Airbus technology defects

[the shrimp]

This story takes place in France, concerning Airbus technology.

A former Air France 747 pilot has been reduced to silence because he knows too much about Airbuses defects, about the reasons of the crashes and about the lies around all this, to hide the truth.

Read here (in english) : http://jacno.com/za-an-inmo.htm (http://jacno.com/za-an-inmo.htm)

If it takes too long, just read this short letter : http://jacno.com/za-an-an39.htm (http://jacno.com/za-an-an39.htm)

It seems unbelievable, but is true. This guy is a real victim of the “Reason of State”.

In France, everything relating to Airbus is locked : justice, media… everything which has something to see with state interest. When orders come from the very top! Is it necessary to recall the Mitterrand’s hidden daughter, where silence was the rule for all media, also hiding means to reduce to silence those who would not accept to say nothing about this young lady?

Could we talk about this incredible story on local forums, to pilot associations and trade-unions, and, if necessary, to civil aviation administrations and journalists?

[Flying Mech]

They did call the A320 the "John Wayne Airplane" after that Paris Air Show disaster in '88 I think.
Why?

It climbs mountains, knocks down trees & kills Indians!

[Colonel Klink]

Anybody who does not think the French are experts at covering up for their own, needs to have a close look at the Alfred Dreyfus incident.It is staggering that this could be allowed to happenand even more so that the European courts won't help.

[The Real Slim Shady]

If you fail to understand the complexities of the systems declaring them unsafe is a great cop out!!!

[fantom]

Do you people think you might need good lawyers soon?

[Brian Abraham]

Quote from Hansard,

"and that is why you employ lawyers: because lawyers are all about the law and not the truth"

[jondc9]

if something is not understood its use can be unsafe

[J.O.]

While I am no psychiatrist, he certainly seems to have a serious case of obsession. What facts about the case were hidden? He fails to inform the reader what they are. Could it be because there aren't any? In fact, a French court recently threw out a case against several officials which made similar accusations.

The investigation clearly states that an error was made by the crew in selecting a vertical speed of 3300 f.p.m. instead of a flight path angle of 3.3 degrees. This, combined with a lack of an installed GPWS, led to the collision with the high terrain on the approach. If any officials needed to answer for their actions, it was the Air Inter management who elected to buy A320s without a GPWS system because "GPWS systems give false warnings". If I were an airline manager, I'd much rather have a crew respond to a false warning than to scatter an aircraft on a mountain top.

[matt_hooks]

Quote from Hansard,
"and that is why you employ lawyers: because lawyers are all about the law and not the truth"

By definition, being called Lawyers rather than Truthyers!

As for the Airbus cover up story, it would hardly be the first time that a western government has covered up something of import. It's interesting that this has not been reported on (to my knowledge) in the British press. Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong on that, but I've never seen any of the information regarding these accidents over here.

[Ignition Override]

This does not suggest that there were no problems with the Boeing 737-2/3 rudder actuators.
So how about with older widebody Airbus types?

We are at a JFK hotel tonight. Not very far from here soon after 9/11, an A-300 crashed. It was very easy to blame the flying pilot, especially buried six feet under the cold ground, due to some comments made by just one pilot he had flown with.
No pilot goes "ape", or "bananas" and pushes wildly on the rudder pedals-maybe the rudder, at that moment, already suffered from erratic oscillations? During my career, I never heard about any pilot, none whatsoever, using rudders in that manner. It is unheard of-but that comment certainly let the NTSB "off the hook".

Imagine the resulting legal 'Katrina' storm (much of it from the FAA....), if the NTSB had used documents from foreign "translated" regulatory agencies to create doubt in the reliability of a large aircraft-after years of operating with US carriers, i.e. American and Fedex! That same plane might have suffered, before the accident flight, structural damage during either turbulence or a hard landing.

Were there not strange anomolies (uncommanded control inputs to other A-300s), in aircraft operated by Interflug, Air France and AirTransat? How often is a rudder designed whereby a pilot pushes on the pedal, but after a certain distance of pedal travel, a disproportiate angle is commanded by the rudder actuator? This has been alleged for the A-300/310.
The"airline" Interflug is gone, and would that company and Air France keep records of maintenance inspections after the 'alleged' incidents?
Did Fedex aircraft suffer unexplained rudder problems on any A-310/300s?

[Dani]

Well well, some more French bashing...
Some of you even need to use the nearly 100 year old story of Dreyfuss to their aid. Are you guys serious? In the last 6 years alone, Bush and his buddies have covered up enough for a century. Where has the Antrax case gone, btw???

While I agree that French government is not one of the most willing to act transparent, some other "Grand Nations" are certainly not much better. But please be more rational and stick to the point.

Fact is, that where ever you invent new technology, there is a possibility of mistakes. Airbus is a very safe and secure aircraft. There are Boeings and there are Airbus. Both are excellent aircraft.

dani

[Ignition Override]

Dani-Our own agency, our friendly FAA, has "allegedly" ;) kept quiet in the past about certain aircraft anomolies. Their dream was to hope it that the aircraft was operated by a foreign airline or military squadron-how would the American public, who flew on these by the thousands, be aware of it?
The aircraft which suffered from aileron 'snatch' in some icing conditions was just one. Look up the political expression "plausible denial". When the reports are locked away in a 'Schublade' and nobody else is aware....dead bodies and fragmented aircraft parts in the frozen ground near Roselawn, Indiana.
Any agency or government can have the motivation to cover something up, not just the French.

Is it possible that it happened with the 'Spatzl', the 'Chips', the 'SPQR', even the Amis? Especially when it is legal and many billions (whether aircraft sales, or staggering Arbeitslosigkeitskosten...) are at stake.

No matter where-it should be exposed, just as plundering of airline pension funds and other...eh...corporate cash "upstreaming", "up" to holding companies, must be exposed :E .
How about kickbacks from bankruptcy law firms which charge an airline extortionate rates? Look under enough stones in the forest, and some slime will be discovered, especially when a government's executive branch dictates the mentality for government department ministers (Secretaries), and therefore appoints them, whether DOT, FAA....the Tombstone agency. When dead bodies are brought in, the FAA reacts as if they were always unaware of a problem or certification flaw (i.e. icing).

And when the pseudo-government agency which helps support, to a very limited extent, private (even airline!) pensions, and strangely:oh: , has the SAME people on the Board which decides whether or not to loan an airline money.
Imagine the possible conflicts of interest.:E . ! Das kann man sich leicht vor-------.

[threemiles]

Interflug is gone, and would that company keep records maintenance inspections after the 'alleged' incidents?

Aircraft belongs to the German Air Force fleet now carrying members of the government. Incident check and any subsequent maintenance was done by LHT, all documentation available.

[vapilot2004]

How often is a rudder designed whereby a pilot pushes on the pedal, but after a certain distance of pedal travel, a disproportiate angle is commanded by the rudder actuator? This has been alleged for the A-300/310.
Interflug is gone, and would that company and Air France keep records maintenance inspections after the 'alleged' incidents?
Did Fedex aircraft suffer UNexplained rudder problems on any A-310/300s?

The unusual rudder actuation of the A300 series is not alleged, IO. It is a demonstrated fact. And to be fair, the 737 Classic series rudder incidents indicated something was clearly wrong with the PCH units. There is more to both stories than is generally known.

Probably hasn't been a lawsuit involving a product defect in recent times where some form of legal subterfuge is not being skillfully applied to free the manufacturer from liability. Sad Status Quo.


Now, allow us move on to the newest generation of aircraft:

The good news:
A physical defect in a valve or other device can 99% of the time be expertly reproduced or reasonably proven forensically to exist - no contest here.

The not so good news:
A software bug can remain well-hidden due to the numerous lines of often complex code that is best understood only by the original programmers. Then there is the programmer's intended interaction with the not-so-finite real world which becomes practically an ethereal matter. The resulting trail from said defect may only be visible to a select few, if there is any trail left at all.

The more we digitise, the more need there is to audit the process and results - especially considering the current state of corporate honesty.

This business of not owning up to one's mistakes (both personal and corporate) is becoming very tiresome.

Honesty and integrity should always trump liability, but that is now but an idealist's dream.

The trust-factor, however, remains huge.

[56P]

Is it possible to obtain a copy in English of the book identified in the first posting above?

[arcniz]

The not so good news:
A software bug can remain well-hidden due to the numerous lines of often complex code that is best understood only by the original programmers. Then there is the programmer's intended interaction with the not-so-finite real world which becomes practically an ethereal matter. The resulting trail from said defect may only be visible to a select few, if there is any trail left at all.

True, indeed. Software generally does not fail-soft. The heavy dependence on software that is 'undocumented' and inaccessible to all but a select-few company insiders means no accountability, no transparency, and no independent verification of the critical control processes and underlying assumptions that operate most functions in modern aircraft.

With engines, airframe, and avionics coming from several sources, the potential for hidden flaws in integral control software compounds with each design change and each 'model' variation thereon.

Imagine further how the design integrity of these aircraft may degrade over decades of 'minor' control and subsystem repairs intended to deal with specific operational problems encountered along the way, many of them done on the cheap without the top-to-bottom integrated-systems evaluations that look at the bigger picture of overall vehicle reliablility in light of each and every modification.

The various civil authorities need to develop enough backbone to compel full disclosure ( confidential, where necessary ) for ongoing technical evaluation of algorithms, principles, and all other operational data about the software controlling ALL airbourne controls, systems, and subsystems used in civil aviation. Only when this is done will the true facts be available for inquiry and independent evaluation when incidents arise.

[411A]

Indeed, rudders, and their sometimes strange actions, notwithstanding pilot inputs.

Now, with American Airlines, their poorly thought out advanced maneuvering program, and the possibility of a rogue First Officer using the rudder in an inappropriate manner...this is bad enough.

But, perhaps not nearly as bad as Boeing, as those with very long memories will recall, again with American Airlines, and one of their B707's suffering a rudder hardover just after takeoff in the very early 1960's, from IDL (now (JFK).
A swan dive straight into Flushing Bay.
Did Boeing cover this up, with the help of the FAA?

You be the judge, but the 707 was a known quantity with regard to rudder hardovers...for quite a long time.
And, the result was, shall we say, not good.

That large rudder power guarded switch, painted red with white stripes was there for a reason, and was certainly used more than one time, you can be sure.

[Ignition Override]

vaPilot2004: It is always my intention to avoid any hint of libel, and also for our generous supervisors at Pprune Towers.
To be quite frank, my aviation reading on days off mostly includes Pprune, a little "Aviation Week & ST", "Flying" and the other Internet, i.e. 'MD-11' anomolies.

By the way, not too many years ago, "Aviation Week" stated that original records from TWA maintenance revealed that BEFORE the 727 flown by Hoot Gibson rolled into a dive over Michigan, there had been uncommanded LE slat problems...again, from dates before that famous incident.
Who had hidden those documents so many years?:E
I've flown nothing larger that the 757 and have no desire to. The smaller planes are more fun, serving large and many smaller airports.

I said nothing about MD-11 certification issues and
'possible' landing gear fatigue (PSP?). Nothing.

[egsc_h17]

True, indeed. Software generally does not fail-soft. The heavy dependence on software that is 'undocumented' and inaccessible to all but a select-few company insiders means no accountability, no transparency, and no independent verification of the critical control processes and underlying assumptions that operate most functions in modern aircraft.
This comment betrays a lack of understanding of safety critical software systems design. I wouldn't expect you to have an understanding of same unless, like myself, you had spent several years studying the topic. If you have not done so then perhaps you could avoid making ill informed sweeping statements about my profession.
Software systems can be and are designed to fail in a deterministic state and furthermore the hardware systems on which they run are designed likewise. The degree of redundancy in a FBW flight control system is typically an order of magnitude greater than for a hydromechanical system.
Safety critical systems are never written in an "undocumented and inaccessible" way. Large projects often have dozens or hundreds of contributors all working within a far more controlled process than that used for business applications. Many systems are subject to external scrutiny and certification. Where redundancy is required it is not unusual to use two different teams (sometimes different companies) to develop the exact same application - a development approach originally pioneered by NASA.
I would be more concerned by many of the mechanical and electrical systems than I am about the software. Pilots tend to blame every glitch "on the computers" when in reality the vast majority of issues are caused by transducer failures or even a simple misunderstanding of how to use the system. Such problems can equally affect hydromechanical aircraft. As far as I'm aware there has never been a FBW failure in a commercial aircraft that has resulted in loss of critical control systems. The number of tech problems due to software are totally eclipsed by mechanical and electrical problems.
FBW software systems are known to have saved aircraft, but are yet to be proven causal in any production hull loss. That makes our record infinitely better than almost every other aircraft system.
Just imho.

[fantom]

Well said!
Wow, some-one who actually knows what they are talking about.
Fifteen happy Airbus years behind me and I'm not dead yet. Isn't that amazing?

[A4]

Didn't Airbus employ 5 different companies to write the FBW software for the A320 family? I believe on the B777 all the flight control software is written by the same company. I know which I think is the more sensible approach.

A4

[arcniz]

egsc_h17 says

This comment betrays a lack of understanding of safety critical software systems design. I wouldn't expect you to have an understanding of same unless, like myself, you had spent several years studying the topic. If you have not done so then perhaps you could avoid making ill informed sweeping statements about my profession.



FWIW, I have been doing design, development, and analysis of fault-tolerant, fail-soft, and never-fail electronics, software, computing architectures and real-time systems since the days when transistors were large enough to trip over and software came in the form of wires and holes. One of my patented designs for testing, diagnosing, and analyzing complex systems has generated more than a trillion US$ of product manufactures in applications ranging from complex LSI circuits to global distributed computing networks, with the total growing by more than a hundred billion $$ this year. Along the way, I have developed a very large number and wide variety of mission-critical electronic products, real-time control computing systems and applications and have planned, supervised or officially reviewed development of many hundreds more. I am also, for several decades, a pilot and aircraft owner-operator, and moderately familiar with the design-life-support cycle of commercial aircraft.


egsc_h17 says

I would be more concerned by many of the mechanical and electrical systems than I am about the software. Pilots tend to blame every glitch "on the computers" when in reality the vast majority of issues are caused by transducer failures or even a simple misunderstanding of how to use the system. Such problems can equally affect hydromechanical aircraft. As far as I'm aware there has never been a FBW failure in a commercial aircraft that has resulted in loss of critical control systems. The number of tech problems due to software are totally eclipsed by mechanical and electrical problems.


The arrogance, shallowness, and evident miscomprehension of the problem embodied in this (foregoing) comment brilliantly underscores a systematic failure to grasp the concept of Systems design for the real world.... where mistakes have irreversible consequences and everyone involved must assume TOTAL responsibility for all possible outcomes. How reassuring... to know one's life hangs on a thread devised, designed, delivered by a shop full of clever snitty self-obsessed primadonnas.


On the surface of it, one would say you appear to be an exemplar of the exact problem to which I have referred. The problem is under-scrutinised and under-tested design experimentation by sanctimoniously self-assured technicians who feel that all problems have been solved, the world is perfect; the current technology of choice will always save the day. Probably you believe this because you have been recognized as competent in your job and your designs have always worked - or appeared to work - properly up til now.

Too much confidence, fueled by the appearances of success, is bad for the judgement and bad for the soul, however. Let us all cross fingers and hope you will never confidently send a load of customers to sleep with the fish.

[Lucifer]

Didn't Airbus employ 5 different companies to write the FBW software for the A320 family? I believe on the B777 all the flight control software is written by the same company. I know which I think is the more sensible approach.
A4
The reason being so that the same error was not repeated over five computers, and so that the others would cancel the input of an incorrect line of code.

Even if one firm was used for the 777, different computers using different programming languages and software platforms were still used.

[egsc_h17]

One of my patented designs for testing, diagnosing, and analyzing complex systems has generated more than a trillion US$ of product manufactures
Since none of my patented designs are likely to have generated a trillion of anything (which of course proves the value of your opinions) and since I did not intend this to degenerate into a personal attack, I'll bow out now and get back to some other shallow arrogance I have to take care of before dinner.

[arcniz]

Since none of my patented designs are likely to have generated a trillion of anything (which of course proves the value of your opinions) and since I did not intend this to degenerate into a personal attack, I'll bow out now and get back to some other shallow arrogance I have to take care of before dinner.

Arrogance was your choice for flavour - per your earlier post. Bon appetit!

[FougaMagister]

The aircraft which suffered from aileron 'snatch' in some icing conditions was just one. Look up the political expression "plausible denial". When the reports are locked away in a 'Schublade' and nobody else is aware....dead bodies and fragmented aircraft parts in the frozen ground near Roselawn, Indiana. Any agency or government can have the motivation to cover something up, not just the French.

IO - I agree that the French authorities do not have a very good track record of facing up to the facts when these might just turn out to be embarassing - call it misplaced national pride if you will.

However, you have it seriously wrong when you mention the Roselawn ATR 72 accident in the same breath. In that case, (and while the French DGAC certainly didn't shine by its cooperation with the NTSB investigation), there were a number of factors which conspired to cause that accident;

1/ The aircraft was flown in freezing drizzle (a heavy icing condition for which it had not been certificated) at the wrong IAS, with the wrong flap setting

2/ It was flown in the hold in these conditions (when the crew should have elected to leave heavy icing asap)

3/ They apparently had not Level 3 anti-icing ON throughout

As part of the accident investigation, ATR sent one of their own aircraft (before its delivery to Alitalia Express) to Edwards AFB, where it was flown by a test crew behind a KC-135 spreading water over the ATR 72's airframe in icing conditions to reproduce those experienced by the ill-fated Roselawn aircraft. While ice did accumulate on some parts, it was mostly shed by the anti-icing when used properly, and the test aircraft did not experience any serious control difficulties or depart from controlled flight. These tests, may I add, were requested, conducted, validated and published by the FAA.

The source of the Roselawn crash was traced to a ridge of ice forming in frizzing drizzle (a known freak icing phenomenon) behind the de-icing boots, therefore disrupting the airflow over the ailerons. While not specifically requested by the FAA, ATR decided to extend the de-icing boots over a larger part of the wing chord to prevent re-occurence.

All current operators of ATRs have very strict and specific anti-icing procedures which when correctly adhered to, make the ATR no less safe in icing conditions than any other turboprop aircraft (Dash 8, Fokker 50, Saab 2000, Casa 235/295, Do-328, etc).

