Really?

I never thought about that.

I never look at the instruments, or out of the window.

Thankyou for your invaluable lesson on airmanship. I'll give it a try next time I fly.

Potentially stupid question from a non-commercial pilot, but are any of the callouts purely 'for the benefit of the tape' in the event it all goes wrong?

I've watched one cockpit video (from a Virgin 747) where during the taxi out the captain appears to simply read the FMA aloud.

Some interesting stuff here, and I identify with much of what the OP has said. I retired 12 years ago, but the cockpit that was my office for my last 14 years is still regarded as pretty much state-of-the-art. If I understand him/her correctly, an MCP is what the manufacturer of my a/c calls the FCU (the Flight Control Unit for all auto-flight selections, i.e., FD and AP).

I used to be a bit of an anorak on calls, and the standardisation of the particular ones that my fleet had chosen to adopt. They had to be compatible with the aim of cross-fleet standardisation, the other fleets all being Boeing or MD.

Reading the previous twenty-odd posts demonstrates that you are unlikely to find two pilots in a bar that are in agreement on what should be verbalised and what is unnecessary. I guess "noise" is any unnecessary and unproductive sound. To be justified, a call must at the very least be succinct, unambiguous and informative. Even then, a plethora of them can be distractingly counterproductive. But some are so important that they justify their existence as verbalising the cross-monitoring between the two pilots, and confirming understanding. It's a compromise, but whatever standard calls we decide to make must be planned and executed properly, or they are no more than a noise.

Standard calls can probably be categorised into three types: commands, responses, and verification calls. When the PF calls for (commands) "Flaps (x)" it is important that the PNF reads back the command BEFORE making the selection (s)he thinks has been commanded. That's what I mean by a response. If the response is not what the PF wanted, there needs to be time for him/her to prevent the wrong selection being made. If all is well, nothing else needs to be said, because both the pilots and the flight-warning system will monitor that the selected flap has been achieved.

This thread, however, seems to be mainly about what I have described as verification calls. Someone has pointed out that, as far as AFS selections on the MCP/FCU are concerned on a/c of the current generation, it's only the changing FMAs that need to be observed and, if necessary, verified verbally. On these a/c, all indications visible on the MCP/FCU are reflected on the FMAs of each pilot's PFD.

There may still be pilots who, while turning the appropriate knob, observe the changing parameter on the adjacent readout (where present) like they did on B757s. The trouble is that - for example - having carefully selected a new altitude and armed it, turbulence may cause you to fumble the knob as you remove your hand. So it's better to avert your gaze to your FMAs at the beginning, and observe the whole process through to its conclusion there.

This philosophy reads across to the FMA verification call, as follows.
(1) It should NEVER be made by the pilot who performed the selection. If the other pilot fails to make the call, making it yourself is valueless at best. This is not a competition, nor a box-ticking exercise. Wait for your colleague to come back into the loop. If necessary, any prompting should be on the lines of "Check your FMAs?" If his/her workload is too high, best leave it be.
(2) It should only be made AFTER the selecting pilot has removed his/her hand from the relevant MCP/FCU selector.

Chris,
Our SOP is that the PF calls the FMA change, the intention ensures that the PF communicates their actions. This I bought into. However, I'm thinking it would make more sense the way you describe.

Thread contributor Check Airman doesn't see the point of calling out expected FMA changes, which I kind of agree with, yet I still think it would be wrong to not actively recognize such changes. With your philosophy, if the PM is required to male the call, then the PF is also armed with strong cues alerting him to possible PM is overload/distraction. Works for me.

Just edited to add that PM/PF in this case is assumed with A/P engaged.

What's the value of making a call when each pilot can plainly see what's going on? If the PM has his head down dealing with something else, wouldn't the call be more of a distraction?

I get your point about keeping both pilots in the loop, but if there's something else going on, do I really need to watch every move the other pilot makes? Isn't he rated? What about CRM? He's trusted me to deal with the abnormal, and I've trusted him to fly the plane. I really don't need to be told that we've levelled off and the AT has adjusted power. If for some reason, the AT hasn't adjusted the power, I expect the PF to take care of it. That's CRM isn't it?

Furthermore, for the guys who are required to make FMA calls, how many of you have made a call in error? You made the usual/expected call, only to realize a moment later that you should have said something else, because the usual/expected FMA wasn't there?

If we started making FMA calls, I'd like this idea.

You are so right:ok:

One of my several pet hates is the common call in many airlines of "SPEED" (shouting intended..) when the airspeed is not in accordance with what ever the company tolerances are. Similarly "ALTITUDE"

A glance at the Boeing 737 FCTM reveals no mention of a standard recommended alert call for an outside airspeed or altimeter tolerance. The FCTM however does say: "The PM calls out significant deviations from command airspeed or flight path." It is then up to the operator to specify the limit of those deviations which would then attract a call from the PM.

I fail to understand the logic of the one word call of "SPEED" or "ALTITUDE". Would it not be more logical for the PM to call "SPEED LOW/HIGH?" so that an immediate corrective action is taken to rectify the speed problem?

If one airspeed indicator shows the speed as above the high published company tolerance, and at the same time the other pilot's speed shows a markedly different indication, at least a rapid glance at the standby ASI may resolve the anomaly.

Same with the call of an altimeter reading. "Altitude High" or Altitude Low" alerts the PF to a problem. But "ALTITUDE" means SFA, IMHO.

And don't you just hate it when an eager beaver sings out "SPEED" when you are a mere one or two knots above or below the published tolerance. Then keeps babbling "Speed" even though the PF is clearly taking corrective action.

