The 80 knot call - potential for confusion?

[Hudson]

In the B737 simulator the instructor can feed an airspeed error into the captain's or first officer's ASI. 25 knots is a fair and reasonable figure.

During take off the PNF calls 80 knots on his own ASI. By the time he actually annunciates the words his ASI is probably around 87 knots depending on speed of acceleration - especially if he had called a fraction late. I have never seen a call made when the ASI is less than 80 knots.

The PF who is steering the aircraft down the centre line glances at his own ASI to check the reading and sees a reading of 70 knots and accelerating. It might even be 98 knots and accelerating.

What to do? Abort or go? It is not a serious problem in itself as there is not only a standby ASI for comparison, but also various ground speed read-outs. It could be argued that as Boeing recommend that one should not abort for a Master Caution above 80 knots, then as the ASI problem is not serious (it just needs time to sort out the problem), the pilot should not abort because of an ASI discrepancy during the take off run above 80 knots.

We often see momentary confusion in the simulator when an ASI difference is picked up as the aircraft is accelerating quickly past 80 knots. Sometimes an abort is initiated and sometimes the PF will rotate on the "Rotate" call regardless of what his own ASI is reading. Quick thinking is needed.

Seems to me that by continuing the take off roll, there is more time available for the PNF to read the three ASI's and compare groundspeeds as well, and have a pretty good idea which one is wrong by the time the VR speed is reached. Much safer than a hasty abort that is not warranted? Any thoughts?

It is difficult to assess which ASI reading is faulty in the time available and often the best solution is to keep the aircraft on the ground longer than normal - but to always continue the take off roll rather than abort.

[BlueEagle]

If an 80kts airspeed call shows an out of limits difference between the PF and PNF ASI then it is a Command call to abort, gently, no rush, no need for reverse thrust above idle, or RTO brakes, yes?

What the standby ASI is reading is often not relevant in todays modern aircraft as it is possible to dispatch, according to the MEL, without it, it is no longer considered vital in, for instance, the B747-400 due to the amount of Independence and backup that goes in to the two main systems.

This is my humble opinion!:ok:

So I would suggest that building anything more than an instrument failure into this situation in the SIM is departing reality.

If you really want to roll a grenade into the 'box', when all the checking is over, then a generator failure at about V1 minus 10kts should do! This may result in a high speed abort, a wheel well fire and a pax evacuation, thus bringing the session to a successful close!

[ftrplt]

there is no reason the PNF cant check both ASI's and the STBY to make sure they are both reading the same value prior to the 80kt call

[wobblyprop]

Although not a line pilot whilst doing the MCC course we used the 80kts call as a "are you still alive" call not an error check.

This may have just been simplified for the course though.

[Hand Solo]

Our SOP is that PNF checks both ASIs when making the 80kt call. Seems to work quite well and its fairly simple to spot even small speed discrepancies of the order of 2-3kts.

[LEM]

It's a Captain's decision, if you know what to do, both an abort or a Go are valid decisions. No absolute thruth. Whatever you decide, do it convincingly.

Personally I would continue, using the STBY one.

But actually, I would have preferred if the Birgenair' donkey had aborted in S. Domingo, instead of killing everybody in his 757:mad: :yuk: :(

[Captain Stable]

It's quite simple - you do what you briefed to do.

If your brief states "Up to nn kts we will stop for any malfunction - above nn kts up to V1 we will stop only for engine failure, fire, smoke indication, blocked runway <flood, famine> ...." then you stop. Woe betide the captain who goes against briefing without a good reason.

IMHO an ASI disagreement is a very good reason to stop, since you are well below V1.

I can't think of a good reason to continue the takeoff.

[Dan Winterland]

The 80 knots call is also a prompt to check the autothrust is in the correct mode. On the 747, if THR HLD is not annunciated, this should prompt a disconnect of the autothrust. (Both 744 and classic with FFRAT). Also, it's areminder to set the trust manually to GA power should take off power not be set by then.

[QAVION]

"there is no reason the PNF cant check both ASI's and the STBY to make sure they are both reading the same value prior to the 80kt call"

This might be a problem on the newer glass cockpit aircraft with LCD displays, where the angle of view may not provide the PNF a clear view of all the instruments.

