BOAC, we have differing views on the training task / effectiveness.
One person’s view of a simple training task is rarely a consensus view, and even when the basics of survival have been taught, there is no guarantee that they will be recalled when required. It might also be argued that in the normal operation before an upset, it is the failure to recall and take appropriate (previously trained) action to prevent the upset which is the initiating problem.
People like a simple view of ‘the problem’; it only requires ‘a single solution’ - more training. However, loc is a complex safety scenario which has many contributing factors affecting the likelihood of an accident.
Most statistics represents a linear analysis (cause=effect) whereas a loc situation is like a chaotic system; a small change here or there results in a major event or just a near miss. Not always ‘catastrophic’ as the presenter said; thus we must look at the successes for those small issues.
Why are loc accidents now so dominant, who classified the incidents, and what were the contributing factors?
What ‘small’ changes have occurred to create this apparent increase in loc accidents?
Another aspect of human behaviour, particularly the stress and surprise of these situations, is where people revert to old (deep seated) habits from previous training or normal operation.
For example, see slide 28 in Avani’s presentation – depicting an upset on EFIS. Note the FD command bars (I hope that most aircraft inhibit these during an upset). I would maintain that many pilots would revert to ‘follow the FD’ (automation dependency) and push forward before rolling – pitch before roll (and which FD bar is pitch, and which roll?). This action would not be in agreement with most loc training.