Reversing an engine during Fire Warning operation.

[Hudson]

B737 all models. An engine fire warning before V1 is often used by simulator instructors to initiate a rejected take off. Fine - that's part of the box ticking exercise.

I have some misgivings, however, when the pilot rejects the take off in the normal manner but uses reverse thrust on the engine that is theoretically on fire but delivering thrust all the same.

I seem to recall that there was criticism levelled at the crew of the Air Tours (?) Boeing 737-200 at Manchester which suffered an uncontained fire in the No 1 engine during the take off roll, for reversing the engine which had suffered the turbine failure. I think in that case, a ruptured fuel tank caught fire and the reverse plume made things worse? It's a long time ago so I may be well off beam.

Your opinions are sought on the airmanship considerations of using reverse thrust on the offending engine if a fire warning is the immediate trigger for a reject below V1?

[BOAC]

There are too many unknowns in the scenario, Hudson, and the important thing is TO STOP QUICKLY using all available means. If the warning was false or the fire contained within the cowlings etc etc and the a/c went nastily off the end or an evacuation was delayed by a slower stop, then it would probably have been better to use reverse. Also it is only 'on' for a short while.

I do not have to hand the details of the MAN 737 accident to which you refer, but I could not see how any criticism could be levelled there - how would the crew know exactly what had happened? There was an example where no reverse would have delayed the evacuation. The only 'operating' criticism which I recall was on another aspect of the BA Airtours SOPs which the Captain followed - and were subsequently changed..

[lomapaseo]

I concur with BOAC.

Stop the plane then work out the next move. While I've got the photos of the BT 737 moving down the runway with the reverser deployed, I can not confirm if the deployment occurred before he got the fire bell and just to add some haze to this, I'm not 100% sure he got a fire bell.

(I'm sure others will chime in here)

You see the first thing that happened was the cowl was blown away by the explosion of the engine cases, so that kind of defeats normal detection means.

And the extra heat being released was certainly streaming behind the engine until he did stop.

[PAXboy]

With regards to the unfortunate accident at MAN, if I recall correctly, the problem was exacerbated by the still rolling a/c turning off the runway? The wind then blew the fire plum against the fuselage? If this is incorrect, no criticism of the crew intended. I recall sitting in a traffic jam, hearing the news on the radio. I was just outside LHR at the time.

[forget]

The Manchester 737 was a -200 with JT8D’s. All 737 dash numbers beyond 200 had CFM56s. Originally, the reverser buckets on the -200s had horizontal hinges, the flow from the buckets going vertically, and forward. In service problems were found with the lower bucket lifting runway debris ahead of the engine intake.

Boeing swung the hinge lines 45 degrees with, aircraft viewed from the front, upper buckets, going 45 degrees inward towards the fuselage.

You can see the effect of this on -200s with the soot marks on the cabin walls.

I thought then, and still think, that the 737 cabin fire and fatalities at Manchester were caused by a mod which should never has been approved. Had the buckets been swung the other way then the upper buckets would have exhausted outwards from the aircraft, the lower buckets hitting the tarmac.

The chosen route meant that, inevitably, an engine failure of the type seen at Manchester, admittedly rare, would fry the cabin in seconds.

The enquiry said the ‘wind blew the fire against the fuselage’. I think not. There was a gentle breeze that day which added practically nothing to the flaming exhaust of a knackered JT8.

[Daysleeper]

The other aspect for modern high bypass engines is that reverse is all "cold stream reversal"
Basically the hot core air goes straight back and its cold(ish) by-pass air thats going out/forward.

[m&v]

The general comments/guidance(attributed to Boeing Instructers)is 'If the engines working use it".
Both in the engine fire on liftoff case (to the safe altitude 400-800)before the 'drill',and in the 'reject' case until stopped.:D

And if the 'fire'occurs inside the FAF/OM,canx the bell,don't 'screw with it'until touchdown(reject scenario)or on the 'go-around'(takeoff scenario):ok:

[Hudson]

If I recall correctly, re the Manchester accident, the wind was barely five knots but because the 737 was stopped 90 degrees to the wind and the fuel was pouring from the left wing area at 2000 kgs per minute and igniting, the slightest wind wafted the flames into the left side of the fuselage and breached the fuselage at passenger seat level.

