'd also like to know what kind of unforeseen $h*t can hit my fans.

[Tree]

DozyWannabe;

"and it is as simple to engage DL as it is to disengage automation on more conventional airliners."

Care to let us know the "simple" way to engage DL? The only way I know is to turn off both FAC's and I surely do not recommend doing that.

[fantom]

Dozy:

You are an example of one of the reasons I don't post here any more (as you can see).

Buy a course and get the facts. Please.

[Dream Land]

non believers, rest assured there are ample cues to know what the other pilot is doing with the aircraft, I don't have to have control wheels and thrust levers moving about to indicate this, as an instructor I can assure you that it is very easy to override automatics (no real need normally) and the other pilot, no I haven't been drinking the Airbus koolaid, just very satisfied with the system, just my 2 cents.

[CONF iture]

The worst scenatio on short final is being a little high on the last couple hundred feet. As you dive to regain the GSlope the Autothrust reduces thrust to keep the speed, and so you arrive very near terra firma with a bit of a high sink and the autothrust IS slow in adding power just when you reach the flare. But by all means, avoid the temptation to pull the nose to arrest the sink. Better to arrive like a load of bricks than scrape the tail.

This is an interesting comment from another thread talking about 321 versus 320.

If the guy pulls his sidestick (which Pilot Monitoring will not notice) to pull the nose, there's a good chance that same PM will not be able to prevent that tailstrike ... and you can forget about your red button in such a time constrained situation.

If the guy pulls his control column (which PM will notice) ... there's a good chance he's gonna put his hand to block that undesirable control column aft movement.

... and there are tons of exemples like that :
- ON THE GROUND
- VERY CLOSE FROM THE GROUND
when the margin for error is very thin
when time is very limited

In Direct Law the pilot is not prevented from doing anything, and it is as simple to engage DL as it is to disengage automation on more conventional airliners.

WHAT ???

Disengaging automation is part of every operation.

Now, how do you engage Direct Law in your every day operation ?
How often do you engage Direct Law in your every day operation ?
Is it an Airbus Standard Operation Procedure ?
Does your partner let you do that ?

747dd has never flown the thing but his comments are spot on, simply because it's based on LOGIC.

As an Airboos driver I'd also like to know what kind of unforeseen $h*t can hit my fans.
Usually people who talk like that don't wait too much to be corrected ...
... A touch of reserve and modesty does not hurt.
... but iI is true you have already 100 hours on that thing ...

[DozyWannabe]

Care to let us know the "simple" way to engage DL? The only way I know is to turn off both FAC's and I surely do not recommend doing that.

My bad, I got my nomenclature confused - last time I studied it in depth was about 7 years ago.

You are an example of one of the reasons I don't post here any more (as you can see).

That's a shame. I'm more than willing to admit that I screwed up... still doesn't make a lot of the 'bus bashing sound any less sophomoric though...

[Dream Land]

there's a good chance that same PM will not be able to prevent that tail strike ... and you can forget about your red button in such a time constrained situation.
Simply not true IMO, even if the non flying pilot adds nose down input without pushing red button the actual command output is a blend of the two side stick inputs and the attitude will be reduced, secondly, most left seaters are well aware of problems caused by DUAL INPUTS, thumbs at the ready:}, especially on final.
Now, how do you engage Direct Law in your every day operation ?
For those of us trained on the Airbus, we realize that Direct Law is not required or desired, the beauty of the airplane is that I can yank the stick in whatever direction I want to get the desired effect, regardless of configuration without causing a stall or hurting the airframe, does it work that way on the 744? :}

[Possum 15]

You would think, after 69 posts, some resolution to this vexing question would be in sight. Instead, the best we can get is “IMHO”. OK;experience. I have approx. 14500 hrs on “conventional” aircraft, around 4500 on FBW, all A340. A lot of these hours have been instructional, from ab initio to training trainers. I am an “average” pilot. Both types have their “pro and cons” none of which if approached in a professional manner, that is good basic flying skills, systems understanding (rather than “knowledge”) and CRM practice, should lead to disaster. I still enjoy flying both.
I have the feeling that the “If it’s not Boeing I’m not going" types are a lot like supporters of a football club, totally faith based, rather than logical. Good or bad, we love it! This may be an admirable trait for football fans, or even followers of English cricket, but is not the way forward for commercial or military aviation (as opposed to warbirds etc.). There is also, I suspect, even a touch of the Ludite added to the fan club mentality. Surely, new and exciting technology should be embraced, not just with caution (or even denial), but with a desire to look at the best aspects of the new with a view to positive evolvement. If not so then the Wright brothers should have stood despondent because the Flyer was positively dangerous and a ship, train or even a horse could go further and carry more with less hazard. Maybe even propeller technology was best (look at early hull losses for jet transports).
In conclusion, and before another red wine, I must say that large and slow (up to M.96) jet transports were the worst way for aviation technology to develop in the seventies (Thank you Congressmen, Senators and lobby groups). Have you ever traveled long haul in cattle class, in close proximity to children screaming their lungs out with boredom, or even worse, singlet clad yobbos on a drinking spree prior to the sex tour? Or the ultimate horror; have you ever traveled in business or first with an Australian sporting team? If so, you will understand. We should be flying SSTMk3 not mega-liners. Two hours max SIN to LHR, greater frequency, MORE COMMANDS, MORE PAY!!!!!! Yeah yeah yeah, dream on P15.