If it really was unsafe in icing conditions, would ATRs be routinely used by airlines in, say, Alaska, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Italy or New Zealand to name but a few?

Cheers :cool:

[Ignition Override]

Greetings FougaMagister: My criticisms were for the US FAA, not any foreign government department or aircraft industry etc. A serious problem can happen with any aircraft.

I read a bit in "Aviation Week & ST" about ATR icing test flights behind the KC-135 after Roselawn. I was mistaken and certainly did not understand the ATR's procedures. My impression was that our "friends" at the FAA covered up, or kept very silent on some critical information.

Your well-informed, objective response was interesting and appreciated.

Merci beau coup. Now it is time to review systems on a "steam-gauge " jet which has a basic rudder etc and no automation.

[electricjetjock]

Arcniz

Pot this is Kettle?:D

[arcniz]

electricjetjock

Hello Kettle. Go ahead...

[FougaMagister]

IO - thanks. The NTSB's report on the Roselawn accident is an interesting read, which chastises the DGAC and the FAA for their lack of oversight in the certification process more than the aircraft itself. It can be found on http://www.aviation-safety.net/index.php

I didn't mean to be abrupt, I just get tired of hearing the words "ATR" and "icing" always associated in the same sentence... When I found the aircraft to be a sound design (if a bit heavy in roll, and with a user-unfriendly AFCS).

Whether or not turboprops really are more prone to airframe icing is debatable; they usually don't have the luxury of being able to fly above the icing level...

Cheers :cool:


P.S: sorry for thread creep!

[Ignition Override]

FougaM:

Roger that.

Bonne nuit.

[Fropilot]

To paraphrase an old saying: "It is better to keep your fingers off your computer keyboard and let people think you are a fool, than to use them to confirm their suspicions."

In the wrong hands anything can be lethal. Just watch pink panther movies.

[airsound]

I'm sad the egsc_h17/arcniz bunfight descended into personal abuse and then huffy withdrawal from the fray. Their obviously expert but contradictory arguments were getting to an interesting stage. In particular, egsc said
As far as I'm aware there has never been a FBW failure in a commercial aircraft that has resulted in loss of critical control systems. The number of tech problems due to software are totally eclipsed by mechanical and electrical problems.
FBW software systems are known to have saved aircraft, but are yet to be proven causal in any production hull loss. That makes our record infinitely better than almost every other aircraft system.
Just imho.
As far as I can tell, arcniz did not offer any contradictory evidence. I wonder, do you have any, arcniz? If you do, I for one would very much like to see it. If you don't, doesn't that rather weaken your argument that
The problem is under-scrutinised and under-tested design experimentation by sanctimoniously self-assured technicians who feel that all problems have been solved, the world is perfect; the current technology of choice will always save the day.
airsound
not stirring, honest......

[Huck]

As far as I'm aware there has never been a FBW failure in a commercial aircraft that has resulted in loss of critical control systems.


Small point, but there was this one:

http://ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001211X11781&key=1

It was an experimental system, though.....

[wileydog3]

By the way, not too many years ago, "Aviation Week" stated that original records from TWA maintenance revealed that BEFORE the 727 flown by Hoot Gibson rolled into a dive over Michigan, there had been uncommanded LE slat problems...again, from dates before that famous incident.


There are LOTS of stories around and apparently sufficient past practice to question whether the slats extension was *uncommanded* or the result of some 'work-arounds' developed by crews to get more wing in cruise.

[wileydog3]

Didn't Airbus employ 5 different companies to write the FBW software for the A320 family? I believe on the B777 all the flight control software is written by the same company. I know which I think is the more sensible approach.
A4


Do you? It is referred to as 'dissimilar redundancy' so one error will not manifest itself in other programs. Also different chips.

IF you were to study the FBW control system, you would see that different chips and different software is controlling different surfaces so a lot can go wrong before you lose (or 'loose' as is often the word used on the net :) ) control. Not a bad idea.

[BlooMoo]

Small point, but there was this one:
http://ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id...11X11781&key=1
It was an experimental system, though.....
Small point, but is automation generally good or bad for the pilot industry?
BM:hmm:
PS The aviation industry(military or commercial) is not the subject of this question.

[Ignition Override]

WileyDog3:
It is certainly possible, although a TWA pilot told me that the specific procedure was unknown to TWA 727 pilots, and it was research at Boeing Aircraft which produced that procedure. A large corporation has, compared to a pilot, unrestricted resources with which to defend its reputation and even more money at stake: all of this creates a huge incentive to produce or fabricate a possible theory. Hoot and his crew also counter-sued the NTSB (!), from what I remember.

If the NTSB was ever totally objective about all investigations, that is news to me. Of course they are "provided" data from the aircraft builder, among the many other sources. But they seem to always do a far better job than the USAF investigation of the "King 56" case: C-130 4-engine rollback, due to syncrophaser glitches. An article on some website about the unnecessary crash stated that Air Force investigators must attend a 3-day school, then they are accident experts, and their conclusions can be final.

The article in Aviation Week stated that the same exact B-727 ship (aircraft) number had suffered from uncommanded slat (a Douglas term :) )/leading edge flap problems before the major incident happened.

[ilidio]

All aircaft have defects in relation to the ones you are not flying..(in general)
A boeing pilot for one can see the defects in airbus, where the airbus pilot would see the same in boeing????
The decussion sould not be abouts there defects? but rather there differences in design and performances...(cockpit flows etc)

[lomapaseo]

.... An article on some website about the unnecessary crash stated that Air Force investigators must attend a 3-day school, then they are accident experts, and their conclusions can be final.
.....


I hope that you don't believe that garbage.

[Graybeard]

It's been a long time since I read about that one in Aviation Leak (week), but wasn't stall protection disabled in Flight Level Change mode, or whatever it was called? What kind of a design problem was that? How deep into the software was that hidden?

As you all must know better than me, the A-320 Air Inter was a failure called modality: the same knob selected glide path angle in degrees and tenths, or rate of descent in thousands and hundreds. Did a real pilot design these things?

Like an old 727 driver told me, "Sometimes I WANT to hurt that airplane, if that will save it."

GB

[HotDog]

You be the judge, but the 707 was a known quantity with regard to rudder hardovers...for quite a long time.
And, the result was, shall we say, not good.


Not just rudder hard overs, 411A.


08/28/1973 21:50

LOCATION: Thirty-five miles west of Los Angeles, California

CARRIER: Trans World Airlines FLIGHT:

AIRCRAFT: Boeing B-707-331B

REGISTRY: N8705T S/N: 18916/455

ABOARD: 152 FATAL: 1 GROUND:

DETAILS: The plane porpoised while descending to LAX. The

aircraft was subjected to 2 minutes of peak acceleration forces of 2.4

g A combination of design tolerances in the aircraft's longitudinal

control system which, under certain conditions, produced a critical

relationship between control forces and aircraft response.

[the shrimp]

On Norbert Jacquet’s website, we can find a page pointing out that the Airbus 320 would be much more dangerous than the Boeing 737 NG (-600 to -900).

Here : http://jacno.com/am5300.htm (May, 5th 2006).

Extracts :

… Referring to the ICAO standards to define the terms of an accidents :

- Airbus 320 : fourteen accidents (including two on the ground, out of operation, that we have to deduce),

- Boeing 737 -600/700/800/900 : none or one accident (There is a debate on the December, 8th 2005 Chicago 737-700 crash, in which we deplore no wounded or dead people in the aircraft. The plane, lightly damaged, will fly again, if not already done).
…
On this same Norbert Jacquet’s page, there is a link towards a page confirming that Bernard Ziegler, father of the “Airbus technology”, in 1961 cut a teleferic cable with his plane ( http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,872735,00.html ).

Was Bernard Ziegler the right man to conceive the Airbus cockpits?

What can we think about the differences on the crashes’ rates for the A 320 and the B 737 NG? (the B 737 NG fleet is 40% inferior to the A 320’s one)?

[Clandestino]

Ladies and gentlemen, before we return this thread on its tracks, I'd like to give my comments on some accidents mentioned here.

Regarding the Roselawn ATR-72 crash: there were two accident reports, one by NTSB and another by its French counterpart, BEA. They were pretty much the same in their factual information and analysis sections, but they differed wildly when it came to probable causes. NTSB blamed the airplane designers and inadeqate regulatory oversight during ATR certification. BEA accused the flightcrew of being negligent for continuing the flight in icing conditions when there were escape routes available. So who got it right? No one - both were seriously wrong.

NTSB claimed that ATR knew that their airplanes' ailerons are prone to hinge moment reversal, especially with ice contamination, and should have been redesigned. Problem is that aileron moment reversal on uncontaminated wing occurs at 26° AoA - deep into stall so it was considered to be a non-issue. Another problem is that atypical icing over Roselawn was caused by supercooled large droplets (SLD). At the time of crash, they were largely unknown fenomenon outside some narrow meteorological circles and even worse, they cannot be created by water spray tankers during icing certification. So ATR and DGAC sprayed and sprayed and sprayed ATRs from tankers and never had problems with ailerons. Also SLD tend not to create large ice deposits on leading edges, they flow chordwise and then freeze. Lack of ice on leading edges can lead one to conclude he's flying through light icing, while ice builds up out of sight.

However, it's absolutely wrong to blame our deceased coleagues for improper operation of their ATR. Sad fact is that they were faced with unknown phenomenon and so became test pilots without ever realizing it. While their actions preceeding loss of control were somewhat unusual, they were far from unreasonable. They did turn on de-icing level 3 (i.e. boots) but were never concerned about icing because there was not much ice on the airplane. Also there was argument that 'since it brought down the airplane, icing was severe'. Well gents, if ATR had powered ailerons, or if they were better designed, if there were brazilia or SF 340 instead of ATR, pax and crew would land happily at KORD and SLDs would be still be unheard of. Biggger de-icing boots, ice evidence probe, increased speeds for tkof/ldg, stick shaker that fires earlier with anti-ice turned on and whole bunch of procedures for dealing with icing are all legacy of Roselawn. It's very improper to chastize the crew for not adhering to procedures that were developed as result of their mishap.

Back to airbus. Halbsheim flypast. Airplane was too low. Then it was too slow. On the top of it, idle thrust comes into equation (comanded, not as result of failure). I apologise for not having the nerve to explain why flying low and slow can be health damaging with any airplane.

Strasbourg crash was caused by misseting 3300 fpm instead of 3.3 degree flight path on FCU (that's autopilot control panel in airbusspeak). FCU has been redesigned since to prevent similar occurences, and i don't know whether it was designed by real pilot, but by my definition, real pilot always check if the autopilot does what it's commanded. With the speed they had, they shouldn't have descended with more than 1000 fpm and they hit 3300. Also PFD have shown unusal nose down attitude, yet they missed all the clues and there was no GPWS to save them.

Belle Harbor crash wasn't caused by excessive rudder deflection. Yes, rudder has some design issues but what tore off the tail was rapid rudder reversals. For the time being, they seem to be commanded and not caused by control unit failure. For those unimformed: you never, ever cycle any of your flight controls rapidly during flight - dangers involved are: PIO, control failure or even airframe failure. So this crash wasn't really type specific.

Toulouse A330 crah is here: (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940630-0&lang=en) I'd just like to add that there are claims that crew went out flying after long day in the office, so fatigue could also be the issue.

Regarding the Gibson dive: crew was blamed for trying to fly with flaps extended and slats retracred, to improve cruise performance. Couple of years later test flight in this configuration was atttempted to prove the theory but it only disproved it, as so rigged 727 was unable to climb to high twenties, let alone cruise above FL300. This claim comes from Stanley Stewart, and while I couldn't verify it, I wouldn't mark mr. Stewart as unreliable source.

To sum it up: FBW or no FBW it's still subject to aerodinamic forces and gravity like any other airplane. I'll just repeat what wileydog3 said: "do the same thing with the 'bus as with any other airplane.. play to the strengths, respect the weaknesses".

[fantom]

Well done, whoever you are. A very good post; very good indeed.

[DozyWannabe]

Strasbourg crash was caused by misseting 3300 fpm instead of 3.3 degree flight path on FCU (that's autopilot control panel in airbusspeak). FCU has been redesigned since to prevent similar occurences, and i don't know whether it was designed by real pilot, but by my definition, real pilot always check if the autopilot does what it's commanded.
Funnily enough my Software Engineering professor, Peter Mellor was brought in when that happened and when he spoke about it, he said that it was an area of human-computer interaction that was in its infancy in the late 1980s. Now we know that in safety-critical applications, multi-function dials (push/pull for secondary functionality) are a big no-no.

I was an aviation nut long before I became a computer geek though, and in those terms I think that the introduction of the A320 and its brethren were similar to the Comet in the way that they were guinea pigs for a new level of aviation technology. Boeing admitted in the '50s that were it not for the Comet, it's likely that the 707 would have suffered similar problems. This is why I think a lot of the AvB argument is pointless. As a software guy, I can understand the frustration of having a layer of abstraction between the nuts and bolts and their human controller, and I can understand the worry that some pilots had of being rendered superfluous by the new technology. But it was and remains an unfounded fear, because there are no fewer flight deck crew on an A320/30/40 than on a modern Boeing.

[NutLoose]

I did hear a strong rumour the probs with the A380 is the horizontal stab test strain gauges are off the clock and they have tried to beef up the stab, but that has thrown the weight and balance out.......... anyone else heard this?, curiously someone else has mentioned there are 380's parked outside at Tolouse minus the backends? again anyone heard this or seen them?

[QCM]

On Norbert Jacquet’s website, we can find a page pointing out that the Airbus 320 would be much more dangerous than the Boeing 737 NG (-600 to -900).
Here : http://jacno.com/am5300.htm (May, 5th 2006).
Extracts :
On this same Norbert Jacquet’s page, there is a link towards a page confirming that Bernard Ziegler, father of the “Airbus technology”, in 1961 cut a teleferic cable with his plane ( http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,872735,00.html ).
Was Bernard Ziegler the right man to conceive the Airbus cockpits?
What can we think about the differences on the crashes’ rates for the A 320 and the B 737 NG? (the B 737 NG fleet is 40% inferior to the A 320’s one)?
Hey gents isn't it Norbert Jacquet himself under the cover of a pseudo (the shrimp) who is lighting the fire of all these very polemical threads? He is well known on the french forums (radiocockpit) to appear with several pseudos,funny guy!!

[WAGM]

Back to the general thread I hope.

Most of us have probably seen the bouncing 319 beer ad so there is no need to post it.

Whilst we could debate it's credibility, I'd suggest and have read it's caused by a dual radalt fault which results in a 'normal' out of range signal comming from the radalts antennas caused by possible water ingress.

Accepting this is possible, then the normal pitch law does not transition to flare law at 100 feet and reverse & spoilers are locked out until either sufficient ground speed or main gear time on ground is achieved. Likewise if the speed decays to Alpha floor, before the aircraft knows its on the ground, then Alpha Lock is activated and TOGA is commanded unless the Autothrust instinctive disconnect is held for 15 seconds prior to this occuring.

As an operator my company SoP's call "RadAlt Alive" at 2500, is this standard with other companies and is it generally recognized that should the Radalt indication not appear then it's a lot more significant than such a failure on the other Brand of A/C.

This could probably be in Technical but seems to follow this thread?

Recall an old story of an Ansett 320 doing "Auto" go-arounds possibly due to Alpha floor activation and we had a Foreign A330 Radalt incident about 5 years ago in Melbourne. Does anyone know of other instances?

[WAGM]

BTW

For any follies, it's still great gear in my book.

Just got to work with what you've got and try to understand what that is:O

[Zeke]

I'd suggest and have read it's caused by a dual radalt fault which results in a 'normal' out of range signal comming {coming} from the radalts antennas caused by possible water ingress.

Load of bollocks, dual rad alt failure gives you direct law on gear down.

The Heineken beer advertisement featured a model aircraft, nothing about that advertisement comes close to reality. Are you this gullible to other advertisements produced by beer companies ?

Likewise if the speed decays to Alpha floor, before the aircraft knows its on the ground, then Alpha Lock is activated and TOGA is commanded unless the Autothrust instinctive disconnect is held for 15 seconds prior to this occuring {occurring}.

Likewise another load of bollocks. No such thing as "Alpha Lock".

As an operator my company SoP's call "RadAlt Alive" at 2500, is this standard with other companies and is it generally recognized that should the Radalt indication not appear then it's a lot more significant than such a failure on the other Brand of A/C.

Another load of bollocks, the calls and FMAs are for low vis operations, the Airbus assumes each and every landing is CAT III. The aircraft does not know the visibility and cloud base.

Rad alt failure on a 777 will not do wonders for an autoland either. No aircraft I am aware of that is currently in production can do an autoland or low visibility approach to a DH without a rad alt.

[J.O.]

My but aren't we a little condescending. The "Rad Alt Alive" call is for more than just low visibility operations. It is a situational awareness call, as a reminder to the crew that they are approaching the ground. Anyone worth their salt should be verifying that the call is coming at the expected time and place, and not at a point where it is unexpected, thus being a possible indicator that they are much closer to terra firma than they think.

[WAGM]

Sorry Zeke,

I should have known not try and be tech on this forum..... but now I've started.

Yes, Dual Radalt Failure gives Direct Law on gear down, autopilot disco... no argument.
There are known cases though where water ingestion at the radalt antenna has resulted in a no return signal. ie the A/C doesn't know the RadAlt has failed and so will not recognize the Dual RadAlt fault.

Along a similar line I've had a Radalt ramp up whilst cruising at FL330 and RA1(Amber) took over both sides indicating -5 feet and a host of ECAMS.... it's just a machine and will always find new ways to break.:bored:

The Heineken beer advertisement featured a model aircraft

If you believe that fine, I hope you never find yourself in such a situation.

Anyone with something constructive to add it would be appreciated.

Flamers move on thanks.:\

Sorry should have said FLARE MODE at 100' not law.... pedantics count?

[Zeke]

If you believe that fine, I hope you never find yourself in such a situation.