On a dry runway an abort using RTO brakes, spoilers and one thrust reverser, is worth 170 feet less than a brakes only, spoilers, no reverse. This would suggest that if an engine fire was the reason for an abort, then rather than pour more power into the flaming engine by using max reverse, the extra runway savings (170 feet) in terms of length and time is simply not worth the risk of stoking the fire.

Thus it could be argued that it might be a safer option not to use reverse on the engine that is on fire. On a wet balanced field length where brakes are less effective, then one would have to re-consider the options of reversing an engine on fire.

In the simulator exercise the crew hear a bell and see a little red light in the fire handle. That little red light could mean a blazing fuel fed fire in the real thing. But the simulator can breed a false sense of security because the pilot knows the fire is not real.

This can lead to complacency if the real thing occurs in an aircraft. Speculating for a moment - If you knew for a fact (via ATC) that you had an engine on fire and were aborting, would you really want to set take off power into a burning engine (which is what you are doing at max reverse)? And for what gain?

[Daysleeper]

Dangerous assumptions there Hudson. Take Off performance in many aircraft is marginal in the stop case. You should use every avaliable means to stop the aircraft. How do you know that ATC are right, or even have time to not grab one of the 2/3 or 4 thrust reverse levers (and which is the right one) how do you explain the nice low speed overrun, say 40knots into the sea or off the cliff at the end of the runway.
And what about asymetric reverse? Could go off the side of the runway very quickly indeed.
The RTO has to be done right. As we are human its best to have one response for all times we want to stop, means less chance of missing something vital.

[m&v]

Lets keep it simple-Unless you briefed for the conditions for the day,not runway limited etc,one can 'play' around with confirming the fire with the tower .Youre going to do that anyway to precipitate the 'evacuation',in the meantime the only thought is Stop!!
In the Calgary case (duplication of Manchester-turbine blowup and shrapnel into the tank)there was NO cockpit Fire Warning indication!!!!advised by Cabin staff.
You may supply ;fuel' to the fire,but the sooner your stopped the sooner you'll pull the shutoff(drill):D

[Lu Zuckerman]

The wind if any or the use of thrust reversers only exacerbated the problem. The reason for the failure lies in the Safety Hazard analyses and the Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA) on the part of Boeing and P&W.

The FAA allows the builders of aircraft equipment to demonstrate the ultimate safety of a design by analysis or test. P&W relied on the technical analysis of the engine combuster can to include thermal creep and the analysis of the manufacturing processes to include quality control. They determined that the possibility of failure of the combuster can to be well within the design requirements of the FAA (1 10 9).

When this analyses was made available to Boeing they saw no reason to include shrapnel containment on the underside of the wing saving both weight and costs.

When the combuster can exploded shrapnel tore through the underside of the wing and raw fuel flowed down onto the still hot combustor can resulting in the huge ball of fire.


:E :E

[DanAir1-11]

http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_avsafety/documents/page/dft_avsafety_502609.hcsp

Above link is to the official report at Manchester.
Very interesting reading if you have the time.

Was unfortunate enough to be at the field at the time. (There was a breeze that morning, 5 to 6 knots between 260 and 270.)
The most horrifying thing I have ever seen, it is bad enough when you see images of accidents on Television, but to be there and to have an immediate understanding that you are watching people perish and knowing the manner in which they are perishing is possibly the most terrifyingly horrific way to do so.
I must admit to seeing life very differently after that morning.

