Abandoning a S/E Procedure

[LOKE]

When can pilots legally/safely abandon a S/E procedure? I realize that pilots cannot accept vectors from a controller – at least initially – when performing a Special S/E procedure. The question is – when can a pilot accept a vector (and altitude assignment) from a controller? At Oakland California we have a S/E Procedure which involves a left turn back to the VOR, located at the field, to enter a specified holding pattern. The Obstacle which is being avoided is the Bay Bridge about 5 miles beyond the runway, so it is well behind the A/C by the time you are 180º and basically pointing downwind for the runway. Could you then accept a vector for an approach to the departure runway – you would be flying over the Bay and there are no obstacle involved.

I understand that the controller doesn’t have the performance information to vector an A/C over future obstacles – while still not clear of them – but I assume that, once an A/C has reached the Minimum Vectoring Altitude for an area, the S/E procedure could be abandoned. Is there any rules or guidelines for this?

Thanks for any info,

LK

[LEM]

I don't undestand what you mean for Special S/E procedure.
What type?
BTW, you are in command of your aircraft, especially in an emergency, not ATC, so it's up to you.

[john_tullamarine]

Two suggestions

(a) put in a suggestion that your performance people liaise with ATC to develop a more compatible procedure

(b) stick with the published procedure until that point where the procedure indicates that it may be varied

[LOKE]

John:

Thanks for the reply. Just to get it straight - these procedures are created by first looking at the performance factors - gradients & obstacles - then they are run by ATC to insure that they don't interfer with traffic conflicts - making sure they don't run through any adjacent traffic patterns, etc. ?

This may sound elementary - but because the Take Off phase of flight only goes to 1500' AGL - would these procedures only pertain until the A/C has reached that altitude.

Thanks for your continuing informative reply's


LK

[john_tullamarine]

Loke,

Can't speak for other engineers, generally, but

(a) a particular runway may, or may not, have a variety of sensible departures for the OEI case.

(b) the performance (wo)man's task is to find the one with the best weight (payload).

(c) one would normally expect an appropriate level of flight standards input but this certainly doesn't always occur.

(d) if the terminal airspace is busy it makes sense to gain some acceptance from the ATC people but this very often is ignored.

In any case, for most jurisdictions, ATC will accept an emergency call and do their controlling bit to keep other aircraft out of the way .. but it makes life easier if ATC at least knows what a particular operator's type/escape procedure is .. often forgotten by the procedure designer

(e) although many operators only look at the V1 failure case and leave the pilot to his/her own devices for other cases, a prudent procedure designer will cover failure at any point and climb to a level which gives nett clearance above the highest point .. 1500 ft is the nominal certification case but doesn't have much relevance to the real world if the particular runway environs require the aircraft to be driven to whatever higher level is necessary to clear critical obstacles. Again this doesn't happen with some operators.

The sensible pilot (particularly if you have an effective union representation) will make sure that he/she knows the operator's philosophy and approach to the procedure design activity.

Regretably all too often what I might see as being appropriate is not congruent with what some engineers might do ....

[Sick Squid]

Worth bearing in mind is also that many ATS units (talking Europe here, can't comment on US) are unaware of any particular single-engine procedures, known in my company as "Emergency Turns." Many of these are company-specific as well. Therefore, they may be very surprised to see you turn off the SID, despite a failire. I always include a discussion of what we would say in the very brief call to ATC should we have to fly an Emergency Turn, given the above considerations.

Also, it's worth discriminating between SID tracks which are there for noise only, as well. Certain flat terrain arifields with complex departure turns for noise would find those turns being ignored in the event of a high-weight engine failure, were I in the seat. All with a call of course, albeit brief and to the point.

Squid

[LOKE]

I am surprised that pilots would be allowed to disregard a S/E Procedure in Day/VMC. I know of one company which allows a S/E Procedure in Day/VFR conditions only – but there is a specific procedure. I think most pilots would have difficulty estimating there performance S/E when viewing an obstacle in the distance – even if they knew what the restrictive obstacle was – which is usually not indicated in the procedure.

It’s my understanding that in the average twin – you climb is less than 150’ per mile. Many procedures provide an escape route where the critical obstacle may be miles from the field and located opposite the direction of take off. I think I’d stick to the procedure – VFR or not.

John – thank you for you information.

LK

[john_tullamarine]

I think I would concur with Loke's comments .. a pilot in the hot seat is not able to make an assessment of gradient (other than by reference to VSI) and, once you turn away from the scheduled escape procedure .. you are ON YOUR OWN ... with a commercial payload and critical conditions .. the distance to climb the net path to a nominal 1500 ft can be a long way .. especially on a twin jet (due to large speed delta associated with flap retraction and low WAT requirements anyway)

[NigelOnDraft]

j_t / LOKE

Whilst in specific circs you are right, as a generalisation I disagree.

2 cases:
1. EDI 24. Emergy turn is R back to the 24 FAF NDB + hold.... Well, you'll firstly be well popular holding at the FAF for the runway in use. Secondly, if you head ~070, you won't hit anything until Norway. I think I can judge the climb gradient needed to avoid sea...
2. BCN 20. Emergy Turn (while you're heading out over the Med) is immediate right turn to an NDB in some hills. Again, thanks, but no thanks, I'll stick to flying over the (flat) blue stuff.

Emergy Turns are a set of procedures that will keep you safe in all weathers, and from a minimum set of choices. However, in good vis, and depending on the exact circs, following them blindly not only strikes me as unnecessary, but potentially poor A'Ship as well....

NoD

(Both the above procedures are of course type/airline specific)

[FlareArmed]

My previous company had a policy that the S/E procedure had to be followed until 3rd segment height at all times. From that point the procedure depended on the visibility.

In IMC the full procedure had to be followed until safety height or if ATC radar was available, the minimum vector altitude.

In VMC, the Captain had the option of tracking as desired as long as terrain clearance was assured. In practice, a visual circuit and landing would be performed.

Typically, if it was a VMC day, the brief would be something like, "track runway heading to 2 dme then turn left heading 260. Once we've reached acceleration altitude, we'll knock it off and return for a visual approach."

[LOKE]

NigelOnDraft:

Actually that was precisely my original point – that there seemed to be S/E Procedures which didn’t seem very realistic – especially at the end - though I’m sure they accomplished the job of avoiding terrain during S/E operations. On the other hand a simple statement that it’s an emergency and the pilot can do what they want, could lead to unintended consequences, especially when more complex S/E Procedures are involved.

I like FlareArmed’s common sense guidance which are procedure at his previous airline. Also john_tullamarine’s always wise counsel to ensure that reasonable S/E procedures are produced to avoid some of the issues that are brought up by NigelOnDraft.

I stick to my statements that it’s difficult for a pilot to evaluate whether a plane will clear an obstacle when they are in S/E operations – even in VFR day. This doesn’t even take into account the obstacle that he is not looking at, which may be miles away – and is really the critical obstacle.

LK

[LEM]

As Nigel has stated, some escape routes are totally absurd and ridicolous.
If I'm taking off toward the sea, like in the LEBL 20 example, I certainly won't head back toward the mountains or incoming traffic.
"Runway heading 3000ft, hold wherever we like over the sea".
End of the briefing.
These escape routes are often defined by wannabees pilots who'd better stay in a university classroom instead of a cockpit.:8

[wellthis]

Well this clearly involves some airmanship and opinions may vary somewhat, and this is simply one of many:

On DEP: the emergency turns in rwy analysis are usually for obstacle avoidance and they must be briefed with every departure and followed in IMC. Turns mandated by noise abatement and other 'cosmatic' factors are void and null with emergency declaration. The general practice is to first fly the airplane, do recall items, clean up, reduce thrust to MCT, trim, then call ATC let alone accepting turns. If contacted by ATC in the meantime, decalre emergency and say you'll call back.

Normally they don't give vectors before positive control and 1000' AGL. But if there is emergency turn, you have to include it in your procedure, all the more reason to spend the shortest time on the radio. Once all established, normally ATC helps out by giving vectors for a landing or to your TO alternate as the case may be. If possible, it is probably better to take longer legs on vectors, DME hold, turns on the good engine,... as to opposed to normal tight hold.

On GA however, it is different and one HAS to follow the procedure to avoid obstacles or worse yet collision, unless of course you have time to ask for rwy heading 3000', which is always the best for ENG out TO and GAs.

As for the original question, A ONE ENG INOP procedure ends when the airplane is safely on the ground and PAX/CREW are either evacuated or deplaned!

[autoflight]

This is a very interesting & complex subject. In my experience, these emergency turns are usually company specific, and mostly need to be followed at any time there is an engine failure. Day night VMC IMC irrelevant unless specified. The real problem is that ATC are not aware of the particular procedure for each airline and aircraft type.
When the crew is busy aviating and navigating, there might not be too much capacity to inform ATC of needed deviation from clearance. What if the frequency is in use just when you have the chance to make the call? Then what if there is conflicting traffic and you are told to maintain a heading or continue as cleared? Or "are you declaring an emergency?" "how many POB?" "what is your endurance?" "confirm you require to turn left onto heading xxx?" All this just as you're performing near max capacity to get everything else, including communication, done correctly.
I cannot believe we should need to inform ATC of our intentions in the event of an engine failure at every airfield where there is such a procedure. Try this at some foreign airfields and you'll have take-off clearance cancelled or delayed. Probably won't make that slot time. Too many times and you won't have a job.
We cannot ignore the fact that ATC should know in advance of the possibilities. The main point really raised by this post should be how we ensure they do know each single engine procedure for all companies and each of their aircraft types The difficulties don't stop there. If your particular procedure is day night VMC IMC specific, does everyone know which procedure? What if ATC think its night VMC and crew decide its still daylight, but IMC?
A situation I have faced is very out of date emergency turn procedure to a non existant navaid. Even if I do this, its harder to communicate my intention.
At another airfield, very soon after take-off an emergency turn was required over a close spaced parallel runway with exactly simultaneous military traffic on another frequency. The North Asian military controller had a very slippery grip of English, the military thought they were King and the local F/O doesn't want to make waves, no matter how well briefed. How is a controller going to make some traffic space when these guys have actually previously done a barrel roll around my A321 at 500ft just as I became visual on ILS final? If the aircraft is heavy, hot day and tailwind we will hit a hill by not turning. Just hope the military jet will break left to avoid a collision.
My life was greatly simplified by refusing to operate to that particular airfield and then retirement from aviation.
Those of you that have a long way yet to go, and who really care about such matters, have my sympathy. Try to solve this problem somehow.

[7p3i7lot]

LEM:
These escape routes are often defined by wannabees pilots who'd better stay in a university classroom instead of a cockpit.

Here Here! By the looks of some of these "procedures" they have no doubt ignored all ATC/Traffic considerations. They use the single (simple?) minded goal to get the company more liftoff weight. End of story.
Fly Safer

[autoflight]

Sorry! Back to the original question.
The approved procedure is discontinued when it has been fully completed. If crew decide on safety grounds to discontinue the procedure, that does not seem too unreasonable to me. If the procedure is discontinued for other reasons, the crew may have some difficulty later defending such a decision.
If the procedure specified after a certain point that the remainer was for separation or airspace requirements, I believe following a reasonable ATC instruction would then be acceptable but not otherwise. What is "reasonable"? Depend on circumstances. If you are very familiar with the area and procedures, you are using first language of yourself and controller and radar environment with transponder altitude capability, reasonable is easier to define. Take away some of these more agreeable circumstances and deviation is more difficult to justify. Unfortunately complience is also more difficult.

[LOKE]

This is an interesting topic – hate to see it die without generating more inputs.

Do any Operators provide a specific S/E Procedure from a runway to a weight – then if the weight is exceeded, provide a different procedure?

Do any Operators provide a S/E Procedure with optional procedures within that procedure – that is either go to X Intersection and hold, or if above an altitude (or some other criteria) accept vectors?

I think most here have implied that they would not accept vectors from ATC if there was any doubt as to whether it was based on anticipated performance of the A/C, by ATC – that is in the direction of obstacles not yet cleared. On the other hand – many have pointed out the absurdity of going to a holding pattern when you should be heading downwind for a landing – or worse yet driving into a bee’s nest of traffic when a safer course is evident.

The issue of whether ATC does know – or should know about these procedures - is another interesting question.

LK

[Dehavillanddriver]

Interesting topic.

the day VMC question is always a hot topic, and in my opinion visually avoiding terrain simply means that you see the hill as you run into it!

35 (or 50) ft isn't much, adding gross to net margins doesn't add much really, and in most cases if you depart RTOW (obstacle) limited and have a failure you will get GPWS etc blaring in your ear.

Saying that you can determine visually that you can miss that hill over there is unrealistic in many cases, and simply gives the pilots a false sense of security.

Another interesting topic is airmanship.

many are quick to accuse others of lacking airmanship, but to date I have yet to see the definitive manual on airmanship.

What is one persons definition is different to another.

Food for thought!

[Welded Wings]

Loke
Do any Operators provide a specific S/E Procedure from a runway to a weight – then if the weight is exceeded, provide a different procedure?
At airports which require extra zoom, we have different takeoff charts for normal t/o at light weights and asterik charts whciha require a special S/E procedure - difference of maybe 3 tonnes paylaod, and different clean up heights.

[john_tullamarine]

Couple of points.

(a) the net to gross margin doesn't give you much fat to play with near the departure end of the runway (depends on which case is limiting and how limiting the runway is) but provides a significant margin by the time you get to the fourth segment particularly.

(b) no reason why you can't have several procedures for one runway based on whatever criteria a particular operator considers important or appropriate .. only depends on how much work the operator wants to pay for.

[Iron City]

The original post that started the thread by LOKE talked to a S/E procedure for Oakland CA that turned the A/C back to the airport navaid to avoid the Bay Bridge. I'm thinking that a part of that procedure may be designed to avoid traffic from SFO, NAS Alameda, San Jose, NAS Moffit Field and goodness knows where else as well as terrain and very changable local wx.

A particular consideration in this case should be the communication with ATC. Presume this qualifies as an emergency, so the short radio call and executing the procedure that gets you out of the immediate danger and keeps fairly clear of other traffic seems to be the best course.

[autoflight]

This subject gets the attention it deserves by just a few. Airlines and aviation authorities are not amongst them.

[LEM]

Both are only interested in cover my a*s policy.

[autoflight]

Which airlines make the effort to ensure air traffic controllers are aware of their particular S/E procedures?

[john_tullamarine]

The sensible ones which pay more than lip service to risk assessment and mitigation.

For procedures which generally accord with normal traffic patterns, SIDs, etc., there is probably no need to worry too much about ATC advice .. although .. those good folk might presume a much greater climb gradient AEO and factor that into traffic conflict planning .. and then along comes Bloggs OEI at, say, 3 percent or so ....

If there is likely to be a surprise factor for ATC, then it is pretty silly not to have them on the distribution list for the procedure. This might not cover all bases but goes some of the way.

For odd-ball procedures where the potential surprise factor is high, then I opt for the "give ATC a briefing on the procedure" in association with distribution. I have to say that I have never had any responses other than interested and appreciative from ATC offices for such an approach.

There is a resources (labour and cost) overhead involved, of course...

[mutt]

J_T, we have tried having that discussion with various ATC units, none of them wanted a procedure that wasn’t approved by their own authorities. We have spent over one year trying the get the Iranians to change the MAP gradient for a specific airport, they have redesigned it, flight tested it and for the last 6 months have waited for the signatures . Our OEI procedure for that airport doesn’t comply with their ICAO standards, there is no way that they are going to accept the procedure and there is no way that we can accept the SID departure. :)

Mutt.

[Old Smokey]

One of my primary tasks in performance engineering is the design of Specific Runway Procedures for OEI operations, call them escape routes if you will, they go by many names. A vitally important follow-up of this procedure design is the advice to pilots, through operational policy stated in the Operations Manuals, of how they are to be executed, and when circumstances may permit 'breaking off' as posed in the original post. And YES, for each one I have designed and implemented, I have personally visited the relevant ATC unit to advise of our requirements in the event of engine failure. They have been very receptive to this, I have not had to deal with the Iranians Mutt.

Before any discussion on appropriate circumstances to break off from an OEI procedure, it is appropriate to briefly detail the considerations that I make in creating a procedure.

(1) The procedure must be such that the maximum possible weight for takeoff may be obtained after considering all obstacles UNTIL SUCH TIME as the aircraft reaches an area where normal (PANS-OPS) obstacle clearance exists. This is usually the MSA.

(2) Even though 3rd segment altitude will almost always be below MSA, obstacle clearance must be assured AT the 3rd segment altitude for the remainder of the procedure, thus avoiding obstacle assessment during the 4th segment. This will require tracking procedures, normally directed to a holding pattern, where further climb to MSA may take place. (The holding pattern may not be a published one, but one created to meet FAR25 requirements for the continued climb). The published procedure MUST continue until MSA is achieved, the pilot does not have the facility to assess obstacles.

(3) The entire procedure will be contained within the MSA coverage, normally 25 nm, and within the control zone of the departure airport.

(4) All procedures must avoid areas of known high traffic density, such as secondary airports, VFR operations areas, and the approach and departure paths from the originating airport.

(5) Where a SID requires a turn BEFORE a turning point specified in the OEI Specific Procedure, a second RTOW is created for OEI compliance with the SID. If the Actual TOW exceeds this 'SID compliant' weight, ATC must be advised and the alternative procedure used.

These are the basics of the criteria that I use, in my opinion any performance engineer providing a lesser degree of protection IS SIMPLY NOT DOING THEIR JOB.

All engine failures do not occur at night and/or in IMC, and in the Operations Manual write-up, the following is specified as acceptable circumstances for the pilot to 'break-off' from a Specific Runway Procedure -

(1) The procedure may not be terminated under any circumstances before Acceleration Altitude is reached, the aircraft is in the en-route configuration, and thrust reduced to Maximum Continuous, and either

(2) In VMC conditions by DAY, normal obstacle clearance to comply with the VFR rules is assured, or

(3) At night or in IMC, the aircraft has achieved sufficient altitude and within the required tracking tolerances to comply with a published Holding or Instrument Approach procedure, or

(4) At night or in IMC, the aircraft is at such an altitude to comply with the ATC Radar Safe Altitude and is receiving Radar vectors.

A bit lengthy, I'm sorry, but I sleep easier at night knowing that the crews using my procedures have full obstacle assurance all of the way to where they can resume normal operations with PANS-OPS protection, and have a clearly defined flight path offering the best foreseeable traffic avoidance.

A final word to pilots using visual obstacle assessment, it's not usually the obvious big obstacles that are 'gonna getcha', it's the little subtle ones.

Old Smokey

[LEM]

One of the funniest escape routes I've seen was for RWY35L in LIMC: instead of turning left as per Sid, it called for a RIGHT turn crossing the missed approach of 35R!

In the name of a higher payload. :yuk:

[fireflybob]

Emergency Turns are so called because that's what you are going to do in event of an engine failure (which I would call an emergency!) in order to ensure compliance with performance requirements.

They are usually promulgated by the company when the straight climb out would make the RTOW too limiting.

In all the companies (UK) that I have flown for all our emergency turn procedures at specific airports were pre notified to ATC by the Nav Dept. Whether a specific controller on the day is aware of the company emergency turn is another matter!

[DFC]

I would like to pick up on the points made by Nigel and LEM stating that they sit down and plan in advance to ignore the OEI procedure and simply fly the aircraft out to sea because they considder flying to a point over land to be a silly idea in the circumstances.

Could it be that the person who approved the procedure in the ops manual (Chief Pilot?) believes that when a twin has an engine failure and becomes a single engine aircraft, taking a public transport flight in a (now) single engine aircraft well out to sea would not be ideal if the aircraft could acheive obstacle clearance over land?

Just a thought.

Regards,

DFC

PS - What's the rush to ditch the procedure? Isn't the idea that in an emergency we don't rush things unnecessarily?

[autoflight]

LEM, circumstances like you describe are not too uncommon. It is unlikely that all operators to such an airport would brief ATC on their s/e procedure. One day there will be a mid-air & the **** will hit the fan world-wide, as airlines & ATC try to profess their ignorance of the risk and blame it on the crews. Its not so serious at a purely domestic airport with just a couple of good airline operators. Make it international with lots of airlines, throw in a few african freighters, fatigue, weather, english as a 3rd language, cultural difficulties etc and the risk is higher. There are a lot of controllers, pilots and aviation authorities with their heads in the sand.

[OzExpat]

I'd like to add my "tuppence worth" to the post by DFC. Heading out over water, while it is a very tempting idea, would require the pilot to assess the risk associated with the existence of a super tanker, aircraft carrier, or any similarly tall vessel, crossing the extended centreline of the runway at the critical moment.

How high will the aircraft be at that point?
How tall is the ship?
Where, exactly, is the first point where the risk exists?

And then, of course, is there any possibility of the existence of an amphibious aircraft operation at the critical time?

Of course, as DFC suggests, even without such a problem, how high is the aircraft going to be in the first couple of miles? How much time will there be to go thru a ditching drill and get the pax ready for that?

These might be some of the reasons why an emergency procedure avoids going over water for anything but the shortest possible time.

As for the reference made by autoflight that "There are a lot of controllers, pilots and aviation authorities with their heads in the sand." I think it needs to be said that there is no clear way for ATC or regulators to predict the climb performance of any particular aeroplane in any given emergency situation. If pilots actually want these emergency procedures to be standardised, it will undoubtedly have to be taken up with ICAO (for Pans Ops) and the FAA (for TERPS).

And, even if you can get those two to actually agree on a standard forumula, it is likely to cater for the worst case scenario only. And that will undoubtedly result in a heavily reduced payload for most aircraft. This whole argument can go around and round and I can't say that I have any suggestions on ways to improve the situation - I'm sure that I'd be a millionaire if I could do that.