The full add is at http://www.aviationexplorer.com/a319_hard_landing_commercial.htm

As they say on that other site it is "AIRBUS A319 BUMPY LANDING - (TELEVISION COMMERCIAL FOR HEINIKEN) - TRICK AVIATION VIDEOGRAPHY"

The first part of the advertisement shows a real aircraft, just after the "cabin crew prepare for landing" it cuts to the fake video.

If you were to review the landing you would notice that none of the gear struts compress, no thrust reversers or spoilers, no strobes or landing lights.

Just after passing the control tower in the background and saying "captain speaking" you will see where they morph the model back to a shot of a real aircraft. You will notice after the morph the spoilers are deployed.

I would like to nominate you for the most gullible ppruner of the year.

[WAGM]

OK Zeke, what ever, I was looking for discussion not abuse.

Has anyone else had any experiences with passive Radalt failures or anything constructive to add?

I'm on the A330, suspect laws are similar but I don't know!

Is wheel speed (>72kts) an OR logic question and what constitutes an on ground LGCIU signal for the engines (FADEC) on the 319?

[Graybeard]

The radio altimteter was designed as a landing aid, and has been adapted for uses beyond, such as GPWS. The signal bounced from the ground gets weaker with the square of the distance, so funny things can happen. Other aircraft, and even heavy rain clouds can reflect the signal, giving a false lockon with a perfectly operating system. Ice without a wet surface is nearly invisible to it, however. Since you are using a computer, you are conversant with speeds/frequencies. The radalt sends and receives on 4.35 GHz, +/- 100 MHz, Frequency Modulated, Continuous Wave.

Most radalt installation failures are due to such simple things as corrosion between the antennas and the fuselage, and coaxial connector fittings at the back of the transceiver mounting tray. Symptoms are almost always a lock onto a false signal at altitude, where the ground return signal is weak, and therefore the transceiver reception is at full volume. Back below 300', most quirks disappear, making them difficult for Sparky to confirm.

I spent a month one week in Auk chasing authrottle retards as 250' on a fleet of 747-200. The pilots were concerned, of course... Lack of electrical bonding between the radalt antennas and the flame sprayed belly panels, and a signal switching inside the radalt at 250' conspired to cause one radalt to go to near 0 feet briefly, triggering A/T retard.

Every radalt anomaly should be reported to maintenance, before it gets worse. Since it is a vital part of a Cat IIIb Autoland system, any altitude indication higher than correct should be reported to authorities.

For dual autoland, of course, at least two radalts must be operating and indicating near identical altitude. Glideslope signal is washed out of the autoland equation by 50', as the radalt indication has been brought in. Below about 40', in widebodies at least, the approach is ballistic.

GB

[ABX]

Hi WAGM,

I see that you're a new prooner so you may not know, posters here tend to say exactly what they think ...

Mate regarding the Heineken Beer ad, all I have ever heard on any forums worldwide, is that it is a fake (it certainly looks like a fake and Zeke's breakdown of it fits perfectly) so, I wonder ...

a) are you giving us the wind-up?

or

b) has somebody been giving you the wind-up? (You know, your captain flaming the new guy a little?)

Don't know, only guessing.

In any case I wish you a long and happy association with proone.

Cheers,

ABX

[WAGM]

Greybeard, ABX,

Thank you for a reasonable reply.

No, this is not a wind up and I don't believe I've been wound either.

This link;

Aviation Safety Investigation Report - Final Airbus A330-341, PK-GPC (http://www.pprune.org/forums/Aviation%20Safety%20Investigation%20Report%20-%20Final%20%20Airbus%20A330-341,%20PK-GPC)

or this link;

www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2001/AAIR/aair200104399.aspx (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2001/AAIR/aair200104399.aspx)


report and my own experience with radalt failure got me interested in the area and made me wonder if just perhaps at least some of that video was based on fact. I believe it would be lazy or stupid just to dismiss it as a fake because that's what was the view of someone else with no specific credentials.

Perhaps there is a PPruner who was involved if the original footage or alternatly the construction of a the fake?

[grumpyoldgeek]

The radio altimteter was designed as a landing aid, and has been adapted for uses beyond, such as GPWS. The signal bounced from the ground gets weaker with the square of the distance, so funny things can happen.

Just to be pedantic (I couldn't sleep a couple of nights ago and cracked open a textbook on radar), the signal gets weaker with the 4th power of distance, not the square. It turns out that the signal from the plane falls off with the square of the distance, as you'd expect, but in addition to that, the return also falls off with the square of the distance, causing an overall loss proportional to the 4th power of distance.

Which, of course, makes your comment all the more relevent.:)

[ABX]

I ask as someone who has little knowledge of this a/c.

Does the A319 (I assume it is a A319 in the Heineken ad?) have brakes on the nose wheel?

I ask because in the beer ad the FLG brakes lock and the wheels smoke, yet the mains do not.

Maybe someone can tell me?

Cheers,

ABX

Ps. I remain to be convinced that the ad is real and tend to believe Zeke's description earlier. :}

[J.O.]

I ask as someone who has little knowledge of this a/c.

Does the A319 (I assume it is a A319 in the Heineken ad?) have brakes on the nose wheel?

There are no brakes on the nosegear of the A319 (or on any other aircraft that I am aware of).

[maui]

JO

Try the 727!

[ABX]

Heineken Ad:

Just after the captain says "This is the captain speaking ..." the front of the plane dips down and the nose wheels smoke (as if being locked up by the brakes), something that would be pretty hard given J.O.'s reply...

There are no brakes on the nose gear of the A319

Sorry WAGM (I truly am not having a shot at you mate) I can't see that video as being real, unless someone has more info not yet shared.

Cheers,

ABX

[idg]

This is what you may be looking for:

Bulletin 812 for 320/1

To paraphrase: If you are in heavy rain the radalts can sense an incorrect height.

If both radalts are affected at once:

If the value detected is greater than 150' spurious autocall out and spurious ECAMs or GPWS warnings.

If value between 150' and 80'

During auto approach:
degradation of the guidance, glideslope no longer flown, excessive deviations can occur.
Variation of londitudinal pitch and or vertical speed leading to GPWS warning.
During Manual approach:
No adverse warnings but GPWS or autocall out warning may be triggered.

Had it once in very heavy rain on descent. Numerous ECAMs and a flash of GPWS.:ok:

[shuttlebus]

In all honesty, the quality of the beer advert video reminds me a lot of flight sim....

I would perhaps cautiously offer this as the possible source of the "false" video...

Regards,

Shuttlebus

[WAGM]

Moving on from the ad debate thanks.

Has anyone else with airbus experience had problems with the Radalt system and/or informed thoughts on it's effect on flight laws/air ground logic etc

[PAXboy]

Non pilot speaking: If I read some of these posts correctly, some people think that the Heineken advert shows a real video of a real a/c??? Shurely shome mistake. Anyone can see that it's been frigged in the video suite.

[flown-it]

Back to the original thread.
Doesn't matter if it be 'bus or boeing. The Mode control panel or what ever the manufacturer choses to call it is The Fiction Panel. If you don't know what your mode annunciators say then you can bet the aircraft will be flying you!! FPA 3.3 or V/S 3300 would have been a non event if they'd only checked the FMAs after making the selection.

[Wrongstuff]

Zeke, Back to the FCOM for you, Alpha Lock lives

[Phil Hudson]

JO

Try the 727!

It is possible that you will find some 727's with nosegear-brakes fitted.
I've got 1000's of hours on the 727 and none of them had brakes up front.

Non pilot speaking: If I read some of these posts correctly, some people think that the Heineken advert shows a real video of a real a/c??? Shurely shome mistake. Anyone can see that it's been frigged in the video suite.

Clearly fake, not even a Bus can do that. :}

[the shrimp]

Hey gents isn't it Norbert Jacquet himself under the cover of a pseudo (the shrimp) who is lighting the fire of all these very polemical threads? He is well known on the french forums (radiocockpit) to appear with several pseudos,funny guy!!
Can you prove your accusation?

Therefore, as you seem to follow this file in France, I have a few questions to ask you and it seems more important to take an interest on this.

First question. In what he reports, Norbert Jacquet refers to false licenses pilot:

One can also add the false airline pilot licenses. Incredible. On two occasions, the authorities gave a false airline pilot license to Asseline, who was flying the crashed Airbus in Habsheim. The facsimiles of these fakes were published, with the signatures and the names of the forgers (press (http://jacno.com/an08.htm)). It is ludicrous. I transmitted these, with some comments, to judge Guichard, who was in charge of the two investigations on the two air disasters, still in progress at this time, to the public prosecutor's office in Colmar (in Alsace), to the public prosecutor's office in Paris, and also in higher place. General silence was the answer. The forgers are well protected. I was even locked up in jail, to preserve their protection!
This story of these false licenses is really unbelievable. What do you think about it? Is France a banana republic? Could a banana republic build aircrafts worthy of the name?

[Tree]

It is possible that you will find some 727's with nosegear-brakes fitted.
I've got 1000's of hours on the 727 and none of them had brakes up front.
Clearly fake, not even a Bus can do that. :}

If you do find one (most likely a 100 series) and are planning a max brake landing I recommend using the locking lever on the shoulder harness!

[maui]

Tree an Phil H

The 200's delivered to Australia had them. I can't recall whether the 100's did. Time was mainly on 200 but initial type was 100, many moons ago.

From memory they activated after about 2/3 pedal travel, so did not factor in normal ops.

M

[HotDog]

Tree, I had thousands of hours on the Convair 880M which had nosewheel brakes fed by No.1 Hydraulic system. (Definitely showing my age.:} )

[Speevy]

1. The a/c can be flwon like any others
2. Fly,navigate,comunicate
3.One head up all times
4.Cross check the accuracy of the FMS
5. KNOW YOUR FMA ALL TIMES
6.WHEN THINGS DON'T GO AS EXPEXTED TAKE OVER
7.Use proper level of automaton for the task
8.PRACTICE TASK SHARING AND BACK UP EACH OTHERS.

Errors are human and we all do them, we shouldn't blame the A/C if we don't know its systems..

I don't think the Airbus is perfect but I am sure it doesn't have any more defects than others...

All the modern fighters are fly by wire (some fly by light)..
Get used to it...
Speevy

[CONF iture]

Along a similar line I've had a Radalt ramp up whilst cruising at FL330 and RA1(Amber) took over both sides indicating -5 feet and a host of ECAMS...
I certainly do agree that in that kind of automated airplanes, the AIR/GND logic can play many tricks, and engineers or certification process can not imagine or produce all that before airline pilots will have to experiment by themselves ...

It is quite common these days to get an "LDG MEMO" at FL370 over the NAT tracks associated to a RAD ALT showing 1000... just because you're not the only one out there...

Regarding your link, they don't talk about pilots experience and background, and as a RA FAULT implies using MANUAL PITCH TRIM, they may well have forgotten how to use that after flying the bus for too long ... witch could explain the too many bounces!?

Back to airbus. Halbsheim flypast. Airplane was too low. Then it was too slow. On the top of it, idle thrust comes into equation (comanded, not as result of failure)
What can I say... you probably report the commonly accepted official version, but did you go further... ?

Have you ever seen at Farnborough one of these Airbuses demonstrating its capabilities of very slow flying... did you notice the resulting attitude?
Now, do you believe that Habsheim 320 was showing that typical attitude... or there were still many nose up degrees to extract before staling!?

Do you know that no more than 3 days after the crash, all the trees on the airplane path have been cut, before producing any clues?

Do you know that flight recorders have been hidden from Justice during the first... 10 days?

Do you know that brand new 320 technology was allowed only 1200 hours certification ... when Airbus decided to implement a 2000 hours program for the later 340?

Reading out of the box can teach all of us many things...

[stilton]

All our 727's in our Micronesian operation had working nose gear brakes at one time (-100's and -200's)

They worked very well.

[Ignition Override]

To 'second' somebody's 'motion' up there, when something does not look, sound or feel right, take over.
The computers might be flying most of the time-but they can not override your authority.


Easy for me to say- how to take over will be the problem.

My first Airbus ground school begins in 4 weeks, however the company produced what appears to be an excellent CD-ROM to study in advance. So far the info seems to be structured in a very clear, logical manner.

[Speevy]

you want to take over:
simple revert to Speed Heading V/S or any other selected modes (op clb,etc) if that doesn't help there is a red push button you usually use to disconect the automatics isn't?

For CONF iture: The accident you refering to, I don't knw all those details, but did you know that the captain was trying to show how smart was the a/c demostrating Alpha Floor but forgot this:
ALPHA-FLOOR PROTECTION
Alpha-floor protection automatically sets the thrust at TOGA thrust, when the aircraft reaches a very high angle of attack.
The Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) generates the signal that triggers the alpha-floor mode. This, in turn, sets TOGA thrust on the engines, regardless of the thrust lever positions.
The FAC sends this signal when the angle of attack is above a predetermined threshold, that is a function of the configuration.
In CONF3 and CONF FULL, this threshold decreases as a function of the aircraft deceleration rate (down to - 3°).
Alpha-floor is available from lift-off until the aircraft reaches 100 feet RA in approach.

I repeat, errors tend to be uman in any case...

If you comand Toga the A320 will go around!!! Look at the Tap video (the one about the xwind) they applyed Toga almost when they were already on th GND if there is any delay is caused by the Spool up time common to all A/C (the 737 and the A320 got almost the same CFM)...

If I am flyng the a/C and something doesn't look right I would take over no matter which a/c we're talking about..
Speevy

[Graybeard]

Sorry:
What's the difference between an A-320 and a chainsaw?
About a hundred trees a minute...

GB

[Zeke]

Zeke, Back to the FCOM for you, Alpha Lock lives

I sent you a PM a few days back, just to clear things up, no such thing exists. This can all be checked in FCOM 1.27.50 of any 318/319/320/321/330/340 series aircraft.

An "ALPFA/SPEED LOCK FUNCTION" exists on the 320 series, or "SLATS ALFA/ SPEED LOCK" function on the 330/340 series, however it does not make sense in the post I replied to.

I believe the other person was trying to suggest thrust lock, however they do not understand the disengagement of the same.

The person clearly does not understand the systems of their aircraft to make such comments, what they did post was bollocks.

[WAGM]

Zeke,

You're clearly a 10,000X smarter and better driver than I and I'm humbled in you presence.......:rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

T'wos far too early in the morning clearly.... was referring to an Alpha-Floor condition, yes Thrust Lock is a totally seperate issue.

Back to RadAlts and their connection with aircraft behaivour though.... from the ATSB report as per the link

Inspection of the radio altimeter system antennas subsequent to the occurrence revealed that they had sustained water ingress at the antenna coaxial cables. The water ingress into the radio altimeter antennas resulted in the radio altimeter signals being interpreted as out of range signals, rather than as a failure of the radio altimeters.and
The loss of valid radio altimeter signals did not result in the automatic switching from flight mode to flare mode when the autopilots disengaged. There may be a valuable lesson here, maybe not???

Perhaps those responding might like to actually digest the report first?

www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2001/AAIR/aair200104399.aspx (http://www.pprune.org/forums/www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2001/AAIR/aair200104399.aspx)

I'd wonderd how often this has occured and if any other PPruners have experienced or heard of similar problems or was this simply an aberration in the big picture of the relatively few things that go wrong with all aircraft?

Thanks to those with something constructive to offer as we're in this season of good will.:)

[hetfield]

What makes me wonder, no focus on the IBERIA/BILBAO accident yet........

[A4]

What makes me wonder, no focus on the IBERIA/BILBAO accident yet........

Wasn't that the Training flight in cr4p wx into BIO (not unusual :) ). Dual input resulting in nosegear touchdown and noseleg shear/collapse :\

Dual inputs in the Bus are a big no no as the inputs are summed. So if one stick is held full left and one full right the result is zero. If both sticks are held half aft the result is FULL aft. The take over pushbutton (big red A/P disco also) should be used but, very close to the ground when reacting instinctively to a rapidly developing situation, it takes a lot of conscious effort to actually think about pushing and holding it as you take control.

The aircraft will shout "DUAL INPUT" at you but by the time this happens you may well have touched down / ballooned.

I'm an Airbus fan, but I have to admit that this is not the best fature of the Bus.

A4

[billy34-kit]

Don't forget A-310 from Transat, aircraft's rudder simply vanished in cruise flight....calm air, no turbulence, no imput...just????

http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/03/06/transat050306.html

[CONF iture]

The take over pushbutton (big red A/P disco also) should be used but, very close to the ground when reacting instinctively to a rapidly developing situation, it takes a lot of conscious effort to actually think about pushing and holding it as you take control
That is so true !
And on top of that, you just don't how your partner did or did not already correct, cos his action on his side stick is invisible to you, so you have to go through a complete new assessment on the situation...
Just out of the loop for these so precious seconds...

[the shrimp]

Has anybody got news from QCM? I haven't read any answer from him to the common sense questions which have been asked to him (to recall: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=3000016#post3000016 ).

Finally, can we say that Norbert Jacquet is really this "funny guy"? Or isn't he just guilty of being right?

A few documents are getting translated on the Airbus defects that caused crashes, pointed out by Norbert Jacquet, and will be presented on this forum later on.

[ACMS]

how could you like an Aircraft that calls you a "RETARD" :)

[CONF iture]

did you know that the captain was trying to show how smart was the a/c demostrating Alpha Floor but forgot this:
ALPHA-FLOOR PROTECTION
Who could you honestly believe, an airline pilot would simply rely on Automatic Protection to kick in, at 100 feet RA, and with nothing less than a full pax load … ?

For sure these guys were very low, and well below the planed 100 ft RA, but that was not their intention, and they explain how they’ve been mislead, but there’s no way they could be possibly waiting for ALPHA FLOOR to assure the show!?

Early in that very short flight, due to an A/THR malfunction, they were already in Manual THR
15 sec before trees, THR LEVERS were advanced
9 sec before trees, THR LEVERS were at TOGA position
3 sec before trees TOGA FMA was called
But only 1 sec before trees, thrust was produced …

And there are 2 main reasons for that thrust production delay:
1- A/THR malfunction did generate late signals to ENG from any THR LEVER adjustment
2- ENG1 did stall… (Could it be the reason forest was cut in such a rush… ?)

If you comand Toga the A320 will go around!!!
Today I hope so… , but was it really the case for 100% situations in these Very - Early - Days… ?