Regards

[Propellerhead]

A couple of points. I think you're all forgetting that if an engine fire bell sounds on T/O, PNF will call 'Engine Fire' WITHOUT reference to which engine it is. The PF will stop the aircraft by closing the thrust levers, deploying speedbarake and using max reverse thrust. He will not necessarily know which engine it is initially, nor does it matter. PNF doesn't call which engine it is because if the fire occurs beyond V1 then the engine is not identified until 400' when PF calls 'confirm the failure' in order to prevent an incorrect diagnosis.

PF should probably look once the RTO is fully initiated as to which engine it is so that he can turn into wind if necessary (although that's a whole new debate).

Also, forget, you're wrong about the effect of the wind. Go to the AAIB accident report and read it, it's incredible what a huge effect 3 kts of cross wind makes on the survivability of the passengers.

[Captain Stable]

Propellerhead, that call depends upon your company's particular SOP's.

In general, it is now accepted that, when PF is carrying out an abort on the runway, he needs to know as he is doing so which engine is the problem. Lives may depend upon it.

[moleslayer]

In general, it is now accepted that, when PF is carrying out an abort on the runway, he needs to know as he is doing so which engine is the problem.

Not in my company Captain S...........

The SOP's for an RTO state......

Until the aircraft has been brought to a complete halt, the parking brake set, and the cabin crew put at their stations.............

Then, and only then, is the failure confirmed, and actions taken.

It might not, as you say be the generally accepted practice, but that's what it says.

Moley.

[forget]

Propellorhead. Thanks for pointing out that I am ‘wrong about the effect of the wind’. You say ‘it’s incredible what a huge effect 3 kts of cross wind makes on the survivability of the passengers’. Cods!

The fuselage burnt through, and people died, because the reversers were directing a huge ‘blow torch’ on the cabin walls. Had the reversers not been deployed then there is no doubt in my mind that the engine fire would not breached the cabin. I’m not saying that the breach would have taken longer - I’m saying it wouldn’t have happened. Why the accident report laid so much emphasis on an insignificant 3 knot wind, versus the effect of a runaway JT8, left me uncomfortable then - and nothing’s changed.

Any airfield firemen out there care to comment?

[BOAC]

I feel, moleslayer, that you should consider including that request in the briefing - it is, as the good Captain says, very important to know which engine is burning, and in a Cat3 abort the PH dare not take his eyes off the view ahead to look in!

[forget]

Summarising from the Manchester 737 Accident Report;

Both reversers deployed and the right EPR peaked briefly at 1.32 before settling at 1.25 for approximately 5 seconds, after which reverse was de-selected on both engines at a speed of about 70 kt; only the right engine reverser buckets retracted. The reverser buckets on the left engine were able to deploy fully. However, by the time reverse was de-selected the N2 had decayed to the point where falling engine oil pressure inhibited the reverser operating system, locking-out the left engine system with the buckets fully extended…………………

The fire station crash alarm was initiated by ATC immediately the fire was observed from the tower. However, many fire crew personnel heard the bang, saw the fire and started to respond before the alarm had sounded. RIV2 and RIV1 rapidly departed and headed to where the aircraft could be seen entering link Delta, followed immediately by the Protector and J1 foam tenders. RIV2 routed via taxiway 2-North, RIV1 and the major tenders via taxiway 2. Other RFF personnel, on hearing the alarm, departed immediately to recover J2 from the hangar where it was undergoing re-painting.

The fire station ambulance, manned by RFF personnel, immediately departed for the West RVP to await the arrival of Fire Service appliances. The Airport Police also dispatched an escort vehicle to the West RVP. However, the GMC Fire Service had been alerted by the land line and told to report to the North RVP, which was in accordance with recently changed procedures.

RIV2 arrived at the scene approximately 25 seconds after the aircraft had stopped. It was positioned on the left side of the aircraft and foam was applied initially onto the left side of the fuselage and then onto the left engine. RIV1 arrived shortly after RIV2, positioned off the nose slightly on the left side, and discharged the whole of its foam along the left side of the fuselage with the intention of protecting passengers, who by then were evacuating from the L1 chute, and cooling the left side of the fuselage. RIV2, having apparently knocked down the fire around the left engine, re-positioned to the rear on the left side, discharged its remaining foam into the rear fuselage, which by that time had collapsed to the ground, and was then re-positioned clear of the aircraft.

The Protector foam tender arrived at the aircraft approximately 30 to 40 seconds after the RIVs and positioned some distance off the nose, well on the right side. It then started to deliver foam into the area of the right over-wing exit and the right rear fuselage, which appeared to be burning fiercely. Subsequently it was re-positioned twice, each time to bring it closer to the apparent seat of the fire on the right rear fuselage, before its water ran out. J1 arrived immediately behind the Protector, but was unable to position in the normally anticipated position on the nose of the aircraft because of the presence of RIV1. It was therefore positioned some 12 metres forward of the nose, slightly on the right side to the rear of RIV1, and foam was delivered down the length of the fuselage on the right side. This drove the flames rearwards, maintaining the forward and over-wing exits clear of fire. Approximately 1 minute after commencing foaming, J1 was re-positioned onto the left side in order to attack more effectively the fire in the area of the left engine and rear fuselage.


From the report ‘the rear fuselage collapsed to the ground’ less than 25 seconds after the aircraft had stopped, plus the time it took RIV1 to discharge the whole of its foam onto the fire.

From this, the report accepts that a tarmac Avtur fire, assisted by only a light breeze, will cause the back end of a 737 to drop off in (probably) less than a minute.

I believe the lethal influence of the upper reverser bucket was neglected because the FDR showed that No 1 engine was stopped, or wind-milling.

From the report;

‘In order to deflect the fire plume laterally by a distance of several feet, the exhaust efflux velocity would have had to have been significant. In fact, FDR evidence has shown that the engine ceased to deliver thrust from the instant the combustion casing ruptured (as would be expected), (would it!!!!) and therefore there would have been no active exhaust efflux from that engine.

It then says; ‘Even if the engine had been intact, but idling at the same RPM as that recorded on the FDR for the damaged engine…….’ ???

So which was it? Was the engine idling, or was it windmilling. One helluva difference in the circumstances.

At the risk of repeating myself, yet again, the fact remains that the report will have us believe that a tarmac Avtur fire, with only a light breeze, will cause the back end of a 737 to drop off in (probably) less than a minute. I think not.

[moleslayer]

I am not sure from your post BOAC what it is that I should be requesting in my briefing.........

I have just quoted word for word tha aircraft manufacturers and my companies procedure for an RTO.

I can hardly go making up my own............

Moley.

[alf5071h]

A good SOP should be simple and apply to the widest range of scenarios for a given circumstance. Thus for a fire warning during takeoff (before V1) the takeoff should be rejected. Follow the RTO SOP; stop the aircraft a.s.a.p. with all available means. The evaluation as to which engine has a fire, use of shutdown drill, and whether to evacuate should then follow logically. Follow SOPs for shutdown / evacuation after assessing the situation (quickly).

For those who had not read the MAN accident report one of the significant points was that the circumstances were a combination of rare events that although they may happen again the probability of fatalities should be very much lower, providing the salient recommendations are heeded.
The cause of the MAN accident was an uncontained failure of the left engine, initiated by a failure of the No 9 combustor can which had been the subject of a repair. A section of the combustor can, which was ejected forcibly from the engine, struck and fractured an underwing fuel tank access panel. The fire which resulted developed catastrophically, primarily because of adverse orientation of the parked aircraft relative to the wind, even though the wind was light. To address the technical failure it was recommended “that direct fusion weld repair of circumferential cracks in JT8D engines combustor cans should be deleted from all approved Engine Overhaul Manuals.”
A major contributor factor was the vulnerability of the wing tank access panels to impact; this was addressed by requiring that existing external fuel tank access panels are not vulnerable to impact from engine or wheel/tyre failures.

The major cause of the fatalities “was rapid incapacitation due to the inhalation of the dense toxic/irritant smoke atmosphere within the cabin, aggravated by evacuation delays caused by a forward right door malfunction and restricted access to the exits.”
Much work has been undertaken in widening escape routes; most modern aircraft meet new requirements formulated as a result of MAN.

It was recommended “that operators should amend their Operations Manuals, if necessary, to direct crews on any rejected take-off or emergency landing to stop on the runway and review the situation before a decision on clearing the runway is made.”
and
“Consideration should be given to the requirement to fit an evacuation alarm permitting flight deck crew to instruct cabincrew to initiate an evacuation immediately, or if the aircraft is still moving to prime for an evacuation immediately the aircraft is brought to a halt.”

Thus IMHO use reverse to stop. Assess the situation. If you decide to evacuate then act quickly.

Keep things simple, do not clutter the thought process with which engine is on fire until you have stopped, remember that you are not going to get reliable external help at all airports around the world, thus practice assessing the situation as presented (e.g. worst case dark foggy night in a simulator).
Follow SOPs, they (should) have been thought out on the ground to cover most eventualities.
Remain focused on the essential issues – ‘when the fire bell rings everything is back and white’ – you will have a nasty fright, but the resolution of the problem is down to you.

[BOAC]

Moleslayer (and Alf) - I would suggesty that you CAN modify the brief if you feel it enhances safety - in fact that is the Captain's responsibility. To attempt, as PH, to identify a burning engine in minimal vis by looking in would almost certainly result in an excursion, and I need to know BEFORE I stop which way to turn my aircraft, hence PNH should identify the engine. If I am able, I can confirm that, if not, I'll turn as necessary. It is too late when you have stopped straight ahead with a right quarter wind to find out you should have turned to the right!

[Hudson]

I note that Boeing via their FCTM do not offer a recommendation as to the wisdom or otherwise of reversing an engine that is on fire during a rejected take off. One assumes this falls under the captain's authority to use his good judgement. Trouble is that rigid company SOP's tend to inhibit lateral thinking at times...

[alf5071h]

There is a subtle difference between a briefing and a SOP. Clearly a brief can modified if you feel it enhances safety; the danger is if the modification infringes a SOP, and then by misperception of a safety threat it could expose the operation to other hazards.

SOPs are ‘Standard’; their strength is that they are (should be) well thought out before flight, judged against a range of threats, and adequately documented. If anyone believes that SOPs could be enhanced or should modified then discuss this with management. It is just as likely that the SOP author has missed a situation or failed to communicate the original intention as any mistake on your part. Thus the industry should encourage individuals to take ‘ownership’ of company SOPs; it is up to the users to aid the authors – communicate all concerns.

Another danger in modifying a briefing or encouraging lateral thinking in ‘standard’ situations is that whilst there are adaptable people who can cope with these changes or a myriad of alternatives, others cannot. Thus unless the briefer is absolutely confident that the changes have been well though through and completely understood then stick with the simple solution. As pilots we are rarely rated against our peers; we do not have a good understanding of how other pilots perceive risk, understand briefings, or indeed how they think. Pilots who have been ‘rated’ are often those involved an incident or accident.

The mitigation of a safety threat often depends on how it is perceived. If a student pilot has been taught that an engine fire is doom, death, etc, and warrants urgent action, then it may be very difficult to change that perception later in life. Often quoted is ‘Train for the threat’; less often are accurate definitions of the threat.

It is very beneficial to discuss use of reverse following a fire warning and the benefits of turning into wind, but the discussion must put many other aspects into context. Thus with a fire warning and RTO what is the dominant threat, what are the consequential threats? Is the warning real? (In my book all warnings are real, only the engineers can tell you afterwards). Are there flames or is it a hot air leak? Is there a fuel leak? Did the warning cease after shut down, was this a cure or did the system burnt through? (Design requirements require a degree of containment of both engine parts and fire within the cowling).