I'm also thinking that the "window" to check all three indicators may be limited if the displays don't start moving until 35 or in some cases 45 kts. As an example, the captain of a 747-400, in a recent incident, didn't notice his airspeed indicator was completely U/S until the F/O called 80kts (An engineer had not hooked up the pitot/static plumbing to the Left Air Data Computer). The takeoff was safely aborted before the aircraft reached much higher speeds.

The very latest 747-400's use a single tiny standby instrument which the average person might find difficult to read, let alone fly an aircraft with.

I'm sure aborting on the ground at low speeds would be far safer than only having one pilot who can see only some of the instruments.... and having a half-serviceable aircraft where any number of systems may be degraded as a result of the faulty airspeed data (Engines, FMC, Stall warning, Flap Load Relief, Aileron Lockout, Autopilot, etc).

Where there's smoke, there may be fire. Who's to say that the F/O's ADC plumbing might suddenly come adrift also?

Hope this helps.

Regards.
Q.

P.S. Don't forget the accident where the pilot-statics had been taped over on a 757(?) and the pilots didn't have a clue how fast or how high they were flying, resulting in the deaths of all those on board.

[Blacksheep]

Historically, the 80 Knot call was a check that the Pitot Static system was functional - i.e. the probes weren't blocked. Since then it seems to have developed into a cross check for an IAS discrepancy and perhaps other things, but it doesn't do any harm to consider the original intention for some of the SOPs that are in daily use.

I would hope that most pilots would wish not to go aviating if the Pitot Static system is not functional. I can think of two occasions in recent history when B757s became airborne with blocked pitot probes and one of them didn't make it back to the airport...

**************************
Through difficulties to the cinema

[maxalt]

AFAIK the 80kts (or 100kts - depending on type) call serves three purposes:

1. ASI serviceability check.
2. Incapacitation check.
3. End of 'Low Speed Regime'.

In the High Speed Regime (up to V1) an abort should only be carried out for:

1. Engine Fail/Fire (a non-supressed Master Warn)
2. Any event/failure which might make the aircraft unsafe/unable to fly.

Number 2 is a general getout clause...and I think the ASI failure in the High Speed Regime would come under that heading.

[LEM]

If modern pilots had the ATTITUDE/POWER basic skill like back in the time, a blocked pitot would not be such a big deal, and certainly not a reason to die.

Very sad, but the Birgenair 757 cockpit was manned by three ******* :mad:

[ftrplt]

Do the all glass cockpit jets have an EICAS warning for IAS discrepancy?

[classic crew]

On the 747-400 there is an EICAS message "IAS DISAGREE". It comes up as a CAUTION along with a aural beeper.

This comes on when the Captains and F/O's airspeed indicators differ by five knots or more. It is inhibited until the disagreement lasts for more than five seconds.

[visualappr]

I agree with LEM. Even in the air when there is a difference between ASI's, B737 first recall items : disconnect automatics.
So fly manually thrust and attitude.
I am not saying that it would not be a reason to abort TO. All depends on the current speed I guess (pilot's reaction time).
However, a lot of people apparently elect to abort. A few months ago during our yearly Flight Safety course, we were shown a video made by the Boeing cy in which it was said that for the moment the highest number of incidents/accidents happen as a result of an aborted Take-off. We were taught to be GO minded after 80 kts and especially nearing V1 .

Good subject, hope to get some more feedback.
All the best.:ok:

[wellthis]

As mentioned above by many, the 80 kts call is also for incaptication. Let's elaborate on that a little bit, shall we? Skipper's leg, at 80 kts he blacks out, in which case, a second call from the FO, a look over to the left, then he takes control....what would you suggest the airspeed is then? At least 110/120 kts? What should he do then? A perfectly good airplane...go flying...only to try and come back alone? Most would suggest stay on the ground.

The same goes for the airspeed. I believe the objective is that PM (pilot monitoring-no longer PNF which implies doing nothing!) should compare speeds, or the annunciators if in glass flight deck, then make the call so that it is finished as the airplane passes 80 kts.(there is no reason for this call to happen much later) Still well below V1, and thus stopping safely should be no problem. Let's not forget the airplane normally touches down much faster at about the same area it reaches 80 kts on TO and still stops quite normally. Also, launching into the air with unreliable airspeed could mean a faulty ADC which will cripple a whole lot of other instruments. Electing to abort would seem more logical.

They say it's much better to be on the ground wishing to be in the sky as opposed to the other way around!
As for training in general, I believe the objective is to enhance every one's ability and confidence by making handling emergencies second nature. Creativity should not be a gross departure from reality.

[LEM]

A little bit off topic: I have always laughed at those "incapacitation checks".

They don't make sense to me.

First of all, an heart attack can happen at any time , and the other pilot must guarantee the proper trajectory of the airplane, incapacitation check or not.

Second, when my copilots brief for the 80 kts incapacitation check, I often reply "Ok, let's hope you are a PILOT and know what to do if my heart attack comes at 81 knots".

:D ;) :E

In other words, an 80 knots or a 500ft incapacitation check don't guarantee anything: you've been alive till a second before, you answer "checked", then comes the heart attack...

It really seems to me the equivalent of the sheep sacrifice of the ancients to the Gods :)

Isn't that ridiculous?

[Hudson]

Lem and Visualappr. As you point out it becomes a question of basic instrument skills. I have had the opportunity to see an ASI fault inserted in a 737-300 simulator on several occasions with different crews. This is preceded by a full discussion on the pros and cons of an abort or continue - so its not just another bit of chicanery by an enthusiastic simulator instructor.

Despite the ideal situation of PNF spotting an ASI reading difference at the 80 knot call and advising the captain who then purses his lips and decides stopping or going it hasn't worked out that simple.

If the flight crew are not on the look-out for the fault (despite having been given the good gen at the briefing) there is several seconds of uncertainty and all the time the aircraft is accelerating fast.

To compound the problem I have also seen the PF commence rotation not on the bugs on his own ASI, but on the actual call "Rotate" by the PNF when in fact it was the PNF ASI that had the erroneous reading at the 80 knot call. The call "Rotate" when given in a firm manner is almost an instruction - not as it is meant to be, an airspeed reading like V1. "Rotate" used to be called "VR" in some airlines and still is in some.

High energy aborts are sometimes the cause of an accident and historically it is usually safer to continue a take off unless the aircraft will not fly for some reason. An ASI problem actioned well after the 80 knot call due to momentary confusion at which ASI is faulty has all the potential for a cock-up if an abort is decided. This is the advantage of simulator training - you can see the indecision that occurs when a mysterious erroneous ASI reading is discovered on the take off run. This is where good airmanship comes into play.

[LEM]

Perfectly agree, and much better to be airborne wishing you had three ASI instead of only (!) two, than being on the grass wishing you had continued.

[safetypee]

From personal experience (I didn’t stop); this topic, and my incident, raises some very interesting operational and human issues. The circumstances of my incident included corporate attitude, peer pressure, macho, and desire to help. However the primary issue was that the company procedure was ill-defined. After a full and frank debrief and self initiated investigation, the following was concluded:
The purpose of procedure - NFP calls 80kts - was twofold:
a) To crosscheck the ASI for errors. (N.B. PF assumed to check his ASI, but not written in the procedure).
b) To define the point beyond which an RTO is not required for a single system failure.

The investigation found that the crosscheck was a hang over from a previous operation with an older ASI sysyem and CAA inspector suggestion – it seemed to be a good thing to have. Whereas a risk assessment of the ASI / pitot static system (should be available from most manufacturers) suggested that there was a low probability of failure. (This was a modern aircraft, but with conventional instrument system).
During take off the PF would be able to check his ASI; although slightly later than 80 kts, thus at a higher speed, but training and experience enabled an accuracy check of +- 2 kts, enough for any gross error. However there was no procedure guidance as to what to do in the event of an error. The assumption was that it was a single system failure, and above 80 kts no RTO was required.
The technical debate re continuing the take off considered the issue of flight with an ASI error. Excluding the obvious gross error or total failure, the only way to determine the serviceable ASI was by comparison with the third / standby system – but there wasn’t one! The certification standard of the aircraft did not require it; later variants of the aircraft are fitted with ADCs / EFIS and have a standby ASI/Altimeter.
The certification basis of the aircraft protects the aircraft from an early rotation, limited elevator effectiveness (Vmu), and there was some protection for over-speed by the aircraft self-rotating; I also expect the end of the runway appearing would assist. For climb-out and subsequent flight the certification requires the aircraft to be in trim at V2+10; thus the PF, without over-reacting, could achieve a safe altitude to asses the situation. However nothing was found in the regulations as to how the crew would establish which ASI was correct; no doubt many assumptions based on airmanship and experience – noise, feel, trim, and power. An excellent simulator exercise for CRM and problem solving (MEL flight without the stand by ASI – the MEL assumes that the risk of ASI disagreement is low, but not impossible).
I could not find any certification requirements for an incapacitation check; this seems to be yet another of those items that could be introduced (operator or CAA inspector) because they seem to be a good thing to do i.e. without rationale. I suspect that the probability of PF being incapacitated is far less that a multiple systems failure that could have far more serious consequences.

The current SOP on an EFIS aircraft requires an 80kt call; this is a check that power is set and that thereafter an RTO is not required for a single system failure. ASIs are checked for gross error / failure. In the event of an ADC error the EFIS comparator gives a low-level ADC alert; if time permits the third ASI/Altimeter system is checked. The aircraft is flown to a safe altitude and the situation re-evaluated using the third ASI to resolve any ambiguity. The certification of a low-level alert suggests that the CAA condone continuing the takeoff; this may be due to the alert being an ADC comparator, the error could be in the ASI, VSI, or altimeter. Thus at 80 kts the Captain can still decide to abort, his call: if so this may be the safest option overall. Aircraft certification does not take into account, poor weather, inexperienced crew, complex ATC scenarios, high terrain, and all of those airframe systems that use ADC input (which we all know well, at least on examination day).
Epilogue:
Company procedures rethought, judged against the quantifiable risks for the aircraft type / operation, and now rewritten. Captains are in command; have a no blame / fair safety culture. Personal self-assessment / de-brief complete, studying for CRM instructor ticket. Beware of introducing procedures without a risk assessment and any well thought out rationale. Always ask the inspector ‘why’, and get a full justification for any request to introduce additional procedures (requirements etc); there are enough vital activities to do with more clutter.

[wellthis]

Airplanes are certified at all weights to abort at the published V1 and come to a safe stop in the condition given for that certification, not just dry VRF days and experienced crews. Plus any crew that is rated on a type should be qualified to operate it. Not to mention that the reject made with all operating engines would provide reverse and more stopping force as you know.(as in the case of our discussion)

Now if a pack trip-off light comes on at 100 kts, sure probably better to continue; but should we detect a malfunction which could potentially be deeper than we think(ADC) at low speed, why not stop and have a look. From personal experience of losing ADC on arrival on a VFR DAY, so many systems are lost that would make it safer to abort on TO. We all have done low speed rejects in the sim, often times you have to add power again to make it to the TWY!!

[Blacksheep]

Most of the above scenarios assume that an Air Data failure would be detected at 80 knots [i.e. low speed] or that an aircraft can safely be controlled in flight without airspeed data. Remember that altitude data may also be missing or corrupted. The last time I was involved in an incident involving a Pitot Static failure the PF identified the defect when he noted that the aircraft was well down the runway and going 'fast' yet he hadn't had an 80 knot call from the PNF. The pilot elected to continue the take-off, and in fact a rejected take off would have been much faster than 80 knots. [From examining the raw inertial groundspeed data later, about V1 in fact]. He made it back on the ground where the pitot head covers were found not to have been removed. On the aircraft type in question the static ports are seperate from the pitot probe but on other common rating types in the fleet the static sensors are on the probe and altitude data would also have been absent.

Don't discount the importance of a compromised Pitot Static system. The Air Data Computers supply data to so many other systems in current aircraft types that the total effect can be extremely confusing.

**************************
Through difficulties to the cinema

PS. On another occasion I observed an aircraft taxi past and turn onto the runway with a pitot cover in place. When I phoned the tower I was scolded for wasting their time as the aircraft was "only positioning to the stand" That won't put me off doing the same thing again though!

[Skyking]

Hudson , RE :" I have never seen a call made when the ASI is less than 80 knots " ......


Hi , just in reference to your statement , in our organisation we do incorporate an " Airspeed Alive " call which is shown as 50 kts on our ASI in the beechjet 400 that we fly in addition to the 80kts call. If as stated in your hypothetical situation that either one of our ASI's are reading incorrectly , it would be possible to pick up the 20 kts difference in reading. On the other hand , it may be a little more difficult to pick if the discrepency is smaller in magnitude.Just a thought.

Cheers
SK

[quid]

In my fleet, we operate at a very large range of V speeds. The lowest I've had lately was 104 and the highest 144. That's a range of V1 speeds of 40 kts. It's too simplistic to try to make a "one size fits all" rule about what's considered "high speed" and what isn't.

We do use an 80 kt. crosscheck and call, (and I've picked up a few other ideas here), and it seems to work for us.

On a test flight a couple of months ago I was in the right seat. I called "80 knots" on mine, and glanced over at the Capt's and it was showing zero. He was a little slow in aborting (I know he didn't want to) so we applied the brakes around 100 knots. At the very light (empty) weight, we weren't even 3000 feet into the takeoff roll, so getting it stopped was very easy.

As was noted by others on this thread, inoperative airspeed readings may lead to other problems in the air. I'd rather keep it on the ground. An abort at 80-100 knots is no problem.

[Hudson]

Quid. "An abort at 80-100 knots is no problem".

I agree. The problem arises if afterwards you are on the carpet with a please explain in front of a government flight operations inspector - or a commercial manager who wants your guts for garters for frightening the passengers with an abort - because you used your good judgement at the time - whereas Mr Boeing states that above 80 knots is considered a high energy abort and that it is not recommended unless for fire, engine failure, take off warning or you think it won't fly. I have witnessed court cases where the lawyers use the manufacturer's manual to hang someone out to dry - regardless of the decision of the pilot to vary from recommended procedure.

I prefer to work on the theory that if you have thrust (good acceleration), your take off performance sums and flap setting are right, and a serviceable artificial horizon or more, then with correct knowledge of attitudes for various speeds, it is safer (in general) to sort out the problem in the air.

The reason that I first started this subject was because I have seen several "incidents" in the simulator where crew confusion has reigned momentarily (5-15 seconds) when the 80 knot call has revealed a serious ASI error - or misread. I believe that the subject should be amplified in simulator briefings and the solutions thrown open for free discussion.

And by the way, reading back through my old 1976 B737 Boeing manual (nice to read original thinking rather than the carefully worded, dumbed down prose of modern manuals), the 80 knot call was purely an airspeed check. It was not an incapacitation check per se. That was added in as an after thought by some companies.

[maxalt]

If modern pilots had the ATTITUDE/POWER basic skill like back in the time, a blocked pitot would not be such a big deal, and certainly not a reason to die.

LEM you made two posts in this vein. I think you are being a bit harsh on modern pilots.

By modern pilots (like the guys in the Birgenair 757) I guess you are referring to pilots who spend most of their time flying Glass Cockpits with sophisticated Flight Directors and Autopilots?

Do you know that (as per manufacturers recomendation) the SOPs at many airlines require crews to use the FD all the time, and Autopilots most of the time? Who can blame them for losing the basics of Pitch and Power flying? It isn't being taught and it is not being required of them!

However, not just 'modern' pilots have crashed aircraft through basic instrument failure. I remember this Northwest Orient (http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi_bin/view_details.cgi?date=12011974&reg=N274US&airline=Northwest+Orient) accident in 1974...on a 727. Icing caused erroneous airspeed increase on climb which the crew misinterpreted as being real...resulting in a fatal stall. You can hardly say those guys were misled by modern cockpit philosophies?

I experienced pitot icing during descent in cloud some years back and it was an ass puckering moment, and no matter how good you think you are I defy any pilot not to be momentarily shocked and disoriented when he sees his airspeed rocketing upward and overspeed warnings ringing in his ears. It takes a massive effort of logic over instinct to resist doing something very stupid and deadly.

[DanAir1-11]

IMHO, despite the fact that you are indeed accelerating rapidly, you would still be comfortably below V1 and as such a STOP command would be prudent, given that the abort would be fairly a relatively tame affair. I would personally err on the side of caution.

[Menen]

Just out of simulator and observed reaction when 30 knot airspeed error intoduced into captains airspeed at press of TOGA on take off. RH seat handling. Left seat calls 80 knots - RH seat said "What! mine is just passed 60" am aborting" LH seat says "Negative - no abort above 80 unless fire, failure - continue". In view of ealier contributions to this subject it was most illuminating - the hestitation and confusion that is.