[Zeke]

CONF iture,
None of what you said is true, the planned height for the flight by AF was 400ft, the hard deck for such a flight stipulated by the DGAC is higher still.
As for your timings
12.45:14 Co-pilot OK, you're at 100ft there, watch, watch
12.45:13 Radio altimeter [One hundred]
12.45:19.1 Radio altimeter [Forty]
12.45:23.6 Radio altimeter [Fifty]
12.45:26 Captain OK ,I'm OK there, disconnect autothrottle
12.45:27.5 Radio altimeter [Forty]
12.45:32 Co-pilot Watch out for those pylons ahaead, eh. See them?
12.45:33 Co-pilot Yeah, yeah, don't worry.
12.45:34.5 [Clack! Clack! Clack!] - power lever dentents
12.45:35.3 Radio altimeter [Thirty]
12.45:36.2 Radio altimeter TOGA/SRS
12.45:38.3 Radio altimeter [Thirty]
12.45:39 Captain Go around track
12.45:39.9 Captain Sh...!
Nothing was wrong with the autothrust, the pilots disconnected it.
Habsheim was not a technology problem, it was a pilot problem, too low, too slow, no energy. You put ANY jet airliner in the same situation, you will get the same result.

[Speevy]

Again, I agree with Zeke!!
It was a pilot mistake......

Why he disconected the A/T so low, the Fcom say you shouldn't do it below 1000ft RA if not for a Goaraound and if he did that the Clack Clack would have happend earlier..
at 12.45.25 he disconected the A/Thr and onlu at 12.45.34 he advanced the thrust lever....

The A/T in the airbus is doing a good job as long as the input are right (wind etc..).
Speevy

[the shrimp]

Questions to Zeke and Speevy.

Are the recordings authentic? There is more than a doubt!

The French Minister MERMAZ, accused in the Alsacian press of having personally intervened by fraudulently manipulating the flight recorders of the Airbus in Habsheim, filed a lawsuit for defamation. Finally... Why did he capitulate?

Read here: http://jacno.com/za-an-moye.htm#rep07 ("In 1992, well before...").

[CONF iture]

None of what you said is true, the planned height for the flight by AF was 400ft, the hard deck for such a flight stipulated by the DGAC is higher still
I’m afraid there was another way to do it at that time
http://www1.airliners.net/open.file/0547430/M/
I don’t say it was either clever or legal... but it was commonly accepted (even by DGAC...) and practised by… Concorde … 747 … or this lovely Mercure.
The A/T in the airbus is doing a good job as long as the input are right
Once again, even if it will never be publicly admitted, the Bus you fly today has learned A LOT from all these early crashes, accidents, incidents.
Fcom say you shouldn't do it below 1000ft RAPlease, would you quote such reference.
As for your timings …
Well… all you do is sticking to the official version…
But did you realise that during 10 days, Flight Recorders have been out of any judicial control.
The Judge Sengelin had to step up and order the immediate seizure of these boxes!!!
… Strangely enough, Judge Sengelin was withdrawn from the case soon after…
Doesn’t it bother you?
Doesn’t it ring a bell to you?
On one side, you have the official version, BTW go and find it on French BEA (http://www.bea-fr.org/)… It seems they’re not too proud of it.
On the other side, if you’re ready to open your mind, and learn many things, there are 3 books (No luck: All of them in French) but all of them available on the web.

[Zeke]

Well… all you do is sticking to the official version…
But did you realise that during 10 days, Flight Recorders have been out of any judicial control.

The official version is the only version that had access to all the evidence, everyone else has an agenda.

It is true that the recorders were "out of any judicial control", they were with the DGAC, in fact they were taken from the scene by Daniel Tenenbaum, the head of the DGAC, news footage of the day confirms that.

Conspiracy theory people use this line of argument because in France a police like investigation takes place for aircraft accidents, their whole judicial system is different to what many are used to. People who make this claim are either ignorant of the process in France, or playing on others being ignorant of the process in France.

What in fact happened in the head of the DGAC, which is equivalent to the head of the CAA in the UK, or head of the FAA in the USA had possession of the boxes. The court then ordered the DGAC to hand over the boxes to the investigation, and as far as I understand they were then basically handed back to the DGAC for the technical analysis to commence.

It is my understanding that this process is not uncommon in France, as the investigation needs to be set up first before it can start accepting evidence.

Michel Asseline (the Captain) in his own book tries to blame everyone else, he also at the same time confirms much of the report by the Ministry of Planning, Housing, Transport and Maritime Affairs said the in official report.

[Speevy]

Please, would you quote such reference.


FCOM 3.04.70 P2
Use of A/thr on app:

Use of autothrust in approach

The pilot should use autothrust for approaches. On final approach, it usually gives more accurate speed control, although in turbulent conditions the actual airspeed may vary from the target speed, by as much as five knots. Although the changeover between auto and manual thrust is easy to make with a little practice, the pilot should, when using autothrust for the final approach, keep it engaged until he retards the thrust levers to idle for touchdown. If the pilot is going to make the landing using manual thrust, he should disconnect the A/THR by the time he has reached 1000 feet on the final approach.

If he makes a shallow flare, with A/THR engaged, it will increase thrust to maintain the approach speed until he pulls the thrust levers back to idle. Therefore he should avoid making a shallow flare, or should retard the thrust levers as soon as it is no longer necessary to carry thrust, and if necessary before he receives the "retard" reminder

Here you go Conf inture

Cheers Speevy

[CONF iture]

Speevy, thank you for the quote.

I can see it’s part of the last modification because just before that it was still:
“… it is recommended to disconnect the A/THR by …”
But anyway, the meaning is not that far, and to be honest I didn’t remember reading that, and if I did, I had forgotten !
So … one point for you !

Now, regarding Habsheim, the crew did get, as they were still on the ground, a blinking amber CLB Annunciation in the FMA, which is quite abnormal, and reveals an A/THR malfunction.
Passing 1000 ft the pilot brought back THR LEVERS from FLX MCT to CLB detent, but N1 commands didn’t follow the order (and it’s part of the same page you did quote: If A/THR fails, A/THR will disconnect) so the pilot had to leave the CLB detent position in order to control the speed, therefore, he was in MANUAL THR.
Early in the fly-by, he depressed the instinctive disc button just to make sure he was in MANUAL THR.
Please, read page 103 to 105 in the Asseline's book, it's good information for an Airbus pilot anyway.

At that point I’d like to mention 2 things:

1- The total flight was less than 5 minutes, but the commission report still did elect not to show the DFDR transcript of that early part of the flight !?

2- It’s easy for me, 18 years after, facing my screen, to say that maybe that early A/THR malfunction should have been the signal to CAPT Asseline not to go further in that flight …

For Zeke, I don’t forget your post, I’ll be back soon.

[Speevy]

That close to the gnd would you honesty get involved with an A/Th problem and try to fix it by disconnecting it?
I would say that the best option is to Goaround especially if something doesn't look right but that's another story..
I don't believe the facts as Reported by the Capt. Asseline, and I think post-trauma defense mechanism are involved in what he says (I am not saying he's a liar just that he cannot be the only source of info.)
You sy the FDR has been manipulated, the day you have some proof, ok I will believe you.
Untill that day....
Speevy

[Zeke]

Passing 1000 ft the pilot brought back THR LEVERS from FLX MCT to CLB detent, but N1 commands didn’t follow the order.

Does N1 always reduce from MCT to CLB when accelerating in a climb ?

Early in the fly-by, he depressed the instinctive disc button just to make sure he was in MANUAL THR.

Didn’t Michel Asseline deliberately press the autothrust disconnect for over 15 seconds on descent whilst in flight idle turning off autothrust for the remainder of the flight ?

Why does he have to "make sure" later, the TLA was 0 (IDLE) and N1 35%.

You do know that the two pilots involved were both management training captains with AF ?

[CONF iture]

Let me answer that one first.
Does N1 always reduce from MCT to CLB when accelerating in a climb ?
Always !
That's the purpose of the thing.
The airplane accelerates in the climb due to the pitch up reduction and the drag reduction.
Didn’t Michel Asseline deliberately press the autothrust disconnect for over 15 seconds on descent whilst in flight idle turning off autothrust for the remainder of the flight ?
Negative.
If you see that in the official report, please, let me know.
Otherwise, could you specify your source.
Why does he have to "make sure" later, the TLA was 0 (IDLE) and N1 35%
Sorry, I don't know what you mean.
Please, clarify.
You do know that the two pilots involved were both management training captains with AF ?
Absolutely right.

[Zeke]

Always !
That's the purpose of the thing.
The airplane accelerates in the climb due to the pitch up reduction and the drag reduction.

Not always a N1 change from MCT to CLB, only always from TOGA to CLB. CLB can command the same N1 as MCT.

If it takes the MCT N1/EPR to accelerate and/or climb whilst in CLB, autothrust can command it. Pretty basic stuff.

If you see that in the official report, please, let me know.

On the road for a few days, will try and dig it up when I get back. From memory about page 50-54 of the official report.

[xetroV]

Greybeard, ABX,
Thank you for a reasonable reply.
No, this is not a wind up and I don't believe I've been wound either.

This link;

Aviation Safety Investigation Report - Final Airbus A330-341, PK-GPC (http://www.pprune.org/forums/Aviation%20Safety%20Investigation%20Report%20-%20Final%20%20Airbus%20A330-341,%20PK-GPC)

or this link;

www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2001/AAIR/aair200104399.aspx (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2001/AAIR/aair200104399.aspx)

report and my own experience with radalt failure got me interested in the area and made me wonder if just perhaps at least some of that video was based on fact. I believe it would be lazy or stupid just to dismiss it as a fake because that's what was the view of someone else with no specific credentials.

Perhaps there is a PPruner who was involved if the original footage or alternatly the construction of a the fake?
I wasn't involved in the original footage and/or the Heineken version of that movie, but I have seen a TV interview on Dutch TV with the guy who made that commercial. I thought there was an article about it on Internet too, somewhere, but unfortunately I can't trace it back.

However, I remember from the interview that they used footage of a perfectly normal A320 landing at Schiphol and a model (can't remember whether it was a scale-model or CGI) of an A319. The original footage was heavily edited: the livery was changed, the A320 was morphed into an A319, and of course the fake hard landing/braking sequence and the passenger address audio were included.

In the interview, the guy who created that commercial said he had been very surprised by the reactions: he had never imagined anyone to seriously believe this landing to be real. In fact, he had even been worried at the time that the fake landing would be so obviously "over the top" that it would spoil the joke.

Well, he needn't have worried: we now know even aviation professionals can be fooled. WAGM, Zeke wasn't flaming you when he suggested you were gullible; he was just being brutally honest. ;)

[CONF iture]

Michel Asseline (the Captain) in his own book tries to blame everyone else.
I’m afraid you didn’t read the same book than me … Asseline is the first one to take part of the blame, but when you hear that: BZ (http://perso.orange.fr/crashdehabsheim/pf%20temoignages.wmv) … how do you want him to react ?

The official version is the only version that had access to all the evidence.
Oh yes, and these guys who compile the official version communicate only what they choose to.
As an example, in the preliminary report (One month after the crash) they talk at large about the CVR but no transcript of DFDR. Just on this forum, you would find a dozen of guys able to read perfectly well such transcripts.
It could have been very interesting to have a look at the Altimeter reading to confirm it was of perfect match with RA call-out … but was-it ?
One month before, an OEB stipulated a dysfunction with Altimeter reading, and strangely, pilots had never been aware of that one!?
In the same time Asseline pretends his Altimeter was showing 100 ft on the appropriate QFE … So why not showing, at this specific time, the Altimeter reading from the DFDR ?

The court then ordered the DGAC to hand over the boxes to the investigation, and as far as I understand they were then basically handed back to the DGAC for the technical analysis to commence.
Crash is on the 26 of June
Judge Sengelin, who is already the second Magistrate Judge on the case because the first one left for his holidays period, realizes on the 29 that the black boxes are still under none judicial control, so naturally request them … but Administration refuses.
On the 5 of July, as nothing moved, he orders the seizure of these boxes.
He finally puts an hand on them the 6, nothing less than 10 days after the crash !
And if you pretend the technical analysis commenced only at that time, explain us how Transport Minister Mermaz was able to declare one day after the crash that the A-320 technology didn’t show any dysfunction ?

Conspiracy theory people use this line of argument because in France a police like investigation takes place for aircraft accidents, their whole judicial system is different to what many are used to. People who make this claim are either ignorant of the process in France, or playing on others being ignorant of the process in France.
True, Civil Aviation takes care of flight recorders as early as possible.
But first, legal seals need to be affixed to them.
Has it been done ?
The answer is NO.
Official document recording serial numbers must be established.
Has it been done ?
The answer is NO.
Official document certifying the transport must be established.
Has it been done ?
The answer is NO.
Then, Administration will duplicate the information from the flight recorders, and originals will be given back to the Judicial Police Officer who delivered them.
Has it been done ?
And the answer is … NO.

And regarding “conspiracy theory” please stay on track !
It looks all too convenient to put a sticker on people who dare questioning.

[CONF iture]

That close to the gnd would you honesty get involved with an A/Th problem and try to fix it by disconnecting it?
You have to put that in perspective, that brand new 320 technology was so new, and flying with computers bugs was the every flight story.
Now, as I said earlier:
"It’s easy for me, 18 years after, facing my screen, to say that maybe that early A/THR malfunction should have been the signal to CAPT Asseline not to go further in that flight …"
I don't believe the facts as Reported by the Capt. Asseline, and I think post-trauma defense mechanism are involved in what he says (I am not saying he's a liar just that he cannot be the only source of info.)
And that's the point, official version cannot be either the only source of info.
There is so much stuff available out there, and all these people in need to share, trace the same path.
Just too bad there's not that much in English.
You sy the FDR has been manipulated, the day you have some proof, ok I will believe you
I didn't say anything ... at least not yet ... !?
And I'm not in a situation to proove anything, but I've realized that too few people know more that the official "too low too slow too late" and for people ready to invest some valuable time, there is a lot to learn.
People with common sense will realize that all these procedures have been very much oriented, commencing by DAY ONE:
"Airplane is not at fault, so Pilot is at fault !"

[the shrimp]

During this time, the French authorities continue to fight this pilot, Norbert Jacquet. Why?

It seems that there is a real problem.

Norbert Jacquet probably knows disturbing things.

[Lemurian]

During this time, the French authorities continue to fight this pilot, Norbert Jacquet. Why?

It seems that there is a real problem.

Norbert Jacquet probably knows disturbing things.
All crackpots do, I'm afraid.

[CONF iture]

Danny,
This site is yours.It will become what you put in it.But if it lacks a modicum of tolerance,of humanism,of moral standards,it will join the cohort of hate/supremacist/...fora that abound on the net.
I am not going to be part of it as it is now.
As a hypocritical french cheese eating surrendering monkey luvvy,I really feel I've stayed my welcome to your world.
Sincerely yours
Roland,aka Pihero/Lemurian...etc...
... probably lost an opportunity to stay away a bit longer:
All crackpots do, I'm afraid.
Hopefully you will have more to say ...

[Clandestino]

It was bleak winter day. Little bird was lying still in the middle of the road, half frozen. It seemed that even its minutes were numbered, when there appeared a cow, and dropped a dung right on the top of it. After a while, heat from dung permeated the little bird's body and it felt blood running again through its veins. It was so delightful to feel alive again that the little bird started singing with the greatest of joy. Alas, along came very hungry kitty, heard the little bird's song, dug it out of dung and ate it.

There are three morals to this story:

1) those who $h*t upon you are not necessarilly your enemies
2) those who pull you out of $h*t are not necessarilly your friends
3) when you're buried in $h*t, don't sing - kepp your mouth (or beak) firmly shut

Misfortunantly, this story was either never translated into French, or, if it was, capt. Asseline has never heard of it. Othervise he would have been familiar with moral3 and would never, ever sit down and write his book. Just take a look at the video of Habsheim flypast. A320 makes slow and dirty flypast, at around 50ft, over surface that's everything except suitable for landing and has trees on its end! It's like playing russian rulette with all chambers full and hoping for bullet to go dud! Of course, when things go wrong, it's freshly certified airplane's fault and not his. There are reasons for doing low and slow flypast with gear down, over runway suitable for your airplane, be it F-15, B737 or super-cub. First, low flypast is purely visual manuevre, you don't have time to check radalt and baroalt is too insensitive to be of any use. Runway also provides you with good height cues. Second, in case you get it wrong, you might get away with touch and go and climb away. Third, no obstacles on and around runway reduces chances of hitting anything solid if your height maintaining discipline is lacking. There is possibility that engines were slow to spool up, that A/THR was unservicable, even that baroalts were misreading but these are irellevant for the flight that was executed poorly and ended in disaster. I'll stop short of calling captain Asseline any derogatory term, I'll say that the fact that two trainning captains didn't recognise their manuever as potentially dangerous isn't stupid, it's tragic! Also it speaks volumes about systemic deficencies in both airline and DGAC. But then, PNF uttered the name of their safety pilot twice, as he was obviously uncomfortable with his PF's handling of flight but didn't stop him. I guess he thought that while what they were doing was dangerous, they would live through it. And they did, unlike 3 of their pax.

I'm not entirely convinced that there was conspiracy to cover up airplane defects. If there was one, then it might have more to do with covering capt Asseline's first part of prenom. As for cutting down trees to cover up evidence of engine stall - that's mightily streched. Could it be possible that locals cut them in anticipation of further AF flybys?

Along comes Norbert Jacques, B747 pilot, who knows disturbing things about Airbus, which he doesn't want to reveal as they'd be too much to swallow and afterwards accuses European court of human rights with conspiring with Airbus industrie. What d'ya call the person who is in possession of flight safety critical information, but refuses to share it? Crackpot doesn't cut it, provided that you hold his claims to be true.

XetroV, I hope you were vrong too, when you mentioned that even professionals can get fooled. I'd say that aerospace professionals participating in PPRuNE tend to fill out their additional info with at least some of their biographies. Posers, pretenders, flamers and other trolls tend to leave all fields except mandatory ones blank.