Where so many imponderables exist, one should stay with the known facts, the basics: - there has been a warning; stop: drills: decision to evacuate. Remember the fatalities at MAN were due to smoke not flames; thus a quick evacuation is a high priority.

We are required to take the safest option, but where we do not have the facts, time or thinking resource to fully evaluate the situation, then don’t guess, don’t prejudge. However, come the day and you do have the facts and time then turn into wind on the runway, but then the facts about the wind and turn direction should be known before you roll.

[Captain Stable]

I have to agree with everything that alf has posted. I would not encourage anyone to go against their company SOP's, and I have never advocated that.

As he says, it is up to the individual to commit himself to ownership of his company's procedures and training. Perceived wisdom changes continually, and it is also incumbent on the individual to keep himself appraised of what developments occur in the industry - this is all part of professionalism.

Particularly in view of the Manchester 737 fire, making a turn on the runway as you come to a halt is now an accepted method of reducing the danger to the aircraft and its occupants and slowing the effects of a fire.

Furthermore, if you are going to order an evacuation, you need to know which side to order it, since you will want to keep passengers away from the blaze as they evacuate upwind.

I don't see much problem in PNF, after calling "STOP, STOP, STOP", as the PF brings the aircraft to a gradual stop (aborting from 100+ kts takes a while) identifying which side the purported fire is on and advising the PF accordingly. Since the turn will have been included in the brief, nothing will come as a surprise to anyone and the requisite PA call can be made without further consultation and clarification and everyone is in the loop.

Not to make such a turn is, IMHO, failing to learn from the past.

As for the subject of using reverse, well, that's a call only the man on the spot can make. Aircraft performance manuals state, of course, that the aircraft brakes alone will bring the aircraft to a stop within the distance available, and the editor's decision on that is final :hmm: so reverse should not be necessary. If I had heard a loud bang out one side followed by other nasty noises from the general direction of the engine, followed by the flight deck lighting up like a Christmas Tree and further bells and whistles, I would be reluctant to use reverse much, if at all. But as I say, it's a call only the man on the spot can make.

[BlueEagle]

Hudson - The Boeing manuals can be particularly vague in certain areas! This is not the way the Boeing pilots and engineers would have it but the way of the Product Liability lawyers. In 1983 the product liability premium for Boeing was USD$50,000,000 and for UTC, (which includes Pratt & Whitney), $250,000,000 so you can imagine how much it would be to-day!

I think that if I heard a big bang I might consider not using reverse on the engine with the fire but if it was just a fire warning then I think I would use it to speed up coming to a halt.

[GlueBall]

Blue Eagle says: "...I think that if I heard a big bang I might consider not using reverse on the engine with the fire..."

The application of measured reverse thrust and the amount of brake pressure applied during an abort are foremost based on instinctive reactions rather than upon thought processed responses. For example, if the airplane is aborted at V1 at maximum takeoff weight on a wet, short runway there is no time to think. Speed, brake action, momentum and rate of closure with the end of the pavement would override any concerns about engine fire or about "hearing a big bang." :ooh:

[alf5071h]

A ‘thinking’ Blue Eagle would not necessarily know where the ‘bang’ during takeoff originated. Therefore it would be unwise to prejudge an engine failure – on one side or the other, not knowing which, and then not use reverse or only asymmetric reverse; to realize afterwards that the ‘bang’ was a tyre failure where all available stopping effort may be required.

This is the core point of my previous post – don’t prejudge the situation; if you have decided to reject a take off follow that procedure without modification. There have been many accidents where the crew’s perception has failed them; good example comes from the DC 10 overrun, (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/1995/a95h0015/a95h0015.asp#2[/url)although the reject was erroneously after V1.