[autoflight]

Plan A: There will be many runways where the escape route is obvious and can be selected as standard. Operators wishing to substantially comply with the standards set for each such runway will not be unduly penalised by following them if required. The airways clearance would automatically include a contingency for the standard s/e procedure. Operators will normally go for the standard, rather than have their flights delayed by a special contingency clearance .
PLAN B: If an operator wants to squeeze in the last kilogram of payload / fuel on a regular basis, and devises a s/e procedure that is better able to do this, it could be annotated on the flight plan. If this case, the departure clearance will include a provision for that.
For runways where the escape route is not so obvious and operators choose different s/e routes, see Plan B.

[FullWings]

Good discussion.

Something that occasionally passes through my mind is the S/E G/A. You have taken off, had your engine failure, followed the ET, climbed to MSA, etc. then returned to the airfield, unfortunately becoming unable to land at the last minute (maybe using a different runway to the one you took off on).

I understand (and I stand to be corrected) that most performance calculations only give obstacle clearance out to 1,500' AAL, clean and after that you are on your own. Given that SID profiles are normally quite different to missed aproaches, should consideration be given to flying a departure instead of a G/A?

If you end up landing (or attempting to land) on another runway, you may be unable to make the gradient required on the appropriate SID but also be 'in the poo' if following the standard G/A...

Maybe the answer is something close to a missed 'circling' approach, involving manoevring to get on an appropriate departure, although terrain at some airfields may negate this.

Anyone got any particular thoughts? :confused:

[autoflight]

I always briefed for terrain clearance following GA. If required, minimum clean speed & T/O power to the time limit. I agree that not enough consideration is given to the gap between 1500ft and safe altitude. If the authorities and the airlines don't do it, it is up to each captain to do so.

[Old Smokey]

It is a good discussion.

I find it very disturbing to read here and there of pilots who want to 'reinvent' the OEI procedures, break off and head out to sea, or attempt to follow the SID. How well did the proponents of such ideas survey the new field of obstacles in doing so ?

Obstacles are assessed very accurately for OEI Special Procedures, and the optimum path chosen. They have to be, margins of obstacle clearance to comply with FAR25 (or it's equivalent) are EXTREMELY small, and small obstacles that wouldn't cause a moment of consideration for crews familiar with a particular airport during normal operations can become critical.

Consider a 100 foot radio mast at 1 nautical mile from the departure end of a 3000 M runway. At the line-up point, can you accurately assess this mast at a distance of 4.8 Km, a mere 1/3 of a degree above the horizontal to the pilot's eye position ? Well, it's a critical obstacle for a 2 engined aircraft at performance limiting weights. So too is a 6 foot man at 1000 feet from the runway end. Now put these same 'indiscernable' obstacles in the 'reinvented' OEI route for those who want to take another route and see the outcome. As I said in an earlier post -"it's not usually the obvious big obstacles that are 'gonna getcha', it's the little subtle ones".

I see cynical remarks in these posts regarding procedures to squeeze the last possible Kilo of payload. Do these same cynics realise that if the performance engineer has chosen a route that obtains those last few kilos of payload, that this must imply that that is the path with the LEAST obstacles, and is therefore the SAFEST. This is one of those rare cases where if you choose the SAFEST option in terms of terrain clearance, then it is also the most commercially viable. A rare marriage.

DFC, you made the statement -"Could it be that the person who approved the procedure in the ops manual (Chief Pilot?)...etc", The procedures are created by performance engineers poring over incredibly large scale survey charts, municipal maps, etc...stuff that is not available amongst normal aeronautical charts etc. These fall far far short of adequacy to evaluate safe routes for OEI procedures. It is a full time job for P/Es and their staff.

It is acknowledged that there are some lousy procedures "out there", but properly designed procedures get you all the way up to MSA, and DO consider high density traffic areas etc., including the shipping alluded to by OzExpat. Do the OEI reinventers consult the shipping authorities to ascertain the largest vessels able to use over-water areas envisaged ? I do. Again, the 'lousy' procedures stick you with one single procedure, often incompatible with the SID. A good service provider will supply OEI data to comply with the SID (usually much more restrictive), in addition to the optimum data over an optimised route, which, if required for your actual Takeoff Weight, must be advised to ATC.

OEI procedures are created by, and provided by the operator (or the operator's sub-contractor). There is a good case to canvass, at ICAO level, for standard, optimised, OEI escape routes for all runways. Until that time, it is an issue that pilots must take up with their management, or their performance engineering departments.

Until that time, for God's sake, for your sake, for your passenger's sake, follow the OEI published procedure.

Please.....I might be one of your passengers.

Old Smokey

[fireflybob]

Old Smokey, absolutely - well said!

[mutt]

I never cease to be amazed at the number of crew who believe that they are protected for obstacles when they fly a SID with an engine out. :)

A good service provider will supply OEI data to comply with the SID (usually much more restrictive) Not always true, we have particular airports where we know the required takeoff weight, its not achievable on any of the SID tracks. Therefore the OEI is unique.

The procedures are created by performance engineers poring over incredibly large scale survey charts, municipal maps, etc...stuff that is not available amongst normal aeronautical charts etc. I would love to say that this is always true:(

I would love to see ICAO level, for standard, optimised, OEI escape routes for all runways. It would make life so much easier and safer.

Mutt.

[Old Smokey]

Mutt,

My quote - "A good service provider will supply OEI data to comply with the SID (usually much more restrictive)"

Your quote - "Not always true, we have particular airports where we know the required takeoff weight, its not achievable on any of the SID tracks."

To qualify this, SECONDARY data is made available for those SIDs which can accomodate 'reasonable' weights. Certainly not all of them. PRIMARY data is always available via the OEI route, invariably different to the SID.

Regards,

Smokey

[john_tullamarine]

Re obstacles and obstacle profiles .. it depends ...

(a) if an obstacle clear gradient is declared by inclino survey, then that's fine ... you just lose some payload (usually) but it is quick and dirty to calculate and fly the straight flight path.

(b) pity that some in (a) are done by working back from the topo or Type A .. defeats any cost and utility value of inclino surveys.

(c) Type A is fine .. but, for a jet twin, especially with a big V2 to fourth segment climb speed split ... usually doesn't go anywhere near far enough .. does 40-50 nm takeoff path cause any concern in some cases ... ?

(d) generally, the ops engineers are on their own .. on quite a few occasions, either we throw a theodolite over the shoulder to go and do some rough field work, and/or commission a surveyor to do the work for critical obstacles if they are sufficiently critical ...

(e) lots of useful data around but, at the end of the day .. muddy boots and a 4WD sort out a lot of critical problems ..

Fortunately, for most departures, the topo etc., data can be used to identify critical bits outside/beyond the Type A or equivalent. One needs to keep in mind that, in the event of an early turn taking the aircraft out of the Type A splay ... the ops engineer is back to basics.

And, at the expense of repeating what my colleagues keep saying .. the guy in the sharp end can't estimate the delta between climb needed and climb available .... a bit late in the last 20-30 seconds to realise that that is the case ...

[autoflight]

It seems that there is a hell of a lot of work to be done in this area.

[Old Smokey]

You're right autoflight, there is a helluva lot of work on a day to day, runway by runway basis to develop these OEI routes. The crazy thing is that the same thing is being replicated at every airline's offices all over the world (most come up with the same or very similar answers). There will be a helluva lot more work to convince the ICAO states to produce standard, optimised, OEI escape routes for all runways. It would add immeauserably to safety, not only in the performance area, but in the other areas of concern regarding conflicting traffic, airspace etc. Australia has made a good start in providing, in the aeronautical documents forum, obstacle-clear gradients for all runways at all licenced aerodromes, a good and well established start, but a long way to go.