I don't say that this works all the time, but it did help me with better understanding of this thread. :E

[Gretchenfrage]

Some interesting arguments. However:
1. Every pilot WILL eventually screw up something at some time.
2. Any aircraft that does not lift it's nose when the pilots pulls, that does not deliver thrust when the pilot slams the throttles IS a screw up.
It's as simple as that

[Ignition Override]

Clandestino:

You asked, what do you call a person who refuses to share critical flight safety information?

Another answer, 'allegedly', could easily be our friends with the US FAA Aircraft Certification Branch, if that is the correct title. They 'allegedly' have access to many types of aircraft incident reports from other countries, to which US citizens have very limited access.

Some aircraft accident websites have no information listed as the primary cause of the accident/incident.

This might be a bit unrelated, but the US Department of Transportation, according to an article years ago in "Conde Naste Traveler" magazine, was under major pressure from the State Department when deciding whether a given foreign airline would be allowed to operate into a US airport.

[the shrimp]

Well, well...

"paranoia", "crackpot", "little bird and dung"...

But we haven't read any answer to the commonsense questions which have been asked:

- About false pilot licenses. Is France a banana republic? Could a banana republic build aircrafts worthy of the name? ( to recall: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=3000016#post3000016 ).

- About the flight recorders of the Airbus in Habsheim ( to recall: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=3005064#post3005064 ).

- Was Bernard Ziegler the right man to conceive the Airbus cockpits? (Bernard Ziegler, father of the “Airbus technology”, cut a teleferic cable with his plane in 1961 ( to recall: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,872735,00.html ).

A few documents are getting translated on the Airbus defects that caused crashes, pointed out by Norbert Jacquet, and will be presented on this forum later on. Work in progress.

[Clandestino]

Any aircraft that does not lift it's nose when the pilots pulls, that does not deliver thrust when the pilot slams the throttles IS a screw up.
It's as simple as that

Dear Gretchenfrage, for a fellow who claims to have flown Airbus, Boeing and MDD, you surely display suprisingly massive misunderstanding of 1) flying near AoAcrit 2) concept of spool up time. CFM-65s at Habsheim made it from flight idle to 84% N1 5secs after selecting TOGA and that's fast for high bypass turbofan, but as the stage was set by lack of speed and altitude (which summed give energy) it wasn't enough.

Also you forgot to include some details about yourself in your public profile.:E

[the shrimp]

... CFM-65s at Habsheim made it from flight idle to 84% N1 5secs after selecting TOGA ...
Where did you find these values?

The French authorities always refused to publish the official report on Internet. We know the reason of that.

[J.O.]

The French authorities always refused to publish the official report on Internet. We know the reason of that.

Maybe they just wanted to give you conspiracy theorists something to do! :ugh:

[the shrimp]

Maybe they just wanted to give you conspiracy theorists something to do! :ugh:
May be, may be...

But... If they did it for this reason, they are really idiots. Hmmm?

Is it what you want to mean?

[Max Angle]

Any aircraft that does not lift it's nose when the pilots pulls, that does not deliver thrust when the pilot slams the throttles IS a screw up.Or was doing what it's makers intended and preventing the pilot from stalling the aircraft. Any jet aircraft at <100ft, thrust levers at idle, the airspeed low and decaying with an obstacle ahead is going to be in trouble. A conventional aircraft would almost certainly have been stalled as the pilot pulled back on the stick, as it was the aircraft mushed into the trees still flying, with the wings level and a relatively low rate of descent which is maybe why there was not a far greater loss of life.

[Lemurian]

I am glad there is some sense in this thread.
As a few of you have already started, the very first reason for this crash is reckless flying . Putting it another way :
"One pilot decided, with an airplane and joy riding passengers and a few hired on the spot qualified FAs to demonstrate a very low pass over the ield used by a local flying club. He then took that airplane, with engines at idle thrust,at an increasing AoA and a decreasing IAS to a very low height, far below what was the floor for low altitude demonstration. With that sort of very low energy situation AND the very unusual view from the cockpit, his SA, to say the least was impaired, he cocked it up end ended in the trees.
Please note that there is no mention of the airplane's brand, so far.
What is more, and now we come to the 320 : A feature that has been commonly overlooked was that the auto=thrust (and therefore the AoA protection ) had been disconnected by the pilot himself, whether consciously or not has never been established (but it requires a continuous 15 seconds of pressure of a button to achieve it).
The second evidence of that accident was the complete self-assuredness of the pilot, down to the flippancy of the ("XXX will have a H@rd-on over this...")

I briefly met Mr A in Colombo in 1989, as I was having a line-check with a retiring captain...I was busy with the flight preparation but I overheard some of his comments, which were pretty graphic, believe me. When he left the cockpit as we were about to take the passengers, the captain just made this comment that stuck in my memory :
"for someone who should have the deaths of several people on his conscience, he is bloody arrogant, that man..."

I apologise for my previous post, very provocative because I thought norbert Jacquet was hiding under some of the pseudos.
I still believe he is, as he is well-known to do that, especially on a French forum that has been completely polluted by this argument.
So, from these apologists of a conspiration, why not post EXACTLY how NJ lost his job, as it involves AF, the DGCA medical council, the police/gendarmerie,some psychiatrists ....list is by no means ended. What is missing, though is the use of polonium !

Regards to all

[FougaMagister]

I am glad there is some sense in this thread. As a few of you have already started, the very first reason for this crash is reckless flying (...) The second evidence of that accident was the complete self-assuredness of the pilot, down to the flippancy of the ("XXX will have a H@rd-on over this...") (...) "for someone who should have the deaths of several people on his conscience, he is bloody arrogant, that man..."

My thoughts exactly. What Michel Asseline has managed to do over the years is to create a smoke screen and muddle up the issue so much that most people (even those with a decent knowledge of the accident investigation) may end up suspecting some conspiracy to protect a supposedly unsafe European (not just French) design.

For those who don't want to delve into the BEA's accident report and the judicial inquiry, watching the footage is enough of a hint; M. Asseline attempts a low-level, low-speed, low-energy flyby (with PAX - including disabled - onboard!) and screws up. Whatever happened to rule 5 (no flying below 500' except in the take-off/landing phases of flight)? His reckless showmanship is something I probably wouldn't even have tried on a PA-28. His "H@rd-on" comment on the CVR is also well documented.

Of course (as on every aircraft) there may well be some design flaws in the Airbus FBW series. But looking for them in the Mulhouse-Habsheim crash is the wrong place to start. I agree with Clandestino and Lemurian's posts.

Cheers :cool:

[Gretchenfrage]

Dear Clandestino and others.
Let me give you full credit and my admiration for your superior knowledge of the AB features. At the same time accept my apologies for preferring certain manufacturers or philosophies. I believe this forum should still be able to bear some rants, not only professorial comments.
Having said that, and in that particular contribution having NOT mentioned any specific manufacturer, I still stand by my comment:
Any aircraft that does not lift it's nose when the pilots pulls, that does not deliver thrust when the pilot slams the throttles IS a screw up.
As long as some official reports are dubious on these things, such criticism will prevail.
GF

[J.O.]

Dear Clandestino and others.
Let me give you full credit and my admiration for your superior knowledge of the AB features. At the same time accept my apologies for preferring certain manufacturers or philosophies. I believe this forum should still be able to bear some rants, not only professorial comments.
Having said that, and in that particular contribution having NOT mentioned any specific manufacturer, I still stand by my comment:
Any aircraft that does not lift it's nose when the pilots pulls, that does not deliver thrust when the pilot slams the throttles IS a screw up.
As long as some official reports are dubious on these things, such criticism will prevail.
GF

You seem awfully sure of yourself. I don't suppose you'd be willing to try to repeat the Habsheim flight in one of your preferred aircraft (such as a B737NG), now would you? If you really repeated it, you would suffer the same (or an even worse) fate. Pulling back the stick and slamming the throttles forward in a very low energy flight regime in a turbofan powered airplane will almost certainly result in a stall, or a rapidly increasing sink rate from which you can't recover when you're at 50 ft. You're entitled to an opinion, but not to your own facts.

[Clandestino]

My data is from Aviation safety network's excerpt. (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880626-0&lang=en) Their sources are listed at the end of the article. CVR transcript (http://aviation-safety.net/investigation/cvr/transcripts/cvr_acf296.php) is interesting too. And I stand corrected; it wasn't 84%, it was mere 83% of N1 @ first tree contact.

[Gretchenfrage]

J.O.
No, I am not awfully sure of myself, one reason I don't feel comfortable in a Airbus. Some other testpilot once felt too sure of himself and his product, that should be a lesson to all of us.
No, I wouldn't want to try a low energy stunt, knowing quite well that in any aircraft you're in trouble. Aerodynamics can't be fooled.
Thanks for entiteling me to a opinion, but what exactly do you mean by "my own facts"??

[Clandestino]

So approaching the matter obliquely didn't help. I only got accused of being profesorial. Oh, well...

Your opinion: aircraft that does not lift it's nose when the pilots pulls, that does not deliver thrust when the pilot slams the throttles IS a screw up. Well sir, since I have to be blunt, this level of ignorance about aerodynamics and powerplants can not be and is not tolerated at PPL level, let alone ATPL. What do you make out of A320 with 14° ANU and slowly descending? Probably nothing ,so I'll tell you: the poor thing has almost stalled. Any further pitch-up would lead to stall, and certainly not to climb away, as engines were at idle. By overriding capt's MA's control inputs, A320's FBW alpha protection actually saved a lot of pax that day. Sadly, alpha-floor protection 'thought' that airplane was landing, as it was at 30 ft RA, so didn't intervene by automatically hitting TOGA. And no, even A320 doesn't override control inputs, while flying far from the edge of envelope. If you pull stick, it will pitch-up, if you have some AoA to spare.

As for slamming the throttles and expecting the instant power - every engine used to power the aircraft, from rotax to klimov to GE90 has spool-up time. Granted, some have it so short that it's often mispercieved as instantenious. But turbofans definitively have perceptible lag and do require some forward thinking. It's the nature of these high-powered beasts, nothing can be done about it. And forget about 'A320 weerd thrust leevers' that don't let the pilot have control. They worked as designed, expected, required - in short they gave TOGA when set to TOGA. Only not instantly, but you won't find instant power in anything, except perhaps JATO packs.

So your opinion puts about every aeroplane ever built in screwed-up category.

Still too profesorial for you? Don't worry, translation comes: you're a faker. If I believed you were pro, I'd be seriously worried about trainning and checking standards at your airline. Still I have to admit that you've made a good point, once:

I insist on my point of view that a true airline pilot has to deal with the shortcomings of his aircraft or stop operating it. He cannot screw up and use such glitches as excuse

[J.O.]

J.O.
No, I am not awfully sure of myself, one reason I don't feel comfortable in a Airbus. Some other testpilot once felt too sure of himself and his product, that should be a lesson to all of us.
No, I wouldn't want to try a low energy stunt, knowing quite well that in any aircraft you're in trouble. Aerodynamics can't be fooled.
Thanks for entiteling me to a opinion, but what exactly do you mean by "my own facts"??

I think Clandestino answered better than I ever could.

[Gretchenfrage]

From the faker:
I start liking that slagging match … you are so predictable with your values and numbers. I suppose one of the beloved TRI’s in the sim and lonely drinkers on layovers. By the way, i was awaiting a answer on what "my own facts" were... But let it rest. Allthough you are right to cite me on this:
I insist on my point of view that a true airline pilot has to deal with the shortcomings of his aircraft or stop operating it. He cannot screw up and use such glitches as excuse.
That’s exactly why I am working on getting away from AB. Because to me (and please take this me for ME) there are too many unpredictabilities and open questions, not to say glitches.
As you stated: Everyone is entitled to his own opinion and that’s what this thread is about after all, isn’t it.
Merry X-mas and bye bye for now
GF

[the shrimp]

Those who uphold Airbus confine themselves to generalities with no link to specific facts. They do not bring any serious answers to pointed out realities and to commonsense questions which have been asked.

When they talk about technical points, they make mistakes and fall into discredit:

...What is more, and now we come to the 320 : A feature that has been commonly overlooked was that the auto=thrust (and therefore the AoA protection ) had been disconnected by the pilot himself...
It’s absolutely wrong. The AoA protection is independent of the autothrust and remain active even with the autothrust disconnected.

We can also read on this topic insults and wrong accusations without any proof against Norbert Jacquet to try to ruin his reputation:

...I apologise for my previous post, very provocative because I thought norbert Jacquet was hiding under some of the pseudos.
I still believe he is, as he is well-known to do that, especially on a French forum that has been completely polluted by this argument.
So, from these apologists of a conspiration, why not post EXACTLY how NJ lost his job, as it involves AF, the DGCA medical council, the police/gendarmerie,some psychiatrists ....list is by no means ended. What is missing, though is the use of polonium !

May we ask a question to Lemurian about this? A new book was recently published in France in which we find the whole first chapter on Norbert Jacquet. His story is mentioned on the back cover of this book : “As regards to those who decide to break the law of silence, their life is destroyed, just like this Air France pilot who became a tramp after he had revealed facts on the Airbus crashes”. Here: http://jacno.com/am3830.htm (we can also see that a documentary is coming soon).

He recently had a few articles in newspapers and his business has been evoked on several TV programs. For example, an article: http://jacno.com/am5200.htm

So, can we also talk about psychiatry or polonium for those people?

It would be a good idea to avoid personal attacks against Norbert. But it’s well known that when someone is scared by somebody’s arguments, he refuses the debate and he tries to discredit this person. Please, stop insulting Norbert Jacquet.

[Lemurian]

The shrimp said :
"It’s absolutely wrong. The AoA protection is independent of the autothrust and remain active even with the autothrust disconnected."
Sorry, mister, Your knowledge of the airbus ATHR system is in error : "If you keep the ATHR disconnect button for more than 15 seconds,the A/THR is lost for the remaindre of the flight, and consequently so is ALPHA FLOOR"
I just typed too quickly and did not want to get into technicalities, but if you insist, the AoA protection remained available -in particular Alpha Prot - and that's the reason why,with so low a total energy, the pilot was prevented from getting a further pitch-up, therefore a stall (that's for Gretchenfrage ) and kept wings level throughout the descent into the trees. My humble opinion is that any other aircraft of the time would have stalled, very probably unsymmetrically, flipped a wing and gone crashing with far more severe results .
As for books and TV programs, you now have hundreds on different levels of conspiracy for the events of Sepember 11,2001. Do I believe them ? Hell,no !

[the shrimp]

... more than 15 seconds,...
That is better. You are in progress. But you speak now about alpha floor and not alpha prot. That is different. It does not seem very clear for you.

And did Cpt Asseline press more than 15 seconds?

And what about AoA protections under 100ft?

I just typed too quickly ...
Sure. And it's not the first time!

And now, what about alpha prot, alpho floor and alpha max?

Can you say the values of the AoA during the Habsheim flight?

Was the speed increasing or decreasing at the end of the flight?

Was the thrust higher or lower than TO thrust at this time?

If it is too technical for you, I have easier. But you wanted to speak technical.

[CONF iture]

I apologise for my previous post
That's fair enough.
It 's a real quality to know when apology, and not every body is able to do it.

Now, I really don't see why you jump on the answer given to your statement:
A feature that has been commonly overlooked was that the auto=thrust (and therefore the AoA protection ) had been disconnected by the pilot himself
... the reply was very much valid:
It’s absolutely wrong. The AoA protection is independent of the autothrust and remain active even with the autothrust disconnected
... and I don't see where "His knowledge of the airbus ATHR system is in error" in what he replied ?

Recognize you are a bit hard to follow:
After pretending AOA protection was lost, you change your mind in the next post: "AoA protection remained available"

I don't feel at ease with many comments from people sticking to the "too low too slow too late" version not to mention the unavoidable associated PNF comment:
CLB can command the same N1 as MCT.
If it takes the MCT N1/EPR to accelerate and/or climb whilst in CLB, autothrust can command it. Pretty basic stuff
So, FCOM ignores the pretty basic stuff:
"When A/THR is active, FMGS commands the thrust according to the vertical mode logic, but uses a thrust not greater than the thrust commanded by the position of the thrust lever. For example, when the thrust levers are set at the CL (climb) detent, the A/THR system can command thrust between idle and max climb"

capt. Asseline has never heard of it. Othervise he would have been familiar with moral3 and would never, ever sit down and write his book
He has probably never read your story, but obviously you have never read his book either as you would know that Asseline shut his mouth, confident in the investigation, and it's only when he realized he was fooled he decided to write the book.

Now, would he have chosen to unite with Norbert Jacquet, early and with consistency, either he would be a tramp too (which he's not and he hasn't been eaten either ...), either together they would have had a much better chance to make them heard.

Sadly, alpha-floor protection 'thought' that airplane was landing, as it was at 30 ft RA, so didn't intervene by automatically hitting TOGA
That airplane, as clever as it could be, didn't have to think or not to think to automatically switch to TOGA, as pilot had done it already even if it was only by a mere 5 sec as stipulated by official report.
And even if ALPHA FLOOR protection was available at that kind of altitude, tell me at what kind of AOA the A/THR would have triggered TOGA ?

[Lemurian]

We are on semantics here.
As seen in my previous post, i talked about the A/THR system and how its deconnection in this case meant the loss of an Aoa protection feature. Had it not been done by the pilot,the Alpha floor mode would have been triggered and the spectators at Habsheim would have had a wonderful memory to tell their grandchildren. Not a ball of fire rising from the trees, but the glorious acceleration/climb of a beautiful airplane.
Though I admire your sense of friendship in defending the indefensible (that goes to the original NJ, too, by the way...), the bottom line is that your friend acted recklessly on an aircraft -and I give you this - that no one really knew at that time, not even he.Whether there is, as you claim, foul play by all the authorities in France and in Europe is left to fora like this one to discuss, generally in vain. In my opinion, I'll go back to the original comment of the Captain I referred to :" For someone who should bear the deaths of a few people on his conscience, he is really very arrogant."

[J.O.]

Command is not for the faint of heart. When in command of an aircraft, you are responsible for all that happens, particularly when you break the rules that you have previously set for a particular flight profile. Acceptance of said responsibility and contrition with respect to the errors made is a sign of a good commander, even when there are contributing factors which may have been outside your immediate perview at the time. Asseline has never accepted this responsibility or made any attempts to be contrite, and this makes it difficult to be sympathetic to him. His defenders are wasting their time because of this, IMHO.

[CONF iture]

As seen in my previous post, i talked about the A/THR system and how its deconnection in this case meant the loss of an Aoa protection feature. Had it not been done by the pilot,the Alpha floor mode would have been triggered and the spectators at Habsheim would have had a wonderful memory to tell their grandchildren
You know you're quite amazing:
What about at least opening an FCOM before posting such comments ?

FCOM 1.22.30 ... ALPHA FLOOR protection is available from lift off to 100 feet RA in approach

Once again, your post shows an obvious lack of knowledge
1- on the aircraft
2- on the Habsheim case

If that: Lemurian (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=43297) is true, I would hide it ASAP !

Before posting next time, why not taking the time to read and to study to be able to build your OWN judgment on that controversial subject.
Looking at the number of Views on this thread, you would not be the only one.

Before I've heard of Norbert Jacquet, I had a similar judgment that you have on the Habsheim case.
Don't be afraid to read him, and if that guy suffers from mental instability, I would not mind suffering from the same instability.

And do not restrain your reading to him, there are other guys around as well. You may even like to have a look on the official report ... if you can find it !?

[the shrimp]

Lemurian and J.O. Still generalities with no link to specific facts. Wash your hands before eating. Don't put your fingers in your nose. Say hello to the lady...

Lemurian, be kind enought to answer my technical questions in my last post. And to the previous questions (about the lawsuits against Norbert Jacquet and their issues, about the false pilot licenses, etc).

Asseline has never accepted this responsibility or made any attempts to be contrite, and this makes it difficult to be sympathetic to him. His defenders are wasting their time because of this, IMHO.
Topic is "Airbus technology defects". We don't mind about Asseline. He is a real arrogant and unbearable man, he played the fool in Habsheim, but this does not change anything about what we are talking about on this topic.

What might we think about what Norbert Jacquet tells? Why are the authorities still on his track?

May we ask this question: is Airbus a banana republic aircraft?

[Lemurian]

Confiture ,
As usual, attacks are better than defense, aren't they ?
The book I have, page 12.22.68.05, paragraph 5 states in italics (verbatim translation ):
"ATTENTION :
If a disconnect button is pressed for more than 15 seconds, the A/THR system is disconnected for the remainder of the flight ; all the A/THR functions, including ALPHA FLOOR are lost. They can only be retrieved after the next FMGC power-up."
As you can see, my dear friend, maybe you could read all of the book you cite, or cite all the relevant articles. I suspect that you don't fly the 'Bus, as I do, otherwise you wouldn't have trusted NJ, but I suspect you won't change your mind.
Staying on the same point, they did not on that flight initially have the "under 100 ft" condition, because of the terrain. Read again the transcript and find out that the rad alt kept on giving varying heights.
By the way, this particular item is one of the main points that are discussed on the requal syllabus. I should know.
I advise you to get some more infos from the University of Bielefeld site, they had published some pretty pertinent remarks on that accident and they are not part of the French conspiracy . Until you come back with infos that are not from Asseline's or Jacquet's books, this discussion is moot. Might as well talk about angels' sex life.
Regards.

[CONF iture]

"ATTENTION :
If a disconnect button is pressed for more than 15 seconds, the A/THR system is disconnected for the remainder of the flight ; all the A/THR functions, including ALPHA FLOOR are lost. They can only be retrieved after the next FMGC power-up."
Great !
... but did CAPT Asseline or anyone in the flight deck at that time press more than 15 seconds one of these disconnect buttons ?
I'm not the only one to ask that question.
And I did ask that question to Zeke 10 days ago ... but still no answer !?
But you're also welcome to quote it.

Having said that, even if someone had done it, it would not have changed anything as:
1- Airplane never reached an AOA to trigger such a protection
2- Airplane was below 100 feet RA

Staying on the same point, they did not on that flight initially have the "under 100 ft" condition, because of the terrain. Read again the transcript and find out that the rad alt kept on giving varying heights
Oh that's getting interesting here !
As you seem to have all the relevant information on the subject and on top of that it's part of your recurrent, please, or I should say PLEASE, quote for me these radar altimeter values, lets say for the last 20 seconds or so, of this flight.
Even better if you want to quote them from the official report ...

I suspect that you don't fly the 'Bus, as I do
That's a bit scary ... but I still believe you can do a good job without knowing everything on the type you fly.
No, my concern is more in this attitude, this lack of openness, this way to stick to a version as "official" it could be without questioning a single minute.

I advise you to get some more infos from the University of Bielefeld site, they had published some pretty pertinent remarks on that accident and they are not part of the French conspiracy
And to illustrate that, I would be more than happy, honestly, if you bring a link to this information. I will obviously read it, and if it's pertinent, I'm ready to change my mind ...


I know I'm bored, but please, keep posting, you make my day every time you do.

[A4]

http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/9.86.html#subj2.1

This link has CVR transcript and timeline for engine N1.

Just scroll down for Habsheim. There is also some narrative from a Flight article following the transcript.

A4

[Lemurian]

Confiture,
the exact word is "I'm boring ", not "I'm bored".
Yes, you are boring, and you should research on your own. Bielefeld ,any research engine will find it for you, they specialise in both CRM and human/computer relationships. Unfortunately, they don't elaborate on conspiracies.That would do you some good.
I am going to talk about the angels' sex life with a bunch of buddies with some beer, it's a lot more fun than your blinkered obsessions.
We really have nothing in common. I like living where I live. don't need to keep looking over my shoulder for baddies to get me and I trust my country's institutions... Funny, hey ?
As you don't, our conversation will just be a slugfest, and it's boring too. Willy-waving is for kids and, personally, I'm past that stage.
Have a nice day !

[Lemurian]

Once again, I apologize : I fell in the trap made by confiture and friends : letting myself get involved in a silly argument.
I realised that other forum members would be interested in the link -the University of Bielefeld- I alluded to.
This document is very interesting because the researchers come out with a sieve to filter the facts that appear in an accident investigation. They call it the WBA, acronym for "Why-Because Analysis".
At the bottom of these 17 pages, the pruner will find more links to other doctoral research.
Here it is :
Lewis WBA (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Papers/SAFECOMP2000.pdf)

There is more but the site is well made, it's up to you to find out.

Regards to all

[J.O.]

Thanks for the link Lemurian. That report succinctly states that the only real issue in dispute between Asseline's conclusions and those of the investigators is the validity of the engine performance. The facts of the case show that they did perform as expected (in fact better than the certification requirements). Instead of attacking Airbus, those who would demand better engine performance in such situations should be asking the certifying authorities (DGAC / FAA) to amend the performance requirements. The same applies to Jorbert's attacks on the flight envelope protections and how they affected the accident. Given that their only evidence to make such a demand is an accident which resulted from a significantly botched attempt at a low fly-past, we all know the response that would come from the authorities. Time to move on folks.

[CONF iture]

Nothing like a beer to get back on track ...
Welcome back Lemurian, and thank you for the link.

I have to go, but it's printed, I will read that on my way, for sure I will !

And don't worry, you're not the only one not to answer the questions:

Zeke thought it was nicer sending a private message, but my question was to anyone interested in the thread, so I believe the answer has to be public as well:

... but did CAPT Asseline or anyone in the flight deck at that time press more than 15 seconds one of these disconnect buttons ?
I'm not the only one to ask that question.
And I did ask that question to Zeke 10 days ago ... but still no answer !?
They disconnected autothrust for 15 sec on descent.
I am not going to contribue to the thread as it is obvious to me that you have not availed yourself to the report, nor do you understand airbus systems.

So I concede there are people much more qualified than me on the Airbus systems, and also on the report.
But, regarding the airplane, you still have to produce an factual reply to that:

Quote:
Originally Posted by Zeke:
CLB can command the same N1 as MCT.
If it takes the MCT N1/EPR to accelerate and/or climb whilst in CLB, autothrust can command it. Pretty basic stuff

And originally Answered by myself:
So, FCOM ignores the pretty basic stuff:
"When A/THR is active, FMGS commands the thrust according to the vertical mode logic, but uses a thrust not greater than the thrust commanded by the position of the thrust lever. For example, when the thrust levers are set at the CL (climb) detent, the A/THR system can command thrust between idle and max climb"



And regarding the report, if you just consult the link posted by A4, you may notice that, according to official report, pilot disconnects A/THR at second 26 and tape ends at second 41.
... Could it be the 15 seconds you're talking about !?

... The silent crowd will appreciate.

Time to move on folks
Time to ask questions folks.

[Clandestino]

Thank you Lemurian, besides defusing myths surrounding Habsheim and Warsaw accidents, the link provided gives good clue why we do accident analysys at all. Basing its conclusion on facts and logical deduction, it sure supports BEA's point of view that airplane worked as expected and fault lies with seriously flawed execution of flypast.

But let me introduce radically different point of view, put forward in report by Christian Roger (http://perso.orange.fr/crashdehabsheim/CRenglish%20phot.pdf), advisor in the defence of capt. Michel Asseline, flight capt. Air France (ret.), former leader of Patrouille de France (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrouille_de_France). president of SNPL (http://www.snpl.com/) Air France 1986-1990. According to it, DFDR and CVR recordings used in accident analysys and legal proceedings were completely forged and didn't come from accident aircraft. Videos taken on the day of accident (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EM0hDchVlY) were all forged too. DGAC, Airbus, BEA, French goverment and French judicial system conspired together to hide the real cause of the accident. With real black boxes gone for good, the only reliable pieces of information, upon which he based his conlusions, were: capt. Aseline's words as he left burning aircraft "the engines didn't pick up correctly" and fact that slash marks on trees were asymetrical. Even the trees were misteriously offed three days later by the by conspirators but it was too late, because capt. Roger has already seen enough broken tree tops and made up his mind regarding the probable cause. Determining that there was asymetrical spooling up of the engines, probably caused by faulty FADEC electronics, was his tour de force.

Chalk one up for paranoia and delusion. With friends like these, capt. Asseline was not quite in the need of enemies. Back to my fable, moral #2.

And the question time it is. You have the guy that claims that:

- the minimum flying speed of A320 is fixed by the builders as "Alpha max". Higher useable speeds may be mentioned, but they can only be recommendations.

-there cannot be traces of fire extinguishing products on the recorders boxes without traces of fire itself

-only one single speed can correspond to a particular angle of incidence in aviation (page 30 - guy is totally ignorant of the existence of ground effect)

-they never said why the radar was not accurate enough (for a plane flying below 50ft, that is)

...and many others. So how is it possible that this guy retires after distinguished career in mil and civ aviation and no one ever notices that something is wrong with him? Since he's heavilly copy/pasting from Roger's report and pushing Roger's agenda as if it were his own, I hereby pronounce CONFiture the most suitable person to answer this question.

[DozyWannabe]

You have to put that in perspective, that brand new 320 technology was so new, and flying with computers bugs was the every flight story.
Actually the number of 'bugs' was practically non-existent by the time flight testing started - as a result of the multiple redundancy that Airbus had decided on from the get-go. The controversy that came later (after the Indian and Air Inter accidents - as well as the A330 crash which killed Nick Warner, which you've already brought up) was purely based on a less than ideal part of the human-computer interface. It was decided that dual function dials (with push-pull selecting between angle of descent and descent rate) was not a good interface design, allowing pilots to become confused as to what they had programmed. As a result the whole interface was overhauled retroactively. My Software Engineering professor was very clear on that, as he was hired as an advisor on software and interface design to Airbus during that time. Airbus was not the only manufacturer to suffer interface issues, as the Cali B757 accident proved many years after the aircraft went into service.

The French have a reputation for working to avoid blame being attached to a French institution or aircraft. But it is not the French alone who do this. Remember how hard Boeing worked to try to prove that the B737 rudder ECU and actuator design had no impact on the Colorado Springs and Pittsburgh incidents, and how hard they worked to divert responsibility to the pilots involved. Remember how hard the Dutch investigators worked to absolve Captain Jacob van Zanten of blame during the Tenerife investigation. This is unhelpful, but normal, not evidence of conspiracy.

Yes, there is a sense of satisfaction when the cause is discovered, and yes there is no doubt a sense of a job well done when bad practices have been brought to light. But in this case Captain Michel Asseline pushed the envelope when it was imprudent to do so, and tragedy resulted. To claim otherwise is a waste of time when there are many more current realities in aviation that require scrutiny.

[Zeke]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Zeke:
CL can command the same N1 as MCT.
If it takes the MCT N1/EPR to accelerate and/or climb whilst in CL, autothrust can command it. Pretty basic stuff
And originally Answered by myself:
So, FCOM ignores the pretty basic stuff:
"When A/THR is active, FMGS commands the thrust according to the vertical mode logic, but uses a thrust not greater than the thrust commanded by the position of the thrust lever. For example, when the thrust levers are set at the CL (climb) detent, the A/THR system can command thrust between idle and max climb"

Again you are showing to lack of knowledge on Airbus systems.

FCOM 2.02.14 P1 FLEX TAKEOFF REQUIREMENTS, the FLEX EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM) cannot be lower than max climb EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM) at the same flight conditions.

I.e. on normal flex takeoff you may command a takeoff EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM) equivalent to max climb EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM.

Max climb EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM) are computed values, they change with flight conditions.

In summary, going from MCT to CL or CL to MCT does not _always_ change EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM). You will only _always_ get a reduction when going TOGA to CL.

[the shrimp]

Lemurian, A4, J.O. and Zeke only speak about the Habsheim crash. They use technical values and analysis that come from the french official report.

This can not be used because (all this is in the links of the biginning of this topic):

- Norbert Jacquet asserted in the press and in his book that the official report was a forgery and that false documents have been built up by investigators to exonerate the plane,

- he has been sued in defamation twice, because he asserted all this (one of the trial was commited by Minister Mermaz),

- he won these two trials by maintaining his accusations against the authorities and the Minister.

That means that Norbert Jacquet finally judicially proved that the official report was based on falsifications.

This was to recall.

It has also been proved that false airline pilot licenses were given to Michel Asseline, the pilot in Habsheim.

[Clandestino]

- he won these two trials by maintaining his accusations against the authorities and the Minister.
That means that Norbert Jacquet finally judicially proved that the official report was based on falsifications.

Nope. He did not.
The courts upheld his right to free expression of his opinions, regardless of their (ir)rationality. Alleged falsifications were not on trial, therefore no verdict upon them was given.
I'm still waiting for that translation of yours, my dear decapod crustacean, but if it's even waguely based on Roger's report (http://perso.orange.fr/crashdehabsheim/CRenglish%20phot.pdf), you need not bother.
Remember, if you're insisting that everything regarding the investigation wass false, then also you have nothing to base your allegation of 'Airbus technollogy defects' on. No CVR, no FDR and only thing you accept to be truthful is the statement of the fellow, whose showing off has killed three people, two of them children. Have you ever heard of denial (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial)?

[J.O.]

It seems our crustacean friend has been swimming a little deeper than he should. It's affecting his cognition. There is a huge difference between a court ruling which says that one is entitled to free speech (no matter how deluded said free speech is), and a ruling which strikes down the findings of an official investigation. I can gaurantee that had such a ruling been made, the repercussions would have been loud and far reaching. Instead, all we have is the repeated ravings of someone who is too naive to admit their own weaknesses in not being able to understand a very safe and logical aircraft design.

[the shrimp]

Remember, if you're insisting that everything regarding the investigation wass false, then also you have nothing to base your allegation of 'Airbus technollogy defects' on.
You insist and speak only about Habsheim. I give answer about Habsheim.

The French law on defamation is one of most severe in the world. If you do not prove what you said, you are convicted.

Norbert Jacquet won the two trials by maintaining his accusations against the authorities and the Minister. He judicially proved that the official report was a forgery to exonerate the plane.

To recall: A few documents are getting translated on the Airbus defects that caused crashes, pointed out by Norbert Jacquet, and will be presented on this forum later on. Work in progress.

... the repercussions would have been loud and far reaching.
Ask French journalists by email: http://jacno.com/za-an-an72.htm (some adresses are not valid any more).

At this juncture, ask them why they did not say anything during twenty years about the Mitterrand’s hidden daughter!

[Zeke]

the shrimp,

Over 35000 hours a day are flown globally in 320 series aircraft, with close to 3000 been built.

We have not seen a single repeat of a Habsheim style incident since Habsheim. This is despite thousands of single engine and all engine go around having been done since Habsheim from a low level by pilots of various training backgrounds, ethnic backgrounds, educational backgrounds, and competence levels, we still do not have a repeat of this incident (or even similar).

If a cover up exists of a serious airbus technology defect ... why do we not see a string of Habsheim style crashes ?

The fact is since Habsheim, the 320 has been a far safer platform than the 737. Despite this crackpots still come out from the woodwork saying that technology defects have been covered up.

Where/what exaclty is this smoking gun that has been covered up ?

:eek: :confused:

[the shrimp]

Zeke,

You confine yourself to generalities with no link to specific facts. You do not bring any serious answers to pointed out realities and to commonsense questions which have been asked.

The 320 have flown for 18 years? OK, Zeke.

During more than 50 years, asbestos was considered an ideal building material. It was an excellent fire retardant, had high electrical resistivity and was inexpensive and easy to use.

And now ? Worldwide, 60 countries have banned the use of asbestos, in whole or in part.

It was not a Christmas tale.

[Lemurian]

Asbestos and Mitterand's daughter !
Next, we'll hear about the Da Vinci code, Kennedy's murder and Elvis Presley's new ranch...and green ETs hiding in the Nevada desert:E
Get a life ...

[Old Aero Guy]

the shrimp,
The fact is since Habsheim, the 320 has been a far safer platform than the 737. :eek: :confused:

While the A320 has been shown to be a safe platform, why drag the 737 into the argument and say that it is less safe when the actual data show otherwise?

Here are the hull loss rates per million departures for the respective airplanes:

737-100/200: 1.41

737-300/400/500: 0.38

737-600/700/800: 0.00

A319/320/321: 0.57

The 737 models that are contemporary with the A320 have actually shown a better accident rate. While the 737-100/200 shows a rate that is higher than the rest of these small twin jets, its rate is consistent with other airplanes of its generation such as:

727: 1.11

747-100/200/300/SP: 2.28

A300: 1.68

Souce: http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf

The fact is that the A320 and fly-by-wire airplanes in general have not had a significant effect on airplane safety either for good or for bad.