Here are some relevant extracts from the accident report: All the members of the flight crew reported that the sound was unlike anything they had heard before. Not only was the bang very loud, but it was difficult to specify its point of origin. None of the crew saw the engine fail light illuminate, nor did they notice the drop in N1. The only cue the captain received to indicate that the take-off was no longer normal was the loud bang, followed by a series of thuds and vibrations. Because the situation did not match any of the captain's previous training or actual flying experience, he was required to respond instantly to the situation by drawing on whatever knowledge or other experience he had. The captain's decision to reject the take-off was based on his perception of the circumstances.

the loud bang was neither similar to any compressor stall symptom that he knew about, nor similar to sounds that he had heard in training or experienced during actual flying.

his action was probably also influenced by the fatal DC8 occurrence that he had witnessed and which resulted in his mental rule of thumb that if structural failure were suspected, he would not take the aircraft into the air.
In support of GlueBall’s post, I heard the Captains description of the above event first hand; similarly after interviewing other pilots who have experienced severe in flight events; it is my conclusion that that the level stress in this type of incident narrows the though process to such a degree that most rational thought is not possible, only the deep-seated / inbred responses such as an RTO procedure remain. This can be mitigated in part through training (hence wise use of the simulator) and with experience, but these are the sort of experiences that we would not wish to have.

[BlueEagle]

Gentlemen, please note, I said think and deliberately put it in italics! I haven't been there so can only guess at my reaction but perhaps I should have said "........accompanied by some very
obvious engine indications".
And yes, I agree, instinctive reaction will be to select all four and then de-select the 'broken' one and it's opposite number.

[Propellerhead]

You're entitiled to your opinion forget, but the AAIB spent months even years investigating the facts of the accident and are not afraid to come up with controversial findings (such as there ongoing battle to fit smokehoods in all cabins). Who are you to sit there and dismiss their findings and pass judgement based on only a rudimentary knowledge of the facts?

I think there have been some other very good posts on this topic and I think RTOs are one of the most emotive topics becaus it is the one instance in an airline pilots job where an instant decision is required in about 1 sec (a 2 sec delay causes a 400ft over-run!), often under great stress and fear (see alf's post). There is no time for discussion, thought, reflection, review. Its go / no go. That's why the SOPs are written and why V1 is so important.

As someone said, if you here a loud bang from one side it could be all the tyres exploding, in which case the brakes are not going to stop you before you go off the end of the runway. All engines in reverse will be a big help in this case.

The Boeing FCTM states :
"Simultaneously close the thrust levers and apply max brakes....Rapidly raise the speedbrakes and apply max reverse thrust consistent with the conditions". Maintain reverse thrust and braking until runway length remaining permits transition to normal landing roll procedure".

Where it says 'consistent with the conditions' I take this to mean runway and crosswind conditions (ie on a slippery runway and strong crosswind directional control may not be able to be maintained with full reverse).

[alf5071h]

Quote from The FAA Take Off Training Guide (endorsed by Boeing): “Basically, full brakes must be applied, the thrust must come to idle, the speedbrakes/spoilers must be raised and maximum reverse thrust consistent with airplane controllability must be applied until the crew is assured that the airplane will stop within the remaining runway.” (Appx 3c - viewfoils)

Extracts and the viewfoils from the Training Guide are here: Take Off Training Guide. (http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/alf501h.htm)

[arff]

Hello;

I am a Fire Officer working in Canada. Your post is very interesting. It is critical for the pilot, when able, to stop and position his (her) aicraft into the wind when the aircraft might be threatened by an outside fire. It is one of the most important factor that could ensure the occupants survivability. By doing so the flames and smoke will pushed towards the back of the aircraft freeing exits (at least front and over wing ones) and keeping flames away from the skin of the aircraft. It allows the foam stream from the ARFF vehicles to carry the product further and to be more effective. Also it makes our job easier because it allows us not to push the fire towards the fuselage (foam stream displaces huge volumes of air - 10000 cubic feet / min) and the stream will be applied lengthwise in relation to the aircraft.

Some airports would like you to vacate the runway asap to keep business running but often it is not in your best interest. I strongly suggest that you take the time to meet your friendly airport fire fighters from time to time and discuss these issues further.

Good Day.