I'm going to buy my pair of sandals, grow a beard, and burn my wife's bra and an ICAO flag on the steps of ICAO headquarters until I get my way. Well, I can dream can't I?

[DFC]

When delaing with the posibility of having to complete a missed approach after a return from a OEI departure, a number of factors need to be considdered;

1. The OEI procedure often works on the worst case scenario........engine failure on the surface, last second airbourne and making the screen height and no more. I don't think that even with a CAT3 missed approach (from the surface in the touchdown zone) would be quite as critical..........even if the weight was the same as departure i.e. no fuel dump.

2. The minima selected for the procedure I believe should (if necessary) allow for the reduced climb performance during the missed approach and if necessary, the minima increased...........this should be in the ops manual. The standard missed approach requires a minimum of 2.5% climb which is 152ft per nm.

---------

Old Smokey,

Yes I am aware that in most cases the OEI procedure is done following a detailed survey by qualified people. However, I am amazed by the statements here that some companies will try to make some quick home-made procedure for such a critical situation while at the same time never dream of constructing an approach procedure unless they had qualified procedure designers and a complete survey.

My comments regarding the chief pilot were designed to counter the argument made that the people who put the procedure in place don't know what they are doing - No matter how qualified (or not) the designer, it is the Chief Pilot who approves the inclusion of the procedure in the Ops Manual........and of course the National Authority (inspector) also get a copy.

Regards,

DFC

[john_tullamarine]

I don't think that I would be pendantic about missed approach flight paths being able to be overlaid on the departure OEI flight path.

Like many things in this game .. it all depends .. especially if one throws in a failure during the early missed approach.

Consider that the approach may be at, say, full flap and an approach speed appropriate to that flap deflection. If the takeoff is based on a small flap deflection, then the clean up distance OEI will be significant and the achievable gradient OEI will be not very much ... could put the aircraft in an unenviable position. This is why the more thoughtful airlines look at the situation analytically rather than using the finger in the wind technique ...

[Old Smokey]

DFC,

A very good post addressing some very valid concerns. In my line of work, OEI is my major concern at the Takeoff stage, but whilst adequate and safe obstacle clearance during a OEI missed approach DOES bother me, not nearly so much as in the Takeoff case. A bit of rationale is necessary -

A 2.5% Gross gradient with 100 feet obstacle clearance is provided in PANS-OPS missed approach procedures. The worst case Takeoff OEI aircraft (2 engined) requires to achieve 2.4% Gross, slightly less than the PANS-OPS 2.5%. As I've stated elsewhere, I discarded the "Approach Climb" data for the (FAR25) aircraft that I'm responsible for, and substituted 2.5% data instead. That's one way to do it, no accounting for Gross to Nett though.

The 2 major Airlines that I've worked for both recommend that MDA be increased for OEI. Yes, Cat 3 is the worst case, but even so, the screen height for the departure would occur some considerable distance before the end of TODA, thus the overshooting aircraft has a 'head start' in altitude over the aircraft taking off on the same runway. If all of the above fails, abandon the IAL missed approach and use the Takeoff OEI procedure instead. Some may raise concerns regarding lateral displacement from the RWY centreline for this latter argument, but this should clearly NOT be so for a Cat 3 missed approach.

The above holds good if the missed approach Flap setting is the same as that used for Takeoff, if greater, a whole new box of tricks is opened - Poorer climb Gradient / Longer OEI acceleration etc. I have overcome this by mandating a lesser flap setting for OEI approach (with proper certification of course), and using the normal Takeoff Flap setting as that for missed approach.

DFC, if you're amazed that some operators are using quick "home made" OEI procedures, then add me to the list, but edit the amazed to horrified. About all that can be said in their defence is that some attempt is better than none at all.

Regarding your last remark - "No matter how qualified (or not) the designer, it is the Chief Pilot who approves the inclusion of the procedure in the Ops Manual........and of course the National Authority (inspector) also get a copy" - You wish! My experience with a VERY respectable regulatory authority is that I design policy and technique, they approve it (or request amendments), examine a few samples very thoroughly, and then allow all other procedures to be produced autonomously. Of course they check one or two at random during audits. My Chief Pilot's role in all of this is to hand the CD I've prepared with the Special Procedures and RTOWs to the Publications Office to print. I'm confident in my work, but it would be nice for my developing ulcer to have a second opinion.

John_T, sorry, I think there was a bit of simultaneous posting going on. No need to edit as I think we said much the same thing.

Regards,

Smokey

[FullWings]

Old Smokey,A 2.5% Gross gradient with 100 feet obstacle clearance is provided in PANS-OPS missed approach procedures.Yes, but where does this 2.5% gradient with 100' end? As someone else put it, it's the gap between 1,500' and MSA which is the problem: could be 10,000'+ at some airports.

I know the tech. guys have checked a V1 cut up to MSA on takeoff, so I have no problems following the SID or OEI procedure. The same can not be said of the MAP - unless I have my facts wrong about the checking of same. I'm not a performance guru like you so am standing by to be educated...

[OzExpat]

A 2.5% Gross gradient with 100 feet obstacle clearance is provided in PANS-OPS missed approach procedures.
Not quite. It's actually the minimum nett climb gradient. There is no allowance for performance degradation from gross to nett, so the aeroplane has to be able to achieve at least 2.5% all the way through the missed approach.

FullWings...but where does this 2.5% gradient with 100' end?
It depends on how long the Intermediate Missed Approach segment has to be. If there's a lot of obstacles around then, yes, it might apply up to 10,000+, as you say. The Final Missed Approach segment only guarantees 164 feet of obstacle clearance, which isn't a lot more than 100 feet. In this country, however, if the obstacles have an elevation in excess of 5,000 feet, the MOC is multiplied by 1.5. If obstacle elevation is 10,000 or above, MOC is doubled.

I don't think this is done anywhere else in the world, but I could stand to be corrected.

[Old Smokey]

FullWings,

Thank you for the compliment, but a performance guru I am not.The only gurus that I know were my mentors and teachers back at Douglas and BAe, I hope to live up to their expectations.

If you're looking for some 'guruship' in the missed approach area, read up OzExpat's post, on checking his profile he is an Instrument Procedures Designer. My area of expertise is in Takeoff performance, and the OEI procedures that go with it. Naturally, ensuring safe levels of performance in the missed approach phase are also one of my responsibilities, compliant with the PANS-OPS procedures used to design them. I have a few current posts floating around with respect to increasing the standard gradients to comply with the minimum PANS-OPS 2.5%, or greater IF REQUIRED. It does concern me that Gross data is used, as opposed to degraded Gross to Nett data used for the Takeoff case. This degradation continues to much increased vertical obstacle clearances during the acceleration phase.

One of your statements concerns me, just in case you misunderstood -

I know the tech. guys have checked a V1 cut up to MSA on takeoff, so I have no problems following the SID or OEI procedure.

Maybe not everyone does this, I do all the way to MSA, and 'contain' the procedure to within the MSA coverage, but others may well cutoff at a point where the procedure enters a published holding pattern (safely), but well below the MSA. Numerous procedures I've seen from other designers take care of the initial problems, e.g. Right turn at 7.0 DME to Track 270 degrees.......and then what? Some 1st/2nd/3rd segments can take up to 40 to 50 miles - WELL beyond the MSA coverage, now we're concerned with En-route obstacles - Oh my God! One procedure that I saw (no names, but the airline began with "V") had the aircraft taking up a track of 010, to what, infinity? In doing analysis for my own operator from the same airport agreed that that was a good INITIAL route, but a 1620 foot hill lay exactly on the 010 track against an acceleration altitude of 1000 feet and during what would be his 3rd segment. So, when you say "I know the tech. guys have checked a V1 cut up to MSA on takeoff", I worry - DO CHECK the criteria by which your procedure designers have created the procedure. Your statement of "I have no problems following the SID or OEI procedure", OK, I mentioned possible limitations on the OEI procedure, but don't think for a moment that with OEI you can follow the SID. Where reasonable loads are achievable with OEI following the SID, I create secondary data for the SID as the OEI route. This is the exception, and more often than not, actual loads make the optimised OEI procedure the only option.