Or the idiot who calls "Speed" in a triumphant tone of gotcha then innocently explains to a pissed off PF that although the speed was OK at the time of the call, the speed trend arrow indicated the PF would soon be outside the tolerance. :mad:

...and when someone engages in the reckless and dangerous practice of disconnection the autopilot (for planes where this is possible - that is) and even the Flight Directors too?

1/8 high on the glide
- checked
lowering nose and reducing thrust
- checked
- nose is confirmed coming down, N1 is confirmed as decreased 3%
Glide coming back, increasing thrust
- checked
..... :{

Silent cockpit please! Call out anomalies only.

In my company the response to e.g. "flaps XX" is to select flap XX and the call out " " (thank god). We don't have any incidents of flaps being wrongly selected. Both pilots know which gates are being used pr. SOP. No one moves the flap handle from flaps 1 to 40, because they think that is what they heard. They know the next step pr. SOP is flaps 5. If you are hard at hearing, and heard something else, that doesn't correspond with SOP... ask! What has this come to?? Might as well put robots in the cockpit (or monkeys), if people can't think or communicate.

Same here, flaps/gear are asked for and the confirmation of that call is the action, after the PM silently checked that the conditions are within limits for that command. No further callous needed. If a non-standard flap setting (2, 10, 25) is used one says so when asking for that setting.

Interesting thing about the speed call. There is no published limit in my outfit and it was trained from the first day that no call is necessary if corrective action is already taken. Interesting enough that leads to more calls "speed is checked" by the PF before any speed call was done by the PM.

Quote from cosmo kramer (my emphasis):
In my company the response to e.g. "flaps XX" is to select flap XX and the call out " " (thank god). We don't have any incidents of flaps being wrongly selected. Both pilots know which gates are being used pr. SOP. No one moves the flap handle from flaps 1 to 40, because they think that is what they heard. They know the next step pr. SOP is flaps 5.

Response from Denti (my emphasis):
Same here, flaps/gear are asked for and the confirmation of that call is the action, after the PM silently checked that the conditions are within limits for that command. No further callous needed. If a non-standard flap setting (2, 10, 25) is used one says so when asking for that setting.

Yes, I agree with the parts I've highlighted. I'm out of touch with the current generation of Boeings, but I presume that - like the Airbuses - the PF can monitor the selection and the results on EICAS/ECAM. As you say, any non-standard command for flap would (hopefully) be acknowledged as such by the PF when making the command.

BUT that's not the main problem my philosophy is addressing. When the PNF's workload is either very high or very low (perhaps mind-wandering), (s)he may interpret an unrelated command or mere comment/observation as a call for the next flap selection. In a noisey cockpit, for example, "Yeah, I'll try that too." could be misheard as "Yeah, I'll take flaps two." If the PNF responds with "Speed checked, Flaps two", there needs to be time for the PF to shout "NEGATIVE!" before the selection is made. Flap calls, of course, are not the only ones that can be misinterpreted - as in "Cheer-up!"

We are all capable of hearing what we expect or want to hear. Most of you are too young to have been airframe drivers at the time of the Staines accident in 1972, when a BEA Trident deep-stalled into a reservoir after T/O from LHR. (I was on VC10s with another airline.) The PNF who retracted the leading-edge flaps ("droops") prematurely was very new, and knew that the next thing he would hear from the dour old captain would be his command for that. The captain was having a heart attack...

"Check Airman",
CRM is not about blind confidence in the infallibility of your workmate - least of all about expecting him/her to have blind faith in yours. To err is to be human, which is the main reason we still need to have two pilots in present-day, automated airliner cockpits. Otherwise, one would suffice 99% of the time.

On the modern Boeings (737) you get an instant indication of the detent position the flap lever has been PLACED IN by the appearance of the speed on the speed tape - once the lever is in the Flap 5 detent for example the "5" speed appears on the speed tape and so on.

My company has the SOP on extension of PM only calling the Flap when the indicator shows the flaps have reached the commanded position.

My recollection of that accident is somewhat different. From what I read the captain was in a foul mood after being involved in a trade union altercation in the crew room prior to the flight.

The two minions on the flight deck were understandably frightened of his martinet personality. While climbing steeply as part of the noise abatement procedure in cloud, the new first officer inadvertently selected the droop lever to up instead of the flap lever to the called for setting.

At the low speed the aircraft was flying at during the noise abatement climb, a stall happened. I don't recall the heart attack theory or if the captain did suffer a heart attack at the crucial second.
Or whether the autopsy found he was in serious danger of a heart attack.

In any case, realising his F/O had whipped the droop lever up at low flying speed and relatively low altitude would be enough to scare anyone into a heart attack!

Below 10k feet adherence to sterile cockpit (avoiding unnecessary chatting, like the underlined above), will avoid that. Especially if hard at hearing I would advice that...

Besides, even if we did chat about which mood we are in (cheer up buddy), it doesn't change what I wrote in my previous post. Everyone is equipped with a brain and the ability to think for themselves.

If misinterpreting chatter for flaps 2, while being outside flaps 2 operational limits and then selecting flaps 2, the person in question shouldn't have been in the cockpit in the first place. More appropriate would be to use the brain and make you colleague aware that you are outside flaps 2 limits - which would then clear up the confusion (that shouldn't have been there in the first place, had sterile cockpit been adhered to). If indeed inside operational limits for flaps 2, and it is selected prior to what the PF had desired, tough luck... the he will learn only to make standard call outs during critical phases of flight.

...regarding speed, I envy you Denti :(

In my airline we have the often standard -5/+10....
It makes it especially "funny" on a gusty day, with Vref + 20 knots speed additive and a few knots below flap limit speed, especially with a new guy besides you, who as soon as the speed fluctuates to Vref + 15 starts to call out "SPEED SPEED"... :oh: