Quote from Clandestino:
"I was trying to point out discretely that you haven't read the part of AF447 report dealing with TAM incident which puts "kid gloves approach" straight into "old wives tales" category - something that has some basis in reality but through misunderstanding and misinterpretation diverges rapidly and significantly from it."

Setting aside your presumption that I hadn't read the reference to the TAM incident in the AF447 accident reports, are you suggesting that a "kid-gloves" approach would have been unsuitable in that case? Are you arguing that the extreme control inputs and attitude changes that the BEA describes were necessary and desirable to survive that UAS event? If not, just what point are you trying to make that places a "kid-gloves" recommendation into what you contemptuously describe as the "old wives' tales category"?

As a coplilot on B707s, I was on a flight where the AP went u/s before TOC out of Caracas for London at night. The captain and I took it in turns, of about 20 mins each, to handfly the a/c for about 7 hours. Fuel considerations necessitated step-climbs. It wasn't difficult, but it required unbroken concentration and - yes - a gentle touch. Our passengers didn't want (or need) to end up wearing the food that the flight attendants were serving them.

Quote from me:
"Regular hand-flying practice reinforces the understanding that in level cruise-flight, regardless of turbulence or windshear, any pitch attitude more than 2 or 3 degrees above or below the norm is unsustainable unless you want to climb or descend."
Reply from Clandestino:
"Regular use of autopilot does not absolve the pilot from obligation to check instruments. Idea that you need to handfly to know your typical flight-phase-related attitude is so unrealistic it... sorry, I can't find the phrase in English."

Never said it did. However, are you familiar with the concepts of "hands-on experience" and "human nature" ? Are you suggesting that a passenger who has never driven a car can take over suddenly and do as good a job as the driver, just because he has watched from the back seat? And in any case, are you suggesting that flight crews should and do spend hours monitoring every small change of attitude made by the AP?

Nuclear Morsels
 

J'accuse: Accusé BEA, Levez-Vous!
 

Without the original and complete DCVR, we'll not be able to fully explain this crash.
Fragmented information relayed by the BEA isn't grounded on any evidence.
In this situation it's difficult to estimate to what extent the provided details agree with the facts, especially that the BEA rejects certain hypotheses without giving reasons such as on Bonin's licence which it backtracked in its 3rd intermediate report as opposed to the 1st interemediate report.
How does it explain its change of heart?
Now, the Judicial Expert's report provides more DCVR but too many pieces are missing from the puzzle.

New ECAM Warnings:
BEA FAULT
BEA REPORT 1 + BEA REPORT 3 DISAGREE

Winnerhofer
What law firm are you associated with?
Alternately, are you just one of those guys who likes to stir things up?

I was not enlightened as to the intent of your post 948 which appears to be additional irrelevant cockpit communication that the court has released. Just the kind of thing that BEA is supposed to remove from their report.

From the Norwegian B737 near stall event this telling morsel:
Too bad the A brand hasn't seen the value of this concept.

In the case of AF447, it is pretty evident that the crew was so stressed that they had turned their ears off.

Maybe the C chord tone is too overpowering when combined with other problems? Haven't flown it, so I have no idea.

Brand A do see the value of the concept, as there is an audible "bell" warning when the trim wheel is moving on the A300/A310 types - i.e. those with a conventional approach to trim.

Approach to trim use is somewhat different on the FBW types, in the sense that the automatic trim will be operating more often than would be the case traditionally, and a mechanical aural alert every time the trim wheel moves could be an annoyance or distraction. That said, an aural alert when trim exceeds a certain value could be a useful addition.

Is it that specific? We've got plenty of examples where a stressful situation has caused crews to disregard aural, visual and tactile warnings.

In our sim experiments, the C-chord was certainly no more intrusive than STALLSTALL, but they were both certainly attention-grabbers!

ETOPS-Rated?
 

BEA fails to mention if these guys were ETOPS-rated.
Show me the ETOPS!

In what way?