And finally to your question of "Yes, but where does this 2.5% gradient with 100' end?. Absolutely no guarantee that it will end at the MSA. Typically, it will take you to a Holding Pattern with it's associated Minimum Holding Altitude. This may well be well below the MSA. On the flight I operated yesterday, the Missed Approach Altitude was 3,000 feet in a Holding Pattern, meanwhile, the MSA was 5,700 feet. Safe for now, climb to MSA/MEA in the holding pattern if you have to divert, or commence another approach. At least you don't have to worry about obstacle clearance in the climb within the holding pattern, only to ensure that you have the aerodynamic performance available for the required further climb. This does have implications in Flight Planning to allow for additional fuel for diversion.

Ozexpat,

In this country, however, if the obstacles have an elevation in excess of 5,000 feet, the MOC is multiplied by 1.5. If obstacle elevation is 10,000 or above, MOC is doubled.

This was always the case in New Guinea (was Port effin Morbid the giveaway?) due to reliability of topographical information. It may well apply in other regions also, but don't forget the factor of Altimeter accuracy as vertical displacement from the QNH source increases.

Said too much already, I'm no guru.

Fly safe, and check the criteria used to create your data.

Old Smokey

[OzExpat]

This was always the case in New Guinea
I wouldn't go so far as to say "always", but it was one of the first things I implemented in PNG. That would've been back around 1986 or so. It was my response to the Pans Ops requirement to cater for "mountainous areas" in a country that is basically all mountains.

I started off by looking at what other countries were doing to meet the requirement. I checked the AIP for New Zealand, Oz, the USA, Singapore and the UK. My conclusion after all that reading was that everybody was copping out on the problem (ie taking the easiest option). I couldn't do that because it would've been much too pessimistic in PNG.

I undertook a review of TAF QNHs over a 5 year period all over the country and found that our QNHs are pretty stable in a fairly narrow range for most of the time. Yes, we get some massive differences in QNH between coastal and highlands regions, but I found that they were pretty well graduated from the low QNH in coastal regions, typically around 1010 mbs, to around 1017 mbs in the Highlands.

This work resulted in the progressive increase in MOC, as explained in my previous post, to account for progressively higher obstacles.
don't forget the factor of Altimeter accuracy as vertical displacement from the QNH source increases
I account for this as well. I adopted the Australian practice of adding a value of 100 feet for QNH accuracy. This value results from the requirement for an Area QNH to be within plus or minus 3 millibars of the local QNH for all aerodromes covered by the Area QNH.

3mbs = 90 feet, which is simply rounded up to 100 feet to make the calcuation simpler.

I apply this 100 feet to all minimum altitudes, regardless of whether it is an Area Minimum Altitude, LSALT, MSA, or a limiting altitude on an approach. It is also applied to the MDA and DA for all procedures and pilots are permitted to subtract 100 feet from the MDA or DA upon receipt of the local QNH.

Of course, in common with other countries, we also require pilots to make an appropriate adjustment for PEC.

check the criteria used to create your data
The topo charts that are available in PNG are not updated very often. In fact, all of them continue to show "Edition 1", even after an update, so I am constantly worried about that.

Thus, whenever I'm in doubt as to the accuracy of the topo data, I go out and take a look. I always do that for approach and departure procedures, right up to MSA. I will only do it for LSALT or AMA if I'm uncertain - that doesn't happen very often because, after 15 years of procedure design in PNG - and a lot of flying around the country myself - I already know most of the areas that are shown appropriately on the charts.

[autoflight]

If engine failures at V1 or on missed approach were more common, there would be an unacceptable number of aircraft accidents due to insufficient regard for extended flight path.
After 37 years of military, airline & various odd overseas airliner contracts, my opinion is that few operators or pilots pay more than lip service to worst case engine out flight path. If the pilot can hack a standard V1 cut and a quick radar circuit to a 15 NM final with a position freeze on downwind, they think they've done it! Maybe throw in a couple of no brainer emergency turn procedures. Handling skills? No contest, must meet requirements. Thinking? Just demonstrate the required procedures. We can get a satisfactory write-up and all go home and do it all again in 6 months.
Nobody ever intentionally forced me to consider the extended flight path. Even when one new destination airfield grid MORA was around 27,000ft, there was no discussion / memo / anything.
Nobody wants to rock the boat. Anyway, we can always find a combination of circumstances that contributed to the accident. How many investigators will be critical of their own employer? Who will sacrifice their promotion by pointing the finger at their own authorities or their own major airlines?
Why won't this subject be a wake-up call for the majority of aviation authorities, operators & pilots? Many hundreds of deaths can result from failure to act.
" status quo good - me like!"

[john_tullamarine]

.. which is why some of us, in sim training, throw in some curve ball exercises in spare time .. this sort of thing included. I like to sleep easier after I see the student head off to wherever.

[mutt]

Read someone’s procedure today for HKG 07L/R, straight ahead to pointX, then right turn to heading 190°………………….. If we gave that to our crews, they would be over the Philippines before they decided to turn back :):):)

Which do you prefer when a procedure calls for “straight ahead to the VOR and hold”. Do you select ALTITUDE HOLD when reaching MFRA and accelerate in the hold, or do you maintain a residual rate of climb while holding?

Mutt.

[FullWings]

Smokey & Oz,

Thanks for the replies.

It's interesting that you should single out my comment about being "happy to follow the SID or OEI procedure". I think I meant to say "happy to follow the OEI procedure, or the SID if there isn't one..."

In my company we have datalinked performance accomodating environmental conditions and any MEL/perf. restrictions. It generally produces a TOPL and then a small selection of assumed temperatures around the ATOW. It will also say things like: "No restriction if SID followed", "Engine failure turn right TRK 210 climb 3000 before return" or "EO accel. ht. 2400", etc. Maybe I'm putting too much trust in the printout but I was hoping that as it was written down somebody/thing might have checked it...

I have to say I generally brief as I said above, as I share the misgivings around pilot-invented OEI procedures. I do vary this sometimes, in places like Kingston, where the sea is at the end of the runway and our ET takes us back over the hills where the storms usually sit. I'd much rather go and dump fuel 10 miles offshore than hold inside a cu-nim on one engine. :ooh:

[Zoner]

Loke’s original question:

“When can pilots legally/safely abandon a S/E procedure? I realize that pilots cannot accept vectors from a controller – at least initially – when performing a Special S/E procedure. The question is – when can a pilot accept a vector (and altitude assignment) from a controller?”

These engine out procedures are conducted on the Captain’s Emergency Authority. This is what allows us to deviate from ATC instructions and/or departure instructions. This means you do whatever is necessary to ensure safety of flight. Once that is accomplished it is the Captain’s decision to continue the procedure or return to ATC control. If the emergency is under control and you are above the MVA why not accept vectors at that point? It all comes down to judgement.

[have another coffee]

Call me stupid, but.......

I never cease to be amazed at the number of crew who believe that they are protected for obstacles when they fly a SID with an engine out.