[Zeke]

You do not bring any serious answers to pointed out realities and to commonsense questions which have been asked.

Since the 25th of June, 1988 :

Seven (7) A320 fatal accidents have occurred, with the tragic loss of 444 lives (17 hull losses total in that time);
Forty seven (47) B737 fatal accidents have occurred, with the tragic loss of 2938 lives (92 hull losses total in that time).


It would seem evident to my previous request that you are not able to point to the smoking gun that was covered up.

It would also seem evident that the technology that is not defective, it is very safe. Because so few fatal accidents with the 320 have occurred, many people are able to recite them in extreme detail, they all have been investigated in great detail. I cannot say the same with the 737, with 128 hull losses to date (maybe 129 awaiting confirmation from Indonesia) they become a blur.

You have been trying to establish that some form of cover up or an inaccurate finding exists in the investigation. If an inaccurate finding or cover up in the investigation occurred regarding some defect in the aircraft design, the said item that was covered up would have come to light sometime in the past 18 years.

As I have pointed out, no such event has occurred.

What airbus technology defect was covered up ?

What is your safety concern ?

[Zeke]

While the A320 has been shown to be a safe platform, why drag the 737 into the argument and say that it is less safe when the actual data show otherwise?

Sorry OAG, nothing personal, just showing that the 737 has killed more people over the same period of time, and that whatever technology defect was said to have been covered up it has not caused another accident.

Souce: http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf

That data is out of date, I can recall more than one 737NG hull loss. One can also split 320 series models into groups as well. The 318/319/321 are at zero, and the 320-100 and 320-200 can be separated.

Just depends on how you butter your bread, I compared all models of similar types over the same time frame. If you were to compare all 737 models that were manufacturer over the past 18-19 years, it still comes out with the 320 being better. I think about 26 733/734/735/738 hull losses have occurred with 1026 lives lost.

The fact is that the A320 and fly-by-wire airplanes in general have not had a significant effect on airplane safety either for good or for bad.

I would disagree, the 320/330/340/777 all are statistically safer. I also note that the 747-800/787/A350 will also be fly by wire, the technology has been embraced by both manufacturers.

[Old Aero Guy]

That data is out of date, I can recall more than one 737NG hull loss.
The data are through 2005. The 737NG hull losses rate still stands at zero. If you have other data, please provide it with a source.
If you were to compare all 737 models that were manufacturer over the past 18-19 years, it still comes out with the 320 being better. I think about 26 733/734/735/738 hull losses have occurred with 1026 lives lost.
Total number of 733/734/735 hull losses (manufactured over the last 18-19 years) through 2005 was 19, not 26. The 738 is not included since there have been zero of those. The total number of A318/319/320/321 hull losses through 2005 were 12. These hull losses provide respective accident rates of 0.38 and 0.57 quoted earlier. If you have other data, please provide it with a source.
I would disagree, the 320/330/340/777 all are statistically safer. I also note that the 747-800/787/A350 will also be fly by wire.
The hull loss rate for the other airplanes and the 744 are:
A330: 0.00
A340: 0.92
777: 0.00
744: 0.75
Since the A340 rate is worse than the 733/734/735 and the 744 (a non-FBW airplane), while the A330 and 777 rate is the same as the 737NG, there is no satistical basis for saying that FBW is safer.
If you think that FBW is safer, that's fine, but the statistics do not back you up.
By the way, the 748 will not be FBW as its primary flight controls will be similar to the 744.

[Golf Charlie Charlie]

The 737NG hull losses rate still stands at zero.

The recent Gol crash involved a 737NG, this being the first and to date only 737NG hull loss.

[Zeke]

The data are through 2005. The 737NG hull losses rate still stands at zero. If you have other data, please provide it with a source.

The three I had in mind
Southwest 737 in Dec (Maybe repaired, still 1 death involved)
Air Algérie 736 in March this year
GOL 738 in Sept this year.

The hull loss rate for the other airplanes and the 744 are:
A330: 0.00
A340: 0.92
777: 0.00
744: 0.75
Since the A340 rate is worse than the 733/734/735 and the 744 (a non-FBW airplane), while the A330 and 777 rate is the same as the 737NG, there is no satistical basis for saying that FBW is safer.
If you think that FBW is safer, that's fine, but the statistics do not back you up.
By the way, the 748 will not be FBW as its primary flight controls will be similar to the 744.

340 has no deaths with a lower hull loss accident rate than the 744.

The 744 has had 3 hull loss accidents, China Airlines in 1993 in Hong Kong, Korean in 1996 at Seoul both hull losses on landing, no loss of life. Singapore in 2000 at Taipei on takeoff, 83 dead.

Only one 340 hull loss in service, the Air France landing at Toronto, no loss of life.

Two other 340 hull losses events maybe on the database you are looking at, one was during maintenance when a hydraulic pump overheated, the other on the tarmac in Colombo in a terrorist attack. Neither during operation, neither a hull loss accident.

Thanks for the 748 info, when did they go back to conventional controls on that design ? Last update I read had wind tunnel testing being done to establish the FBW control systems.

[the shrimp]

Asbestos and Mitterand's daughter !
Next, we'll hear about the Da Vinci code, Kennedy's murder and Elvis Presley's new ranch...and green ETs hiding in the Nevada desert:E
Get a life ...

Asbestos? We know that it is true. We all know that. Do you claim the opposite?

Mitterrand's hidden daughter? We know that it is true. We all know that. Do you claim the opposite?

Who is the funny guy?

Please, Lemurian...

[CONF iture]

Passing 1000 ft the pilot brought back THR LEVERS from FLX MCT to CLB detent, but N1 commands didn’t follow the order
Does N1 always reduce from MCT to CLB when accelerating in a climb ?
on normal flex takeoff you may command a takeoff EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM) equivalent to max climb EPR (V2500) or N1 (CFM.

So, please, bring up some figures ... and don't forget:
- Bâle-Mulhouse is not that far from 1000 feet ASL
- The guy leveled off at 1000 feet AGL

To give you a chance, you may even consider the guy leveled off higher, even if that flight didn't last 5 minutes time, and ended at the same altitude it started.

Again you are showing to lack of knowledge on Airbus systems
... So I won't insult you by specifying the reference you should be looking for ...


BTW, you've been very quiet on that other early assumption ?
Didn’t Michel Asseline deliberately press the autothrust disconnect for over 15 seconds on descent whilst in flight idle turning off autothrust for the remainder of the flight ?

[Max Angle]

Does anyone know what the orginal plan for the flypast was?. If he was planning to do a "high alpha" pass like the Airbus display pilots do at airshows he would, as they do, have disabled alpha-floor protection by holding the pb's in for 15 seconds which disconnects all the autothrust functions including alpha-floor for the remainder of the flight.

It's a bit ironic that Airbus's airshow party piece is only possible with one of the main protections locked out.

[Zeke]

So, please, bring up some figures

Never flown a 320-100, I did not profess to have that data. I just said that it is not always the case, such as with a high derate (up to 40% with the current EEC) or high flex takeoff (up to flex 70). I have presented the 320 FCOM reference to back myself up.

Two questions for you :

What airbus technology defect was covered up ?

What is your safety concern ?

other early assumption ?

I sent a PM to the person concerned.

The whole debate got childish, it keeps going in circles, your posts are a testament to that. No one is able to show that a serious or safety defect existed at the time, name the serious or safety defect that was covered supposed to have been covered up, and then state how this serious or safety defect has not resulted in a string of subsequent accidents in the past 18-20 years which required a cover up.

If a serious or safety defect exists I would be the first person wanting it to get fixed, I want to know what it is, no one is able to put a finger on it.

Does anyone know what the original plan for the flypast was?

The Air France requirement at the time was not lower than 300' when above a runway which is suitable for landing. The two pilots were both Air France training captains, it was an assumption that they were aware of the Air France policy at the time.

[john_tullamarine]

Please, folks, can we keep the discussion on a level attitude ?

Having inherited this thread from elsewhere we will extend some tolerance ... I really don't like to go in and delete sections of posts which wander too far off the beaten track but, if need be, I will ...

Play the ball, not the man.

Conspiracist theorising will be tolerated to a degree .. but not indefinitely.

[Old Aero Guy]

The three I had in mind
Southwest 737 in Dec (Maybe repaired, still 1 death involved)
Air Algérie 736 in March this year
GOL 738 in Sept this year.

The first two events were not hull losses. The airplanes were repaired and returned to service.
You are correct, the GOL incident was the first 737NG hull loss. However, since this was the first hull loss in 8 years of 737NG operation, I suspect the 737NG rate will be as good or better than the 737-300/400/500. (Thanks for the reminder GCC)

340 has no deaths with a lower hull loss accident rate than the 744.
The 744 has had 3 hull loss accidents, China Airlines in 1993 in Hong Kong, Korean in 1996 at Seoul both hull losses on landing, no loss of life. Singapore in 2000 at Taipei on takeoff, 83 dead.
Only one 340 hull loss in service, the Air France landing at Toronto, no loss of life.
Two other 340 hull losses events maybe on the database you are looking at, one was during maintenance when a hydraulic pump overheated, the other on the tarmac in Colombo in a terrorist attack. Neither during operation, neither a hull loss accident.

There seems to be some confusion over the number of hull loss accidents and the rate of hull loss accidents.
The 744 does not have a higher hull loss accident rate then the A340. As I stated earlier, the 744 hull loss rate is 0.75 hull losses per one million operations while the A340 is 0.92 hull losses per one million operation.
If you had read the link I provided, you would have seen these rates were calculated based on the 3 744 hull losses you described and the single Air France A340 overrun. The other A340 hull losses were not included since they did not take place during airline operations.
Statistically, the difference in these rates in not significant. Neither is the difference in rates between the A320 family and the 737-300/400/500 & 737NG. The rates do not support your supposition that FBW airliners are safer via virtue of their technology level.
Your aguments that Airbus FBW has no significant flaws needs to be made on the merits of the Airbus design, not via comparisons with other non-FBW types.

[Zeke]

There seems to be some confusion over the number of hull loss accidents and the rate of hull loss accidents.
The 744 does not have a higher hull loss accident rate then the A340. As I stated earlier, the 744 hull loss rate is 0.75 hull losses per one million operations while the A340 is 0.92 hull losses per one million operation.

Depends on how Boeing want to portray their aircraft in their reports.

An equally valid way to portray the same data would have been to compare :
The entire 340 series to the entire 747 series.
The entire 320 series to the entire 737 series

As they all share the same TCDS.

[Old Aero Guy]

Depends on how Boeing want to portray their aircraft in their reports.
An equally valid way to portray the same data would have been to compare :
The entire 340 series to the entire 747 series.
The entire 320 series to the entire 737 series
As they all share the same TCDS.

Yes, you could do that, but you'd be missing some things that are important to the hull loss rate that the link report shows.

http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf

First, look at page 11. Note that the First Generation of jet transports (DC-8, 707 etc) had a high accident rate at initial introduction that dropped after inservice experience was gained, but has now increased to the initial rate or greater.

There are many reasons for these rates. An important one in the early years is that pilots transitioning from props to jets didn't have a full appreciation of the differences between the two types and there was a lot of learning and training required that wasn't there initially. Other reasons were that the existing certification regulations and pilot-to-airplane interfaces were not as well developed as they are today.

The climbing rate in the later years is due to airframe age and the relegation of these early airplanes to lower tier operators in less developed parts of the world.

Note that the second generation jet transports (727,737-100/200. BAC-111) show the same type of trends at both ends of their service life, albeit at lower accident rate levels.

The current generation of airplanes (A318/319/320/321, 737-300/400/500, 737NG, 757, 767, A330, A340, 744 and 777) began operation with low accident rates that have been continued over their careers.

Also consider that airplanes on the same TCDS do not necessarily share the same certification basis or the same design features. Certification regulations do advance and not all of them are "grandfathered" into new derivatives of older airplanes. Likewise, economic and customer demanded features also show up on the newer models. In many cases, these features also make the newer airplanes more operator "friendly" and safer.

Therefore, airplanes shown on the same TCDS can vary widely in their design philosophy and features.

For these reasons, the linked report does not lump the 737-100/200 with the 737-300/400/500 or the 747-100/200/300/SP with the 747-400. Likewise, the A300-B2/B4 is not included with the A300-600.

Assuming you want to discuss a design's merits relative to other airplanes, it would seem to be more consistent to argue those merits relative to its contemporaries rather than ancestors of those contemporaries that were developed 20 to 30 years earlier. After all, some of the reasons a 737-300 has a better hull loss rate than a 737-200 are same reasons an A300-600 has a better hull loss rate than an A300.

[CONF iture]

Clandestino, you did state something regarding ALPHA FLOOR but did not produce any answer to that question:
And even if ALPHA FLOOR protection was available at that kind of altitude, at what kind of AOA the A/THR would have triggered TOGA ?... and I think it's an important question.

But let me introduce radically different point of view, put forward in report by Christian Roger (http://perso.orange.fr/crashdehabsheim/CRenglish%20phot.pdf), advisor in the defence of capt. Michel Asseline ...
GOOD, it's a good step !
At least, and at last, you're looking at something else that the official version.

So how is it possible that this guy retires after distinguished career in mil and civ aviation and no one ever notices that something is wrong with him? Since he's heavilly copy/pasting from Roger's report and pushing Roger's agenda as if it were his own, I hereby pronounce CONFiture the most suitable person to answer this question
... but you still don't seem to have the big picture regarding Habsheim and these following 18 years, and I don't blame you because it takes much longer than a few weeks to try and assimilate all these technical reports and judicial procedures, and I'm personally still working on that.

But if you go on with your reading, you will probably discover that SNPL or Roger position, during all these years, have been almost anything except, crystal clear ...
I name these two one because you did, but it could be applicable to many more ...

I can see only one guy who kept the same heading: Norbert Jacquet !
No wonder he's still the only one to pay the big price.
No wonder justice is still firmly after him, even with authorities pretending this man lost his mind ... !?

But let's go back to Roger's paper, which is one of the too few English written on Habsheim:

"-there cannot be traces of fire extinguishing products on the recorders boxes without traces of fire itself"

You quote a paragraph title but fail to mention the paragraph itself which develops the notion of fire by, smoke and/or soot.
... and looking at these pictures, isn't it surprising they were not able to identify any trace of smoke or soot on these recorders ???
photos from JC Boetsch site (http://perso.orange.fr/crashdehabsheim/le%20crash%20en%20N%20&%20B.htm)

-they never said why the radar was not accurate enough (for a plane flying below 50ft, that is)
You will find the answer in the Venet and Belotti initial report (but I don't think that one has been translated)

Ironically, I presume, you wrote that:
Videos taken on the day of accident (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EM0hDchVlY) were all forged too
So I understand you don't seem aware that only ONE of these videos has been retained by the commission, even if there were many more available !?
And that "OFFICIAL VIDEO" is the one, the very first one on your link.

Now, I'd like you to watch carefully, I should say listen carefully, to that official video, and tell me what you can hear at the precise time 00:30 ?

[Zeke]

Therefore, airplanes shown on the same TCDS can vary widely in their design philosophy and features.

To share the same TCDS, they must have the same fundamental airframe and systems, they share the same fundamental design philosophy, otherwise certification authorities would demand full recertification.

To suggest that this is not the case on the 737 and 747 is false. The fundamental systems and airframe philosophy has changed little for those types, the fundamentals remain the same, e.g. the overhead panel on the 737 has not changed since the 1960s, people are still turning off the hydraulics in flight when they mean the anti-ice 40 years later. The 737-300 retains 80% airframe spares commonality with the 737-200.

For these reasons, the linked report does not lump the 737-100/200 with the 737-300/400/500 or the 747-100/200/300/SP with the 747-400. Likewise, the A300-B2/B4 is not included with the A300-600.

The report does not say that at all, it just splits them up when they were introduced in service, it does not give a rational for doing so.

Even with this statement the grouping was skewed to suit Boeing, as the 747-300 entered service after the 757 and 767, and at about the same time as the A310. The 737-300, 757, 767, A300-600, A310 all entered service within a year or two of the 747-300.

[Old Aero Guy]

To share the same TCDS, they must have the same fundamental airframe and systems, they share the same fundamental design philosophy, otherwise certification authorities would demand full recertification.
To suggest that this is not the case on the 737 and 747 is false. The fundamental systems and airframe philosophy has changed little for those types, the fundamentals remain the same, e.g. the overhead panel on the 737 has not changed since the 1960s, people are still turning off the hydraulics in flight when they mean the anti-ice 40 years later. The 737-300 retains 80% airframe spares commonality with the 737-200.
The report does not say that at all, it just splits them up when they were introduced in service, it does not give a rational for doing so.
Even with this statement the grouping was skewed to suit Boeing, as the 747-300 entered service after the 757 and 767, and at about the same time as the A310. The 737-300, 757, 767, A300-600, A310 all entered service within a year or two of the 747-300.
To say that the groupings are based only on EIS is patently false.


The 757 and 767 introduced two crew operation with much more flight deck automation even though they entered service about the same time as the 747-300. The 747-300 flight deck was still a three crew operation and is essentially the same as the 747-100/200. The 747-400 flight deck introduced new levels of automation and allowed the airplane to go to a two crew flight deck. Note that this happened without requiring a new TCDS for the 747.


Note that the same distinction was made for the A300 versus the A300-600. The fundamental technical changes that went in to the revisions of this airplane that allowed it to go from a three crew to a two crew flight deck are recognized by the groupings.


In addition to airplane technical level, the groupings account for the operational environment changes that have taken place over time. Things like pilot skill sets and attributes and airway/airport infrastructure were far different in the mid-60's compared to the mid-80's and they have continued to advance to the present day.


The groupings are a fair attempt to represent the total environment present during the design and operation of the airplanes shown. While no set of groupings can be perfect, I doubt that Airbus would disagree with these or the statistical story they tell.