[maxalt]

The fellow who wanted to press on didn't remember the full story.

1. Engine Fail/Fire (a non-supressed Master Warn)
2. Any event/failure which might make the aircraft unsafe/unable to fly.

...including airspeed malfunction IMHO...as I said earlier.

[LEM]

maxalt,

"LEM you made two posts in this vein. I think you are being a bit harsh on modern pilots.

By modern pilots (like the guys in the Birgenair 757) I guess you are referring to pilots who spend most of their time flying Glass Cockpits with sophisticated Flight Directors and Autopilots?

Do you know that (as per manufacturers recomendation) the SOPs at many airlines require crews to use the FD all the time, and Autopilots most of the time? Who can blame them for losing the basics of Pitch and Power flying? It isn't being taught and it is not being required of them!"





I don't give a damn **** about SOP's when they tell me not to be a PILOT!
Can you imagine a bus driver who knows how to push buttons but not to drive anymore?

I'm used to this subject: I'm always been the one who pushes for hand flying (no FD, no FMS, nothing) - although able to push buttons very well.

To me it's a kind of religion, and has turned into a sort of mission: my copilots know that their (almost) only opportunity to hand fly is to fly with me, and they know they don't even need to ask to disconnect everything.

I have noticed how bad their skills have become, now that all is required from them is filling papers and pushing CDU buttons.

Retaining good basic handling skills is a MUST, not only to be a real pilot, but above all to be a safe pilot.
Not only you can better monitor the automatisms, but for sure time will come when you will have to rely solely on your handling skills.
I'm deeply convinced official training is insufficient (today as in the past), and one has to train himself when the conditions are easy: raw data circling approach at the minima, not at the turistic altitude of 1500ft, NDB approach instead of ILS... and so on, all done in CAVOK, simulating bad weather, that's valuable training, instead of pushing a stupid button which even my dog would be able to push.

With that background, when you'll have to make a circling at night, low ceiling, under the rain etc... that will be a piece of cake.
When I was a copilot I've seen incredible things from the laft seat!

If only the passengers knew!!

I'm not gonna waist time enumerating all of them, but it's a shame!

So, going back to your post, those (Asian?) companies mandating the use of autopilot are just one of the aberrations of our time, where the man is dying everyday a bit more and turning into a little alienated robot.

CRM has become the only magic word, and you end up with three incapable ****** , although very experienced, killing everybody for a faulty ASI, instead of being able to say FU** the good manners, level off and give it a handful!

I'm gonna stop here.
Sort of disgusted?
You bet! :yuk:
Who can blame them for losing the basics of Pitch and Power flying?
I do.

[maxalt]

Sorry LEM, I couldn't read that post...too much effing and blinding.

Get a grip.

[Smokie]

LEM,
I couldn't give a tinkers cuss about the language but basically you have hit the nail on the head.
Far to many guys and gals relying on Auto Pilot, FMS etc.

When the chips are down and all you've got is a "basic" but very Heavy Areoplane, then God forgive them that can't fly the afore mentioned Aeronautical Ironmongery to a safe and happy conclusion.








And High above the Albatross, hangs motionless upon the air..............

[Idunno]

Both LEM and Smokie seem to miss the point.

Airlines have SOPs that dictate automation.

Anyhow, if you 'fly' Airbus, disconnecting the automatics does not mean you are 'handling' the machine in the way you did with a geriatric jet. The computers are always there between you and the flight surfaces. There is no real flying of such aircraft, you point them and they go! There is no 'feel' to the flight controls. No feedback. No trim.
What exactly does this trick prove?

The only way to truly 'fly' an Airbus 'manually' is to switch off the FACs and go Direct Law.
Not a good idea on a revenue flight.
This is why they invented simulators.

In addition, disconnecting everything might be fun if you fly around the desert in CAVOK without another bird in the sky. Its just not a wise move when operating in a high workload two crew environment in congested airspace, so most never get the opportunity anyhow.

[LEM]

Idunno, I have expressed my opinions on the alienating nature of the FBW Airbusses on several occasions (see the "Airbus shock" thread for some fun...:D ).