I think we'd all have heard about it if they weren't! An A330 type certification pretty much implies an ETOPS certification, does it not?

ETOPS
 

Implies indeed and therin lies the nastiest of rubs.
It's a seperate rating with a specific exam ipso facto of A330 rating which is line-checked.
The TSB published the ratings of the SR111 crew with a specific reference to their respective ETOPS ratings.
The BEA hasn't come out with theirs yet....

Well yes, the MD-11 is a trijet and therefore no such inference can be derived!

Touché, Dozy!
 

Forgot those trijets...TRITOPS!

Airbus trim wheels
Movement perfectly visible .. if you check it !

Folks,

I've deleted some commentary in the last page.

Robust discussion is fine and that includes criticism.

However, savage criticism not backed up by objective, public domain citation is not fair play and will be removed.

Yes, but only visible in your peripheral vision or by turning your head.

Not so good when there are interesting things going on in front of you.

If you think about it, trim should only move as you accelerate/decelerate or change configuration.
You do not want it to make a run into one of the stops unknown and unseen.

Human Factors
 

The desired result from such warning sounds should be to alert the crew to a problem, but not to overburden the cockpit aural environment.

Instead of: STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL with crickets interspersed
perhaps
STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL ..... with crickets
would be a better choice.

Maybe the warnings should be prioritized also. The C chord altitude alert should be a lower priority than the Stall warning.

After all, you can't fix the altitude until the aircraft is under control.

Background
 

David ROBERT a réalisé au cours de ce stage le ler juillet 2007, un exercice STALL WARNING mais A l'issue de ce contrôle noté satisfaisant, son niveau professionnel ayant été jugé perfectible, David ROBERT a été convoqué à un entretien technique.

Robert underwent his STALL WARNING training but although he made it through his check, his professionalism was deemed to be improvable and was summoned for a technical interview.

Marc Dubois n'a jamais fait de stage spécifique " Commandant de Bord " ni chez Air Inter ni chez Air France
Chez Air Inter, il n'a été que co-pilote y compris sur A320.
Il est allé ensuite chez la Postale sur 737/200 et n'a été nommé CDB A320 chez AF que 29 mai 2001
Tous les CDB IT et/ou AF ont fait des stages spécifiques Commandant de Bord, indépendants de la qualif de l'avion sur lequel on va être qualifié en tant que tel.

Marc Dubois never underwent CDB (Commandant de Bord) training.
All AF & IT CDB regardless of their ratings had to undergo the CDB training.

Machinbird,

THe stall warning consists of a “STALL, STALL” aural warning, followed
by a characteristic cricket sound and the illumination of the Master Warning light. It has priority over the C-chord warning, so the C-chord is interrupted when the stall warning is active.

Once again, PPRuNe helps me understand why even DECs nowadays have to hop through "Reading comprehension" HR hoops.

Sorry; I stand corrected. Presumption was based on obvious signs you had no clue about it.

No.

No.

That talk about "oh-so-sensitive-controls-that-eat-inexperienced-pilots-for-breakfast-when-they-try-to-handfly-at-altitude" is total bollocks. If you haven't read and understood HTBJ, well there is TAM crew that has proven you can throw altn lawed A330 around and not even hurt anyone. Their actions were massively wrong but absolutely not fatal! AF447 was not downed by manual ineptitude but by sustained pitch-up input! CM2 wanted to climb and aeroplane just couldn't comply with demand because of gravity and air density.

Both. PPRuNe constantly reminds me about the second one.

I am suggesting these loaded questions just show popular prejudice of the way modern passenger aeroplanes are flown and have merely slight resemblance to reality.

Experts' Panel
 

Airbus rejected the findings of the Experts' report because one of the members was ex-AF with no Airbus experience whatsoever.
L’un d’entre eux, l’ancien pilote Alain de Valence a fait toute sa carrière chez Air France, qu’il n’a quitté qu’en 2007.
L?impartialité des experts mise en cause - Libération

Experts Report Download Link