[Possum 15]

And further to the above “rant”. Yogjakarta. Reports (verbal and unofficial) trickling out of Indonesian authorities are not looking good for the unfortunate crew. Perhaps more “Go around” yoke inputs (from either seat) may have been appropriate. We are in greater danger from ourselves than the aircraft we fly.

[CONF iture]

Simply not true IMO, even if the non flying pilot adds nose down input without pushing red button the actual command output is a blend of the two side stick inputs and the attitude will be reduced, secondly, most left seaters are well aware of problems caused by DUAL INPUTS, thumbs at the ready, especially on final

1- Whatever action will have the PM on his sidestick, he's already one step behind, as his action will be based only on the developping airplane attitude and not knowing what kind of input was requested on the other side.

2- And what happen if at the same time the PF realizes his mistake and decides also to push forward his sidestick ... !?

3- "a blend of 2 sidestick inputs" ... WHAT A MESS !

4- RED BUTTON theory and practice are two very different things.
How many times did you hit that red button in the flare ?
How many times did you hit that red button in the rotation ?
Did you ever think afterwards:
Maybe I should have …
But I didn't get the proper information ...
And I didn't get time ...


For those of us trained on the Airbus, we realize that Direct Law is not required or desired, the beauty of the airplane is that I can yank the stick in whatever direction I want to get the desired effect, regardless of configuration without causing a stall or hurting the airframe, does it work that way on the 744?
It is actually a great feature.
But once again, how many times did you use it ?
What about airmanship (basic training, skills, rules) ?

I will not argue on that point:
It is a great feature,
but still, does not replace a pair of good control columns when most needed.
And I believe all big airplane manufactures understood that ...
probably thanks to that early Airbus move.

[Dream Land]

3- "a blend of 2 side stick inputs" ... WHAT A MESS !
Yes, and was the cause of the only tail strike at my current airline, on short final as you mention.

[Possum 15]

Dream Land, I find it difficult to believe that the cause of the tail strike was dual stick inputs. There are a number of pod strikes lodged against the 744, including a beauty at Kai Tak caught in full technicolour video. Have you a theory that the cause of this was a single yoke input, or did the runway just leap up and bite them?

[DozyWannabe]

What about airmanship (basic training, skills, rules) ?
Just as valid on the Airbus FD as the Boeing one.
but still, does not replace a pair of good control columns when most needed.
And I believe all big airplane manufactures understood that ...
probably thanks to that early Airbus move.
Your opinion...
It could equally be argued that as the only other remaining 'big airplane' manufacturer, Boeing is remaining stubbornly stuck in the past.

* - For the record, I subscribe to neither of these viewpoints, believing strongly that you pays your money and takes your choice.

[Dream Land]

Sorry but the culture here doesn't share all the information, maybe initially a high flare, followed by the LHS trying to save it? Just not privy to all the details except it was a dual input while landing.

[Possum 15]

Dream Land, I apologise for being a tad facetious in my last post. The point I wanted to make is that a dual stick input occurred after an unsafe airplane state had already developed. In my first post on this thread (#13), I referred to one of the less glorious days in my aviation career when I tried to salvage a high nose up attitude with a “dual yoke input”, with limited, but some, success. The real issue is; should I have recognized a low and slow approach could develop into an increasing pitch attitude after touchdown and commanded an early go-around, or corrected the profile with a takeover well above the runway? The answer is, alas, YES! Fortunately the training manager was the understanding (of other factors) type and I was merely told not to do it again. In theory, with the bus takeover button, I would not have had to cope with my strong armed mate pulling harder than I could push - maybe, maybe not. The real issue is timely error and threat recognition. Irrespective of what type we fly that is the most important tool we have in our safety armoury. Once again I agree with Dozy, both types are good, I found the bus no worse than the Boeing in strong crosswind conditions, in particular the geometry of the 340-300 easier to cope with than the 744, roll control being a little less critical. The 340 JNB incident was purely not understanding the correct rotation technique, caused by bad training. It is good, very good, to get paid to fly either type!

So to the original point of this thread. I believe the difference between Airbus and Boeing controls matters much less than the smucks who apply the inputs. Goodnight, and good luck.

[CONF iture]

VHHX (http://airliners.net/open.file/0047556/M/)
Kai Tak was surely a place on its own

And as you correctly mention :
Perhaps more “Go around” yoke inputs (from either seat) may have been appropriate. We are in greater danger from ourselves than the aircraft we fly

But take the same TWO crew members on an identical situation, on the same aircraft,
and, as a team,
the crew with fully visible coupled control columns
has a better tool
than the crew with fully invisible independent sidesticks.

... Simply because they do share more vital information.


And here is an interesting note on how Airbus sidestick philosophy can keep one guy out of the loop in marginal flight conditions.

This is extracted from a Company Flight Analysis Bulletin
Simultaneous inputs and Go-Around (http://www.crashdehabsheim.net/AF%20incident.htm)

I did translate some of the FO comments (who was Pilot Monitoring at the time) during that turbulent and windy approach, and the go-around :

... that’s the instant I’ve REALIZED I didn’t know how the CAPT was reacting.
I had no idea of his inputs, I was guessing, ... I had that unpleasant powerless feeling, loneliness and passivity, I could only hear his sidestick reaching mechanical limits, I felt very helpless ...
That was a real paradox to be in the cockpit with a maximum of attention, ready to react, and not having a minimum of information on the PF inputs,

... I imagine I could have had a similar feeling during my 2000 hours as mountain flight instructor on plane and glider if I had not had dual control commands on specific flight phases.


After analysis, the commission came to this somehow revealing conclusion:
As sidestick coupling has not been planed on A-320 and A-340, one must find a solution

Afterwards Airbus made that study I was mentioning earlier, and came to the conclusion that:
Interconnection was operationally not beneficial, and technically not efficient

At the same time Airbus decided to implement the DUAL INPUT WARNING

[Dream Land]

But take the same TWO crew members on an identical situation, on the same aircraft,
and, as a team,
the crew with fully visible coupled control columns
has a better tool
than the crew with fully invisible independent sidesticks.
As a previous check airman I can tell you that your assumption is incorrect, on the Airbus I am in no way limited in knowing what inputs are taking place during the landing, as a matter of fact I feel that I have better control of the situation since all that is needed to be in complete control is a push of the red button. :ok:
The point I wanted to make is that a dual stick input occurred after an unsafe airplane state had already developed. by Possum 15 Yes I fully agree, glad things worked out for you, I don't like cheating the other guy out of the landing but I now do not hesitate to push the button.

[CONF iture]

on the Airbus I am in no way limited in knowing what inputs are taking place during the landing
How can you be that sure !?
Do you use something I am not aware of ???

In normal conditions (probably close to 99%), it is a true statement, but only if you slightly modify it :
On the Airbus I am in no way limited in correctly guessing what inputs are taking place during the landing

For the remaining percentage, when things are getting marginal out there, it is a false statement, and you would have to drastically modify it :
On the Airbus I am in no way sure what inputs are taking place during the landing

When you decide to push that red button, maybe the guy was already correcting but you don’t know it (The developing airplane attitude may just be a consequence of these marginal outside conditions) but you’re still in the mind he was not correcting so you might go for a big surprise,
And you will have to go through a complete and new assessment of the situation

Now, that low over the ground, precious seconds have gone before you realize that the only available option was the GO-AROUND

I don't like cheating the other guy out of the landing but I now do not hesitate to push the button

I would say Airbus does not leave many options:

- Either you take control early in the approach as you are the one ultimately in charge for the vessel
- Either you let it go to your limit before you hit the red button, but if you’re low over the ground, you do it because you’ve already decided it was for the go-around

[DozyWannabe]

CONF iture:

Did Airbus sack you or something? Do something nasty to a family member or pet?

Not meaning to sound rude, but you've just laboured the same three or four points over and over again every single time you've posted on this thread. Yes, some pilots feel the same way as you do and because of that they prefer the Boeing layout - but that doesn't make it objectively safer or better.

Finally, Habsheim was a long time ago, and since then both Airbus and pilots have learned a lot about accommodating each other's viewpionts. The final say on that one was that Airbus were naive, but the fundamental cause was that Asseline screwed up. No more, no less. It astonishes me how many still want to drag that incident up, when the rest of the world moved on over a decade ago.

[Dream Land]

How can you be that sure !?
Do you use something I am not aware of ??? I guess it all comes with the job, as a check airman I was in more of a proactive posture during the landing phase, how do I know what inputs, it's called many flight hours in many airplanes, I am not an above average pilot, every single day in many parts of the world there are hundreds of captains prepared to step in and take control if the landing is being mishandled, all without a yoke :eek: . Hint: when the nose goes up, it's an up input, get it, not too tuff if you have any time in an airplane. :hmm:

[Possum 15]

Either you take control early in the approach as you are the one ultimately in charge for the vessel
- Either you let it go to your limit before you hit the red button, but if you’re low over the ground, you do it because you’ve already decided it was for the go-around
The first option sounds good to me. If the conditions are not suitable for the experience level of the trainee or co-pilot, and/or beyond the company limits (if any) for co-pilot then is there a problem with taking over, or taking the whole sector? On both Boeing and Airbus - NO!
The second option you put forward requires some clarification. Firstly, I would hope "your limit" is within those defined by SOPs. At any time an aircraft unsafe state appears likely or develops you must take over and correct (remember threat and error management?) . Once again, Airbus or Boeing - just do it. There is no question of robbing anyone of anything, safety is the goal of both pilots, not their egos.
The mention of a pilot "feeling passive" is more a reflection on the pilot than the control system being used. If a co-pilot feels the aircraft is in danger he must communicate this to the Captain. If the communication has no effect then he (or she/he) must do something! Both a column or side-stick is eminently suitable.

[Possum 15]

CONF, There is one factor about your view that linked controls are 100% safe that bothers me. How does a commander (for instance) guarantee that the other pilot will allow corrective action to take place? After all there is no priority button on the 734 (for example) control column is there? What happens if "I HAVE CONTROL" or "TAKING OVER" is not complied with? This could be the case of the junior crew member dealing with a commander who is making an error (The "I will not be humiliated by a go-around, I can salvage this" syndrome), or deliberate violation, or is even incapacitated. You must know that these circumstances have led to accidents/incidents in the past. Perhaps some of these incidents may have had positive outcomes if a priority system had been available. Get my drift?

[DesiPilot]

Oh Conf,
If I were flying with you I guess reaching 1000' AGL I will hand over the controls to you knowing that you do not trust anyone sitting on the right seat and you will take over the controls eventually. I would be interested to find out how many Jr. FOs in your company actually get disappointed when they find out that you will be flying with them, knowing very well that you will not let them make any mistakes and you will take over the controls and from the flight during landing phase they will learn nada.
We fly 320 family in my company and the worst one of the lot for tail strike 321 as well. The call "Pitch" is called at 7.5 degrees I am sure as a captain sitting on the left seat you can tell without looking at PFD what 5 degrees or 7.5 degrees looks like.
Take over by all means, but at least let the other person learn as well. Your control coloumn theory is great but I have seen some horific landings in the likes of 73, 74, 75 DC9. I think what it takes is getting used to the airplane. I've had quite a few very experienced pilots jump seat with us when I was flying CRJs. On final approach they were all white knuckeled because we had a 2.5-3 degrees nose down attitude. Now that is a flare for you, from 3 degrees nose down to 5 degrees nose up :)

[stillalbatross]

The difference between the two is that the Airbus camp see what they fly as a design that gets the aircraft from a to b using a design that the Airbus consortium put together. It is the Airbus take on airliner design. The Boeing camp remind me of a bunch of Religious zealots fighting science with the bible. There is apparently no other way of designing an airliner to get from a to b other than what Boeing do, they would lead you to believe. And every time you mention any other version or airliner design that isn't Boeing it's like saying you had problems with the 50000 animals all fitting on a wooden boat..........

That there could be such a religious following for a company who hasn't made anything in airliner design that was evolutionary is remarkable. Prior to 777, I can't think of a manufacturer in any field who has managed to flog an outdated product for as long as Boeing has done with some of it's designs.

Lockheed and Douglas come back, please

[CONF iture]

DW, who is the first one, and by the way single one, to mention Habsheim in this thread ?
My points are quite close to the thread title ... do you mind ?
You don't like my observations, fine ... it's still what I think.

P15, your comments are interesting, and don't get me wrong, I mainly share them, but did I say:
"linked controls are 100% safe"
It is your own interpretation, as my saying is far less ambitious:
For a 2 crew members, fully visible coupled control columns provide much more information than fully invisible independent sidesticks.

How does a commander (for instance) guarantee that the other pilot will allow corrective action to take place?
If guys are starting fighting for controls, i'm afraid we're touching a much bigger issue and I don't think any manufacturer did ever plan anything regarding that issue ... Probably the Chiefpilot will !?
But if your commander feels that much humiliated, what would prevent him to be the last one on red button ... ?

DP, what makes you think I'm a leftseater ?
Did I ever mention that ?
I'm more interested in PF versus PM, 2 crew members working together.

That's the beauty of fully visible coupled control colums: Every single input is known by both, at all time.
PM can monitor more accurately PF performance ... and let him go further ... best way to learn, I agree too !

Another anecdote on takeoff this time:
I call V1
I call Vr
but don't see the usual nose movement ...
so call Vr again (RWY is long today, no big deal)
when at the same time nose pitches up far too quickly
thanks God, PF is as fast to stop that high rate rotation ...

... not elegant ... but tail was saved !

What happened ?
Mistake was mine, gross error in CG calculation, so gross error in trim setting.
So at first Vr call, PF pulled as usual on his sidestick, but without pitchup reaction, he decided to pull maybe too quickly this time ...

Me, as the Pilot MONITORING I was supposed to be, I was aware of NOTHING !!!
I was just a privileged passenger, nothing more.
Thanks to that beautiful Airbus Sidestick Philosophy ...

And if anyone thinking red button is of any use in that situation ... forget about it, except if your name is ... Lucky Luke.

Now, Dream Land, in your quality of check airman, I assume you would have anticipated all that ... Give me your inputs !

Before I go, can anyone, at last, answer that question ?

So again, please, give me any valuable and professional reason as to why the absence of tactile (and I add visual) feedback should increase safety

[TyroPicard]

CONF
Did you look at the Sidestick Position Indicator? That would allow you to monitor exactly what inputs PF was applying at Vr. I do it on every take-off as PM.....
Lucky Luke

[GMDS]

TP: remember JNB ................
A valuable tip: Look at the attitude indicator, the speed and the vertical speed! It's elementary (called flying), but THIS shows whats happening (instrument feedback) and NOT the sidestick indicator. A lot of top AB instructors now admit, that the Maltese cross serves only during controls check on gnd and is not a useful tool as additional feedback for control inputs by the collegue to get airborne.

[Clandestino]

That thingy that shows sidestick position on PFD (and to me it looks more like WW2 Luftwaffe cross than Maltese one) is certainly not an useful tool as additional feedback for control inputs by the collegue once airborne because... it disappears as soon as weight is not on wheels. A lot of top AB instructors certainly know their FCOMs well.

:D Very good story, CONFiture. Now let's suppose the same too-little-nose-up-trim mistake has happened on aircraft with classic flight controls:

You call V1
You call Vr
You don't see the usual nose movement, but as vigilant PM you see that capt has pulled just the right amount of yoke so chances are you probably do nothing, believing everything will be fine. I mean, you did nothing when you didn't know what the captain control inputs were, why would you do anything now when you see that they're correct?
Captains pulls a little more and as veesquared starts to bite, nose pitches up far too quickly
thanks God, PF is as fast to stop that high rate rotation ...

So what's the relevance of miscalculated CofG to FBW controls?:confused:

[GMDS]

Clandestino you are correct, i misspelled, English beeing only my fourth language. Sorry, it's edited. I meant "to get" and wrote "once".
Must have sounded foolish and out of context.
GMDS

[TyroPicard]

GMDS you are correct - thank you - it's just one of the things I look at, not the only one! I was trying to point out to CONF iture that at rotation you can see exactly what input PF has applied if you are monitoring correctly; I still think it is a useful indication, whatever "top AB instructors" might say. It indicates:
Forward sidestick application at start of take-off roll, and reduction to zero by 100 kts.
Erroneous roll demand will be visible, both during take-off roll and at rotation.
Pitch demand at rotation.
TP

[GMDS]

Thought so, TP.
Beeing not so fond of dead sticks, I wanted to back up CONFiture (a little sarcastically i admit...) in underlining that the SS indicator is ONE more value you have to get "intellectually" on a instrument. With a stick/yoke feedback it makes it much easier to monitor the PF, you can scan inside and outside with less values to be interpreted. As we know, intellectual values are processed by our brain in a serial manner, thus one by one and slower, absorbing more brain power. In these short and intense moments (T/O, LDG), I very much prefer the aid of the tactile feedbacks, because our brain can process these in a parallel way to intellectual values, therefore beeing much faster.
Thats the whole point of my criticism of dead controls. If guys can interpret instrument values as fast and precisely as i did the mix with tactile feedbacks, then they have my admiration and i would accept their standpoint. (I doubt it though, assuming their brain, allthough maybe better equipped, is probably similarly wired as mine.);)
GMDS

[Possum 15]

GMDS, are you referring to tactile feedback as PF or PNF? As PF feedback is a non-sequiter, after all you are providing inputs to an hydraulic or mechanical system (in the case of non-FBW) or a FCC in the case of FBW. Any "feedback" is only control system resistance. If you are an IP or a PNF monitoring a manoeuver then how do you get tactile (ie perceived by touch) feedback unless you have your hands on the control column and are inducing the input yourself. You can perceive column position by visual cue, or physically if you have your hands on the column, but not tactile feedback. Not much different to a Bus SPI. Anyway, I will withdraw to my position of saying that I have experience of both systems (except Boeing FBW) and that after a short period to adapt (either way) the same basic principles of aeronautics apply. As someone else observed, it is possible we are missing out on the best system because of the fact that airliner design is now in the hands of two large concerns that are often hindered by their own history. For instance, I always preferred the DC9 to the 727. "Tactile feedback" through that trim wheel I found a little overwhelming (being similar to a pulley wheel on a steam driven farm implement), compared to the trim position indicator. But these days no more Douglas, Fokker, Lockheed etc. What might have been!
Also:
One very fundamental characteristic of the information processing system requires mention. Although man has a vast capacity for sensing information, the decision making stage of the process consists of just one single channel. In other words, although information may be sensed from the approach lights, the altimeter, airspeed indicator and ATC, the decision-making channel is being time-shared between the different inputs.
(Broadbent, 1958; Poulten, 1971)
- So, while one piece of information is being processed, the others are shunted temporarily into the notoriously unreliable short-term memory store to await available time in the single channel. When time becomes available, they are retrieved from storage and despatched on their way. Many factors affect the efficiency of this storage and retrieval operation and a source of potential error is revealed. While it is often felt that one can do more than one thing at time, this subjective feeling results from the rapid scanning and time-sharing which takes place between one piece of information and another.
GMDS, you are a very rare person indeed if you can process through parallel channels!

[GMDS]

Possum.
I don't know if were talking the exact same subject.
Look at your quote precisely. It mentions information beeing put in via eye and ear sensors only. I agree with that processing. However i truly believe that the sensing through hands and the lower end of the spine gets to our brain on a seperate channel, therefore increases the feedback possibiliy.
If your point of view was absolute, then we could give Lewis Hamilton a steering wheel with no street and wheelforce-feedback and simply by watching his instruments and the track he should set the same laptimes. I wonder how he would feel about that .....

I did my share of instructing and felt it easier to evaluate and help a candidate with a moving yoke. Someone mentioned above that instruction was not high on the agenda with the AB philosophy. Lets face it, a huge chunk of our daily ops consists of instructing. As i recall the Israelis changed the design of their Lavi, initially based on the F16 FBW SS, to a moving stick precisely because they said that 30% of its operation was instruction.