Your point regarding congested airspaces is a good one, of course, but fortunately many of us stll fly both to congested airspaces and places with little traffic.

May I decide by myself if it is safe to hand flying, or do I need a writted rule for everything?

My blood pressure is still high when I think about pilots unable to fly the aircraft in a goaround, killing hundreds of passengers because they are completely lost without automation - or because the automation is screwing up.

SOP's didn't save those passengers.

And that's only one example.

[SR71]

Great thread!

:ok:

[b777pilot]

i don't give a damn **** to SOPs'??? good show old chap! that's telling them how you have conducted your flight-deck!!

ah yes, if only the passengers knew. indeed.

[Captain Stable]

SOPs can never cover all eventualities. Sooner or later you will have to operate outside them. Logic dictates that you should get all input you can before making your decision, and you should then (if at all possible) brief the people concerned - FO, CC, ATC - whoever.

I would be disappointed in a company whose SOPs stated that the aircraft should be flown FD/AP on/engaged at all times. I would also be disappointed if they didn't stress that pilots should keep all their skills brushed up at all times - not just when the next Base Check is looming. Someone who doesn't know how to operate all the automatics in a skillful and professional manner is being as cavalier as the person who can't fly without them.

In the example given above, of the automatics taking you into harm's way, the fool who blindly allows the automatics to continue to do so will die a fool. Clearly that is not a case within the intentions of this thread.

Another point needs making - which is that, particularly at altitude, a human being, no matter how proficient simply cannot fly a modern high-performance aircraft as smoothly, as economically or as proficiently as the automatics can. Anyone who thinks he can is deluding himself.

There are right times and places to practise your skills and there are wrong places to do so. It is important not to get them confused. It is also incumbent upon us to keep all our skills up to date.

[LEM]

Well said, Captain Stable.

I don't know for sure, but if there are really companies mandating the use of autopilot at all times , that's very sad.

What I've seen personally, instead, is that airlines encourage in their SOPs their crews to fly raw data at least once every ten sectors.

That's also sad, to see pilots have become so lazy, they need to be pushed to keep up their basic skills.

And it's a bit pathetic to see these pilots disengaging the autopilot only the day before their sim checkride. :\

[Hobo]

Blacksheep,

I think the history of the 80kts call dates back to a tailwheeled Boeing bomber (B17?). It was the speed that the pilot pushed the control column forward to get the tailwheel off the ground. This tradition (as well as using the same style of control column) continued with every Boeing aircraft thereafter.

It certainly is a Boeing thing, on a British civil jet with more than two engines but less than 4 we called 100kts.

[7p3i7lot]

Hobo,
Great post. The Boeing theory sounds very plausible to me. If anyone has a refutation I am all ears.
;)

[Blacksheep]

Interesting point Hobo and probably right on, but our good old British Lancasters got their tails up a bit quicker than that.

When I cut my teeth as an Instrument Technician Smiths had recently introduced an ASI designed for 'heavy jets' - the Mark VI as I recall - on which the lowest reading was 60 knots and and the pointer didn't move at all until that speed was reached. In this case 80 knots, being at the three o'clock position, was a good speed to confirm that it was working. We did have a Vulcan get airborne with the Pitot-Statics inoperative and he got down safely but it isn't something you'd want to do on purpose.

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Through difficulties to the cinema

[Hudson]

Hobo. Can you quote an authoritive source on this 80 knot thingy for Boeing? I find it a bit difficult to accept that Boeing would nominate a 80 knot call purely based on a 1943 vintage aircraft. My bet is that someone has heard this from someone in the industry and it gets passed down through history until it becomes "fact". Blacksheeps point about 60 knots being the lowest ASI reading before the needle comes off the stops sounds a more valid point of view.

In large tailwheel bombers - and I flew Lincolns - a slight forward pressure was kept on the wheel until the tail gradually came up. It was never done at any specific speed. One thing though about the Airbus 100 knot check and that is it sure removes any decision making about going or aborting if an ASI discrepancy is discovered at that point. It is go man - go!

[Dan Winterland]

I can believe it. Have you seen the shape of the 747's main flight deck windows. They're the same shape as the B17s!

[Hudson]

Dan. And the tyres on both types are made out of the same stuff called rubber, too! Eerie coincidence, n'est pas?