If there is no required climb gradient published on my SID departure chart, then where do I hit an obstacle? Where do the design criteria for SID's differ from OEI performance requirements?

And to answer the original question:

Reading my company documents, it says that; "The final segment and the takeoff flight path is complete when all obstacles have been cleared OR the aircraft has reached a minimum of 1500 feet above the airport elevation." This also defines the end of the singe engine procedure. Now I'll never know whether this end of the procedure is due to reaching 1500ft HAA OR I've cleared all obstacles flying in a direction I usually do not fly to (asuming 1500ft HAA is still below MSA).
My experience is that knowledge of airfield and surroundings are the only factor in deciding safe course of action reaching end of single engine procedure. And yes, it would be nice if the single engine procedure would end if MSA or, holding pattern with obstacle clearance assured, is reached. But reading this thread, this not industry standard......

nice thread :ok:

[dispatchdoug]

This comes straight from the Ops manual from one US-based Regional-Jet operator who operates in the Western US (ie., the Rocky Mountains)

The most important thing to remember is that the performance evaluation terminates at 3000' AFE.

The system they use creates two types of departures.

All airports will have an engine failure procedure. However, they do come in two different varieties, Standard and Special. Standard Engine Failure Procedures are designed for airports, other than those special airports where climb gradient and/or obstacles are a factor.

The general instructions for a Standard Engine Failure Procedure Takeoff Path are contained in the table below. They are very simple and allow the aircraft to attain an altitude and position where radar vectors can be provided, or to reach an MEA or approach altitude.
The Standard Engine Failure procedures for each departure will be found on the “Takeoff Report” page of the release directly under the runway length.

If the engine failure occurs at 1000 AFE or more, when in IMC, Commence turn to NAVAID or heading as listed on runway analysis page using maximum
bank angle appropriate for aircraft speed.
1. If NAVAID is listed, hold on the inbound radial using a direct entry and standard holding procedures.
2. If heading is listed, fly heading until a minimum safe altitude is attained.
Radar vectors may be accepted when available.

When in VMC:
Return to land visually or complete the IMC procedure.

If below 1000AFE when the engine fails (like in the V1 cut scenario), climb to 1000AFE and complete the IMC or VMC procedure (as appropriate). The weight report gives the heading that should be flown (whether runway heading, or a left or right turn as required).

For airports that require complex OEI departures (such as at KRNO here in the US), they create simple-special, or complex special procedures that define the procedure to be flown.

The Complex-Special Procedure is issued when an engine failure procedure is too complex to fit in the Simple-Special table and/or other considerations must be taken into account. Often, all-engine procedures are also specified in order to ensure that the aircraft will remain in the obstacle protected area until reaching a safe engine failure altitude. The minimum flap retraction altitude remains at 1,000’ AFE unless otherwise specified in the procedure.
2) A Complex-Special Procedure may be issued as a Complex-Special DP that replaces the normal DP or IFR departure procedure. An additional page may also be issued to provide important preflight guidance and restrictions.

Complex-Special
Procedures are mandatory under IMC and VMC.

[OzExpat]

have another coffee...
If there is no required climb gradient published on my SID departure chart, then where do I hit an obstacle? Where do the design criteria for SID's differ from OEI performance requirements?
If your charts are based on Pans Ops, the standard minimum nett climb gradient for a SID is 3.3%. I don't know about TERPs, but it is probably the same. There is no requirement by ICAO to show the SID climb gradient on the chart, if it doesn't exceed the standard gradient. I think that most countries have adopted this policy. So, to answer your first question, provided that your aircraft can sustain a nett climb gradient of at least 3.3%, you won't hit any obstacles if you follow the SID (and if it's been designed properly, of course).

The answer to your second question is a bit more complex and I think that I'd prefer to leave that one to Old Smokey, or John T. They have far more experience in the OEI scenarios than I do. However, what I can say is that, if your aircraft can still climb at 3.3% or better with one engine inop, you can happily and safely follow the SID.

There are 2 problems with this, however. Firstly, there are a lot of aircraft that can't achieve a 3.3% climb gradient with OEI. Second, the particular SID may require a steeper climb gradient and, if so, it will (or at least should) be highlighted on the chart. I've seen SIDs with gradients up to 4.7% and there may be some that demand even better performance than that. If you're dealing with one of those, then a 3.3% climb gradient is likely to ruin your whole day. :eek:

With those few comments, I'll pass the ball to the OEI experts!

[have another coffee]

OzExpat

So yes, you can call me stupid..... :uhoh:

3.3% is above the minimum required 2.4% climb gradient for the OEI scenario (2 engined aircraft).

I would assume that the final climb gradient (4th segment) of 1.2% should be enough to climb safely above MSA from the position I am following a single engine procedure. If that's the case, the answer on the orignal question would be a no brainer. And I think it is, as it's the responsability? of the airline to provide me with save climb-out procedures in case of single engine (JAR). I can't think of an example right now where this would not be the case as most emergency turns would lead you to area's of low terrain or in the direction of facilities which have a published holding procedure.

Food for the brain......

[mutt]

Have another coffee,

It really depends on what the airline is trying to achieve and the regulatory requirements, if that goal is to gain the highest takeoff weight, then you might have a straight out departure based upon the Type A aerodrome chart.

If you elect to ignore the straight out departure and follow the SID, then the only protection that you are offered is based on your own assessment of the aircrafts ability to meet the required climb gradient.

Old_smokey and J_T show us all how the OEI assessment should be conducted in an ideal world, however within airlines due to monetary constraints, attitudes or just a pure lack of knowledge, their ideal world doesn’t always exist.

In the FAA world, we do not assess all SIDS, we provide either a straight out departure or a specific engine failure procedure.

Mutt.

[LOKE]

ALL PERFORMANCE JUNKYS:

I just can’t stand to see this thread go to Page 2 – so I’ll start another related one. Though there is clearly some ambiguity in requirements for Take Off Performance (especially under FARs), Go-around requirements are even less specific.

I am going to start a thread entitled “Go-around performance requirements??.”

Although Takeoff Performance has a specific FAR – 121.189, which specifies requirements for 121 carriers, Go-around requirements are a bit more vague. In fact some of the guideline documents – AC 120-OBS-11 & AC 120.29A, confuse rather than clarify requirements.

See you there,

LOKE

[john_tullamarine]

.... "Old_smokey and J_T show us all how the OEI assessment should be conducted in an ideal world, however within airlines due to monetary constraints, attitudes or just a pure lack of knowledge, their ideal world doesn’t always exist."

.. except at the Inquiry ... how far one strays from the ideal is a matter for risk management and desire not to suffer legal penalty after the event ....

[Old Smokey]

This was LOKE's thread, and I'm not trying to hijack it, nor trying to have the last word. I did, however, have a fair bit to say, and feel a professional responsibility to address a few remaining contentious points. There are literally thousands of pilots 'out there', who, due to no fault of their own, have little or minimal knowledge of safe flight following OEI at the Takeoff phase. Company culture is usually the culprit, much emphasis is placed upon engine failure manipulative skills, but all too often, little placed on obstacle management (and therefore survival) for continued flight. I was fortunate, I was raised in an airline where performance knowledge was not just well disciplined, but a religion.

We have people like Mutt, whom I percieve to be striving for the best possible levels of safety consistant with economic viability. But yet, to Mutt, for whom I have the highest respect, I say that the perfect world is possible, and does exist with some operators.

