Originally Posted by PJ2
I intend no disrespect nor rudeness here, but you are not a flight safety specialist nor are you an experienced airline pilot and are therefore not qualified to make such statements. Neither does reading government reports on the industry provide a complete picture.
First, let me thank you for your sensitivity toward me as a person who you believe might otherwise construe your comments as either disrespectful or rude. Please know that I offer my responsive comments in exactly same way – with neither disrespect nor discourtesy intended in any way. Of course you have no knowledge of my personal or professional background and I’m aware that simply my providing that information over this medium doesn’t qualify as “proof-positive” – in either direction. However, I can assure you that your assumptions are completely off base. I started my aviation experience quite some time ago, serving in both the military and the civilian world. I’ve been involved in a good share of the various parts of the aviation industry from aircraft certification involvement to airline operations to accident investigations; and, while my airline history includes flying the line, my primary involvement (and interest) has been, and continues to be, as an instructor / evaluator, including the increasingly popular role flight simulation plays in modern aviation. I will hasten to add that, as human, I sometimes get to the “preaching point” or take my position to the “absurd example” posture without a lot of effort; but I attribute that to my passion for wanting this industry to be as error free and enjoyable as it can be. While I attempt to mediate the somewhat overly emotional response all the time – there are those situations where it just … well, “slips out.”
Originally Posted by PJ2
The arguments expressed in this and other threads by those who either are flight safety specialists or airline pilots or both, recognize the complexity of these factors; these arguments do not adhere to or rely upon a mechanical model of causality and trending. Your arguments thus far "read" as typical arguments presented by accountants and managers who deal in financial concepts and priorities or by those who are organizationally a long distance from the daily operation and who haven't spent time in or had any contact with flight safety work.
I don’t, for one second, dismiss the complexities involved in airline operations – nor the extremes those complexities may achieve when discussing human nature in the cockpit – or the human nature of those who comment on those features. My comments were intended to address the attitudes of those who currently seem to be in the decision-making positions of most airlines (perhaps all airlines – but, I’ll stay away from such a broad-brush comment). I said, and I continue to say, that people who start businesses usually start them because they believe they will be able to make a living by running that business. The more entrepreneurial those persons are, the more they tend to believe that they can not only make a living, but a very
good living, by running that business. That, in general, is not a bad thing. It’s when the motive to make more money over-rides or hides the damage that is or may be done elsewhere in the company or the community that I tend to take a more objectionable view of the motives. But, as a practicing conservative, I strongly believe that governmental regulation should be kept to an absolute minimum – governed by legalities and improprieties. In other words, monopolies shouldn’t be allowed. Mistreatment of employees shouldn’t be allowed. Conscription by employers shouldn’t be allowed. Collusion and “price fixing” shouldn’t be allowed. But there should not be a governmental practice that ensures the success of any specific business. Such a practice merely ensures having policies (heaven forbid, laws) that allow steps to be taken to have the taxpayer or business customers pick up the cost of that specific business being successful when the business owners/managers can’t make of go it on their own. It is particularly reprehensible when such “bailout” measures are taken by the government that generated the reason for the “bailout” necessity in the first place.
Originally Posted by PJ2
All of these issues have been discussed at length in PPRuNe by many; they are not in doubt, but nor are they claiming that all is falling apart around us. That is not the nature of safety work. Flight safety work today is, or ought to be, preventative - we have the tools and the mandate through SMS. Such tools, training and experience reveal clear trends in the character of accidents and are expressing concerns as any early-warning system might. The nature and requirements of risk perception and management has changed dramatically just as the industry and airline piloting profession itself have changed.
I couldn’t agree more that safety is the work of preventative effort. The question then becomes “what form is that prevention to take?” That is precisely where accident investigation comes into the picture. Why did that accident happen? What could we do that would allow the prevention of such an accident occurring again? It usually comes down to the mechanics involved (which are, by the way, getting better and better – although I am somewhat concerned that we may be getting way too dependent on computer-based systems for decision making and application – but that’s another issue for another time), or the actions of the crewmembers involved, or “an act of God.” Given the probability that we’re not going to influence God’s actions, and given the fact that this discussion isn’t centered on the reliability or functioning of the aircraft systems … it comes down to the actions of the crewmembers. Did the crew know what was going on? Did the crew properly identify the circumstances? Did the crew respond properly by exercising the skills they had been taught? Were those skills themselves insufficient to adequately rectify the situation?
If the answer to
any of these questions is “no,” then there is probably an issue with the quality or quantity of the training.
If the answer to
all of these questions is “yes,” then there is probably an underlying issue that has not been recognized previously.
But, invariably, the solution is not, and cannot be, that if we had only paid the crew members a higher salary, the accident/incident would have been avoided.
Originally Posted by PJ2
Dismissing these changes with a wave-off statement like, "there have always been airplane accidents ... what indicators exist that would prompt anyone to believe that there is a precipitous decline in safety, or what would you say are the indicators or concerns that there is any decline is safety" tells me that you don't understand flight safety work and don't understand what is being said. The people who are watching this industry and who are in the cockpits daily, know. That is what this discussion is about.
Please understand, my comment was not dismissive; and I maintain that it was, and is, accurate. There
have always been airplane accidents. But, restricting ourselves to the crewmember issue … we’ve always been interested in finding out what we could do to prevent that particular situation from occurring again in the future. We train differently. We train more. We train different tasks or skills. We recognize the existence of outside influence with greater impact than previously understood (i.e., fatigue, mental distraction, etc.) and attempt to set in place restrictions to obviate their effect. We look for a better way to determine if competency is actually achieved. We look for a way to be able to rely on that competency being able to be called upon after not having practiced it for some time.
If the current methods used to train and determine competency are inadequate – we need to determine the resolution to that deficiency. More training? More frequent training? Different training? More evaluation? More frequent evaluation? Different evaluation? This is where the regulations come into effect – then the regulator must step in and set the requirements to ensure those levels are met – and met regularly, by each person going through those training and evaluation cycles.
If the persons going through airline training today are simply unable to assimilate the necessary training objectives – those persons should never be deemed qualified and allowed to operate as though they were qualified. There can be no excuse for saying that a person meets the necessary objectives when they do not. If an airline isn’t willing (or capable) of determining when a crewmember is competent to do the job he or she has been trained to accomplish – with the training and evaluation completed (both content and frequency) and is able to draw on that competency whenever necessary – it then becomes the responsibility of the regulator to correct that willingness or capability.
It simply makes no sense – to me or, in my experience, to anyone who knows human nature – for a pilot to believe that his or her salary and benefits package is so “substandard” that he or she may deliberately perform less diligently, fly more sloppily, make decisions less professionally, or take greater risks. If the persons who are hired by an airline are identified as prone to be unaware of the diligence that is essential, the meticulousness that is necessary, the professionalism that is required, or the fact that risk-taking is unwarranted and ill-advised, then the airline must be informed immediately and the airline must take appropriate action before those personality characteristics can contribute to an accident.
My opinion is that safety may be compromised by incompetent, ill-trained, poorly trained, forgetful, overly confident, fatigued, or distracted pilots; but safety is not being compromised by underpaid pilots because they are underpaid. If that were true, why is it that accidents still happen to airlines providing enviable compensation packages to their crewmembers?