B737 NG/MAX - Go Around with CWS
 

Was J/S in the cockpit the other day on one of our 737 MAX 8.

The guys got told to go around.
The Capt, PF, pressed CWS, adjusted the MCP and then CMD again. Increased speed, HDG SEL and V/S 2000fpm.

Very smooth I must say.
I always thought the guys pressed TO/GA but the Capt explained that it disconnects the autopilot on the 737.
He said he can fly without but by pressing CWS and then CMD, it puts the automatics back in.

Very strange how Boeing kicks out the autopilot when you press TOGA.

Invent your own procedure, press 10 piano keys on the MCP in quick succession, all so you avoid the dreadful following the flight directors in manual flight for a few seconds.

Silky smooth.

Is he going to put it in CWS during an engine failure aswell?

Except not always. Dual A/P approach will leave the A/P engaged once a few conditions are met.

What altitude did this go around commence? The last three airlines that I've worked for have taught that crews may elect to conduct an abandoned approach over the go around procedure where a missed approach is started from a high enough altitude. If conducted from near or below minimums, the full go around procedure is followed. As long as the airline permits the variation in procedure, I don't see a problem. In fact, it's letting us put our training to use and think like pilots again instead of the robotic thinking that some schools and airlines are attempting to create.

As a case in point, the last go around I conducted was due to stabilization criteria not being met. Rather than commanding for go around thrust at 1,000' AGL, we called "abandon approach" and pretty much did exactly what this pilot did. You're still protected in altitude by the approach, and the loss of another 150' feet while you reprogram the MCP doesn't impact flight safety when you still have 700 to 900' to go to minimums. Given we were also just over 1,000' from the missed approach altitude, I would argue that using the full go around procedure would have created more workload, not less. The go around I did before the one above (a year or so before) was an ATC instructed one from 150' AGL. In that case we followed the full procedure.

It makes me happy to see that other airlines and other pilots are still able to think and use the appropriate tools in the appropriate moment - assuming of course that the airline permits this variation in procedure. If not, then I have issues about the maintenance and adherence to SOP.

'L seat NG 20 years.In 1999 it wa shighly popular that AP DISC on a GA----less so as the years went by. Of course we were all younger then!

In CWS you are still flying manually. And hence in CWS, his hands should've been on the yoke, not on the MCP. He pretty much gave you a very false sense of safety just to look smooth.

Interesting CRM case study if you ask me.

On what other types does the AP disconnect on TOGA, and why?

My recollection of MD-80, MD-11, and MD-95 was that AP would stay engaged but it's been a while. I do remember that we demonstrated low altitude G/A with runway contact in MD-80. AP stayed engaged.

I think the technique is fine, but what it's covering up isn't.

Completely made up procedure, really good if you want to perform a G/A with the airplane still in APP mode. It's also a very good way to increase your workload and/or enter a low speed situation.

KLM by any chance?

What a clusterf*** all for the sake of looking cool

Go Around - Press TOGA - Double click the A/P disconnect to stop the noise - Ask Flap 15

Pitch to FD (You can take the autopilot now)

Positive rate - Gear up

What narcissistic personality trait does it require to want to deviate from something so straightforward, all in the name of looking slick. These types always look slick until they’re a smoking hole in the ground.

Or fly a Boeing that doesn't disconnect on pressing GA

It’s not a good idea in my opinion. Capt Slick goes very quickly to Capt Sick when the EGPWS issues a Terrain Warning because it applies different logic in TOGA mode than it does in V/S. it increases pilot workload a bit while they figure it out and then later, after landing it increases workload a lot while they explain their personal procedure to the Chief Pilot and the Regulator. It might work 1000 times at a field with no terrain but a few years later when one of Capt Slicks co-pilots is flying into an airport that is surrounded by terrain, not so good.

When did KLM start flying the 737 MAX 8?

Do you see the question mark at the end of the sentence? I have no idea about the KLM fleet mate, couldn't care less.

Oh dear, more pilots who simply can’t fly, discussing how to press buttons to cover their skills gaps. Olden, olden days: aircraft crashed because they broke down. Olden days: aircraft crashed because their pilots couldn’t navigate. Modern days: aircraft crash because their pilots can’t fly any more.

I updated your claim just to make it more "in line with" historical statistics.

Nothing indicates the guy can't fly. He just likes to show he knew, just like in the old days the big'ol captain did. Kind'a like Tenerife right? The left guy shows he knows. The right guy looks and thinks "what the...?"

As mentioned before: interesting CRM case.

You’ve made an assumption there and it’s not a very good one. The obvious inference from your statement above is that you are not one of the pilots who ‘simply can’t fly’ so I’d like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on being an excellent pilot. Well done. You are excellent. A lot of us want to be like you. You are valuable. Everything will be ok.
But keep in mind, you can be teaching people mountain flying in a Cub on Saturday and still know it’s not a good idea to carry out a a missed approach in V/S mode if there is terrain around the field on Sunday. The two things aren’t dependent on each other.
The subject is worthy of discussion, people will learn from this thread so that’s good.
I used to use V/S for go-arounds until I realised that I was teaching F/O’s that it was ‘cool’ to do that ( the results are great) but I had no control over their knowledge base and that many ( most?) would not be able to identify situations where it is not appropriate to do that.

Perhaps you haven't sim checked as many pilots as I have in recent years. The decline in manual flying skills is horrifying.

Yes, I can fly, well, smoothly, and accurately, because I was well trained many, many years ago and then always kept my skills sharp, flying raw data often in a variety of aircraft. A reason I quit was that I was told by a training manager that I shouldn’t be doing that. I wasn’t going to keep taking the salary if I couldn’t do the job and I know that you have to fly by hand often and not in only the easiest circumstances to retain that capability. He didn’t, or he did but he was too frightened to trust the crews he was signing off to let them (he was an airbus man of course).

So no, it’s not an assumption, it’s an assertion based on experience. It’s backed up too by many recent crashes and serious incidents involving pilots who simply couldn’t fly.

Not really. I actually agree that lots of pilots can’t fly well anymore but your assumption was that people posting here couldn’t fly anymore and were discussing pushing buttons.
The point I was making is that a pilot can be on this thread advocating against using modes other than TOGA and it’s not because they can’t fly as well as you or I, but because they can see that it is not wise in some circumstances.
It’s a good thread because young 737 pilots will think about the situation in more depth than they otherwise would have.
I was going to suggest that with all your checking experience you explain to the newer generation the terrain floor software logic changes that occur when TOGA is pushed but that might be unfair considering you have retired. I would do it but my understanding is not good enough to preach online, I might get something wrong and lead someone astray.
Someone reading this will be able to give an in depth description and that will make the thread even more valuable.

One of the most dangerous things you can do in an aircraft is to deprive your colleague of their in-the-moment competence or confidence. Using modes whose functioning they do not, or may not, understand, or whose precise vagaries in conditional states they do not, or may not, understand, is a great way to achieve that. I don’t really care about the complexities of those modes in the uses proposed, because a pilot who can fly doesn’t need them. I probably wouldn’t be interested in discussing them other than as an academic exercise in considering their design and fitness for purpose, it would be like making an extended study of the plumber’s wrench as a tool for screwing wood screws in - you can do it, but it’s not sensible. There used to be teaching, originating I believe in the NBAA, that in marginal situations, reversion to the next lower level of automation was well-advised, right back to raw data. That seems to have been forgotten.