[Clandestino]

Well done CONF iture! You have managed to drag down this thread into very irellevant details, upon which you insist as if they're of utmost importance. So:
... but you still don't seem to have the big picture regarding Habsheim
Correct! All the pictures I have are only of 320x200 resolution, but there are more than 2000 of them, sequentially aranged and with soundtrack attached. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EM0hDchVlY) They show flypast of A320 with 6 crew and 130 passengers onboard. Can you, or for that matter anyone PPRuNeing, defend this flypast as being executed safely, even prior hitting the trees? If so then we can proceed to discuss minor anomalies that might have happened, if not - and that's my point of view - any possible fault is irelevant in view of flypast that was done below reasonably safe level, below reasonably safe airspeed and with below reasonably safe thrust.

For the entertainment of those who think that previous paragraph is my attempt of evading CONF iture's well aimed questions, here are some answers to them. Still I insist that these answers, while correct as my knowledge allows, are absolutely irellevant to cause of Habsheim disaster or alleged Airbus technology defects.

Alpha floor on current A320 in CONF3 fires imediately below 14° AoA. By no means it's certain that it would save the airplane and also MA didn't disable autothrust, he merely disconnected it. However, it was noted that A320entered service with AF only six weeks before accident and already pilots were practicing flypasts atr speeds down to alpha floor - at RA greater than 100 ft that is. It is entirely possible that MA was unaware that flying at 30 ft would deprive him of alpha floor protection.

Regarding the absence of soot it's entirely concievable that black boxes were away of flames as tail section is largest unburnt part of airplane but it was drenched in foam by firemen as precaution. So no evidence of forgery here.

Radar track of low flying airplane is notoriously hard to obtain (did you know that radars used by ATC work only to the line of sight?) and it's irelevant in the view of FDR data, video footages and a couple of hundred witnesses and those gave much more precise account of airplane's final flightpath than any radar could.

With videos is same old story: some people claim that sound of spooling engines was engineered as engines were actally not spooling up. Sure but then what's kicking the dust moments before airplane contacted the trees if not engine exhausts? Or do you claim that it was photoshoped? And on the videos you can se airplane sinking into woods with no significant bank or yaw, so theory of one engine stalling goes out the window.

I was very disgusted after reading Roger's report. There was that distinguished pilot who put the weight of his authority behind some severly insensible notions in hope he would push them through. I might have overreacted in asking what was wrong with this guy during his active service as it's possible that his condition developed post retirement. Unlike his protege, Jacquet, he at least had the wits to indulge in conspiracy theorizing after being withdrawn from service use. You see, unlike medical, one's pension can not be taken away on mental health grounds.

[boeingdriverx]

I think that introduction of a new technology will always have its infancy problems... look at the introduction of the first jets... Same thing here with Airbus airplanes and the introduction of the Fly By Wire technology. Nowadays I think that most of the 'bugs' are fixed and this generation of airplane is very nice, enjoyable and safe to fly.

My point of view on the Habsheim crash is better described by the following FCOM 1.27.20 p3 paragraph:

"FLARE MODE: (...) as the aircraft descend through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2 degres nose down over a period of 8 seconds"

I am not going to discuss the good or the bad of doing flypasts in an airliner full of passenger... But look carefully at this FCOM paragraph and you will understand that this airplane was already in FLARE mode (DFDR data shows RA less than 30ft at some point) and introduced a pitch down moment exactly when the pilot needed the opposite. Pilot lack of knowledge? Airbus bad design? it is a mix of both who made this airplane crash.

Did Airbus change the logic of these modes after this crash? I have honestly no idea. But the latter Flight Controls designs on the A330 and A340 show lots of differrences compared to the initial A320 design. On the 330/340 no more FACs or ELACs but 3 PRIMs and 2 SECs... Most of the functions remaining the same (alpha prot / alpha floor / high speed prot etc.)

Flypasts at 20ft in the simulator will be worth trying... If I have a chance to do it, I will let you know.

Happy new year
BD

[the shrimp]

The shrimp was on holidays.

Conspiracist theorising will be tolerated to a degree .. but not indefinitely.
John, Norbert Jacquet does not make a theory but he talks about facts, with documents (on his website). For example: the story of false airline pilot licenses or the different trials he won dealing with forgeries on the crashes reports. The documents he used for these trials are huge and we are unable to present all of them here, translated, but results have to be considerated: Norbert Jacquet won the trials.

Edifying facts, just like those which have already been presented here, are numerous but are not translated in English yet. We are working on a complete file in English, but it’s a tough job and we need time for a serious work. We will put these documents on line on a website that we are going to create. Dozen of pages have to be translated, and this only for his own book!

Meanwhile, here’s a few extracts of a long legal expert’s job (7 half days), carried out by two judicial experts (on this topic, Norbert Jacquet was called a funny guy, a crackpot, a paranoiac, and he was accused of many things):
We examined Mr Norbert Jacquet on the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of April 2000 at the prison of Epinal [France] … This examination did not reveal any pathology of his personality.
…
The tests did not reveal any trouble of his mental functioning nor paranoia structure of his personality.
…
Norbert Jacquet’s personality is normal. He integrated an established system of value. He knows the prohibitions and laws. He is fully able to respect them and is not inclined to infringe them.
…
His behaviour concerns a contextual and non pathological aspect.
…
[Recall of what Norbert had to go through] The fact that in such a situation his personality did not change shows us a good psychic balance.
…
Norbert Jacquet’s personality is deprived of pathology.

( http://jacno.com/an13.htm ) Is it enough?

But look carefully at this FCOM paragraph and you will understand that this airplane was already in FLARE mode (DFDR data shows RA less than 30ft at some point) and introduced a pitch down moment exactly when the pilot needed the opposite. Pilot lack of knowledge? Airbus bad design? it is a mix of both who made this airplane crash.
Norbert Jacquet said that just after the crash. In all the newspapers: http://jacno.com/an00.htm (“An abnormal limitation by the computer of the pilot’s action on the flight controls etc.” … “an order of the computers to land” etc.

Happy new year to all of you.

[Zeke]

My point of view on the Habsheim crash is better described by the following FCOM 1.27.20 p3 paragraph:
"FLARE MODE: (...) as the aircraft descend through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2 degres nose down over a period of 8 econds"

Nice wind up.

Selective quoting on your part, by leaving out the important bit in the (...) it paints a different story. Also left the bit out after the last sentence.

The aircraft adds a bias into the control system equivalent to pilot control input that would result nose attitude that is two degrees lower than what the attitude was when passing 50 over a period of 8 seconds.

It does not try and reduce the attitude to 2 degrees nose down over a period of 8.

A pilot can still get a 15 degree nose up in the flare even if passing 50ft the nose attitude was zero simply by pulling back on the control stick.

You have also mislead people by not also stating what happens when TOGA is selected as per FCOM 1.22.30.

Pilot lack of knowledge? Airbus bad design?

I think you will find he was with the test pilots when it was certified, and had done low passes and low level alfa max before in a test aircraft at a more suitable location. Not with a bunch of passengers, fully briefed and prepared, and not over rising terrain with obstacles at the end.

But the latter Flight Controls designs on the A330 and A340 show lots of differences compared to the initial A320 design. On the 330/340 no more FACs or ELACs but 3 PRIMs and 2 SECs

Still much the same, the three primary computers took over from the ELACs and SECs, the secondary computers took over from the FACs. The number of computers was reduced by one, and the circuit breakers moved under the floor.

The design is almost the same between them, some FAC functions went into the PRIMs, MLA was added, LAF removed, additional spoilers and actuators. Control systems gains were kept similar so that handling characteristics similar between the family.

[MrBernoulli]

Phew, this is heavy stuff! Would it be fair to call the A380 a technology defect? It is one ugly son-of-a-bitch.

[HotDog]

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. You chaps from the "Old Country" have produced some crackers like the Bristol freighter or the Shorts Skyvan that they forgot to unpack from the container. You even turned a lovely DC-4 into an ugly Carvair. I thought the first 747 I spotted at Kai Tak on my way to report for duty on a Convair 880, was not a pretty sight. Don't worry, you'll get over it; the A380 looks great and will look even better when they lenghten it eventually like the DC-8.:ok:

[MrBernoulli]

Thanks for the laugh HotDog. :)

But you're right, it is a stumpy looking aircraft. Length would improve its appearance (said the actress to the bishop) but that would bring its own problems ...... to an aircraft that already has plenty.

PS - While this corner of the world is now my adopted home I am, too, originally from south of the equator ...... but a long way from you!:ok:

[HotDog]

I wish you a Happy New Year "Daniel". Come back south again some day and we'll have a beer or two. Qantas should have their A380s by then. (InshAllah):D

[CONF iture]

The aircraft adds a bias into the control system equivalent to pilot control input that would result nose attitude that is two degrees lower than what the attitude was when passing 50 over a period of 8 seconds.
It does not try and reduce the attitude to 2 degrees nose down over a period of 8.

... I'm not so sure about that one ...
But I'm not an expert in English language ... you can guess, but if what you say is true, should not have they wrote:

"As the aircraft descends through 30ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it of 2 deg nose down over a period of 8 seconds"

... but I may be wrong on that one ... so let's say it's a question ?

[Zeke]

... but I may be wrong on that one ... so let's say it's a question ?

You are incorrect.

The missing bit that was not posted boeingdriverx in the (...) where he did not include all the text from the FCOM.

FLARE MODE

The flight mode changes to flare mode when the aircraft passes 50 ft RA as it descends to land.

The system memorises the attitude at 50 ft, and that attitude become the initial reference for pitch attitude control.

As the aircraft descends through 30 ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2º nose down over a period of 8 seconds. This means it takes gentle nose-up action by the pilot to flare the aircraft.

It is 2º nose down from the initial reference (the 50 ft attitude), all it means to a pilot is that a flare “feels” conventional and requires slight backpressure to flare.

Taking one part of that out of context has a different meaning as boeingdriverx demonstrated.

[boeingdriverx]

Zeke,

sorry

you write:"It is 2º nose down FROM the initial reference"

but airbus write: "reducing it to 2º nose down"

This two sentences are NOT logically the same, you are making an assumption. Your intepretation might be good or wrong. I think these sentences are quite ambiguous.

So don't be so sure of yourself when different interpretation are possible.

BD

[Zeke]

you write:"It is 2º nose down FROM the initial reference" but airbus write: "reducing it to 2º nose down"
Incorrect Airbus says "The system memorises the attitude at 50 ft, and that attitude become the initial reference for pitch attitude control. As the aircraft descends through 30 ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2º nose down over a period of 8 seconds."

The INTIAL REFERANCE is not the 0º pitch attitude on the PFD, it is the attitude at 50’.
So don't be so sure of yourself when different interpretation are possible.

Airbus references which agree with the above include the A320 instructor manual, A320 FCTM , and the A319/A320/A321 Flight deck and systems briefing for pilots.

This is exactly the same with your aircraft and manuals at Gulf Air. Feel free to speak to one of your airbus training captains for further clarification.

[CONF iture]

Can you, or for that matter anyone PPRuNeing, defend this flypast as being executed safely, even prior hitting the trees?
Absolutely not, and I don’t think anybody would argue on that.

But how responsible was it not to communicate to the pilots the following OEBs:
1- OEB 19/1: Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitude.
2- OEB 06/2: Baro-setting cross check.
Knowing that would have been a valuable input for MA not to go there !

Now instead of talking, let's practice a little exercise:

Link A (5 videos)
First video is known as the "Official video", the only one retained by the commission
Following 4 videos ... have been ignored by the commission (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EM0hDchVlY)

Link B (1 video)
That video is the same as the official one ... except for the soundtrack ! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bEZFtNBRqw&mode=related&search=)

For the purpose of that exercise:
- crank up the volume
- take a timing between the yellow balloon … and engine spool up

Do the exercise on the official video from Link A
Do the same exercise on the video from Link B

And draw your own conclusion ...

In the doubt, compare with the remaining 4 videos from Link A and find out which video is the only one not to show the same timing for engine spool up.


Additional notes:

- Identify the differences of wording between official video from Link A and video from Link B.

- Note on official video from Link A the words “TRES BON” at time 0030
How can we ear: "TRES BON" ?
Where is it coming from ?
Who would dare saying "VERY GOOD" on the sight of a crashing aircraft ?

So, if the pilot is the only one at fault, and the airplane so clean ...
Why that need to modify the soundtrack !?

[Minorite invisible]

Absolutely not, and I don’t think anybody would argue on that.

But how responsible was it not to communicate to the pilots the following OEBs:
1- OEB 19/1: Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitude.
2- OEB 06/2: Baro-setting cross check.
Knowing that would have been a valuable input for MA not to go there !

Now instead of talking, let's practice a little exercise:

Link A (5 videos)
First video is known as the "Official video", the only one retained by the commission
Following 4 videos ... have been ignored by the commission (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EM0hDchVlY)

Link B (1 video)
That video is the same as the official one ... except for the soundtrack ! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bEZFtNBRqw&mode=related&search=)

For the purpose of that exercise:
- crank up the volume
- take a timing between the yellow balloon … and engine spool up

Do the exercise on the official video from Link A
Do the same exercise on the video from Link B

And draw your own conclusion ...

In the doubt, compare with the remaining 4 videos from Link A and find out which video is the only one not to show the same timing for engine spool up.


Additional notes:

- Identify the differences of wording between official video from Link A and video from Link B.

- Note on official video from Link A the words “TRES BON” at time 0030
How can we ear: "TRES BON" ?
Where is it coming from ?
Who would dare saying "VERY GOOD" on the sight of a crashing aircraft ?

So, if the pilot is the only one at fault, and the airplane so clean ...
Why that need to modify the soundtrack !?

It is clear that the pilots screwed up on that one and held part of the blame for the accident, maybe even most of the blame, but not all of it.

It is also clear that Billions were at stake at Airbus, the company's very survival was at stake, with Billions of government money invested. Were Airbus and the French government going to let an investigation blame the aircraft and possibly sink the whole company?

The soundtrack exercise leave no doubt. If one starts a timer at the moment the A-320 passes the hot air balloon to when the engine spool up is heard, there is a few seconds difference according to which version of the tape you listen to. The soundtrack was surely doctored, and one cannot do that without doctoring the flight data recorder to match the doctored soundtrack.

Does anyone know this story? http://www.historylink.org/essays/output.cfm?file_id=390
http://www.historylink.org/this_week/thisweek2005/thisweek08_04_2005.cfm
http://www.flightsim.com/cgi/kds?$=main/feature/barrel/barrel.htm
http://www.vsocial.com/video/?d=4468

Although Tex Jonhston did this manoeuvre on orders from his superiors, he was reprimanded for doing it, and had he failed and survived, the blame would have been put squarely on his shoulders. The same thing was to happen in the A-320 affair, except that the Captain expected the engine to spool up when he called for it, not seconds later.

[airsupport]

All these things will be discussed at the picnic. ;)

(see AA A300 topic).

[the shrimp]

Legal actions have been taken against Norbert Jacquet, accused of "outraging" the French institutions (no laughing please!). Norbert is threatened with jail. He has to prepare his defense. He also has to be ready to undercover if necessary.

For this reason, translations in progress are going to be delayed.

[Minorite invisible]

Now instead of talking, let's practice a little exercise:
Link A (5 videos)
First video is known as the "Official video", the only one retained by the commission
Following 4 videos ... have been ignored by the commission
Link B (1 video)
That video is the same as the official one ... except for the soundtrack !
For the purpose of that exercise:
- crank up the volume
- take a timing between the yellow balloon … and engine spool up

Has anyone noticed that the second video, the one whose soundtrack does not match the official one, has been removed from Youtube? All the other "official" videos are still on-line.

[Clandestino]

Now you mention it, I did. And your point is?

[Thirty Eight South]

It's been 16 or 17 years since this happened - big deal- find something relevant in this argument.

Here's a challenge - find a second example of this happening - these things fly all over the place -fly buy wire has made major contributions to flight safety, particularly preventing CFIT. If you are using You Tube to justify your argument, then get off the train.

So,forget about this unusual line of argument - how much has FBW contributed to flight safety?

Harping on the same point isn't solving anything. Give me an example of a Boeing event which is conclusively non contributory? - the stats aren't in your favor, but I'd be interested to see what you can come up with.

Give me an up to date example, because your are boring me with this argument-what about Boeing 737 rudders or 747 cargo door commanded opening as few examples...answers on post card

is the cricket back on yet?

[the shrimp]

... the stats ...



Hull losses (last generations):

Boeing 777: none
Boeing 737NG: 1

Airbus 330: 4 (3 ground write-off)
Airbus 340: 3 (2 ground write-off)
Airbus 319/320/321: 17 (6 ground write-off)

[DozyWannabe]

Note how he limits his 737 stats to the NG, yet lumps the A319/320/321 stats together?
Don't bite, people...

[the shrimp]

Hull losses (last generations):



last generation / derrnières générations / letzte Generationen / últimas generaciones / ultime generazioni / Последние поколения


Boeing 737NG = Boeing 737-600/700/800/900

Boeing 737-100/200/300/400/500 = out of production. Finished. Over.

[DozyWannabe]

So?

You don't get a do-over on hull losses by type just because you switched a glass cockpit into an old airframe.

A fairer comparison would be across the first 10 years of the types concerned, while pilots were still getting used to how the aircraft operated. But you're not interested in fair, you're interested in bashing Airbus for reasons I can't quite fathom.

[the shrimp]

A fairer comparison would be across the first 10 years of the types concerned

The whole technology and technics changed since the sixties. The whole environment changed. Air transportation is now much safer than it used to be, for all kind of reasons. The comparison you suggest is not realistic.

you're interested in bashing Airbus for reasons I can't quite fathom.

Just tell the truth.

[the shrimp]

There is a real problem with Airbus in France, isn't there?

http://jacno.com/za-an-am9500.htm

Everyone may judge by himself.

[JuanTerGo]

As an A320 TC would like to make the following observations.

1. Regardless of flare mode, when you pull hard back on an A320 sidestick at 30ft, the nose goes up. Otherwise, manual go-arounds would be, to say the least, interesting.

2. Spool up. High bypass engines spool up slowly. I imagine most jet pilots would expect a delay between selecting TOGA power at low power and obtaining the commanded thrust. That is normal tubofan behaviour.

[the shrimp]

Norbert Jacquet website's translation is going to be delayed.

Norbert is wanted by the authorities. His family, friends, former colleagues and others are interrogated to know where he might be.

Do they want to lock him up in a psychiatric hospital?

( to recall : http://jacno.com/za-an-am9500.htm )