Again, the AB system is just as safe as others. A control system that gives you tactile/motion feedback gives you a additional means of feedback and control, beeing as safe as the other.
Why deprive us of such a feature?
GMDS

[Possum 15]

GMDS, greetings, you make some interesting observations.
However, I must comment on your reference to the Israeli military. Don’t be fooled. Like the military of many countries they often do not make the correct choices when it comes to flying training. Take my own country. Despite having quite a good home and away record on the field (except for some unacountably disappointing performances in last centuries major matches), they have made some abysmal choices in both flying training equipment and methods. “All through Jet” or ab-initio on piston/turbine, high performance or not, civilian contractors maybe, tandem seating or not, the list of choices chopped and changed is endless. This has normally been due to “committee think” or just plain incompetence. Sometimes though other factors have played a part; think Bofors, or the number of very recently retired senior officers now taking pay packets from companies they have dealt with while serving! These mistakes are normally rectified with public funds. Good old foul ups in this area in the airline industry are normally caused by short-sightedness induced by the growing influence of bean-counters over operational advice. Except in the case of state-run airlines these mistakes, in the long term, are rectified, if the airline is still alive, with losses to shareholders.
As for your assertion that you can process more than one channel of information (visual, aural or sensory) at a time – I will have to take your word for it that you are different. In over twenty years of reading Human Factors/CRM texts I have never found anything to suggest that the rest of us can. This is the cause of information overload. Information overload can often lead to the shutting down of the decision making process or of “fixation”. Why do so many of our simulator transition courses start with fixed base, “motion off”? Why are some manoeuvres easier to fly motion off? Reduced tactile feedback perhaps? Of course tactile feedback, in the real world, is all too much with us so it has to a part of the simulator training environment – and ultimately it is. Why don’t we perform at optimum in a noisy environment, or if aural warnings are not appropriately silenced, or airframe vibration is severe? I would suggest our inability to, or difficulty in, separating and selecting sensory inputs as we would like to, that is in a logical and correct priority.
Tactile feedback can often be counter-intuitive. How so, you may ask? Take the good old basic steep turn training sequence. Good for scan development, or practice. Disengage A/P and go manual thrust, roll into the turn and at around 25° of bank increase pitch and add a couple of points of EPR or N1. You are then, at 45° of bank pulling like hell to maintain attitude. Of course you could trim, but this leads to problems with ballooning on the roll out, unless of course you trim out of the turn – mmmmm, “flying with trim” – not good! Why not develop a system that allows you to set attitude, add thrust and not have to have the arms of a Bulgarian weight lifter (no offence offered) and the scan rate of Chuck Yeager? WAIT A MINUTE, somebody already did!
Once again, you still haven’t told me how you get tactile feedback without hands on the controls, a very disturbing condition for most students, and even more so for fully qualified co-pilots. It often leads to the “F*** it, he can fly it” attitude, or at the very least an inhibition of natural reaction and input. Of course, this is distinct from the “follow me through” instructional technique which can be useful.
I ran a simulator session only yesterday, with circuit training and engine-out work as the main focus. With this discussion in mind I tried to analyse what were the cues I was really using to determine performance; the most critical area being from V1 to early climb, that is rotation rate and pitch attitude control, yaw control and roll control. I found observation of yoke position (yes I do fly Boeing), either from the instructor’s station or the left seat (student in the right) was not an issue. Performance cues were sufficient. However tactile feedback was important in one particular area. This was rudder input. It is much easier to analyse and teach if the feet are monitoring rudder pedal input. Any instability in roll control can be identified as overactive, or incorrect, use of rudder, thus producing yaw, then inducing roll, as the cause of poor roll control rather than incorrect aileron use. As I am sure you know, poor roll control at this stage makes for poor pitch (and thus IAS) control, as dealing with the roll situation as well as maintaining a constant and correct rate of rotation in spite of the confusing tactile feedback from the control column (change of force versus pitch rate in the 10°NU area), is not easy until learned. From the instructors station it is possible to observe rudder input from leg movement, or readout from screen displayed parameters, but much easier from rudder movement tactile feedback. But, wait a minute! Even the Great Satan Airbus has live and linked rudder pedal movement!
Anyway I feel I am preaching to the already converted, and not necessarily of my faith! I hope I haven’t bored you to tears, or death. Good luck and many happy landings!

[GMDS]

Well, Possum I generally do have my hands on the controls once dirty, and very fast enroute with any little bang or yaw. On the B I instantly know about input and thrust, on the AB I need to look at the instruments additionally.
But you didn't bore me with your contribution, you sometimes almost made my case though ....... so we're not that far apart.
Happy flying on a Boeing, you lucky guy .
GMDS

[CONF iture]

Very good story, CONFiture. Now let's suppose the same too-little-nose-up-trim mistake has happened on aircraft with classic flight controls
1- That was not just "too-little" but MAJOR ... passing 50 feet the VISIBLE trim wheel (and at least it's a good thing they kept it !) moved from 1.5 to ... 4.5 UP
2- No interest in classic flight controls comparison, but in fully visible coupled flight controls, it could be as well 777 or C-17 or EMB last generation ...

So what's the relevance of miscalculated CofG to FBW controls?
I don't know, it is your own question !?
Please do not change my meaning at your own convenience.

You don't see the usual nose movement, but as vigilant PM you SEE that capt has pulled just the right amount of yoke
That's the word I like, so instead of logically thinking that the guy did not pull, you already know he DID, so he's not the one at stake, but airplane is !

so chances are you probably do nothing
WRONG !
I'm already THINKING ... and in the RIGHT direction:
Either that elevator is not connected ...
Either the trim setting is not correct (and I would not mind that option ...)

I am in the knowledge
I am in the loop
I am aware of
I am a step ahead
I am prepared for the probable next development

If it does not make a difference to you, it does a MAJOR one to me.

Captains pulls a little more and as veesquared starts to bite, nose pitches up far too quickly
Wrong again !
If the guy pulls a little more, an additional 15 KT to Vr won't make a huge difference to the rotation rate.
It will if the guy decides to pull too quickly ...
... but if he does it's natural and easy to block it.