I work for a major airline as a Pilot / Performance Engineer, and have several performance sub-contracts with other operators. I RIGIDLY insist with all of my 'clients' (including my primary employer), that I have sole control over Operations Manual content in all matters related to Training for OEI procedures, Actual procedures for OEI, development of Specific Runway OEI Procedures, and RTOWs. It is not enough for the P/E department to hand the Airport Analyses to Flight Operations and leave it to them to use at their own discretion.

Several comments throughout this thread still disturb me, the worst being.....If no OEI procedure is laid down, then follow the SID..... One Major Major Airline who uses a contractor to provide airport analysis, only supplies crews with OEI procedures if a deviation from 'Straight Ahead Runway Track' for the next 25 miles is required. The 'Straight Ahead' runways therefore have no laid down OEI procedure, where, in many cases a simple 1.6% climb gradient (for a 2 engined aircraft) is available to a standard company acceleration altitude. No OEI has been laid down, so..... the proponent of no OEI so follow the SID takes up the SID where 3.3% is the minimum requirement, and heaven only knows what the required acceleration altitude would be. If you're going to do this, at least get out the AFM, and calculate for a 4.1% gradient (3.3%+0.8%) all of the way up to MSA. Of course, 3.3% is the minimum, it may be more, I've seen up to 5.2%. And again, if you're going to do this where the MSA is particularly high, what are you going to do about the 5/10 minute limit on Takeoff thrust?

Another concern that lingers is that pilots DO NOT HAVE the full range of obstacle data at their disposal to evaluate the most critical obstacles, this is simply not available in the 'public' Aeronautical forum, with limited exception in Australia via the published STOD/OCG system (and then only for 15000 M straight ahead). The Terminal Area Charts and Instrument Approach Charts show a good range of the major 'big' obstacles. In 36 years of doing SERIOUS Performance Engineering work and more runway analyses than I can remember, I can recall only 2 of the TAC/IAL obstacles as being the critical obstacles. The smaller less obvious ones will get you.

If this post sounds like self aggrandisement, then I apologise, it's not so. If 99.99% of the readers think of this as my ego trip, then so be it, but if it saves 1 life, then it has been worthwhile.

In my final words I refer to John Tullamarine's post immediately preceding this one. John is one more professional along with Mutt for whom I've developed the greatest respect. John T refers to the legal repercussions following 'straying' from the ideal, I tend to think more of blood, viscera, and human body parts strewn over the point of impact, and THAT's the bottom line.

Old Smokey

[LOKE]

Regarding Old Smokey’s post about this being my thread – I simply started it and am very pleased that it has gotten the response that it has – all of you own it more than I do. I hope that no one interpreted my last post as desiring to end it.

I don’t recall whether it was this topic or another, but John Tullamarine stated something to the effect that the regulations that we live with do not guarantee absolute safety in all circumstances – simply an increase in the odds. The safest aircraft never leaves the ground but this is not conducive to a profitable commercial airline operation. John – please correct me if I’ve miss interpreted your comments.

One of the concepts that has come out of this thread, in my opinion, is that a major section of the pilot population is not as knowledgeable of the details of engine out procedures as they should be, therefore, many are making decisions based on incorrect odds.

I recall a quote from Perry Mason which seems to apply:

“Sir – you are drawing conclusions from facts not yet in evidence.”

Loke

[john_tullamarine]

At the risk of inflaming passions with the first point, there are a few underlying considerations ..

(a) a successful pilot necessarily needs to have a strong ego to do the job. A consequent risk is that of believing excessively in one's inherent knowledge base and presuming technical competence where such a presumption is not entirely justified

(b) traditional pilot training regimes don't address all sorts of things - including obstacle performance strategies (although one readily can learn all about energy climbs, manoeuvring performance, etc. etc. ... )

(c) most airlines don't train beyond the generic (and some don't bother to train anything) so the old wives' tale network sometimes runs rife with various interesting beliefs coming to the surface

(d) as one very experienced ops engineer was fond of saying, when he was still with us, "why do they hassle us so much when the end result is the same if the wing falls off ... ?" (ie why don't pilots berate the structures people as well as ops engineering). I guess that, as pilots, we are much more interested in the rocky bits we see regularly during our flight operations... perhaps we should take as active an interest in many other areas of the technical aspects ..

(e) some airlines, in my view, don't address all reasonable considerations in analysing and determining RTOW and departure paths.

... and, it is a brave pilot who heads off down the runway, hoping that nothing untoward is going to happen ... and trusting to luck and good fortune to thread his way out of danger if something does go awry.

My views are aligned with Old Smokey's ... blood and guts on the ground is the end concern .. my one foray into accident investigation left me with a distaste for burnt bodies ... but the routine significant concern is the legal impact of poor decision-making at the inquiry. More disquieting is the oft-observed tendency for the operator to abandon the pilot to his/her own defence at said inquiry. Pilots who choose not to have a healthy respect for this aspect of the real world live in fairyland ...

And, certainly, there are no guarantees ... only probabilities and risk levels. Aim is to juggle the odds as much as one reasonably can to maximise the chances of survival.

[OzExpat]

Smokey...

If you're going to do this, at least get out the AFM, and calculate for a 4.1% gradient (3.3%+0.8%) all of the way up to MSA.
Why would one want to add another 0.8% to a net climb gradient that already provides for it?

[Old Smokey]

OzExpat,

I WAS nervous about putting that one in without further explanation, and you caught me out, I should have been more specific. Yes, I concede that the SIDs already do have the Gross/Net factor built in, BUT, and it's a big BUT, simply applying AFM data to provide for a 3.3% climb gradient would not be enough because of the 1st segment. An aircraft just capable of complying with 3.3% with gear up (upon which 2nd segment is based), would fall below 3.3% in the first segment. TYPICALLY 1st Vs 2nd segment delta is about 0.8%, coincidently in line with the Gross Vs Net delta for the 2nd segment for a 2 engined aircraft. Crude - Yes!, but adding the 0.8% and taking advantage of the increased PANS-OPS clearances Vs the FAR25 clearances should come close to a reasonable compromise. Please remember the tone of my suggestion, i,e, at least if you're going to do this, then do SOMETHING about making provision for consequences of engine failure. Some 1st segments are very long, and some SIDs have their worst gradients close-in.

BTW, I sometimes use PANS-OPS data, reduce it to the actual obstacles that enforced the PANS-OPS requirements, and re-apply the FAR25 obstacle clearance criteria. A bit lazy, definately safe, and perfectly acceptable if the obstacles aren't too limiting.

Thanks for keeping me honest,

Old Smokey

[targaman]

Very interesting to see the lack harmonisation globally! No surprises here.

LAX has several completely unworkable SIDS, GA procedures and S/E procedures (S/E procedures should really be engine out procedures to cater for aircraft bigger than a twin)

Most of the unworkability stems from the floor of a VFR corridor that runs right over the airport, the traffic density at peak times and the tendency to use opposing runways in light wind conditions particularly for freight operations after midnight.

In an emergency, and a critical engine/system failure at V1 is an emergency in my book regardless of weight, the PIC has all the flexibility to do what ever he/she needs to do to maintain safe flight (Legal right).

However as we all know he/she also has the responibility to get it right (Legal responsibility under Duty of care- Negligence Law).

Generally speaking a pilot unfortunate to be in this situation (Emergency at V1) for real had better hope they are in an airspace that has civilised laws and their legal rights are protected otherwise they will find themselves in Jail for a very long time even if they got it right!

My secret to survival after over four decades of safe flying is a very large jar of vaselne that I keep in my flight bag!