Interesting matter:
Due to the sidestick size, it is by far easier to command an abrupt and out of proportion displacement than it is with a control column.

thanks God, PF is as fast to stop that high rate rotation ...
It does not hurt if PNF is in the loop ... two brains usually produce a better fix than one.

Did you look at the Sidestick Position Indicator? That would allow you to monitor exactly what inputs PF was applying at Vr. I do it on every take-off as PM.....
Lucky Luke
No, I did not ... and you're right: I probably should have !
To be honest, it is not something that has been mentioned during initial or recurrent, or I don’t remember, but for sure it has not been emphasized.
Even Airbus keeps very discreet on the subject:
the cross is not to be used by PF during the takeoff, whereas the PNF can check the validity of the PF initial stick input
That's the single mention I've found, and I believe it to be pretty new in FCTM
AI even does not mention it in the « AVOIDING TAILSTRIKES » FCOM BULLETIN where they talk at large on rotation technique.
That makes me think that Airbus does not want to promote the idea that input monitoring must be necessary or at least desirable as they're unable to provide it except for this flight phase ...
Saying that, staring at that little cross during that intense flight phase makes one more too many things to look at and probably extra concentration witch could be detrimental to other parameter observations ... when control column displacements provide such information in a very natural way.

Additional note from Emirates incident safety recommendations :
It is recommended that the operator immediately issue a clear instruction to ensure that the Airbus FBW pilots are left in no doubt that the Side Stick Order Indicator is not to be used for reference during the takeoff rotation
But still, I take your advise Lucky Luke, and I will work on that !
One last thing: Interesting to see that you value and care about control inputs from your team mate, contrary to many here !?

P15, once again I mainly share your comments.
Why not develop a system that allows you to set attitude, add thrust and not have to have the arms of a Bulgarian weight lifter (no offence offered) and the scan rate of Chuck Yeager? WAIT A MINUTE, somebody already did!
No doubt, nice feature, and I would not criticize.
But of any utility during short final ?
My critics go to the way Airbus decided to implement a sidestick philosophy, which is detrimental to a two crew members awareness on each other control inputs, fact Airbus had to acknowledge later on, but for which a fix is "operationally not beneficial, technically not efficient"

From the instructors station it is possible to observe rudder input from leg movement, or readout from screen displayed parameters, but much easier from rudder movement tactile feedback. But, wait a minute! Even the Great Satan Airbus has live and linked rudder pedal movement!
Glad they kept that as well, and did not reach the extreme to do without.
Rudder input consciousness during V1 cut is paramount for PNF.
But do not under value pitch and roll input knowledge (as well as rudder ...) during short final and flare in adverse conditions !

No official jet instruction under my belt, but first months operation with new guys on type requires fair amount of monitoring, and contrary to what was said earlier, simulator is not the place you assimilate everything.

Cessna instruction, so many touch and go, at all time flight control displacements in your visual perimeter, ideal to produce a valuable debriefing, and when requested, discreet hand and feet on these flight controls, in a damping mode, enough to better appreciate student inputs and react when necessary.

... why should it be different on big jets ?

[747dieseldude]

Hi Again.

From reading the posts till now, I learn a few things.
First, this has gone from the old Airbus-v-Boeing thread to a discussion about static side-stick and throttles vs. conservative interlinked moving controls, in terms or cross-checking and monitoring capability.
CONF, and others like us who oppose the still sidestick do not oppose Airbus, or FBW, and not even the sidestick, but only the STILLness of it, and the throttles.

By reading the "pro-airbus" or "pro sidestick" posts, I can learn that airbus has managed to achieve an acceptable (at least by some) system of monitoring other pilot's input. They had done so by introducing new instruments (either 'maltese' or 'luftwaffe' cross) and new procedures ("monitor the cross, but do not use it for rotation" or "if you are clairvoyant enought to know you will need to disengage the a/t, do it above 1,000'....").

According to the posts in this thread, the still sidestick and a/t may provide the same level of cross-checking and monitoring as conventional controls. fine.
But on one, NOT A SINGLE POST, has made a point on how they might be BETTER!?! Isn't new technology supposed to be better? If it can match the old technology only by adding instruments and procedurs, isn't it actually worse?

Don't get me wrong. I thing FBW technology is the way forward, and brings safety and performance.
And the sidestick is good as well, especially during meal service, and during these moments in cruise when you feel you need to stare at the bottom of the HSI.

If only it would move when my buddy or the a/p was doing something, and if only the engine power would match the thrust lever position...

[GMDS]

Amen to every word, Dieseldude.
The constant reduction to beeing a "Airbus enemy" if one criticises the slightest little thing on a AB, sounds Bush-phobic.
Me too wouldn't mind keeping sidestick with the table and even the sometimes woefully confusing ECAM, if only the controls would mirror my collegues or the autopilots inputs.
And it would be SO easy and cheap to add, a lot to gain and nothing to lose but some French pride.:ugh:
GMDS

[Fil]

1- That was not just "too-little" but MAJOR ... passing 50 feet the VISIBLE trim wheel (and at least it's a good thing they kept it !) moved from 1.5 to ... 4.5 UP
2- No interest in classic flight controls comparison, but in fully visible coupled flight controls, it could be as well 777 or C-17 or EMB last generation ...


Just as a aside it is Airbus on who elected to keep the visible trim wheel on their FBW aircraft and Boeing who deceided to remove it from their FBW 777. Had you been in a Boeing CONF you'd not have seen this maybe in a way backing up what you were saying about visible feedback.

How many here tend to favour the aircraft they first flew in their sidestick/control column views?

My own (personal) feelings is neither manufacturer got it entirely right. Why don't Airbus thrust levers move? Why doesn't the 777 have decent envelope protection? Why is there no trim wheel only those trim levers on the 777? Why does the Airbus tend to get trickier (or more challenging) on gusty crosswind days whereas the 777 isn't affected as much?

Fil
(Have flown both 320 and 777)

[CONF iture]

Just as a aside it is Airbus on who elected to keep the visible trim wheel on their FBW aircraft
... it could be they changed their mind as well ...
Trim wheel ? (http://airliners.net/open.file?id=1046644&size=L&width=1091&height=806&sok=JURER%20%20%28nvepensg_trarevp%20%3D%20%27Nveohf%20N380% 27%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=8)

Now, how much longer for rudder pedals to be linked ... !?

757 / 767 had already lost trim wheels, but at least they kept the MAIN flight controls items.

Fixed thrust levers is not a big issue, as thrust reading is very clear to both pilots.
It just makes thrust disconnection less conventional and one has to think before proceeding.

How many here tend to favour the aircraft they first flew in their sidestick/control column views?
No emotion here, but technical characteristics.
Actually I do appreciate bus flightdeck for MANY reasons, but I realize how much, sometimes, I would even more appreciate to still benefit from the things I did mention earlier in this thread.

Airbus took a radical option with sidesticks.
I believe they did not consult properly.
They did not evaluate properly.
Pilots were not central parameters in the equation.
AI was already betting on a single pilot operation,
just waiting for the day they simply would do without.

... but automatism did not deliver as expected ... ?

20 years later still no airliner manufacturer to follow the Airbus sidestick philosophy !?

[DozyWannabe]

If it can match the old technology only by adding instruments and procedurs, isn't it actually worse?
Nope, just different.

There are several examples where a force-feedback control would actually be more dangerous than less in the event of a malfunction.

Airbus took a radical option with sidesticks.
I believe they did not consult properly.
They did not evaluate properly.
Pilots were not central parameters in the equation.
AI was already betting on a single pilot operation,
just waiting for the day they simply would do without.
With all due respect, what utter rubbish.

Yet again you say the same thing over and over without a shred of proof other than your 'opinion'. Having spoken to some of the people who worked on the project, pilots were no less central in the equation than anyone else in the airline industry. That 'AI was .. betting on single pilot operation' is a terrible slur and utterly unfounded.

[Possum 15]

CONF, is it that your opinions are set in concrete and you are in denial? I have a lot (and I mean a lot) of experience on conventional control systems and around 4000hrs Airbus. I believe the 330/340 generation is head and shoulders above the 767/747 generation and are a significant step forward. As I have mentioned in previous posts I cannot compare 777. I believe however that control wheels will go the way of the old wooden wheels on the tall ships of old. Boeing commercial are shackled by their own history. Unfortunately there is no other American manufacturer of airliners. There should be.
20 years later still no airliner manufacturer to follow the Airbus sidestick philosophy !?
I wonder why? And I really wonder why when I see 744 pilots trying to acheive a constant 2.5deg rate of rotation to the takeoff attitude with often variable results due to feedback producing changing control column forces as the aircraft rotates through the 10deg area. Ugly!
I could go on and on.
CONF, if you believe that there is no further development in aviation (single pilot or even no pilot) then I will let you reflect on the fact that as a young first officer I flew on two occasions with a Flight Navigator, once even with a Radio Operator, and many times with Flight Engineers. Most of these gentlemen are now engaged in other pursuits. One of the first uses for military aircraft was visual recconaisance. This fine art is now entirely (in modern armies at least) in the hands of pilotless aircraft and the miriad of sensors with which they can be equiped. These drones do a better job than the O1-A or OH 1. Alas, believe me, they do, they really do! So - NEVER SAY NEVER!
Once again, happy landings.

[neville_nobody]

Interesting to note that Embraer went into cockpit design of the 190 with a clean sheet of paper and decided on ram's horn control columns. They surveyed pilots and the control column was the most favourable form of control device with the ram horn design being the most ergonomic!

[Dream Land]

Try eating your lunch on the rams horn, lol. :} So much for ergonomics.

[GMDS]

so i take it that the French are more into dining than crossmonitoring on the job ............ more lol :}

[dash6]

A fellow aviator on an AB course asked the trainer what the table was stressed to. After a short silence the trainer admitted he was not sure,but "It will take the weight of an Air Inter flight attendant." Roll on Boeing sidesticks!

[john_tullamarine]

... don't do that .... I near choked on my coffee .... :}

[the shrimp]

Norbert Jacquet always questioned Airbus FBW computers. The first time, in 1988, after the Habsheim crash: http://jacno.com/an00.htm (extracts: “An abnormal limitation by the computer of the pilot’s action on the flight controls etc.” ... “an order of the computers to land” etc.

Difference between Airbus and Boeing controls? Norbert Jacquet is jailed to silence him!: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=272603